Mr. Gilman. Do you come under his jurisdiction?

General Pinckney. No, I do not. I am within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. We have primary responsibility for policy.

Mr. Gilman. And he is in charge of procedure?

General Pinckney. Yes, of defense intelligence and intelligence procedures.

Mr. Wolff. If the gentleman would yield for just a moment. I would suggest we raise this with General Tighe and ask that if the information is not sufficient for the gentleman, that we bring this matter to the attention of General Pinckney once again.

Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Pinckney. Mr. Gilman, I will inform General Tighe of your interest, so that he will be prepared.

Mr. Gilman. Thank you.

Mr. Dornan. Mr. Chairman, just one brief question, and I do want to say now glad I am to see that Col. John Fer has joined the staff. You will be working with Captain Vohden, John?

Colonel Fer. No, sir, I am going to replace him at the tail end of June. I will be in place on my own in July.

Mr. Dornan. It seems incredible that it has been a decade since I talked to your family members when you were still a POW. Some of them were living in the Palos Verdes area?

Colonel Fer. Right.

Mr. Dornan. It is almost 10 years since they first made contact. It is amazing that this problem still goes on.

STATUS REVIEW

I want to ask Captain Vohden, or anyone else who wishes to comment, if there has ever been a status review finding that has resulted in an upholding of an MIA or one of the few remaining POW categories.

Captain Vohden. Not since we reinstituted the status reviews in 1977.

Mr. Dornan. But in the first go-around there were?

Captain Vohden. Initially, I think, in 1973 or 1974 there were one or two cases where the individuals were retained in a missing status.

Mr. Dornan. So, in the last 2 years there has not been a single case where the original category has been upheld. Has there been a slowdown because of the Garwood case at all?

Captain Vohden. No, sir. We are still proceeding in accordance with our procedures and in accordance with the law.

Mr. Dornan. How many cases would still be remaining as of today, or last Friday when you checked, or whatever you use as a break point, April 30?

General Pinckney. 110 as of today.

Mr. Dornan. And you are getting down to the harder cases, of course, all the time. I do not mean that cynically, but are you saving the toughest cases for last?

General Pinckney. No. We take them in the order of their being shot down or captured.

Mr. Dornan. Do you know Doug Clarke, Captain Vohden, who put this book out?
Captain VOHDEN. No, sir. I met him one time, but I do not know him personally.

Mr. DORNAN. Is he still active, do you know, on active duty?

Captain VOHDEN. Yes, sir; he is.

DROPPING THE BALL

Mr. DORNAN. Tell him, in just a cursory reading of the book, I found it a shoddy job with a lot of political assumptions in here that are wrong. For example, that any administration used the POW issue as a way to prolong the war, or to make war more palatable or acceptable to people. Your own family members will tell you that the Government—and I say this with all due respect to the Pentagon—was dragged, kicking and screaming, into involvement in depth in the MIA issue. It remains one of the greatest disgraces of the war, and I am waiting to see the paper written on this, how we handled it; and God forbid any future wars, that all of the POW mail for about the last 5 years of the war was contaminated and handled by pro-Communist, pro-Hanoi, pro-war groups that sat over a porno shop at the corner of 42d Street and 9th Avenue in New York. Not a single one of you got a letter to or from your prison camps that was not “massaged” and resubmitted to your family with pro-Communist propaganda inserted in their envelope by this group. So, the Government never was able to get a handle on this issue properly. I think President Nixon dropped the ball, President Ford dropped the ball, and President Carter may be dropping the ball worse than his two predecessors because he made the boldest promises during the campaign of 1976 that he would handle it differently.

The whole policy reversal that the Carter administration has gone through confounds me, given his own experience, as I mentioned previously, with his own “favorite uncle.”

Thank you.

Mr. Gilman, Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. Wolff. I am sorry, but we are due to vote in about 2 minutes. We had a lot of speeches today, a lot of questions asked. I want to assure Mr. Dornan that if somebody dropped the ball, this committee is going to pick it up and run with it.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]
POW/MIA's: U.S. Policies and Procedures

Tuesday, June 5, 1979

House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10:35 a.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lester L. Wolff (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Wolff. We are pleased today to welcome Lt. Gen. Eugene F. Tighe, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as our witness. With this hearing we are completing this phase of our evaluation of American policies and procedures with regard to American prisoners and missing in Southeast Asia. In an earlier hearing we have heard testimony from Ms. Ann Mills Griffiths, executive director of the National League of Families, and Dr. Roger Shields, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, both of whom raised cogent and compelling questions about this subject. On the basis of their concerns we posed a series of questions to the Departments of State and Defense which, in general, involved reasons for a lack of faith in the Government's concern for and handling of this entire issue.

In response we had testimony from Mr. Robert Oakley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, and Brig. Gen. T. C. Pinckney, Director of the East Asia section of International Security Affairs at the Defense Department, who clarified this subject from the viewpoint of the executive branch.

These first two hearings did much to clear the air and to get at some of the problems troubling the National League of Families and others interested in this matter. However, one major point which we have yet to discuss, and which goes to the very heart of the POW/MIA issue, is that of evaluating reports of alleged live sightings. The question of the fate of Americans or even of their remains, and even more painful the possibility of whether any Americans remain alive in Indochina, has long troubled many of us. The sudden reappearance of Marine Pfc. Robert Garwood after 14 years has given added urgency to this issue.

For that reason we are continuing today to examine that part of the POW/MIA system of the U.S. Government which deals directly with information and information gathering. Since this is appropriately lodged within the intelligence community, in the Defense Intelligence Agency, we welcome the comments of General Tighe in this connection. We recognize that much of the Defense Intelligence Agency's work is highly sensitive and that sources and procedures
must be protected. However, it should be possible to put enough of the system on public record to answer the question: What happens to a live sighting report? How is it evaluated? Who determines validity? When and how is such information associated with specific Americans?

We understand, General Tighe, that your comments may at some point require the subcommittee to go into closed session; I will wait for a motion on that count until such time as we have a quorum for a closed session present. In the interim I would ask, General Tighe, if you would please proceed with your public statement.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. EUGENE F. TIGHE, JR., U.S. AIR FORCE, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY CHARLES F. TROWBRIDGE

General Tighe, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I really appreciate the opportunity to testify before this subcommittee on a matter in which the Defense Intelligence Agency has been involved for many years. Although Congress has previously heard testimony from the intelligence community and DIA, as far as I know, this is the first appearance by a director of the Agency.

There is no easy way to recount the POW/MIA intelligence effort of the past years. The war was very complex, and the fact that we still search for our missing is reflected in that complexity. The efforts of the entire intelligence community are well documented in extensive testimony given before the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia.

I know that certain members of this subcommittee, having previously been members of the select committee, are well aware of DIA’s role and contribution through its close cooperation during the select committee’s lengthy investigation. However, at the request of the subcommittee, I would like to summarize DIA’s role and its present involvement in the intelligence aspect of the POW/MIA issue.

ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

During the early phases of American involvement in the Vietnamese war, POW/MIA intelligence was handled through interdepartmental liaison. This effort was generally formalized in several committees and working groups, involving representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency. DIA, having only been established in late 1961, assumed a limited responsibility for POW/MIA analysis until mid-1966. After that time, DIA’s efforts regarding POW/MIA intelligence became more comprehensive.

During 1967, DIA assumed chairmanship of the Interagency POW Intelligence Ad Hoc Committee. In December 1971 a DIA chaired intelligence task force was established to supervise the intelligence aspects of the POW/MIA problems and to provide more rapid and effective communication between policymakers and intelligence officials. The task force met until the spring of 1973 when the POW’s were repatriated.

Within the U.S. Government, DIA has provided direct intelligence support on these matters to: The office of the Secretary of Defense, specifically the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Staff; the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Staff; the Military Services, especially the intelligence and casualty branches; Commander in Chief, Pacific; the Joint Casualty Resolution Center; the U.S. delegation to the four party joint military team, and the Department of State.

DIA continues to be the focal point for all intelligence relating to POW/MIA matters. The prisoner of war and missing in action branch within DIA, currently, is the only national level office with a full-time effort for review, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence relating to POW/MIA matters.

In the most general of terms, throughout the war all POW/MIA intelligence information was channeled into DIA for analysis. Through close coordination and daily contact with POW intelligence branches of the military services, all information relating to POW's was provided to these branches for use by the POW's parent service casualty branch. Only after the return of the U.S. prisoners and the reduction of the individual military POW intelligence branches in early 1974 did DIA begin to interface directly with the service casualty branches.

DIA'S PRESENT EFFORTS

At this point I think it would be appropriate to discuss DIA's efforts in the present POW/MIA situation.

The intelligence community still gives high priority to POW/MIA reports, and new leads or allegations are continually being pursued. DIA continues to analyze and disseminate new information. Naturally our collection capabilities throughout Southeast Asia dropped significantly after the fall of Saigon in April 1975. Refugee reports constitute nearly all our current source. Since April 1975, DIA has received 231 refugee reports. As you might expect, and proportionate to the refugee flow, 176 of these reports were received during the last year. Although many of these reports allege knowledge of Americans in South Vietnam, they have contained no hard evidence that American prisoners captured before the fall of Saigon remain alive in that country. There has been no new substantive information from North Vietnam. Reports from Laos have been less than informative.

SIGHTINGS BY REFUGEES

DIA continues to evaluate all POW/MIA related sightings by refugees. Any necessary followup action is conducted by DIA and other military organizations through the defense attachés, the joint casualty resolution center liaison officer in Bangkok, or through domestic military assets. Because of numerous refugee movements between refugee camps, their onward settlement in other countries, their temporary accommodations provided by sponsor organizations and final residence, followup action for clarification or amplification of reported information can consume many man-hours and month of delay. As an example, DIA's extensive investigation and evaluation of Mr. Ngo Phi Hung's testimony before this subcommittee required some 500 man-hours over a 4-month period.

Of the 231 refugee reports, 39 percent contain alleged firsthand information on POW sightings, half of which pertain to Americans who
remained behind after the fall of Saigon and were subsequently released. Thirty-one percent contain hearsay information. Seventy-nine reports contain both firsthand and hearsay information on crash and grave sites. A few reports allude to deserters or other Americans working with the resistance.

U.S. Marine Corps debriefers have informed DIA that Pfc. Robert Garwood, USMC, upon his recent return from Vietnam, provided them no POW/MIA information of substance but only rumor, hearsay, or speculation.

**Deserter May Be Alive**

With the return of Private First Class Garwood, there remains the possibility that a "deserter," Pfc. McKinley Nolan, U.S. Army, may still be alive in Southeast Asia. Private First Class Nolan's association with the Vietnamese and Cambodian Communists was followed by DIA from November 1967 until the receipt of the last report on him in 1974.

In regard to the refugee reports just discussed, DIA has prepared all 231 reports for release to the National League of Families in accordance with a Freedom of Information Act request. The release documents included original reports, refugee letters, translations, and followup actions taken.

On the subject of Freedom of Information Act requests, DIA has responded to over 460 requests within the last 18 months. Most of these requests were from POW/MIA next of kin asking for the entire DIA file on their missing husbands or sons.

Release of this information parallels DIA's efforts over the years to insure all DIA material was provided to the parent service for use in their communication with next of kin.

Additionally, in response to Freedom of Information Act requests, DIA recently prepared and released a 10,000-page, 15 volume DOD publication of intelligence reports entitled "Uncorrelated Information Relating to Missing Americans in Southeast Asia." Over 400 copies of these documents have been provided to Congress, the news media, private individuals, and organizations.

**Vietnam's Detailed Records**

Whenever the POW/MIA issue is discussed, inevitably the question is asked: How many of the missing do we think the other side should account for? My answer is everyone on whom they are able. As to the ability of the Vietnamese Government to provide an accounting of missing Americans, I really do not know. DIA believes the North Vietnamese ministry of defense maintains centralized information on U.S. POW's, and that data pertaining to the death and/or burial of an American was forwarded to Hanoi. Based on this information and on the known Communist proclivity for detailed reporting, we believe the Vietnamese should possess sufficient knowledge to resolve the status of a large number of unresolved cases and they could affect the return of a number of remains beyond those returned to date.

The difficulty in assessing the Vietnamese capabilities regarding casualty resolution stems from their unexplained erratic pattern of
accountability in the past. For example, they have officially admitted to the deaths of Americans in captivity; at the same time, they have not officially acknowledged other Americans in the same category, even when publicly available evidence of capture exists from Communist sources.

The Vietnamese logically have acknowledged some Americans whose deaths in captivity were witnessed by released U.S. POW's but paradoxically have omitted listing other prisoners who died in the presence of released American POW's. They have unexpectedly returned the remains of some Americans who were killed in action, but have not done so with other American KIA's of whom they have tacitly admitted knowledge.

WITHHOLDING INFORMATION

In addition to the unpredictability of the Vietnamese in this matter, it would be unreasonable to expect Vietnamese knowledge of many American losses that occurred in inaccessible terrain or over water. Also, they may be reluctant to provide information relative to incidents outside of Vietnam.

It seems clear that the Vietnamese are withholding information. Some examples of our evidence typify their dichotomous behavior in regard to casualty resolution of Americans in Southeast Asia. Other cases illustrate situations in which the Vietnamese may not be capable of coming forth with information. The Communist governments of Laos and Cambodia have been virtually intransigent in providing information on unaccounted for Americans.

NEGOTIATION FOLDERS

As a corollary to the estimated Vietnamese capability to provide an accounting of missing Americans, DIA, in conjunction with the joint casualty resolution center, has prepared negotiation folders on missing individuals for presentation by the Department of State to the Vietnamese and Lao Governments. Folders on 281 individuals, each containing a summary of the loss incident, a language translation, any acknowledging information by the captors and maps of the loss location, have been passed to date.

DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS

I believe that actions of this subcommittee coupled with those of the Department of State to continue to press the governments of Southeast Asia through all available diplomatic channels is our best course of action to achieve additional accounting of our missing men. Further resolution of this issue rests with the information held by those governments and not in the information held by the U.S. Government.

I have maintained a close personal interest in the POW/MIA issue, and as a Director of DIA, I can assure you that the Agency will continue to provide a dedicated effort directed toward a successful accounting for Americans missing in Southeast Asia. Toward that end, Mr. Charles F. Trowbridge of DIA, will shortly accompany the
commander of the joint casualty resolution center—JRC—on a
visit to U.S. officials in Hong Kong, Bangkok, and Kuala Lumpur,
to discuss the potential of Indo-Chinese refugees as a collection means
for POW/MIA/KIA/BNR information. Our hopes are to make this
effort a much more effective and lucrative one. We want a focus on
the questions that are asked of refugees to see if we can get some
further insight from this very valuable intelligence source.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I thank you
once again for the opportunity of coming before you today and solicit
your questions as you may have them.

Mr. Wolff, General, I thank you very much for a very comprehen­
sive statement. There are some questions that are prompted by your
statement. Some of these questions might have to be answered in
executive session, others might be answered here in open session.
I would ask that the opportunity for open session answers to be forth­
coming before we go into executive session. I believe the gentleman—

Mr. Guyer. Mr. Chairman, due to the exigency of the meeting
and the situation with the members, I move we do now go into execu­
tive session.

Mr. Wolff. Well, would you move that we go into executive
session after the members have had an opportunity of asking—

Mr. Guyer. Take the vote.

Mr. Wolff. Yes, we will take the vote now but let the session con­
tinue to be open until such time as General Tighe feels it is required
to go into closed session.

Mr. Guyer. That is right.

Mr. Diggs. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wolff. Yes.

Mr. Diggs. I would like to be reported as voting "no," but I don’t
want my vote to—if you need the vote to close, I will vote "aye,"
for that purpose.

Mr. Wolff. I have no objection to it as long as they want to con­
tinue in open hearing, but there are a couple of us that can’t be here.

Mr. Diggs. If you need my vote for that, Mr. Chairman, fine, but
you know my traditional position on the vote.

Mr. Palmer. Mr. Diggs’ vote is needed for the quorum of five on
the subcommittee. Also, the general has indicated where questions
can be answered in open session he will and where he prefers not to,
he will reply either in writing or he will reserve those for the closed
session.

Mr. Wolff. Mr. Palmer, may I just say that although the vote is
necessary, an affirmative vote is not necessary if we have a majority
of those present who vote for a closed session.

Mr. Palmer. I stand corrected, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wolff. Mr. Diggs’ prior position will also not change the
condition.

Would you call the roll, please.

Mr. Palmer. Mr. Wolff.

Mr. Wolff. Aye.

Mr. Palmer. Mr. Guyer.

Mr. Guyer. Aye.

Mr. Palmer. Mr. Diggs.

Mr.Diggs. No.
Mr. PALMER. Mr. Goodling.
Mr. GOODLING. Aye.
Mr. PALMER. Mr. Pritchard.
Mr. PRITCHARD. Aye.
Mr. PALMER. Mr. Lagomarsino is with us but he is not a member of the subcommittee.
Mr. LAGOMARSI. If I were, I would vote "aye."
Mr. WOLFF. Would you give us the result of that vote?
Mr. PALMER. The vote is 4 "ayes" and 1 "nay." The motion is carried.
Mr. WOLFF. The motion is carried.
Thank you, gentlemen. We will continue.

We have another member for the quorum. Do you want to be recorded on this as to whether the meeting is open or closed? We are requesting a closed meeting.
Mr. HALL. I would vote to keep it open.
Mr. WOLFF. We will keep the meeting open until such time as the General feels that there are questions which have to be asked which would be required, for security reasons, the protection of sources to keep the information secure.

PFC GARWOOD

I should like to start off. On page 5, General, you say:

U.S. Marine Corps debriefers have informed DIA that Pfc. Robert Garwood, USMC, upon his recent return from Vietnam provided them no POW/MIA information of substance, but only rumor, hearsay or speculation.

Two Members of the Congress spoke to Garwood; I was one of them and Mr. Gilman was the other Member. I believe that there are proceedings that are taking place, however, I must say at this point the information that Private Garwood gave to us was different obviously than the information your debriefers received. As Private Garwood indicated, he felt there were other Americans that were alive.

Now, the one point on this is the fact that he said that he would not testify to any of this until his trial had been completed. He indicated at that time he felt there were other Americans in his position, let me put it that way, but I think he may well have been referring to Nolan or someone else. I would like to ask whether or not in open session you can give us any information on this as to the results of the information that you have taken from him?

General TIGHE. First, I would like to acknowledge, Mr. Chairman, the fact that we are talking about what he has provided the Marine Corps, and to the best of my knowledge they would stand on this if I asked them right down to the moment. I don't know what the Marine Corps has done as far as interrogating him today, for example. He may have given them some additional data, but when this information was passed to DIA, he had not given them any. That does not mean that he will not do so after his trial or at some future date, but what he had spoken to them about, as I understand it, was judged to be rumor, hearsay, or speculation. He may be preserving other data for a later time.

Mr. WOLFF. There is one other point in your testimony. You indicated that you had passed on folders of 281 individuals to the Vietnam-
ese. Could you give us an idea, has there been any response on that? I am referring to page 8.

General Tighe. Yes, sir. To the best of my knowledge we had no formal response through the State Department. For the completeness of the record, I will refer if I may, to Mr. Trowbridge, who heads up my branch for that. Have we received any formal response from the Vietnamese on any of these cases?

Mr. Trowbridge. They have not formally responded, Mr. Chairman, addressing any of the negotiation folders that were passed. In other words, of the remains that have been returned to U.S. control, 19 of these individuals have had folders passed.

General Tighe. The response, Mr. Chairman, is that of 281 cases, the remains of 19 have been returned to us.

Mr. Wolff. And no further communication has come from them at all on the others?

Mr. Trowbridge. No, sir.

POSSIBLE UNKNOWN SOLDIER

Mr. Wolff. Now it seems to me that I recall one of the remains that were returned was not identifiable. Is that still the case?

General Tighe. I will have to furnish the answer for the record. Do you know the response?

Mr. Trowbridge. I think you are referring to the four remains that came from Laos. One is still unidentified, yes. Two were determined not to be caucasian.

General Tighe. They were not judged to be the remains of Americans.

Mr. Wolff. Two of them were judged not to be valid remains of Americans?

Mr. Trowbridge. Yes.

Mr. Wolff. What is your answer to something like that? Are they attempting to delude us in any way?

Mr. Trowbridge. No, sir; I don't believe so. I don't know the circumstances or from where they gathered these remains. The Vietnamese, I think, have provided us similar remains.

Mr. Wolff. May I ask this, of the one that is unidentifiable, we have yet to have an Unknown Soldier of Vietnam. Could this possibly be an Unknown Soldier of Vietnam?

Mr. Trowbridge. Sir, I could not address that. I don't know what the requirements would be to designate someone as an Unknown Soldier.

Mr. Wolff. I have questions that I can ask in closed session.

I will pass to Mr. Diggs.

Mr. Diggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, could you explain why you are the first Director of the Agency to appear before the subcommittee?

General Tighe. I guess, Mr. Diggs, I am probably the first one to be invited. I don't know. I really do not know the answer to that.

Mr. Diggs. Is that true, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. Wolff. That is true as far as this subcommittee is concerned.

Mr. Diggs. The Interagency Ad Hoc Committee is composed of what, of whom?
General Tighe. The committee that was set up, as I understand it, as a subcommittee of the then-U.S. Intelligence Board included the State Department, the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and Military Services. I will stand to correct the record if there were any other members but basically that is the membership.

INCENTIVES FOR INFORMATION

Mr. Diggs. Have we ever provided any kind of bounties or incentives to try to locate or get information about any of these people?

General Tighe. That is a U.S. tradition of past wars and I would have to reserve the answer to that past the time when aircrew members, for example, at least in the early parts of the war I know carried kits that identified them and so forth and had reward data in them. I am not sure though about the ground forces, whether they had similar incentives.

Do you know whether or not they did?

Mr. Trowbridge. I don’t know for sure.

General Tighe. Prior to the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty in January 1973, the Joint Personnel Recovery Center in South Vietnam had a program providing monetary rewards for information leading to the recovery or return of captured U.S. personnel. From early 1973 through April 1975, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center maintained a rewards program aimed at obtaining information concerning the location of the remains of deceased U.S. personnel. Other agencies were involved in the collection of intelligence concerning unaccounted-for Americans.

U.S. ground force personnel carried only their Geneva Convention Identification Card and their dog tags when on combat missions.

MIA RACIAL BREAKDOWN

Mr. Diggs. Mr. Trowbridge responded to a question a moment ago saying that two of the people were apparently not caucasian and therefore it was assumed that they were not Americans which raises a question in my mind about the racial factor involved in these refugees. I assume that you got some kind of breakdown by race of these that are still missing.

General Tighe. I don’t know why we would have but it is possible. We have the whole file computerized and I assume you could come up with any kind of a grouping that you wanted or a listing of any of the individual factors.

Mr. Diggs. Well, I assumed that factor is there. Mr. Trowbridge made a fact of it so I was just curious.

General Tighe. I think Mr. Trowbridge was describing bone structure that was probably by its size judged to be Laotian or Vietnamese and if I am wrong, correct me, Mr. Trowbridge.

Mr. Trowbridge. Yes, sir.

Mr. Diggs. Could some American of oriental descent be maybe among these people, maybe among the missing? I was just curious as to why he equated Americans as caucasian.

Mr. Trowbridge. That was a poor choice of words on my part.
TREATMENT OF REFUGEES

Mr. Diggs. I would like to know if there is a breakdown available but beyond that I am wondering if there was any evidence that any of these refugees were treated any differently. Is there any evidence that any of these refugees were treated any differently based on their racial characteristics? Do you have any intelligence on that?

General Tighe. Are you talking about the refugees that we interrogate, for example?

Mr. Diggs. That is correct, and those that are presumed to be missing.

Mr. Goodling. You mean military?

Mr. Diggs. Military, I am sorry.

General Tighe. I have no evidence that there was any different treatment. I can recall reading where some enlisted men, for example, were propagandized regarding their oppressive treatment by officers and so forth and so on in an attempt to woo them but I don’t know of any specific racial approaches by the Vietnamese.

Mr. Diggs. Can I assume that you have a breakdown also by State?

Mr. Diggs. I was just curious as to how many of these missing people might be from Michigan, for example.

General Tighe. We can get you anything you want to have.

Mr. Diggs. I particularly would like to know those from Michigan.

NO POW’S IN UNITED STATES

Do we have any prisoners of war ourselves from this conflict?

General Tighe. I beg your pardon?

Mr. Diggs. Do we have any POW’s ourselves from this conflict?

General Tighe. To the best of my knowledge the United States has no prisoners of war from any conflict.

Mr. Diggs. Well, we had them during World War II and some were stationed near Opelika, Ala., 30 miles from where I was stationed at Tuskegee.

General Tighe. Yes. I was fed very well by some of them when I came back to Camp Stoneman in California. To the best of my knowledge we have none.

Mr. Diggs. We had them and they have been released, sent back, is that it?

General Tighe. That is my understanding. I am not sure that we brought any prisoners of war into the United States from Korea, for example. I know they held many of them in Chato Island and many places like that during the Korean war and I would suggest the same thing is true of any prisoners of war we had from the Vietnamese war.

Mr. Diggs. Can you check this?

General Tighe. I will make sure you get the testimony corrected.

Mr. Diggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wolff. Mr. Goodling.

POW’S IN LAOS

Mr. Goodling. General, oftentimes when I am caught in a discussion of this nature people talk about Laos and they seem to think
there are a lot of POW's there. Do you have any way of getting any
information from that area at all?

General Tighe. As I mentioned in my testimony, about the only
thing that we have today is the reports of refugees and sifting and
sorting what they have to report. As far as Laos is concerned, we have
spent a considerable amount of attention to reports particularly up
near the Samnui area where the Communist government operated
during the war and where there was strong U.S. belief that there were
prisoners of war held which were never subsequently accounted for.
We have really no way of knowing today whether there are or aren't
in Laos and the attitude of the Lao Government, I am sure they
are not interested in cooperative arrangements to allow us to find out.

Mr. Goodling. I notice you said the last report of a sighting of
Private First Class Nolan was in 1974.

General Tighe. Simply the date of the last sighting of him by
someone who has returned.

Mr. Goodling. An American that has returned?

General Tighe. That is right.

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS NOLAN

Mr. Goodling. What were his activities during 1967–74?

General Tighe. Mr. Trowbridge, could you answer that for the
record?

Mr. Trowbridge. Yes, sir.

He left Saigon with his Vietnamese wife and he joined with the VC
for a period of time. They used him for propaganda purposes. He lived
with the VC. He was actually in a detention facility with U.S. prisoners
who returned; however, while he was in that detention facility he began
to live with his wife and made his own means of self-support. He
was not treated as a prisoner during that time, at least not like those
that he was headed—well, he went into Cambodia and was with the
Khmer Rouge for a while, became dissatisfied with them and headed
back for Vietnam. That was the last information we had in 1974 and
that is the last we have heard of Private First Class Nolan.

Mr. Goodling. Thank you.

Mr. Wolff. Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

UNCORRELATED MATERIAL

General, your Agency recently reported and you mentioned this
in your testimony that you have released 15 volumes of uncorrelated
data, intelligence reports and so on. In all of these 15 volumes there
were no reports that could reasonably be associated with specific
Americans, is that correct?

General Tighe. That is correct.

Mr. Lagomarsino. If they were, why are they considered un-
correlated?

General Tighe. By that we simply mean that in the generalities
of them and/or other details there was no one with whom we could
correlate the identity of the individual discussed and that is true of
a great deal of the Refugee-type data, of course, that they speak of
white men or they speak of Americans or Westerners in much the same
way and the identities are not possible or we have not been able to correlate with anything regarding the specific individual.

POW'S FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

Mr. Lagomarsino. Are there any prisoners left in Vietnam or Laos by countries that are friendly to the United States?

General Tighe. I don't know whether there are still French and Spanish in Vietnam but I would not be surprised if there were. We found many years after they had been incarcerating many Spaniards who came out through Thailand, for example, who were a great source of information. I would not be surprised if they hold some French and Spanish at least.

Mr. Lagomarsino. From conflicts?

General Tighe. Yes, sir.

Mr. Lagomarsino. How about from the Vietnam war itself, some of our allies?

General Tighe. There are newspaper people, for example, who are missing in the conflict form other nations for whom there has been no accounting but I am not aware of any specific prisoners of war from any country.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Have we been asked by other countries to assist them in finding their MIA's?

General Tighe. I would defer to Mr. Trowbridge. I don't know of any.

Mr. Trowbridge. They have not previously requested. However, in our evaluation of information that has been provided to us over the years if we did come across a report that would indicate such information, we provided it through the State Department to that particular third country.

Mr. Lagomarsino. We have done it?

Mr. Trowbridge. Yes, sir.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Thank you.

POW'S HELD AFTER 1973

Mr. Wolff. I just would like to ask in the final part of the open session here, is there any merit to the reports that indicated that prisoners, Americans, were held after 1973 long after the release of American prisoners?

General Tighe. I have no evidence to support that. I would suggest that—and this is a personal judgment based on the logistics alone and the chaos in Southeast Asia after the conclusion of the war there—it is entirely possible that they weren't able to say one way or the other as to what they had as a total nation because as a matter of fact there were still pockets of resistance in the southern part of the nation. So on the specificity of the date of the release of the last one, I would say we have no evidence past that date that will support that.

Mr. Wolfe. The Soviets have been fairly friendly as of recent date. Have we asked them for any help in securing information on any MIA's at all?

General Tighe. My memory would be of hearsay only. I understand that the United States formally asked the Soviet Union to assist, but I would have to refer that to the record. I would like to furnish that accurately for the record.
Mr. Wolff. If you would, please.

General Tighe. On May 25, 1979, representatives of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow requested the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs' assistance in obtaining casualty resolution information from the Vietnamese. The Soviet response was that the desired information could be obtained more readily by direct United States-Vietnamese contact. When told that our direct effort had met with little or no success, the Soviet representative stated that he would pass the request to his superiors.

Mr. Wolff. Mr. Goodling.

Mr. Goodling. One question following Congressman Diggs' line of questioning. I think you mentioned two remains that you decided were not American remains.

General Tighe. Yes, sir.

Mr. Goodling. Did we then check with our allies, South Korea or anybody else who had troops there whether they were theirs?

General Tighe. Mr. Trowbridge.

Mr. Trowbridge. Sir, to the best of my knowledge we have not. Again this falls into the line of casualty identification laboratories and in their identification of the remains it was their judgment that these were not Americans. What country they may have determined they were from, I don't know. I believe they felt they were indigenous Laotian.

Mr. Goodling. I think the South Koreans and others would be very interested.

General Tighe. To the best of my knowledge, sir, these remains were alleged to have been remains from Laos, not from Vietnam.

Mr. Trowbridge. They would make an offer to the Laotians to return those remains. I know they have done similarly with the Vietnamese remains.

Mr. Goodling. Thank you.

Mr. Wolff. One final question. Were all of these sightings—you say they are uncollaborated. Have there been any that you had in collaboration but information from different sources on the same individual or the same case?

Loose Data

General Tighe. Sir, there is no doubt that we have varying degrees of evidence of the status of MIA and POW's who are never accounted for in great depth and, of course, that is the type of correlated thing we put together very painstakingly and build a picture of an individual from very many general reports. Generally speaking, for example, an airman's crashsite or the area where they were seen to bailout or something like that allows a geographic identity also. These uncorrelated reports generally are of a nature, for example, of one person talking to another. "We saw a group of five Americans in a generally unlocated area." That is the kind of loose and general data. Otherwise, if there is any element of it at all we could correlate timewise or geographically or by any describers at all; we have done that and we have files that contain considerable differences of completeness as to the identifiability of the individual.
Mr. Wolff. How do you account for the fact that the families, many of the families, have had evidence of sightings of the individuals, pictures taken of individuals. This information has been furnished to the Department I take it, and there has been little or no information that has been forthcoming on those individuals’ sightings after capture?

General Tighe. That is one of the reactions of the Vietnamese I find almost inexplicable but extraordinarily unfriendly to say the least, and certainly uncooperative, but it is not unusual. I can recall, for example, a very good friend of mine who was shot down in Korea and who on gun camera film was pictured on the ground, having parachuted alive and well and for whom we could never find an accounting of any kind. He was in good health when he landed and gave the sign on the ground; but in Vietnam where there have been photographs taken, if such is true, and as a matter of fact we have gotten reports that are indisputable of their being alive at certain times and not being able to account for them. There is simply a lack of cooperation on the part of the Vietnamese.

Death during captivity

Mr. Wolff. Have you had any reports from the Vietnamese relative to the death of an individual during captivity?

General Tighe. Well, to the best of my knowledge there were 23, as I recall, or some number similar to that who were described to have died in captivity by the Vietnamese when the major release was made. Is that true?

Mr. Trowbridge. Yes. That was from the North Vietnamese and those remains were returned. There was also a died in captivity, from the South which no remains have ever been returned.

Mr. Wolff. I think that we had perhaps—:

Mr. Lagomarsino. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one question?

Mr. Wolff. Yes.

Questioning refugees

Mr. Lagomarsino. How could interrogation of refugees be improved to provide better leads as regards POWs?

General Tighe. What we are hoping to do is to make sure that sufficiently sharp questions and pointed questions are asked of them early on so that we can find people quite early who seem to have something we really want to get on to while they still remember it and before they get into this maze I have described or they are uncatchable—they go to so many parts of the world—and try to get people while they still have something to say. We want to get the people who had first contact with them to focus their interrogations with the view in mind of being able to find out what they know about POWs.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Thank you.

Current leads

Mr. Wolff. Again one question. At the present time, are there any leads that you are currently following that could possibly lead us to find anyone alive there?

General Tighe. I do not believe there is any activity going on at the present time to determine whether or not reports of people still alive
in Southeast Asia are true or not. I don’t believe we have any ongoing excursions or new initiatives at all. However, if we can pin down any one individual report and make a sufficiently good case to the State Department, they immediately take it up or have that addressed to the North Vietnamese Government and it is simply a matter of having enough to talk about or enough detail to go beyond those cases we have already presented them with.

Mr. Wolff. I have just been handed a note that Tucker Gougelman died in prison in 1976 and his remains were later returned. Also, Arlo Gay was released in 1976 or 1977 and there was evidence of Americans having been alive after 1973.

General Tighe. DIA has no hard evidence to support the contention that American personnel who were lost during the Southeast Asian conflict were held after the signing of the Peace Agreement in 1973. Approximately 70 Americans either missed evacuation or voluntarily remained behind after the fall of South Vietnam to the Communists in April 1975. By September 1976, all of these individuals were either accounted for or allowed to leave Vietnam. However, there remains the possibility that some American deserters might still remain in Vietnam.

Mr. Wolff. Fine. One point, and I don’t know whether this must be brought up in executive session or not. We were told by Garwood that he twice attempted to pass information to us that he would like to return. Was that information received by us or was it short circuited in some way?

General Tighe. If I may furnish the answer for the record and/or in closed session, whichever is more convenient for you, I would appreciate that.

Mr. Wolff. I have no further questions. Does anyone have further questions?

Mr. Goodling. No.

Mr. Lagomarsino. No.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. Wolff. General, are there some things you could not tell us in open session that you think we ought to know?

General Tighe. I would like first to respond to the question you asked about the knowledge of Garwood’s attempts to turn himself in.

Mr. Wolff. Yes.

GARWOOD CASE

General Tighe. Very shortly before he came back—and we can get you a time specifically on it—we were informed through intelligence reporting from a European country that one of their nationals had been approached by Garwood. This was reported in normal intelligence channels before he came out. Very shortly afterward we were able to get the North Vietnamese to open up on it, so we did have some knowledge at that time.

ALLIES’ INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

There’s one other thing I would like to comment on. One of the most valuable sources of intelligence should be the data we get from friendly
allies who have relations with the Hanoi Government. We screen that
probably more carefully than any other material, so we do have a bit
of inside information that is very valuable to us. I would suggest we
have made our concerns sufficiently known throughout the world.
We do have people very sensitive to our need. The [deleted] are very
sensitive, for example, as are West European countries.

SOVIET PRESSURE

Mr. Wolff. I had particular reference not that they are so friendly,
but because the Soviets are friendly with the Vietnamese, I take it we
could make use of the present circumstances if we get them to push
the Vietnamese to be a little more forthcoming. I am wondering
whether we have exerted sufficient pressure on them to do that.

General Tighe. I can't say that we have, and I doubt very much
that it would be very productive. I don't have a great deal of con­
fidence that it would get us very much, Mr. Chairman. Certainly we
should try, but I suspect that at this stage in the game, with whatever,
policies the Vietnamese have on the release of information to help
our casualty resolution, they probably would not impart the in­
formation to the Russians.

Mr. Wolff. I want you to know that this subcommittee has been
invited to Vietnam by the Vietnamese and are planning to go.

General Tighe. Very good.

INDEPENDENT ACTIVITIES

Mr. Wolff. We will take this particular area of interest as one of
prime concern in pressing for additional information.

What could you tell us about this fellow [deleted].

General Tighe. I talked to Mr. [deleted] in my office a couple of
months ago and he related his activities. He indicated that he had
worked for the Defense Attaché Office in Saigon. I checked his cre­
dentials with the Defense Attaché for whom he worked. I had not
heard of him before. I listened to his story about contacts he had who
could locate remains in Laos. I was impressed with the businesslike
attitude he had toward the project, the seriousness of it, and what
seemed to be a rather businesslike way of accounting for the sites and
so forth.

Basically my interest, of course, was to pursue anything that might
look like it had possibilities for casualty resolution. I would have to
say that the man's activities are credible, and he seems like a very
dedicated and highly intelligent young man. I saw some of his writings
that indicate he is a very capable writer. There is just no way that I
can verify any of the data that he gave us. I am not able to determine
how valid his data is.

Mr. Wolff. Do you think it is worthwhile to let him pursue inde­
dependently his activities?

General Tighe. I think if there is a legitimate way by which we can
recover remains, we ought to do it, and I think we owe it to every
family of every one of these men to try to do it. I think that there is
also a possibility that in time the Laotian Government may be more
sympathetic and may allow us to pursue our interests there more
freely. I am not able to come up with the means by which that can
take place.
CORRELATED REPORTS

Mr. Wolff. In talking to Dermot Foley, who was Garwood's attorney, he identified certain specific packages in correlated reports relating to Garwood. You did indicate these were uncorrelated reports and yet now they are fairly well correlated in that it has been proven by him this was the individual that was reported.

General Tighe. Let me ask Mr. Trowbridge if he can respond differently.

Mr. Trowbridge. I believe what has happened there, was that we incorporated the studies that were done by the DIA, and rather than segregate the uncorrelated information in those reports within the study, we determined it would be best to publish the entire study with the uncorrelated package, which was the case, and probably the report that Mr. Foley referred to relating to Garwood and they did in fact correlate.

General Tighe. We explained that in the summary of the reports that are included in the uncorrelated publication.

Mr. Wolff. Do you have input into the determinations as to the change of status?

General Tighe. I don't know the answer to that question specifically.

Mr. Trowbridge. Sir, the Defense Intelligence Agency provides all information held in the file on an individual. We hold back nothing, and it is provided to the parent service for use in their status determinations.

General Tighe. Do you make any recommendations at all?

Mr. Trowbridge. No, other than the fact that a report would have been, as a part of the record, correlated to that individual; but as far as any recommendation toward the status, no.

Mr. Gilman. Would the chairman yield?

Mr. Wolff. Yes.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

Mr. Gilman. Is all that information put in the case files that both the parents and family can review it?

Mr. Trowbridge. Again, sir, we provide it to the Service, and what they do at that point I cannot answer. I would like to say I am certain that they provide everything they possibly can, which would be anything other than what has been sanitized or excised because it's classified.

Mr. Wolff. I think one aspect of all of this is to in some fashion—you are not going to satisfy every family, I am sure—satisfy as well as you can the families and the next of kin. I am concerned. Do we have available to us or is there information that has not been passed on to the families?

General Tighe. I would suggest that everything possible that is known to exist has been passed on through the Freedom of Information Act request. [Deleted.]

Mr. Wolff. What I mean is under the Freedom of Information Act are you required to pass on any and all data you might have or do you specifically withhold certain data based on protection of sources?

General Tighe. To the best of my knowledge, the only thing that is excised is material that contains data we feel might have some reference to the sources, or that would jeopardize them. This is kept to a minimum so there is very little of the report excised, and basically
the context of the data is contained despite the excision. The sanitation is kept to a minimum, although it may look crude to the individual receiving it because the gaps sometimes are not easy to bridge.

**SUBCOMMITTEE ROLE**

Mr. Wolff. Is there anything that you think that we could be doing to aid you in the performance of your duties in extracting either more information from the Vietnamese or facilitating the process that you are engaged in?

General Tighe. Well, the biggest problem we have, of course, today is the Vietnamese. I don't know what kind of leverage we have on them and the options that we are going to be able to use, except the humanitarian approach in our request of them. The United States, as a matter of policy, and your subcommittee and the Congress of the United States should unequivocally endorse any attempts that are likely to succeed in helping to resolve the casualties that are still on our rolls from the Vietnam war.

Mr. Wolff. Do you think it is possible to resolve this problem?

General Tighe. I think it is with the cooperation of the two governments, which I suppose is possible. Without that cooperation, there is very little remaining that we are going to be able to do except through this refugee interrogation.

**INFORMATION WITHHELD BY VIETNAM**

Mr. Wolff. Now, General, as you have indicated in your public testimony, how would you come to the conclusion that there is information the Vietnamese have and have not passed to us?

General Tighe. Simply because of the great admixtures of the ways, they crossed themselves up in what they told us through the years, or as I have said in my testimony, things that we knew they knew but failed to reveal even though when they knew we knew them. The different admixtures of what they did and did not tell us and how they have dragged their feet in the process. I would suggest also that a lot of that dragging of feet was possibly because of the chaos that resulted from the war itself and from their inability to put manpower to the process of going out and doing a formal study of the problem. But it is certainly possible that the remains are there. In general I would suggest the villagers in that part of the world would know where every gravesite is located, as well as every piece of wreckage.

Mr. Wolff. Is it possible that the central government itself, not wanting to admit to their failings, has withheld information based upon that?

General Tighe. I believe that they, as I said, maintain meticulous records about many other things. I would be very surprised if they had not centralized a record or file on every casualty that was ever reported to them.

Mr. Wolff. Thank you.

Mr. Goodling.

Mr. Goodling. Just one question, General. Would you have any hot leads that you are pursuing now in relationship to any POW that may be living or dead?
General Tighe. I have none.
Mr. Goodling. I have no further questions.
Mr. Wolff. Mr. Lagomarsino.
Mr. Lagomarsino. Yes.

OTHER COUNTRY POW’S

General, back to the question I asked in open session about the possible prisoners held by Vietnam, what about other nationalities?
General Tighe. Well, let me comment on the response that four individuals, for example, were alleged to be prisoners of war who died in Laos. To the best of my knowledge, we had no other country participation in the military activity in Laos, unless they were involved in intelligence reconnaissance on their own at some time that I know nothing about. I think we will find that so.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Apparently what we were referring to were diplomats who were captured when Saigon fell.

General Tighe. Well, to the best of my knowledge, the negotiation for the release of the diplomats who are still living, I believe, in Saigon, or Ho Chi Minh City as it is now called, is still ongoing. There are live diplomats in Vietnam today.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Are we involved in that?

General Tighe. To the best of my knowledge, we are not. The concerned government is, through other governments I understand, attempting to release them.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Mr. Trowbridge, we are not involved in that?
Mr. Trowbridge. I cannot answer that really—not to my knowledge.

Mr. Lagomarsino. The gentleman now there, nodding his head, what does that mean?

STATE DEPARTMENT ASSISTANCE

General Tighe. The State Department representative has passed the word that the State Department is trying to do everything it can to help in the extrication of those diplomats.
Mr. Lagomarsino. There was a report some time ago by a fellow named Doan Van Toai who apparently claims to have seen four Western foreigners in prison. He says he was not able to contact them, but I guess they were Americans. Have we ever contacted or interviewed him?

General Tighe. I can’t answer that question.
Mr. Trowbridge. I would have to check.

General Tighe. If you will provide the precise spelling of the name, we would be very happy to check it out. Mr. Toai was interviewed on March 16, 1979. He provided a limited description of four U.S. personnel detained in a Saigon jail in October 1975. This report probably equates to some of a large number of American civilians who by choice or circumstances were not evacuated prior to the Communist takeover of South Vietnam but who have subsequently been released. Debriefings of these repatriated Americans indicated that they were subjected to interrogations in efforts to uncover any CIA affiliation. Some were placed in jail until the Communist authorities were convinced of the Americans’ innocence.

Mr. Lagomarsino. I have no further questions.
Mr. Wolff. Thank you.
The refugee who appeared before the subcommittee, Ngo Phi Hung, did we follow through with any attempts to collaborate any of the information he had? He indicated that he would give us the names of some of the people who were in the boat. Have we tried to get that information?

General Tighe. I believe we were able to check the reporting from people on the boat. I believe also we subsequently had a report from his brother, if I am not mistaken. I will pass that to Mr. Trowbridge. Is that not true?

Mr. Trowbridge. Yes, sir, that is true.

General Tighe. Who denies the data that he reports when he was in a position to know.

Mr. Wolff. His brother?

General Tighe. Yes, sir.

Mr. Trowbridge. I said he could not collaborate anything that was said by his brother. He said he was not knowledgeable of any of those activities.

Mr. Wolff. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Tighe. You mention that Mr. Trowbridge will shortly be visiting the Far East in order to take advantage of the potential of the Indochinese refugee information. Has anyone had direct communication with the refugees as they come out? Do we have anyone onsite? I know that based on your testimony the hardcore cases get to you, but is there anyone out there in the field who gets around to talking with the refugees? This committee found in prior testimony that because of their limited manpower even the State Department was getting just the general information around. They have stated that they would like to talk to anyone who knew anything about this situation, but they are not involved in a full campaign of checking with each refugee that comes out.

General Tighe. First, I would like to say I am reasonably sure that we are not interviewing each refugee because the volume is such that...

Mr. Gilman. I realize you don't have that ability but are there fieldmen who do get around from time to time?

General Tighe. Mr. Trowbridge, will you discuss how we have contact with the refugee centers?

Mr. Trowbridge. To the best of my knowledge, the way it is handled is that they are interviewed in some cases in these various host countries where the United States does not make direct contact with them. There are various volunteer organizations, missions, private or otherwise, that do some of the initial screening of the refugees. In the refugee centers there are posters, loudspeakers, and publications soliciting information on POW/MIAs, and they use those methods to
get out the word. When anyone who has this information comes in contact with the officials that are screening them, whether they be United States or from these private organizations, it is then brought to the attention of the U.S. official. It may be someone connected with the Embassy or a defense attaché through the Embassy, and at that time the individuals are recontacted and interviewed for this particular information. In some cases it may be someone from the Defense Attaché office, or it may be someone from the Joint Casualty Resolution Center in Bangkok; then that information is provided back to the DIA for evaluation.

Mr. Gilman. Are you satisfied that we are undertaking as extensive a survey of the potential refugee information as we could?

General Tighe. Under no circumstances, sir.

MORE INTERROGATORS

Mr. Gilman. Is there anything we can do to help beef that up a bit?

General Tighe. That is clearly a budgetary decision based on what the United States wants to expend to do it. It is a very big job, as you can understand, with the extraordinary volume of refugees.

Mr. Gilman. I would assume maybe 50 to 100 more investigators might be of help. Has there been any recommendation for that sort of thing?

General Tighe. To the best of my knowledge, the only attempts have been my regular budgetary attempts to get human collection people in the business of interrogating defectors and refugees in general. We have a rather extensive program going on now in other areas where refugees are very lucrative sources of intelligence but not specifically focused toward that particular issue.

Mr. Gilman. General, have you met any resistance in getting funds in that direction?

FUNDS FOR MANPOWER

General Tighe. I think only in the order of necessary priorities of what we have to spend versus what we would spend. We all have to make some judgments. I never get enough, as you can well imagine, and I never have enough in the human collection business especially.

Mr. Gilman. I have been a bit concerned as I review some of the reports that the Trowbridge office and each of the departments are whittling down their MIA/POW manpower, so that pretty soon they will whittle it right under the rug. I wonder what we could do to provide you with the necessary funding that you need to do a better job of glean- ing the information that we should be obtaining.

General Tighe. I very much appreciate that. I think you as a subcommittee could recommend a fundamental approach to this problem to the Director of Central Intelligence. I think this is something that could be added to the list of suggestions. It is a very worthy one.

On the other question of the resources that we have to put to the task, I think you know that we are regularly finding a crisis area that we had not counted on or a functional area that we think worth beefing up. Interestingly, as I inquire into what the specific activities are on a daily basis for Mr. Trowbridge's people, I find an unusual amount of their time is now being spent not on looking toward the resolution
of the data they are getting but in preparing for the testimony and extracting necessary material from their files, some of which has been retired, to support court cases. And of course they are spending an inordinate amount on the Freedom of Information issue.

Mr. Gilman. I should imagine that this process should be nearly over since we are down to 100-some cases. What is the figure that you are down to?

Mr. Trowbridge. I don’t have the figure, but it is approximately 100.

Mr. Gilman. One hundred. So that activity is soon to be completed.

General Tighe. That would be very helpful because they are spread across a number of functional areas.

Mr. Gilman. You suggest that we should approach the Director of Central Intelligence on this matter.

General Tighe. Yes.

CIA-DIA rapport

Mr. Gilman. Is there a good rapport between the CIA and your office? Do you get all the information you feel you should be getting on this issue?

General Tighe. I think all that is known is available with the exception I gave previously. There has been an immense amount of goodwill to exchange everything that is available in all of the agencies.

Mr. Gilman. Do you feel you have adequate enough funding for the analytical type of job we should be doing in reviewing the massive intelligence data that does come through in all kinds of reports?

General Tighe. I would like to have no backlog of refugee reports, for example. I would like to be on top of all of them. I am not on top of them, and I don’t think I will ever get manned to the point we could be. If we stimulate the refugee interrogation, we are going to have more. We are going to have a bigger backlog, but I think we are dealing with the reports quickly, sorting out those most likely prospects and giving them the adequate attention they deserve.

Refugee followup

Mr. Gilman. You mentioned in your testimony some 200 hard-core cases resulting from the refugee reports.

General Tighe. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gilman. What sort of followup do you do? Is that a direct followup with the refugee to pursue that information?

General Tighe. If I may turn to Mr. Trowbridge to answer the specifics of that.

Mr. Trowbridge. Again, sir, one of the things we are planning on doing on this trip is to focus attention on the problem of getting as much information as possible from the refugee during the first encounter. When we do get the information, if we need amplification or clarification of anything that comes in, we go directly back to that country, depending on where it is. We may work through the Joint Casualty Resolution Center officer or defense attaches. But by the time we get the information, the individual may have moved on to a third country or may have come to this country. If that is the case, we follow up in that country and we are following up in this country.

Mr. Gilman. Up to now we have not had that sort of direct followup under your plan?
Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir. In other words, we provide the message traffic back to the people within those countries.

Mr. GILMAN. You are relying on the State Department people primarily, are you not?

General Tighe. Or defense attachés?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Defense attachés.

Mr. GILMAN. I see.

19 REMAINS RETURNED

This committee and the Department of Defense in the course of the past few years have turned over some 200 hardcore files to the Vietnamese written in the Vietnamese language. I think some were also in the Laotian language. Have we ever received any response at all on any of those folders, General?

General Tighe. I think the answer is the same as I gave before. They returned the remains of 19 of those people whose names were among those folders.

Mr. GILMAN. But never in response to the file?

General Tighe. I asked that we furnish that for the record to make sure you have an accurate response. If anyone in the room could help me in that response, I would appreciate it.

Mr. GILMAN. Have you ever had any response at all with respect to those folders?

Mr. SIEVERTS. Woodcock turned the information over to the—

Mr. GILMAN. The select committees.

Mr. SIEVERTS. Right, and then the process continued over a period of about 2 years in which as many as 50 at a time were passed. The response that has come has only been in connection with the returns of remains, but when that happened the Vietnamese did specify that those were the cases for the files. In other words, it was a positive effort to link the remains with the files.

Mr. GILMAN. And there was no correlation of the files with the remains?

Mr. SIEVERTS. There was no correlation of the files with the remains.

CAMBODIAN RESPONSE

Mr. GILMAN. And no identification from Cambodia?

Mr. SIEVERTS. We have not given any folders to Cambodia.

Mr. GILMAN. Have we received a response?

Mr. SIEVERTS. We have had one response from Cambodia in response to the representative of the Communist Cambodian Government a list of all Americans missing, possibly captured, possibly alive and known dead in Cambodia. Very shortly thereafter, about a week later, we received an answer to the effect, and I quote, “There are no prisoners and no Americans and no foreigners in Cambodia.” There was just barely time for a turn around, it was clearly not a researched answer, but it was an answer.

CHINESE ASSISTANCE

Mr. GILMAN. General Tighe, based on our recent new relationship with Communist China, have we had an opportunity to explore
whether they could be of any assistance to us? At one time or another there was some report that the Chinese might be able to provide us with some information based upon their relationship with Vietnam.

General TIGHE. To the best of my knowledge, we have made no overtures on the basis of that new relationship. I shortly will be receiving the accreditation of their first Defense Attaché. That is a very appropriate subject I can bring up with him during his accreditation call, and I certainly will, but I have not had any opportunity before this time since he is newly arrived.

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS NOLAN

Mr. GILMAN. I am pleased you intend to pursue that with him.
You mentioned a prisoner by the name of Nolan. I had not heard that name before. Is there a possibility that we can get Mr. Nolan back to the States?

General TIGHE. I would not be surprised to have him attempt to come home at any time.

Mr. GILMAN. Has he made a request to come home?

General TIGHE. I know of no such request.

GARWOOD REQUEST

Mr. GILMAN. You mentioned in prior testimony that Mr. Garwood had made a prior request through other channels. How long ago had that request been made?

General TIGHE. That was days before we finally had the Vietnamese, as I recall, making a formal announcement that they held him, and I think that was the first meeting of the press.

Mr. GILMAN. It was my impression that he had made other requests through other channels.

General TIGHE. Yes. I said through another country. We had evidence of that, of a West European country.

Mr. GILMAN. How far in advance of the formal announcement did we have knowledge of that request?

General TIGHE. I can furnish that specifically for the record, but it seems to me it was about 2 weeks before we read about this in the Hanoi press.

[The following was subsequently submitted for the record.]

On 9 February 1979, the Department of State and the Defense Intelligence Agency were informed through diplomatic channels that Pfc Robert R. Garwood, USMC, had passed a handwritten note on 1 February 1979 to a West European national in a hotel in Hanoi. As far as we know, this is the first and only note passed by Pfc Garwood. Garwood talked to the West European and requested his assistance in effecting a return to the United States. On 14 February, the U.S. mission to the United Nations informed Ha Van Lu, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) Ambassador to the United Nations, that we knew Pfc Garwood was being held in Vietnam and that he wanted to return to the United States. The SRV Ambassador was requested to inform his government that we requested his immediate release as well as the identification of any other Americans living in Vietnam. On 15 February 1979, the Associated Press published the information that Garwood was in Vietnam and wanted to return to the United States. On the 27th, the Vietnamese government, through the Red Cross, officially confirmed the presence of Pfc Garwood in Vietnam, probably as a result of our démarche. Pfc Garwood was eventually released on 21 March 1979.
Mr. Gilman. We didn’t know anything about his wanting to come home aside from press report?

General Tighe. We knew of him, but nothing about his attempts to come home or desire to come home, except the note he passed.

Mr. Gilman. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wolff. Thank you, Mr. Gilman.

There are two comments I would like to make and then I will turn it over to Mr. Dornan for some questions.

No. 1 is the fact that this committee was supposed to go to Vietnam. I just wonder whether or not they were holding Garwood to turn over to us as they seem to be turning over remains all the time. They might have wanted to do something with this committee and when we canceled our visit because of their invasion of Cambodia, he surfaced shortly thereafter.

REWARDS FOR INFORMATION

The other point is you did indicate that we in previous wars had rewards for pilots. Is there anything in the way—do you think it would be helpful at all or would it be just confusing the issue—if making known a reward through the refugees for information that could be collaborated? In other words, maybe letting them come here to the United States as an indication of their goodwill toward this country. Do you think it would be more difficult for you to operate under that because you get so many false leads or do you think that it might provide us with one or two helpful leads?

General Tighe. I think because of our generosity in bringing so many of these refugees to the United States, we have an immense amount of goodwill all over the refugee world.

Mr. Wolff. I am not talking about that, I am talking about the incentive to some of these people that we are not bringing in.

General Tighe. My point is that with that kind of statistical sampling, at least a very dense statistical sampling, and that amount of goodwill, and the publicity that reaches them on our interest in this kind of data, we probably are getting the maximum amount of verifiable data. This is without what information we might have to sift through that would be provided by someone who is interested more in the reward than in providing good information.

U.N. PROGRAM INADEQUATE

Mr. Wolff. The only point I make on that is I am very critical of our refugee program on an overall basis. I do not believe we are doing an adequate job with the refugees so far as this particular issue is concerned. When you consider the High Commission has, I believe, two people in toto, or two or three people maximum in all of Thailand to cover all those camps it is a ridiculous situation in relation to the influx of refugees coming in.

I don’t see how we are going to handle this with the poor work that is being done by the United Nations. I am hopeful that our Ambassador will be able to do something in this connection and pay greater atten-
tion to it. I am afraid, however, that knowing our Ambassador's interest in Africa he may be spending a good deal of his time on African refugees rather than on Vietnamese refugees.

Pursuing Information

One thing that this committee wants you to know, General Tighe, is that we are going to continue to pursue this matter as you are. We are not going to issue a final report until there is enough material for a final report. We are not going to drop the issue, we are going to continue to pursue it as long as there is the opportunity or you feel there is an opportunity of providing information that will be of substance. You know a lot of people felt that when the Select Committee on MIA's went out of business this was not going to be pursued. We were charged with this responsibility, and as chairman of this committee, I say we are going to continue to pursue it.

General Tighe. The casualty resolution, Mr. Chairman, is very much an open subject. I agree that there probably never will be a final report that should be issued. I think it has got to be an open case. As far as what we should do to resolve those unresolved cases, I think we should expend effort or any incentive to improve information or to get information that is valid and will help to resolve those cases. So I applaud that approach, and I think we all should keep that kind of attitude toward the business.

Mr. Wolff. Thank you.

Mr. Dornan.

Mckinley Nolan

Mr. Dornan. General, when I first met you in your office over 1½ years ago I noted that we shared the same university and your son had gone there. I met your son and developed a friendship with you. I thought that here is the “right man” in the “right job” and someone that the families could put their total faith in. You have never let that faith down; and I want to congratulate you for the way you responded: to just publish everything that you had. I think that whatever solace the families have had in these last two agonizing years, particularly, come from the aggressive and faithful way that you have pursued this whole tragic issue. It never ceases to amaze me—the almost unbelievable theatrical quality; the melodramatic quality of personal agony that this story takes on.

I am hearing the name Nolan for the first time. I played a man in grammar school, a fictitious man. “Breathes there a man with soul so dead who never to himself has said, this is my own, my native land?” What is Nolan’s first name? I hope it is not Philip.

Mr. Trowbridge. McKinley?

Mr. Dornan. McKinley? It sounds Presidential.

Well, this man Nolan is now thinking that his own, his native land would like to see him again. He is probably right. I must have missed something in the open session this morning. How did you find out about Mr. Nolan?

General Tighe. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Dornan, we have quite a long list of reports of other American prisoners of war.

1 Robert K. Dorman, a Representative in Congress from the State of California.
who returned and who told of his existence and of his activities. I believe the last of those reports kept track of him through 1974.

Mr. Nolan. Was he a marine?

General Tighe. Army, and I believe a staff sergeant. I think he was a noncom.

Mr. Trowbridge. He was a private first class.

Mr. Dornan. Taken prisoner in which area?

Mr. Trowbridge. Sir, he was a deserter.

Mr. Dornan. Which corps area?

Mr. Trowbridge. He deserted from the Saigon area.

Mr. Dornan. He would have been from the Salt, Pepper, where a blond kid towed the three armored personnel carriers out of Danang?

Mr. Wolff. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. Dornan. Yes.

DEserters

Mr. Wolff. I just asked Mr. Gilman if we have any information on the number of deserters we had during the Vietnam war and whether they have all been accounted for?

General Tighe. I don't know that we know, but I think that we could probably ask the Services to furnish what they believe was that number. It could be furnished for the committee.

Mr. Wolff. Would you indicate whether they have all been accounted for? With all due respect to the Vietnamese, we are getting these names one at a time and I think it would be helpful if we could kind of—

General Tighe. I have never asked the question of whether or not we still had a list of all those. I will pass it to the committee.

Mr. Wolff. Since there is some question about Garwood being a deserter or someone who was captured, I think it would be helpful to us in putting together part of the pieces of this puzzle to determine the number of desertions.

Salt and Pepper

Mr. Dornan. Following up on that question, could you supply to the committee the best guesstimates of the Salt, Pepper, and also the blond-haired kid that had so much bravado he hooked up and towed three armored personnel carriers from the Danang area over to the North Vietnamese side?

General Tighe. I will defer to Mr. Trowbridge. We can get some guesstimates, but whether or not they will be good, I don't know.

Mr. Trowbridge. I would hate to make a guess at an individual being a deserter, putting that tag on him incorrectly, and that is just about what it would have to be.

Mr. Gilman. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. Dornan. Yes.

Mr. Gilman. Isn't that what we did with Garwood? We speculated he was a deserter without having some third hand reports?

Mr. Trowbridge. Again, he was carried by the Marine Corps as a prisoner. We did provide information on his activities, and in that particular case we did have eye witnesses. Here we are talking about

The list referred to is classified and is retained in committee files.
some people who are just Salt and Pepper in which there is no identity involved.

Mr. Dornan. They were never identified eyeball-to-eyeball by other American prisoners?

Mr. Trowbridge. Yes, there were two individuals, Salt and Pepper, but we don't know who they are.

Mr. Dornan. I respect the military. If you have 100 MIA families who all want to think of their son dying as a hero, it would be outrageous to say that here are 10 and we might speculate 2 of these might have been deserters.

**VIETNAMESE ACTIVITIES**

Has there ever been a case physically where someone eyeballed a North Vietnamese folder on an American POW on the Woodcock trip; or on any subsequent trips has anybody seen any evidence, even circumstantial evidence, that they have folders of their own origin, or taking one of our folders and adding to it, that they have actually been tracking Missing In Action cases?

Let me add as a prologue to your answer that, for example, Captain Vohden knows of the absolute precise, almost Nazi-like, recordkeeping that went on with the POW's. For example, holding letters for 6 or 7 years, photographs of the families that they would flash in front of the man as a form of psychological torture 4 or 5 years after those photographs arrived, returning to an Annapolis or West Point officer his ring or a pair of eyeglasses that they took off him, or even toothpaste.

The Germans in their stalags would still have the Red Cross packages. They would eat the Lifesavers and Hershey bars and return packages of vitamins 5, 6, 7 years later, return them to Americans. Like the Federal prison system, where they put all your belongings in a brown envelope and return it to you with the dust of 20 years, they would return to our POW's, with the dust of 7 and 8 years, articles that they took from them early on.

Since they were making combs out of the aluminum from the F-105 Thunderbirds and giving them to the Jane Fondas that would visit, they certainly kept track of an airplane. They put up signs on grave-sites that we have photographs of. What evidence is there that they followed with this same precision individual MIA or POW cases?

**METICULOUS RECORDS**

General Tighe. Well, I could give one bit of evidence. We speak in my statement to the effect that we know how meticulous they are at recordkeeping. We note, for example, that in telling us about the prisoners they held, at the same time they withheld other data which subsequently came to light and which indicated they had the records but didn't choose to give them.

The thing that impresses me is that you will recall in some of the [deleted] intelligence that we released, there was someone regularly reporting this data from all over Vietnam. Somebody was on the receiving end of those reports that they made back to their headquarters. So there was undoubtedly that same meticulous system of collecting data, or an attempt at it, throughout Vietnam throughout
all the war. You would expect them to have data on the activities of Americans everywhere.

Mr. Wolff. On that score I believe that Garwood did indicate to us they would not let him take his watch out of Vietnam because it was not on the original list of items he had on his person when he was either taken or was——

Mr. Dornan. A watch that he bought there years later?

Mr. Wolff. No, a watch that he had had on him.

Mr. Dornan. It was in the folder but they had not properly recorded it.

Mr. Wolff. They said it was not recorded in his articles when he was taken.

Mr. Dornan. Fourteen years before.

Mr. Gilman. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. Dornan. Yes.

Mr. Gilman. I think it was at the end of 1975, and I have the correct date, they introduced to us a Committee on the Missing that they had recently established that was ostensibly established to collect information and data in 1975.

WHEELEDING AND DEALING

Mr. Dornan. General, I have said in open testimony what the former Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, told me. He used the word "warehousing" and then he said, "I resist that word as a warehousing of bags of bones, but they have stashed somewhere comprehensive records and remains of Americans." He said, "If they intend to use the 'French system' of slowly leaking this out to us, we would be fools to pay for this."

Now with the matter of these [deleted], which is something else I was just made aware of this morning, since this is a closed session have we talked to our friends——

Mr. Wolff. Excuse me one moment. I have to leave. Mr. Gilman is going to take over.

Mr. Dornan. Have we talked to our friends in the country in question and asked if there has been any type of blackmail? Or have there been any suggestions by the Communist Government of Vietnam on what type of wheeling and dealing they would do to return these [deleted] diplomats, keeping in mind also that the diplomats have always had a special category—or the whole world is totally uncivilized in warfare? Supposedly, no matter how many of your young men you are killing on either side, you try to return, through a neutral country, a diplomat. So it seems to be extremely offensive to hold diplomats taken when Saigon was overrun. Has there been any discussion on what they propose to get these [deleted].

General Tighe. I had no knowledge in previous testimony of U.S. efforts. I know of no way to answer that question, but I would defer to Mr. Sieverts, who might be able to answer.

Mr. Dornan. Frank?

U.S. EFFORTS

Mr. Sieverts. We do know of extensive contacts between the [deleted] authorities and the Vietnamese authorities. We have sup
ported those efforts in some of our own contacts. The [deleted] have also enlisted the help of other governments and of international organizations such as the Red Cross and the U.N. Refugee Commission. I don't think we can say what kind of blackmail might be involved, except to note the fact that those diplomats have not yet been released. This is, as you say, a most serious violation—not just the human standards but all the conventions governing the standards of diplomats. I am just not quite clear in my own mind what exactly it is that the Vietnamese are looking for in return.

INFORMATION FOLDERS

Mr. DORNAN. General, could I make a peculiar request of you. If there is a budget for this, and it would only be a few hundred dollars, the condition of the folders that we were going to take into Hanoi, the members of this committee, back in January was really so untypical of a great and wealthy Nation that it made me feel peculiar hand-carrying them in. They looked like fourth or fifth Xerox copies. They were assembled quickly at the last minute by our very excellent representatives in Bangkok and given to us.

As peculiar as this may sound, I think that they should be respected with the same awe and honor that we respect the remains when they come out where they are treated with great reverence and an American flag is put on the remains and they are brought out with great pomp and ceremony. I would like to see each folder treated individually as a mother would treat it if she were to present it. A mother might go to a 5 and 10 cent store and get a simulated leather cover. She would make sure that every word was correct, that the print was clear and an original copy.

If there is some way where we could allocate, whether it is Intelligence funds or State Department funds, some way to take each one of the 400 or 500 cases we were taking in and put it in a proper folder with an American crest or seal or flag on it. The Vietnamese checked and double checked on the back of sheets the grammar and in each case it is written in a different narrative style. Some are in the third person, some are in the first person, some use very cold military jargon, others are written in a very intelligible narrative form.

I think there should be a standardization, and I would like to show you these folders, and see that the next congressional delegation that goes in there could not present them in a very beautiful and formal way so that they feel that rather than an unwinding process is taking place that we are still focusing with all of our energy on the importance of verifying these cases, because although the odds won't be the best odds, the family will hope for, I believe, that a matching up could take place in Hanoi very easily between what Dr. Kissinger referred to as a certain warehousing of information, if not remains, in the hundreds of cases that we have left. Is there a budget to do that?

General TIGHE. Let me just tell you that I will do everything in my power to make you proud of anything you carry in there if you give me the opportunity to do so.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, General. That is the response I thought I would get.
In trying to look for some solution other than an Intelligence solution on how to get more information out of them, and maybe this is a State Department question rather than an Intelligence question, is there any evidence lately now that the dust has settled and the killing has stopped for awhile in Cambodia and that the reports now back and forth between the Chinese and the North Vietnamese have them at loggerheads—and I read with interest the reports that they have brain injury cases and sickness cases. I read this in Newsweek. People are speculating, are the Soviets using that Chinese-North Vietnamese border incident area, where the Germans used the Spanish Civil War to test new weapons? Is there a laser-type weapon coming?

All of that exotic and melodramatic writing in the press, have we seen any movement of Vietnam toward us to shore up their position against China where maybe we could again open the door by saying, look, people, we have not forgotten the accountability on the MIA’s, section 8(b) in the Paris Accords? Any progress in that area at all?

General TIGHE. I can only answer in general. I would like first to comment that the report of exotic weapons used is something that interested us a great deal. The Chinese, of course, went against almost a totally defensive force. The main battle forces of Vietnam never got into that fray. As a result, they were using human wave tactics to breach defenses and had extraordinary casualties breaching those defensive positions that the Vietnamese had set up. The casualties were extraordinary, as you know, because of the type of attacks those people were making. I would probably have given you a more optimistic answer that there could be some kind of a thawing possible some day downstream except for having read in this morning’s newspaper what treatment the U.S. Chamber of Commerce representatives got at the airport leaving Vietnam yesterday. Certainly there is no indication that the attitude of the Vietnamese toward the United States is doing anything but hardening.

Mr. DORNAN. I missed the treatment they got. What happened at the airport?

General TIGHE. They were detailed, searched, made to sign statements that they had conducted illegal activities in the country, and held for a very long time. This lasted 2½ hours or so. There were a couple of ambassadors held on the airplane waiting takeoff, waiting for these American Chamber of Commerce people to be released.

INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

Mr. DORNAN. General, I am going to yield back the rest of my time, but one final question. Having just read Joseph Peresceff’s book on declassified material on World War II—“Piercing the Third Reich” is the title of his book—it seems to me with all due respect to CIA and DIA that we may be going backward in our accumulation of intelligence at the human level. We have spy-in-the-sky satellites, we have electronic devices, but that person-to-person intelligence that is so valuable that General Haig described to me in Europe a year ago is the keystone to really figuring out what the Soviets are up to in the Soviet Pact countries.
NEW MORALITY

We have been jerking so many people out of the field. Is there anything to hope for given this new morality about intelligence in our country? I don’t think there is any new morality in France or Germany, or Japan, or England, or any other country on the face of the Earth except in the United States. Not even in Mexico or Canada is there a new morality in intelligence. Given the new morality that we don’t offend potential adversaries, is there any way of us getting any information out of Laos on Americans there or is there any way we will ever be able to confirm what you and I discussed: 1½ years ago, there were Americans alive in January 1973 in Laos and that there may have been some truthfulness to Soth Patrasii’s statement that they might have up to 180 Americans alive?

AMERICANS IN LAOS

[Deleted.]

Mr. DORNAN. First of all, do you believe that men were alive at the end of our involvement in Indochina in Laos?

General TIGHE. The answer to the question is that my data base on live Americans in Laos predates the end of hostilities there but I do firmly believe there were Americans alive and photographed in Laos in the Sam Neua area up to a period of about 18 months before hostilities ceased. My belief in our ability to find out specifically what happened in that country is very high if you want to get it. [Deleted.]

Mr. DORNAN. Do you agree with my assessment that we are the only country on the face of the Earth where our intelligence people suffer this new morality?

Mr. GILMAN [presiding]. How much time do you want?

General TIGHE. Let me answer that in a little offhand way, if I may. During my appearances before the House and Senate this year, and I have made several to date, my pleas both in the collection and analysis ends of the business have been met with very, very full cooperation of all the membership.

Mr. DORNAN. So the new morality may be giving away to old reality.

[Deleted.]

Mr. DORNAN. Do you believe personally that Americans were probably still alive in January of 1973?

General TIGHE. I would have to say a personal belief, yes, there were some live Americans. However, we have no hard evidence that any servicemen are alive and being held prisoner against their will in Southeast Asia.

Mr. DORNAN. [Deleted.]

General TIGHE. [Deleted.]

Mr. DORNAN. [Deleted.]

General TIGHE. [Deleted.]

Mr. DORNAN. For a while.

General TIGHE. That decision would have to be made by the State Department.

Mr. DORNAN. But eventually it should come out?

General TIGHE. Yes, sir.
TRIP TO HANOI

Mr. Gilman. General Tighe, this committee, as you know, will be going to Hanoi sometime in August. We would like to receive from you, Mr. Trowbridge, or any other agency any files or papers to be presented at that time that might be of help in our direct discussion.

General Tighe. They can supply it.

Mr. Gilman. The subcommittee thanks you and Mr. Trowbridge and Mr. Sieverts.

There being no further questions, the subcommittee stands adjourned.

General Tighe. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]