to about $700 million ($450 for “postwar reconstruction”, $50 million “development loan”, $208.8 “Food for Peace”) by Christmas 1973.

The Administration then proceeded to restore all cuts—and then go beyond even its original request, winding up at $1.1 billion.

This $1.1 billion, moreover, is used almost entirely for war-related programs and has no impact whatsoever on the reconstruction or human needs of Indochina. Almost half of this money, for example, is for “Food for Peace” “Food for Peace” is imported in South Vietnam and Cambodia by local importers, who pay currency to the GVN and Lon Nol governments. The Administration has used 100% of these funds in South Vietnam, and 90% in Cambodia, for “common defense” needs, i.e. war.

Most of the remaining money—for the commodity import programs, “technical support” programs, etc.—are similarly used to support the war. They are designed to provide the minimal economic backing necessary for the Tylen and Lin Nol regimes to survive, with much of the local currency generated by the OIP and other programs also finding its way into the budgets of the army, air force and police.

3. FY 1974 implementation: Humanitarian and reconstruction funds reduced

Despite the fact that the “economic” aid has risen, moreover, the actual FY 1974 funds devoted to humanitarian or reconstruction needs has actually fallen. Total funds requested for “humanitarian, reconstruction and development” programs in the FY 1974 original presentation amounted to $228.8 million. At this writing, however, we have found that the Administration has allocated only $172 million for what is termed “development”, “humanitarian”, and “reconstruction”. And even this minuscule amount of aid contains a massive deception of Congress. Of the $96.4 million for “humanitarian” needs, some $75 million went to “refugee relief.” Much of this money pays for “refugee resettlement” which, as former U.S. AID officials Edward Bloor and Leon Van Wagonen, as well as the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees, have recently pointed out, is not humanitarian at all. Rather U.S. and GVN officials have denied refugees the “freedom of movement” guaranteed them under Article 11 of the Paris Agreement, by refusing to allow them to return to the villages of their birth and instead resettling them in marginal areas, often without water and decent farming land, so as to claim this land for “strategic reasons”.

Of a total of $3.2 billion appropriated by Congress in FY 1974 for Indochina-related expenses, then only $60 million, or .08% has actually gone to meet the humanitarian and reconstruction needs of the people. The rest has gone—directly or indirectly—for more war.

4. Requests for increased FY 1975 AID: Four administrative myths

Since FY 1974 aid was not designed either to meet the human needs of the people of Vietnam, nor to lead to a political solution, it is not surprising that the Administration’s FY 1975 aid requests for FY 1974 allocations.

Just one year ago, on April 24, the President unveiled his FY 1975 budget proposal for Indochina. This year, this section of the President’s Foreign Aid speech was entitled “Toward Reconstruction of Indochina.” In it, the President requested $996.8 million for “Postwar Reconstruction”, more than double last year’s $450 million allocation.

Other Administration documents reveal, moreover, that the President intends to ask for $2.1 billion in military aid for FY 1975, an increase of 42% over last year’s military appropriations.

The only major category which did not jump up spectacularly for FY 1975 was the Administration’s “Food for Peace” request, which was only $320 million, about half of the FY 1974 allocation. Last year at this time, however, the Administration only requested $208.8 million for “Food for Peace.” Since it eventually grew to $307 million, there is no doubt that this year’s request could grow similarly over the next 12 months.

Depending on one’s measure, therefore, the FY 1975 Administration request represents an increase over FY 1974 allocations of varying degrees:

1. Overall, the jump is from $3.2 billion in FY 1974 to a requested $3.7 billion in FY 1975—an increase of 16%.

2. Total economic and military inputs into the three countries of Indochina have increased 30%, from $2.3 billion to $3.2 billion.

3. The increase in the case of the increase, however, comes from ignoring the humanitarian “Food for Peace” estimates for FY 1975. Comparing “Indochina Postwar Reconstruction Aid” funds, with “Military Assistance Service Fund” and
"Military Assistance Program" funds, we find an increase from $2.08 billion to $3.02 billion, a jump of 45%.

This large increase in requested FY 1976 aid has resulted entirely from the weakness of the Administration position in Indochina. Unable to triumph militarily, but unwilling to try and compete politically for fear of losing, the Administration is doing little more right now than simply more of the same.

Unable to admit this to the American people and Congress—and perhaps to themselves—however, Administration officials have instead attempted to present this year’s aid requests in the best possible light. The essence of their position is that if these aid requests are passed, they will both give the GVN and Lon Nol government a “fair chance” against the weapons supplied the other side by the Soviet Union and China, and also make them economically and militarily viable so that they will not demand American aid 3 or 4 years from now.

Unfortunately, such arguments by the Administration are little but myths.

**Myth (1)** Administration programs are made necessary by our “commitments” under the Paris Agreements.—On March 25, 1974, Henry Kissinger wrote to Senator Kennedy that “as a signatory of the Paris Agreement * * * the United States committed itself to strengthening the conditions which made the ceasefire possible * * * with these commitments in mind, we continue to provide the Republic of Vietnam with the means necessary for its self-defense and its economic viability.”

The American people have been given many reasons in public for our involvement in Vietnam over the years: there was the domino theory, the Gulf of Tonkin, the Sandinista threat, the “Xe Loi” scare, and the over-popular “commitment to allowing the Vietnamese people the right of self-determination.”

In fact, as the Pentagon Papers reveal, all of these public rationales were mere sugar-coating for what former Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton described as 70% of our goal: “To avoid a humiliating defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor).” McNaughton also stated that only “10%” of our “alms” were to “permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer way of life.”

Of all the previous untruths, however, none is more absurd than Mr. Kissinger’s. The notion that the Paris Agreement serves as a rationale for our continued intervention is plainly untrue.

Article 1 of the Paris Agreement states that “The United States * * * respect(s) the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam.” By signing this, the Administration conceded on the crucial point of debate over the years: Vietnam is one country, by definition wrought by a civil war. Continuing U.S. involvement in Vietnam, therefore, constitutes blatant intervention in a civil war, one recognized by international law and common sense to be illegal.

If there was any doubt on this question, moreover, Article 4 of the Paris Agreement removes it. Article 4 states that “The United States will not continue its military involvement or interfere in the internal affairs of South Vietnam.” In signing the Agreement, therefore, the Administration was making a solemn commitment to end our involvement—military, political and economic—to some Vietnam, i.e. the zones controlled by President Thieu, as well as by the PRG.

For Mr. Kissinger to now claim that this Paris Agreement in fact “commits” the U.S. to further and massive involvement represents one of the most grotesque and twisted myths ever put forward to the American public as a reason for intervention abroad.

**Myth (2):** This substantial amount of aid will suffice to launch the GVN on the road to economic recovery, allowing us to reduce our aid substantially in the next 2-3 years.—Recently, for example, the U.S. Ambassador to Saigon Mr. Graham Martin, stated that, "If * * * the Congress approves the 850 million dollars I have recommended for fiscal year 1976, plus approximately 700 million dollars for the following year, I am convinced further economic aid from the United States could be drastically reduced or even eliminated altogether, by fiscal year 1977." (U.S. News and World Report, April 29, 1974).

All available evidence suggests precisely the opposite, however, The World Bank, for example, recently completed a survey for South Vietnam’s economy. In its report dated January 29, 1974, World Bank experts concluded that “* * * net aid required in 1976 will be on the order of $770 million a year or about $1.3 billion, higher than seems probable for 1974. In short, it seems probable that Vietnam is at least a medium ‘long haul’ case as far as foreign aid is concerned. For what it is worth, as a purely arithmetical exercise but with about the same parameters we have mentioned above, by 1980 the external resource gap would close by about $300 million a year to about $450 million.” (Source: “Current

Mr. Martin is also rather distinguished about the total amount of funds necessary to get the Thieu economy back on its feet again. For example, he states in the same interview that “We were able to give only 300 million dollars” in economic aid to the Thieu government in FY 1974.

In actual fact, however, AID provided a chart to the House Government Operations Subcommittee on March 20, 1974, indicating that the U.S. had actually provided $706.5 million in “economic and humanitarian assistance to Vietnam, fiscal year 1974.” (House Government Operations Subcommittee, “Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1974, part II, page 890). This figure, moreover, does not include a $60 million “loan” and $49 million supplemental appropriation expected to pass Congress for FY 1974, and an extra $50 million “Food for Peace” money.

Thus the U.S. is supplying $878 million to Thieu’s economy this year, not only the $300 million that Martin suggests.

Mr. Martin’s $870 and $700 figures, moreover, are based on the assumption that the fighting does not drastically increase in the next year or two. In fact, however, escalation is not only possible but probable, given the refusal of the GVN to even test the other side’s offer for a ceasefire and political settlement.

Myth (5): Our aid is “defensive”, designed to offset weapons given the other side by the Soviet Union and China.—The only official figures of Soviet and Chinese military aid to North Vietnam of which I am aware are for the years 1966-68, and 1970 and 1971. For these 6 years, during which hundreds of thousands of U.S. ground troops were fighting in Indochina, and the U.S. air force dropped well over 7 million tons of bombs, U.S. military expenditures were estimated to total roughly $90 billion. During these same 6 years, source Soviet and Chinese military aid combined was estimated to total roughly $2.24 billion—or roughly about $380 million a year, or roughly 1/30 the amount of armament we funneled in.

Since the ceasefire, moreover, Soviet and Chinese aid has reportedly been substantially reduced. Mr. Martin himself, for example, stated on January 10, 1974, that the Soviet and Chinese “are not resupplying them (Hanoi), with massive weapons of war as they have continuously over the past years.” (Congressional Record, E2122, April 4, 1974.)

Given this fact, it is fair to assume the Soviet and Chinese military aid to its allies may be on the order of $1-200 million, or less for the coming fiscal year. At the same time, however, we find the Administration proposing $3.08 billion or 10-20 times as much military aid to the Thieu and Lon Nol regimes, as well as $163 million more for U.S. forces in the area.

Indeed, the Soviet and Chinese could turn this equation around and argue that they are in fact only supplying their allies to protect them against the vastly greater quantity of arms given the Thieu and Lon Nol governments. This case can be made even more strongly, moreover, by noting that many of the most expensive items in the other side’s inventory, e.g. SAM missiles, are quite clearly defensive weapons; or—as in the case of Soviet-supplied MiGs for the North Vietnamese air force—they are weapons which have historically been used defensively.

Many of the most expensive items we supply our allies in Indochina however e.g. airplanes, spare parts of bombs, are often used offensively. Numerous western journalists visiting PRG zones since the ceasefire, for example, have reported GVN bombing deep inside numerous PRG zones, where no PRG military activity was taking place.

The thesis that our military aid is not at all geared to the threat from the other side, moreover, is strengthened by a comparison of our military aid to the GVN in calendar years 1972 and 1973.

In CY 1972, we supplied $2.368 billion in military aid to the Thieu regime. In that year 39,587 ARVN soldiers were killed. In CY 1973, ARVN casualties declined by two-thirds, to 13,022. This substantial decline in casualties helps to substantiate the universal opinion that fighting was substantially lower in 1973 than it was in 1972. And yet U.S. military aid to the Thieu regime totalled $2.371 billion in 1973, precisely as much as it had been in 1972 when the fighting had been much higher. (Source: AID figures supplied to Cong. Abzug, Feb. 20, 1974.)

All evidence indicates, therefore, that the amount of U.S. military aid given to the Thieu government is determined more by the constant size of the GVN
army—1.1 million men—than by the amount of aid supplied by the Soviet Union and China to their allies.

Myth (4): Administration FY 75 aid requests will allow pro-U.S. regimes “stand on their own feet”, thereby allowing the U.S. to walk away in a matter of years. At the end of his request for economic aid funds for Indochina last week, the President stated that “the investment I am now seeking (is) * * * to give the people of Indochina a chance to stand on their own feet.”

Graham Martin, in the interview referred to above, was even more explicit about the time required for the “to stand on their own feet”: “How do we end our involvement? * * * I have said our objective should be to end it leaving a Vietnam economically viable, militarily capable of defending itself with its own manpower, and free to choose its own government and its own leaders. I believe this can be done within the next three years.”

These optimistic and idealistic pronouncements are reminiscent of former predictions of a “light at the end of the tunnel”. And, as in 1961, as in 1964, these predictions cannot and are not substantiated. All available evidence, indeed indicates exactly the opposite.

Thieu’s opponents are, if anything, stronger since the ceasefire. Numerous reports from western journalists indicate that the PRG has begun building up its economy, reconstructing its bomb-leveled communities in the zones under its control. The relative prosperity, cleanliness, and lower prices in its rural villages, moreover, have astonished numerous outside observers who have visited its zones.

The PRG has, moreover, seized the political initiative. On my recent trip to Saigon, for example, one friend explained it this way before the ceasefire, both sides meant war. You might be for the PRG, but to join it meant to opt for a difficult and dangerous way of life. Since the ceasefire, however, Thieu has continued to call for war, while the PRG have come to represent peace. It is common knowledge, for example, that everyone in PRG zones is encouraged to learn the Paris Agreement, and the PRG has convinced many Vietnamese that it sincerely wants to implement it. In GVN zones, on the other hand, the Paris Agreement is not publicized and Thieu does little but talk of more war.

During my visit to South Vietnam, moreover, I found that most experts believe that the military balance is also shifting away from Thieu. U.S. technicians trying to keep the GVN airforce together, for example, told me that VNAF mechanics have little interest in maintaining their own planes. The desertion rate is reportedly high since the ceasefire, and local accomodations between PRG and ARVN units have skyrocketed since the ceasefire. This has allowed the PRG to move more freely than ever throughout South Vietnam, extending its influence into many villages and hamlets it formerly could not reach.

The motion, moreover, that by providing well over 90% of the GVN’s resources, the U.S. is leaving Vietnam “free to choose its own government” makes no more sense today than it did 20 years ago. The basic fact is that the Thieu government is the only administration in the world which derives 90% of its resources from a foreign government. And, as such, it is not responsible to its own people but to the U.S. This basic structural fact means that the GVN will never be able to “stand on its own”—for it has no base in its own country. (See Table 4)

The principal economic problem of the GVN, for example, is the tremendous cost of maintaining its 1.1 million-man army, 300,000 civil servants, and 120,000 policemen. This huge parasitic class not only devours our aid, but can only survive through an ever-increasing amount of aid and war material from the outside.

The Thieu government, unwilling to compete politically, unable to allow a relaxation of tensions which might see its army desert en masse, unable to relax police control of its population, is therefore structurally committed to maintaining this huge bureaucracy indefinitely.

Thus, it is, for example, that despite the decline in the real value of U.S. transfers of resources to South Vietnam’s economy since the 1969 peak, the per capita level of imports into South Vietnam in constant U.S. dollar values remains today at about $25—still higher than the $22 per capita a decade ago. Despite this tremendous influx of funds from the outside, however, the Thieu government has been unable to use this capital for development. It has all been eaten up by an ever-swelling bureaucracy which has seen GVN per capita spending increased from about $25 to $50 during the same period.
Another example of the structural inability of the GVN to stand on its own is the artificial nature of its urban economy. By refusing to allow millions of refugees to return to the villages of their birth—because such villages are in zones controlled by the PRG—the GVN has ensured that millions of its citizens will remain unproductive, and often in need of doles just to survive. This has in turn, led to over-crowding and filth in and around South Vietnam’s major cities and increased the probability that the GVN will need aid indefinitely.

Fundamentally, however, the most basic structural inability of the GVN is its military orientation and disinclination to shift towards a peace-time economy and political mode of competition. In part, it is a question of sheer momentum. For over a decade now, General Thieu and other top officials have remained in power due to American largesse in return for ordering troops into battle. Like any government anywhere, it finds it easier to do what it knows best, than shift to what appears to be a more high-risk arena of political competition. In part, however, it may also be a realization or fear on the part of the GVN’s part that it simply cannot compete politically with the PRG—that the GVN’s well-known corruption, its police-state tactics, and its decade-long commitment to war, will place it at a disadvantage against its adversaries.

Whatever the case, it is clear that as long as the war in Indochina continues—at whatever foreseeable level—the GVN will simply not be able to “stand on its own” no matter how much aid is given it. (1) Agricultural production will still be limited, with war victims, refugees and often, urban dwellers, demanding American food imports indefinitely. (2) Domestic and foreign investors will not put money into long-term investments. (3) Mobilization of manpower and resources for the war machine will continue to constitute a powerful inflationary force; world prices will remain high, and the major items required for capital intensive agriculture we have introduced to compensate for lost production due to war, will continue to be too expensive for most farmers.

And if all the above is true for South Vietnam, of course, the situation is even less hopeful for the Administration in Cambodia.

One need do little here but repeat the obvious: the Lon Nol regime is composed entirely today of hard-line extremists, with such moderates as In Tam having left the cabinet in disgust. The Lon Nol government’s military position is hopeless, with the Khmer Rouge controlling 70-80% of Cambodia, and remaining on the offensive in the rest. Politically, the Lon Nol government has virtually no support at all—it has even lost the support it originally enjoyed from a numerically tiny group of intellectuals.

For the Administration to suggest that it is in either the American or Cambodian interest for Congress to appropriate more than $600 million in FY 1975—for war in Cambodia is beneath comment. Even more so than in South Vietnam, the only solution for everyone is for us to stop intervening in Cambodia and to allow what all admit is a civil war among Cambodians to take its course.

This fiscal year 1975 budget request for Indochina aid, then, represents a fundamental attempt by the Administration to deceive Congress and the American people. It will not allow the GVN or Lon Nol governments to become economically viable, it is not a measured response to Soviet and Chinese aid to their allies, and it offers no hope of ever ending.
TABLE 1.—FISCAL YEAR 1974 AND 1975 U.S. EXPENDITURES FOR INDOCHINA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Original fiscal year 1974 request</th>
<th>Fiscal year 1974 allocation</th>
<th>Original fiscal year 1975 request</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic aid:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Indo-China post-war reconstruction</td>
<td>$519,000,000</td>
<td>$435,000,000</td>
<td>$393,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Food for Peace,</td>
<td>$208,000,000</td>
<td>$130,000,000</td>
<td>$250,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Loans,</td>
<td>$75,000,000</td>
<td>$49,000,000</td>
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</tr>
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<td>4. Supplemental</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal economic aid</td>
<td>$872,000,000</td>
<td>$714,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military aid:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Map,</td>
<td>$1,900,000,000</td>
<td>$1,108,000,000</td>
<td>$1,200,000,000</td>
</tr>
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<td>6. Map,</td>
<td>$181,000,000</td>
<td>$342,000,000</td>
<td>$480,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal, economic and military aid</td>
<td>$2,083,000,000</td>
<td>$1,446,000,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Indochina-related U.S. forces</td>
<td>$10,000,000,000</td>
<td>$3,280,000,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>$3,993,000,000</td>
<td>$3,743,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Letter from Secretary of State Kissinger to Senator Kennedy, Congressional Record, S384, Apr. 1, 1974
4 Military aid: figures for 1975 are preliminary and are based on $1,900,000,000 for Southeast Asia costs in fiscal year 1975. The $463,000,000 for U.S. forces largely are air bases in Thailand.
5 Of this, the $1,833,000,000 for South Vietnam (source—footnote 3 above), $77,000,000, Cambodia (source—conference with Department of Agriculture).
6 President's Foreign Aid Message, Congressional Record, H3094, Apr. 24, 1974.
9 Civilian figures below prepared by the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees.
10 These figures are estimates made by the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees.
11 This figure was supplied the Indochina Resource Center from the DOD Comptroller's office on Apr. 29, 1974, and defined as incremental Southeast Asia costs for the support of U.S. forces related to the phase-down of the Indo-China conflict.
12 Up 27 percent.

TABLE 2.—HUMAN TOLL OF WAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Civilian killed</th>
<th>Civilian wounded</th>
<th>ARVN killed</th>
<th>ARVN wounded</th>
<th>Enemy killed</th>
<th>Total killed and wounded</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>11,234</td>
<td>23,118</td>
<td>35,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>20,975</td>
<td>121,949</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>27,915</td>
<td>187,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>21,823</td>
<td>46,278</td>
<td>68,101</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>33,246</td>
<td>71,582</td>
<td>104,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>22,069</td>
<td>48,192</td>
<td>70,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>13,822</td>
<td>48,237</td>
<td>62,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expelled from</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td></td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>311,000</td>
<td>62,060</td>
<td>473,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRG zones</td>
<td>700,000</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated non-</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>registered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,819,700</td>
<td>510,169</td>
<td>4,723</td>
<td>430,000</td>
<td>1,005,000</td>
<td>183,935</td>
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### TABLE 3.—A COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES, SOVIET, AND CHINESE EXPENDITURES IN INDOCHINA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Economic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5,263.5</td>
<td>736.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>17,431.9</td>
<td>568.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>22,463.3</td>
<td>536.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>11,424.3</td>
<td>675.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>73,100.0</td>
<td>2,900.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The 5 selected years chosen above are the only ones for which it is possible to compare United States, Soviet, and Chinese expenditures for Indochina.

**Source:** (1) Soviet and Chinese expenditures for 1966-68 were drawn from National Security Study Memorandum No. 1, as reprinted in the Congressional Record, May 10, 1972. They are included in the section prepared by the State Department, in response to question 28, in a chart captioned "In Million U.S. Dollars at Soviet Foreign Trade Prices", on p. E5000. (2) Soviet and Chinese expenditures for 1970-71 are taken from an Associated Press dispatch published in the New York Times on Apr. 13, 1972. The dispatch cites "U.S. Government sources, not allowing use of their agency name." It is entitled, "Soviet Arms Aid to Hanoi Is Down." (3) U.S. expenditures for 1966-68, and 1970, are taken from "Impact of the Vietnam War", prepared by the Library of Congress, June 30, 1971, p. 2. Costs are given in fiscal years, and are incremental, i.e., costs that would not have been incurred was the United States not involved in Indochina. The 1971 figure is an estimate reported by The Air War in Indochina, by a Cornell University study team, Beacon Press, p. 100. We have divided U.S. costs into military and economic by subtracting from the total figure given in the sources just listed, the figures for U.S. economic aid listed in the "Fiscal Year 1974 Program Presentation to the Congress", prepared by the U.S. Agency for International Development, p. 10.

### TABLE 4.—UNITED STATES NOW SUPPLIES 86.3 PERCENT OF THIEU’S TOTAL RESOURCES

**Note:** This information chart was recently supplied by the U.S. Agency for International Development. For the first time in the war it officially outlines in the clearest way possible the fact that the United States is responsible for over 85 percent of the Thieu Government’s total resources. It is important to note, moreover, that during 1973 the United States was forbidden by the Paris Agreement from interfering in the internal affairs of Vietnam. The 86.3 percent of the Thieu Government’s resources supplied by the United States is divided up as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Source</th>
<th>Millions</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Income Source</th>
<th>Millions</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-supplied income= 86.3 percent:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GVN-generated income= 13 percent:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. military aid</td>
<td>$2,270.5</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>Direct taxes</td>
<td>$58.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. commodity import program</td>
<td>300.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>Indirect taxes</td>
<td>263.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Food for Peace</td>
<td>143.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>Import revenues</td>
<td>10.16</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Project Aid</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Currency additions</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. loan</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Bond sales</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import revenues due to U.S. presence (minimum)</td>
<td>91.44</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3d country aid</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SOUTH VIETNAM—GOVERNMENT BUDGETS BY CALENDAR YEARS 1964–74

[In millions of dollars: estimated]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Direct taxes</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>65.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Indirect and other domestic taxes</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>124.1</td>
<td>128.3</td>
<td>135.6</td>
<td>138.1</td>
<td>158.9</td>
<td>190.3</td>
<td>199.0</td>
<td>201.5</td>
<td>283.2</td>
<td>301.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Import revenues</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>215.8</td>
<td>177.5</td>
<td>158.9</td>
<td>275.5</td>
<td>328.8</td>
<td>379.6</td>
<td>114.3</td>
<td>101.6</td>
<td>95.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Addition to currency supply</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>255.7</td>
<td>131.7</td>
<td>117.5</td>
<td>249.4</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>154.8</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>93.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Bond sales</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>121.4</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Loans from foreign countries</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>283.2</td>
<td>101.5</td>
<td>425.9</td>
<td>264.3</td>
<td>101.6</td>
<td>154.8</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>154.8</td>
<td>154.8</td>
<td>154.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. U.S. AID project assistance</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>104.8</td>
<td>157.5</td>
<td>264.3</td>
<td>101.6</td>
<td>154.8</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>154.8</td>
<td>154.8</td>
<td>154.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. U.S. C.I.P.</td>
<td>104.8</td>
<td>157.5</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>165.2</td>
<td>104.4</td>
<td>176.1</td>
<td>182.3</td>
<td>196.4</td>
<td>225.6</td>
<td>300.0</td>
<td>240.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. U.S. Food for Peace</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>153.3</td>
<td>138.3</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>121.0</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>118.1</td>
<td>143.0</td>
<td>143.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. U.S. military aid</td>
<td>181.8</td>
<td>268.9</td>
<td>862.0</td>
<td>1,203.5</td>
<td>1,065.4</td>
<td>1,608.2</td>
<td>1,692.6</td>
<td>1,982.5</td>
<td>2,332.6</td>
<td>2,270.5</td>
<td>1,026.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Third country grant aid</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
<td>627.9</td>
<td>1,050.7</td>
<td>1,307.4</td>
<td>2,328.4</td>
<td>2,152.1</td>
<td>2,632.3</td>
<td>2,782.2</td>
<td>3,170.8</td>
<td>3,856.6</td>
<td>3,394.0</td>
<td>2,345.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 12. Countertpart contribution to the budget | 129.5 | 174.5 | 301.2 | 277.7 | 177.4 | 190.6 | 239.5 | 267.4 | 305.0 | 400.2 | 390.2 |
| **Total GVN budget** | 292.5 | 382.5 | 657.0 | 610.2 | 498.8 | 853.1 | 794.0 | 800.0 | 675.4 | 855.6 | 854.3 |

#### Conversion rate

| VNS/USD | (81/1) | (79/1) | (120/1) | (160/1) | (168/1) | (192/1) | (226/1) | (294/1) | (412/1) | (512/1) | (604/1) |

#### Key to above table:

1. The GVN did accomplish a modest gain in direct taxes during 1973. For a population of 20,000,000, however, the $3 per capita raise in taxes is a telling indictment of the GVN's political appeal. Line (2)—Although we have counted all $283,200,000 in Indirect taxes as internally generated, in fact 30 percent of Indirect taxes during the war were generated by the U.S. presence, and a substantial portion of such indirect taxes are still derived directly from the U.S. presence. Line (3)—Virtually all import revenues are derived from U.S.-subsidized imports. Notwithstanding, we have estimated the GVN's internally-generated import revenues at 10 percent of the total, a rather high estimate. Line (4)—This simply means that the GVN printed up new currency, thus stimulating inflation. Line (5)—The GVN borrowed on the future here, presumably from the national bank. Line (6)—The 1973 loan was from the United States; those in 1974 will come from a variety of countries and institutions like the World Bank. Lines (7)—(10)—These are 4 of the leading categories of U.S. funding. Inflation has meant that they amount to a declining amount of real aid and, thus, declining living standards. The 1974 military aid figure of $1,026,000,000 is not that seriously by the Indochina Resource Center, since it cannot be correlated with the requests of $1,600,000,000 for fiscal year 1974 and $1,600,000,000 for fiscal year 1975. Line (12)—This indicates that portion of American aid which enters GVN budget accounting. The budget is quite obviously a small portion of what it takes to keep the GVN in existence.

#### Source:

Table 1, letter to Congresswoman Bella Abzug, from House Foreign Operations Committee, Feb. 20, 1974—from AID.
Mr. Nix. Just before you begin, Mr. Porter, it occurred to me some time ago the President is one of those rare individuals who has the capacity to use ambiguities to hide factual situations. But we do not intend to have him fool us anymore.

Now Mr. Porter.

## STATEMENT OF D. GARETH PORTER, CODIRECTOR, INDOCHINA RESOURCE CENTER, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. Porter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to speak very briefly to the question of the role which the Paris agreement, signed in January of 1973, can play in turning American policy and the conflict in Vietnam away from war and the military solution toward a peaceful and political solution. I think there has been a tendency in Congress—and one for which I am afraid the administration is largely responsible—to minimize the importance of the Paris agreement, both as an American commitment and also as a solution for the problem of the Vietnamese conflict, a solution which will meet not only the interests of the American people but also the interests of the Vietnamese people.

The Paris agreement, I think it is safe to say, is the only formula by which the conflict in Vietnam can be resolved without a return to the full-scale warfare that we witnessed in 1972. I think it is worthwhile to recall briefly the major provisions of the Paris agreement, just so that we have in mind the basic structure of peace and the process of moving toward a peaceful settlement which the agreement outlines.

First of all, the central provision of the entire agreement is the standstill cease-fire. That means that both sides' armed forces are not to move forward, to move into new positions which either gain control of new territory for either side or come into contact with the forces of the opposite side. That, of course, is the foundation stone of the entire agreement.
Second, and equally important is the demarcation, the formal demarcation of zones of control of both sides. Because without a demarcation of the zones, it would be very difficult to maintain a cease-fire for any length of time, because there would be constant disagreement over who controls what.

Third, the key political provision is the guarantee of democratic freedoms within both zones of control so that there is no longer a political monopoly on the part of either party to the agreement within its zone of control and that the minimal conditions can be attained for an eventual election for a national government.

Fourth, the creation of a National Council of National Reconciliation which is to have three parts. Which is to have the purpose, first of all, of helping to implement fully all of the provisions of the agreement, and second, to arrange the details of the final political settlement, including the national election.

Of course, it is to play that role through a process of accommodation and compromise among the three political groups represented in the national council, the Provisional Revolutionary Government, the Government of Vietnam and the third force, which is not aligned with either party.

Now, there has been a tendency, as I say, within Congress to dismiss the Paris agreement as a viable solution to the problem as a factor in American policymaking. There is a feeling that, first of all, the agreement was really only intended to serve as a cover for American military disengagements and to allow the two Vietnamese parties to fight it out among themselves.

Second, there is a widespread opinion that neither of the two sides is really all that interested in implementing the terms of the agreement and particularly not interested in bringing about the standstill cease-fire which is at the center of the agreement.

I would like to address myself briefly to both of those opinions, because I think both of them are fundamentally mistaken and constitute blocks to movement on the part of Congress toward accepting the Paris agreement as the basis for a political as opposed to a military solution to the Vietnam conflict.

First of all, there is the idea that the agreement was not in fact meant to end conclusively the military conflict and move that conflict to the political plane. I think if you examine the terms of the agreement carefully, you will find there are provisions in the agreement which, as we know, from the publication in newspapers of the background of the negotiations, inserted in the text of the agreement at the insistence of the North Vietnamese.

Those provisions were there specifically in order to insure that there can be a viable standstill cease-fire.

The first one I am thinking of is the demarcation of zones to be negotiated between the two sides. It is clear that in the process of that negotiation, there has to be some give and take. In other words, one party is going to have to say, you can take this village if you give us this village, and split this one in the middle.

There has to be some process of negotiation in the demarcation of the zones of control. The provision for demarcating zones of control was inserted in the text at the insistence of the North Vietnamese so that there could be a realistic basis for a standstill cease-fire.
Second, there is a provision, article 4, of the protocol on the cease-fire—which is, I am afraid, very seldom read—which provides that the local commanders of the two parties get together and arrange for local cease-fires. That is where two military units of opposing parties are in contact with each other, the local commanders are to meet and arrange local cease-fires.

In terms of the map of the conflict in South Vietnam, this is the only realistic basis for a nationwide standstill cease-fire. So that I think the text of the agreement belies the argument that this was an agreement that was only intended as a cover for American military disengagement from a war which was expected to continue.

Another objection to this view of the agreement is that the policy of the North Vietnamese and of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, since the agreement was signed has been consistently along the lines of working toward the full implementation of the standstill cease-fire. This has been the first point of every one of their plans for resolving the internal political problems of South Vietnam. I think it is significant that the PRG has made public their position that the one and only condition for the resumption of American searches for missing in action in South Vietnam is the full implementation of a standstill cease-fire.

If, in fact, they were less interested in a standstill cease-fire than in trying to achieve some interim political objectives, it seems to me they would raise other conditions instead of—or in addition to—the standstill cease-fire for the resumption of these search teams for the missing in action.

I think this highlights the fact that this is the fundamental concern of the other side in the entire structure of the Paris agreement.

Now, this leads into the second argument, that the two sides are equally unwilling to abide by the terms of the Paris agreement, particularly the standstill cease-fire provision. It would be reasonable to dismiss the agreement as a feasible formula for a peace settlement if, in fact, that were true. But I think the evidence has accumulated over the past year and a half that, although the Saigon Government has been manifestly unwilling to abide by the terms of the agreement, that the North Vietnamese and the PRG have seen it in their interest to have the major central provision which I have already mentioned, carried out.

I think if you go back to the press coverage of the terms of the agreement, when they were first announced, and the reactions of the two sides, you will find that both sides regarded the basic terms of the agreement as being favorable to the PRG and to the Thieu regime. It is not surprising that the Thieu regime refused to sign the agreement from the period October to January and signed the final text only under the most severe diplomatic and political pressure, including some Members from Congress who warned that, if he didn't sign, the GVN would not get military or political aid.

Finally, after the agreement was signed, it immediately went on offensive militarily to achieve a number of objectives: First of all, to take back land that was lost in the 2 or 3 days before the cease-fire deadline; second, to take back territory, villages and other land which was lost during the 1972 Communist offensive in South Vietnam;
Third, to occupy land wherever PRG defenses were weakest; fourth, but not least important, was the objective of preventing the consolidation militarily as well as economically of the zone of control under the Provisional Revolutionary Government. They have attempted to prevent this consolidation by several means.

One of them was to continue to fire artillery and carry out air strikes against populated areas of the PRG zone to discourage the return of refugees to those areas so that the economy of the PRG zone could be reconstructed.

Second, the Thieu regime has carried out air and artillery strikes against the lines of communications, both the old trails and infiltration routes as well as new routes built within the PRG zone.

I should say that the road building program is fully consistent with the terms of the agreement, despite the objections raised by the White House as well as President Thieu. If you look at the protocol on the cease-fire, article 3.a.(2), it provides specifically that there can be road building by engineering battalions in either zone of control.

I think it is worth noting that some of the heaviest fighting recently has been in Kontum Province. This fighting is specifically related to the attempt by ARVN, The Army of the Republic of Vietnam, to interdict lines of communication within the PRG zone just north of the province capital of Kontum where a North Vietnam road building operation is going forward.

A series of ARVN bases in this area had the mission of calling in air and artillery strikes against movement over roads which have been built and preventing further road building. These ARVN bases have been attacked during the past month and overrun by Communist forces. There has been a constant repetition of this pattern of ARVN bases within the PRG zone attacking lines of communication and in turn, being attacked and overrun by Communist forces.

This has been one of the major reasons that fighting has continued in South Vietnam.

Finally, I would like to call attention to what seems to me to be the primary hinderance to any movement back toward a cease-fire—a cease-fire which never did come into existence when it was supposed to. That is to return to this problem of the demarcation of zones of control.

I have attached to the copies of my statement which you have in front of you a map which has been published by the North Vietnamese in an English language publication called Vietnam Courier. This map, which I have discussed with U.S. officials following the Vietnam situation, is considered to be generally accurate in terms of a very rough idea or outline of the de facto zones of control of the Provisional Revolutionary Government. One can argue that there are points here and there in which it is inaccurate, but it is not intended, obviously, to be a detailed military map, but only a very rough outline.

But, I think the importance of this map is to show that there is a very considerable part of the map under the de facto control of PRG. If there were to be serious negotiations over demarcation of zones, this would represent the zone of control which the PRG would obtain.

In the negotiations, so far, however, the Saigon Government has refused to admit that the PRG controls any territory whatsoever. Its position has been that the PRG controls only a perimeter around
fixed military installations. Since the Provisional Revolutionary Gov-
ernment has never build fixed military installations in South Vietnam,
it is in effect taking the position that PRG controls no territory what-
soever.
So, it is evident that the Saigon Government has refused to seriously
negotiate the demarcation of the zones of control. This constitutes as
well the primary justification for the continued offensive operations
by the Saigon Government because they do not, in fact, admit the
legitimacy of the zone of the PRG.
I think if we are interested in moving away from the present mili-
tary conflict, in avoiding the ultimate military confrontation and re-
turn to the military warfare, if we are interested in moving a political
solution, the Paris agreement provides the only formula which can
lead in that direction.
If we want to orient our policy toward the Paris agreement, the
first step is to use our very considerable power over the Saigon Govern-
ment, because of the fact that we pay some 90 percent of money
which is necessary to keep it in power, to abide by the basic terms of
the Paris agreement: The standstill cease-fire, the demarcation of
zones, the provision of democratic freedoms and the establishment of
the National Council of National Reconciliation. It is going to have
to be up to Congress to move the American policy in that direction.
The only way to do that is to use the power of the purse, which Con-
gress does have, and to do so during this fiscal year 1975 authoriza-
tion and appropriations cycle.
So, we recommend that Congress not authorize or appropriate
any further aid for Saigon, except for humanitarian aid, until its
policy of frustrating the Paris agreement is changed.
Thank you.
[Mr. Porter's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of D. Gareth Porter, Codirector, Indochina Resource
Center, Washington, D.C.

In political and journalistic comment on the situation in Vietnam since the
Paris Agreement was signed in January 1973, there has been a disposition to
regard the agreement itself as ineffective and no longer relevant to the problem of
American policy. I believe that this point of view is a serious error in thinking
which now stands in the way of firm action to bring about real peace in Vietnam.
It is based on two assumptions about the agreement which are worth
examining briefly: the first is that its basic purpose was simply to negotiate the
military withdrawal of the U.S. and allow the Vietnamese to "fight it out among
themselves." The second is that both sides have equally little interest in imple-
menting the cease-fire provision.
The notion that the Paris Agreement represented only a means for the U.S. to
remove its military forces, and obtain the release of its prisoners, and was never
seriously intended to end the fighting between the Thieu regime and its foes is
telied by both the text of the agreement and by the emphasis which the North
Vietnamese have placed on the importance of a standstill cease-fire. The agree-
ment itself included provisions not only for a standstill cease-fire but for the de-
marcation of zones of control for the two sides and for the arrangement of local
ceasefires between the commanders of opposing units which are in contact with
each other. These latter two provisions, which were included at the insistence of
the North Vietnamese negotiators, would not have been necessary if the North
Vietnamese had not wished to insure that the agreement provided a concrete
formula by which the fighting could be permanently halted and a start made to-
ward a political settlement. Furthermore, the Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment has pushed within the framework of the Joint Military Commission (first
the four-power commission and later the two-party commission) for the full
implementation of these key provisions.
It would be reasonable to dismiss the Paris Agreement as a cover for U.S. military disengagement and a continuation of the war if the two Vietnamese sides had both adopted roughly equivalent military postures in violation of the agreement. But the attitudes of the two sides toward the key military and political provisions of the agreement were, from the beginning, diametrically opposite. These provisions—the in-place ceasefire, the demarcation of zones of control, the restoration of democratic freedoms and freedom of movement, the establishment of a tripartite National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord and the release of captured and detained civilians—were regarded by both sides as unfavorable to the Thieu regime and favorable to the interests of the PRG. They would have strengthened the claim of the PRG to full equality with the GVN in determining the political future of South Vietnam, while at the same time eroding Thieu’s own political monopoly within his zone of control; consolidated the PRG zone and reversed the exodus of population from those areas which had taken place during the war; and set in motion a process of accommodation and relaxation of tensions which would have weakened the GVN hold on population within its zone, including ARVN soldiers. As Thieu himself has publicly recognized, any real opening up of the political process to the participation of the communists risked the serious “subversion” of his regime.

Given this calculus of political advantage, it is not surprising that Thieu’s attitude toward the entire agreement was totally negative from the publication of the summary of the first draft agreement, which served as the basis for the final text. Thieu denounced the draft agreement, publicly threatened to refuse to sign it, and did sign the final text only after strong U.S. diplomatic and political pressure. The GVN, in contrast to Hanoi and the PRG, who broadcast the text in full over radio and circulated it in private, form to their populations, did not broadcast or publish the full text but put out a highly distorted version of its principal provisions to its own middle and lower-ranking cadres.

The military posture of the Thieu regime clearly reflected its refusal to accept the PRG as a co-equal administration with its own zone of control—a recognition which would have destroyed his regime’s pretensions to sovereignty over all South Vietnamese territory. Thieu’s forces went on the offensive from the time of the ceasefire in order to regain control of villages and other strategic points which it lost just before the ceasefire, to regain areas lost during the 1972 offensive, to occupy any other areas where PRG defenses were weak, and finally, to prevent or hinder the consolidation of that part of the PRG zone which it could not occupy, by means of air strike and artillery.

During the first three weeks after the agreement, according to one American official, the GVN recaptured about 350 hamlets which had been occupied by the PRG before the ceasefire deadline—and then went on to recapture a number of additional hamlets which had been under PRG control for considerably longer periods. And in violation of Article 2 of the ceasefire protocol, ARVN troops began to move into areas which were either contested or already under PRG control at the time of the ceasefire, building new permanent military outposts to expand the GVN zone of control. This pattern was evident particularly in those areas which they had been forced to abandon during the 1972 communist offensive because ARVN forces had been spread too thin. For example, in the months following the agreement, the area all along Route 4 between My Tho and Vinh Long in the Mekong Delta was dotted with newly-build ARVN posts, as the GVN tried to reestablish the control it had lost in 1972. Other flagrant examples of such “landgrabbing” operations took place in the Glong Trom area of Kiên Hòa Province and in the Central Vietnamese provinces of Quảng Nam and Quảng Ngãi, all of which had long been under PRG control. The U.S. Defense Attaché’s Office admitted to Senate investigators in April 1973, that the GVN had “initiated several operations designed to expand areas of control,” to which the PRG had “reacted strongly.” As a result, some of these areas have remained military hot spots ever since the initial ARVN moves.

One of the most significant operations by ARVN to regain territory it had lost long before the ceasefire was in Northern Bình Định Province, where it controlled little more than a few yards on either side of Route 1 at the time of the agreement. In August and September, Saigon’s 22nd Infantry Division and three battalions of rangers were moved into Northern Bình Định to seize twenty square miles of rice land from the PRG. The heavy fighting in this area was then attributed by ARVN spokesmen in Saigon to North Vietnamese attacks. The ARVN offensive was revealed by a Washington Post reporter who had been tipped off by an American official who feared such offensive operations would trigger a major communist military response.
In some instances, ARVN operations to expand the GVN area of control broke what had been a relatively stable local ceasefire. This was the case in Western Kontum Province, for example, where local units appear to have worked a tact, if not explicit, modus vivendi in the first part of 1973. But during July, Corps Commander Gen. Nguyen Van Toan rotated military units and ordered the new unit to try to widen its “defense perimeter.” As a result, there was intense fighting in an area which had been peaceful.

One of the major causes of fighting, which has become even more significant in the past six months, has been the systematic effort by the GVN to prevent the consolidation of the PRG zone of control by means of air strikes and artillery against both populated areas and communications and logistics lines. One of the methods of preventing the strengthening of the zone was heavy “harrassment” which is legitimate under Article 8(a) (2) of the protocol on the ceasefire—has thus been a major target of ARVN military operations. Scattered through the countryside on the building of new roads and the movement of men and supplies across the road network, and to assist in slowing down that movement by air strikes and artillery fired from or called in by the base. This was the case with Le Minh, an isolated border post in Western Pleiku Province, which was reported to have been established after the ceasefire— and which had the mission of impeding the construction of a road through the area; it was also the case with Tong Le Chan, a border ranger post 12 kilometers southwest of An Loc and only 8 kilometers from the Cambodian border in PRG territory. It had the mission of impeding the movement of men and material from the Cambodian border area down to the Dan Tieng area north of Saigon. Again, the primary means was artillery and air strikes called in by reconnaissance teams from the base.

The most recent such ARVN bases to make news were a series of isolated bases northeast of Kontum City near a new road being built by the communist forces through a zone long under their control. This road would link up with old interprovincial Route 5-B running eastward to the PRG zone in Quang Ngai Province. This would complete the major east-west road links within the PRG zone. The commander of one of the mountain bases told a Washington Post reporter that his job was to gather intelligence on movements over the new road and to call in artillery fire on the road. Four or five months Saigon’s air force has been bombing the PRG road.

In addition to the use of air power and artillery to prevent the consolidation of the PRG zone, in recent months, there has also been a series of air raids against heavily populated areas under PRG control. These raids are apparently aimed at inflicting maximum damage on the population as reprisals for PRG military moves. These raids have been directed primarily against PRG towns and villages in Tay Ninh and Phuoc Long Province, including the main PRG-controlled town in III Corps, Loc Ninh. According to U.S. News and World Report (January 30, 1974), Saigon Air Force commanders have complained that these air strikes were merely “vengeance bombings” and were not worth the risk of valuable pilots and aircraft.

These breaches of the ceasefire by the Thieu regime all highlight the central importance of formal demarcation of zones of control, as called for in Article 3(b) of the Paris Agreement. The Thieu regime has simply refused to recognize in the discussions of the Joint Military Commission the existence of a PRG zone of control, despite the fact that such a zone of control has long been recognized, even by U.S. officials. Although the PRG has never formally submitted a map detailing the territory it considers under its control, for obvious reasons, the rough outline of the territory it controls is generally well-known. A very rough map showing the PRG zone published by the DRV publication, Vietnam Courier (and appended to this statement) is considered generally accurate by U.S. officials who analyze Vietnamese affairs and have access to maps used internally by the U.S. government.
In order to prevent the negotiation of zones of control, Saigon's representative to the JMC has taken the position that his government would recognize only a perimeter of control around fixed military installations. Since the communist forces have never established fixed military installations, but have relied instead on local political and administrative organs as the basis for their control over the population, this position is tantamount to denying that the PRG controls any territory. And it provides the rationale for continuous military operations directed against the area under PRG control at the time of the ceasefire.

The refusal of the Thieu regime to negotiate a firm delineation of zones of control, therefore, constitutes the most important indication of his government's attitude toward a standstill ceasefire. Unless and until the present posture toward the demarcation of zones is changed to one of cooperation in this necessary endeavor, it cannot be said that the GVN is willing to abide by the standstill ceasefire provision of the agreement.

Although it is generally admitted, even by high administration officials, that the Thieu regime has frequently violated the ceasefires, the administration nevertheless argues that it is North Vietnam and the PRG who are primarily responsible for the breakdown of the ceasefires. But there are two kinds of evidence which contradict this assertion. First, internal communist documents which were captured both before and after the January, 1973 ceasefire deadline confirmed that the Community Party's policy was to implement the cease-fire strictly. A major directive issued by the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi to its followers in the South and reconstructed by U.S. intelligence in November, 1972, ruled out any offensive operations during the first 90 days of the ceasefire and cautioned even against reprisals against Saigon government officials.

And a top-secret directive from the Party's central office for South Vietnam captured by Saigon's forces soon after the ceasefire made it clear that the standstill ceasefire was an important part of the strategy of using political struggle as the means for weakening the Thieu regime. As translated by the U.S. Mission, the document called on cadres in the South to mobilize the people for political struggle in order to "create basic conditions to guarantee the implementation of the agreement, maintain peace and enable the revolution to continue its march forward." A later directive, issued at the end of March, made it even clearer that armed force was to be used only in response to violation of the ceasefire by Saigon.

Second, the evidence indicated that the military attacks carried out by the Communist forces since the ceasefire have in fact been responses to prior GVN offensive actions. The major violations charged by the GVN are all such responses to GVN ceasefire violations. The highly publicized seizures of the Lo Minh and Tong Le Chanh bases, for example, were both responses to ARVN operations to interdict PRG supply lines.

The overrunning of the ARVN bases north of Kontum falls into the same category. The GVN also charges that the abandonment of the ARVN outpost at Bach Ma in Thua Thien Province on October 12 was a major violation of the ceasefire. But a check with official U.S. sources revealed that ARVN had established the base on a previously unoccupied mountain top after the ceasefire, in an effort to push the ceasefire line forward.

Early last November, there was a great deal of publicity given to the seizure by Communist troops of a series of ARVN bases in Quang Duc Province on the Cambodian border. But again, official U.S. sources confirm that in October, ARVN had established a series of new military posts along Highway 14 in Quang Duc and moved several battalions of troops into an area in which the GVN had previously had no control. So it was another case of ARVN attempting to enlarge its zone of control, bringing a Communist military response.

Finally, the differences in the policies of the two sides toward the ceasefire is highlighted by the fact that the PRG has consistently made the implementation of the ceasefire provision the first condition for any substantive progress in reaching a political solution, and also the sole condition for the resumption of search missions for American missing in action. The GVN meanwhile has proposed an agreement which prohibits the use of mortars, rockets, mines and individual acts of terrorism, but which would not rule out continued air and ground attacks.

In summary, it is not true that the two sides are equally disinterested in ending the shooting and moving the conflict from the military plane to the political plane. There is substantial evidence of a willingness by the PRG and
the North Vietnamese to abide by the terms of the Paris Agreement if the U.S. will prevail upon Thieu to do the same. In this context, the Paris Agreement appears to be the best means of avoiding a military resolution of the Vietnam conflict and allowing political competition to decide the fate of South Vietnam. Indeed, it provides the only available legal and political framework within which such a non-military solution can be achieved.

The main policy problem for the U.S. Congress to consider, therefore, is whether it is in our interest to continue unconditional support for the Thieu regime as it resists the implementation of the central provisions of the Paris Agreement and leaves no option open to the other side—except another military onslaught. Now is the time for Congress to consider this question carefully and to act to reverse the present course of U.S. policy in Vietnam.

Mr. Nix. Thank you, Mr. Porter. Both you and Mr. Branfman have studied our involvement in that part of the world and all of its ramifications. You have analyzed it, and you know of the tremendous loss of lives. You know of the extraordinary expenditures made, all of which came out of the pockets of the people of the United States. You also know that we have not been benefited by the action we took.

I therefore would like to pose the question what, in your opinion, are the considerations that move the Government of the United States to enter this conflict in the beginning?

Mr. BRANFMAN. Well, I think it is very important to note when we talk about both our involvement in the beginning, 25 years ago, and our involvement today, we are talking about a decision that was made not by the Government as a whole, but by a very small group of people in the executive branch, none of whom are subject to election besides one, the President, who is selected from a choice of two men every 4 years.

Many of us think that there are two or three key factors. One is that this country found itself at the end of World War II with a considerable empire. Whether you want to call it an empire or proxy empire, it was an empire in the sense that governments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America were in our economic systems.

Since that time, as far as we can tell, the executive branch of this country has never allowed a government or people in the Third World to extricate itself from this empire without using force to try and keep it in this empire. Usually, as much force as is necessary. The only reason Vietnam got out of hand is the Vietnamese fought back in a way no other people have fought back in the Third World since the end of World War II.

We think some of the factors involved in the economic side were things like the pressure of corporations in this country to have access to raw materials, cheap labor, and to some extent markets for finished products.

Second, the factors Congressman Dellums was talking about, the huge military industrial complexes, huge war machine which has to expand.

I remember so well talking with a systems analyst a couple of years ago up on Route 128, up in Boston. He had studied the airway in Indochina very, very carefully at a very high level. We were talking and I said to him, “What is it, why are we bombing these people? What is involved here?”

He said, “Well, you have to understand from the Pentagon’s point of view we have to justify each program in a cost-effective basis. We have to show that each individual program works. The stakes are very high.”
He said that it had nothing to do with the competition from the Soviet Union or China. It was a competition within the four services. If the Air Force wanted to continue its B-52 bombers, they had to justify their use, or they would have to cut it back.

He gave me the example of a famous story about the air war over North Vietnam. We were sending planes over North Vietnam with one or two bombs. They weren’t fully loaded. It was a tremendous scandal. Many people were shot down. I said I remembered the story. “Why do you think they were sending those planes over North Vietnam with so few bombs?” he said.

He then explained that the Air Force had a great deal of difficulty in justifying its effectiveness. They could tell the American people they were destroying so many trucks a week. But they could not tell this to McNamara, who had access to the same photos as the Air Force and knew they were destroying few if any trucks. So they had to come up with some kind of measure, since the Air Force had to show each bombing program—for the F-4, F-105, et cetera—achieving its objective.

One of the measures they came up with was the aircraft utilization ratio at the squadron level. In other words, an Air Force squadron was effective to the degree it kept its airplanes flying. This was one of the way of determining effectiveness. The Air Forces sent out the orders down to the squadron level to keep those planes flying. So planes were sent out over North Vietnam regularly despite a bomb shortage. The planes went out with one or two bombs, no chance of destroying anything. The planes kept flying. The bureaucracy kept grinding on.

This is one tiny example of the bureaucratic momentum fueling the war. The issues at stake are not only whether a program is effective. If the Navy cuts out Polaris submarines, not only does this mean the Navy has less Polaris submarines, it means there isn’t a place for five new admirals. When you have a monster like this Navy of ours, it suddenly doesn’t stop on its own initiative, curtail its activities. It just keeps growing. There are always new junior officers to be promoted. There are more and more of them.

I think when you put together the fact that because of an increasing concentration of technology since the end of World War II, plus the increasing concentration of capital in this country, what we have seen is more and more power flowing into the hands of the executive branch.

We see people in the executive branch who make decisions not on the basis of what the American people as a whole want, but on the basis of those who contribute to their campaigns and the Pentagon.

I think those are the essential elements.

Mr. Nix. Do you think Congress was derelict in its duty in not seeking to exercise its constitutional authority to intervene and say no?

Mr. Branfman. I feel that very strongly. I think it was derelict in its duties in many ways. The last of which is that by not doing so, it has brought us to a near dictatorship in this country. The Congress, as imperfect as it is, as slow moving as it is at this point, as one looks at the existing institutions in this society, is the only one one might even dream of might respond to the needs of the people. It is the only one whose Members are elected on a regular basis.
I feel it strongly personally coming to Washington and being able to walk around Congress and visit offices. When one goes over to the executive agencies on the other hand, it is something out of George Orwell. You can’t get past the door without a pass. If you have any conferences with anyone in the executive branch, there will often be two or three people sitting in, one taking it down. They have to be careful of what is being said, monitor each other.

My personal feeling is that Congress has been derelict in its duty very much so by not stopping this thing, by allowing it to get out of hand. But more to the point, it is derelict to the point now. This thing isn’t stopping. We got into Indochina precisely the way I described last year, through covert police actions. It got out of hand a bit, and Johnson felt he had to send in ground troops.

But this matter of covert involvement of deceiving the American people, is what got us into Indochina in the first place—and is what is being repeated right now. Unless Congress stops it, I see in a decade from now a situation such as George Orwell has described.

Remember, he talked about a war machine around the globe which ruled the great masses of people. The “proles” were not allowed to know who was running their lives. They were kept ill fed, ill clothed, and ill housed, because of this war machine.

I think when you need the kinds of demands that are being made on the energy sources right now, the way the population in this country is responding, it has been called the revolution of rising expectations and all the rest. I think you realize we are heading for an explosion unless Congress intervenes.

Indochina, in this broad picture, is a major step. It is a very symbolic step. It could be the turning point. It could launch us into a new era of increased popular control over the leaders of the Government.

Mr. Nix. I want to thank you very much. I want to interpose this thought. Don’t you think that because of recent positions taken by the Congress of the United States, there is some evidence that Congress intends to assert its authority. I had in mind the War Powers Bill. I have in mind the constant discussion, constant assertions on the part of many Members of the Congress that it is absolutely essential that Congress assume its proper place and act in a responsible manner.

Don’t you think that is evidence of the fact that there is an awakening on the part of the Congress caused, of course, by the complaints of the people of the United States of America?

Mr. BRANFMAN. I think tremendous progress has been made. It is on this optimistic and hopeful note that I began my statement. For the first time some of us have begun to entertain some real hopes that Congress could continue on a very clear path it has embarked on. But I don’t think we can underestimate what remains to be done.

Let me come back to this minor example. Congress cut money for Indochina last year. The administration digrantly ignored this cut, and not only ignored it, but raised it by a third. Mr. Porter mentioned that this went only to support the Thieu Government’s war machine. We think a suspension in aid, a “Pause For Peace,” is the fastest way to end this thing. Otherwise, it is going to drag on and on.

Failing this, we think, a drastic and urgent reduction is called for in Indochina. It has to be drastic, large and massive. Because if it is
just a minor action, the administration will be able to raise it and con-
tinue through its various subterfuges.

Mr. Nix. I want to thank you, gentlemen. I reluctantly want to bring
this meeting to a close because it is of extreme interest here and it
raises the questions which in my mind are absolutely essential to the
country, itself. Solutions must be found. Otherwise, we are at the end
of everything.

The subcommittee will stand adjourned. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 3:50, the subcommittee adjourned.]
The subcommittee met at 2 p.m. in room H-236, The Capitol, Hon. Robert N. C. Nix (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Nix. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today we will hear from two witnesses who will speak from their personal experience in regard to two Asian nations who are experiencing "one man rule," while at the same time receiving financial support from the United States because of their anti-Communist position in Asia. The two nations are South Vietnam and the Philippines.

The issue is the constant one of whether or not the United States can achieve its foreign policy objectives of peace through law by aiding countries having dictatorial regimes in order to prevent aggression by means of attack or internal subversion from Communist powers.

While it is true that we should not interfere in the internal affairs of other nations, the above question becomes important when we do involve ourselves through extensive assistance programs in the affairs of such countries.

We have to face up to the problem of whether in the long run we wish to promote democracy in the world as a real guarantee of peace or whether we will maintain a mere anti-Communist position which may benefit only our short-run goals.

The American people have a right to the discussion of issues of this kind since it is their sons and their hardearned savings which are spent on causes in individual countries which are not always noble, for sometimes obscure policies.

Our purpose today is to build a record on these issues which will have a bearing on the votes of our members on legislation before the Foreign Affairs Committee.


The committee welcomes you, Mr. Ransom. You may proceed.
Mr. Ransom. Let me say a word of appreciation for the opportunity to share my views with you. I am most grateful.

As you suggested, in January of this year I spent 2 weeks in South Vietnam in company with four friends. Our primary mission was to try to ascertain at first hand why the Paris Agreement of January 27, 1973, had not successfully ended the war in Vietnam and restored peace to that troubled area.

It was a first trip for each of us, and 2 weeks' time is certainly inadequate to develop any comprehensive understanding of the Vietnamese culture and people. However, over the years of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia we had all followed the military situation closely and were familiar with much of the literature relating both to the war and to Vietnam itself, and this did provide us with a good background for our in-country experience.

In addition to our primary concern about the failure of the peace treaty, we were also interested in a number of ancillary issues. For example, we sought to discover whether it was true that the Thieu government was still holding substantial numbers of political prisoners in its jails.

Then, too, each of us had our own personal focuses. As an attorney, I was interested in the legal-judicial system, due process and what we in this country refer to as the constitutional rights of the citizen. Finally, I wished to visit the My Lai area on the Batangan Peninsula where my oldest son was killed 6 years ago.

I might say in this regard my wife and I consider my son's life was wasted and served the country no purpose. In going to Vietnam I hoped I might find his death somehow served the Vietnamese people. I am sorry to say in this regard we were disappointed also.

We spent our first week in Saigon, where we broke up into different groups of two and three and, through interpreters, interviewed as many Vietnamese people as time would permit. We normally started early in the morning and did not finish often until just before midnight curfew.

After the first week, three of the group spent 2 days to the south in the Me Kong Delta area and then returned to Saigon to devote the balance of their stay conducting further interviews. Two of us journied to the northern provinces where we spoke to people in such places as Hue, Quang Tri, Da Nang, Hoi An and Quang Ngai.

We tried to speak to as wide a variety of Vietnamese people as time would permit. Our list included a number of Senators and Deputies from the Legislature, university and high school professors, teachers and students.

We spoke to many former prisoners and relatives and families of persons who are still in prison; also; Buddhist monks, a Catholic priest, village chiefs and other local officials, rural development cadresmen, military personnel, local businessmen, housewives and many of the most humble rice farmers.

Finally, in different combinations, we spent several hours with the U.S. Ambassador, the Honorable Graham Martin, and mem-
bers of his immediate staff. Aside from these Americans, we also visited with a number of others who are working in Vietnam, many in a variety of different charitable functions but also including several who were employees of corporations assigned to the Defense Attaché’s Office which is now under the American Embassy.

I am assuming that the political prisoner question is beyond the scope of this subcommittee’s present inquiry. It is perhaps worth noting in passing that the wire services yesterday, in reporting on the rocket attack on Bien Hoa on Monday, routinely referred to the many victims in the Tan Hiep jail as Viet Cong and other “political prisoners.”

Similarly, I am sure that the subcommittee is not interested in my personal opinions as to why the Paris agreement and its companion protocols have failed. Suffice it to say that I went to Vietnam certain in my own mind, perhaps naively, that there was still some prospect of reviving the peace machinery outlined in the agreement, starting with the appointment of the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord.

I came home cynically convinced that peace was never really intended; that the agreement was little more than a coverup for the withdrawal of our own forces; and that we are steadfastly adhering to our longstanding policy of Vietnamization by continuing our massive military assistance in the hope that it will see Mr. Thieu through to ultimate victory on the battlefield.

Let me then restrict myself to personal observations.

First, I would mention my surprise at the high level of continuing war. I had read, of course, of the charges and countercharges with regard to cease-fire violations, but I still was not prepared to find that, once outside of Saigon, the country is still one large armed camp.

In my 5 days in the northern provinces I observed very little military activity other than one mortar barrage being fired by Saigon forces near My Lai late one morning, and the constant rotation of helicopter gunships and other military aircraft into and out of the airfield at Da Nang during the several hours I waited for a flight back to Saigon.

Nighttime was another story; with frequent exchanges of rocket and artillery fire, particularly around the airports, and occasional small arms and automatic weapons fire, particularly in the area near Hoi An.

Along the highways every culvert and bridge, of which there are many, is surrounded by foxholes, sandbag revetments, gun positions, mine nets, and searchlights. Virtually every bridge has been blown and rebuilt at least once.

We had heard it said that Saigon controls about two-thirds of the people, mainly in the cities and major towns to which so much of the rural population has fled, but only one-third of the land. Certainly, each of the towns and cities we visited seemed rather securely in GVN hands, apart from the shellings at night.

But it was equally apparent that the highways between them are most tenuously and narrowly held, in many places only for a kilometer or so on either side of the pavement. We were told that these roads often become a no man’s land after dark, and it was clear that most intercity travel occurs by day.
Due to the fluidity of the situation along these highways and the comparative ease with which the PRG forces can exfiltrate their own lines, military checkpoints cause frequent interruptions to all vehicular traffic. Sometimes all passengers are required to alight while the vehicle is thoroughly searched, but more often the soldiers simply spot-check the papers of a few of the uniformed passengers.

Along the sandy plains between Hue and Quang Tri, where the fighting was so fierce in the Easter offensive of 1972, there are still rusting tanks, trucks, and other ordnance strewn across the countryside. It was along this route that so many civilians, trying to flee to the south, were caught between the opposing forces.

It was in this area, south of Quang Tri, that we first visited some of the return-to-village camps, most of them hugging the highways for protection.

Further to the south, in the delta region below Hoi An, we saw evidence that some of these return-to-village settlements are definitely being used by the GVN to push out its boundaries and thereby retake land formerly controlled by the PRG. This practice was reported last December by the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Refugees.

We were told that the return-to-village program, still relatively in its infancy, is very largely financed by the United States. Unlike the refugee resettlement program, under which families are moved into settlements without reference to where they originally came from, return-to-village is supposed to be what its name implies, an effort to get the people back as close as possible to where their homes are or were.

For the most part, conditions in these camps were deplorable. People were cramped and crowded under the most filthy and squalid circumstances. We were told that each family was supposed to receive a very modest but apparently adequate cash payment equivalent to about $60 with which to construct their hut, sheets of metal for the roof during the monsoon, and a 6-month supply of rice on which to live until they could plant, raise, and harvest their own crop.

In several newly settled camps the rice supply has stopped after 2 months, and the village chief told us that the situation was getting desperate. A monk had organized a group of young people in the area who fanned out boats through the delta distributing 1- and 2-day supplies of rice that had been obtained through charitable sources to the families in direct need. We saw several persons approaching the starvation level.

We could not obtain an explanation of why, if the United States was furnishing either the rice or the funds to purchase the rice, it was not getting down to those for whom it was intended. We were left to conclude that it could not find its way down through the layers of corruption at the national, provincial, district, town and village levels.

Another problem that is plaguing some areas is unexploded ordnance. People returning to their fields for the first time run a constant risk from the mines, shells, bombs and other explosives. Again we were told that there was ample leftover U.S. equipment in the country to clear the fields, but the job is not being done and many people are being forced by desperation to resume plowing in these uncleared zones.
Certain life in no country at war is pleasant, particularly when that war has gone on as long as this one has. The solution to that problem must be to end the war.

Particularly outside of Saigon we encountered a universal and all-pervasive war weariness on the part of virtually every person we spoke to. To our question as to how the war might best be ended, the answer that came back most often was that we should try to persuade our Government to stop all of its military aid to the Thieu government.

If that could only be accomplished by stopping all aid, military and humanitarian, they urged that we do so. They admitted that if we did they would be in for some very lean and difficult days ahead and that parts of the country would be faced with near starvation.

They thought the price in terms of human suffering well worth the ultimate reward—war's end. Once over, they hoped that we might then be willing to resume nonmilitary assistance.

It was their feeling that the only way to make Thieu stop his endless quest for a military solution would be to stop his supplies. This then would force him to implement the Paris agreement and could well lead to eventual peace.

To this end they were almost unanimous that they could work out whatever accommodations might be necessary to live in peace with their countrymen on the other side.

Certainly I would agree that we must not keep going down the same old road to death and despair that we have followed inexorably for so long. If ever we are to derive any honor from our participation in the war in Southeast Asia, first there must be peace.

I hope this will raise questions in any area where you think I might be proficient to answer.

Mr. Nix. Thank you very much.

Let me ask you to state the number or approximate number of people who accompanied you on your trip.

Mr. Ransom. There were a total of five.

Mr. Nix. I wrote a letter to Ambassador Graham Martin that you saw?

Mr. Ransom. Yes, sir.

Mr. Nix. How were you received?

Mr. Ransom. I was in Da Nang with one other member of our group when the three who had gone to the delta just for 2 days and then came back to further interview in Saigon called the Ambassador and he invited them over promptly.

They spent a great deal of time with the Ambassador and some of his staff members, predominantly arguing with him on political prisoner questions, on questions of civil liberties, commenting to him on the kinds of things that we found in the country that we had thought were offensive, asking his opinions on them.

I am told that at the end of that first session the Ambassador, who, as you know, is a very old-time State Department employee—and he has worked for other Government functions as well—he is an old warhorse. He is the kind, unfortunately, of person who is responsible, I believe, for the kind of policy that leaves us where we are today in Vietnam. He supports the Thieu regime 100 percent and supports what we have done in Vietnam throughout the war.

He is a 100-percent advocate for the American position and for the Thieu position. He simplistically takes the point of view that if you
are not for him, you therefore are a Communist and a friend of Hanoi, and he makes no bones about this.

At the end of his conversation on the first day—the one at which I was not present—he handed Rev. John Weber, president of the New York Theological Seminary, a slip of paper on which there were two phone numbers and he explained to them these were the numbers of the PRG and the DVN delegation at Tansunut airport; and, because of Mr. Weber's influence with the Communists, would he call them and ask them to call off the shelling and killing in South Vietnam.

As you read since then, Mr. Weber pointed out that before we went to Vietnam he had never before in his life met a citizen of Vietnam, let alone having influence with them for the other side.

So, on the basis of that letter, several weeks ago the Ambassador wrote to Mr. Weber and told him that he was disappointed in Mr. Weber's failure to call the Communist delegation and the PRG, and he sent him a picture, 10 pictures, of maimed, bleeding, and dead children who had been killed in a school shelling that the Ambassador said was caused by the PRG. I understand whose shell that was is today very much in dispute. The Ambassador laid that shelling directly on Weber's head for his failure to make the phone call.

Mr. Weber pointed out as an American citizen he had to assume his share of responsibility of American policy and he would assume responsibility for these children's death and he would post one-half the pictures of the tragedy behind his desk as a reminder of his responsibility; and he returned the other five pictures to the Ambassador, pointing out that as Ambassador he was in a stronger position to force American policy and he would hope the Ambassador would post the other pictures over his desk as a reminder of his responsibility.

Mr. Nix. I must say to you, my experience indicates to me that the Ambassador, whoever he might have been, has nothing to do with the shaping of American policy in Vietnam, any part of it.

Now, I gather from things I have read of the present Ambassador, he does not have the wisdom of Solomon; otherwise he would not be engaged in the kind of controversy he has recently.

In the event the Congress of the United States declined to go along with any appropriations for South Vietnam, would you agree with me that the war would still go on?

Mr. Ransom. It would go on for some time, yes, sir. I don't think it could go on very long.

Mr. Nix. Nevertheless, it would go on for some time and the result obviously would be the death and suffering of a great number of people. Now, I voted against these funds, but nevertheless I must in fairness reach the conclusion that there seems to be a logical conclusion that the war would go on, and there would be suffering.

How would you suggest that the Congress arrive at the decision to withhold funds?

Mr. Ransom. I think the most important thing is the military side of it. Obviously we are in violation of the Paris agreement and its protocols if we go beyond a bullet-for-bullet, man-for-man, truck-for-truck, plane-for-plane replacement of military ordnance and we are substantially oversubscribing in that regard.
Now they are ammunition wasters. The rule of thumb is 10 rounds for every round of the PRG we fire back 10 of them in these rocket artillery exchanges at night.

I think the one way to force Thieu to implement the first step, the appointment of his representatives to the National Council, is by not continuing to overarm him. He has 1 million, I am told—1,100,000 persons armed in his various military services or the militia, as opposed to something over 100,000 North Vietnamese in South Vietnam, plus whatever the military arm of the PRG, however many they have. But he massively outnumbers them and I think he could very easily do with far less in military pay.

Now I think on the humanitarian side, what we have got to do is find a way to make sure what we are sending them gets to where it is supposed to be. I don't know whether that would possibly call in the U.N. or International Red Cross, or get Le Duc Tho's agreement to putting more U.S. AID people in the country to make sure it gets down through the local officials to the people who need it. But I think it is insane for us to be supplying these funds and provisions for people that are not getting it.

Mr. Nix. I am in substantial agreement with you. But now that they are supplying funds, we are doing that all over the world for a great number of places in the world. Just this morning we had a full hearing of the Foreign Affairs Committee at which the Secretary of Defense appeared and they are seeking appropriations for all these places in the world, and it appears to me first that the United States followed that procedure as a matter of policy over the years. They have done that.

Obviously when they initiated this policy, they concluded that certain benefits would accrue to the United States of America as a result of what they were doing. I question whether or not we have benefitted.

I question our ability to continue this program because of our financial position, because of the rising sentiment contra of the people in this country. I question also whether or not there is any counter program under consideration in the Department of State, the Department of the Army or any other place in America.

It seems to me—and I am discouraged to have to conclude as I do—that we initiated a policy long ago that dominates and looks into certain benefits; that we have never considered another procedure; that we are pursuing this policy down the road to destruction.

We cannot go on very long down this road, because obviously it has an ending, and that is the bankruptcy of the United States of America. The ending on the other hand is a revolt by masses of people in this country over that policy.

I am heartened in the belief that the American Government and those responsible for these policies are sufficiently sensible to realize the peril that the country faces and therefore to reconstruct the policy and change it, I hope.

Let me ask you about your visits to the jails in South Vietnam.

Mr. Ransom. We never got near them. We were not allowed in the jails.

Mr. Nix. Were you permitted to speak with people that had been?

Mr. Ransom. We spoke to a sufficient number—more than just a handful—possibly 30 or 40 former prisoners or family members of
persons who are still in jail, to the point where I am just—from my being a lawyer I am a skeptic, but I am perfectly satisfied that what we read about the numbers of political prisoners in the jails is not exaggerated.

Of course, the estimates range from Father Chuntin's two hundred-plus thousand down to Amnesty International's estimate of 75,000 to 100,000.

But I am just certain, albeit Mr. Thieu may have reclassified everybody as a "common criminal," you talk to them about what their offenses were and it is obvious by any rational definition these are purely political prisoners.

I talked to a journalist, for example, who had spent several years in jail and his crime had been translating from English into Vietnamese articles from the American press that were critical of the Thieu regime. I spoke to a number of students whose crime—and the ones we spoke to had been released late last year and some of their friends were in jail for the same offense and are still there or were when we left in January—their offense was a one-shot, 1-day demonstration against one-man elections.

We spoke to persons who had been in jail for the offense of forming peace groups in their communities to try to discuss and develop alternate solutions to Vietnam's problems other than on the battlefield.

And the parade of this kind of political dissent for which these people routinely were imprisoned, tortured in very many cases, just tells an incredible story about what is still going on there, to the point where there virtually is no dissent.

And I suppose that really is one of the problems of implementing the agreement to the point of getting the National Council of Concord going, because the agreement says both sides, the GVN and the PRG, will appoint their delegates; those delegates will then jointly appoint delegates from the third force that were acceptable to both of them, and there really is not a third force because for so long there has been no political opposition to the present regime.

Mr. Nix. I am not hopeful that any such thing as you suggest will occur. The only way in which a change can be brought about is to cut the funds off. There is no other way. Once that is done, they cannot replenish their stocks from any other source, because funds will not be forthcoming from any other place, and perhaps the result we hope for will come about, but only in that manner.

Mr. Ransom. I can claim no expertise in this area, but I see another possible source for "Super K," the Honorable Mr. Kissinger, to devote 82 days to Vietnam, where I think our responsibilities are perhaps greater than in the Mideast. I grant you, for the Mideast for the moment it is much more dangerous. I do not believe Mr. Kissinger could not put on his Vietnam hat and visit Peking, Moscow, and Le Duc Tho and get this thing back on the track again.

Mr. Nix. I have great faith in Mr. Kissinger.

Mr. Ransom. So do I; he has proved that.

Mr. Nix. He is one of the most outstanding men ever to hold that public office, but I take pause for one reason. I am not privy to the secret agreements that were entered into during those deliberations. I have no doubt that there are secret agreements, there were secret agreements entered into. That has been true over the years in all of these conferences.
Then, too, Mr. Kissinger is deeply involved at the moment in other matters in other parts of the world.

Mr. Ransom. Some of these secret commitments are being exposed. I am sure you have been following Shultz' revelations—and those are not particularly satisfying to me—in terms of further deception of the American public. I think Vietnam has been such a long and horrible tale of deception, I would hope we could at least agree on whether we had secretly and privately committed ourselves to overarming Thieu.

I think the tragedy of that is that the United States refuses to admit we were ever wrong in Vietnam. We committed ourselves to a policy of Vietnamization and we are not willing to say that was wrong; that the only route that leads us down is military victory or defeat, and it is just we cannot admit that we were ever wrong in that part of the world.

Mr. Nixon. That is understandable to me, also. The only way we really cleanse our conscience is when they throw one man out and put everything on him. We are going to take the blame. The usual method would be to discharge the man that entered into the negotiations, make him responsible for all the things that went wrong, and we will walk out of this thing absolutely fair and clean.

Mr. Ransom. But, sir, when I got back I went to call on the State Department. My second son is married to the daughter of the brand-new then Assistant Secretary of State, Far East, Pacific, and I was assured by the staff that specializes on Vietnam matters there, if we were to hold an election in Vietnam today, Thieu would get 90 per cent of the vote.

I do not believe that; but, were that true, why are we afraid of forcing elections that Thieu would overwhelmingly win?

Mr. Nixon. Well, what they would tell me if I asked them: "Don't you see, we are reluctant to interfere in the government of another nation." I have heard all of those answers. And when I receive an answer from the State Department, it comes through channels and I have never had the time or the energy to wind through all of the channels up to the top and get an answer. That is an exercise in futility.

Mr. Ransom. You asked me earlier—you stated the Honorable Graham Martin has no say in policy. As a followup to the story I told you about Mr. Weber, let me repeat an incident that involves myself.

The day after Mr. Weber was there, I went over to the Embassy, and the Ambassador graciously spent about an hour with me. I guess we rehashed some of the subjects they had been over the day before. He did not ask me to call any Communist friends.

We discussed the fact that I had lost a son, and that he had lost a son, I believe a stepson, in Vietnam, and how come we were so "poles apart" on our attitude about war in that country.

He said, "Well, Mr. Ransom, you are a lawyer; don't you believe that murderers belong in jail?" I said, "Under normal circumstances—tell me the facts."

He went over to his desk and he brought back a report, perhaps like this, and at the top there were pictures of two Vietnamese, I presume PRG, and he said, "Now, Mr. Ransom, these two men assassinated Mr. So-and-so." (I am sorry to say I don't know who it was, but it was some important either political figure or academician.) He
said, "Now, don't you believe those men should be in jail for murdering this man?"

I said, "If that is the fact, yes, I do." I said, "Unless perhaps they are POW's more rightly than common criminals." I said: "But what about our Phoenix program? What can you tell me of that? Because I have read in the press that we have assassinated perhaps 22,000 Vietnamese under the American Phoenix program."

He said, "Mr. Ransom, Americans are not assassins."

I said, "Mr. Ambassador, I was in OSS during World War II, and I spent 6 weeks of the most intensive training in Washington, D.C., prior to going overseas, the purpose of which was nothing more than to make me an official assassin."

Now, he wrote up a full account of this, and he gave it to Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Frelinghuysen brought this back and put it in the Congressional Record. In his report on his conversation with me, the Ambassador said nothing about our prior conversation about assassination. He said, "Mr. Ransom brought up the fact that he was an assassin for OSS, which undoubtedly makes it easier for him to understand what the PRG is doing in this country."

In other words, the truth is not in the man, and it is that kind of reporting, if that is coming back—I grant you, that is a small item; how he insults me is a matter of no significance at all. But if his reporting is no more accurate on important matters back to the Department of State, then I say he can have a very profound effect on policy. And that is what worries me.

Mr. Nix. Mr. Ransom, I am very glad that you have enough faith to believe that he has a profound effect. I am without faith on that score.

Mr. Ransom. You are far more experienced than I, sir.

Mr. Nix. I want you to know it has been a real pleasure to have you. I know the trip you took was to some degree satisfying to you because you had a firsthand opportunity to learn something about the thinking of the people and what was happening in the country. You read about it, I read about it, everyone else did. But to go there and to visit, to evaluate the situation for yourself, I think affords some satisfaction in your case, as it would have done in mine.

I said so much about it, but I hesitate to go there because somebody may shoot at me.

Mr. Ransom. They are delightful and lovely people, and I do say I came back with a conviction I must do something to help them.

Mr. Nix. I think you are. We intend to pursue this thing until we bring out the facts, however ugly the facts are, so that we can come to some conclusions that might be helpful to the American people.

I want to thank you very much.

Mr. Ransom. Thank you, sir, and God bless you in those deliberations.

Mr. Nix. Our next witness is Mr. Benedict John Kerkvliet, fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution—expert on the Philippines.

You may proceed whenever you are ready.
Statement of Benedict John Kerkvliet, Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution

Mr. Kerkvliet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Nix. Would you rather summarize?
Mr. Kerkvliet. Yes, sir. I have a summary statement, and I would like for the longer version to be included in the record.
Mr. Nix. Without objection, that will be made part of the record.
Mr. Kerkvliet. I have a statement that will last about 10 minutes, and then we can have questions, if you care to.

I am here today in part, sir, as a kind of follow-up to the Vietnam situation which I followed closely also. I see events in the Philippines turning in such a fashion that I fear for outcomes that might be similar to what we have been experiencing in Vietnam.

I am also here today representing, besides myself, an organization called Friends of the Filipino People, which is similarly concerned about events in the Philippines and America's role there.

We have been following closely events in the Philippines since President Ferdinand Marcos imposed martial law and curtailed all civil liberties. I lived in the Philippines from March 1969 through November 1970, while doing research on peasant movements there, especially the Huk rebellion (1946-54). Since then, I have studied political developments in the Philippines and other countries in Southeast Asia, partly in connection with my teaching and my own research.

My studies and those of others in the Friends of the Filipino People and organizations with similar interests have caused us to be alarmed at trends in the Philippines. We fear increased repression and violence under the present martial law regime. And we fear that the United States will continue to contribute directly to this repression.

We want, therefore, the U.S. Government to end all military and military-related assistance to the Marcos regime, the newest antidemocratic government in Southeast Asia.

The basis for this position is the following argument. First, under martial law, repression and abusive government practices have been major themes in Philippine politics during the last 11/2 years. They far exceed whatever shortcomings the country had prior to martial law.

Second, repression and abuses have provoked Filipinos from many different backgrounds and political orientations to resist, often nonviolently. Rebellion is more extensive now than before martial law.

Third, the response of the Philippine Government, in turn, has been more repression and further militarization of the Government.

Fourth, this military apparatus, including the country's enlarged armed forces and modernized national police, depends heavily upon the United States. Whether or not Congress has approved, the U.S. Government is helping to perpetuate this regime and its repressive policies.
Since September 1972, the Republic of the Philippines, once known as America's showcase of democracy, has become a dictatorship. Since declaring martial law, President Marcos has ruled by Presidential decree.

He dismissed the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, banned all political parties, and canceled all elections. He destroyed the previously independent judicial branch and has instituted military tribunals to try civilians accused of crimes against the government. Because of martial law, there is no freedom of the press, no freedom of speech, no freedom of assembly, no freedom from arbitrary arrest, and no guarantee of a fair trial. Nor are workers allowed to strike or demonstrate.

The police and the armed forces have arrested over 12,000 peasants, workers, students, journalists, civil libertarians, nuns, priests, ministers, political opponents of Marcos, and others who criticize. One Presidential decree makes rumor mongering a punishable crime. Anyone who utters any criticism automatically becomes an enemy of the state.

Inside the prisons, the police and soldiers have tortured and killed prisoners.

Outside the prisons, military officers and other government officials abuse civilians and continue practices of corruption and favoritism. The Filipino people are still suffering from fear, corruption, and unequal treatment by the people who have been charged with carrying out Marcos' decrees.

Economic and political conditions, which were bad before martial law, have since become worse. But now Filipinos have few legal options in order to express their discontent. The result has been increased illegal actions, resistance and even armed rebellion.

The reaction, in turn, of the Marcos regime is more repression. A recent example was the Philippine military's attack in February against Filipino Muslim rebels in the province of Sulu. It resulted in the destruction of Jolo, a city of 150,000 people.

Between 1,000 and 2,000 people died. The government's air force bombed and napalmed the city and countryside, its navy bombarded the area with heavy artillery and its army fielded 5,000 heavily armed soldiers. This was, in the Philippine military's language, "a mailed first approach" to end the rebellion. Since the battle, the military has continued what it calls sanitizing operations against the rebels.

A central theme in Philippine politics under martial law has been militarization. Whereas previously the Philippine military played only minor roles, it now has the center of the stage. Military officers are active in nearly every aspect of government. The military's numbers have also grown, from 65,000 men in 1972 to 100,000 men now. By mid-1975, the Marcos regime plans that the military will number 200,000.

What is so disturbing, Mr. Chairman, is that aid from the United States has been the main source of money, materiel and technical assistance for the buildup of the military apparatus over the years. Now that U.S. assistance has borne fruit—a martial law government that relies increasingly on its military, which in turn relies heavily on more aid from the United States.

The Philippine national police system, for example, is in large measure the result of U.S. AID's Internal Security program. This