AID police program can take major credit for such things as the
citizen registration and ID card system now underway in the Philip-
pines, the arrest of thousands of Filipinos held in new detention
centers, and 1,500 modernized police departments in which many po-
licemen have the latest American riot guns, walkie-talkies and patrol
car computer consoles.

Today, AID continues to help the Marcos regime to train and
equip its police forces and integrate them under the command of
the Philippine constabulary.

U.S. assistance for narcotics control, too, seems to be helping the
Marcos regime build a police state. The Philippine constabulary’s
antinarcotics unit, which receives U.S. aid, is known to arrest sus-
pected critics and subversives in Manila.

In at least one instance, the arrested person, a young Filipino
named Liliboa Hilao, died while detained in the antinarcotics unit’s
building at Camp Crame [the PC Headquarters in Quezon City].
According to Liliboa Hilao’s relatives, the constabulary officers first
molested her at her home, then tortured her to death at Camp Crame.

Both the police and Philippine armed forces rely almost exclusively
on weapons, materiel, and other U.S. assistance in order to suppress
growing dissent and rebellion. Last year, for example, the United
States supplied the Philippines with such things as helicopters, trans-
port aircraft, machineguns, recoilless rifles, and long-range commun-
ication equipment in order that the Marcos regime could, in the words
of one Pentagon spokesman, “cope with the current situation.”

During the battle at Jolo in February, the Philippine military used
howitzers, .50-caliber machineguns, F-86 Sabre jets, C-47 gunships,
ammo helicopters, naval batteries, bombs and napalm—all supplied by
the United States.

Surplus U.S. supplies from Vietnam, which were intended for peace-
ful purposes, have also gone into the Marcos regime’s counterinsur-
gency efforts. So have some supplies from U.S. AID. U.S. Army Green
Beret units engaged in civic action and training exercises in the Philip-
pine countryside also appear to be involved in the counterinsurgency.
There are reports of still other American military personnel who are
directly involved with the Marcos regime’s counterinsurgency.

The conclusions and recommendations we reach, therefore, are these:
It is clear that the United States, through its military and military-
related assistance, has contributed immensely to sustaining the Philip-
pine military before martial law. Today it continues to help the Marcos
regime build an even larger military apparatus. If Congress appropri-
ates more of the American taxpayers’ money to give military or mili-
tary-related assistance to the Philippines for fiscal year 1976, that
money, too, will further support the dictatorship.

For this reason, the Friends of the Filipino People and I recom-
 mend that Congress appropriate no military or military-related assist-
ance for the Philippines. This year is an excellent opportunity for the
United States to draw the line. It can say now, before the situation in
the Philippines becomes worse, that it will no longer be party to the
growth of another antidemocratic regime.

We further recommend that Congress conduct a thorough investiga-
tion to find out exactly what American military or paramilitary per-
sonnel have done or are doing in the Philippines. There is evidence
that American personnel seem to be helping the Marcos government's counterinsurgency efforts.

In my full testimony, I present unconfirmed reports that American personnel in fact are directly involved in counterinsurgency there. This situation is reminiscent of the 1950's and 1960's when there were many hints and unconfirmed reports that the U.S. Government was directly involved in counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Today we have similar hints and reports about the Philippines.

I might add we get similar denials, as we did in the 1950's and early 1960's in Vietnam from officials in the State and Defense Departments.

There are other similarities that seem ominous: Civic action missions, which the U.S. Government tried earlier in Vietnam, have reappeared now in the Philippines. The Philippines' national police system is an outgrowth of AID's internal security program from Vietnam.

William H. Sullivan, an architect of the U.S. Government's Vietnam policy in the 1960's and the Ambassador to Laos who coordinated the bombing of the country, is now the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines.

This time, hopefully, Congress and other Americans will learn the truth of the matter before it is too late—before an American President presents a fait accompli and says Congress must appropriate much larger sums to support "our boys" or our alleged commitments in the Philippines.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee.

[The prepared statement follows:]}

STATEMENT OF BENEDICT J. KERKVLIET, FELLOW, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am Benedict J. Kerkvliet, a professor of political science at the University of Hawaii and currently, for 1973-74, a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars here in Washington. I am speaking today on behalf of myself and an organization of concerned Filipinos and Americans called Friends of the Filipino People (FFP).

We have been following closely events in the Philippines since President Ferdinand Marcos imposed martial law and curtailed all civil liberties in that country. I, for example, lived in the Philippines from March 1969 through November 1970 while doing research on peasant movements there, especially the Huk rebellion (1946-1954). And since then I have studied political developments in the Philippines and other countries in Southeast Asia, partly in connection with my teaching and my own research. My studies and those of others in the Friends of the Filipino People and organizations with similar interests have caused us to be alarmed at trends in the Philippines. We fear increased repression and violence under the present martial law regime. And we fear that the United States will continue to contribute directly to this repression. We want the United States government to show to the world this year that it will no longer continue to support military dictatorships. We want the United States to end all military and military-related assistance to the Marcos regime, the newest dictatorship in Southeast Asia. If the Administration of President Richard Nixon fails to stop this aid, then we want at least the 93d Congress of the United States to refuse to appropriate any more money to the martial law regime in the Philippines.

The basis for this position is the following argument. First, the martial law regime in the Philippines is a repressive one. Repression and abusive government practices have been major themes in the country's politics during the last one and one-half years. They far exceed whatever shortcomings the country had prior to martial law. Second, repression and abuses have provoked Filipinos from many different backgrounds and political orientations to resist, often rebel. Rebellion is more extensive than before martial law. Third, the response of the Philippine government, in turn, has been more repression and
further militarization of the government and the entire society. Fourth, this military apparatus, including the country’s enlarged armed forces and modernized national police, is heavily dependent upon the United States. Whether or not Congress has approved, the United States government is perpetuating this dictatorship and its repressive policies. This not only makes a farce of our democratic principles and heritage, but it could easily drag the United States into another “Vietnam” type of war in Southeast Asia. That prospect scares me to death, and I should think that it would millions of other Americans and Filipinos, too.

Political repression in the Philippines

Since September 1972, the Republic of the Philippines has been under martial law. “This country, which once was widely known as America’s ‘showcase of democracy’ and one of the few countries in the Third World, to have any semblance of democracy, has become a dictatorship. The dictator is Ferdinand E. Marcos, who is both President and Prime Minister of the Republic.

The laws of the land under martial law are the Presidential Decrees, Letters of Instructions, and General Orders that only President Marcos or his own ministers can issue. He has proclaimed over 440 Presidential Decrees so far. He has destroyed the legislative and judicial branches of government, silenced the press, ordered the arrests of thousands, and mobilized the military.

One of President Marcos’ first acts after declaring martial law was to dismiss the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives. He banned all political parties and cancelled all elections, including his own. His second, and final, term as President should have ended December 1978. He arrested prominent Senators and several delegates to the Constitutional Convention, which was then in session. These persons had been Marcos’ political enemies and outspoken critics of the militaristic tendencies of the Marcos administration prior to martial law.

He also destroyed the previously independent judicial branch. General Order No. 3, which Marcos issued the first day of martial law, directs the court by excluding all acts, decrees, and other orders of Marcos or his representatives from judicial scrutiny. Also excluded are criminal cases involving such issues as “national security,” “the fundamental laws of the State,” and “public order.” He added four members to the Supreme Court, appointing persons known to be loyal to him. Then, as a journalist recently wrote, “to seal the collapse of the old independent judiciary, President Marcos not only squeezed resignation letters from all judges down to the Court of First Instance level (presided over by district judges); he also made sure the nine carry-over Supreme Court justices took new oaths of office under his Constitution.”

The President has also formed “military tribunals,” one or more for each military region of the country, to try both civilian and military cases involving “crimes” against the government.

The Marcos government was not content with simply cancelling all elections. It has wanted to give the appearance of free choice, especially for the benefit of the outside world. It has called, therefore, two referendums: one to approve a new Constitution, which allowed Marcos to stay in power indefinitely, and the other to approve the programs of the “New Society.” For these referendums, the Marcos regime created “Citizen Assemblies” throughout the country. People had to vote in public, frequently in the presence of armed police, and with government officials coaching them on the “correct” ballots. As the highly respected Bishop Francisco F. Claver wrote recently:

“Probably the single most resented aspect of martial law (and this is true among the privileged as well as the underprivileged classes) is the loss of freedom of choice at the polls. The last two referendums have been parodied farces, a fact that is not lost on even the regime’s staunchest supporters. For a people used to turning out of office unpopular administrations in the past through the instrumentality of the free ballot, having to vote according to ‘suggested answers’ is the ultimate indignity. The people feel the inwardly deep,
but they also realize they are not going to achieve anything in open demand for their rights.\footnote{Francisco E. Claver, S. J., Bishop of Malaybalay (in Mindanao), "Church and State under Martial Law: A Biased View," Pahoyog (Honolulu), February 1974, p. 8.}

The New Society prohibits the civil liberties of the "old society." As one recent study concluded, "... there is no freedom of the press, no freedom of speech, no freedom of assembly, no freedom from arbitrary arrest, and no guarantee of a fair trial."\footnote{David A. Rosenberg, "Freedom vs. Responsibility: Changes in the Philippine Press Since Martial Law," (paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, Boston, Massachusetts, 1–8 April 1974), p. 42.} Where there were 15 or 20 daily newspapers before martial law, there are only three now—all of them strictly controlled by the government, and one of them with close ties to President Marcos. The number of radio and television stations has similarly declined. All media must abide by the government's rules of censorship. These rules prohibit any criticism, let alone any dissent, of government policies and the President himself. "The media report virtually nothing but praise for the Marcos administration," wrote one scholar.\footnote{P. H. de V. Koffend, "One Year of Martial Law," Asia Magazine, 25 November 1973, p. 1; 8 April 1974, p. 40.} A correspondent remarked, as others have, "Manila's press after martial law counts among the dullest and most obedient in the world."

Media people must adhere to government censorship lest they lose their licenses, be imprisoned, or both. Since martial law, the government has imprisoned numerous journalists, publishers, and broadcasters. At least one of them has been tried on charges of "subversion," and sentenced to several years of hard labor. Under martial law, "subversive literature" is, as Maryknoll priests told a \textit{Washington Post} correspondent last November, "any article even mildly critical of the regime—even articles from magazines such as \textit{Time} or \textit{Newsweek} ..." The government has banned from the country at least nine issues of \textit{Time}, for example, because they had stories containing criticism of Marcos' policies.\footnote{H. D. S. Greenway, "Church and State, Under Martial Law: A Biased View," Pahoyog (Honolulu), February 1974, p. 8.}

The government has outlawed strikes, political organizations, and unauthorized political meetings. "Strikes are a luxury we cannot afford in the New Society," said Alejandro Melchor, the Executive Secretary to Marcos. The regime has also dissolved labor courts and imposed compulsory arbitration in order to suppress labor and peasant unrest that had been common prior to martial law. Peasants, who comprise nearly 75% of the population, can only form associations that have the government's approval. In most localities the government has outlawed chapters of the two largest peasant organizations prior to martial law, the \textit{MASAKA} (Malayong Samahan Mapasadsak, or Free Farmers Union), and the \textit{FFF} (Federation of Free Farmers).

Fear and force are principal means the government uses to get compliance and obedience. Both the censored Manila newspapers and the foreign press report numerous police raids and mass arrests. During the first three months of martial law, the Philippine Constabulary (PC) stated that 3,234 persons had been arrested. After one year of martial law, the government admitted that it had arrested or, in the government's language, "detained" 11,697 persons.\footnote{H. D. S. Greenway, "Church and State, Under Martial Law: A Biased View," Pahoyog (Honolulu), February 1974, p. 8.} The figure must be far above that now because arrests and police raids have continued unabated in the eight months since last September. A common practice of the specially trained "Metrocom" (Metropolitan Command) police attached to the Philippine Constabulary is to surround an entire neighborhood, usually at night, force everybody out of their homes, and arrest people who look suspicious. These are called "zona" raids, named after the similar methods of the military during the Japanese occupation in World War II. In recent months, the police have focused especially on intellectuals and clergy. In December, for example, the PC raided the Baguio City branch of the University of the Philippines and arrested 150 professors and students. The PC released some of them a short time later, but they took the others to a PC prison or "detention-center" for interrogation and imprisonment.

Among the prominent persons recently arrested are Dr. Nemesio Prudente, former president of the Philippine College of Commerce in Manila; Attorney
Charito Planas, a critic of martial law and a former delegate to the Constitutional Convention; and Lorenzo Tañada, Jr., a media executive and son of former Senator Tañada who has been a lawyer for several of those people arrested during martial law. As for the clergy, the government has raided convents, church schools, church universities, and private homes in order to arrest ministers, priests, and nuns. At least 22 priests and nuns had been "detained" as of November 1973, according to a New York Times report. By now the number is larger because the government, angry with those in the Catholic Church who continue to criticize the military for its abuses and martial law in general, has quickened its drive against the clergy despite military assurances earlier that arbitrary arrest of Catholic clergy would stop. Frequentiy, people arrested are never charged with a crime. People suffer, as priests in one Philippine province recently protested, "arbitrary arrests and acts of harassment on [grounds of] mere suspicion of so-called subversive activities." Others, such as Baldomero T. Olivera, a former press secretary to a late Philippine President, are arrested for "rumor mongering," a punishable crime according to Presidential Decree No. 90. Anyone who utters any criticism automatically becomes an enemy of the State," reported Professor John M. Swomley, Jr., after returning from a visit to political prisoners in Manila. Still others are accused of specific crimes, including "subversion," but languish in prison for months without trial. From time to time, the government releases "detainees," after they agree to endorse the New Society and to report regularly to assigned police and military officers. Others, however, have been in prison for months. Senators Jose Diokno and Benigno Aquino, Jr., for instance, have been in prison since the first days of martial law. They still have not yet been formally charged. Their ostensible offense seems to be that they were strong critics and threatening political opponents of Marcos prior to martial law. Inside the prisons, government authorities often abuse the prisoners. A peasant whom the P.O. arrested, for example, fought the guards at the "detention camp." The guards, in turn, electrocuted his penis. He had fought the guards in the first place because the reason he had been arrested was because he had tried to get the landlord to follow the rules of Marco's land reform program. A former prisoner wrote that many of those people arrested for subversive activity never make it to prison; "often as not, they are killed at the time of their capture by ambitious military men anxious to report 'battle' victories." Those who escape murder "are taken to secret apartments and at times to military camps where they are squeezed for information through the use of a wide range of crude to sophisticated torture techniques." In mid 1973, 27 priests reported in a joint letter that they had documentary proof of men who had been "killed in jail even before their guilt could be investigated and established." A pastoral letter of Sulu and Mindanao priests read to hundreds of congregations on Easter Sunday 1974 protested, "That some detainees, according to a growing number of reports, have been subjected to torture in violation of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, yet there are no signs that steps are being taken to correct this." A study in November 1973, based on a survey of key Informants throughout the Philippines, found that, "There are frequent reports of physical torture from all regions of the country. The families and relatives of prisoners are [also] kept under surveillance." Outside the prison, too, military officers and other government authorities abuse civilians and continue practices of corruption and favoritism. In the provinces, people report that military authorities get away with everything from sophisticated torture techniques. a

13 See the following reports, for example, in the Philippine Times (Chicago): 15 November 1973, p. 1ff.; 15 December 1973, p. 1ff.; and 15 April 1974, p. 1ff.
14 Philippine Times (Chicago), 28 February 1974, p. 11.
trucks into their own vehicles.\textsuperscript{22} A study of all regions in the country found, for example:

In the cities of Central Luzon, the 1st PC Zone Command protects gambling and houses of prostitution. In Cebu and Eastern Visayas, the 3rd PC Zone Command protects smuggling and vice, which are reported to be much worse now than before martial law. From Zamboanga del Norte, there are many reports of crimes committed by the military against defenseless Muslim civilians. In Mindoro, the PC are accused of land grabbing from the Mangyans (a tribal group).

The study concluded that instead of controlling the abuses of local politicians, who are by and large the same people as before martial law:

The military in most of the eleven regions of the country are... party to the abuses. There is a marriage of convenience from which both military and politicians profit. The ordinary people are the ones who suffer. There is no one to defend their rights. No one to whom they can appeal their grievances. They are intimidated, fearful. They have no recourse from either the abuses of the military or the politicians, and abuses are common.\textsuperscript{23}

A lawyer for recent refugees from heavy fighting in Sulu province said, “The efforts of the President to establish his New Society by martial law have failed because despite the various decrees,... the people are still suffering from want, fear, corruption, and iniquitous treatment from the people who have been charged with carrying out his presidential orders.”\textsuperscript{24}

Since martial law began, the Marcos regime has increased its budget for propaganda from 3 million pesos to 68 million pesos ($10 million) in order to sell the New Society both at home and abroad.\textsuperscript{25} But appearance of reform is not enough, not when repression is so harsh and the “reforms” themselves so empty. As a Wall Street Journal reporter wrote a year ago, “Despite a few promising indications, his [Marcos’] ‘New Society’ remains more a matter of public relations than of profound reforms. Its momentum, moreover, seems to be sagging.”\textsuperscript{26} Land reform, for example, which Marcos has said repeatedly should be the only gauge of success or failure for the New Society, has so far been a failure. And it shows every likelihood of continuing to be so because it excludes most tenant farmers, while those who are affected will probably end up as poor as they were before martial law.\textsuperscript{27}

Corruption continues, even at the highest levels of government. The major difference is that corrupt military officers have replaced some of the corrupt politicians.\textsuperscript{28} The widely advertised claim that “crime in the streets” is wiped out appears to have been only a temporary reality. Even the government censored press reports more stories of crime now than it did a year ago. Last October, the Department of Defense admitted to a delegation of Catholic bishops that the crime rate was on the rise and was fast approaching pre-martial law proportions.\textsuperscript{29}

Those who have benefited from martial law include the foreign investors, particularly large American, Japanese, and multinational corporations.\textsuperscript{30} Other beneficiaries include Filipino political and economic elites. Talk about redistribution of wealth and undermining the wealthy families notwithstanding the martial law regime has not posed a threat to the elite as a whole. Only a few of the


\textsuperscript{24} Quoted by Brian Gomez, “To Moroland?,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 December 1973, p. 28.


\textsuperscript{26} Pahayag (Honolulu), 18 January 1974, p. 12; Philippine Times (Chicago), 15 January 1974, p. 8, 28 February 1974, p. 11; and Eduardo dela Cruz, “Military Abuses Denounced,” Philippine Times, 30 April 1974, p. 11.


\textsuperscript{29} Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 March 1974, p. 20.


Oligarchical families have lost some wealth and political clout. They did because they were political enemies of Marcos, who took his revenge once he had acquired so much power by virtue of martial law. Marcos and his family have benefited, too. Reputed to have been the wealthiest man in Southeast Asia before martial law, Marcos must be one of the wealthiest men in Asia now. He is also, in effect, President for life—or for as long as he can hang on to the position.

**Growing Resistance and Rebellion**

Social, economic, and political conditions in the Philippines were bad before martial law. Since then, they have become in several respects even worse. But now Filipinos have far fewer legal options in order to express their discontent. The result, almost inevitably, has been increased illegal actions, resistance, and even armed rebellion. The authorities characterize the people who do these things as “subversives,” “communists,” and “Maoists.” If there is any truth at all to this, it accounts for only a small number of people. It is the government—its repressive policies and bad economics—that is provoking people to resist and to rebel.

Take wage laborers, for example. Inflation exceeded 30 percent last year and it is still climbing; unemployment is increasing; employers lay off workers in violation of their contracts; and corporation executives connive with government officials to ignore minimum wages and other labor laws. The result is that workers want the right to strike. But the government continues to refuse. Some workers have publicly protested and gone on strike, anyway, risking imprisonment or even death. The PC and local police have arrested many of the workers’ leaders.

Squatter families, who compose one-fourth to one-third of Manila’s population, have been organizing for years in order to protect themselves against forced eviction and government abuses. Now, under martial law, the evictions have been stepped up in order to make way for the regime’s “beautification projects,” yet the squatters can no longer demonstrate or hold rallies. But because the situation has become so serious late last year, several hundred people dared to march toward the President’s palace to protest “the government’s violation of an agreement that no squatters would be ejected beyond the six-meter distance from the Manila Bay shoreline.” The PC’s Metrocom police confronted the squatters, forced them to disperse, and arrested several leaders. The next week, the Metrocom raided the homes of those in the squatters’ “ZOTTO” organization and arrested more leaders.

Presidential Decree No. 33 prohibits the “printing, possession, distribution, and circulation” of leaflets, handbills, papers, graffiti, or any other materials that might “incite” people or criticize the government. Despite this decree and the prison sentence it carries, “underground” papers and leaflets continue to appear in increasing numbers. Many university people who were active in numerous nationalist organizations prior to martial law have now resorted to secret meetings and surreptitious methods in order to collect information and publish news that never gets into the government censored press. They do this despite the fact that police and the PC arrest and imprison people for these “subversive” and “communist” activities.

Meanwhile, there is considerable evidence that the number of groups prepared to fight in armed rebellion is increasing. One group, called the Filipino Freedom Fighters, pleaded with Marcos in a publicity circulated letter last September to lift martial law. While his term of office under the pre-martial law Constitution expired at the end of 1973, the Freedom Fighters stated that Marcos, in their view, was no longer the legitimate president and warned that force may be necessary in order to oust him. The Freedom Fighters reportedly include lawyers, professors, students, some libertarian-minded wealthy families, and even some disgruntled officers in the Philippine military.

In the countryside prior to martial law, organized rebellion was confined mainly to the small New People’s Army in parts of the Cagayan Valley and Muslim rebels in parts of Mindanao. But since martial law, organized resistance and rebellion have appeared in most regions of the country. Reports from the

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Manila and foreign press show armed groups have clashed with the Philippine
military in several provinces in the following regions: Ilocos, Cagayan Valley,
Central Luzon, Southern Luzon, Bicol, Western Visayas, Eastern Visayas,
Mindanao, and Sulu—virtually every part of the country. The province of
Pampanga in Central Luzon, for example, had a clash last October for the first
time in over four years between “insurgents” and the PC. Armed rebels are
also appearing again in other areas, such as Bulacan and Nueva Ecija, where
the peasant-based Huk rebellion had been strong in the 1940s and 1950s. The
Island of Panay in Western Visayas has become, according to another report,
“a veritable powder keg,” with 200 or more well armed rebels scattered across
the three provinces there. The rebels reportedly have considerable village
support.

“Many students from universities in Manila and other cities have gone under-
ground to join armed rebels in armed rebellion in different parts of the country.
Prior to martial law, these students and peasants had been active in student
political organizations and peasant associations. Martial law has banned these
groups. A study last fall noted, for example, that many of the approximately
100 armed rebels in Davao Oriental and Davao del Norte (in Mindanao) were
young people who had been active in the “Khi Rho” before. The Khi Rho was
a Catholic youth group that worked especially with peasant associations. An-
other report tells of four rebels whom the PC recently killed. One had been
the secretary-general of the SDK, which was a legitimate student political organi-
sation prior to martial law. Another had been the editor of the University of
the Philippines student newspaper. Two more had been student activists.” Several
priests and nuns, too, have joined armed peasant groups to prepare for armed
rebellion. Although the number of rebels may still be small and the degree of
cooperation among these various groups may be weak, the rebels seem to be
growing in strength—and even in cooperation. Reports recently have said that
the various underground groups within the “Christians for National Libera-
tion” are making a “united front” with other underground groups and the so-
called “Maoist” New People’s Army.

The New People’s Army, too, seems to be larger now than it was when Marcos
declared martial law in September 1972. A news report on a province in the
Bicol region said, for example, “No more than a communist toehold before the
imposition of martial law, this southern tip of Luzon has developed in the 16
months since September 1972 into what appears to be a solid spreading base
of the . . . New People’s Army. The NPA has taken hold of Sorsogon because
it is rooted in the community. Its leaders here are former student activists, born
here . . . and former Marcos political opponents led by a former local mayor.” The
Philippine army has said that the number of “Communist regulars” has
increased during martial law from 1,716 to 2,236.

Although the government characterizes most of these rebels and other “sub-
versives” as “communists” and “Maoists,” this is not a fair description, as I
have tried to indicate here. A few may be communists, such as some of those in
the New People’s Army. But most people are doing things that the government
considers illegal; including armed rebellion, first, in order to protect themselves
against repression, and second, to work for improved conditions in their country.
Most of these Filipinos would prefer legitimate channels of criticism, dissent,
and protest, but martial law has closed those off.

The situation reminds me very much of the conditions in which the large
peasant movement in Central Luzon in the 1940s became a strong peasant rebel-
lion that lasted until the mid 1950s. This was the Huk rebellion. Peasants had
not wanted to take up guns to fight for economic justice and against the police
and landlords’ violent practices. But because of officially sanctioned repression
beginning in 1945 and 1946, peasants had to fight back. They were forced to
rebel. The government and U.S. authorities at that time, too, called the Heks a

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28 Philippine Times (Chicago), 15 April 1974, p. 6.
29 Joseph Lelyveld, “Church In Philippines Becoming a Focus of Opposition to Marcos,”
32 Robert W. Smith, “Sorsogon, Fast Becoming New People’s Army Territory, Manchester
33 Philippine Times (Chicago), 15 January 1974, p. 1f.
"communist" rebellion. But it was not. One would think that government officials would have learned better over the years since then.

The largest and strongest rebellion during martial law thus far has been the Muslim movement in Mindanao and Sulu, the southern extreme of the Philippines. The Marcos regime has been terribly anxious to portray the Muslim rebels as "Maoists." It is the Marcos regime's interests to do this, first, in order to keep Muslim countries, upon whom the Philippines depends for most of its oil, from accusing the Philippine government of waging a genocidal war on Muslim brothers. Second, the Marcos government knows that the United States government is more likely to help in the counter-insurgency if the insurgents are "communists" and "Maoists."

But the Muslim rebellion is far more complicated than communist subversion. "The . . . charge—that the rebels are 'Muslim Maoists'—remains the best illustration, among many, of the Manila [government] failure to see itself, or the problem, as Muslims see it," wrote Harvey Stockwin, a close observer of the situation. "The rebels are no nearer reconciling Maoism to Islam than are, for example, Sabah's Tun Mustapha or Libya's Colonel Moammer Kadaffi."

The first complication is that there are several Muslim rebel groups, not just one. They do not want exactly the same thing and they are not under one unified leadership. Second, the current rebellion among Filipinos Muslims is part of a long history of trouble between this minority group and the central government in Manila—whether under the Spanish, Americans, or Philippine Republic—and the Christian Filipino majority. The issues go way back: Muslim identity, land-ownership, and independence or at least an autonomous Muslim state.

Although fighting between Muslim rebels and the Philippine military occurred off and on during the 1960s, it was martial law that pushed an even larger number of Muslims into full-scale rebellion. One important reason was the increased presence of the Philippine military itself. The military's reputation is extremely bad among Muslims, and as the military started to exercise its new power under martial law, it easily angered these people. A second important reason was the government's demand that all citizens turn over their weapons. This was all the more so in a martial law situation since the government's demand that all citizens turn over their weapons.

April 17, 1974, p. 21.

On several occasions last year, the Philippine military used airpower, naval bombardment, and heavy assaults against Muslim rebel positions in Mindanao and Sulu. A few months ago, in February 1974, the government put their full might behind a sustained attack on Muslim rebels, numbering between 400 and 2,000, who had moved from the countryside to take control of the Muslim city of Jolo in Sulu province. It had been a city of 300,000 people. Afterwards, according to a Manila newspaper; it had only 20,000 people. The city was in ruins, said a New York Times reporter; "It was acres of charred rubble and blasted concrete, from which bodies were still being recovered . . . more than a week after the Philippine armed forces finally took Jolo back from the Muslim insurgents."
Another reporter said that Jolo was 90 percent destroyed. Between 1,000 and 2,000 people were killed.40 The government's air force had bombed and napalmed the city, its navy had bombarded it with heavy artillery, and its army had fielded 5,000 heavily armed soldiers. This was, in Philippine military language, "a mailed fist approach" to end the rebellion. After the battle, the Marcos regime's Secretary of Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile, reflected on the method: "We should have taught these people a lesson a long time ago. We have been too easy on them. They must be forced to give up this foolish idea of dismembering a portion of our country."41 One Muslim rebel told a foreign correspondent, "The [Philippine] army's aim is genocide, to wipe out all Moros [Muslims] and take our homeland. Why? Because Sulu is rich. Oil in sea, crops, prestige of Sabah, there were 22,000 Filipinos Muslim, fighting wars. In Muslim lands, and we will die to keep them."42

Since the large battle in February, the Philippine military has continued what it calls "sanitizing operations" against Muslims beyond the ruins of Jolo.43

Several thousand Filipino refugees, both Muslim and Christian, try to find shelter and food in Zamboanga, Cotabato, Basilan, and other places. The Prime Minister of Malaysia recently reported that in his country alone, on the Island of Sabah, there were 22,000 Filipino Muslim refugees.44 But reputable observers say that rather than bringing the war to a halt, the government's military methods have strengthened the Muslim rebellion. As one foreign correspondent wrote recently about Jolo's destruction, "First, and last, it has increased the polarization between Christian and Muslim in the Southern Philippines. . . . Some of the younger [Muslims] inevitably feel that joining up with the rebels is the only way out. There are numerous swirling cross-currents, eddying all the more because of Jolo. They add up to vicious, gathering, circles of fear and suspicion, hatred and violence."45

Other Government military attacks similar to the one on Jolo have occurred during martial law. In October 1972, for example, a military commander in Northern Luzon forced 60,000 Filipinos to move just as they were preparing to harvest their rice crops. The commander said he wanted to "sanitize" the area with a "big military operation." It was an area where the New People's Army was strong. "Everyone who remains in the area is NPA," General Tranquillo Paranis is reported to have said as he prepared the attack. Martial law, he added, had helped to persuade local government officials to cooperate with this military method.46

I fear that government attacks like this, the one in Jolo, and other repressive military methods will continue in many parts of the Philippines as the government continues to militarize and resort to large scale violence in order to rule.

A major theme in Philippine politics under martial law has been militarization. Previously, the military played only minor roles. Now it has the center of the stage. In terms of size, for example, the military numbered between 60,000 and 65,000 when Marcos declared martial law in September 1972. By late 1973, government news reports said that the Philippine military was about 80,000. By May 1974, the number was 100,000. The Marcos regime plans that by mid-1978 the military will number 250,000.47 Some of the new recruits will be volunteers, but the majority will be draftees. For the first time in the Republic's history, it will have a national draft.

Military expenditures are, in fact, beyond what previous governments had planned, and they continue to rise. Although the regime's budget has been secret, one report said that a number of economists believe that military expenditures are far more substantial than the level authorized in the pre-martial law budget.48 These military expenditures were a major cause for last year's record deficit of 1.2 billion pesos ($150 million).49

40 Sydney H. Schanberg, "An Impossible Conflict in Philippines," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 28 March 1974, p. 3B.
42 Schanberg, "An Impossible Conflict," p. 8C.
Under martial law President Marcos has given this growing military organization increased powers in nearly every aspect of government. Several provinces have had Philippine Constabulary and Philippine Army colonels and generals for governors. In most regions, military officers are in charge of the important Regional Offices for Development, which supervise, among other things public works and parts of the land reform program. Marcos has also made military officers responsible for the management of the Manila electric company, a steel mill, and other companies that the regime took from rival political families after martial law. And there are the new military tribunals mentioned earlier that try civilians accused of certain crimes against the state.

In addition to the military itself, there is the national police system. The National Police Commission, which was established a few years ago, is now making steady progress in bringing all of the country’s 1,500 police departments under one integrated police system. The chief of the National Police Commission is the secretary of Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile. As the police departments are integrated, the Philippine Constabulary will take control and supervise all police functions. In this way the integrated national police forces will come under the Philippine armed forces. Accomplishments of this integration program thus far include, for example, unification of all police forces in metropolitan Manila, centralized data banks and communication systems for police work throughout the country, and training schools for all policemen and police chiefs. The Marcos regime has also released special funds to raise the salaries and add fringe benefits for policemen throughout the country. This comes at a time when wages for most Filipino workers have been declining.

Another important part of militarization is the government’s efforts to watch or, as government reports say, “monitor” people. One part of this is the expanding role of several security, investigation, and spy agencies. In addition to enhancing the role of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA), the regime has created related organizations, such as the Civil Intelligence and Security Agency (CISA). The job assigned to CISA is to gather intelligence information on students, teachers, professors, and non-academic personnel at schools and campuses across the country. Another method to keep track of people is the compulsory registration system that the regime has begun. This system requires, according to Presidential Decree 278 issued in August 1973, that, “… all citizens of the republic … shall be assigned a reference number and issued a national reference card … Citizens or nationals of foreign countries resident in the Philippines shall likewise be assigned” a card to serve as “the official identification of the person to whom it is issued.” These numbers and the registration information, together with the centralized computer system that will store the data, will help the government to track down criminals, subversives, critics, and complement its other surveillance methods.

**American Support**

When President Marcos declared martial law, the U.S. Embassy in Manila and the State Department in Washington had “no comment.” Since then, U.S. diplomatic officials have avoided a categorical endorsement of martial law in the Philippines. But by its actions, the United States does support President Marcos’s regime and apparently plans to continue to do so.

For example, when the Philippine Constabulary and other police forces arrested thousands of civil libertarians, prominent Senators, and other critics of Marcos’ government during those first weeks of martial law, the United States Navy’s Naval Command helped. It provided information to the Philippine police that led to the arrest of Filipinos and Americans who had been providing legal services to American GIs there. More significantly, U.S. military and economic assistance has continued—even increased. Aid under the Military Assistance Program (MAP), which had been going down since the mid 1960s, is now going up again. MAP aid increased from 31.4 million in FY 1972 to 818.7 million in FY 1973, and to 113.9 million in FY 1974. President Nixon’s Administration this year is asking for 171.9 million for FY 1975. On several occasions, U.S. Ambas-

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sador to the Philippines William H. Sullivan has assured the Philippines that U.S. assistance will continue.

To the Marcos government and its supporters, this assistance, which exceeds $100 million per year, constitutes both support and approval of martial law. For instance, a report in a government censored newspaper said when the US Senate voted last year for more assistance that, "In effect, the Senate action in committee constituted an unmistakable approval of the New Society being established in the Philippines by President Marcos." Another government censored newspaper said in its editorial, "In the case of the Philippines... the U.S. Senate action constitutes an unmistakable approval of the new order. It was held in U.S. circles that affairs here are our own concern and that there are no indications that martial law has endangered democracy in the Philippines."

What is so disturbing is that aid from the United States has been the main source of money, material, and technical assistance for the buildup of the military apparatus in the Philippines over the years. Now, U.S. economic and military aid have borne fruit—a dictatorship that relies increasingly on its military, which in turn relies heavily on more aid from the United States. It is hardly the kind of legacy that one would expect the oldest democracy in the world would like to leave.

The modernized police forces, including the Philippine Constabulary's infamous Metrocom, has raided hundreds of homes, arrested thousands of Filipinos, interrogated them, and collected dossiers on suspected "subversives" during martial law. This police system is, in large measure, the result of US AID's "Internal Security Program." So far the program has spent nearly $5.5 million of U.S. taxpayers money. According to the Executive Branch last year, AID is reviewing the program "for possible increase in funding." The program, according to AID, has achieved most of its original objectives. The Philippines now has facilities to train 4,000 policemen per year; it can give advanced training to some of these police—including training at such U.S. counter-insurgency centers as Fort Bragg and the John F. Kennedy School for Special Warfare; 35 of the planned 55 police communications networks have been installed; and Philippine municipalities have developed a coordinated records system. Put into other terms, the program can take credit for such achievements as the ID card system now under way; the arrest of over 12,000 persons held in new "detention centers," and 1,500 modernized police departments in which many policemen have the latest American riot guns, walkie-talkies, and patrol car computer consoles.

U.S. AID continues to help the Marcos regime train and equip its police forces and integrate them under the command of Philippine Constabulary. Last year, Secretary of Defense Enrile thanked "our friends from the United States Agency for International Development" for their assistance for police training when he spoke to a graduating class of the new Police Commission Academy. Just recently, U.S. AID gave the police department in Angeles City, Pampanga, 10 new motorcycles with radios (previously the department only had 2), and 15 jeeps with two-way radios. U.S. assistance for "narcotics control," too, seems to be helping the Marcos regime build a police state. The Philippine Constabulary's Anti-Narcotics Unit, which receives U.S. aid, is known to arrest suspected critics and "subversives" in Manila. In at least one instance, the arrested person, a young Filipino named Liliosa Hilao, died while detained at the Anti-Narcotics Unit's building at Camp Crame (the PC headquarters in Quezon City). According to Liliosa Hilao's relatives, the PC officers who arrested her molested her at home, then tortured her to death at Camp Crame. For FY 1975 the Nixon Administration has requested $250,000 for "Narcotics Control."

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Turning to U.S. assistance designated specifically for the Philippine military, it seems doubtful that without U.S. aid, the Philippine military could have developed to where it is now or continue to expand in the years ahead. According to the U.S. General Accounting Office in 1972, "During fiscal years 1964 through 1971, 56 percent of the U.S. military grant aid was used to cover the Philippine Armed Forces' operating costs, and the percentage has been growing during recent years." The GAO found that U.S. assistance paid for 72 percent of the Philippine military's operating costs in FY 1968, 75 percent of its operating costs in FY 1970, and over 82 percent of its operating costs in FY 1971. U.S. assistance is also the Philippine military's major supplier of weapons and materiel. As the GAO reported in 1972, "With minor exceptions, the United States has provided all major items of military equipment and most of the training received by the Philippine Armed Forces." In 1969 General George B. Pickett, then Chief of JUSMAG-Philippines, graphically illustrated this dependence when he told the Senate that all the Philippine military's ammunition comes from the United States.

In addition to ammunition, weapons, planes, and other strictly military equipment, the Philippine military, according to General Robert H. Warren, has depended upon the U.S. Military Assistance Program since the 1960s for such consumables as the following: batteries, clothing and individual equipment, medical supplies and equipment, industrial supplies and material, and general supplies and support equipment. In FY 1973, the United States gave over $41 million to the Philippines in MAP money, training, and defense property transfers. In that same year, the Philippine military purchased from the U.S. only $187,000 worth of military equipment.

In addition to U.S. military assistance funds, the Philippine military has used funds from "Food for Peace" or Public Law 480 (Section 116) to buy essential military equipment and construct its bases. General Warren reported to the Senate, for example, that by 1969 the Philippine military has used over $8 million from these funds to complete projects such as "naval facilities," "air force facilities," "three aircraft control and warning sites," a "Long Lines Communication System." 71

The principal justifications over the years for U.S. assistance to the Philippine military have been to protect American bases and business interests and to help the Philippine government fight "communism" and "insurgency." Just last year, for example, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Congress during hearings on U.S. military assistance:

"Economic growth of the Philippines ... has been slow and is still insufficient to permit the country to meet its full military requirements. This is particularly true in the face of the current insurgency. The people of the Philippines require assistance to modernize their armed forces and their constabulary. The security assistance material program amounting to $19.3 million and $8 million FMS credit are designed to provide mobility, firepower, and communications—the three basic elements required to combat insurgency forces."

It was because of the "Insurgency problem" in the Philippines last year that the Nixon Administration asked for more U.S. military and military-related assistance to the Philippines for FY 1974.

During martial law, the Philippine military and police have continued to rely almost exclusively on weapons, materiel, and other U.S. assistance in order to suppress growing dissent and rebellion. In order to combat insurgency, Admiral Moorer said, the United States supplied the Philippines in 1973-74 with helicopters and transport aircraft, machine guns, recoilless rifles, and other weapons, together with long-range communication equipment. The Pentagon said last year that in order to help the Marcos regime "cope with the current situation," the U.S. military has been "moving up the delivery dates of some of the equipment in the military assistance program."

Notes:

3. Ibid., p. 240.
most urgently needed by the Philippine Armed Forces—such as, M-16 rifles and UH-1H helicopters. . . . In addition we are . . . providing the Philippines C-128K aircraft to help provide greater inter-island mobility."

Since the rebellion in Mindanao and Sulu has been the strongest one this past year, the importance of American weapons systems has been particularly noticeable in fighting there. When the Philippine armed forces bombed and attacked the city of Jolo in February for example, they used howitzers, 50-cal. machine guns, F-86 Sabre jets, C-47 gunships, armed helicopters, and naval batteries—all supplied by the United States.88 The Philippine Air Force not only dropped U.S. supplied bombs and fired U.S. supplied machine guns, but they also dropped U.S. supplied napalm. In other battles, too, according to a Filipino consul in Honolulu, the Philippine armed forces has used napalm.90

Surplus supplies from Vietnam, which were supposed to be used for peaceful purposes, and at least some U.S. economic aid also went last year to the Marcos regime’s counter-insurgency efforts. A New York Times correspondent reported that during heavy fighting against Muslim rebels in 1973, the Philippine military used “crates of supplies, some adorned with the red, white and blue handshaking label of the United States Agency for International Development.”91 Last October, an American official in Manila admitted that the Philippine air force had misused some planes that the United States had given to it from Vietnam surplus. Rather than using the planes for development projects, the air force mounted machine guns on them to battle Muslim rebels and to ferry troops between the islands.92

In addition to U.S. money and supplies, there are indications that American military personnel are also involved in helping the Marcos regime to suppress rebellions. If so, it would not be the first time that American troops have assisted the Philippine armed forces in counter-insurgency. In 1969, for example, the Philippine Constabulary asked the U.S. Air Force at Clark Air Force Base to give helicopter support for a P0 raid on “Hak insurgents,” to do aerial photography in connection with counter-insurgency, and to provide transportation and communication services to Filipino officers directing counter-insurgency operations.93

One example of U.S. military personnel directly involved with the Philippine military’s operations is the assistance General Louis H. Wilson, commander of the United States Fleet Force Pacific, has given. According to a Manila newspaper, Marcos awarded General Wilson the Philippine Legion of Honor “for his work in developing the Philippine Marine brigade. . . . He added immeasurably to the development, expansion and enhancement of the capability of the marines [in the Philippines] to perform their role in the New Society.” Among other things, General Wilson led U.S. Marines on joint exercises “with the Philippine marines without cost to the Philippine government to keep the marines abreast of developments in amphibious warfare.”94 In this context, it is important to remember that Filipino marines and “amphibious warfare” have been important during the campaigns against Muslim rebels, whose strongholds exist on several southern islands.

Another example of U.S. military personnel helping the Marcos government with military and counter-insurgency is the work of the U.S. Army Green Berets. Over the last two years, the Green Berets have done “civic action” in many provinces. Some provinces are known to have rebel groups, such as the provinces of Iloilo and Capiz in the Visayas, Zamboanga, Batan, and Pampanga in Central Luzon, and Nueva Viscaya and Isabela in Northern Luzon. The Philippine government and U.S. military admit that the Green Berets are there; they say their purpose is to help build schools, distribute medicines, dig wells, and other

91 Chicago Tribune, 28 February 1974, p. 12c.
92 Epron, Report of the Philippine armed forces dropping napalm during the battle in Jolo, Philippine Times (Chicago), 28 February 1974, p. 12c. In 1975, Consul Honorio T. Cagaman, speaking at a symposium on the University of Hawaii campus, said that the Philippine military had been using napalm against “insurgents.” See Ko Leo O Hawaii (University of Hawaii Press), 1975, p. 2.
96 Bulletin Today (Manila), 5 March 1974, p. 20.
"civic action" projects. American officials have added that the Green Berets are also in the Philippines for "training exercises." Both American and Filipino officials deny that the Green Berets give military support to the Philippine government. But the underlying purpose of these Green Beret exercises appears to be counter-insurgency. Major J. Brunner, a Green Beret spokesman, told one reporter, "The Special Forces achieved a tarnished image through Vietnam, as spies, killers, bayonet baddies. We're trying to change that image." By conducting a civic action with Filipino soldiers, he said, "you can build up the image of respectability of the host country's forces, and another Vietnam can be avoided." But a Filipino priest and other Filipinos interpreted the Green Beret's presence slightly differently. The priest told the correspondent, the Americans are "getting smart. They're getting to know the terrain where the resistance is operating, trying to poison the water before the guerrillas get to swim in it." A study by several Filipino clergy last November said that "for one were on Panay.

Resistance and rebellion, as a consequence of the Marcos regime, have been told, but have not been able to verify positively, that American personnel in fact are directly involved in counter-insurgency there. This situation is reminiscent of the 1950s and 1960s when there were many hints and unconfirmed reports that the U.S. government was directly involved in counter-insurgency in Vietnam. Today we have similar hints and reports about the Philippines. And there are other similarities that seem ominous: Civic action missions, which the U.S. government tried earlier in Vietnam, have reappeared now in the Philippines. The Philippines' national police system is

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Democracy and civil liberties are dead in the Philippines. The Marcos regime is a dictatorship. Resistance and rebellion, as a consequence of worsening conditions and political repression, are growing. And the Philippines is developing into a military state. These things are clear from what has happened since martial law.

It is also clear that the United States, through its military and military-related assistance, has contributed immensely to sustaining the Philippine military before martial law. Today it continues to help the Marcos regime build an even larger military apparatus. If Congress appropriates more of the American taxpayers' money to give military or military-related assistance to the Philippines for FY 1973, that money, too, will further support the dictatorship.

For this reason, the Friends of the Filipino People (FFP) and I recommend that Congress appropriate no military or military-related assistance for the Philippines. This year is an excellent opportunity for the United States Congress to draw the line. It can say now, before the situation in the Philippines becomes worse, that it will no longer be the party to the growth of another antidemocratic regime.

We further recommend that Congress conduct a thorough investigation to find out exactly what American military or para-military personnel have done or are doing in the Philippines. I have presented evidence that American military personnel seem to be helping the Marcos government's counter-insurgency efforts. I have also reported what I have been told, but have not been able to verify positively, that American personnel in fact are directly involved in counter-insurgency there. This situation is reminiscent of the 1950s and 1960s when there were many hints and unconfirmed reports that the U.S. government was directly involved in counter-insurgency in Vietnam. Today we have similar hints and reports about the Philippines. And there are other similarities that seem ominous: Civic action missions, which the U.S. government tried earlier in Vietnam, have reappeared now in the Philippines. The Philippines' national police system is

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See, for example, the following:


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an outgrowth of AID's internal security program in Vietnam. And William H. Sullivan, an architect of the U.S. government's Vietnam policy in the 1960s and the ambassador to Laos who coordinated the bombing of that country, is now the U.S. ambassador to the Philippines.

This time, hopefully, Congress and all other Americans will learn the truth of the matter before it is too late—before an American President presents a fait accompli and says Congress must appropriate much larger amounts to support "our boys" or "our commitments" in the Philippines.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee.

Mr. Nix. Thank you, Mr. Kerkvliet.

Let me ask you, what is the extent of the documentation to enable us to assess the charges made?

Mr. Kerkvliet. The extent of the charges about the Marcos government or American involvement?

Mr. Nix. The killing and the takeover. I see you refer to a number of newspaper articles: the New York Times, the Times Journal. The reason I question you is this: This subcommittee will ask persons responsible in the State Department and the military to appear in these hearings, and these accusations will be put to them for answers.

Obviously, they will admit some facts and deny others. It is equally obvious to me that the facts of least importance will be admitted; those of major importance will be denied.

That is why I wonder whether or not there is documentation or verification that could be furnished from any source that you know of.

Mr. Kerkvliet. I would be happy to furnish additional documentation. One reason I footnoted my longer testimony was to give you the sources at least for those that are readily available, newspapers and so on, both from the Philippines and from this country. And from some foreign press which seems to be doing a better job, particularly in London, of reporting and investigating what is going on.

But I would be happy to produce additional copies of some of these newspaper items.

[The material follows:]

[From Far Eastern Economic Review, Mar. 11, 1974]

THE MEN WHO DEFY MARCOS

(By Robin Osborne)

SANDAKAN, SARAWAK.—A few months ago the Jolo countryside was a delightful sequence from a tropical dream: of tall mountains crowned with cotton wool clouds, gentle valleys lined with green abaca palms, coconuts, bananas. Breadfruit and mangos grow abundantly. Sunlight penetrates thick forests to scatter golden specks on the dark matted vegetation underfoot (the rain comes all the year round). White sand beaches surround the island, lapped by the crystal waters of the Sulu Sea, which is rich in lobsters, fish and probably oil (see page 44).

The Tausug, a devoutly Muslim people of Malay descent, inhabit this paradise. They number over 220,000 on Jolo; almost the entire population. Beneath a mellow exterior of serenity, and smiles, the Tausug are strongly independent, renowned as fierce warriors. Since the Spanish conquest in the 1500s, the Tausug, Moro, so called for their religious similarity to the Moors, have resisted foreign control by the Spanish, the Americans, the Japanese, and successive Philippine national governments.

Between fights, they turned to Isles of fishing, farming and gay festivals. Until recently, tourists retreated to Jolo seeking peace and quiet and escape from busy agendas. But now silence is only a brief punctuation in a long passage of bursting shells. The 400-year-old time bomb has exploded again.

"Looks peaceful doesn't it?" remarked Benhur Dandan, Secretary of the Lupa Sug (original name for Jolo) Revolutionary Council. Despite his sedentary title, the 28-year-old ex-schoolteacher has fought for two years as a full-time guerilla against the Philippine armed forces.
After fifteen minutes' trot through dense jungle, hidden from a reconnaissance plane above, we arrived at a small underground cave. Artillery shells crashed through the trees nearby, explosions cushioned by the thick wet earth. "From the army brigade in Jolo city, ten kilometres away" Dadan explained. "All day and all night, especially during our prayer times. They think it will intimidate us, but we pray to God it will make us stronger."

Inside the cave, a young girl lay shockingly wounded. A peasant woman bandaged the arm which had been nearly blasted away. There are no medicines. "Since we took the city and then were driven out, we have had no medication and no food except what the land gives us. See how the civilians suffer. The army's aim is genocide, to wipe out El Moros and take our homeland."

"Why? "Because Sulu is rich. Oil in the sea, crops, prestige for President Marcos' Manila Government. But Sulu, the greater islands of Mindanao and Palawan are Muslim lands, and we will die to keep them." Dadan's remarks were typical of the strong feelings throughout the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). But the organisation's name, a fairly recent one, is misleading. Its assumption of purposeful unity among the estimated 5,000 strong rebel arm seems misfounded. All guerrillas I met acknowledge the leadership of ex-University of the Philippines Professor Nurullahi Misuari, and the existence of a mountain headquarters in Bato Puth. But virtually none is aware of any strategic planning aimed at achieving what they all want. And what they want, with no compromises, is a totally independent homeland, the Bangsa Moro Republik.

Engagements occur when the Philippine army presses inland from its strongholds in Tarang, Malabung, and Jolo city. The guerrillas then drive them back, showing their strength in direct small arms combat. Since their February 7 attack on the capital however, the rebels remain on the defensive. Though they concede that the situation has moved from small skirmishes to fullscale warfare, they complain of the government's "dirty tactics."

While they are courageous and strongly motivated, facing reality is not a rebel asset. The fact remains that many civilians, valuable supporters, are exposed to attack and surprisingly few families have protective underground bunkers. Instead thousands evacuate to safe places; but Jolo is a small island and safe places are few.

Surprise, a usual insurgent advantage, oddly has swung to the government side. No doubt willing to resist, the Moro population is uneducated in how to set about it. Although rather chaotic, rural Jolo should not be thought a disaster. The guerrillas still actively control 95% of the island, including many towns. Squads of battle-toughened young revolutionaries patrol every road and jungle path.

Their appearance is unique to Jolo. Mostly long-haired, they wear green Islamic headbands, prayer beads, blue jeans, jackets with an embroidered Allah patch, Tobaccobrush and menthol cigarettes (smuggled from Sabah) protrude from a pocket. They are well armed, often with powerful Belgian FN automatics and talk of anything but defeat. "This time it's different. We will never stop, there will be no peace until Independence."

So what motivates them? Maoist doctrine as the Government claims? Kasiin Abdullah, a provincial officer, explained: "Look at us, we know nothing of Mao. We are Muslim, and Communism runs against our faith. We are not fighting a holy war either. We don't kill Christians for their beliefs. I even led a Catholic priest and three Sisters to safety in the hills. We just oppose any outside force that tries to crush us. But now there is so much opposing us. We hope the United Nations will intervene."

The Maoist theory was always hotly denied. Only once did I hear "the strength of the masses" mentioned, and it sounded more like campus rhetoric than serious political theory. It may be a distant echo from high in the mountains, but if so it was poorly received down below. If they must be labelled, "communists" would be more apt than "communists."

The strong government reprisals, and thus the state of the rebel nation, came as a direct result of the ambitious attack on Jolo city. After tentatively occupying the town for three days, the plan has slipped from Moro hands probably for some time to come. Strategically, such an urban area is difficult for a guerrilla force to hold. In losing it, they lost prestige and vital access to medicines, supplies and information.

The question remains: why did they attempt the illogical and near impossible? No tactical reason was forthcoming. The common remark: "Because we needed our capital." That may be, but the adventure has surely delayed the Bangsa Moro Republik for many years.
Jolo, The Philippines, Feb. 21.—Scanning a scene of devastation and ruin unlike any this country has seen since World War II, an old man remarked in English as rueful as it was jagged, “Sorry this time because of this you see now.”

He was standing in what had been the commercial center of a town of 40,000 people. Now it was acres of charred rubble and blasted concrete, from which bodies were still being recovered this morning, more than a week after the Philippine armed forces finally took Jolo back from Moslem insurgents.

The Government admits to more than 800 dead, giving a “body count” of 225 rebels, about 50 civilians and only 29 of its own troops. From what could be learned from survivors here today, it seemed reasonable to estimate the toll at nearly double the Government’s figure but much lower than 10,000 dead or missing mentioned in earlier reports.

An air force officer said that at least 100 Government troops had actually been killed so far in the fighting, which is continuing in the interior of Jolo Island, an outcropping of volcanic hills and coconut groves in the center of the Sulu Sea about 570 miles southwest of Manila.

The hospital administrator, Sauradjan Ibba, said he had been hearing estimates of 200 civilians killed, and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Jolo, the Most Rev. Phillip Smith of Boston, said he thought that a fair guess. Clearly no one will ever know for sure. But even 200 would be a low figure, considering the heavy firepower poured into the town by army artillery, naval batteries firing from a few hundred yards offshore and an old tank used to keep the rebels from capturing the airstrip.

Outside the town, the Government has been using Sabre jets, aged C-47 gunships and armed helicopters, all supplied by the United States, to strafe and bomb the rebel force, which is estimated now at about 1,500. In the last month the insurgents have managed to shoot down two jets and four helicopters.

One helicopter was shot down from the town plaza by members of the 90-man Jolo police force, all of whom defected to the rebels, along with the mayor, when the fighting started Feb. 7. Two were hit two days ago, after official spokesmen had announced in Manila that the rebels were scattered and fleeing to the hills.

The Manila spokesmen have been dispensing accounts of the ferocity of the rebels and their disregard for human life. The Secretary of Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile, said in an interview that the rebels had raped nuns in Jolo, then added, “We don’t want to make anything out of this.”

The report, later broadcast, was disclaimed on all sides here and with special vehemence by the nuns. “Nothing has been hurt, nothing has been hit, nothing has been abducted, nothing has been molested,” protested Sister Imaculata, who answered the door at the Carmelite convent.

According to another nun, Sister Marlon Chico of the Good Shepherd Order, the rebels deserved praise for their pains to spare civilian lives. She said they had led the residents of the western end of town, where only a handful of buildings remain. A resident named Bay Milakhum, who was wearing an armband that identified him as “Senior deputy sheriff” of Jolo, said the air force later bombed those places. He said he had seen mass graves.

Alajadi Amlottoh, a mathematics teacher in a local high school, took refuge with his family in a doctor’s house on the edge of town the night of Feb. 7. There were insurgents near the house, Mr. Amlottoh said this morning as he lay in the Sulu public hospital under a pink tablecloth that was serving as a blanket.

According to Mr. Amlottoh, the house was shelled by an army battery and seven civilians died, including his wife, his eldest daughter, two of his sons and his sister-in-law.

Of his six surviving children, two were wounded, including a three-year-old daughter, whose left hand had been torn off by shrapnel. She sat next to Mr. Amlottoh on his hospital bed as he spoke. He had lost his left arm.

“They only suspected there were rebels there but they were all evacuees,” he said. Then, after a pause, he repeated himself, as if he needed to search for some sense in the words. “They just suspected it,” he said.

[From the New York Times, Feb. 23, 1974]

**BATTLE LEAVES PHILIPPINE TOWN IN RUINS**

*(By Joseph Lelyveld)*

*Jolo, The Philippines, Feb. 21.—Scanning a scene of devastation and ruin unlike any this country has seen since World War II, an old man remarked in English as rueful as it was jagged, “Sorry this time because of this you see now.”

He was standing in what had been the commercial center of a town of 40,000 people. Now it was acres of charred rubble and blasted concrete, from which bodies were still being recovered this morning, more than a week after the Philippine armed forces finally took Jolo back from Moslem insurgents.

The Government admits to more than 800 dead, giving a “body count” of 225 rebels, about 50 civilians and only 29 of its own troops. From what could be learned from survivors here today, it seemed reasonable to estimate the toll at nearly double the Government’s figure but much lower than 10,000 dead or missing mentioned in earlier reports.

An air force officer said that at least 100 Government troops had actually been killed so far in the fighting, which is continuing in the interior of Jolo Island, an outcropping of volcanic hills and coconut groves in the center of the Sulu Sea about 570 miles southwest of Manila.

The hospital administrator, Sauradjan Ibba, said he had been hearing estimates of 200 civilians killed, and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Jolo, the Most Rev. Phillip Smith of Boston, said he thought that a fair guess. Clearly no one will ever know for sure. But even 200 would be a low figure, considering the heavy firepower poured into the town by army artillery, naval batteries firing from a few hundred yards offshore and an old tank used to keep the rebels from capturing the airstrip.

Outside the town, the Government has been using Sabre jets, aged C-47 gunships and armed helicopters, all supplied by the United States, to strafe and bomb the rebel force, which is estimated now at about 1,500. In the last month the insurgents have managed to shoot down two jets and four helicopters.

One helicopter was shot down from the town plaza by members of the 90-man Jolo police force, all of whom defected to the rebels, along with the mayor, when the fighting started Feb. 7. Two were hit two days ago, after official spokesmen had announced in Manila that the rebels were scattered and fleeing to the hills.

The Manila spokesmen have been dispensing accounts of the ferocity of the rebels and their disregard for human life. The Secretary of Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile, said in an interview that the rebels had raped nuns in Jolo, then added, “We don’t want to make anything out of this.”

The report, later broadcast, was disclaimed on all sides here and with special vehemence by the nuns. “Nothing has been hurt, nothing has been hit, nothing has been abducted, nothing has been molested,” protested Sister Imaculata, who answered the door at the Carmelite convent.

According to another nun, Sister Marlon Chico of the Good Shepherd Order, the rebels deserved praise for their pains to spare civilian lives. She said they had led the residents of the western end of town, where only a handful of buildings remain. A resident named Bay Milakhum, who was wearing an armband that identified him as “Senior deputy sheriff” of Jolo, said the air force later bombed those places. He said he had seen mass graves.

Alajadi Amlottoh, a mathematics teacher in a local high school, took refuge with his family in a doctor’s house on the edge of town the night of Feb. 7. There were insurgents near the house, Mr. Amlottoh said this morning as he lay in the Sulu public hospital under a pink tablecloth that was serving as a blanket.

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“They only suspected there were rebels there but they were all evacuees,” he said. Then, after a pause, he repeated himself, as if he needed to search for some sense in the words. “They just suspected it,” he said.*
Government spokesmen contend that the carnage in Jolo has not upset the conciliatory "policy of attraction" that has supposedly guided the handling of the Moslem insurgency since September. But experienced observers think it is bound to increase the mistrust in the Moslem areas of Sulu and Mindanao for a remote, unsympathetic, Christian Government in Manila. That mistrust, they say, is the underlying cause of the struggle.

SETTLERS MOVE IN

Of the 40 million Filipinos, only 2.5 million are Moslems. Ten years ago, most lived in areas in which Moslems were in the majority. In the open political system that then existed in the Philippines, they enjoyed a measure of influence in Manila.

But Christian settlers, who view the Moslem areas as a Philippine frontier, now outnumber the Moslems in most places and there have been bitter struggles for land. With the introduction of martial law by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in September, 1972, the Moslems lost whatever leverage their votes had given them.

Assignment of blame for the outbreak on Jolo depends on who is telling the story and where he begins. It is clear that rebels, managed to infiltrate the town of Jolo, starting on about Feb. 4, and that, backed by the police, they staged a coordinated attack on military camps at opposite ends of the town in the early hours of Feb. 7.

But the armed forces had started a major military operation on Jolo Island late in January to regain towns the rebels had been occupying without challenge for several months. That operation, which began with two amphibious landings on the southern side of the island, apparently started the rebels thinking of diversionary tactics in Jolo town.

Once the rebels started infiltrating the town, there were three armed groups there besides the Government troops—the infiltrators, a group of "returned" rebels who had been allowed to keep their weapons after surrendering to the Government, and the police, who apparently viewed these "returnees" as a threat to their authority.

It even appears that the Government dispensed arms to rebels who surrendered, making new weapons an inducement to change sides. The surrendered rebels were then enlisted in the Government's operations against the remaining insurgents.

This divide-and-rule tactic was successful to an extent, but it pushed the police into the arms of the insurgents. Mr. Enrile denied that the defection of the entire police force and the mayor indicated any failure by military intelligence. "We knew all along they belonged to the rebel group," he said, "but we gave them the benefit of the doubt."

The official view is that the Moslem insurgency on Jolo has been taken over by "Maoists" and has thereby lost the support of the people, but there is no firm evidence that the insurgent leaders have told their followers anything about Mao Tse-tung or, indeed, that they have any ideological leanings that way.

A leader of the "returned" rebels now fighting with the army replied with a bewildered stare when he was asked about "Maoists" in the hills. When asked whether the insurgents there were good Moslems, he replied that they were.

The insurgents tell their followers that they are fighting to prevent "genocide" against all Moslems in the Philippines. The Marcos Government, which relies upon Saudi Arabia and Iran for its oil supplies, is especially sensitive these days about such charges. That may be one reason the armed forces are now making "Maoist" their euphemism for Moslem rebel.

No more than 2,000 of Jolo's population appeared to still be in the town today. Many of these were scavenging in the ruins. They appeared to be finding little of value, for the damage that was begun by shelling was completed on the afternoon of Feb. 8 by a fire that razed the center of the town.

The blaze could easily have been started by artillery fire, but military authorities insist it was begun by "Maoists" to cover their retreat. Other sources assert the army started it to burn the rebels out.
AN IMPOSSIBLE CONFLICT IN PHILIPPINES

(By Sydney H. Schanberg)

People are slowly returning to this island town of ruins to try to begin their lives again. But nothing is settled.

The Moslem rebellion that led to the destruction of most of Jolo by shelling and fires in February—in a fierce battle pitting the rebels against a more heavily armed government force—is still very much alive. The insurgents, driven from the town, have once again taken to the thickly forested hills, breaking into small bands and disappearing into natural caves and into the heavily reinforced bunkers and tunnels built by the Japanese during their World War II occupation.

Citing centuries of neglect and abuse by the Christian majority that rules in Manila, over 600 miles to the north, and by their own feudal lords in the south, the insurgents are demanding nothing less than a separate Moslem state under new leadership.

"They will be hard to locate and dig out," says Jolo Island's military commander, Alfeo F. Billera. "They know the terrain. They can hide beside trails and lay ambushes."

A war of attrition seems a certainty, and many Filipinos believe that the rebellion has now become pivotal to the success or failure of President Ferdinand E. Marcos's rule by martial law, begun on Sept. 23, 1972.

The insurgency has ballooned because of fear that the Moslem countries of the Middle East, out of sympathy for the Moslems here, might deny their oil to Manila. That could strangle Philippine development and push the country into turmoil again.

No easy solution is likely, for the insurgents seem determined on secession, and the government—at least partly because it believes there are valuable oil deposits in the waters around this island area—is equally determined not to let the region go.

"We should have taught these people a lesson a long time ago," said Secretary of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in an interview in Manila. "We have been too easy on them. They must be forced to give up this foolish idea of dismembering a portion of our country."

Enrile, who represents a hard-line faction in the Philippine cabinet, is said to reflect the attitude of his generals, who were embarrassed by their failure to prevent the Jolo attack and who now want to strike back and repair the army's frayed image.

The army has been suffering heavier casualties in the fighting than it admits. The highest figure given by any official is 36 soldiers killed in the Jolo campaign. But independent sources on this remote island of extinct volcanos, coconut groves and idyllic beaches say that more than 100 in the army are dead, and that the toll in the jungle fighting outside the town is rising.

The insurgents have taken heavy losses, too. The army has killed 200 to 300 rebels since early February. But there is no way to confirm these figures.

Many civilians were also killed in the four days of fighting in Jolo town—figures range from 200 to 400. Some were killed in crossfires. Again, there is no way of knowing how many were killed intentionally and by whom.

Now, with the rebels pushed out of the town, the army's howitzers boom away through the day, sending shells toward the hideouts in the cloud-wreathed hills that virtually embrace the town on three sides, and the Air Force's F-86 jets swoop low over the hills to bomb or to strafe with .50-cal. machine guns.

The noise doesn't seem to bother those returning to Jolo. They have other things on their minds, such as salvage among the rubble of their houses—like a handful of nails or a piece of charred pipe.

More than half of this once-busy trading port, which used to have nearly 100,000 residents, is destroyed. Some skeletal remains stand here and there—a cracked wall of a house, a cement pillar reaching to nowhere—but everything else is leveled.

"My heart is crying for the loss of all my possessions," said Abdurasad Sabandal, a 42-year-old merchant. "I have eight children and I have nothing to feed them; I must leave it all to God."
Sabandal is a Moslem, like most of the residents of Jolo town and most of the more than 400,000 people of the Sulu Island chain of which Jolo Island is the heart. Most of them take a fatalistic view of what has happened to them as something that Allah controls and only he can explain.

The government says that the 200 to 1,000 rebels who entered Jolo set fire to the town as they retreated, and that this caused nearly all the damage. And there is evidence that some fires were set by the insurgents and that the blazes, fanned by a stiff breeze from the sea, swept out of control through the poorer shantytown neighborhoods.

But there is also evidence that at least some of the fires were started by government artillery firing from a military camp in the northwest corner of the town and from cannon on naval gunships.

A few people in town said, without rancor, that the rebels did most of the burning; others blamed both sides and some blamed only the government. The antigovernment sentiment was strongest among young people.

As a foreigner stood in the middle of the street taking pictures of the ruins, a young man slipped up to him and whispered quickly: "They are not Maoists, they are independents. All the damage was done by government shelling." Then he darted down a side street and disappeared.

The Marcos government has branded the insurgents Maoists, apparently because it fears that if the rebellion is viewed as a Moslem-Christian conflict, the Islamic countries that provide most of the Philippines's oil—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran—will reduce or shut off supplies. A few of the known rebel leaders have Communist backgrounds, but most analysts of the five-year rebellion believe that the insurgents are in the main young students radicalized by the struggle into die-hard guerrillas but not Communists.

What set off the recent resurgence of the long-smoldering rebellion was the government's attempt—after the martial-law declaration—to confiscate firearms. The program went well in the north, but was a disaster in the Moslem areas.

The weapons sweep brought all the other irritations to the boiling point, and for the last year or so the rebellion has become fierce—with no end in sight.

"These young men and women are fighting a real revolution against the old corrupt style of government," said one of their sympathizers, who asked to remain unidentified to avoid government retaliation. He added: "They're a new force. They will not be crushed until the last man is dead."

Mr. Kerckhoffs. The problem is, as was the problem in Vietnam, if you have a regime which is very closemouthed in the first place and does not allow much investigation in the second place, either by foreigners or local people, Filipinos, then it becomes very difficult for skeptics or critics like myself and others who try to follow it as closely as possible, to be able to rebut or to refute or to offer foolproof evidence until it becomes so glaring and so noticeable to the whole world, but by that time it is too late...

Mr. Nix. You see, these accusations are of sufficient volume and they charge offenses that are unacceptable to any people of a country such as ours; and in saying that I would ask them to appear here to be interrogated, I rely on the fact that they do not wish to tell the truth to start with on the important matters, and I think the American people would read between the lines, between the accusations and the lack of a complete answer and explanation, and we could logically conclude that many of the accusations, more serious ones, are based on fact.

That is the kind of inquiry that can be conducted. That is what we intend to do.

I also would appreciate your being present at the time so we may advise you as we get the answers. That would be most helpful to the committee.
I honestly believe what you are doing is what any really interested, dedicated American citizen should do; because we can't go on as we are doing. I said earlier that the same procedures have been used over the years in many countries, and to the detriment, I believe, of this country.

As to the financial side of it, certainly we cannot continue because our position in that field will not support it. It is leading down the road to bankruptcy, so far as I am concerned, and we just can't keep this sort of thing up.

Mr. Kerckvliet. If I might add a followup to the point about response from other witnesses from the administration, one thing that keeps coming up again and again is that the justification, particularly for the military and police assistance, is that this money and material and all is being used to counteract Communist efforts inside the Philippines, not just against any insurgency, but Communist insurgency.

Of course, this is what was also said in Vietnam and in many other cases, but in the Philippines, it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, it is a particularly clear case, perhaps the clearest we have had in many years, of insurgencies whose Communist influences to the extent they are present are very small.

You have growing insurgency, growing rebellion. It is not just one insurgency, not just one rebellion. There are many different groups in many different parts of the country that are a consequence of the growing repression which has accompanied martial law.

Before martial law, as even the Government itself admitted, the number of so-called Communist insurgents was very small indeed, but now you have major fighting in Mindanano and other parts of the Muslim Filipino areas and in other parts of the Christian Filipino area where there were no insurgenacies before. We have reports, both personal reports, letters and so on from friends in the Philippines, as well as newspaper accounts, of students who before martial law were engaged in a variety of student organizations, priests who before martial law were engaged in a variety of socially oriented church organizations, lay people in the same kinds of church organizations—a variety of people like this—journalists who were before printing and carrying out the professional obligations as they saw them as journalists.

Now they cannot do these things, and they are forced to do what are considered illegal, subversive activities which are given this general label of "communism."

I am making the point here because it is so clear, so obvious in the last 1/2, years, that the repression has increased insurgenacies, but the insurgenacies are a reaction to that and not something which we can identify or pin down as communist.

Mr. Nix. I could anticipate rightfully so, that the State Department or the Department of the Army or any other department will give the Communist [inaudible]—it is without merit. We have to embrace the people of the People's Republic, embrace the people of the Soviet Union, and they are not going to come here and say—

Mr. Kerckvliet. What would be the justification for the military and so on?
Mr. Nix. I don't know what justification they will give. Whatever it is, it is not going to be acceptable to me, because it cannot be logical, for one reason. I can assure you that the State Department has never been without answers, whether they were acceptable to me or not.

But we are going to ask the questions and we are going to examine the answers in the light of logic, commonsense, and let the final judgment be that of the American people. That is what we want to do.

I want to thank you very much. The bells have sounded. We have to go.

Mr. Kerkvliet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 3 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
LETTER FROM LINWOOD HOLTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO CHAIRMAN ROBERT N. C. NIX, INCLUDING EVALUATION AND COMMENTS ON TESTIMONY GIVEN BY PROF. BENEDICT KERKVLIET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Hon. Robert Nix,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I understand that Professor Benedict Kerkvliet, of the Friends of the Filipino People, recently testified before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs which you head. A member of your staff, Mr. Thomas Kennedy, subsequently asked the Director of the Office of Philippine Affairs for a Department evaluation of Professor Kerkvliet's testimony.

While we do not have a transcript of the testimony given before your subcommittee, it is our assumption that it did not significantly differ from the views expressed by Professor Kerkvliet in an appearance before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on May 24th. Our comments are accordingly largely based upon the written record of views handed out by Professor Kerkvliet at that time.

In general, we regard that testimony as questionable. Our impression is that there has been a willingness, even an eagerness, to seize upon comment derogatory to the Philippine Government or which suggests that the United States Government is unacceptably involved in its support. We do not question Professor Kerkvliet's right to feel strongly on such matters and to express his opinion. We do question the scholarly standards which permit the apparent selection of fragmentary fact and comment to fit predetermined theses.

As for general United States relations with the Philippine Government, I hope you will not object to my repeating an earlier response to an inquiry after Professor Kerkvliet had appeared before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations:

United States policy toward the Philippines operates within the framework of the Nixon Doctrine, which was initially enunciated on July 29, 1969, in Guam on the eve of the President's visit to the Philippines. You will recall that the President again defined the basic character of America's role in the world in his second inaugural address, when he said, among other things: "The time has passed when America will make every other nation's future our responsibility, or presume to tell other people of other nations how to manage their own affairs."

We recognize both the controversial nature of the measures taken by the Philippine Government since President Marcos proclaimed martial law in September 1972 and the problems experienced in the Philippines prior to that action. Some American citizens have been disturbed by the imposition of controls and the suspension of some civil liberties in a country whose history has been so involved with that of the United States. Others are encouraged by improvements in law and order, efforts at economic development and the Philippine Government's avowed intention to promote social, economic and administrative reforms including a land distribution program. President Marcos has on several occasions stressed that he regards martial law as a temporary measure.

It has been our view that the events leading up to the declaration of martial law, and the policies followed by the Philippine Government since that time, are fundamentally of an internal nature, and that any problems in the
last analysis can only be dealt with by the Philippine people in the context of their own governmental processes and procedures. We have therefore felt that the interests of the United States would best be served if we did not attempt to comment on or characterize internal developments in the Philippines.

This letter is probably not an appropriate vehicle to attempt a point-by-point commentary on Professor Kerkvliet's testimony. I am, however, attaching comments which deal in abbreviated fashion with some major assertions which we noted in his testimony.

I hope you will call on me if you believe we can be of further assistance.

Cordially,

LINWOOD HOLTON,
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations.

BRIEF COMMENTS ON PROFESSOR KERKVLIET'S TESTIMONY

1. RECORD OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT

Assertions.—That martial law is the cloak for the establishment of a dictatorship in the Philippines. Civil rights are severely restricted, the media are gagged, arbitrary arrests and mass repression are common, reforms have not been pushed through, crime is increasing, the rich are richer and the poor are poorer. (Our summary of the major points in Pages 2-10 of Professor Kerkvliet's testimony.)

Comment.—The best available evidence that the Philippines is not the closed, dictatorial society described is the extensive quotations of dissent views voiced within the Philippines which Professor Kerkvliet notes throughout his testimony. Improvements in law and order are reflected, for example, in greatly increased tourist travel—Manila now has a shortage of hotel rooms. Administrative shake-ups and new economic initiatives are at least partially responsible for a dramatic surge in export receipts and in foreign exchange reserves during the past eighteen months. Not all efforts have been successful, e.g., the ambitious land reform program has been delayed because the Government initially moved without a full appreciation of the obstacles and costs involved, but the fact remains that this was and is an effort to deal with a problem on which there had been little progress in the past.

2. U.S. ASSISTANCE TO PHILIPPINE MILITARY

Assertions.—It is suggested that U.S. military assistance grants over the past several years have not only provided most of the major military equipment needs of the Philippine Armed Forces, but have covered the great proportion of its operating costs, with the Philippine Government purchasing only insignificant quantities from the U.S. (Our summary of the major points in Pages 21-25 of Professor Kerkvliet's testimony.)

Comment.—The strength of Philippine uniformed military forces has varied between 80,000 and 90,000 during the past several years. Over the same period, annual military assistance grants have remained at approximately $15 million per year, plus some transfers of surplus items of equipment. The focus of the military assistance program has been shifting from a situation in which U.S. military aid was largely used to supply consumables, such as ammunition, to an emphasis on supplying the equipment needed to modernize the Philippine forces and improve their effectiveness.

This process has involved substantial increases in the degree and extent of Philippine Government support of its armed forces. Most recently by an arrangement with Colt Industries, underwritten by 13.6 million in U.S. foreign military sales credits, the Philippine Government is moving ahead on plans to produce the full inventory of M-16s needed by the armed forces.

3. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO PHILIPPINE MILITARY AND POLICE

Assertions.—U.S. AID assistance has been used to assist the Philippine military forces, to build up a repressive police apparatus and to assist in anticocaine activities of a politically repressive nature. (Our summary of points in pages 23-26 of Professor Kerkvliet's testimony.)

Comment.—PL-480 funds were last used to support general military purposes of the Philippine Government in 1965; there has been no such use since that time.
AID assistance to the civilian police in the Philippines began in 1968 and is now virtually ended. It included assistance in establishing a uniform crime statistics reporting system, and in the establishment of communications networks in fifty-five provinces, the latter utilized primarily by other government agencies and provincial offices. One remaining communications technician will leave in August 1974, bringing the latter program to an end.

Assistance in narcotics enforcement is a high priority objective in our relations with foreign states as well as domestically. AID assistance in this field is restricted to narcotics enforcement elements.

4. U.S. SUPPORT FOR MILITARY

Assertions.—That in recent fighting with Muslim insurgents the Philippine Air Force dropped U.S. supplied napalm on the city of Jolo, that light planes donated by U.S. AID have been used in the fighting with Muslim rebels and that many other items of military equipment supplied by the U.S. have been utilized in that fighting. (Our summary of points in Pages 26-28 of Professor Kerkvliet’s testimony.)

Comment.—The U.S. emphatically has not supplied napalm to the Philippines. Given a few essentials, napalm is not particularly hard to make and it is conceivable that Philippine military forces could have procured from other sources or manufactured napalm. On the other hand, we did discover that Philippine military units have used a few small planes received through AID channels in actions against the Muslim guerrillas; such use was entirely contrary to the understanding under which the planes had been made available, and was stopped in response to our representations. As a general proposition, nevertheless, military equipment of U.S. origin is being used by the Philippine armed forces in actions against both Muslim insurrectionists and Maoist dissidents. Most Philippine military equipment is of U.S. origin and we cannot expect them to go into combat bare-handed. The Philippine Government has made clear on several occasions that it recognizes and hopes to rectify Muslim grievances; meanwhile, however, it has an obligation to preserve order.

5. DIRECT U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN FIGHTING

Assertions.—That American pilots flew American planes in bombing missions over Mindanao last year, that American soldiers have been fighting in Mindanao and Sulu, and that “Green Berets” are engaged in counter-insurgency measures in the Philippines. (Our summary of points in Pages 28-30 of Professor Kerkvliet’s testimony.)

Comment.—No U.S. Government personnel have been involved in the fighting in Jolo or Mindanao.

The U.S. has not given logistical support to the Philippine Armed Forces fighting the Muslims.

The U.S. Air Force did not fly, and is not flying, bombing missions over Mindanao or Jolo or anywhere in the Philippines.

There have been no U.S. casualties resulting from the Muslim insurgency. (U.S. military personnel stationed primarily at Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base numbered near 17,000; deaths—40 in 1973, 50 in 1972 and 41 from the beginning of 1973 through 1 May 1974.) None of these were as a result of combat action since U.S. forces have not been and are not now involved in combat action in the Philippines.

U.S. Army Civic Action Teams (“Green Berets”) have conducted training exercises in the Philippines since 1970; these have typically involved medical, dental, veterinary, engineers and sanitation projects in the provinces, and as a general policy have been kept well removed from areas of insurgent/dissident activities; the program will terminate on 30 June 1974 with the deactivation of the 1st Civil Affairs Battalion, the parent unit of the teams.
EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO A GROUP OF AMERICAN CITIZENS REQUESTING AND RECEIVING PERMISSION TO VISIT VIETNAM TO INVESTIGATE, AS OBJECTIVE OBSERVERS, CONDITIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM'S PRISON SYSTEM


Mr. Graham Martin,

Dear Mr. Ambassador: The purpose of this letter is to request that you do all in your power to assist these American citizens in their effort to serve as objective observers of conditions in the Republic of South Vietnam’s prison system.

They are the following persons:
1. Aryeh Neier, Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union.
2. Mr. William Webber, President, New York Theological Seminary.
3. Mr. Robert Chenoweth, former Prisoner of War.
5. Mr. John Boone, Former Commissioner, Massachusetts Correctional System, Current Director, Center for Criminal Justice, Boston University.
6. Ms. Ying Kelly, City Councilwoman, Berkeley, Calif.
7. Mr. Robert Ransom, IBM Executive, Gold Star Father.

These persons are distinguished American citizens. Their views based on an investigation without interference will be most helpful.

I hope that it is possible for you to do all that you can to assist them in arriving at the truth as to allegations made by others in the United States regarding the penal system of the Republic of South Vietnam.

Sincerely,

Robert N. C. Nix,
Chairman, Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee.

Hon. Le Cong Chat,
Minister of Interior, Republic of South Vietnam, Saigon, South Vietnam.

Dear Mr. Minister: The purpose of this letter is to request that your agency assist the following American citizens in making an objective study of prison conditions in relation to political prisoners in the Republic of South Vietnam.

They are the following persons:
1. Aryeh Neier, Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union.
2. Mr. William Webber, President, New York Theological Seminary.
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(90)
I hope that it is possible for you to do all that you can to assist them in arriving at the truth as to allegations made by others in the United States regarding the penal system of the Republic of South Vietnam.

Sincerely,

ROBERT N. C. NIX,
Chairman, Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee.

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Hon. Robert N. C. Nix, Chairman, Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: In accordance with the request conveyed in your letter to me of January 4 I did receive the group about whom you wrote. Unfortunately, they did not contact the Embassy and deliver your letter until only a few days before their departure although they had been in the Republic of Viet-Nam for more than ten days at that point. Consequently, we were unable to be of as much help to them as might have been the case had we been informed earlier of their visit.

As always, I shall respond fully to any request from you, or the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and report fully on the extent to which we are able to comply with your request. The attached report of our conversations with Dr. Webber's group is, accordingly, forwarded for your information. Copies have, of course, been sent to the Department of State. After reading it, you may share my concern that the true objectives of this group were not in accord with the representations made to you when they sought your endorsement.

I was profoundly disappointed, as I am sure you will be, that the group apparently made no effort to use their influence to secure affirmative action from the DRV/PRG delegations on the proposals before them during the visit of the group. One was to facilitate the "civilian prisoner" return as called for in the Paris Agreement. Despite their refusal to assist, this process is now, once again, underway and we fervently hope Hanoi will permit the process to be completed. The second, and far more important, was the proposal to cease the use of indiscriminate mortar and rocket attacks and the planting of mines, all of which kill and maim innocent children and civilians but serve no direct military purpose. I simply find it incomprehensible that the only answer was that "Dr. Webber said it was the wrong numbers."

I am certain that you fully share my conviction that the American people should be told the complete truth, not only about conditions in Viet-Nam, but also of the activities of those who seek to influence Congressional actions regarding Viet-Nam.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

GRAHAM MARTIN.

MEMORANDA OF CONVERSATIONS ON JANUARY 16, 17, AND 18, 1974, BETWEEN AMBASSADOR MARTIN, EMBASSY OFFICERS, AND A GROUP OF AMERICAN CITIZENS VISITING VIET-NAM TO INVESTIGATE "PROSPECTS FOR PEACE"

Place:—American Embassy, Saigon, Republic of Viet-Nam.

Participants.—January 16—Ambassador Graham Martin; Henry S. Sizer, political officer; Hal W. Pattison, political officer; Mr. John Boone, visiting professor, Boston University; director, Coalition for Corrections Change; former Commissioner, Massachusetts State Department of Corrections; Ms. Ying Lee Kelley, counsellor, Berkeley, Calif.; Women for Peace (East Bay); Asian American Community Alliance; and Rev. George W. Webber, president, New York Theological Seminary; chairman, National Steering Committee, Clergy and Laity Concerned; former pastor, East Harlem Protestant Parish, New York City.

January 17—Ambassador Graham Martin; Rev. Hugh Aplin; Mr. A. Sizer, political officer; Mr. Robert Brown, IBM executive; Gold Star father.

January 18—Ambassador Graham Martin; Henry S. Sizer, political officer; and Mr. John Boone.

During the initial amities, Mr. Webber observed that when he was in the Navy, he was always told to make courtesy calls on our Ambassador, Mr. Webber
said that he had been in the Navy first as a gunnery officer and then decided to become a clergyman. Fortunately, he said, he married his wife while he was still in the Navy and before she had any suspicion that he was going to permanently defect.

The Ambassador observed that this gave them two points of common ground from which to start; that he had served in World War II in the Army and in the Air Corps, and that his father had been a clergyman. The Ambassador noted that when he was a younger his father had thought that he might possibly follow in his footsteps. Accordingly, he had received a very thorough grounding in classical studies, including Latin, Greek and History. He had also absorbed a lifetime conviction that one could never compromise with the truth. He observed that being a clergyman's son was perhaps good training for diplomacy. If one could surmount the divisions within the community and the parish, particularly if one's father was a man who felt compelled to speak out on issues which he thought were important, then one did get excellent lessons in diplomacy.

Mr. Webber remarked that clergymen's sons have a remarkable record of achievement when compared with those whose fathers had been in other professions. He said that his biggest problem when, for a long time he had been Dean of Students at the Union Seminary, was upset students, students who were there because their fathers and mothers decided that they were going to be clergymen at an early age. The students hadn't rebelled, and it didn't work out very well.

The Ambassador said that he thought he had successfully rebelled, but now and then he was not so certain that he had fully escaped. He recalled that in 1939, just after he had been appointed Ambassador to Italy, he had been called back to Washington to attend the National Conference on World Refugee Problems. The Ambassador recalled that Bishop Swatson of Catholic Relief Services was Chairman of the Conference and Countess Alexandra Tolstoy had made a special trip from New York to present to the Ambassador a plaque on behalf of the Conference praising his humanitarian services to world refugees. The Ambassador said that, although he had received more honors than he could have ever possibly deserved, this was the one that had touched him the most and the one which he appreciated the most. As he stood on the platform that evening he realized that, perhaps, he had not escaped his father after all.

Mr. Webber said that his parents were shocked when he made the decision to become a clergyman, but that when he goes back and traces what they did for him there is a coherence that they can't avoid. Mr. Webber said the group was grateful that the Ambassador would break into his busy schedule to receive them.

The Ambassador responded that he had always been deeply convinced of the necessity for most intimate relationships between the Foreign Service of the United States and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. Therefore, when he received the letter from Chairman Nix of the Subcommittee on Asia he was, of course, glad to respond to the Chairman's request that he receive them.

Mr. Webber said that all five of the group had only one common denominator, that three of them had met each other for the first time on this trip, but that all of them had been very much involved in the "Peace Movement" in the United States during the last several years. Mr. Webber said that they had all been very curious in the past year as they tried to read the newspapers and articles from various groups of one kind and another about what was really happening in Viet-Nam. They thought that they would come on this anniversary of the Paris Agreements to see for themselves.

So: Mr. Webber said, they had gotten themselves together and decided that they would come and spend a couple of weeks in Viet-Nam under the general heading of "prospects for peace" and just do everything they could to get another personal interpretation of what it is to their people in various circles at home as to what had really happened in the last year. Mr. Webber said they hoped that they would find it was an encouraging prospect and that's what he thought told the five of them here from their very different experiences. Mr. Webber introduced Mr. John Bevan, described as a journalist and a professional correction officer, and Ms. Kelley who he said was the only politician of the group.

The Ambassador said that Mr. Webber shouldn't use the word "politician" with a slight derogatory tone. After all, in the old Greek sense of the word there is no more noble role. He recalled that even Ms. Bella Abzug had once said to him that "after all I'm a politician."

Ms. Kelley said that she agreed that Ms. Abzug was indeed very professional. Ms. Kelley said that she was doing her very short term of service in this way,
that she felt in some way she could bring a greater understanding to people, and that she had a particular ability to "move people" and she hoped that this ability might prove useful, Ms. Kelley said that she also represented a newspaper and the organization "East Bay Women for Peace" which was very bitter about our policy here. She said that all Americans who have some control over Vietnamese affairs should exercise a responsibility to have the indignities currently practiced cease immediately.

The Ambassador said that he agreed that we had a responsibility but he was not certain that he would share the summary judgments, without the citation of any substantive evidence, expressed in the letter from Ms. Laub, the Chairman of the organization to which Ms. Kelley had alluded. Ms. Kelley sharply asked what summary judgments. The Ambassador said that perhaps it would be better to read Ms. Laub's letter since he did not wish to misquote anyone. He then read the letter, which follows:

Dear Ambassador Martin: East Bay Women for Peace, in the San Francisco Bay Area of California, have long been deeply concerned at the Saigon Government's arrest, torture, and lengthy confinement without trial of those who hold positions independent of President Nguyen van Thieu—neutralists, students, members of religious and civic bodies, and many others.

We are aware that President Thieu officially denies the existence of these prisoners; but their presence is well-attested by many reliable observers, who agree in reporting the present government's widespread use of universal surveillance, frequent arrests, torture, and the virtual abandonment of even the forms of legality.

We find it intolerable that our Government should support such tactics of repression. We have long supported the prompt formation of the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord agreed to by all parties signing the Peace Accords of January 27, 1973, but which President Thieu completely opposes.

As our representative in Saigon, we strongly urge that you help in every way you can to bring the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord into being. Only so can the long-suffering people of Viet-Nam exercise their unquestioned right to work out their own destiny.

Sincerely,

Edith Laub, Chairman,
For the East Bay Women for Peace.

The Ambassador said that parts of that letter all Americans could completely agree with. The position of our government has been completely consistent in calling for the full implementation of the Paris Agreements, but he pointed out that, as his old friend Averell Harriman with whom he came into government service in 1933 had observed, it takes two to tango. The Ambassador said that the record was completely clear, that it is not the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam or the Government of the United States of America which is holding up the implementation of the provisions of the Paris Agreements. Above all, it is not the Government of Viet-Nam which is holding up the return of the civilian prisoners. It has fully agreed to implement that provision and has repeatedly advanced any proposals for doing so. And just now, once again, he requested the NVA/PRG side to stop stalling and get on with it. It appears, however, that the NVA/PRG side prefer to stall in order to keep the issue alive as a propaganda issue, so that people like Miss Laub can be persuaded to complain about it:

The Ambassador called attention to the first paragraph of Ms. Laub's letter as a perfect example of what he meant by a "summary judgment". The second paragraph takes note of the denial by the President of the Republic of Viet-Nam but goes on to say the existence of these prisoners who, Ms. Laub infers are in prison solely because of their opposition to the Government, is "well attested by many reliable observers". The Ambassador doubted there had been any such "reliable observers" or that any truly objective and competent observers would "attest" any such thing.

The Ambassador said he did not know Ms. Laub. Therefore, he assumed her motives were pure and her concern was genuine and he could only conclude that Ms. Laub was another victim of the cleverly presented campaign of gross distortion being pursued by those whose emotional involvement in a North Vietnamese victory was, seemingly, as intense as ever.

The Ambassador said he too would find it "intolerable that our Government should support such tactics of repression". If in fact such charges were true,
which they were not. He said that he did not know Ms. Laub's age but he suspected that, long before Ms. Laub was born, he had been actively engaged in opposing all such repression whenever it occurred and getting quite a few scares in the process. The Ambassador said he, therefore, felt very sorry for Ms. Laub and others like her whose decent and humanitarian impulses were being cynically and callously manipulated by those who were striving desperately to insure the victory of North Vietnam where the abuses about which she was concerned really did exist.

Ms. Kelley said that this is why the group had come. Viet-Nam is so far away and she agreed that they do not have all the facts and she would certainly appreciate being corrected. The Ambassador said that, in order to be as helpful as he possibly could, he was going to take some actions for which, undoubtedly, he would be criticized. However, he had taken at face value Congressman Nix's description of the group as distinguished citizens really concerned with objective determinations of fact. He also accepted at face value the statements which had just been made that the purpose of the group was to really determine facts as they really were. Therefore, he had with him here a series of intelligence reports which, perhaps more clearly than he himself could do orally, could give them an objective picture of what was actually happening. The Ambassador said that it covered most of the points which he thought, if he were in their position, he would very much want to know about. The Ambassador supposed the group shared his conviction that statements should be confirmed by documentation with some precision.

Mr. Webber said that they appreciated that very much and respected very much that attitude. He said that the three of the group who were men had all been in the military. He said that Mr. Robert Ransom had been in the OSS during World War II, he said that he thought they all believed in our country. He said objectivity is our problem. He said that we want to be objective. He said that we do accept the fact that we are not experts. We really do want your help in understanding.

Mr. Webber said that he would be very much interested and grateful for anything that the Ambassador could share with them about what has happened in the last year in terms of the American role in Viet-Nam. He said he could mention three things that, just wandering around and talking to a variety of people, have distressed them because they do not understand. This is without any effort to say that they do understand, but the group has been very disturbed because the papers have said that President Thieu has reported that the war is escalating and the papers make that clear now. Mr. Webber said that that's a very distressing fact if a year after peace the war is heating up and he would be interested in anything that he could be told.

Mr. Webber said that another area of distress was that many people suggested that a major problem was the U.S. aid was not really reaching places where it ought to go. He said that, of course, in light of our record at home in the United States on corruption, that this perhaps is not as important as it might have once been.

And, Mr. Webber said, the third thing that distressed the group were the rumors that they have heard about the difference between the justice delivery system in this country and in our own. He said Mr. Boone had observed this in the Court yesterday. These, Mr. Webber said, are some of the matters that have distressed us and we would be glad to be helpful in correcting distortions at home.

The Ambassador pointed out that with the conclusion of the Paris Agreement a year ago, our role had completely changed. We were no longer involved in the war. We had hoped that the war would completely stop with the cease-fire which had been agreed to. Again in negotiations in May and June in which the Ambassador said he had participated along with Dr. Kissinger, another cease-fire was arranged. Neither time had it been observed by the other side. Nevertheless, the Ambassador said we were not engaged in the fighting, or in any way in an advisory role regarding the fighting. We had committed ourselves to replacing equipment losses on a one-for-one basis and this was completely spelled out in the Paris Agreements. If the North Vietnamese had respected the Agreement it would not be necessary for the Americans to have a very large presence here at all. We had made vast reductions and had planned for even more.

Regrettably, however, the fact was that North Viet-Nam had not respected the Agreements. Therefore, a certain number of people in the Defense Attaché Office were retained, engaged solely on logistic assistance to the military forces of South Viet-Nam. Although Hanoi propaganda, echoed by their colleagues in
the United States, charged the U.S. with 24,000 disguised military advisers, the open record, available for anyone to see, completely “attested” to the fact that we had less than one thousand U.S. personnel engaged in anything remotely connected with the military, plus about 3,000 civilian contractors, teaching how to care for and repair equipment. The Paris Agreements prohibited any kind of advisory role and that prohibition was completely enforced. Perhaps it would be useful, the Ambassador said, if more of their colleagues who had been active in the peace movement would realize that it is their country, not ours.

The Ambassador said that Mr. Webber had observed that he had found it distressing that President Thieu had publicly said that the intensity of the violence was increasing, that to quote Mr. Webber “the war was escalating”. The Ambassador said that it was a cold hard fact that the fighting was continuing and he was glad Dr. Webber found it “distressing”.

The Ambassador said he trusted Dr. Webber’s “distress” was over the fact of the fighting itself and was not the “distress” of some of his colleagues in the “Peace Movement” that the GVN, by daring to resist the continuing attacks of the North Vietnamese, was interfering with a complete North Vietnamese victory, in which so many of those colleagues had such a deep emotional involvement. The Ambassador said he had seen the same stories and had read them all the way through. He noted that after recording the fighting “was escalating” President Thieu had said the GVN fully intended to defend itself, but sincerely wished for a halt in the fighting which could occur immediately the moment the North Vietnamese ceased their murders of GVN officials and the slaughter of innocent civilians by their tactics of terror.

The Ambassador said that when Dr. Webber returned to the United States he might report that President Thieu shared his “distress” that the war “was escalating”; that he might report no one was fighting in North Viet-Nam, that it was the North Vietnamese who were still continuing their infiltration. It was the North Vietnamese who were stepping up the subversive activities and attacks on innocent civilians by the planting of mines and mortaring of villages with no military objective but to strike terror.

But, said the Ambassador, if one were really “distressed”, the proper place to complain would be Hanoi. The mere fact that a guerrilla campaign was in progress in South Viet-Nam, the Ambassador said, was in and of itself a denial of the violent criticisms by some of their colleagues of South Viet-Nam as a repressive, closed society. By definition no guerrilla action of any consequence can be carried on in a repressive, closed society. There is no possibility whatever of any guerrilla activity in North Viet-Nam, in the People’s Republic of China, in the Soviet Union, or in Cuba. Guerrilla action of this scale and magnitude can be carried on only in a reasonably free and open society. The Ambassador said that a free and open society can be described in many ways depending on the bias, prejudices or the degree of objectivity of the observer. There are those who would limit the characterization of any society as “free and open” unless it is wholly perfect and without blemish, overlooking the historical record that, except for a few moments in the Garden of Eden, the human race has not yet quite managed this accomplishment. However, to those addicted to the narcotic of “selective outrage”, it is a convenient standard to use making it easy to concentrate on the warts of a society and extrapilate those warts as a picture of the total society. Fortunately, the Ambassador said, the great majority of Americans are more honest and objective observers. They can recognize the warts for what they are and put them in the total perspective. But the basic fact remains that no objective observer can possibly deny that any guerrilla operation can be effective except in a society which is basically free and open, and no objective and honest observer will come to any other conclusion than that South Viet-Nam, with all its warts and blemishes, is basically a free and open society and that North Viet-Nam is not.

The Ambassador said that there is one other basic fact which he thought just has to be recognized. For the entire period of this conflict, whenever people have had a choice amid the disruptions of the war, they have come only one way, to territory controlled by the South, never to the territory controlled by the North. The Ambassador said that he thought the group really ought to ask themselves why. Why have the refugees never gone to North Viet-Nam? Why have they never gone into the so-called PRG area? Why, when given a choice, do they always come to the areas controlled by the Government of South Viet-Nam? The Ambassador said that dealing with refugees had been his business, that he knew the problems, that he had never seen a refugee camp that couldn’t be criticized. Why, the Ambassador asked, when the refugees are pushed even out