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U.S. COMMITMENT TO SEATO

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 8, 1974

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Fulbright, Sparkman, McGovern, Case, Javits, Pearson and Percy.

Senator Church. The hearing will please come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

The hearing today on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the Treaty Organization is being held in response to a request by the Senate that the Committee on Foreign Relations conduct a full and complete review of SEATO. Last November the Senate approved Senate Resolution 174 which I sponsored, along with Senator Aiken and Senator Byrd of West Virginia, calling for the current review. The committee is to report its findings and recommendations to the Senate by March 31.

[Text of S. Res. 174 follows:]

[Text of S. Res. 174, 93d Cong., 1st sess.]

RESOLUTION Relating to the United States commitment to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Organization

Resolved, by the United States Senate that the Committee on Foreign Relations undertake a full and complete review of United States participation in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Treaty Organization and report to the Senate the committee's findings and recommendations no later than March 31, 1974. Such review shall include reexamination of the basic foreign policy considerations which originally lead the United States to join the SEATO Organization and reassessment of those considerations in the light of subsequent developments relating to that Organization and the foreign policy interests of the United States.

Senator Church. The evolving relationship between the United States and other nations of the world, including nations we used to consider implacable foes, has caused many to question the wisdom of continued United States support of SEATO. Support by others of SEATO seems to be evaporating. Pakistan, one of the eight original signatories, left the alliance late last year. France intended to stop paying dues as of the end of June of this year. Britain professes to maintain an interest. However, almost all British forces have been withdrawn from that part of the world. Australia and New Zealand have made clear their disenchantment, if that is a strong enough word, if not open hostility, with the Organization. Only the two
recipients of SEATO largesse and protection Thailand and the Philippine, together with the United States, remain firm supporters of this obviously troubled alliance.

Despite these problems, which have led some to conclude there is little likelihood the SEATO partners will be asked to take military action in concert, SEATO remains a latent commitment and a portent of a continuing U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. So long as the United States is in SEATO that possibility of pressure for renewed involvement under the treaty commitment will remain.

At the SEATO Council meeting in September the members agreed on certain moves to try to rehabilitate SEATO, to better attune the Treaty Organization to the changed situation in Asia. I am sure the Representative of the State Department, Secretary Ingersoll, will have more to tell the members about that reorganization during the course of the hearing today.

It is sometimes said that an abrupt break of the tie with SEATO would cause great alarm in Southeast Asia and consternation in the South Pacific. It is argued that U.S. movement away from SEATO would signify abandonment of its friends in Asia by the United States. I hope our witnesses will address that question this morning.

The United States has adopted a much more realistic attitude toward China, and has ended its ground involvement with South Vietnam without throwing other Asian nations into panic. I suspect that other nations will judge us by more meaningful measures than our attitude toward SEATO, a largely moribund alliance.

I believe we should consider alternatives to SEATO. If there is value in the alliance, it may be that the useful aspects can be preserved through other means of cooperation. I hope that the nations of Southeast Asia are now ready to assume the lead in working together in their own interests. It would be far better to help those who are striving on their own than to hang on to organizations and policies which perpetuate parentalism of the past.

WITNESSES

On behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations I am happy to welcome the witnesses today, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Mr. Robert S. Ingersoll, Dr. George Kahin of Cornell University, and Dr. Bernard Gordon of the University of New Hampshire.

Before we begin, Secretary Ingersoll, I have already explained my particular predicament this morning, for which I apologize. I am obliged to go to the floor of the Senate very soon now. I hope that it will be possible after the Senate vote to return and hear as much of the testimony as I can. Meanwhile, I will ask other members of the committee if they will take over. Senator Pearson will take over in my place when I have to leave.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR BYRD OF WEST VIRGINIA

Senator Church, I have received a statement from Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia which he has asked to have included in the record. Senator Byrd takes the position that the United States should
withdraw from SEATO, and describes it as an outmoded and outdated international agreement. Without objection, Senator Byrd’s written testimony will be included at an appropriate place in the record. [See appendix.]

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS STUDIES

Senator Church. Second, I believe it would be in order to include two special studies done for the Committee by the Library of Congress entitled “The Role of SEATO in U.S. Foreign Policy” and “Precedents for U.S. Abrogation of Treaties” in an appendix to the record. Without objection that will be done. [See appendix.]

Secretary Ingersoll, we are ready for you to proceed. I know you have a prepared statement, after which there will be questions.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. INGERSOLL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY MONTEAGLE STEARNS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS; AND CHRISTIAN CHAPMAN, DIRECTOR OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

Mr. INGERSOLL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to introduce Monty Stearns, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, and Mr. Christian Chapman, who is in charge of our Regional Affairs Section of the East Asia Bureau.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee I welcome the invitation to be here today to discuss with you the Manila Treaty and its organization, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, as called for by Senator Church’s resolution. This is a most timely resolution giving the Congress and the executive branch an opportunity to review where we stand in Southeast Asia. And I am especially gratified as I just returned from a 6-week visit of East Asia and the Pacific.

What strikes the visitor to Asia most forcibly is the depth and extent of the changes that have occurred since 1954 when the Manila Pact was signed. That, of course is obvious, but it is the first proposition that must be stated. It lead directly to the second proposition: to continue to play a role in this area the United States must maintain under continuing critical review its general posture and policies, and its specific undertakings and actions, and be prepared to make adjustments as may be necessary. That is why we have taken this review seriously.

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS INFLUENCING REVIEW OF MANILA PACT, SEATO

We began our own reappraisal of the Manila Pact and SEATO last year in preparation for the 1973 SEATO Council Ministers meeting which was held September 28, 1973 in New York. The major developments over the past few years which have, in particular, influenced this review included (1) the détente between the United States and the PRC [People’s Republic of China] which reduced tensions throughout the area; (2) the peace agreements in Vietnam and Laos;
Let me now examine first the Southeast Asia Collective Security Treaty, called the Manila Pact in brief, and then the organization, SEATO. There is a tendency in everyday usage to employ the word "SEATO" to mean the treaty as well as the organization. Since it is important to reappraise the Manila Pact and the SEATO organization separately, I will maintain this distinction throughout my statement. The Manila Pact signed by eight nations in 1954 was part of the security system which the United States fostered in Asia. This system was intended both to contain the People’s Republic of China and through the linkage of bilateral and multilateral defense arrangements, force deployments and bases to serve as a shield behind which the Asian countries, most of them recently independent, politically uncertain and economically weak, could become strong and capable of resisting communist aggressiveness.

In addition to the broad purpose of containing what was then termed the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it was also the particular hope of the SEATO framers that the Manila Pact would strengthen the 1954 Geneva settlement for Indochina. To carry out these purposes, they deliberately avoided duplicating the pattern of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]. The wording of the commitment in the Manila Pact to act in cases of aggression uses Monroe Doctrine language rather than the NATO formula. Also unlike NATO, SEATO did not call for standing forces. Its strength was to be in the deterrent power of its members of whom the United States was the strongest.

Now, 20 years later, the most common criticism of the Manila Pact is that it has outlived its usefulness in the new era of détente and that its cold war origins may hinder the transition process to a peaceful region free of great power rivalries.

Our view is that the Pact and SEATO have not outlived their usefulness in the present era of transition. We believe that in a period that has seen the withdrawal of half a million U.S. troops from the Asian mainland and a significant reduction in the U.S. military presence elsewhere in East Asia it would create doubt and uncertainty were the United States to urge the dismantling of the Manila Pact and SEATO at this time. It is true that SEATO has never been a military command and is no longer a planning organization. We do not speak of SEATO “divisions.” No U.S. troops are dedicated to SEATO “missions.” The members are committed to nothing more dramatic than to act in accordance with their constitutional processes to meet a threat of aggression. Yet, in a period when peace is in sight, though not yet fully achieved, a period characterized by shifts in the balance
of power and changing relationships within the area, the pact and SEATO remain tangible indications of continuing U.S. concern in East Asia. They demonstrate that even as our perceptions change we are mindful that old associations cannot be shrugged off, that even as we seek better relations with powerful former adversaries, we do not intend to abandon older and weaker friends. The Manila Pact and SEATO give evidence of our continuing interest and in particular they provide Thailand, a core country in Southeast Asia, with an undergirth of multinational support as it adjusts to an uncertain future. Abolishing the pact and SEATO would simply enforce a current opinion among Asian leaders that the United States is rapidly withdrawing from Asia and leaving them to fend for themselves.

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

No serious alternative to the collective security arrangements of the Manila Pact has yet developed and none is in sight. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations—ASEAN—has provided the principal organizational impetus to regional collaboration to date and we find this development highly encouraging, particularly since it is an indigenus effort. But ASEAN comprises only half of Southeast Asia and there are as yet serious obstacles to any expansion of its membership and effective regional cohesion. Appreciating their difficulties in cooperating even in noncontroversial fields, the nations of Southeast Asia have evinced no interest in a formal security pact or organization of their own. Their future goal envisages neutralization of Southeast Asia with regional cooperation limited to economic, social and cultural aspects. But for the time being all these nations continue to look to the established defense relationships with the United States for their security.

EFFECT OF PREMATURELY DISMANTLING EXISTING SECURITY AGREEMENT

We should not undermine the sense of confidence that has developed among the countries of the area by prematurely dismantling an existing security arrangement. Such an action could well be misinterpreted as a U.S. withdrawal from Asia with all the unsettling effects that this would imply. In particular it might tempt the PRC and U.S.S.R. to intensify their rivalry into the region. Although both these powers have a greater reason than formerly in preventing Asian problems from straining their bilateral ties with the United States, the new equilibrium remains fragile. Our influence on these powers to behave in a way that we view as constructive and responsible is very limited. And the Soviet concept of an Asian collective security system may not have been successful to date in attracting Asian governments, but it does reflect a strong Soviet desire to play a greater role in the whole region.

We prefer therefore to steer a careful course of gradually shifting the burdens and responsibilities of security to the countries of the area, and maintaining the treaty as part of the equilibrium in the transition process.
MEMBERS' VIEW OF TREATY

With the exception of the special case of Pakistan, which withdrew from the treaty on November 8, 1973, no other signatory has indicated a desire to denounce the treaty or to seek changes in its terms. France will cease paying dues to the organization at the end of June this year but will maintain its obligations under the treaty. Australia and New Zealand, which have been highly critical of SEATO in recent months, have never attacked the treaty itself. The residual positive role of the treaty in today's transition process in Southeast Asia is generally recognized by all members.

POSSIBILITIES OF U.S. MILITARY ACTIONS

The contention in the United States that the Manila Pact might involve us in another Southeast Asian war is, I believe exaggerated. There is at home an entirely different political climate—expressed for instance in legislation limiting the use of American combat forces abroad—which quite alters the possibilities of military actions which might be taken in the 1970's as contrasted to the 1960's. The wording of the Manila Pact is sufficiently broad and flexible to fully take into account this new situation. It requires that action to meet overt aggression be taken according to the constitutional processes of each member and that only consultation be undertaken to consider insurgency and subversion.

MODIFICATIONS TO SEATO ORGANIZATION

When it comes to the organization, all members recognize that the cold war is over and that the treaty organization should be tailored to meet existing conditions. It was Thailand which introduced the resolution calling the Secretary General of SEATO to undertake a full study of SEATO before the 1973 Council of Ministers meeting and to make recommendations for change. The Secretary General submitted his proposals to the Council representatives in Bangkok for each country to review. In working out the final proposals to be put before the Council of Ministers, our own role was to act as the honest broker between Thailand, on the one hand, which recognized the need for change but of all members most desired to maintain SEATO in being, and New Zealand and Australia, on the other hand, which pressed for the most drastic reductions.

The consensus, reached by all members and formally approved by the Council Ministers on September 28, 1973, produced substantial modifications to the organization:

a. military planning was suspended as of September 28, 1973;
b. the Military Planning Office has been greatly reduced in number of personnel and integrated as of January 31, 1974 into the civil Secretariat, (the old head of the Military Planning Office became Deputy Secretary General);
c. military exercises have been reduced in frequency and extent;
d. the Information Office has been eliminated along with its old strident anticommunist output;
e. an overall reduction in staffing of the Secretariat is underway (from 88 to 34 professionals);
f. cultural activities have been dropped and all future economic and social projects will be concentrated on security/development related projects in Thailand and the Philippines.
g. a number of economies are being effected in the budget so that member country contributions will remain approximately the same in spite of French and Pakistani withdrawals from budgetary contributions. The U.S. share from fiscal year 1972 to fiscal year 1975 has been only around $500,000 a year or less.

The SEATO organization, therefore, has undertaken its own re-appraisal and worked out changes that were satisfactory to all. Australia and New Zealand have indicated to us that they are pleased with these changes and that they intend to support the new lower profile organization.

PLANS FOR TIME BEING

In sum, Mr. Chairman, we plan for the time being to maintain intact the Manila Pact and the organization as it was reformed in September 1973. A U.S. withdrawal from either the treaty or the organization would be given symbolic significance which might have consequences out of proportion to the problem. The pact has a residual role to play in preserving the equilibrium as Southeast Asia moves to a still undetermined future by restraining U.S.S.R./PRC rivalry in the area and providing international support for Thailand. The Thais continue to attach importance to the organization and its headquarters in Bangkok. The annual price for maintaining the organization remains small.

As we stand on the threshold of what is hoped will be a new era of developing peace and stability in Southeast Asia, we should do nothing to undermine that hope and we should make reductions and alterations in old security arrangements to correspond realistically with genuine reductions of tensions in the region, and in keeping with the desires of the members of ASEAN. We look to the coming months and years as a period when it will be possible to weave a fabric of common interests with old enemies, as well as strengthening those already established with old friends. We must assure that the cooperative efforts achieved in the context of SEATO are woven into this endeavor. And we will keep the pact and the Organization under continuing review as trends become clearer, which we trust will be in the direction of peace and stability and increased cooperation among all the nations of Southeast Asia.

Mr. Chairman, that is the end of my statement.

SECURITY DEVELOPMENT AND COUNTERINSURGENCY ACTIVITIES

Senator Sparkman, Mr. Secretary, it is a very thorough and interesting statement. I note the planned emphasis on security development activities. How does security development differ from counterinsurgency? Is this a continuation of military activities under another office, another name?

Mr. Ingersoll, No, sir, Mr. Chairman. The principal thrust of security development activities is to help, particularly in Thailand and the Philippines, to develop the economies of the areas that have been
somewhat unstable due to economic conditions in those areas, and to give the peoples of those territories the reason to be more peaceful and peace loving and to have less desire to create insurgency difficulties.

I think this kind of an effort is one that most countries of Asia pursue in trying to substitute economic development for insurgency or any kinds of military effort on the part of its citizens.

NEUTRALIZATION OF INDIAN OCEAN

Senator SPARKMAN. It has been suggested from time to time that the Indian Ocean might be neutralized in order to avoid big power confrontation. There have been some news articles within the last few days regarding the interest, of both our country and of Russia in that area. Do you believe that it can be neutralized against confrontation by the big powers?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, I think—

Senator SPARKMAN. Actually have we explored this to any extent with any of the big powers, with Russia, for instance? That is the principal contender, I believe.

Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes sir, we have, and the response has not been very forthcoming inasmuch as the Soviet Union has continued to deploy their naval forces in the Indian Ocean. Our desire, I think, would be for an eventual neutralization of the area, but it must be a mutual effort on the part of the major powers and not just on the part of the United States. Without that response from the Soviet Union we think it is unwise for us to remain out of the area.

SEATO CONCEPT MODIFIED

Senator SPARKMAN. From your very able statement it seems to me that the concept of SEATO today is not the concept of when it was originally set up. Is that right?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, I would say that it has been modified to take into account the changing circumstances of Southeast Asia. I believe that I did indicate that Thailand, in particular, would not like to have SEATO eliminated because of the tie that it has to the United States and to the other nations who are signatory to the treaty.

As I pointed out, it is a transition through which we are passing. If SEATO were eliminated it would cause, I think, unnecessary shocks to the nations that are in that area.

COUNTRIES ACTIVE IN SEATO

Senator SPARKMAN. What countries are today active partners in the SEATO setup?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Australia, Britain and the United States. France is also committed under the treaty but does not contribute to the budget support.

WITHDRAWAL OF PAKISTAN

Senator SPARKMAN. And that is true of Pakistan, isn't it?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Pakistan has withdrawn from the treaty.

Senator SPARKMAN. They gave formal notice of withdrawal?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes. Principally because when it was included East Pakistan was very closely associated with this part of the world. Now that Bangladesh is an independent nation Pakistan feels it is no longer a part of Southeast Asia. I think that is the reason for the withdrawal.

THAILAND'S ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S.

Senator SPARKMAN. By the way, has there been any change in Thailand's attitude toward the United States since the new government came into power?

Mr. INGERSOLL. I did not sense it at all while I was there. I met with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and other officials and it was a very friendly meeting, indicating a desire for continuing close relationships with the United States. This was not only true in Thailand but throughout all of Asia where I traveled. There seemed to be a continuing desire on the part of these countries that the U.S. presence remain in that part of the world.

WEAKNESS OF ORGANIZATION

Senator SPARKMAN. This was set up in 1954, wasn't it?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. When the organization was set up, I remember talking to Secretary Dulles regarding it. I told him at that time that it seemed to me to have a weakness and that was that even though it was a Southeast Asian organization there was very little Asian support in it. It looked like it was the big powers, the United States and Britain and France. It didn't have enough Asian nations tied into it.

Mr. INGERSOLL. What was his response?

Senator SPARKMAN. I think it was to the effect he had done the best he could. [Laughter.] I wouldn't say those were the exact words, but I think that was the substance of our conversation.

Senator Case.

Senator SPARKMAN. I will pass right now, Mr. Chairman.


U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM ASIA

Senator McGovern. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ingersoll, in your testimony you state that abolishing the Pact and SEATO would simply enforce a current opinion among Asian leaders that the United States is rapidly withdrawing from Asia and leaving them to fend for themselves. But in talking about some of the reasons why we need to be reevaluating our role in Southeast Asia you conclude with this phrase, "recognizing their more pronounced desire to determine their own future, free of great power rivalries." Don't those two sentiments run counter to each other? If there is a growing desire on the part of those nations to fend for themselves, free of great power rivalries, why wouldn't they in fact welcome the withdrawal of the United States from military security arrangements as represented by the SEATO arrangement?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, I think the answer to that, Senator, is that the governments of these countries are realistic in the appraisal of condi-
tions that still exist in Southeast Asia. While many of them have a long-term goal of neutrality for the region, they don't see this as a practical solution at this time. They have set up the 'long-range goal the Association of Southeast Asian nations as a neutral group. But, as I talked to the leaders in that part of the world they all recognize that the time has not yet come, and that while they go through the transition toward that era of neutrality, they would like to continue the security arrangements that exist, such as the Manila Pact and SEATO organization.

**EFFECT OF REGIONAL POWER BLOCs ON UNITED NATIONS**

Senator McGovern. It seemed to me more and more in recent years that the concept of a regional power bloc in which the United States is involved with countries 10,000 miles away from our own shores is a contradiction to the spirit and concept of the United Nations. As I understand the U.N. structure and its concept, it is an organization of all the nations of the world. It cuts across regional, geographic, national lines, ideological lines. Don't you think there is a contradiction in the spirit and purpose of these regional power blocs as ever against the desire to strengthen the United Nations as a structure for a world community?

Mr. Ingersoll. Well, I think there may be from the idealistic and theoretical standpoint.

Senator McGovern. Even from the practical standpoint?

Mr. Ingersoll. I doubt it from a practical standpoint, Senator, inasmuch as all of the heads of these countries clearly stated to me on this recent trip that I just returned from that they did not see the ultimate or idealistic goal as having been achieved yet. During this transition period they very much welcome the presence of the United States and actually feared our withdrawal.

**LEGAL BASIS FOR U.S. PARTICIPATION IN WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

Senator McGovern. To what extent was our involvement in this organization the basis for our being drawn into the Vietnam conflict?

Mr. Ingersoll. Well, I understand that it was cited as one of the bases for our involvement in Vietnam in connection with the Tonkin Gulf resolution.

Senator McGovern. As I recall, when we would ask administration spokesmen what legal obligation we had, what our commitment was, to participate in this area, they would frequently reply it was the SEATO obligation. Is that your view? Is that the administration's view?

Mr. Ingersoll. No, I believe it was the action of the Senate in approving the activities in Vietnam. As I recall, it was based upon the SEATO and Manila Pact but it would not have taken place if it had not been for the positive action of the Senate.

Senator McGovern. And the Gulf of Tonkin resolution?

Mr. Ingersoll. I believe so.

Senator McGovern. On what basis were we involved militarily before that? The Gulf of Tonkin resolution came in 1964. On what basis were we committing American military forces prior to that time?
Mr. Ingersoll. Well, as I recall, Senator, we were in an advisory capacity before that.

Senator McGovern. They were advising, but advising with helicopters and machine guns and weapons of all kinds.

Mr. Ingersoll. We did supply weapons.

Senator McGovern. I think it is a technicality what the label was. Certainly we were involved militarily long before the Gulf of Tonkin.

Mr. Ingersoll. Yes, sir.

Senator McGovern. And my impression is that we cited the SEATO obligation as the reason why we should be there.

Mr. Ingersoll. I am not familiar with that having been cited before the Tonkin Gulf resolution, but you may be right, I am not familiar with that.

Senator McGovern. Just a couple of questions about the current situation—

Senator Javits' Impressions Not Favorable

Senator Javits. Senator McGovern, would it be convenient to you to give me 1 minute? I am due at the Labor and Public Welfare where I am the ranking member.

Senator McGovern. I will be glad to yield.

Senator Javits. I will submit additional questions in writing and ask that they be answered. [See appendix.] I will at this time ask the following:

My impressions from this statement are not favorable. I think that you have to be an on, or an off, nation. I think the idea that you are advertising to the world, that we will think about it and we will shape our policy to whatever we think the situation is, is a bad policy. I think you have to tell them we are going to develop a new policy and we are going to propose one. I think your position is one of great weakness, leaves us weak, leaves them uncertain, and doesn't advance American policy at all. That is my judgment. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Sparkman. Thank you.

All right, Senator McGovern.

Senator Javits. I thank Senator McGovern very much.

Secretary Rusk Tied Operations in Vietnam to SEATO

Senator Sparkman. Senator McGovern, in connection with the question you just put, as I recall, Secretary of State Dean Rusk in testifying before this committee did definitely tie the operations in Vietnam with SEATO. That is my recollection and, furthermore, you talk about the beginning. I have always considered the beginning of the Vietnam involvement was when President Eisenhower wrote the letter to President Diem in which he assured them that we would extend aid, both military and economic, and sent a few military advisers and that grew and grew and grew.

Senator McGovern. I appreciate the chairman's intervention. I was confident from my own recollection that was the rationalization that was argued and, if in fact that is the case, then it seems to me when
we evaluate whether it is in our own interest to remain as a committed member of this organization, we ought to remember the experience we have had with it over the last 20 years.

Mr. INGERSOLL. Senator, pardon me a moment, but I do believe that we were involved in Indochina even before the SEATO Pact so I don't think it was the basis for our initiation of support to Indochina.

Senator McGovern, I think that is probably right. But I do remember the Secretary of State said it was the basis of our involvement.

PRINCIPLE OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Just one other point here, Mr. Ingersoll. You state that, in referring to the language of the Manila Pact, that it uses Monroe Doctrine language rather than the NATO formula. My understanding of the Monroe Doctrine is that it covers what we have always felt historically was a special relationship that we bear to the countries in the Western Hemisphere and that this is a special sphere of American influence and security. How does that doctrine get converted into some kind of a special obligation we have in Southeast Asia, 10,000 miles away? I don't see how the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine came to pervade the SEATO arrangements.

Mr. INGERSOLL. I don't mean to indicate it was the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine but only the principle. In the case of NATO, my understanding is that an attack on one of the nations is considered an attack on all and we are obligated to take necessary action under those circumstances in accordance with our constitutional processes. Under the Monroe Doctrine formula, an attack on one is considered to endanger the peace and security of all and we are obligated to act to meet the common danger in accordance with our constitutional processes. This is the only thing I was referring to in relation to the Monroe Doctrine. Not the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine at all.

Senator McGovern. Is my time up, Mr. Chairman?

Senator SPARKMAN. Are we keeping time? I was not aware of it.

SITUATION IN PHILIPPINES

Senator McGovern. Maybe I can ask one more question. With reference to the situation in the Philippines, Mr. Ingersoll, you have just been out in that part of the world. How widespread and meaningful is the current dissidence, turbulence inside the Philippines?

Mr. INGERSOLL. As I understand it, it is primarily limited to the Muslim population in Mindanao and the islands off to the southwest, Jolo and others. There is a group of so-called Maoists that have moved from central Luzon to one of the outer islands, but it is a very small group. But the principal insurrection is that of the Muslims in Mindanao and the southern islands.

Senator McGovern. Is there either any SEATO involvement in cooperation with the Philippine Government to suppress that activity or is there any U.S. military involvement? None at all? It is being handled entirely by the Philippine Government?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes, sir.

Senator McGovern. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sparkman. Senator Case, are you ready now or shall I go to Senator Pearson?

Senator Case. Please go to Senator Pearson.


STATEMENT SUMMARIZED

Senator Pearson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to summarize from what I got out of your very good statement. You indicated it was the position of the Department of State and the administration that we ought to continue in the altered and changed role of SEATO because to do otherwise would create great uncertainty. SEATO serves as a symbol of our interest, and there is no alternative. SEATO might prevent a competitive relationship between the People's Republic and the Soviet Union and it requires no military commitment as such. Is that pretty much what you wanted to argue today here?

Mr. Ingersoll. Yes, sir.

CONTINUED RELATIONSHIP IN SEATO AND NIXON DOCTRINE

Senator Pearson. How does this continued relationship in SEATO square up and relate to the Nixon doctrine? Does it enforce it or does it not run counter to the policies that the President announced at Guam some years ago?

Mr. Ingersoll. Our feeling, Senator Pearson, is that this reinforces the Nixon doctrine, that the changes that have already taken place in SEATO are an example of adjusting our commitments and our obligations to the new conditions. We certainly encourage through the Nixon doctrine all nations, not only of Asia but of the world, to develop their own capabilities of defending their own borders. But we believe that we are in a transition period, and that the Nixon doctrine cannot take effect overnight. It takes a period of time and this is why we recommend a continuation of the Manila Pact and the SEATO organization and our part in it.

EFFECT ON SEATO IF U.S. WITHDREW

Senator Pearson. But if the United States should withdraw or abrogate its position in relation to the organization rather than the treaty do you think the organization would continue?

Mr. Ingersoll. I am unable to say, sir. We are the largest contributor to the budget.

Senator Pearson. Aside from the money or the budget, do you think it would continue as a viable organization if the United States withdrew?

Mr. Ingersoll. Well, as long as we continue as a member of the pact, the Manila Pact, I would think that it might possibly continue, yes.

In recent days we have just concluded an ANZUS meeting in Wellington, New Zealand and Australia—both of whose Labor governments ran on an anti-SEATO platform during the 1972 elections—now are very pleased with the present organization, wish that it would continue, and give it its full support.
Senator Pearson. You answered the question I had when Senator McGovern asked you about the position of Pakistan. Has Bangladesh made any overtures for membership or sought in any way to fulfill the role previously held by Pakistan?

Mr. Ingersoll. Not as far as I know, sir.

FRENCH WITHDRAWAL OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT

Senator Pearson. What was the French reason for withdrawing financial support?

Mr. Ingersoll. Well, I don't know all of the facts.

Senator Pearson. Consistency with their general policy?

Mr. Ingersoll. I think it is consistent. They have been in disagreement with SEATO since about 1967 when they were in disagreement with our policy in Vietnam.

DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION BETWEEN P.R.C., U.S.S.R.

Senator Pearson. The final question I have is in relation to the role of this organization and our role in it in perhaps preventing a People's Republic and Soviet Union competition seeking to extend their spheres of influence. Where, precisely, do you see such competition developing in Southeast Asia or in Asia?

Mr. Ingersoll. Well, I do not know just what is in the minds of the officials of the People's Republic of China, but it has been reported by officials of countries of Southeast Asia who have visited Peking in recent months that the leadership in Peking have stated they do not see any conflict in their interests with the Manila Pact, and that they do not wish, at least at this time, to see any removal of U.S. Forces from that area. I would imagine that they are thinking about the possibility of the Soviet Union moving into the area where a vacuum might be created by our withdrawal.

Senator Pearson. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Sparkman, Senator Percy.

PROPORTION OF SEATO BUDGET BORNE BY UNITED STATES

Senator Percy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I left SEATO some years back troubled by the size of the structure and really wondered whether it was worth that kind of expenditure and effort. I think that the SEATO Secretariat would be wise to cut the number of professionals and reduce its budget.

Of course, a budget of a half million dollars, compared with the $175 to $85 million defense budget, is not very large, but what proportion of the total do we actually bear now?

Mr. Ingersoll. Well, under the previous arrangement when Pakistan and France were paying members it was 25 percent. The new percentage has not been finally adjusted, but we would imagine it will be around 30 to 31 percent in the new adjustment.
Senator Percy. In your judgment is that a fair proportion for this country to bear?

Mr. Ingersoll. I would think so; yes, sir.

U.S. COMMITMENTS TO SEATO

Senator Percy. Because we are deeply concerned about our commitments, moral or otherwise, to go to the defense of allies or friends, and because we want to be certain that Congress is now in a position to share the responsibility for any decision to commit our Armed Forces in activities abroad—other than in case of a direct attack upon us—could you clarify for the record then our commitments to SEATO? As I read article IV, it simply indicates that if a SEATO member is attacked, all this does is to trigger each of the countries to act to meet the situation in accord with its own constitutional process.

That implies that there is no authority for the Defense Department to move forces or to take precipitous action. It would be a trigger for the executive branch of Government to come to the Congress and ask for specific action, taking no action of an overt nature, no action that would put our forces in hostilities, other than what the Congress at that time would direct. Is that correct?

Mr. Ingersoll. That is correct, Senator Percy.

Senator Percy. With that understanding, I think that I am a lot more comfortable with it.

[The following information was subsequently supplied.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: Upon review of the transcript of my testimony before your Committee on March 6, 1974, in connection with the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, I believe it would be helpful to clarify my response to Senator Percy’s question (pp. 80–81 of transcript), concerning Article IV of the Treaty and the authority of the President.

I must admit that in giving the rather categorical answer which I gave to Senator Percy’s question, I understood the question a little differently from the way it appears in the transcript. Specifically, I did not intend to confirm the possible implication of Senator Percy’s statement that the President may not move military forces except as directed by the Congress or take any military action without specific prior Congressional authorization. Even the recently enacted War Powers Resolution does not purport to impose such limitations.

I do not believe any purpose would be served by again going over all the ground which was covered in connection with the War Powers Resolution, and I am sure you are familiar with the President’s and Secretary Kissinger’s statements concerning the various legislative restrictions on reinvolvement of United States forces in hostilities in Indochina. I do think it would be useful, however, to make clear the Department of State’s views concerning the legal effect of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, which was what I had in mind in my testimony.

In this connection, I would refer to the view expressed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in connection with the Senate’s advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty: ‘‘The Treaty in no way affects the basic division of authority between the President and the Congress as defined in the Constitution. In no way does it alter the constitutional relationship between them. In particular, it does not increase, decrease, or change the power of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces or impair the full authority of Con-
gress to declare war; (Ex. Rept. No. 1, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. quoting from Ex. Rept. No. 8, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.)."

The Department of State continues to regard this as a definitive statement of the legal effect of the Treaty.

I would very much appreciate it if you would insert this letter into the record of my testimony following my answer at line 18 on page 31 of the transcript.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT S. INGERSOLL,
Assistant Secretary of State,
East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

ATTITUDE OF NEW GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND TOWARD SEATO

Senator Percy. I wonder if you could tell us what the attitude of the new government of Thailand is toward SEATO?

Mr. Ingersoll. Well, I met with the present Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, and in their conversations they were most anxious for us to continue our relationships. More recently since I left there the Foreign Minister has made a public statement in which he urged that the United States continue its membership in SEATO and its commitment under the Manila Pact. This was a public press statement that he made.

AUSTRALIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SEATO

Senator Percy. I was in Australia just after the elections there and I was aware of the anti-SEATO position of the candidates. Would you want to expand a little bit now on your own statement as to how that has been moderated in the postelection period and what Australia's attitude is toward SEATO now?

Mr. Ingersoll. Well, not only in Australia but in New Zealand this anti-SEATO feeling existed prior to the Council of Ministers meeting in New York last September. With the modifications that were recommended by the Secretary General of SEATO for the contraction of the organization, the elimination of military planning, the reduction in military exercises, the elimination of the Information Office which had been putting out rather strident anticommunist press releases, now both of those governments are in full support of SEATO in its present posture. As I mentioned earlier, in the recent ANZUS meeting held in Wellington last week they are fully in support of the present organization and their commitment to the pact.

Senator Percy. That is my impression after talking with the Prime Minister and I am glad to have your own reaffirmation of it.

INSURGENCY IN THAILAND AND SEATO'S ROLE

Could you describe what the present state of insurgency is in Thailand and what role, if any, SEATO would play in coping with that problem?

Mr. Ingersoll. Well, it is pretty hard to describe just what the present state of insurgency in Thailand is. It fluctuates. And there are several elements in the north and northeast of Thailand. There are, for instance, a large number of North Vietnamese in northeast Thailand who have been there for sometime, and because the area is rather sparsely settled and sparsely administered, I might say, from the central government, there are times when the population there does not adhere to direction from the central government.
There are also tribesmen a little further to the west but in the northern part, who also do not take too much direction from the central government. In most of these areas, at least up in the hills, their main support is the growing of opium, and this has been one of our principal concerns that these tribesmen flaunt the power of the central government in order to continue the production and trans-shipment of opium. There is a considerable effort by the Thai Government, without any support from us except technical, in activities to try to reduce this narcotics trade. I would say that they are quite interrelated, the insurgency and the opium trade, but SEATO has no——

Senator Percy. No role in this at all?

Mr. Ingersoll. The only role that SEATO may have is the efforts that the organization is making to develop substitute crops for opium for those people to produce if opium is no longer grown. I had the experience of being served a tea of safflower seed which they had developed to reduce the cholesterol count of people of our part of the world who have heart problems, and they think this might be a crop that they could substitute for opium and it's a very worthwhile crop.

SEATO MILITARY EXERCISES SINCE U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM

Senator Percy. You have made a statement about military exercises. What exercises have there been since the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. Where were these exercises carried out and are other exercises planned for this year?

Mr. Ingersoll. I will have to defer the immediate answer on that but, for the record, I will provide that for you. I do not have it.

Senator Percy. I would appreciate that very much.

[The information referred to follows:]

SEATO Military Exercises

(Supplied by Dept. of State)

Since the withdrawal of the last U.S. armed forces personnel from Viet-Nam in March 1973 there has been one SEATO military exercise. A ground/air command post exercise to test headquarters procedures and communications was held May 10-22, 1973 in Bangkok. The exercise did not involve movement of troops or maneuvers.

The September 28, 1973 SEATO Council meeting decided that the future military exercises would be held less frequently than in past years. The aim of exercises will be both at improving techniques and capabilities in the field of security/development through civic action type projects and at improving joint operational techniques of the forces of member countries. The SEATO Secretariat is still in the process of drawing up a schedule of future exercises. The only exercise tentatively planned for 1974 is a non-conventional type exercise; it is a study symposium in Bangkok focused primarily on the Thai insurgency problem.

LONG-TERM POSSIBILITIES OF NEUTRALIZING SOUTHEAST ASIA

Senator Percy. What is your assessment of the long-term possibilities for the neutralization of Southeast Asia. Is it, in your judgment, a realistic goal?

Mr. Ingersoll. Senator, I am an optimist and I believe in the long term as the nations of the world realize the futility of war that neutrality is the ultimate solution. But I don't believe we have reached the millenium yet, and we have to look at the practical situation as it is.
Senator Percy. I would like to ask you one personal question which relates to a question asked by Senator Fulbright when you were up for confirmation as Ambassador to Japan. He asked you then why a person like you, serving as a chief executive officer of a major business firm, where you could make management decisions, would want to come into government?

You now have a vastly increased responsibility but you are in a department headed now by a man whose creativity and whose gifts are beyond dispute.

Are you able, as the Department is now organized, to get decisions? When you come to a conclusion, when you decide that a policy should be changed, are you able to carry it out as you used to in business, or do you just write memoranda and circulate them and sit there with the frustration that most ambassadors do, having the feeling that no one is reading them or paying any attention to them?

Would you just comment personally whether you feel the Department has been revitalized? Has it higher morale with one of the most gifted men in American history as its head? What are the problems that you see at the operating level?

Mr. Ingersoll. Well, I have not been in the Department under previous Secretaries of State, but I know that under the present circumstances the Department is operating under high gear. It is getting decisions. Information is getting not only to the Assistant Secretaries but to the field. We have several staff meetings a week directly with the Secretary, as the regional assistant secretaries do, which enables us to present problems directly to him and get answers. And we do get responses through the normal channels as well.

So I believe, although I have not been there very long, we can function and are functioning quite well.

Senator Percy. Thank you for your excellent testimony.

Senator Sparkman. Senator Case, are you ready now?

SEATO AND INCREASED U.S. STRENGTH AT DIEGO GARCIA

Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Ingersoll.

I have a couple of rather specific questions. Is there any relation, in your mind, between SEATO and the increase in our strength at Diego Garcia?

Mr. Ingersoll. I would not see much relationship except to indicate to the nations in that part of the world, and some of them are similar to those in the Indian Ocean littoral, that we do not intend to turn our backs on our friends in that part of the world.

Senator Case. That is a very specific relationship?

Mr. Ingersoll. Yes, sir. But in terms of any legal or consultative requirement, there is no relationship.

Senator Case. When I say specific that was not the right word. The whole thing is very vague and nebulous and I think it should be. I am not a member of a group which thinks you can have a fine blueprint for a foreign policy in the world or in a part of the world, and so I am not going to be critical on that ground in any sense.
I would like you to tell me, if you can, of course you can, I am sure, what the Nixon doctrine is. We talk about it a great deal, but I would like to have you go through it.

Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, I will try to give you my understanding of it, sir:

I believe that in 1969 the Nixon doctrine was intended to convey not only the countries of Asia but to all other countries of the world that while we had been helping in prior years from a military standpoint, and perhaps from an economic standpoint too; he thought it was in the best interests of those countries as well as of the United States if we should encourage them to stand on their own feet militarily, economically and any other way. They should particularly become militarily strong enough to handle their own internal problems as well as any problems on their borders from outside.

We would continue the strategic support of our nuclear umbrella wherever that was required.

Senator CASE. Whoops, whoops, "wherever required," that is what I would like to have you clarify. Maybe I should let you finish. But it seems to me the word "required" is as broad as a church door and as deep as a well.

Mr. INGERSOLL. All right, sir, I will be more specific: wherever our commitments require that.

Senator CASE. Now that is just another way of saying that. If you will, try to make it as concrete as you can.

Mr. INGERSOLL. I will give you one example. Having been Ambassador to Japan our obligations under the Mutual Security Treaty with Japan were quite specific and we were obligated to respond to any attack on Japan. I think we also have a similar agreement with Korea and with the Philippines and other nations.

Senator CASE. Now, excuse me, may I understand this. To respond is that an agreement raising an obligation to automatically move ships and troops and airplanes when they are attacked?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, there is always the constitutional processes that impinge upon any action by the executive branch of the Government, and—

Senator CASE. But it is an obligation under which it would be hoped that Congress would abide by, as well as the Executive, for us to come to their aid with troops and ships and airplanes of what?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Of what?

Senator CASE. Any country?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Not those countries with which we have such a treaty, a mutual security treaty. But I would like to say that I think that obligation exists through the constitutional process. I believe the hope is that with that kind of a security arrangement—

Senator CASE. Yes, I don't mean to say—

REACTION TO THREATS BY NUCLEAR POWERS

Mr. INGERSOLL. The nations would not be subject to blackmail by those who might have nuclear power and threaten them with it.

Senator CASE. What has nuclear power to do with this?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, I was pointing out that under the Nixon doctrine we are encouraging the nations to develop their own resources for their own defense from the standpoint of their own lands. But if they should be threatened by a nuclear power we stand ready through our mutual security treaty to protect them from that.

Senator CASE. Threatened by a nuclear power? Does that mean threatened by a power using, or threatening the use of nuclear weapons against them, or a nuclear power threatening them in any sense?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, I would imagine it is threatening them in any sense.

Senator CASE. Then those words “nuclear power” are just a definition of which nations rather than the kind of attack that might be made on them, right?

Mr. INGERSOLL. I don’t believe it is limited to nuclear powers.

Senator CASE. Why did they say nuclear? What does that mean? Why does the doctrine say nuclear? I am really trying to get some idea of what we are talking about.

Mr. INGERSOLL. I will have to get the exact wording of it, sir.

Senator CASE. Well, the word “nuclear” is used in the document.

Mr. INGERSOLL. I thought it was but I wasn’t sure.

Senator CASE. It is used and in just the same way you used it, but I don’t know what it means.

Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, I think that at the time these treaties were established that it was thought the nuclear powers were the ones that might threaten these nations, and I think they had the concern also.

Senator CASE. There are only what, four nuclear powers, United States, Russia, England and France, as I understand it, and certainly we were not talking about England and France, and we were not talking about the United States so we were just talking about if it was Russia that threatened.

Mr. INGERSOLL. I would think so, and we were thinking about the People’s Republic of China, too.

Senator CASE. And if Russia threatened and threatened in any way by moving conventional forces or in any other way that is what the nuclear doctrine was, wasn’t it, I mean the Nixon doctrine?

Mr. INGERSOLL. I would imagine. The Nixon doctrine was taking the situation as it was at that time.

Senator CASE. Yes, I know that.

Mr. INGERSOLL. And the obligations or treaty commitments that we had and defining where we would like to be over a transitional period.

Senator CASE. You mean it was derogating our then commitments?

Mr. INGERSOLL. No, I don’t believe it was but it was encouraging the countries to whom it was addressed that they should become even better, stronger partners than they had been when the treaties were originally drafted.

NIXON DOCTRINE CALLED EXHORTATION

Senator CASE. Really then it was just a speech, wasn’t it, and I am not critical, you know, the chairman—

Mr. INGERSOLL. It evolved as just a speech initially and then it was followed by action.
Senator Case. Well, I mean a speech encouraging these countries to do more.

Mr. Ingersoll. Yes.

Senator Case. Recognizing that in South Vietnam the great problem was the South Vietnamese weren't defending themselves, Isn't that right?

Mr. Ingersoll. I don't think it was limited to South Vietnam.

Senator Case. No.

Mr. Ingersoll. I think Korea was another place.

Senator Case. But it was really an exhortation rather than anything else. I do not believe that you can have a series of operations or principles which automatically come into play and don't require in every decision that you make a greater exercise of judgment at the time. It does, I am sure. But it was just to give some indication we were getting a little sick of a situation in which countries weren't doing their part.

Mr. Ingersoll. I would imagine that was the basis for part of it and we have withdrawn—

Senator Case. Not only the basis but the substance of it.

Mr. Ingersoll. Sure, and we have withdrawn our forces from many of the areas that might have begun to rely on us entirely and not on their own forces.

Senator Case. That is right, and I think it was a wholesome thing. But the only real criticism I have of it, as I do of so much of the stuff that goes out, is that it is intended or at least made to sound much more specific than it is, and much more simple than it is and much more automatic in operation than it is. And none of these things are true about any kind of commitment, or policy or anything else in international affairs. Isn't that a correct statement?

Mr. Ingersoll. I think that is true. As you said earlier, many of these foreign policy statements must necessarily be vague, and be implemented as the circumstances may require. It is difficult to draft a worldwide statement that can be specific on every case.

Senator Case. Unless you are going to just have no statement at all and just, you know, move your forces around a little bit and, in effect, that is the substantive action, that is the substance of our foreign policy in any event. I should think, and what you are doing, and assuming Congress gives you the money at Diego Garcia. And again I am not being critical of that action or any other action. My own criticism of it is that we are not speaking, and we do not speak, frankly to ourselves or among ourselves or to the world, and this is really what I am troubled about. And I don’t mean I think the people downtown are stupid, you are not at all stupid, you know perfectly well what you are doing, and I believe it would be a lot better if we said so in much franker language than we do. People can take it if you will strip away the rhetoric, I think, much more happily than otherwise.

WETHER DEMOCRACY IS POSSIBLE IN INDOCHINA

Now, Mr. Chairman, I am afraid I have gone off on a hunt of my own here, but since I really think this is the essence of our problems I would like to know whether you think there is a chance for develop-
ment of this area of the world or a continued existence of this area of the world without a Communist organization, without the dictatorial organization that communism provides.

It seems to me that, broadly speaking, the attraction of communism is nothing really but that. It provides a kind of order that most people find much more comfortable than a rather uncomfortable democratic system, and that while certain liberals still cling to the idea that our Nation is a true democracy, it isn't, of course, that at all. It is a system of organization of society taking full account of the deficiencies of human nature and, not cynically, but just openly, admitting that human beings have to be controlled in order to do things, and the only difference between this and an absolute monarchy, for instance, is who chooses the leaders, that is all, and how the people are kept in line, in one case by persuasion and appeals to their better nature and the correction of economic incentives, and in the other case by fiat.

There isn't a moral question except as in the greatest sense it is a moral question about the dignity of the individual and, of course, the possibility of having power exercised by people without check and without corruption, and that is about, it seems to me, the size of it.

Now, do you think in this part of the world democracy is possible?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, the definition of democracy—

Senator CASE. I mean the kind of thing that doesn't require Communist organization and society in order to continue to exist.

Mr. INGERSOLL. I do, Senator, and I saw evidences of this in three countries of Indochina that I visited, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. There were several examples of people refusing to go back into Communist territory and other examples of people leaving the Communist territory for the free territory.

Senator CASE. There are things about it they don't like, I am sure, and most everybody would rather live outside.

Mr. INGERSOLL. But the privations of some of these refugee camps were such that they were willing to take that over, you might say, living in the countryside under Communist domination.

Senator CASE. Well, the Communists regard this just as a transition period while people are getting used to what is best for them. Really that is the thing, and you haven't really answered my question—I guess you have, you said you do believe there is a hope for it.

Mr. INGERSOLL. I certainly do.

Senator CASE. What do you base that on. In the first place people's preference, that isn't enough.

Mr. INGERSOLL. I think the will of the governments in that area, and at least the current support of those governments by the people who have chosen that form of government over the other.

Senator CASE. Because they wouldn't accept the self-discipline that is required?

Mr. INGERSOLL. I think that is yet to be seen.

Senator CASE. It is yet to be seen?

Mr. INGERSOLL. So far they are choosing that, and the responsibility that goes along with it. But there are many problems in that part of the world—economic, political, social and racial. And some countries, for instance, Thailand, are tending toward a freer society than they have had in the past. The Thais are now working on a constitution,
which they hope to vote for before the rainy season. This, I think, an encouraging sign.

**EFFECT IF UNITED STATES PULLED OUT ENTIRELY**

Senator Case. Now you, I take it, are rather of the view that if we pulled out entirely, leaving aside the moral question of our commitments and having enticed people to rely on us, and so on, if we just decided, you know, we can’t do it, it won’t work, that the general collapse of the area would be rather quick and you would get a totalitarian organization there under some sort of communist leadership, whether or not it was indigenous in each country, each to its own country or under common control, undoubtedly you would have racial and national rivalries again as they have, for instance between China and Russia, and what not, but it would be a totalitarian regime without any question in your judgment, is that right?

Mr. Ingersoll. Well, I think the tendency would be—

Senator Case. Not that it isn’t now.

Mr. Ingersoll. Would be for these countries to see the shadow of China and their ideological approach over their shoulder all the time, whereas they may not become fully communist it might be somewhat like Finland under the Soviets on the other side.

Senator Case. Finland is a little different. Finland has demonstrated in the past they can govern themselves so it is really quite a difference.

Mr. Ingersoll. They may have been able to withstand it more than some of these countries could.

Senator Case. And these countries have not ever demonstrated a capacity for self-government and self-restraint and, of course, you don’t have democracy down there either. We are supporting a tyranny which depending upon the point of view, may be just as rigorous as that which the Communists impose with different people and for different reasons.

Mr. Ingersoll. There have been very few instances of people choosing communism in the past 25 years in that part of the world.

Senator Case. Yes, I am not saying, who is to say, the people should have the right to choose. I mean that is—

Mr. Ingersoll. That is what we believe in.

Senator Case. We do, but is our belief naive?

Mr. Ingersoll. It is based on the freedom of the individual, I think, and human dignity.

Senator Case. That is right. But what I guess we are really groping for is the question of whether this effort is a possible one and whether the costs that we impose on ourselves to make it and the costs that we know are being paid in lives and torture and what not on our side of this show, as well as that inflicted by the North, which is just as evil as far as the individual results go, whether it is worth it. In your judgment it is.

Mr. Ingersoll. I do believe it is.

Senator Case. Have you got a reason?

Mr. Ingersoll. Well, I think it is based on the idea that we believe in the dignity of the human being and—
Senator CASE. People will argue, though, there is no dignity in South Vietnam. That Thieu has got just the same dictatorial power as the North. Now, that isn't true, but is that lack of efficiency only on the part of the Southern leadership?

Mr. INGERSOLL. No, I think he has deliberately chosen, at least from the standpoint of economics, a free market system rather than a completely controlled system.

Senator CASE. For a few people to get rich and put the money in Switzerland?

Mr. INGERSOLL. No, I don't think so.

Senator CASE. Tell me.

Mr. INGERSOLL. I went around and saw a lot of individuals, exercising their freedom and enjoying it in the country. I was down in the Delta, not just in Saigon but out in the country, and I would say they much prefer that kind of a life than what they would have under the regimented society just across the border.

Senator CASE. I don't want you to think I am on the other side of this thing. I am not. I am just trying to incite you to respond in the most convincing way you can, that is all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD GENEVA ACCORDS

The CHAIRMAN. I think we are going to have to vote in a minute. I have one or two questions, Mr. Secretary. I am sorry I came in late but I read your statement. You say, "In addition to the broad purpose of containing what was then termed the Sino-Soviet bloc, it was also the particular hope of the SEATO framers that the Manila Pact would strengthen the 1954 Geneva settlement for Indochina." I find that difficult to reconcile with what our actions in Southeast Asia were. What do you mean by that?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, I think at the time it was hoped that the Geneva Settlement would bring peace.

The CHAIRMAN. But we were the principal people who did not accept the Geneva accords and we were very active. That was the main thrust of our policy. We didn't accept them. We pressed the Government of South Vietnam not to have an election. Didn't President Eisenhower say if they had an election Ho Chi Minh would get 80 percent of the votes?

Mr. INGERSOLL. I think we did say we would do nothing to undermine the Geneva accords. The CHAIRMAN. You think we did nothing to undermine the Geneva accords?

Mr. INGERSOLL. If you mean by helping the Diem government, perhaps not. Perhaps we did in that regard.

The CHAIRMAN. The real purpose of it was to prevent the Geneva accords from taking effect because he was afraid Ho Chi Minh would win the election, isn't that really the fact?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, I don't know that we know all the consequences, but perhaps—
The CHAIRMAN. Well, you do know the consequences. It did not take effect.

Mr. INGERSOLL. It did not take effect?

The CHAIRMAN. And we were the principal supporters of the Diem government which refused to go along with the Geneva accords, is that not true?

Mr. INGERSOLL. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. How can you make a statement like that unless you are joining the deception in which they engaged. You don’t approve of that, do you?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Senator, I think you and I had that discussion when I was up for this job and I think you know that I don’t join in that effort.

SITUATIONS IN LAOS, CAMBODIA

The CHAIRMAN. I thing this morning’s papers said there was a remarkable movement in Laos toward reconciliation or settlement, is that correct?

Mr. INGERSOLL. We are fully behind it, yes sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I also saw that quite a number of, 10,000, I think it said, of the rebels in Cambodia had petitioned to come over to support Lon Nol, is that correct? It is in the paper.

Mr. INGERSOLL. I think that is a very fine trend if it is true.

The CHAIRMAN. Assuming it is true, what lesson do you draw from those two developments, if any?

Mr. INGERSOLL. I think that the accord in Laos is an effort which we support very strongly of permitting the indigenous population and governments to resolve those questions themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. But I thought we had withdrawn from Laos. I thought we had no longer any forces there or we were leaving it all up to them to do it themselves, is that right?

Mr. INGERSOLL. That is true, that is what I say, we support it.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it unreasonable to draw the conclusion if we get out of these matters that people will sort out their own problems and will do it much better than if we continue to bomb them as they did for so many years?

Mr. INGERSOLL. I think if we can get the kind of agreement that they will sign in Laos and other areas we will certainly welcome it.

The CHAIRMAN. We are not getting it, they were doing it themselves, weren’t they?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Oh, but there was a cease-fire and it was under those circumstances that the two sides got together. There was fighting right up to the cease-fire, intense fighting.

The CHAIRMAN. But isn’t the significant difference we are no longer there calling the shots?

Mr. INGERSOLL. We were still there at the time of the cease-fire.

The CHAIRMAN. Are we now?

Mr. INGERSOLL. No, we are not now.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, isn’t it logical then to believe that once we get out of their hair and don’t influence them with our military power that they tend to resolve their differences?
Mr. INGERSOLL. I think eventually that is true, as long as the other side doesn’t continue to get military support to overcome——

The CHAIRMAN. That being so, how do you justify a policy that tends to continue our occupation or our presence or our influence in these internal affairs of these small countries?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, I think as far as Cambodia is concerned we would welcome the two sides getting together and resolving the problems themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. But the way to bring that about is to remove ourselves would be the lesson that seems quite clear in both those countries.

Mr. INGERSOLL. I think if you wished to have a military victory by the other side that can be done very quickly.

The CHAIRMAN. I don’t know about a military victory. Apparently they are resolving it without a military victory in Laos. There is no military victory.

Mr. INGERSOLL. But I say that was done by a written accord and we would welcome that taking place in Cambodia as well.

The CHAIRMAN. I welcome it, too. I am not talking about welcoming it. I certainly welcome it, but I am talking about how you bring it about and I don’t see that our military activities did very much to promote it.

Mr. INGERSOLL. I think, sir, that if both sides realize that military victory is not possible, then there is a tendency for them to get together. So far the other side in Cambodia has not been discouraged enough to think they can’t win a military victory and therefore they have been unwilling to respond to the efforts by the Lon Nol government to have a discussion of that type.

U.S. RESPONSIBILITY REGARDING POLITICAL, SOCIAL SYSTEMS OF OTHER COUNTRIES

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I see they have rung the bell for the vote and I am going to have to leave. One last question growing out of Senator Case’s discussion. Do you think it is our responsibility to see that these countries have a political and social system similar to ours?

Mr. INGERSOLL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am puzzled by your answers to Senator Case. When you use the word “communism,” do you mean a Marxist political system, social system or do you mean simply a dictatorship?

Mr. INGERSOLL. I didn’t hear that last.

The CHAIRMAN. Simply a dictatorship, a nonrepresentative democracy. The words bother me very much because it is hard for me to believe that these people, the Vietcong are Marxists, that they have any particular knowledge or devotion to that principle. But they are authoritarian, in the same sense that the Government of Spain is authoritarian, or the Government of Peru, you can take any of the dictatorships. I just wondered, it bothers me very much—this rather loose use of the word “communism.”

Mr. INGERSOLL. I agree with you, sir, and I think it is difficult to describe the kind of government regimes just as Communist. I believe the ones we are talking about are dedicated to the principle of Marx
or Lenin or Mao and have been indoctrinated into those teachings. They also follow, as they have in Cambodia, the practices that have been developed principally in China, but sometimes in the Soviet Union, for the organization of their economy and their Government.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a 5-minute bell and I am sorry to leave. We will have to recess. I don't know whether Senator Church is going to be able to come back. I suppose we can be back maybe in 10 minutes. That is a cloture vote.

Mr. INGERSOLL. We will wait for you.

[short recess was taken.]

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. The committee will come to order.

BUDGETARY SITUATION OF UNITED STATES

Mr. Secretary, I don't know that there is much use, and we have so little time to pursue it, but I hope you will try to moderate our tendency to intervening in everybody's business, not only for their sake but for our own so that we won't continue to waste our resources all over the world. And I hope you will take note of the budget situation. You as a businessman ought to be concerned about that.

Mr. INGERSOLL. Very much concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. Inflation and deficit in our operations. The Senator from New Jersey said a while ago that he didn't want to be critical of Diego Garcia. I want to register, in view of his statement, that I am very critical; I am very dubious that we should continue to expand bases that we can't afford. You are starting out with $29 million, it will be $2 billion before you are through with it, that is the way it always goes, and you will build up a base there, that means the Russians have to. You ought to have some consideration for the Russians because if we do it, they will have to do it and it causes an overexpenditure on both sides. Don't you have any sympathy for the Russian economy? Do you want to force them to bankrupt themselves as we have?

Mr. INGERSOLL. I would like to say the reverse, do they have any consideration for our economy, sir? I hope this will not be true and that through negotiations with the Soviet Union we can agree on reductions in military expenditures.

RESPONSIBILITY OF STATE DEPARTMENT

The CHAIRMAN. There is no indication of it. I mean the Defense Department obviously is not interested in détente. From DOD's budgetary and other actions, it seems to me, it is the responsibility of the States Department to take the lead in bringing our commitments into better alignment with our capacity to service them properly. Especially, we should have learned in Vietnam.

I tried to elicit what from you, but you wouldn't give me the right answer. As soon as we leave, these states seem to sort out their differences and go about their business, not exactly as you would like but at least the way they would like, and I thought that was one of the lessons to be drawn from South Vietnam. That after all we could do we didn't really do very much for them of an affirmative, constructive
nature. Now they seem to be sorting out their difficulties, as soon as we leave.

I don't believe I have any more. Thank you very much. I hope you will give this consideration and not let the Joint Chiefs determine our foreign policy altogether.

Mr. Ingersoll. Sir, I think I have a reputation with the Joint Chiefs and the military since, as Ambassador to Japan, I have been looking very critically at their deployments there.

The Chairman. Sure.

Mr. Ingersoll. And I hope to continue that kind of assessment for all of East Asia and the Pacific.

The Chairman. I hope you will. We certainly need your support, that is the State Department's support, because this is a big conflict.

I don't say that particularly critically of the Joint Chiefs. They are doing what they call their thing, their mission. What that mission is nobody has ever been able to determine. But it is a nice word and they will ask and get anything they can get, and the only countervailing force in our Government is really the State Department. We try in a feeble way, but we don't have much clout.

Mr. Ingersoll. Well, we welcome this opportunity to discuss these issues with you and I hope we will have further opportunities and we will pursue our role as we perceive it, sir.

The Chairman. Good. Thank you very much.

WITNESS PROCEDURE

Our next witness then is Dr. Kahin, I believe. Is he here?

In view of the limitation of time, perhaps Dr. Gordon could come with Dr. Kahin. I might explain that, for your information, cloture was voted which means Senator Church cannot come back because his amendment, which I am cosponsor of, is the pending business.

Dr. Kahin and Dr. Gordon, will you come forward, please. I regret the lateness of the hour, but I know Dr. Kahin has been here many times before, he has been consulting with this committee for 10 years at least or maybe longer. Which of you wishes to proceed first, go ahead, please.

STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE McT. KAHIN, CORNELL UNIVERSITY

Dr. Kahin. I would like to begin by saying, Mr. Chairman, that I was struck by Secretary Ingersoll's remark that the end of SEATO would create doubt and uncertainty on the part of the several governments covered by SEATO in Southeast Asia. I would certainly agree with respect at least to those regimes so, lacking in popular support as to be unable to cope with rebellion on their own. But I submit that this might be a very healthy thing, because without the certainty that they could count on American support against rebels and potential rebels they would probably be politically more realistic and more sensitive to the grievances of their own people.

I must say I was astonished at his very moderate description of the character and scope of insurgency in Thailand. I would think that many Thai would wonder what country he was talking about. And I should add that I was surprised at his categorical statement that
American military are not involved in any respect in suppression of insurgent's activity in the Philippines. I hope he is right. There are reports to the contrary.

I would emphatically agree with his statement that the purposes of SEATO have changed, but my benchmarks are a little different than his. It is, I think, quite evident that the major reason why the present administration insists upon continued American participation in the treaty is its usefulness in making available to the President an instrument for potential use against local insurgencies in Southeast Asia. As a matter of fact, SEATO continues to provide an assertive President with one of the strongest cards for bypassing Congress if he should wish to launch new or expanded military interventions in Indochina, Thailand, or the Philippines.

May I say, Mr. Chairman, there is a considerably longer statement that I prepared and I hope that it will be inserted into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. The entire statement will be inserted as written and you can comment on it in any way you like. I am sure that is proper.

Dr. KAHIN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The same with Dr. Gordon. They will both be inserted.

INTENT OF SENATE WHEN SEATO WAS APPROVED

Dr. KAHIN. I will now, then, touch on some of the major points that are lodged in that statement.

Let me emphasize that to employ SEATO in this way as a basis for military intervention in Southeast Asia against dissident elements there, call them rebels, insurgents or whatever, is diametrically opposed to the intent of the Senate when this body consented to the treaty. Yet Congress has never been able to constrain the President from ignoring that intent and it would seem to me that there is little reason to expect that it will ever succeed in doing so while the United States is tied to SEATO.

And thus with respect to the Southeast Asian area, continuing American participation in SEATO does militate against prospects for any effective reassertion by Congress of its foreign policy role.

You undoubtedly recall much better than I that when John Foster Dulles stood before this committee to urge Senate approval of the SEATO Treaty he sought to relieve the anxieties of those Senators who were apprehensive lest its clause relating to insurgency or subversion might draw the United States into the support of unpopular governments against broadly based political opposition. And it was to assuage their concern that he stated; and I will quote:

If there is a revolutionary movement in Vietnam or Thailand, we [the SEATO] allies would consult together as to what to do about it... but we have no undertaking to put it down; all we have is an undertaking to consult together as to what to do about it.

And when further pressed by some skeptical Members of the Senate he assured this committee categorically that there was no obligation for action in such cases, and that the authority for action in cases of armed attack from outside the treaty area would not be employed as a subterfuge for dealing militarily with situations involving subversion.
Yet, that is precisely what did happen in Vietnam, and could easily happen in Thailand or the Philippines.

As it was understood and endorsed, then, by the Senate 19 years ago, SEATO did not authorize American military intervention in situations such as arose in Vietnam. But through a quite unjustified Presidential interpretation of that treaty it came to be employed as the executive branch’s principal authority for putting down a revolutionary movement in Vietnam. As early as March 1966 the Johnson administration moved from the Tonkin Gulf resolution to SEATO as the major justification for its Vietnam policy.

As the record of American participation in SEATO testifies, where the operation of a treaty is dependent upon the executive branch’s findings as to the nature of relevant conditions abroad, and where Congress has no independent means for checking them, any assertive President can easily ignore the understanding upon which senatorial confirmation of the treaty originally rested. In the case of SEATO all the President had to do was to assert that a locally rooted insurgency was actually a case of clear-cut outside aggression, the very subterfuge that the Senate had previously been assured would never be resorted to.

Those Senators who had endorsed the treaty clearly had not reckoned with the power of a President to define insurgency as outside aggression, and by resorting to this expedient the President was able to shift over to a basis of treaty authority that empowered a signatory to act rather than merely consult with his fellow pact members. A condition in the treaty stipulating that invocation of such authority must be in conformity with a signatory’s constitutional processes poses no problem to an American President so long as Congress acquiesces in his simply consulting with a few of its more amenable Members. For such casuistry to succeed and for the original intent of the Senate in endorsing SEATO to be defied, all that is required is an apathetic and poorly informed Congress. This made it possible to invoke SEATO in the case of Vietnam and it could again with respect to other countries of Southeast Asia.

**AUTHORITY UNDER SEATO CLAIMED BY PRESIDENT**

The same authority under SEATO claimed by the Chief Executive in justification of American intervention in Vietnam still remains immediately available to any American President if he should decide to intervene militarily against rebels in Thailand or the Philippines. Nor can the possibility be entirely dismissed that SEATO might be drawn on as justification for renewed American military intervention in Indochina—that despite the actions taken by Congress to restrain the executive branch from embarking upon such a course, and despite the administration’s having signed the Paris peace accords.

As the protocol of the Southeast Asia Regional Defense Treaty makes quite explicit, the protection made available applies as much to Cambodia as it ever did to South Vietnam, and there is nothing to prevent the present regime in Phnom Penh from repudiating Sihanouk’s renunciation of SEATO’s protection and requesting supportive American military intervention.

If President Nixon chose to grant the request he could resort to that same perversion of SEATO utilized by his predecessor in Vietnam,
asserting that the intelligence available to him established that the situation in Cambodia was basically one of outside aggression rather than rebellion or civil war.

While the Congress has not deprived the President of whatever legitimacy SEATO might bestow upon a renewal of American bombing in Cambodia, it has certainly made that more difficult by denying funds for this purpose. But it has not undertaken any such preemptive action to safeguard his launching, to safeguard against his launching military action to protect the governments of the Philippines or Thailand against rebels that they are unable to suppress on their own. In those two countries the door is still wide open to Presidential action initiated military intervention against an insurgency.

Let me turn more particularly to Thailand——

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE OF PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT

The Chairman. Before you leave the Philippines, you intimated that you had information that we are militarily assisting the Philippine Government.

Dr. Kahin. Yes.

The Chairman. You do have?

Dr. Kahin. I do have some information that comes in the form of a report, a collective report by the Catholic Superiors. These are the heads of the religious orders in the Philippines. A report of theirs that was dated last November 26, as I recall, indicated that they have strong reason to believe that on Panay, the American military are involved in action against the insurgents.

The Chairman. We asked them this at a briefing last fall, and they categorically denied we were doing such things. I forget what hearings. We did have a hearing last fall in which that matter came up and at least I was very concerned that we would get drawn in again into a similar situation which would be another tragedy.

Dr. Kahin. Yes.

The Chairman. Well, if you have anything that might be appropriate for the record of this hearing on that subject it would be useful if you had it.

Dr. Kahin. I will make the citation available to the committee.

The Chairman. All right. Go ahead, proceed.

[The information referred to follows:]

STATEMENT FROM THE SUMMARY OF THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF MAJOR RELIGIOUS SUPERIORS (PAGE 12), NOVEMBER 26, 1973

In the Visayas (Regions VI, VII, & VIII), the NPA (New People's Army) is concentrating its efforts on Panay. It is having success in gaining support especially on both sides of the Iloilo-Capiz boundary, in the mountain areas of Aklan and in the Sibalom valley of Antique. NPA regulars on the island number about 300. But, recruitment is brisk especially from the mountain barrios of Capiz and Aklan. The presence of U.S. military personnel directing the anti-rebel campaign on Panay has been confirmed by very reliable sources. American army men in uniform are working on the road from Iloilo to Capiz. This is NPA infested territory so people wonder why.

Dr. Kahin. Would you like me to turn to Thailand or the Philippines first?

The Chairman. It doesn't matter.
Dr. Kahin. The commitment that we have to Thailand is tied to and crucially dependent upon a special interpretation of the SEATO treaty by Executive action in the Kennedy administration that was never submitted to Congress for approval, and that considerably increases the possibility for committing American forces against an internal insurgency as well as against outside aggression. I refer to the joint communique by Secretary of State Rusk and Foreign Minister Thanat in March of 1962 which in effect bilateralized the SEATO agreement, asserting that the United States was obliged to come to Thailand's support even if other SEATO signatories refused to go along.

That communique cited the case of Vietnam as an appropriate example of how under SEATO Thailand could rely on American support against the threat of insurgency, and the communique employs language that Thai leaders have come to understand provides the basis for active American military support against any major insurgency within Thailand as well as against outside aggression. Certainly this administration has not shaken their faith as to the strength of that commitment.

Any initial anxiety there might have been was quickly put to rest in President Nixon's public statement in Bangkok July 28, 1969. It was then that after pledging to maintain all existing American commitments to Thailand, he went on to say and I quote, "The United States will stand proudly with Thailand against all of those who might threaten it from abroad or from within." Echoing the feelings of Thailand's military leaders, the Bangkok World then observed, "I again quote, "The inclusion of threats from within is seen as a startling vote of confidence to a Thai nation cautious over the prospects of American involvement in future Southeast Asian problems."

Mr. Nixon's statement came as a surprise to a Thai leadership fearing that his mission here was only to prepare the nation for the eventuality of American disengagement. "The Thai-United States relationship is stronger now than at any time in days past." And as Vice President Agnew made evident during his visit to Bangkok 2 years later, the Nixon administration indicated no subsequent reservations about that pledge; indeed, it reinforced the Thai leadership's conviction that if any of their insurgencies became a serious threat they could count upon the United States to come to their rescue.

U.S. Support Against Insurgency in Thailand

I am sure you are aware that American support against insurgency in Thailand is not a hypothetical question. Countersubversive training by American Special Forces and CIA personnel is known to have been going on there for many years, and Thai counterinsurgency military operations have enlisted the assistance of American military advisers both in the field and in Bangkok.

Since the fall of 1970, an arrangement has existed whereby several thousand Chinese Kuomintang troops police substantial hill and mountain areas of northern Thailand. Whether some Thai are correct
in their understanding that the United States has backed and funded the arrangement, it would appear that Congress has not been sufficiently concerned to ask the administration pertinent questions about this matter. But whoever pays for these mercenaries, their military role in Thailand is something of a measure of the extent of the insurgency in this area and of the Thai military’s inability to handle the problem on its own. In addition, if Bangkok is willing to turn to foreign mercenaries to help contain insurgents, it is not prepared to handle on its own; surely it is logical to ask at what point it is likely to assert the right its leaders have assumed is guaranteed by the Rusk-Thanat communiqué and call for direct American military support.

There is, I think, some reason to hope that with Thailand’s king and students have recently secured a considerable degree of control over the Thailand Government’s policy, that the likelihood of a request for American military support against insurgents is now less than it was 6 months ago when Generals Prapas and Thanom were politically dominant. But it would seem to me irresponsible to base our policy on the assumption that the present political balance in Thailand will necessarily continue and that the Thai army is not capable of reasserting the dominant position it held for so long.

Although during the last few years the several insurgent groups in Thailand have increased in power and in the extent of territory they control, as yet they have not seriously threatened American military bases and personnel or seized control of areas of vital importance to the Bangkok Government. But what should we expect if either or both of these situations should arise? On the basis of his previous record, what should we expect President Nixon to do? Would he assert that we have a clear-cut case of outside aggression and invoke the SEATO Pact as justification for American intervention, at first presumably with the less controversial dimension of additional military advisers and special forces, along with tactical air power? Or would he simply repair to that formula that served him so well during the last years of American intervention in Vietnam, his duty to protect American military personnel abroad? Or to strengthen his case in the face of an undoubtedly hostile Congress, might he resort to both?

**U.S. COMMITMENT TO PHILIPPINES**

Let me turn very briefly, Mr. Chairman, to the Philippines. There, too, the continuing existence of SEATO increases the possibility of the United States being drawn into military intervention against insurgents. The same interpretation of the SEATO treaty that permitted it to be used as authority for Presidentially initiated military intervention against insurgents in Vietnam could be applied to the Philippines.

Although, as I know you are aware, SEATO constitutes the sole basis for the American defense commitment to Thailand, in the Philippines that backing is supplemented by the antecedent bilateral mutual defense treaty that was signed in 1951.

By a series of Executive actions, again never submitted to my knowledge to the Senate for approval, that 1951 treaty has been reinterpreted in a way that has committed the United States more heavily and with less flexibility than originally envisaged. In their combination this mutual defense treaty and American obligations under
SEATO, especially when perceived in the context of the islands' major American and fleet bases add up to a formidable American defense commitment.

You may note that neither in the original 1951 mutual defense treaty nor in any of the subsequent elucidations is it stipulated that an attack to which the United States would respond must come from outside the Philippines. And there is nothing in the treaty itself or in these stronger supplementary statements that would not conform to and dovetail with that same special interpretation of the American SEATO commitment that had been applied in Vietnam and made available for Thailand.

With respect to these American treaty commitments the question of deciding what constituted an armed attack on or against the Philippines would be up to the President of the United States. It would be he who would make the determination as to whether an insurgency directed against the government in Manila would qualify as the sort of armed attack that in conformity with the authority provided by the two treaties could legitimize American military intervention in support of that government.

Certainly the existence of major and geographically quite extensive American naval and air bases in the Philippines increases the possibility of American military intervention. The extensive vested interests of our own military in these bases and in maintaining an unimpeded access to them leaves the possibility of American intervention to protect them something of a hostage to the course of insurgent activity. The proximity of the largest of these bases to territory frequently penetrated by insurgents, it seems to me, makes this proposition something more than academic.

Because of the heightened social tensions attending President Marcos' recent seizure of dictatorial powers, and the ensuing increase in the size of both communist-led insurgencies in Luzon and in the Visayas, as well as by the Muslim-led rebels in the South, it would seem to me quite unrealistic to dismiss the possibility that Marcos might call for American counterinsurgency support well beyond what the Nixon administration has already provided him, ultimately with the possibility escalating to direct American military intervention.

Now, on the face of it one might regard Marcos' insistence on referring to the anti-Communist Muslim rebels in Sulu and Mindanao as "Maoists" as simply a clumsy effort to bracket them with pro-Communist insurgents in Luzon and some of the other islands. But his dogmatic insistence on adhering to this terminology may also bespeak his appreciation of the fact that the United States has from the outset made clear that under its SEATO commitment American military power will be available only against Communist forces.

U.S. COMMITMENT UNDER SEATO TODAY

One concluding remark, Mr. Chairman: although today no longer attempting to provide justification in terms of the containment of China, the Nixon administration still clings to SEATO. It does so no longer for the reasons for which that treaty was originally intended but rather for purposes that were never countenanced by the Senate.