the Plain of Jars, that general conditions seemed substandard even by Laotian standards.

Dr. McCready. It was substandard, it was a road camp we moved into after Sam Thong blew. We had to move 182 patients with us and staff. It was a mess. At the present time, there is a 200-bed hospital, X-ray and so forth, but it took a while to build.

Senator Kennedy. Is it built now?

Dr. McCready. Yes.

Senator Kennedy. Operating now?

Dr. McCready. Yes. It has been—well, we put the last 50-bed ward on it last month.

Senator Kennedy. Would you give us sort of a brief comment generally in terms of the medical facilities?

Dr. McCready. Well, as far as the Khong Sedone hospital, it is pretty different. Most of the hospitals in Laos—I have completed going over the yearly statistics for 1969 and 1970 for all the hospitals in Laos. I discovered that in calendar 1970 there was a 32 percent increase in caseload at all locations. In 1970 itself, December was 60 percent over January. Naturally, you can’t grow doctors and nurses that fast. An overall average of hospitals, OB and RLG, was 155 percent of capacity during 1970. They are crowded.

Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ambassador, just in terms of the AID budget for future relief in 1970, despite a very significant increase in total number of refugees, we see a rather dramatic reduction in terms of the refugee relief budget and a reduction, although it is rather modest, in the public health budget.

Mr. Sullivan. You said it was a reduction of the budget?

Senator Kennedy. That is right, in those particular categories, refugee relief and resettlement. That has been cut by about a third.

Mr. Sullivan. This may be the transfer of the—

Senator Kennedy. Has public health development been cut very much?

Mr. Sullivan. I will ask Mr. Meinecke, but I think it represents the transfer of funds.

Mr. Sullivan. This may be the transfer of the—

Senator Kennedy. Actually, may I comment that, for the 1971 budget, because of the increased number of refugees, the budget has been increased somewhat sharply over the last year. In fact, it is about $17,300,000 for fiscal year 1971. This, of course, is a function of the number of refugees we have to take care of. With the transfers and everything else I think it is still very responsive to the kind of care that the GAO people suggested we consider in the refurbishing of not only the staff but the organization and methods that we instituted in September of 1970. So, basically, in fiscal year 1970, we spent about $16 million and this year we are projecting $17.8 million, up a million dollars.

I might also comment that a great quantity of that increase is in Public Law 480 commodities.

Senator Kennedy. May we go into Cambodia, if we could?

Mr. Sullivan. I have a prepared statement on Cambodia which I would like to read and also will call on Mr. Meinecke, on the AID side.
Perhaps the most important points to be made about the refugee situation in Cambodia are the things that have not happened:

There has been no massive destruction of urban or heavily populated areas.

There are no large refugee camps.

There is no sweeping program of U.S. assistance advice, and involvement.

There has been no need for large-scale government programs of resettlement and relief.

There has been no conspicuous overcrowding or squalor in Phnom Penh.

Because of the rather modest dimensions of the problem, and the lack of any involvement of Americans, detailed figures are few and not always reliable. I should like, therefore, to present a general overview of what has happened in Cambodia since March 1970, and its effect on population movements, before entering upon these figures which are available to throw light on the current situation.

You will recall that Prince Sihanouk was deposed as chief of state on March 18, 1970, by a unanimous vote of the Cambodian parliament, and that thereafter the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong rejected efforts of the Cambodian Government to negotiate a peaceful withdrawal of the Vietnamese Communist forces in Cambodia. Although there had been skirmishes and local military action between Cambodian and Vietnamese Communist forces earlier, at least since the summer of 1969, the VC/NVA did not begin a general offensive against Cambodian forces, along much of the border and in the southern and eastern provinces, until the last few days of March and the first week of April.

The Cambodian forces, hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned, fell back before this enemy offensive. Here and there, discovering or suspecting that local ethnic Vietnamese residents were joining the invading enemy, they turned on and killed groups of ethnic Vietnamese civilians. The Cambodian Government, to which we and other friendly nations has expressed our shock and concern over these incidents, quickly took measures to prevent their recurrence. At the same time, and in cooperation with the Government of Vietnam, it began bringing its urban Vietnamese population together in resettlement camps, partly for their own safety, partly because it was clear that elements of the Vietnamese community, exposed for many years to North Vietnamese and Viet Cong organizational and propaganda efforts, were aiding the Vietnamese Communist invaders with supplies, information, and acts of terrorism.

The Cambodian and Vietnamese Governments agreed on the repatriation of most of this ethnic Vietnamese population, which was carried out during the summer of 1970. About 200,000 Vietnamese returned to the Republic of Vietnam, some on their own, but most by an air and sealift organized by the two governments on their own. They did not ask for, nor did they need, American help in this task.

Not all the ethnic Vietnamese, of course, left Cambodia. The 1962 census had shown an ethnic Vietnamese population of some 217,000, and this number had undoubtedly grown considerably in 7 years. Some 3,000 to 10,000 Vietnamese remain in Phnom Penh, of whom
fewer than a thousand are being housed in a resettlement camp and may still return to Vietnam. Another 8,000 or so Vietnamese are still living normally in western Cambodia and along the Tonle Sap. Some of them may wish to return to South Vietnam, but no facilities for their doing so have been available yet. Still other Vietnamese remain in villages along the border, where in some cases they may represent a source of supplies and recruits for the VC/NVA. Finally, an unknown but probably large number of Cambodians are wholly or partly Vietnamese, but adopted Cambodian manners and customs, in many cases intermarried with Cambodians, and are thought of as Cambodians. They have not been subjected to the suspicion of cooperating with the enemy which has fallen on other ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia.

In the meantime, and as the Vietnamese Communists were on the verge of consolidating their control over southern Cambodia with a secure road link to the port of Kompong Som—formerly Sihanoukville—United States and GVN began their cross-border operations on April 30. These operations ended on June 30.

One of the last significant US/RVNAF operations before June 30 involved the extrication from the northeasternmost province of Ratanakiri of some 5,000 Cambodian troops, their dependents, and civilians. The North Vietnamese offensive in April had cut off and surrounded their force but had failed to overrun it. The troops were subsequently trained in Vietnam and both they and the civilians have returned to Phnom Penh. They constitute a major part of the few thousand people housed in refugee camps in and around Phnom Penh.

With the exception of this group from Ratanakiri, we do not believe that the U.S. operations in Cambodia generated any large number of refugees or caused a significant number of civilian casualties.

Many Cambodians, however, fled as their homes fell under the control of the VC/NVA, who occupied much of eastern and northern Cambodia. Fortunately, this area is sparsely settled; the four eastern provinces in which NVA/VC control is complete, although they represent 26 percent of Cambodia's territory, contained less than 5 percent of the country's population. It is in this area, and adjoining regions to the west and south, that the enemy has been attempting ever since last summer to rebuild base areas and supply depots, and it is on this lightly populated area that U.S. air operations, to interdict the flow of enemy supplies and troops, have been focused.

The flow of refugees from Commuist-controlled and threatened areas has continued, though at a manageable rate. There is considerable agreement among Cambodian Government reports, the results of our Embassy's contacts in the field, and even press reports, on the reasons which motivate these people to leave their homes and seek safety in government-controlled areas:

First, people are afraid of the VC/NVA and of their Cambodian puppet forces. It does not take very many executions to terrorize a village.

Second, there is strong resentment against the invaders, not simply as Communists but as Vietnamese.
Third, living conditions have quickly deteriorated in the areas which have fallen under enemy control. The cutoff of trade with the cities and areas under government control, and the VC/NVA demands for food and other supplies, have imposed a heavy burden. Fourth, there is strong distaste for the controls and regulations which the Communists have sought to impose. Travel controls, for instance, are much resented, even by villagers who have no immediate plane to travel and who might do so only once or twice in a lifetime.

Other refugees have left areas of heavy fighting between Cambodian and VC/NVA forces. Such movements have kept civilian casualties from the fighting to a relatively low level. Cambodian Government figures show some 450 civilians killed since the beginning of hostilities, and about a thousand wounded. Probably these figures are incomplete, but they do suggest that physical destruction in some of the villages and small towns where there have been sharp engagements has fortunately not been matched by civilian casualties.

Typically, individuals and families move into the towns from insecure areas or areas of combat, and move out again as soon as they can safely recover their plots of land. The villagers tend to follow Cambodian armed forces and, where government control is reestablished, try very quickly to resume their normal lives, rebuild their houses, and cultivate their fields. While they are in the towns or cities, these refugees typically live with relatives or friends. In a country where food supplies are ample, and where family ties are extensive or widespread, it is thus possible for sizeable population movements to take place with relatively little distress and without much government involvement.

At present, some 50,000 families, or about 250,000 persons, are believed to be taking refuge in Phnom Penh. Of these, no more than about 5,000 are located in the five refugee camps now in existence in and around the capital. About 6,500 are dependents of military personnel whom they are unable to accompany, and are being cared for by government aid. Outside Phnom Penh, the available information indicates that some 12,000 families—say 60,000 people—are refugees in provincial towns.

Much of the burden of assistance to these refugees who need help has been borne by Cambodian private organizations, with help from abroad. The Khmer Red Cross plays a leading role in distributing food and relief supplies and in providing medical care. It is also the principal channel for contributions from abroad, which up to the present have totaled some $2.5 million from at least 17 countries. The Association of Khmer Women, and relief agencies of the Catholic and Protestant churches of Cambodia, have also been active in relief efforts.

Relief activities of the Government of the Khmer Republic are carried out by two agencies, the Ministry of Social Welfare and the Commissariat General for War Victims, a new subcabinet agency established last July. The Ministry of Social Welfare is concerned primarily with continuing or permanent programs, such as the operation of an orphanage and the construction of housing for refugees. The Commissariat General is responsible for supplement-
ing and coordinating the efforts of voluntary agencies to provide essentially temporary aid in cash or in kind, tiding over refugees until they can find employment in town or return to their land.

Like many aspects of the Cambodian nationalist struggle against external aggression, the performance of the Government of the Khmer Republic and of individual Cambodians in caring for war victims has been impressive. Our assistance has not been sought, and there has been no need for it. Unless there is some unexpected change in the situation, we have no plans to involve ourselves in the Cambodian refugee program or to assume new responsibilities with regard to it.

Senator Kennedy. You say, Mr. Ambassador, our assistance has not been sought and there seems to be no need for it. Isn’t this funny, since our assistance is sought in everything else—in terms of the American troop involvement last year, logistic support, military supplies, etc.—yet it appears within this area they haven’t sought our assistance, in terms of the care and development of human resources?

Mr. Sullivan. I think they take some pride in being able to take care of their own people.

Senator Kennedy. That is what we were told about Vietnam and Laos, too, and yet we certainly have seen that they have been unable to achieve that in war-torn countries.

Mr. Sullivan. I am not aware of—I don’t know anybody who said that about Laos. We have always felt Laos was unable to take care of its refugees and had a program within the system.

Senator Kennedy. You don’t see any need, then, in terms of refugees in Cambodia?

Mr. Sullivan. At the current level, there does not appear to be a need.

Senator Kennedy. Hasn’t the effect of the war almost doubled the population in the capital city of Phnom Penh?

Mr. Sullivan. I don’t believe it has doubled at the present time. Most of these 200,000 Vietnamese are moved out of Cambodia, moved out of the immediate environment of Phnom Penh.

Senator Kennedy. We are talking about Khmer.

Mr. Sullivan. 250,000 Khmer came in to replace them. It is probably an augmentation of a little over 200,000.

Senator Kennedy. What is the population of Phnom Penh?

Mr. Sullivan. I will ask Mr. Corcoran to come up.

Mr. Corcoran. The total population of Cambodia is about 7 million and Phnom Penh is about 400,000, a little over 400,000. Most of the refugees are in the Phnom Penh area.

Senator Kennedy. What does the Cambodian Government say in terms of its population?

Mr. Corcoran. They use the figure over 7 million.

Senator Kennedy. Excuse me?

Mr. Corcoran. Over 7 million.

Senator Kennedy. No, just in terms of the capital city, Phnom Penh?

Mr. Corcoran. 400,000.

Senator Kennedy. They use 400,000?

The information made available to our committee fixed the figure closer to 700,000. How has it varied over last year?
Mr. CORCORAN. That would come out—

Senator KENNEDY. That was what?

Mr. CORCORAN. That would balance. There are in Phnom Penh living with friends, relatives, about 245,000 refugees, the great bulk of those in the country. The next largest group would be in Battambang, some 20,000 Khmer plus 4,000 Vietnamese refugees.

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think there was a period when there was a great swell of refugees into Phnom Penh and some of these have disappeared again. But the two movements of the Vietnamese going out and the Khmer refugees going in, have augmented the population of the city. But I don't think anywhere near doubled it; I haven't heard of a figure as high as 700,000.

Senator KENNEDY. Time Magazine estimated nearly 2 million; other news reports talk in excess of that. The information that was given to our staff by the Director of the War victims Directorate accept the figure of 700,000.

Mr. SULLIVAN. We will have to get this for the record.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, it is very important, obviously. If we haven't got those figures accurate then it is awfully difficult to talk about the population in need.

(Subsequently, the following information was provided:)

At the last census, in 1962, the population of Phnom Penh was 388,995. By 1970, as a result of population growth and normal migration from rural to urban areas, the city's population was probably between 700,000 and 750,000. The best available estimates at present indicate that approximately 250,000 Khmer have taken refuge in Phnom Penh since the outbreak of hostilities. It is not known how many of the 200,000 Vietnamese repatriates came from Phnom Penh, but a conservative estimate would be at least 100,000. The present population of Phnom Penh therefore is probably about 900,000.

Mr. DOOLIN. I might make this general observation Mr. Chairman. I have been to Phnom Penh several times; I was there last summer and last January. I didn't see any significant evidence of gross overcrowding or a marked change between last summer and this past January, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, we will have to just keep on digging into this until we find out. Every other feature of the war in Laos and Vietnam—the kind of military activity, the military involvement with corresponding creation of millions of refugees—that has taken place in Vietnam and Laos is being repeated in Cambodia. Then to sort of suggest—to simply shake our heads and say, well, it is not a problem there—leads one to think that we are getting the same kind of response we had before this committee 6 years ago on refugees in South Vietnam.

Mr. DOOLIN. May I make a general comment?

Senator KENNEDY. Sure.

Mr. DOOLIN. I find this very, very refreshing. For example, in talking to the senior members of the Cambodia military, they say, "You don't have to worry about a Vietnamization program because we are going to do it ourselves; if we can't cut it, we don't deserve to win." This is the approach they take. I think this is a refreshing approach.

Senator KENNEDY. I am not surprised. The South Vietnamese have taken a very similar kind of approach. Yet you look in their
budget. What percent of the budget goes to social welfare? If they are doing the job you say they are doing, then let’s hear about it.

Mr. MEINEKE. Well, we in AID, the only thing that we are doing to help the country——

Senator KENNEDY. No, let’s hear what they are doing. Obviously, given your experience here in the past, we are not going to just accept the general kind of comment that they can handle this themselves. Let’s hear what they are doing about it—if they give you such cause to be so confident about it or quiet in our approach it.

Mr. MEINEKE. I will have to determine that from their budget and supply it for the record.

Senator KENNEDY. You must have some information now. You are here testifying about refugees in Cambodia. You made some gratuitous statements about there being no significant need over there, and that the Cambodians are handling it. I would expect the first thing you would offer is evidence of what they are doing about it. You ought to be able to make some comments on that.

Mr. MEINEKE. Today, the Cambodians—we have only been there a very short time.

Senator KENNEDY. What are they doing about it?

Mr. MEINEKE. We have only been there a very short time.

Senator KENNEDY. What are they doing about it?

Mr. MEINEKE. As far as USAID is concerned they have not asked for aid for refugees and we haven’t been involved.

Senator KENNEDY. We know they haven’t. I have asked you to comment on it and I want to know what they are doing.

Mr. MEINEKE. I think the Ambassador has testified to the point of what they are doing through the Khmer Red Cross, but the details, we haven’t had a staff out there to determine the details.

Senator KENNEDY. What dimension is that Red Cross aid?

Mr. MEINEKE. I frankly don’t know.

Mr. DOOLIN. Senator, I can only say on the basis of personal observations——

Senator KENNEDY. Well, we ought to have something more than personal observations. We have had staff people make personal observations as well.

Mr. DOOLIN. In Cambodia, Mr. Chairman?

Senator KENNEDY. That is right.

Mr. CORCORAN. I do not have the figures on the budget, but I know that there are two Cambodian government agencies which handle the refugee problem: the Commissioner General for War Victims and the Ministry of Social Action, Labor and Employment. These people have received also a certain amount of assistance from private religious and welfare organizations mentioned in the Ambassador’s opening statement. But the problem, as the Ambassador also pointed out, is being handled at the level, not so much of the Cambodian Government as by family and friends of these Cambodians who have moved into the capital or other provincial capitals.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you have, or can you bring up here staff who have visited Cambodia?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I have not been in Cambodia for——

Senator KENNEDY. Well, do you have anybody here who has visited any refugees in Cambodia? Now, if you have got anybody who has visited any of those camps——
Mr. DOOLIN. No, there is the one camp, Mr. Chairman, outside of Phnom Penh which is very small, as I understand it, I have not visited it.

Senator KENNEDY. Haven't we got somebody here who has visited? The staff of this committee has visited some of the camps—they describe the origin of the problem, they talk of appalling conditions, extremely overcrowded, heavily fly-infested, generally distressed, evidence of malnutrition, especially among a large number of children.

Do we have to bring this up again? Are we going to have to start all over in terms of trying to shake the Administration and the various departments in Cambodia to get them doing something about refugees; have we learned anything in the last 6 or 7 years?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, I think this raises a basic question as to whether the United States should attempt to move into a country which has not asked for assistance, and attempt to Americanize what they are doing or attempt to do.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, we are right back at it, as far as the war goes. Mr. Ambassador. You have the United States waging war in Cambodia, waging a full dress air war, fixed wing bombing, U.S.-supported supply missions. We are willing to do that in Cambodia. But when we ask about refugees and refugee camps, we hear an answer, “Well, we can’t do that, we can’t interfere in that.”

We can’t exercise U.S. influence to look out after scores of children who are suffering from malnutrition. What really is important?

Mr. SULLIVAN. The air action that we are conducting in the Northeast of Cambodia is conducted at the request of the Cambodians. They have not asked for any assistance in connection with refugees.

Senator KENNEDY. I don’t feel any compulsions whatsoever in trying to find out what’s happening to refugees—clustered in these camps, suffering from malnutrition, as pointed out in our report: “conditions very unsanitary, heavily fly-infested, generally depressed.” Don’t you see any responsibility for trying to do something about those kinds of conditions? We can get in there in terms of the air war, but let’s not bother about the people?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think we have humanitarian concerns about it and we have made offers to the Cambodians in assistance. The private American organizations have made offers to the Cambodians and they have turned them down.

Senator KENNEDY. Now, as I understand, Catholic Relief Service has requested resources, just the modest amount of $10,000 for refugee relief, but that request has been denied.

Mr. SULLIVAN. I don’t think it has been denied. I think it is in process. The Catholic Relief Service is on PL-480.

(Subsequent to the hearing, the following information was supplied to the Subcommittee)

Catholic Relief Services terminated its refugee relief program in Cambodia on December 31, 1970, after expending $194,100. The Subcommittee also learned that negotiations between CRS, the Cambodian Government, and the U.S. Government, for further CRS programs in Cambodia, were never finalized.

Senator KENNEDY. See, no one really knows. We have been passing the mike back and forth, and no one knows. This is the same thing, again, what we had 6 or 7 years ago in terms of Vietnamese
refugees. It seems we have the same circumstances in Cambodia. I suppose the question comes down to what has to be done. Are we going to have to send more investigators, to get the GAO, to find out what needs to be done? We will be sitting down here a year from now and we will have testimony about how bad it was the year before, but we are making some progress today? If that is what has to be done, we are prepared to do it. But it always distresses me that it always has to come out this way. For all of our power and influence—and we can justify these aerial bombings and all the other kinds of military aspects of it—but we haven’t got enough leverage to do something about thousands of human beings and children caught in the cross-fire of war. I just don’t understand it.

Now, in terms of this report, and I am quoting from our report, as of “early August, the general views and attitudes of both Cambodia and U.S. officials in Phnom Penh were hauntingly familiar to earlier opinion out of Saigon . . . there is little doubt human priorities will again get lost in the tide of war.”

Do you have any comment?

Mr. MEINECKE. I would just like to make one comment as to the kind of program that is now underway and just beginning, supported by the supplemental AID legislation in the last part of December, 1970, is just getting under way. Its basic purpose is to finance the normal imports that have been interrupted. The local currency generated will be provided to the local government’s budget.

I am just suggesting that it is a part of the budget support in that way. Perhaps the Cambodian Government can then do the kind of things you have found in your study, to take care of their own people. They are very proud. They want to take care of their own situation. That has been their status so far in this particular effort. We hope they can do it themselves, that they are self-sufficient. Time will only tell whether they can do it. Time can only tell whether they really need outside aid and if they do than we stand ready to give that kind of assistance, I presume.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, as I understand, they made an appeal to international agencies, did they not, last summer?

Mr. MEINECKE. I am not sure about the appeal.

Senator KENNEDY. You have got some backup people here who ought to know about that.

Mr. CORCORAN. The International League of Red Cross Societies and the International Committee of the Red Cross made an appeal on June 5 for contributions on behalf of both Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees.

Senator KENNEDY. They made this request for how much; just a general appeal?

Mr. CORCORAN. A general appeal.

Senator KENNEDY. I wonder why they did that if there is no problem?

Mr. CORCORAN. The Red Cross Society?

Senator KENNEDY. I mean, I wonder why they did that if there is no problem?

Mr. CORCORAN. Well, there certainly is a problem.

Senator KENNEDY. What was their response to that?
Mr. CORCORAN. A representative of the American Red Cross visited Phnom Penh to study the needs of refugees. A representative of the Embassy reported no food shortages on July 10, and no requirement for special food shipments. Then in that month the Cambodians established the Commissariat General for war victims and they concluded the joint operation in March on repatriation, the last flotilla leaving on the 15th. On August 14, the League of Red Cross Societies and the International Committee of Red Cross did a joint progress report indicating approximately 100,000 Cambodians had been displaced by the war, and 9,000 in camps around Phnom Penh requiring Red Cross help, and approximately 18,000 Vietnamese were still awaiting repatriation. September 1, the Cambodian Government announced plans to construct temporary housing for refugees and on the 4th they established cooperatives to help find work. On December 31 Catholic Relief Service terminated their activity. February 12 of this year World Vision Relief Organization President Stanley Mooneyham visited Cambodia and discussed with the Government a project for the construction and staffing of a general hospital.

On the 15th the Vietnamese Government Committee on Repatriates from Cambodia published a report indicating 155,100 refugees had been assisted in resettling themselves and another 155,601 were being assisted through the group resettlement plan.

Then on April 10, Cambodians informally requested assistance in airlifting approximately 300 representatives from a province in Vietnam back to Phnom Penh.

Senator KENNEDY. Do we have anyone monitoring the refugee program in Cambodia; do you know?

Mr. CORCORAN. The Embassy.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you have a person; do you know who he is?

Mr. CORCORAN. No; there isn't a person designated.

Senator KENNEDY. One person?

Mr. CORCORAN. It would be the political section of the Embassy.

Senator KENNEDY. But there is nobody who has the responsibility for refugees in the Embassy in Cambodia?

Mr. CORCORAN. They may be in the Embassy's internal organization.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you gentlemen know if there is or isn't?

How many people have we got in the Embassy?

Mr. CORCORAN. 37 civilians and 39 military are permanently assigned.

Senator KENNEDY. How many on temporary duty?

Mr. CORCORAN. Five civilians and 10 military on temporary duty right now.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you know if any of those have any responsibility for the human part of the war—refugees or civilian casualties?

Mr. CORCORAN. I have no knowledge of any specific individual.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, in any event, there was a request made by the International Red Cross for assistance. Did we respond to that—the American Government?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Our Red Cross Society did, I believe.

Senator KENNEDY. The Red Cross Society?
Mr. SULLIVAN. The American Red Cross did respond; yes.
Senator KENNEDY. Was there any Government contribution?
Mr. SULLIVAN. It was not made to the Government; it was made to the various societies of the various countries.
Senator KENNEDY. But we didn't participate in any way in terms of any governmental contribution or support that you know of?
Mr. CORCORAN. Well, the response to that appeal was made by a variety of—
Senator KENNEDY. What was your name again?
Mr. CORCORAN. Thomas Corcoran.
The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees responded; the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies of Denmark, France, Germany, Belgium, Canada, India, Israel, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, the United States of America, and Catholic Relief Services, the Democratic Alliance and OXFAM in England, Asian Christian Service, World Vision, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars all responded.
Senator KENNEDY. As I understand, the U.S. assistance to Cambodia, this military assistance program, for $185 million and the AID program of $70 million, there is nothing in that AID program remotely connected to refugee relief or emergency health care. The reason, you say, is that there is no pressing problem.
I just don't believe that is the case, Mr. Ambassador, and I think our preliminary studies quite clearly indicate that. I guess we will simply have to use our staff, the GAO, and all the other kinds of resources we have, in order to come up with some documentation and solution to the refugee problem. We hope you do the same so we don't get into a situation, which I know you have regretted—that we have all regretted—where thousands of people were disadvantaged in South Vietnam and Laos because of our inaction.
Mr. SULLIVAN. As I said, our information is that there are roughly 5,000 people who are currently in this sort of status. We will certainly instruct our Embassy to monitor their welfare, and if the Cambodian Government seeks any assistance—but there are no plans now to force it on them if they do not ask for it.
Senator KENNEDY. Would any of you have objection to an amendment to the military appropriation which would limit the spending on military assistance in IndoChina to 10 times the amount spent on civilian and humanitarian concerns?
Mr. SULLIVAN. I imagine my colleagues in the Defense Department might have a comment on that.
Mr. Doolin. I would say, Mr. Chairman, that if the Congress would increase the civilian assistance to one-tenth of military expenditures, we would welcome it.
Senator KENNEDY. Are you prepared to ask for it? Pass that mike around again.
Mr. SULLIVAN. I think an arbitrary figure of request based on that sort of formula would not be the normal way we would go about making a request. Requests are made upon the basis of what is considered to be the need.
Senator Kennedy. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador and gentlemen. You have been very helpful. I want to thank you for your appearance here.

The subcommittee will stand in recess until 2:30 this afternoon. (Whereupon, the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 the same day.)

(Subsequent to the hearing, the following information was submitted to the subcommittee:)

Refugee camps in Phnom Penh have been visited from time to time by personnel of the U.S. Embassy there, as well as by representatives of international organizations such as the ICRC/LICROSS. The Embassy's reporting indicates that there are no major problems of food, clothing, or health for the refugees, and that the most important problem has been the additional burden on Phnom Penh educational facilities represented by refugee children (including those living with relatives or friends).
APPENDIX I

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF SELECTED LAOTIAN VILLAGES UNDER PATHET LAO OR NORTH VIETNAMESE CONTROL, SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

(Note: The following eleven aerial photographs of selected Laotian were submitted to the Subcommittee by Mr. Dennis Doolin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. The accompanying map indicates the site of the villages and towns in Laos.)

Subsequent to the hearing, the Subcommittee Chairman wrote, on May 10, 1971, to the Hon. Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense, making, among other requests, the following two requests for information on Laos:

"2. The intensity and the impact on the civilian population of the American sponsored air war in Laos has evoked much controversy and concern. The hearing records and other documents of the Subcommittee contain significant information, but continue to raise a number of questions. What is the history of the air war over Laos, which some sources suggest has evolved in at least four escalating phases beginning in 1964? In separate calculations for northern and southern Laos, what is the monthly rate of sorties, identified by the kinds of aircraft employed, since January 1968? What is the monthly tonnage of ordnance for each area, and over the same period of time? How would the Department characterize the kinds of ordnance used? What are the rules of engagement and operations authorities governing air activities in Laos? What revisions, if any, have been made in these procedures since January, 1968?

"4. At the hearing on April 22, Mr. Doolin submitted a series of aerial photographs of selected towns and villages in Laos in order to illustrate the care taken by American personnel in protecting the civilian population in areas subject to air strikes. These photographs, and relevant identifying data, will be made a part of the public record. It would be useful, however, to have as well a number of additional photographs for the Subcommittee's review. I would like to suggest that this request include the most recent photographs, and relevant identifying data, of the towns and villages listed below.

1. Phong Saly
2. Sam Neua
3. Ban Ban
4. Ban Souy
5. Ban Tham
6. Ban Koua (Taseng Nhoune)
7. Ban Naxou (Taseng Sen Noi)
8. Ban Hop Oh (Taseng He Mouane)
9. Ban Sy Lousang (Taseng Ang)
10. Ban Thateng (Saravane Province)
11. Ban Na Kay (Khammouane Province)"

As of July 1, 1971, no response has been received by the Subcommittee.
Lao Villages Under PL/NVA Control

Map showing Lao villages under PL/NVA control.
Appendix II

Documentation of American Bombing of Civilian Targets in Laos
Prepared by Fred Branfman

My name is Fred Branfman. I spent nearly 4 years in Laos, from March 1967 until February 1971. For the first two years I was an educational advisor with International Voluntary Services, Inc., a private voluntary group under contract to the United States Agency of International Development in Laos. I spent the last two years as a freelance researcher, writer, interpreter, and journalist.

I have devoted most of the past year and a half to researching American bombing in Laos.

Most of this bombing has occurred in the half of Laos controlled by the Pathet Lao. This is a mountainous, forested region of some 50,000 square miles. It is inhabited, according to an estimate of an American Embassy official in March, 1970, by over 900,000 people, grouped in some 3,500 villages.

This area is quite possibly the most heavily bombed region in the history of warfare, a zone described by one refugee who left it as a “lake of blood and destruction.” It is a region that has had, by conservative estimate, more than two million tons of bombs dropped on it. It is thus a region the size of New York State that has undergone as much American bombing as Europe and the entire Pacific theater combined during World War II. (2,057,244 tons.)

American bombers have struck throughout this region. Bombing has occurred both in northern Laos, and throughout Pathet Lao areas in southern Laos. The Ho Chi Minh trail is but a small portion of the area bombed in southern Laos, a zone inhabited by some 250,000 people.

Massive evidence has emerged that much of this bombing has been carried out against villages; that, in fact, for the last 7 years the United States has carried out the most protracted bombing of civilian targets in history in this region; that thousands of villages have been struck, tens of thousands of civilians have been killed and wounded; and hundreds of thousands have been driven underground.

I have interviewed several thousand refugees and several hundred defectors from Pathet Lao portions of Sam Neua, Xiang Khouang, Saravane, Sedone and Attopeu provinces. In addition I have spoken with M. Jacques Decornoy, southeast Asian desk editor of Le Monde, who visited Sam Neua province in the spring of 1968; a Belgian television crew who visited Phong Saly province in the spring of 1970; and American and Lao officials working with refugees from Pathet Lao zones in Houa Khong, Luang Prabang, and Khammouane provinces.

All of these sources have reported widespread American bombing of villages in the areas with which they are familiar.

Each of the several thousand refugees interviewed has stated that his village was either partially or totally destroyed by American bombing while he inhabited it; that his village was bombed repeatedly; that he was forced to take refuge in the forest near his village, to spend much of his time in caves, holes or tunnels.

All refugees and defectors interviewed have indicated that relatively few soldiers were struck during the bombing raids; that the soldiers moved through the forest constantly, in small groups, under cover of the night; that the vast majority or bombing casualties were civilians.

Refugees interviewed generally say that the bombing began in 1964; that by 1967 and 1968 villages were frequently bombed, and many were evacuated; and that their villages were systematically bombed throughout 1969, “more times than they can count.”

(89)
In addition, I have interviewed dozens of American pilots bombing Laos from Danang Air Force Base in South Vietnam, and half a dozen American officials intimately concerned with targeting bombing strikes in Laos. With a few exceptions, these men have all indicated to me that civilian targets are bombed in Laos. As one example, the following comment was made to me on August 21, 1970, by the foreign service officer who did the staff work on approving targets for both Ambassadors Sullivan and Godley: “The U.S.? What can we do? Nothing ... Just keep on killing, destroying, bombing, devastating ... But how much longer can we keep it up? Pretty soon the Pathet Lao will have the whole country except for the cities and land corridors between them. What will we do then? Bomb Savannakhet, Pakse? The problem is we have no policy.”

All American personnel interviewed have indicated to me that with the exception of the Ho Chi Minh trail American aircraft have taken relatively little anti-aircraft fire in Laos, and that aircraft losses have been tiny compared to North Vietnam.

Two basic reasons for the bombing of civilian targets in Laos have emerged from conversations with these men:

1. Difficulty of terrain—Pathet Lao areas are densely forested. The guerrillas, who stay in the forest, are rarely locatable. Small trucks moving at night are equally difficult to fix. Even when military targets are identified, jets moving at 600 mph and bombing from 5,000 feet cannot strike them with accuracy. As strikes over Laos doubled after the November 1968 bombing halt over North Vietnam, bombing raids were more and more made against the one set of targets readily identifiable from the air: villages.

2. Destruction of the civilian infrastructure in Pathet Lao areas—Communist guerrillas in Laos are stronger on the ground than Asian soldiers supported by the United States. As a result, it was decided to bomb civilian targets in an attempt to demoralize the civilian population, deprive the Pathet Lao of indigenous food supplies, force them to employ civilians to do portage, kill off potential recruits and porters, and cause a population flow away from their zones.

It was, in the words of Robert Shaplen writing in Foreign Affairs of April, 1970 after a CIA-sponsored trip to northern Laos, an attempt “to destroy the social and economic fabric in Pathet Lao areas.”

Documentation

I include here excerpts from a digest entitled “Documentation of American Bombing of Civilian Targets in Laos.” This digest totals several hundred pages, and includes both indirect and direct testimony to the bombing.

Excerpts presented here are but a tiny fraction of total documentation. They include the following:

A. Indirect documentation


4. Letter from a former USAID official in Laos describing bombing of civilian targets in Khammouane province.

5. A newsletter from a former volunteer describing the bombing of Muong Phulane on February 15, 1967.

B. Direct testimony gathered from refugees

6. Tape transcript of interview with refugees from Phonesavan-Khang Khay area. This was an interview conducted by Les Whitte, associate editor of the Jack Anderson column. The tape is available on request. (This is one of dozens of tape transcripts that have been prepared.)

7. Excerpts from essays written in Laoian, and translated into English, describing life under the bombs for people from the Plain of Jars. Lao originals are available on request. (The excerpts are taken from over 20 essays, totalling some 50 pages.)
8. Sample case histories of victims of American bombing. Photographs are available on request. (Well over 100 such case histories have been collected.)

9. Tape transcript of a portion of a color film made concerning American bombing of civilian targets in Laos. This film is available on request. It runs some 20-30 minutes.

Conclusion

Until now, Congressional attempts to monitor American bombing practices in Laos have consisted primarily of accepting oral and written testimony from officials of the Executive branch. In all cases, these officials have testified that American bombers do not strike inhabited villages in Laos.

The documentation on American bombing of civilian targets in Laos that has been collected, however, suggests that merely accepting testimony from officials concerned may not be sufficient to determine the nature and extent of American bombing in Laos.

This is not difficult to understand. For if American bombers have frequently struck inhabited villages in Laos, officials who have testified before this Subcommittee may share responsibility for violating our own Rules of Engagement, giving false testimony before Congressional committees in the past, and violating such international agreements as the 1907 Hague Conventions, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the Nuremberg-defined statutes forbidding Crimes Against Humanity. It is unlikely that they would voluntarily incriminate themselves.

Clearly, the time has come to supplement hearings such as these with an urgent Congressional inquiry into American bombing practices in Laos.

Such an investigation would necessitate the immediate dispatch of an independent commission of inquiry to Southeast Asia. Such a commission would attempt to establish the scope and nature of American bombing in Laos and Cambodia, past and present.

Congressional investigators would:

(a) Inspect target folders on file at Udorn and Tan Son Nhut air force bases. These target folders contain written descriptions of all approved targets, and periodic photographs for each target.

(b) Inspect fresh photo reconnaissance film provided daily to CIA and air force photo reconnaissance teams at Udorn and Tan Son Nhut.

(c) Inspect weekly target lists approved by the American Ambassador to Laos over the last seven years, and compare coordinates listed with the location of villages on maps of Laos.

(d) Go out on visual reconnaissance flights over guerrilla-controlled territory in Laos and Cambodia.

(e) Conduct extensive interviews with refugees and defectors from guerrilla-controlled portions of Laos and Cambodia.

(f) Conduct extensive informal interviews with the full range of American personnel involved in the air war over Laos and Cambodia.

(g) Participate in weekly targeting meetings at Udorn and Tan Son Nhut air force bases, and monitor the entire target approval process.

In the last two years, more than 2,600,000 tons of bombs have been dropped on Indochina. This is as much American bombing as was done throughout all of Europe, the Pacific theater and Korea, during 8 years of warfare during World War II and the Korean War.

At the rate bombs have fallen since January 1, 1971, more than 800,000 tons will fall on Indochina before the end of this year. That's 2,400,000 bombs each day, 100 tons each hour.

This documentation suggests that much of this tonnage is falling right now on peasants in Laos and Cambodia, subsistence rice farmers who have committed no injury against, pose no threat to, the people of this nation. Peasants who, indeed, have neither seen an American nor have the slightest idea why Americans are bombing them.

This documentation suggests that there are hundreds of thousands of them, right now, lying out in the forest, huddled together in caves, holes, tunnels and trenches, hiding from American bombers.

This documentation suggests that at this very moment there are people—children, old women and men, with families and hopes and feelings—people being burned alive by napalm, buried alive by 500 pound bombs, cut to pieces by fragmentation bombs, riddled by anti-personnel bombs.
This documentation suggests that dozens of these peasants will be dead one week from today; hundreds one month from today, and thousands one year from today.

We cannot hear their screams, but we cannot ignore them.

For their agony is clearly the most pressing human problem of our time.

INDIRECT DOCUMENTATION

A. Excerpts from study by U.N. Advisor Chapelier

(Note. These comments appear in an in-depth study of refugees entitled: "Plain of Jars: Social Changes Under Five Years of Pathet Lao Administration." This study was done by the U.N. advisor Georges Chapelier.)

"... All these efforts tended to enhance national consciousness, but perhaps what contributed more than anything else to forge an in-group feeling were the heavy and recurrent bombings. A brief account of what we consider the major event in the five years under the Pathet Lao will make it easier to understand the reaction of the people and to further Pathet Lao politics of portage responsibilities and restriction of consumer goods.

"Prior to 1967, bombings were light and far from populated centers. By 1968 the intensity of the bombings was such that no organized life was possible in the villages. The villagers moved to the outskirts and then deeper into the forest as the bombing climax reached its peak in 1969 when jet planes came daily and destroyed all stationary structures. Nothing was left standing. The villagers lived in trenches and holes or in caves. They only farmed at night. All of the interrogators, without any exception, had his village completely destroyed. In the last phase, bombings were aimed at the systematic destruction of the material basis of the civilian society. Harvests burned down and rice became scarce, portage became more and more frequent." (pp. 18-19)

"These people seem to be fed up with bombings and unable to foresee the end of this tragic epoch. It must be noted that these observations are valuable at a behavioral level and do not engage the authors about the inner feelings of the refugees. A genuine assimilation between communism and bombings if frequent in Vientiane, even amongst western-educated people. A meaningful example is given by the answer of a Deputy whom we were asking, "Do you think that the Lao personality fits well in the communist system or, more simply, that Lao peasants are happy in PL territories?" He replied with a large smile: "But don't you know that they are bombed day after day, live in holes like animals and work in their paddies fields at night? Is that a good life?" Obviously, he assimilated communism and bombings and his reaction is typical of the Lao social climate in Vientiane." (p. 38)

B. "Owls in the Grotto," by Jacques Decornoy

Right up to the last few feet of the journey, it was necessary to steer the car between bomb and rocket craters. A wooden ladder propped against the chalky-rock gave access to the grotto hotel, a natural hole in the mountain "aided" by charges of dynamite. The traveller passed from one "suite" to another, walking along a "floor" of sharp pebbles, to arrive finally at his "room." From his bed he can see the sky through a break in the mountain. He can feel a fresh wind, but it would be extraordinary bad luck if a rocket landed in this cave. The foundations of this shelter are perfectly protected from bomb explosions in any case. A tiny motor distributes a supply almost unknown in "liberated Laos"—electricity.

This retreat for hunted guerrillas is managed by Mme. Kemphet Pholsena, a graduate of Moscow University, French speaking, and a daughter of Quinm Pholsena, Laotian Minister of Foreign Affairs and neutralist leader, assassinated in April, 1968. Life, here, is of the simplest. Set on the rocky

* Note—Jacques Decornoy; Southeast Asian desk editor for Le Monde, visited the Pathet Lao capital province of Sam Neua in the spring of 1968.

His reports on the visit appeared in Le Monde in a 5-part series July 3-7, 1968.

His accounts are of immense interest because to this day he has been one of the few western observers to witness the bombing and its effects first-hand.

We reprint here the second article of this 5-part series, which deals specifically with the bombing, as well as the first paragraph of the 3rd article.
platform which forms the entrance to the grotto is a washbasin. A dangerous place if one "puts one's nose out of the mountain; it can happen that one cannot finish shaving because of the jets raiding from Thailand. Then, one lies flat on the floor of the grotto with a bit of the soil and a few dower lfts attached to the rock by a thread of wire for a view. A difficult life but still possible in this season. But when the rainy season begins, water penetrates the chalky mass and drips into the "hotel." A world without noise, for the surrounding villages have disappeared, the inhabitants themselves living hidden in the mountains. A few buffalo, a few pigs walk below our feet between the craters made by American bombs. At the end of 1967, several large bombs fell two metres from the grotto; it is dangerous to lean out at any time of the night or day.

Thousand bombs

A "routine" day... at 7 o'clock, an AD-6 plane prows above us. It hangs around for about ten minutes, then leaves. At 7:30 the plane returns, flies over once, and, three times, drops its cargo a few kilometres from the "hotel." There is a flight of jets at 8 o'clock and at 8:30 jets and bombs. The same operation at 9 o'clock. In the afternoon we hear planes again on several occasions. It is not surprising, in these circumstances, to watch the breathless arrival at the "hotel" of a Secretary of State in the defunct government of national union. Papers in his hand, he has run from one cave to another. In this region which they control (and administer), the Laotians seem to be an underground in their own land, the guerrillas camouflaging themselves in the shelter of the rocks, as if the enemy ruled the valley, though he is only master of the skies.

It seems that the intensity and density of the bombing is even greater in the province of Xieng-Khouang in the Plain of Jars. Their persistence in this zone of grottoes raises the problem of the real motives of the Americans. Prince Souvanna Phouma told us in Vientiane (Le Monde, February 23rd) that the raids were aimed less at the Laotians than at the North Vietnamese at their point of entry into the country. It is certain that the US Air Force attacks the trails. But such a relentless attack on the region where we were can only be explained if the target is the central administration itself of the Neolao Haksat. Thousands of bombs have fallen for three years on a small area two to three kilometres long. In front of the cave where Prince Souphanouvong received us, the craters were so close that they cut into each other. In this forgotten war, unlike the attacks on North Vietnam, these raids have never been officially reported, but only, with much delay and discretion, "admitted." The Americans are trying to "break" the Laotian Left, both psychologically and, if possible, physically.

In Vientiane and at the Prime Minister's residence in the district, who know that he encourages these offensives, is not ready to forgive him. They also blame Thailand, from which all the bombers fly, and governments supporting American intervention or maintaining a complete silence on the subject. To declare, as Prince Souvanna Phouma has done, that the Lao Haksat "will rejoin the national community" when it is "liberated" by "North Vietnamese ascendancy" is to misunderstand completely the views of the leaders of the Left who ask, on the contrary, that Vientiane should disengage itself from "enormous American influence" and that the Americans no longer intervene in their country.

One of the officials of the Sam-Neura district told us that between February, 1965 and March, 1968, 65 villages had been destroyed. A number impossible to verify for a short report, but it is a fact that between Sam-Neura and a place about 80 kilometres away where we stayed, no house in the villages and hamlets had been spared. Bridges had been destroyed, fields up to the rivers were holed with bomb craters.

Shelters in the hill

Life in the caves has its inconveniences for the peasants. It is even more serious for the political and administrative people who have to rule an immense mountainous country, stretching from China to Cambodia, where distances are counted less in kilometres than in days and nights of marching. Nevertheless, the people work on without any sign of giving in. "Owls by day, foxes by night" goes the Laotian proverb. During the day the owl goes to earth in the shadow, but, at night, the fox comes out.
To take risks at night, even when one is a fox, presents problems. At three in the morning, we had to leave for Sam-Neua, but the command-car skidded at the foot of a bomb crater. The journey had to take place later at dawn—a delicate moment.

We could not stay on in this village, so, camouflaging the command-car, we left on foot, by a mule path, crossed a river on a bamboo bridge to arrive finally, in the forest, at a hut of poor planks covered by a roof of corrugated iron, with a "floor" of beaten earth; the office of the chairman of the district administration. Attached to a nail, the map of this region of the province, broken by bomb splinters, drawn by hand, without scale—one sign among others of the great poverty of the Neo Lao Haksat. In another hut close by we ate glutinous rice, which forms the basis of Laotian food, surrounded by men and women of the militia who were busy reinforcing a shelter hollowed out of the hill, under the trees. In the afternoon, several times, American planes flew over us. Profiting from a break in the clouds, reconnaissance planes passed over again and again. From above Sam-Neua, they could see only the motionless ruins and deserted houses.

The first real raid against the population centre itself was launched on February 19, 1965. Very serious attacks were made on it quite recently on March 17 and 19, 1965. The town looks like a long street, bordered with European-type houses built at the time of French colonial rule, and traditional Laotian dwellings of wood and bamboo. The two ends of the town were raised to the ground. The old ruins of 1965 have disappeared, those of March 1968 were still, "smoking" when we visited them. Branches of trees lay all along the length of the river, houses were totally burned out (phosphorus had been used).

At the other end of Sam-Neua, the sight was even more painful. Everywhere enormous craters, the church and many houses were demolished. In order to reach the people who might be living there, the Americans dropped their all-too-famous "bombes a killes" (fragmentation bombs). Here lay a "mother bomb" disembowelled, by the side of the road. All around, over a dozen metres, the earth was covered with "daughter bombs," little machines that the Vietnamese know well, unexploded and hiding hundreds of steel splinters. One of them had rolled into a shelter, under a mat, mortally wounding the three people who had taken refuge there.

The inhabitants dispersed into the forest, but only to find very thin protection there. As night fell, one saw them emerge, walk around, feed their cattle. Some ventured as far as the town there to collect the remains of beams or doors which they carried off into the forest, the wreckage of their destroyed homes, not completely burned. There were no traces of D.C.A— as mobile, apparently, as in Vietnam—but units are to be found in the region since the March raids. About two kilometres from Sam-Neua, one can see the debris of a plane shot down; the pilot was torn to pieces by the bombs which he did not have time to release.*

All the inhabited zones situated around the population centre have suffered greatly. One district official tells the litany of their misfortunes:

- March 66: 15 killed in such and such a village
- November 06: 15 killed in another
- The same month: a pagoda destroyed; 6 monks killed
- September 67: 8 killed
- November 1: 7 killed
- November 10: 16 killed
- February 68: 4 killed

To which we must add the many wounded. The inhabitants ask the reason for this deluge, of fire and steel. "I don't even know where America is," said a peasant mother whose daughter had just been killed and who had lost all her belongings. A peasant said: "I understood nothing before when people spoke against the United States. After the raids on my village, I know what they mean". Everything American, far and wide, is hated by the people.

*The Pathet Lao claims to have shot down more than 300 planes, which seems very exaggerated. Their D.C.A do not have shells larger than 37 millimetres. In this field at least, it is hard to argue from the socialists countries seems modest (these countries, and above them, North Vietnam, China, and the U.S.S.R., have diplomatic representatives in Vietnam).
The factory of the night
Bane-Kang... "During the course of the last two months, American planes have dropped almost as many bombs on Laos as on North Vietnam" the weekly Times reported on March 22. In these conditions, rare are the cases where it is not necessary to live permanently underground, hidden in the forest, or sheltered in a cave.

The village of Bane-Kang is one of these, and one knows the reason for this very well. Some unexploded bombs lie about around it, overflights are frequent, but we have been able to sleep without fear in one of these houses on piles underneath which flocks of ducks and black pigs wander by day and night. In the afternoon, when it is hottest, the men and women go to the river to take a bath, each in a different place. On the opposite bank, officials showed us the rice paddies with pride... 

C. Life of a refugee in Ban X, by a Lao student

(The following account of the "Former Life of the Refugees in Ban X" was written by a student participant in the 1970 IVS student summer work program. I have omitted both the name of the student and the name of the village in which he worked, since he was fearful of personal repercussions.

However, let me give the following biographical information. The boy is a student at one of the highest educational institutions in Laos. I have known him for more than a year. He came to the summer program recommended by both Lao and foreign staff at his school.

He wrote the following article at my request. He wrote it originally in Lao and I translated it into English. The English translation was reviewed and approved by the student, who reads but does not write English.)

Former life of the refugees in Ban X

In this village there live 228 families containing 2219 people. These refugees came from the province of Xieng Khouang which is presently controlled by the Neo Lao Hak Sat.

Before 1964 (according to the refugees) in the region of Tasseng Phan and Tasseng Phieang there was only prosperity in the ricefield and fish in the plentiful waters. There were no floods and no droughts because the water which fed the rice plants came from the mountains and not simply from rainfall as in our part of the country. Many animals were raised very comfortably. Each family had not less than 20 cows and numerous pigs, dogs, ducks, and chickens.

After 1964 the conditions of the area changed greatly, in many different ways. Sometimes the administration of the area belonged to the Royal Lao Government and sometimes the area was under Pathet Lao administration. But more often the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) controlled the area. At that time began the bombing increasing the misery, until finally it became impossible to live in the region.

Life under the Pathet Lao cadre

When the bombing became heavy with T-28 airplanes and many kinds of jets bombing the forests in the vicinity of the villages, it was necessary to go live in the forest and to dig holes in which many families lived together. For food it was necessary to work together in teams when the planes were not bombing. When the airplanes came over a lot it meant that there wouldn't be enough rice for everyone.

The holes had to be dug very deeply and on top it was necessary to put broken tree branches.

If the branches were already dry it was necessary to remove them and put on fresh branches. And on the paths in the area it was necessary to place grass after traveling back and forth. If that wasn't done they would be bombed.

During the bombing, if the planes couldn't select a place to bomb, but they saw some animals or people, they would simply drop the bombs on them. This was the primary reason why the refugees fled from the homes of their birth and came here.

Life with the Pathet Lao was difficult because they always accused people of holding allegiance to the Royal Lao Government (RLG). People were always being taken for interrogation. Young men and women were drafted into...
working for the army, into being soldiers or carrying supplies and weapons for
the army. Girls 18 years old and older had to work for the army. What
made it especially oppressive for the refugees was then they were ordered
to move. Sometimes they heard news that the position of their tunnel homes
had been revealed. Then a company of Neo Lao soldiers would come and
order the people to move. Always they moved at night. Whenever they stopped they had to dig holes in
which to hide. Sometimes they tunneled into the tops of mountains. They
had to carry all their food and belongings with them. When the food was
all gone they had to return to their old homes and dig up rice which they
buried in barrels. The constant moving created many problems for the
refugees. They grew sick and tired of working that way, until finally they
decided not to move anymore and they fled to the region controlled by our
government to gain their freedom.

This was the second reason which forced my friends to flee and come
here. The living had been very oppressive on account of the moving, on
account of the living in holes eating in the holes and sleeping in the holes
this way. We could say that the emigration was necessitated equally in these
two ways.

Planting rice had to be done at night. Sometimes the planes would bomb
all night until daylight so there was no opportunity to plant rice. The most
important reason why the refugees had to come here from their villages
must be the bombing.

Also the upland rice fields where the bombs had already fallen had become
entirely covered with ponds and small craters. It was impossible to grow
rice. Also there were "bombi" of the very round kind, so many that they
were almost everywhere. These "bombi" were another important reason why
the search for food was dangerous.

The refugees were sick and tired of the actions of the Meo soldiers because
as they said they were always seeking wealth. Many people said that the Meo
soldiers waged war not to win independence but to win cattle, buffalo and
property of the population. Many parents of refugee children had been killed
by the Meo soldiers. When the refugees arrived in the area controlled by the
Meo soldiers, many of them saw buffalo and cattle which the Meo soldiers had
stolen. Yet it was impossible to claim their livestock because the soldiers
maintained that the buffalo and cattle had been captured from the Vietnamese.

When living with the PL cadres, the people were drafted into working
without pay. Rice, fish and other food was also conscripted. When the refugees
came to the government's side, the Meo soldiers stole their cattle and buffalo
and killed for for eating right in front of their, the refugees', eyes.

To summarize; wickedness was always with the people. The wealthy people
were those who had the power. Lawlessness was present on both sides.

**Education of the children**

With the Pathet Lao the children were not able to study with full
effectiveness because they did not have schools, nor teachers with much
knowledge, nor teaching equipment.

Each student had to pay an instruction fee of 50K/month. The teachers
were selected by their own village when the village saw that the candidate
had sufficient knowledge. He could then compose his own lessons and teach.
Traveling to school had to be done when the airplanes were not bombing,
like very, very early. After nine A.M., the school let out. When traveling
to and from school the children had to add tree branches to their clothing
and wear very drab colors. They absolutely could not wear red or white.

For the adults specifically; Old people also had to go to school under
the trees. But they had "workers" to teach them separately. The workers
really belonged to the NLHS. With the Pathet Lao, the children practiced
the dance "Cooperation," the "Naly" dance,† and many, many others. In

‡After translating this paper I asked the author to explain what was meant by the
term "bombi". He said he had never heard of it before talking with the refugees. They
had explained that the "bombi" were round metal balls dropped by the airplanes. They
were roughly 21 cm in diameter. The refugees said that they were everywhere, in the
villages, in the forests and in the ricefields. When the "bombi" were touched or disturbed
they would explode, sending out many small bullets. The refugees said that the adults
and the older children learned to avoid them but that they were very dangerous for the
little children who didn't know enough not to touch them.

†This is a kind of dance for girls only.
singing the only popular songs were those which cursed all the American imperialists. The habits of the children were to like singing songs to like dancing, and to like working together. It shows how the children have been trained by the Pathet Lao and the training has all been absorbed by the children.

Tactics of the Neo Lao (Hok Sat)

For recruiting young men into serving they had many kinds of psychology. For instance when the young men hold their guns, they have power for freedom and all have thoughts like "Fight against the interfering imperialists." If they are allowed to fight anywhere against those from the government's (RLG) side, they will fight until the others give in, if the others don't give in they won't allow them to escape, if they try to escape they will kill them. There is a certain kind of grass which they call freedom grass or grass against things which have a split leaf like the dok dao heuang leaf* except bigger. It is this leaf which all of the PL soldiers must eat before they wage war. If this leaf is lost and not eaten then their hearts will not be courageous, Their (the PL) object of worship during the time of battle is the rain. If the rain falls they will have good opportunity to win easily because their weapons are most effective when the rain falls.

All of the above is from the real lives of the refugees as related by them. Until up to 1-9-69 the refugees said that they were fleeing from hell. Then they came out of their holes to the region of freedom. The poverty of living, eating and sleeping in the holes, the fear of all the different kinds of bombs dropped by the airplanes, the fatigue of constantly being ordered to move; the conscription into working, the conscription of food by the Neo Lao, all added to the sorrow of these fellow Laotians, who had done no evil but still reaped such misfortune.

The houses where they had always lived and always slept, and the land on which they had always planted their crops, the land where they had spent all of their days, all of the animals which they used to sell to earn profit for their homes were completely bombed. From this damage there remained only many ponds, two or three times a man's in depth. Of trees there remained only a few mango trees and coconut trees. There was left only the remains of the earth which had lost its fertility for growing crops. This like the ruins of the mistreatment of the refugees when the war ended.

Problems of the refugees in their present lives

As normal, living in a new place, different from that where one had always worked and made a living and spent his life, caused problems. Now the refugees have no jobs or if they do, it is at only very low wages, like 200K per day.

Catching fish seems very difficult because the refugees are not used to such large bodies of water. They cannot swim or sail boats. Also, they cannot raise animals with much success because their houses were built too close together. There are many diseases which easily kill the animals. Equipment for living and cooking is sufficient, but there is a great lack of kerosene. The things which interest the refugees are far beneath the dignity and concerns of the local villagers. In response to my questions the refugees said that they now regard themselves as having a very low status.

These are the problems of the refugees at the present time.

D. Letter from a former USAID official, Khammouane Province

October 8, 1970.

Dear —— I first became aware of a fairly high incidence of American bombing in Laos when I first went to Thakhek with IVS in 1965. Even then the jets based in Thailand flew overhead daily to areas north of us. It was later that same year when a large influx of refugees came from Pathet Lao controlled areas to the Thakhek area, where I was involved with a relief and resettlement program for them. I frequently inquired of the

*I checked with the author of this paper on the significance of the "split leaf" and the "dok dao heuang" leaf. He was uncertain of their meaning. They were simply terms used by the refugees in explaining the "freedom grass".*
refugees why they had left their homes to become refugees, I received a wide range of responses, which included, to be sure, the fact that many of them did not like living under the restrictive controls imposed by the Pathet Lao administration. However, the reason many of them gave was that they could no longer stand an existence of living in forests and caves, trying to farm at night, but being unable to light fires at night, because being seen in daylight, or having a fire seen at night subjected them to bombing from jets.

One of my saddest experiences was in talking with an elderly man whom I had come to know as a hard-working resident of one of the villages of refugees I was assisting to resettle. A friend of his had recently arrived from a village near this man's former village to tell of the fate of this man's family. For some reason when this man had left his village, most of his family remained—two married daughters and one married son and their families, living in three adjacent houses. The man had long been expecting that any time his family would come too, to join him in building a new life out of the war. The news his friend brought was that about two years previously two jet airplanes had attacked the village and the three houses of this man's children were destroyed, and all of his relatives killed. Questioning the man who brought the news, I was told that there had been no Pathet Lao soldiers in the vicinity of their village for at least six months prior to the bombing.

In the summer of 1967, while I was still working with the USAID refugee program in Thakhek, a village about 150 miles northeast of Vientiane, but in the other part of the province for which I was responsible, a village I had visited many times, as some refugees from Pathet Lao areas farther east were located there, was bombed by two American jet aircraft. I visited the village three days later to assess the damage for a report to the U.S. Embassy. Though remarkably, only 8 people were killed and 17 wounded, of the 87 houses in the village, 32 were completely destroyed and the remaining ones were damaged beyond repair. A crater, apparently from a 500-pound bomb, was in the geometric center of the village. I am enclosing pictures of what was left of this village, but there was so little left, it's hard to fully visualize the destruction from the pictures. This bombing, by the way, was one of many I know of which was classified as an "accident" since it occurred so near any areas which had at that time been controlled by the Pathet Lao for many years, was the base camp village of no less than four separate Lao-governed and American supported military units, and was near a distinctive limestone outcropping which resembled no other location within 100 miles. Asked how it could have happened the U.S. Air Attache to Laos, who accompanied the group which made reparation payments to the survivors (I was in the group), replied in essence (I can't remember his exact words) that the jets fly so fast, that it is very easy for a pilot to lose track of just where he is! So, he just bombs wherever he happens to be; obviously. Obviously, also, the target was the village, whether it was the right one or not, since virtually all of the bombs, rockets, etc. dropped by the two planes landed in or adjacent to the village. Most of the people killed and injured were caught in the open on the river bank bathing near the village.

Less than a year later, we went again to a village less than one kilometer away from the first one, which had sustained a bombing attack—the area still being in government hands. This time, fortunately, no one was killed—only the Buddhist temple damaged and one water buffalo killed.

After the first of the two above incidents, in a third adjacent village, which was lucky enough to be missed, the Taisseng (hamlet chief) said to me that the village women, particularly, were terrified, and he asked, what can I tell the women so they will not be so afraid?

How would you answer him?

Numerous other times when I was working with refugees I was told of village bombing incidents where innocent villagers were the victims. In one case a village was attacked while having a festival, and all the villagers were gathered in the open in the center of the village. Some 80 people were killed. When told of such incidents, I usually asked if there were any Pathet Lao soldiers in the village at the time, or had been recently. I cannot remember a single instance of a positive response.

At one point, in Thakhek, when discussing the bombing situation with the local CIA representative, who was responsible for a series of Lao guerrilla
units operating in Pathet Lao areas, he said that he had tried everything, including giving the U.S. Air Force in Thailand the exact map coordinates of his teams so they wouldn't be bombed, all to no avail. The bombing was so intense that anyone who lit a fire at night was bombed. He said he had difficulty in convincing these military groups not to light fires at night, because they had difficulty believing that the Americans, for whom they worked, would bomb them.

During most of my last year in Thakhek, 1968, my house rattled steadily every night, caused by the bombs which could be heard in the distance as a long, steady rumble. The only type of aircraft with capability of enough bombs to create such an effect are B-52’s.

To put the picture in the proper context, I quote “the figures of U.S. expenses in Laos as of February, 1969, given by the USAID Director: $52 million dollars for the AID program, of which IVS is a pretty small part; approximately $500 million total, including the military effort. There is little doubt, that while the AID expenditure has remained relatively constant, that the military input has risen. Thus, over 90% of the expense to the U.S. taxpayer of our involvement in Laos goes to a military effort in which probably 90% of the Lao people have no interest and no control over, and the net effect of which is basically to kill Lao people.”

B. Newsletter from a former IVS volunteer, Muong Phalane

February 16, 1967.

DEAR FRIENDS AND FAMILY, I’m sitting here trying to gather my thoughts over a terrible situation. Three and one-half days ago Muong Phalane was bombed by three American 105 jet fighter-bombers. Eighteen 750 pound bombs were dropped and fifteen have so far exploded. Six were immediate impact and the rest were delay action bombs, thus hoping to catch the enemy off guard and unprepared.

The jet planes certainly caught the villagers unprepared. It was 6:45 Monday morning, February 18th, and the children were readying for school while the morning market was forming. The jets came and in a few shocking minutes changed the history, complexion, and people of Muong Phalane.

That morning I was in the city visiting friends during their Vietnamese New Year celebration. I arrived back in Phalane by 10:30 a.m. on the first helicopter into the area. Since that time I have not left the people until now to write you this letter.

This was one of the most difficult periods of my life. I was met with suspicion, distrust and hatred because the people felt that this was my work. They didn’t understand the nature of the mistake. All they understood was their loss — and that this was caused by American jet-bombers. For three days and three nights I talked with the people, slept with them in the forest because of their fright, and shared the meager food we had for meals. It has been difficult for me but more difficult for them — who have lost homes, possessions, fathers and wives. I have spent these days with the people — listening to them, sympathizing with them and answering them when I could. Because I have shared with them in these last three days of crises, I have felt their feelings turn towards accepting me where before there was suspicion, towards living me where before there was mistrust and towards talking with me where before there was acquiescence.

I am involved with these people now and I can feel their pulse — and finally feel my own. It is far from an easy situation — but often now I feel the sentiments of the people with me.

I write this long prologue to the important description because I have been shocked into self-concern. A few hours ago a friend told me that the USAID director in this area will request that I be removed. Apparently, it is this supervisor’s feeling that my ways are not in accord with those of USAID and to get the community rebuilt would best be done by someone who would carry out the dictates of USAID. I have become too involved with the people to be useful. It has taken me, eight months to work through my own personality barriers to where I can understand, participate with the people and anticipate their feelings — and now he will request that I be replaced. Once again the gap and seemingly unbridgeable distance between administrator and field work is visible — and what happens to the people?... they learn to survive.
From break of day
Till sunset glow
I toil.
I dig my well,
I plow my field,
And earn my food and drink.
What care
Who rules the land
If I
Am left in peace?

Anonymous (Chinese, 2300 B.C.)

Taken from the Peace Calendar published by the War Resister’s League.

I had to use a crow-bar to break into my house. When I finally got in to get my camera I glanced at my desk and saw the Peace Calendar. Bitter irony. I picked up the camera and quickly ran out of the house. The war has come to Muong Phalane. I could taste the tears and see the hurt in reddened eyes. God damn it!

What was I doing? Why couldn’t I have been here? If I had been here the people would not hate me so . . .

Now I sit on the steps of my house in a deserted town. I don’t have to fight for my privacy now—everyone has left because the bombs have come.

The war came to Phalane today. This morning, three 105 jet fighter-bombers flew over Phalane, each dropping six 750 pound bombs. The power was frightening and the damage was awesome. It’s something most Americans need to experience to see how inhuman and out of scale war has become—but most likely we will remain ignorant and irresponsible.

When I arrived in Phalane the people were still in shock, half having fled to the forests, some wandering around consoling each other, some sitting—staring, and some beginning to get angry. I arrived with some Lao generals and a USAF demolition crew and it was strange to see the emotional conflict the villagers were going through—feeling unfriendly, worn, abused, and growing hostile, yet having to kowtow and show humility with these important men. With me, whom they knew, they could begin to be freer, more open and less tolerant. It was hard to believe those whom I had considered my friends now viewing me with such suspicion and hatred—why did I leave; they asked? Why did the jet planes bomb Muong Phalane? Had I been here the jet planes would not have come, they said. Some took me and showed me where their houses had been, where their father was buried, where their roof was in shambles, where they had lost all their possessions and had nothing. Some just glared at me. The children were without smiles and greetings. They had grown up quickly.

I walked through the village with the people—they half telling me what happened, half demanding to know why. Together, we looked at the huge bomb craters and the ruins that had once been their homes. As we walked around they explained, the tragedy of each bomb hole.

“Here is where my family slept and my wife is still buried. What will I do with my young child who is still breast-feeding?”

“My wife was on the front porch and I was still resting with my child inside the house when the jet planes came and the bombs dropped. One bomb dropped next to the porch throwing rocks and injuring my wife—but it did not explode. I have much luck.”

After we walked around looking at the craters, ruins and holes where the unexploded bombs had buried themselves, the demolition experts said that only about one-third of the bombs had exploded and that the rest would soon explode. The people soon realized the danger and we all realized how lucky we had been that the bombs did not explode as we were looking at them—which was their purpose. The area was evacuated and as the teacher, the one with much luck, and I walked away we heard a tremendous blast, looked in the direction of his house, saw the great burst of dirt flying and ran helplessly, defenselessly, not knowing where to hide, cloths of dirt falling around us. Luckily we were not hurt. I looked at him and saw he was speechless on the verge of tears, then, finally looking at me and saying, “I have lost all, I have nothing.”
The village was quickly evacuated and the people left for nearby villages and a dry riverbed where most would sleep. That day jets kept coming overhead and prolonging the fright. I left for a nearby soldiers camp and runway where the injured were taken. Two had died, about 15 were injured and about 30 houses were destroyed. It could have been much worse. The village was lucky. The injured were soon taken by USAF helicopters to a hospital in Karat, Thailand. The care was fast and efficient—but the villagers could only feel their losses.

I went to the riverbed to see and talk with the villagers that had fled. They had brought what they could carry on their backs and this was their new home. I tried to take pictures but I was told by the villagers to put my camera away. They were angry and did not want their poverty exposed.

I came back to the riverbed that afternoon with half a sack of rice and all the food in my house. My food and possessions were theirs. We slept together, shared our blankets and our food—and we have continued to share for three days and nights. They were surprised and grateful for me sharing their misfortune—and so they shared their feelings and fears. These people are still afraid to light fires at night to warm themselves because they are afraid the jets will see them. When the jets are heard voices are hushed and people are tight with fear. These people will not return to Phalane until the bombs are removed. Eight bombs have since exploded leaving two bombs still left in the center of the village. The demolition experts say it might be two weeks before the buried bombs can be reached and detonated.

The people will survive. This disaster has united many—many in suffering, many in fear, many in suspicion, some in hatred. The people have lost their peace and the Americans have lost the people.

I hope I will be able to stay here and share with you what more I learn and see.

(Signed) LEO SITZER.

DIRECT DOCUMENTATION

F. Transcript of Interview with Refugees from Phone Savan and Khang Khay Region of Lao—May 22, 1970 as recorded by Fred Brantman:

I'm in a second story room in the Lao capital of Vientiane. With me are 5 refugees from the American bombing. The contradiction here is that the Americans say that there has been no bombing of villages by American planes. Yet these 5 have been bombed and were villagers before their villages were in part or totally destroyed. The noises outside are the everpresent motor scooters of Vientiane. The first refugee with whom I'm speaking is a good-looking young fellow of 24 with longish hair from the town of Kau... from the town of Khang Khay.

Q. Where do you come from? (spoken in Lao)

A. He says he comes from Ban Son which is 5 kilometers out of Khang Khay.

Q. Do you recall the approximate time of year or the month in which your town was first bombed?

A. He says that he can't remember exactly the time of the month and the year and all that, but they began first in 1964... to bomb his village.

Q. Were the planes which bombed your village jet planes or motordriven planes? (Note: interviewer mentioning jet planes not translated at this point.)

A. The first planes to come were the T28s, propeller-driven planes.

Q. You were saying that the first planes to come were motordriven, T28s, do you recall whether they had on them the Lao insignia or the American insignia?

A. He says he doesn’t know what the letters are but they weren't Lao letters.

Q. They were not Lao letters, O.K. Since that time in 1964, up until the time you left your village, do you know how many airplanes, about how many times was your village bombed?

A. He says he can't count how many...

Q. But by that do you mean 5 times, 10 times, 100 times?

A. He says that they can't say how many because it was just so changeable. Sometimes, very few would come by, they wouldn't bomb that much. Sometimes, they wouldn't bomb at all, and sometimes they would bomb 4 or 5 times in one day. So you can't add up the total bombing.
Q. Do we know how many total days approximately... What I'm wondering is whether it was 10 or 1000.
A. He says in one month it might be 10 times or 15 times... I said, "Well, would that hold for 1969?" He said in 1969 it was every day. Sometimes in 1 day it might come 10 times, we couldn't eat our rice at all... couldn't eat food at all.
Q. Why, why.
A. Well, it's more of an expression...
Q. Because they were interrupted so often...
A. Yeah, the planes were just coming.
Q. O.K. Is your town near the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail?
A. It's near route 13... It's up near... it has nothing to do with the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
Q. How far... how far... how far is route 13 from the Ho Chi Minh Trail?
A. It's near route 7.
Q. O.K. How far is route 7? About how many kilometers?
A. He says he doesn't know.
Q. Well, I'll look it up on the map. You say the markings on the jets were the same emblem as the markings that you had seen on the T28s through all those earlier years since 1964?
A. (Interpreter) He said in 1964. Because of the jets started coming. In 1964 was T28s, in 1965, jets.
Q. Oh, I thought you said 1969.
A. No.
Q. You say in 1965 the jets began to come and they had the same emblem as the T28s, the motor driven planes that you had seen the year before.
A. Yes.
Q. What did that emblem look like?
A. I asked him if he could write it for us... he said that he can't write it. He only knows 2 letters: U.S.
A. (writes out the emblem)
Q. Uh huh. Was there any star or any circle or just "USA"? or a square or hexagon?
A. (draws a picture)
Q. It was not like this? Not that? But this? The emblem that has been written here is "USA": by this gentleman.
A. Many white kinds of lines, coming from a star.
Q. Now how many folks actually lived in your village?
A. About 10 houses, 40 or 50 people.
Q. About 10 houses, 40 or 50 people. Were any of those people during the six years of the bombing hurt in any way by the bombs?
A. He says in the general area of Ban Son, there were about 20 people who died.
Q. And how many lived in that general area which he described?
A. About 600 people.
Q. That'd be about how many houses?
A. (Interpreter) You can figure about 6 people to a house.
Q. Say of the 30, rather 20 who died of the 600 in the area of his will go... Of the 100 to 150 houses in that area were any of those houses damaged or destroyed?
A. By 1969 there was not a single house standing.
Q. That wasn't patched up in some way?
A. He says if you looked, you only saw the red earth, nothing standing.
Q. Well where did the people live?
A. They would go to live in the forest and caves in the side of a mountain.
Q. Were any children injured, of the 600 how many do you think were injured?
A. About... over 40 people were injured.
Q. 40 people, plus the 20 killed, so we have 60 injured and 20 killed. What of the 60 people killed and injured, were most of them old people, or were they Pathet Lao soldiers or were they children? Or were they simply men working in the fields during the day and not working for the Pathet Lao?
A. He says, well, he can't say, you know about their ages, they were like all ages. But, as far as soldiers, they never saw any soldiers get killed by the bombing. They never saw a Pathet Lao soldier die.
Q. Why was that?
A. He says that they were in their own area and the villagers were in a different area. And they never saw any soldiers, the soldiers were off in the forest.

Q. Were, did, ... then did these people who were killed, do I understand you're telling me, that they had nothing to do with the war at all?
A. He says he doesn't know, nothing about the war ... all he know is about these 20 people was that they were simple villagers, just farmers, they didn't have guns. He says as far as the soldiers go that's the soldiers' business, I don't know anything about soldiers.

Q. What sort of bombs were dropped? Were they the CBU's or were they explosive impact bombs?
A. Every kind of bomb ... big 500 lb. bombs, they used napalm. There were machine guns. Napalm.

Q. Napalm, also. Now how did the people come to die? When the bombs hit them directly, or when the napalm burned them or when the bullets struck them and they died later?
A. The majority died immediately.

Q. These 20 that died . . .
A. He said they were badly wounded they would die immediately ... If they were badly hit, they would die immediately ... If they were badly wounded they would go to the hospital and then they would die.

Q. ... Now of the 20 who were killed, how many do you think were under 12 years old?
A. He says about 8 or 9 out of the 20.

Q. Why did so many children die? ... out of that percentage?
A. He says, well, one reason is the children didn't have much strength. So, if there was a concussion or something, the blood would start coming ... they're not like a big man with a system that could withstand that. The blood would just come out and they would die. And also the children would be running around playing and couldn't make it back to the holes. It was harder to control them.

Q. O.K. Were there old people also who died? People who were over 50, let's say 60 years old?
A. The old men were like the children, they didn't have good health. And also some of them couldn't hear the bombs or the planes coming sometimes. So they might not make it back to the holes.

Q. What sort of holes did people run to when bombs came?
A. He says there were every kind of holes. He can't describe them. Some were big. Some were small. If a plane came, they might just go to the nearest hiding place. It depends where they were.

Q. They would go to the nearest hole.
A. And this other man said sometimes they would go inside of a mountain or a hill.

Q. Did the Pathet Lao ever come, I gather from what he said before that the Pathet Lao never came to his village, that they were some distance from it. Did the people ever wonder why they were being bombed?
A. He says during that period, they couldn't think. They were, very afraid. They hated just like that.

Q. Did you think it was the Lao bombing you or did you think it was the Americans?
A. He says at that time we didn't know who it was but the Pathet Lao would tell us that it was the Americans.

Q. When did they see the Pathet Lao?
A. They would come to talk to us in the village, propaganda talks in the village.

Q. When did you leave your native village?
A. He said near the 10th month.

Q. That would be this past October about of '69.
A. About . . . he said the 9th month near the 10th. (Interpreter: that would be in September, 1960)

Q. I'm now turning to the second of the refugees. He's of slighter build, a darker skin, with alert brown eyes, and is 18 years old.

Q. Could you tell me what village you come from?
A. Ban Fat.

Q. Though you are younger than your brother, do you also recall the bombing?
A. He says, yes, I remember.