plaster purchases on the local market. As the capability of the Ministry of Social Welfare to manage and administer the refugee and social welfare programs has grown over the years, the need for U.S. advisers has decreased steadily. The remaining staff of the CORDS War Victims Directorate will serve primarily as advisers to the Ministry in Saigon on matters of policy development and project planning. Small advisory staffs will remain in the Regions to backstop and assist the Vietnamese provincial social welfare staffs. However, it may be necessary to revise these plans which were made before the present crisis developed.

The dollar value of the Title II Food for Peace Program shipments decreased from $10.0 million in FY 71 to $5.0 million in FY 72 and was programmed for FY 73 at the level of $7.0 million. Prior stockpiles are being drawn on to meet the present crisis, and we are planning to increase these supplies as may be needed.

The American Aid Chapter budget for the Ministry of Social Welfare which is funded from counterpart funds generated by the AID Commodity Import Program increased from VN $3.7 billion for OY 70 and 71 to VN $4.0 billion for CY 72. At the same time the Ministry's own budget from the GVN has increased from VN $500 million in 1970 to VN $1.2 billion in 1972.

WAR VETERANS BENEFITS

After several years of preparation, the National Assembly of Vietnam adopted, and the President promulgated in July of 1970, a comprehensive law providing pensions and benefits for war veterans, their widows, their orphans, and their dependent parents.

Under this law, retired soldiers (including members of the Regional and Popular Forces) receive pensions which are graded in relation to their last rank and pay and their length of service.

Disabled veterans receive allowances equal to their salary while in military service multiplied by the percentage of their disability plus the full allowances for wives and children which they received while in active service. In addition, they receive free medical and hospital care, free vocational training, and preference in public and private employment, and a number of other benefits.

Widows, orphans and dependent parents of the military receive allowances graded according to the last rank and pay of the deceased soldier. In addition, they receive the same medical, educational and employment benefits as the disabled veterans.

As of April 1972, over 700,000 persons—32,000 retired soldiers, 103,000 widows, 410,000 orphans, 100,000 dependent parents and 65,000 disabled veterans—were receiving the benefits to which they are entitled.

The entire budget of the Ministry of War Veterans is funded from the GVN's own budget. It amounted to 20 billion plasters in CY 1971 and will be increased to 20.3 billion plasters for 1972. Under the Foreign Assistance Act, AID is prohibited from making financial contributions to veterans programs anywhere. However, AID is providing some technical assistance to the Veterans' Ministry to help them to improve their organization and administrative procedures.

SOCIAL WELFARE

As I mentioned earlier, there are a substantial number of other war victims whose needs stem directly from the war, or from more indirect causes of the war. Of particular concern among these are the civilian war widows, orphans and disabled who are not eligible for benefits under the War Veterans' Law.

Since 1965, the urgency and magnitude of the refugee problem and emergency needs resulting from enemy attacks and natural disasters have placed overwhelming demands upon the material resources and personnel available to the Ministry of Social Welfare (MSW). Moreover, social welfare needs have traditionally been met within the extended family which has a strong sense of responsibility for its members. Consequently, there was no established pattern of public social welfare services, and it has been only recently that the GVN has begun to consider what practical measures might be initiated to alleviate the most urgent needs and facilitate the social rehabilitation of civilian widows and their children, orphans and the disabled. The MSW, with assistance from
the U.S. and other sources, has been developing programs aimed at strengthening its social welfare capabilities, as well as improving and expanding existing social welfare services and experimenting with pilot projects under both public and voluntary agency auspices.

A four-year plan

For the first time this year, the GVN has replaced its annual "Community Defense and Local Development Plan" with a four-year plan covering the period from 1972 through 1975. It sets out program goals and plans for implementation not just for one year but for four. Along with the plans of all other Ministries, a four-year plan for the Ministry of Social Welfare is included in this document. While only a modest beginning, this is at least a first step towards planning for the longer range welfare needs of the disadvantaged people in Vietnam, something the U.S. advisers have urged on the GVN for a long time.

Expansion of child welfare programs

Approximately six months ago A.I.D. advised the GVN that it was prepared to allocate 547 million piasters in counterpart funds for the implementation of a plan calling for expansion of existing and the initiation of new child welfare programs. The detailed plans for the first portion of this program were approved on April 1. They cover an increase in the assistance to day care centers and an expansion of day care services, particularly for children of war widows, to enable mothers to work or take needed training. Additionally, the program provides for an increase in government assistance to officially recognized orphanages, improvement of facilities for juvenile offenders, vocational classes for orphans, additional training for child and family welfare workers, social services for maternity hospitals to prevent abandonment of newborn babies, and funds to assist in mobilizing Vietnamese voluntary agencies and private resources in support of programs for widows and orphans.

Expansion of services for the disabled

In addition to expansion of the facilities and services of the National Rehabilitation Institute, which has increased production or repair and fitting of artificial limbs from a monthly rate of 24 in 1965 to 860 per month now, U.S. assistance enabled the Ministry of Social Welfare to initiate a vocational rehabilitation program for the disabled and the blind in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and the National Rehabilitation Institute. Under a contract with the World Rehabilitation Fund, a team of vocational rehabilitation specialists has assisted the Ministry in establishing on a pilot basis, a regional referral center in Danang and has trained Vietnamese personnel to staff the center. The objective is to provide a link between the range of services required for rehabilitation and the disabled who need such services. To this end, the Danang Center will provide counseling for vocational training in the technical training school under the Ministry of Education and assist in subsequent job placement. The WRF team is also advising MOE vocational training schools in the adaptation of training programs and facilities to accommodate the needs of the disabled.

Food for Peace Program

The Food for Peace Program is reaching a total of 1,525,800 children, war victims, Montagnards and patients of maternal and child health programs. Of this total, 922,000 Vietnamese children are receiving supplementary feeding through school lunch programs, orphanages, and day care centers. Dried milk, wheat flour, corn soya milk, bulgar wheat, and vegetable oil valued at $9.5 million from existing stockpiles and current shipments are being distributed this fiscal year. A somewhat larger amount will probably be made available next year. A supplementary program is now being prepared in light of the emergency requirements resulting from the current enemy offensive.

The PL-480 Title II program in Vietnam, by its very nature, was born within the adversity of war. While efforts were made to administer the urgently needed food assistance under the strict programming and control procedures established by the Act and applied everywhere else in the world, it soon became evident that in most areas of Vietnam the program had to operate under the crisis conditions of a country at war. The aim was to provide food on an emergency basis to sustain Vietnamese whose normal patterns of livelihood were disrupted by the
military conflict, and to assist hundreds of thousands of needy Vietnamese who, as a result of the war, disease, or other factors, were unable to provide for their basic food needs.

The most difficult area in the administration of the Title II program in Vietnam turned out to be that of programming agricultural commodities far in advance of the actual call-forward, shipment and distribution.

Large quantities of all available commodities had to be programmed to meet not only actual, known, and foreseeable needs, but also to maintain in the program pipeline, and in storage in country, sufficient quantities of food so that in emergencies like the Tet offensive of 1968, the mass movement of refugees from Cambodia in 1970, and the present offensive, the Vietnamese would not go hungry. Such emergencies have disrupted time and again the receipt, storage, and distribution of foodstuffs; and every time their impact lingered long after the immediate crisis had passed.

Under such circumstances, it was unavoidable that at times there were not enough commodities in transit or in storage in country to meet the demand of a sudden emergency, and at other times there were larger quantities of certain commodities in storage in certain areas than the distribution apparatus could handle or than were needed to satisfy the needs of those entitled to receive them.

When serious deficiencies in the program were uncovered by both internal and external audits, shipments were reduced in an attempt to correct these deficiencies. As rapidly as conditions permitted, we have progressively directed our Title II activities toward a more tightly programmed and controlled system.

On occasion, surplus foods were spoiled in warehouses, although these quantities were minor in proportion to the magnitude of the quantities that were shipped—probably less than 3 million dollars worth out of a total of more than 100 million dollars worth shipped since 1966. To those who have highlighted these losses, I would say that their criticism would have been much louder and far more justified if people had gone hungry during the various emergencies because supplies in country were insufficient at the moment they were needed.

Unquestionably, sizable quantities were distributed to persons who were technically not eligible, were improperly used by recipients, or were pilfered. Considering the fact that in Vietnam several million people fall legitimately into the category of "needy persons", not even an army of auditors and monitors could oversee the program in such a way that the end-use of these commodities is always properly controlled.

We hope that once the present crisis has passed, the Title II program in Vietnam will no longer be an emergency program. In FY 1971 and 1972, total tonnage and number of recipients have been substantially reduced as increased security reduced the need. This reduction has been attained closely to GVN's and U.S. Voluntary Agencies administrative capabilities. In addition, certain commodities have been eliminated. For example, cornmeal, rolled oats, and rolled wheat were not acceptable to most of the Vietnamese as a food and were being diverted to other purpuses. Further, vegetables, which was considered to pilgerage, is now being supplied under the Title I program where it is handled by commercial importers for sale in normal commercial channels. Tighter controls and extensive monitoring have been instituted to prevent not only misuse of commodities but also the possibility of the recurrence of overstocking and spoilage. While the overall size of the program has been reduced, certain components have actually been increased. For instance, pre-school and school lunch programs are now rapidly expanding, and the distribution of commodities to the Montagnards is growing steadily.

Voluntary agencies

As previously reported to this Subcommittee, the U.S. assistance to the GVN in the social welfare area is augmented by the programs of over 30 American and other foreign voluntary agencies and International voluntary organizations, as well as significant technical and material aid provided by the United Nations and UNICEF, and through contributions from a number of other free world countries that are not involved in military aid.

Constraints on expansion of social welfare services

It is true that the social welfare needs in South Vietnam exceed by far current resources. As the members of this Committee know only too well, this is a
situation which prevails in practically every country, including the United States. In Vietnam, the needs are especially great, in part because of the war, and in part because Vietnam is a country with an average annual per capita income of only $175. However, it would be of no benefit to the Vietnamese to encourage them to adopt programs which they will not be able to support themselves a few years from now. Compared with other countries, the United States has been and continues to be extremely generous in supporting humanitarian and refugee needs around the world; but in the light of other demands, both domestic and foreign, it is necessary that social welfare, which will add to the Vietnamese budget in future years, be closely related to the over-all economic prospects of that country. The Government of Vietnam is fully conscious of these implications and we believe is planning its program with appropriate caution.

Critics who believe that the GVN is not doing enough in this field must bear in mind that, quite apart from budgetary considerations, Vietnam is a country with no tradition of and prior experience with public and private social welfare programs. Considering these restraints, we believe that the Ministry of Social Welfare, which was organized only a few years ago, is doing a good job in meeting the short-term welfare needs, and an increasingly good job in addressing the longer term welfare needs of Vietnam.

CIVILIAN HEALTH AND WAR-RELATED CASUALTY PROGRAM

I would like now to turn to the civilian war casualties problem, which also has been of continuing concern to us and to this committee. As in the case of the refugee program, the current North Vietnamese offensive undoubtedly is causing an increase of civilian casualties.

However, rapid changes in the situation make it very difficult to provide comprehensive statistics. I can say that all reports indicate that the Vietnamese Government through the Ministries of Health and Social Welfare is doing a remarkable job in meeting emergency requirements. As I indicated earlier, the Special Relief and Reconstruction Committee is preparing a team of National Police, Rural Development Cadre, Public Health, Social Welfare, Education, Information Service, Agriculture, and Engineer officials to enter An Loc when security permits to handle emergency needs and start getting the city back on its feet.

It has been reported that approximately 600 wounded civilians were in An Loc which, as you know, has been sealed off by the enemy. Later reports indicate that the hospital there has been destroyed by North Vietnamese artillery fire, so at this moment we are unsure of the situation there. In the north, the hospital patients in Hue are being evacuated to Danang, and additional bed space is being prepared in the hospitals in Danang, Qui Nhon, and as far south as Bien Hoa. Our program for prepositioning stocks of medical supplies and food has thus far been meeting the serious requirements. Obviously, as the magnitude of the problem increases additional support will be needed and steps are being taken to meet the need.

In addition, the MOH has formed an emergency committee to review and make recommendations for providing additional medical assistance as required. This committee is in daily contact with USAID Public Health. It is reported that MOH personnel continue to meet the health needs of the large numbers of displaced persons in temporary reception centers throughout the country. MOH mobile health teams are providing basic medical care where needed and are making recommendations to improve health and sanitation in the new refugee camps. Immunizations are being given. Insofar as can be determined, no serious health problems have been encountered, and only minor diarrheas and upper respiratory illnesses are evident. Casualties are receiving care in provincial hospitals. I regret that our senior USAID Public Health official is not available in Washington for these hearings, but under the critical circumstances, it was felt that the present emergency required his continued presence in Vietnam.

Civilian war casualty statistics

Setting aside the current situation for the moment, since 1968 there has been a steady decline in the number of civilian war casualties admitted to hospitals, while the total number of general admissions to these hospitals for all causes has increased. While it is virtually impossible to obtain precise statistics as to
the total number of civilian war casualties in Vietnam, our present source of data, hospital admissions which identify civilian war casualties, is the most reliable because of the difficulty we have for reporting the number of civilian casualties.

To illustrate the trend (see Table 3, attached) civilian war casualties reported for 1971 were 39,365 as compared to 84,482 in 1968. At the same time, hospital admissions from all causes were 597,423 in 1971 as compared to 466,972 in 1968.

**Progress in the delivery of GVN health services**

Through the combined efforts of the GVN and the U.S. Government, and assistance from American and International Voluntary Agencies, significant progress has been evident in the development of the GVN capability to deliver medical care to the Vietnamese people and in the formulation of health programs with long range benefit. Because of the war, medical care and the critical need for training health personnel, priority has been placed upon curative medicine by the Ministry of Health.

Since the early 1960's, AID has provided funds for the construction of eight new hospitals, the major renovation of eleven others, the provision of 28 surgical suites and the construction of more than 170 district Maternity-Infantery-Dispensaries, 370 village and 400 hamlet Maternity-Dispensaries. This accomplishment has significantly alleviated much of the crowded conditions in hospitals during the past five years, since more than 4,000 new beds were added during that period.

In the past, USAID has supported U.S. or other Third Country medical personnel in all provinces and some autonomous city hospitals caring for civilian war casualties. The reduced level of casualties, joint utilization of military and civilian hospitals, increased outputs of professional and auxiliary health workers trained in the U.S., supported Schools of Medicine and Dentistry, plus USAID advisory services to nursing, laboratory and other para-medical training institutions has permitted a reduction in our staffing requirements. As a result, it has been possible to reduce the medical teams and U.S. direct-hire personnel formerly required to augment the Ministry of Health staffing of civilian hospitals.

One of the most significant developments has been the success of the Joint Utilization Program, which was inaugurated in September 1969. It provides for the joint staffing of 26 provincial hospitals with Ministry of Health and Vietnamese Army medical personnel, both professional and paramedical. In addition to the regular MOH civilian staffing, over 2,000 military personnel including approximately 125 military doctors are presently assigned to MOH hospitals to compensate for the staffing shortage of MOH personnel. The success of this GVN undertaking has also made possible joint staffing in at least 135 district health facilities.

Medical commodities for civilian medical care continue to be furnished through the U.S. Army Medical Depot, Ryukyu Islands, with AID and Defense Department funds. Approximately fifty percent of the USAID-funded support of the Public Health Sector Program is for medical logistics. The GVN has not been able to assume a significant share of the logistics costs essential for providing adequate supplies needed in the treatment of the civilian sick and war casualties. We are, however, working closely with the GVN to assist them in developing the existing drug manufacture and processing capabilities, both in the Ministry of Health and in the private sector. Although GVN funding for health programs has increased each year, funds made available from the national budget have thus far been inadequate to meet the total needs of the civilian health program. Nevertheless, the MOH budget for medical supplies reflects a sharp increase from VN $384,000,000 in CY 71 to approximately VN $1,328,000,000 in CY 72 for medical supply procurement through Vietnamese channels.

Medical equipment maintenance training courses have been established at the MOH Medical Logistics Center to provide the hospitals with a medical equipment and plant maintenance capability. In addition, the Logistics Center is providing class room and on-the-job training for Vietnamese personnel in higher echelon maintenance and repair of medical and medical-related equipment. It is anticipated that in about four years sufficient numbers of technicians will have been graduated to meet the basic requirement for maintenance technicians at MOH hospitals and depot facilities.
Ministry of Health Four-Year Health Plan

Completion of the Ministry of Health Four-Year Health Plan, which is based on an assessment of the Ministry's capabilities and resources, is a major step forward in the "Vietnamization" of the Health Program. This plan enables the Ministry to specify the type of assistance required to meet priority needs rather than rely on outside assessments of MOH needs. The plan, which was officially implemented at the national level in January 1972, is scheduled to move into full operation on July 1, 1972, when plans will have been completed for each province. Since the cost of the plan will outstrip resources at the start, the plan will initially be used to determine priorities rather than to establish goals to be achieved within specific time frames. The inventory and evaluation work completed to date for the plan has been invaluable assistance to the MOH in shifting its resources to meet the present emergency.

In summary, because of the increased GVN staffing capability, it has been possible to shift the primary AID effort from an operational to an advisory role and to focus our attention on those health priorities which have long-term benefit to the Vietnamese people, such as medical and dental education, preventive medicine, and family planning. Dollar funding from the AID budget amounted to $19.6 million in FY 71, $124 million in FY 72 and is programmed at $9.4 million in FY 73 (see Table 4, attached). Among the reasons for this reduction is the reduction in the number of U.S. advisers from 124 at the end of FY 71 to a programmed number of 89 by the end of FY 73. This is possible because of the steadily increasing capability of the Ministry of Health to staff and fund the operational jobs formerly performed by U.S. personnel. I assure you that the Health Sector Program, which includes support for the care and treatment of civilian war casualties, remains a high priority technical assistance program. We intend to provide continued assistance as may be required for this important effort, and as in the case of the refugee program, we may have to reassess the requirements for support when the full impact of the present situation is assessed.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I emphasize our concern, which we know you share, for the toll this war has taken of the human resources of Vietnam. We do feel the Government of Vietnam has come a long way towards developing a full sense of responsibility for the unfortunate civilians caught in the cross fire of battle. It is quite true that the Programs do not fully satisfy all requirements, but they are improving, surely and steadily. We appreciate the continued interest of this Committee which has contributed so much to the progress made.

TABLE 1.—REFUGEE SUMMARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Newly registered refugees</th>
<th>Refugees returned home</th>
<th>Refugees paid resettlement benefits</th>
<th>Refugees in temporary status at end of year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 1967</td>
<td>1,678,000</td>
<td>325,000</td>
<td>643,000</td>
<td>810,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>463,000</td>
<td>315,000</td>
<td>137,000</td>
<td>746,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>114,000</td>
<td>104,000</td>
<td>82,000</td>
<td>226,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1,478,000</td>
<td>386,000</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>114,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>192,000</td>
<td>186,000</td>
<td>784,000</td>
<td>754,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>283,000</td>
<td>283,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>91,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,612,000</td>
<td>2,086,000</td>
<td>2,086,000</td>
<td>2,086,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Registered for out-of-camp benefits.
2 Refugees generated in prior years but registered this year for out-of-camp or return-to-village benefits.
3 Includes 100,000 in process of receiving return-to-village allowances.

Nortei USAID
### TABLE 2.—REFUGEE AND SOCIAL WELFARE FUNDING SUMMARY, BY FISCAL YEARS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. In millions of U.S. dollars</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AID budget</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Law 480 title II (as programmed)</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. volunteer agencies</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donors</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. In millions of Vietnam piastres

|                     |             |             |             |             |                |               |
| GVN budget         | 507.4       | 424.8       | 896.8       | 1,026.6     | 1,200.0        | ( )           |
| Counterpart funds  | 2,360.0     | 3,351.2     | 3,787.8     | 3,717.0     | 5,000.0        | ( )           |
| Total              | 2,867.4     | 3,776.0     | 4,684.6     | 4,743.6     | 6,200.0        |               |

1 Unknown.

### TABLE 3.—HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS SUMMARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>All causes totals</th>
<th>Civilian war casualties</th>
<th>GVN hospital</th>
<th>U.S. military hospital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>473,140</td>
<td>48,734</td>
<td>46,783</td>
<td>1,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>456,972</td>
<td>84,492</td>
<td>76,702</td>
<td>7,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>526,772</td>
<td>67,767</td>
<td>59,223</td>
<td>6,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>574,124</td>
<td>50,982</td>
<td>46,247</td>
<td>4,685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>597,402</td>
<td>39,395</td>
<td>38,395</td>
<td>1,977</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 4.—HEALTH PROGRAM FUNDING SUMMARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>U.S. AID/PH</th>
<th>VNE$2</th>
<th>GVN/MOH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>$27,602</td>
<td>980,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>20,368</td>
<td>3,135,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>19,566</td>
<td>3,950,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>19,566</td>
<td>4,700,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 (estimated)</td>
<td>12,400</td>
<td>7,500,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973 (proposed)</td>
<td>9,400</td>
<td></td>
<td>( )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 GVN fiscal year is on calendar year basis.
2 Unknown.

Senator Kennedy. Perhaps we could talk a little bit about the present situation and what is being done for the new refugees. You say there are 700,000 refugees since April 1, is that correct?

Mr. Nooter. That is correct.

Senator Kennedy. This does not include the number of refugees that have been displaced within the occupied areas, such as we heard this morning, does it?

Mr. Nooter. These are the new refugees caused by the military actions that have taken place since April 1. They are in addition to the refugees who were in camps, some of them for a number of
years, particularly in the northern part of South Vietnam. Something in the neighborhood of 150,000 persons were considered refugees prior to these recent happenings. In addition, some 600,000 had returned to their villages but were still receiving resettlement benefits from the government.

Senator KENNEDY. But there have been 700,000 new refugees since April 1?

Mr. NOOTER. That is correct.

Senator KENNEDY. And that is in government territory?

Mr. NOOTER. Obviously these are estimates at this time, but it would include, as I understand it, the refugees that are in government territory as well as the estimates of those people who have been displaced from their homes and may not be in government territory. Some of this territory is a little difficult to define.

Senator KENNEDY. Could you give us a breakdown? You have some that are refugees within the government territory, and others who are in Viet-Cong territories. How do you break that down?

Mr. NOOTER. Perhaps Mr. Firnstahl can help us on that.

Do you have the breakdowns there?

Mr. FIRNSTAHL. We are showing 558,000 refugees in I Corps, in the north, of which 290,000 are in Quang Tri Province, 3,000 in Quang Nam, 9,000 in Quang Tin, 35,000 in Quang Ngai, and 200,000 in Thua Thien. By and large these represent people who have fled to the government areas. That is also true of the 90,000 in II Corps, the 53,000 in III Corps, and the 11,000 in IV Corps.

Senator KENNEDY. They were all in government territories!

Mr. FIRNSTAHL. Yes.

Senator FONG. You figure that two out of three have moved!

Mr. FIRNSTAHL. Two out of three people have moved out of Quang Tri province.

Senator FONG. And the other one-third remain?

Mr. FIRNSTAHL. The other one-third either remain or have moved in some way of which the government is not aware, moved in with their families or some relatives perhaps. They do not show up in the statistics.

Senator FONG. How many do you have at Quang Tri?

Mr. FIRNSTAHL. Quang Tri, 5,700.

Senator FONG. How do you know when the people have moved?

Mr. FIRNSTAHL. The district people report them to provincial headquarters.
Senator Fong. Which people are we referring to as having been reported?

Mr. FirostaHL. Down in the provinces and the villages and the hamlets. When a hamlet is destroyed, or is moved and reported to the district headquarters, the district headquarters notifies the province, and these appear on the provincial monthly reports.

Senator Fong. And they are taken care of by the government?

Mr. FirnstaHL. That is right, sir.

Senator Fong. In other words, two out of three people who live in Quang Tri were taken care of by the government after they moved?

Mr. FirnstaHL. Two out of three people who lived in Quang Tri moved into the government controlled areas in Thua Thien Province.

Senator Fong. The government is now taking care of them?

Mr. FirnstaHL. Yes, sir.

Senator Fong. So the government is taking care of those 700,000?

Mr. FirnstaHL. They are all receiving some sort of benefits, and they are in government controlled areas.

Senator Kennedy. What sort of benefits are they receiving?

Mr. FirnstaHL. In Hue, there are about six feeding stations where people can be fed and housed. In Danang there now are about 104. In addition, there are ten major camps in Danang which are housing the refugees and feeding them as they come from the north. We had used pre-positioned Public Law 480 food commodities and medical supplies. These camps are generally run by a combination of Buddhists, Catholics, Ministry of Social Welfare people, and the general population of the cities.

Senator Fong. Can you tell us whether any refugee who needs help will get that help?

Mr. FirostaHL. Yes, sir, help is available in each of those camps for anybody who wishes it. You do not have to be registered, you can just show up.

Senator Fong. Is there enough food to help them?

Mr. Firmstahl. We have sufficient supplies for everyone in I Corps at this time. We have 30 days' supply of Public Law 480 relief food, and more than a 30 days' supply of rice at this time, with more on the way.

Senator Fong. Much of this help will be furnished by the South Vietnamese Government?

Mr. FirnstaHL. Almost all of it is. We help sometimes in the logistics process of getting the stuff there. But the actual operation of the centers and the actual distribution of the commodities is all done by the Vietnamese.

Senator Kennedy. What kind of feeding stations do you have on the road where most of the people are?

Mr. FirnstaHL. Just over the border from Quang Tri, in Thua Thien Province, when I left there last week, there were three large collecting stations. What these collecting stations did was to give the people a meal on the way, or they could stay there for a day or two, and then the stations could give them rice to get to Hue. The same is true just north of Hue.
We have an Army camp at Kai Kai which is a way station for people coming into Danang.

Senator Kennedy. We read a report from Danang—it is from one of the major newspapers—that "thousands of refugees made their way into Danang last night and early this morning unaware of the Government preparation, and in desperation they broke into schools, churches and pagodas." They don't really spell it out, at least in some of these news reports, but the kind of organized system which you have outlined for us here this morning doesn't seem to have much affect.

Mr. Firmsahl. I was in Danang last Thursday and Friday and Saturday. And at that time the preparations were underway. I haven't been there since. So, I can't tell you what has happened since then.

Senator Kennedy. This is last week, May 4?

Mr. FIRNSTAHL. The camps were prepared and the food was pre-positioned at that time.

Senator Kennedy. How many people are using it?

Mr. FIRNSTAHL. Our reports, as of last night when I talked to Saigon, say that there are about 250,000 in camps, or in the reception stations in Danang.

Senator Kennedy. And in Hue? We read that 80 percent of the people have all fled Hue. Can you give us a description of the preparations made for this? We hear and see pictures of how all the civil servants are bailing out and leaving. And we see the pictures even of the officers of the army fleeing these combat zones. So who is staying behind to feed all these refugees in all these stations you have spoken of?

Mr. FIRNSTAHL. Prior to the fall of Fire Base Bastogne, which occurred last Saturday, these feeding stations were in operation, and people were being fed every day by the civil service and volunteers, Buddhists, Catholics, and people on the city staff. I don't know what has happened since.

Mr. Nooter. From reports that we have, the majority of the population of Hue has now moved further down south.

Senator Kennedy. So what good does it do to set up centers in Hue if the population is moving down south?

Mr. Nooter. The present situation is quite different from that of a few days ago, when refugees were mainly moving to Hue. And, of course, the situation Mr. Firnstahl describes was that of a few days ago. Now, perhaps three-fourths or 80 percent of the population of Hue, as well as the refugees that were there, have moved on further down south, where similar stations are being set up to take care of them.

Senator Kennedy. Part of setting up any kind of food distribution program for refugees is planning. You have mentioned here that this planning and programing has been going on for some period of time. Let's ask right now, what are you planning for the next, say, 3 weeks? Where are you prepositioning rice? Where are you prepositioning special feeding stations? What do you anticipate in terms of the NVA offensive so that you can start planning right now for 2 weeks from now, as far as civilians and refugees are concerned? You
seem to be so well organized today. Let's ask what you are planning for the next 2 weeks for refugees.

Mr. Nooter. I should perhaps answer that question in two parts. Here at the Washington end, we watch for what the overall country level of supplies is. And, of course, Mr. Fmnstahl and the people in Saigon are handling the distribution around the country.

On the Washington end, we have recently arranged some additional rice shipments to Vietnam. Some actually were in transport on the high seas for other destinations and have been diverted to Vietnam, to be sure that there will be stocks on hand in the country.

Mr. Fmnstahl. In Saigon, we have a joint working group that works with the Ministries of Economy and Social Welfare that provides for shipments of rice into these areas under this current situation. We have flown rice to places where they have developed a shortage, and we have sent up food stuffs on LST’s from Danang to Hue or from Saigon to Danang.

The army camps have had food prepositioned in them, medical supplies and staffs arranged. That doesn’t mean that it is always 100 percent successful by any means. But it is an example of the fact that the Vietnamese are capable at this stage of the game to cope with rather extensive disasters, which is a tremendous improvement over the past performance in the early part of this war.

Senator Kennedy. What were you planning for, say, 3 weeks ago? Did you anticipate 700,000 refugees?

Mr. Fmnstahl. No. But we do have stock levels, regional and provincial, of rice, Public Law 480, and other commodities.

Senator Kennedy. When are these stocks going to be depleted?

Mr. Fmnstahl. I don’t know the actual rate of depletion, but we are resupplying these areas as the need develops.

Senator Kennedy. What do you anticipate, what are you planning for over these next few weeks as the number of refugees increases?

Mr. Nooter. We expect the number to rise to something like 1 million people.

Senator Kennedy. You have a million now, as I understand it. You have 700,000 in Government hands, and, if you figure two out of three are in Government hands, you must count about 300,000 in the other areas that are occupied. I suppose if there is any plan of rolling back the North Vietnamese you are going to have to start providing for these refugees as well.

Mr. Fmnstahl. There are sufficient stocks of rice and food in Vietnam now to handle the foreseeable future.

Senator Kennedy. For how many refugees? Certainly in any planning you would have to anticipate the possible total number. What do you anticipate would be the increased number of refugees, say, in the next month or so?

Mr. Nooter. We don’t have a specific target in mind. But we do know that there are sufficient rice stocks and food stocks in the country in one form or another, or on the way, for almost any likely eventuality. The Government itself has substantial quantities of rice available. These stocks would normally be for commercial sales, but if needed, these stocks can be called upon to meet emergency needs.
Senator Kennedy. Of course we heard the same thing in Bangladesh too, about all the stocks that were stored down at Chittagong. But they just weren't getting up-country to the people, and the people were starving.

Mr. Nooter. In addition to our own information reporting we also watch the papers very closely, and sometimes they do give us a tip as to what is going on. Although this emergency has been to a large extent unexpected, that there would be this number of refugees, I think we can say to date that preplanning and preparation has been adequate, and on the whole the news stories tend to verify that the feeding of refugees has been going quite well.

Senator Fong. Has the U.S. Government direct control over the refugee program?

Mr. Nooter. I am sorry?

Senator Fong. Has the U.S. Government direct control over the refugee program?

Mr. Nooter. No, the South Vietnamese Government handles the refugee programs. We provide advisory assistance, food and other commodities for it.

Senator Fong. Do you work very closely with the South Vietnamese Government?

Mr. Nooter. Yes, indeed.

Senator Fong. And your function is advisory?

Mr. Nooter. That is correct.

Senator Fong. In other words you provide whatever advice is necessary, if requested?

Mr. Nooter. That is correct.

Senator Fong. Have you been providing such advisory assistance?

Mr. Nooter. We have been providing the advisory assistance, and the foodstuffs have been moving in. The Vietnamese have been performing very well on their side.

Senator Fong. In fact, the feeding, the getting of the foodstuffs to the various places, and the setting up these refugee camps, is the work and the primary responsibility of the South Vietnamese Government?

Mr. Nooter. Yes, it is.

Senator Fong. You have no control over it, do you?

Mr. Nooter. Obviously we have some influence. Our advisors work with them, and sometimes point out areas where help is needed.

Senator Fong. What about the physical carrying on of the work?

Mr. Nooter. It is carried on by the South Vietnamese. They have had a good response from their own people, incidentally. Religious groups and other private Vietnamese groups have pitched in and helped out. This has been reported in the press, as well as in our official reporting.

Senator Fong. This is true of refugee programs throughout Vietnam?

Mr. Nooter. That is correct, but, of course, principally in the northern portion where there is the largest flow of refugees.

Senator Kennedy. In going through your statement, I have a series of questions. About the forced relocations. Were there any or are there now any forced relocations?
Mr. Nooter. Forced relocations were a problem in the early part of 1971, as I have indicated in my statement, one which gave us very serious concern, and one which we have moved to try to deal with, and that was brought under control. Forced relocations were virtually stopped by April of 1971, and that situation has continued up until the present.

Senator Kennedy. You still had some relocations last year, forced relocations, did you not?

Mr. Nooter. In the early part of the year, yes, sir, between January and April 1971.

Senator Kennedy. Do you anticipate that there is going to be more, or is it going to drop off because of the recent situation.

Mr. Nooter. We have no plans, nor do the South Vietnamese have any plans, for forced relocations for this year. The present situation, of course, in some instances may require moving out populations from areas where military intelligence indicates there would be heavy military activity, which these people themselves may not be in a position to know about. That kind of situation might make it necessary to move the population. On the whole, I believe that would be something that this committee would approve if it means moving people out of the area of military activities.

Senator Kennedy. We have the recent reports about the planned removal of 39,000 civilians from Kontum. Do you know whether that is still anticipated?

Mr. Nooter. I don’t have any up-to-date information, other than what I have read in the press on that. It would fall into the category that I just mentioned, however.

Let me amend that. I did hear recently that there is some problem because the road from Kontum, once opened up, is now closed again. So, it may not be possible to get those people out.

Senator Kennedy. How much of that do you anticipate? Is there any way of estimating that now, over the period of the next year?

Mr. Nooter. No, I am sure that would only be done in cases where there seemed no other way to protect the civilian population, but I don’t know any way to estimate it. This will depend on the military situation.

Senator Kennedy. Last year you had a series of relocations between May 20 through August 21, 62,000 Montagnards, as I understand. That was called “the gathering of the people” program. Do you remember that program?

Mr. Finstahl. 1970.


Mr. Nooter. Yes, sir.

Senator Kennedy. What has happened to those people since they have been resettled? Do you have any program report on that? Have they been prosperous? What has been the death rate? How many of those people have left the camps after being resettled? Do you have any information on that?

Mr. Finstahl. Some of these relocations have been successful, others have been very poor, and some have been just marginal. Relocating Montagnards is always a problem, and if care is not taken to put them in the right places, it becomes mere of a problem. By
and large, they have gotten all the allowances which the government has provided for them, plus substantive additional allowances in problem areas.

There are three or four bad Montagnard camps, but of the 60,000 I would say that the vast majority of them are getting along at least marginally well in their present locations. The problem is generally a lack of land.

Senator Kennedy. Do you have any breakdown on the various camps and what has happened to the people, do you have that information?

Mr. FERNSTAH. I don't have it available. We can provide that to the committee.

(Subsequent to the hearing, the following information was submitted:)

RELOCATIONS OF MONTAGNARDS IN MR 2.

Movements of Montagnard hamlets in MR 2 began sometime between May and September of 1970 when MR 2 reported several thousand had already been moved in Pleiku and Dalac Provinces. Shortly after MR 2 became aware of these movements in September, the matter was brought to the attention of the II CTZ Commander who then agreed to hold off further relocations until after the rice harvest in late November or early December. In the meantime, a number of visits were made by MSW and CPDC to the provinces concerned, and plans were developed for the orderly preparation of future moves. Over 52,000 people were moved between Septemlbr 1970 and August 1971. The relocatees were registered as refugees and received resettlement benefits, PL 480 Title II food distributions and other commodities. Development projects were started, and medical services were provided by the provincial public health services.

During the period December 1970 to June 1971, as plans for relocations were received and approved by CPDC, MSW funds for the development of the new sites were released and allowances were given the people.

Prior to the present enemy offensive, the majority of these relocations sites had become fairly viable; however, some continued to have problems, principally because of lack of land. Buon Kii B and Buon M'Bro in Dalac Province are two that still have this problem and province officials and advisors are presently developing plans to find land for these relocatees. An Office of Highland Affairs Task Force recently spent three days in the Buon Blech site of Phu Bon Province and developed a detailed plan for improving that site. MSW resources are continuing to be put into all the sites, with additional funds for food and development allocated each year.

Because of the enemy offensive in the Central Highlands and the present high level of military activity in all of MR II, a status report on each of the Montagnard relocation sites cannot be prepared at this time.

Senator Kennedy. Our report from the GAO says that about 2,500 Montagnards were forcibly relocated in January 1971, and only 750 lived at this site and the rest had left the site because of the terrible living conditions. And in March 1971 it was reported that between two and three hundred Montagnards had died at this camp from malnutrition, tuberculosis and influenza. It startles me that you are able to give this kind of impression—that everything is going so well, given the past crisis of these people. We have the GAO report which says that, even prior to the current escalation, Montagnards were dying of malnutrition. If you couldn't get food supplies and the medical supplies out there at a time when you were having successful "Vietnamization," I think it is unbelievable to presume that you are able to meet the crisis at the present time. The GAO report is full of examples of malnutrition and how people
are dying because of the lack of relief supplies. And to have you come up here this morning, after an increase of some 700,000 refugees, and say, that everything is okay—that the South Vietnamese are on top of it—this runs completely contradictory to everything we have seen over recent years.

Mr. Nooter. It is certainly true, nor would we ever attempt to deny it, that some of the refugee situations in the past have been handled inadequately or badly.

I am certain that there will be similar instances in the present situation. So far we don't know of any such instances, but I am sure that over time there will be some.

The forced relocation of the Montagnards in central Vietnam in 1970 and 1971 was an especially undesirable movement. It ran contrary to the urgings of U.S. advisors, both military and civilian. It was done by the Vietnamese, and in an unauthorized way. And, of course, any relocation of Montagnards does represent a very special problem because of special ethnic problems, and the poorer health and living conditions of Montagnards in any event.

In fact, one of the incidents which occurred during that particular movement in the early part of last year is now being thoroughly reviewed and investigated by our mission. I will be glad to give the committee a copy of that report when we have completed it.

Senator Kennedy. Are you prepared to come to the Congress and ask for any additional resources or support for programs for refugees and war casualties, given this recent increase in the number of refugees?

Mr. Nooter. We will be asking the Congress for any funds which appear to be necessary to deal with this situation. The principal reason why the amounts available for the refugee programs have decreased over the last several years is simply because that as the Vietnamese have taken over the program it has been possible to reduce the number of U.S. advisors without an adverse effect on the program.

Now, certainly the Public Law 480—title II food which goes to the refugees will have to be increased as a result of this present emergency. I don't have a figure available, because the situation is still unfolding, but we will be increasing the funds for that purpose as the situation progresses.

Senator Fong. How about the counterpart funds?

Mr. Nooter. The other source of assistance to refugees does come from the counterpart funds generated by our commercial import program. They do not appear in our presentations as refugee funds as such. But they do represent a substantial amount of help to refugees. This will also be increased simply by programming more of these counterpart funds for refugees in Vietnam.

Senator Kennedy. But the principal American AID contribution has been in the form of personnel and not in the form of actual help and assistance. It has been decreased from $16 million down to $2.6 million, and that cutback just represents American personnel.

Mr. Nooter. Well, it includes the decrease in American personnel and some contracts with private agencies that provide various kinds of training advisers, and so on. Generally what the amounts repre-
sent are the direct U.S. inputs, and they do not include the counterpart funds or the Public Law 480 food, which are really the largest elements of the refugee program today.

Senator Kennedy. What do you use the counterpart funds for?

Mr. Nooter. These are programmed into the Vietnamese budget, where they are used to pay benefits to refugees, both emergency benefits and resettlement benefits, as well as a whole variety of other programs for the care of orphans, and so on.

Do you want to elaborate on that, Mr. Firnstahl?

Mr. Firnstahl. I could add that much of the apparent decrease results from the change from dollar-funded commodities to piaster allowances. So you have had a decrease in dollars since you have had an increase in piaster counterpart funds.

Mr. Nooter. Much of the financing of commodities with dollars for direct U.S. procurement, as Mr. Firnstahl said, is presently being done through the counterpart system because it is more flexible.

Senator Fong. Why weren't the piasters used then?

Mr. Firnstahl. As an example, at that time we were providing aluminum roofing because of the magnitude of the problem and because it was the easiest way to get a lot of people resettled in a hurry. As Vietnam developed the ability to produce their own roofing or whatever other material they wanted in the local market.

Senator Fong. Where did you formerly buy these things?

Mr. Firnstahl. From U.S. sources.

Senator Fong. And you say, now you give them piasters?

Mr. Firnstahl. Yes.

Senator Fong. Therefore they can buy them from the local manufacturers?

Mr. Firnstahl. We can use counterpart funds and cut down on the dollar requirements.

Senator Kennedy. The total percentage has been reduced in any event. For, according to the GAO, funds for refugees have gone from 5 percent of total expenditures to 3.7 percent, in relation to the South Vietnamese budget.

Mr. Nooter. Of course, these expenditures will depend upon the problem in Vietnam, rather than any other predetermined method. Obviously those numbers will be affected this year by the present situation, and I expect it will increase expenditures.

Senator Kennedy. A little better than 10 percent of the amount that has been allocated, has actually been expended—but this has not been reported over the last 3 or 4 years.

Mr. Nooter. That varies by the type of benefit paid. In those areas where the number of benefits actually paid are lower than the estimates, then there would be an under expenditure. In the areas where it proves greater than expected, then there would be a greater than expected expenditure.

Mr. Firnstahl. Actually, for 1970 and 1971 for war victims relief, over 100 percent of the amount allocated was spent. For resettlement benefit payments, it was over 100 percent. In the area of social welfare, we expended 88 percent and 53 percent, respectively, in 1970 and 1971.
Mr. NOOTER. So the number of areas—

Senator KENNEDY. The percentage of the amount allocated which was actually spent is between 30 and 40 percent, is it not?

Mr. FIRNSTAHL. No, sir. I think last year the Vietnamese spent over 90 percent of the approximately 4 million piasters which were authorized.

Senator KENNEDY. It says in the GAO report, that of the funds allocated to be expended on development projects, only 26.8 percent was actually expended last year.

Mr. NOOTER. What page?

Senator KENNEDY. Page 38 of the GAO report. You would have to spend every cent allocated for other programs—plus a little more—to bring that percentage up.

Mr. FIRNSTAHL. I think it was $484 million piasters last year for site development projects.

Mr. NOOTER. What was the final total for the year? Does this represent through August?

Mr. FIRNSTAHL. The figure in the GAO report represents expenditures only through August.

Senator KENNEDY. The GAO says, however, that "only about 26 percent of the allocated funds have been expended."

Mr. NOOTER. Yes. That was through August 31, 1971. The actual amount for the year as a whole, for the calendar year, ended up being 90 percent of the amount allocated in the Vietnamese budget.

Mr. FIRNSTAHL. For resettlement and return to village benefits we spent 90 percent of the $2,749,000 that was allocated.

Senator KENNEDY. As of August 31, 1971?

Mr. FIRNSTAHL. Not as of August, but as of the end of the year. We spent last year for all development projects $434,197,000 piasters, out of a total authorized of 500 million. When you combine that with the resettlement and return to village authorizations, we spent 90 percent of the total by the end of the calendar year.

Senator Fono. Then, as I understand it, the effort as far as refugees is concerned has not been diminished?

Mr. FIRNSTAHL. No.

Senator KENNEDY. If that is the case, you spent 75 percent of it in the last three months.

Mr. FIRNSTAHL. That is a normal thing, though, in Vietnam, that expenditures pick up impetus as the year goes on. It takes a while to get the projects approved, and it takes a while to get the money allocated, and it is usually spent in the last quarter of the year.

Mr. NOOTER. That may be something that they learned from AID.

Senator KENNEDY. How do you explain the various decreases in your budget from 1971. In 12 different categories, the greatest decreases have been in the fields of education, refugees, and social welfare. Since 1971, funds for education have been reduced 50 percent; public health, 52 percent; refugees, 73 percent. There are other programs that have not been cutback, such as public safety. But the programs that really benefit the people—the education programs, and the public health programs, the refugee programs, and the programs for war victims—these have been the programs that have been cutback the greatest extent.
How do you explain that?

Mr. Nooter. There were very heavy capital expenditures in those programs in the late 1960's for the construction of facilities, hospitals, schools, and for the establishment of training institutions in Vietnam; for example, medical schools, which now graduate more than 200 doctors a year, which I believe makes it one of the largest medical schools in the world. These schools have now largely been established. The work has not been entirely completed, but the heavy construction and input of U.S. funds are, on the main, behind us. As the Vietnamese return from training abroad or receive training in their country and are qualified to take over, they then pick this up. And their costs are now funded within the Vietnamese budget.

Therefore, our expenditures can be reduced. This is the general way all of these programs are going. In education, the Vietnamese now receive virtually no assistance from us in the field of primary education. They have over 86 percent of their primary-age children in school, or they did before this recent military activity. Therefore, we think it is appropriate that U.S. funding can decrease in these areas, and without adverse effect on the program.

Senator Kennedy. The refugee program, according to the statistics, has been decreased 73 percent since 1971. Certainly the number of refugees, of those dislocated and uprooted by the war, the number of war orphans, and those that are in need of medical attention, certainly the numbers of these people have not decreased.

Mr. Nooter. The refugee situation prior to April 1 was improving. Large numbers of people had been resettled, and the scope and magnitude of the program had been reduced. The future inputs from us and from the South Vietnamese, as I mentioned earlier, are going to be set by what the needs are. As these needs increase we are going to have to be putting more money in there.

Senator Kennedy. What do you anticipate? What can you tell us about your plans for the future?

Mr. Nooter. I don't think I can give you any financial estimates at this time, since the situation is just unfolding.

Senator Kennedy. Well, even before the current escalation, at the rate we were providing prosthetic devices, for example, according to the GAO, it would have taken anywhere from 8 or 9 years for all the people to get the prosthetic devices they need. And here we are cutting back on this program. You say they are able to take over this kind of a program, and they are able to do it. But nonetheless you see the cruel fact that people are going to have to wait years for these kinds of devices. And I don't know how you justify this—how you rationalize it.

Mr. Nooter. The staff there now is able to handle the provision of about 11,000 prosthetic devices a year.

Senator Kennedy. Let's take that as an example. Why do you believe that, when it runs completely counter to past experience and the present desperate situation?

Mr. Nooter. I don't understand.

Senator Kennedy. What page is that in your testimony?

Mr. Nooter. I don't think this particular problem is discussed in the statement. But the actual number provided in the last 3 months
of last calendar year was 2,906. If I may continue, we are not satisfied with that rate. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that we haven't done enough in that area. And I might say that this is an area where we are going to have to do some additional work.

It is true that there is still a backlog of people who need artificial limbs.

I agree with you that that is inadequate. We have made efforts during the past few years to speed up that program. Principally we have done some work to see if the local hospitals around the country are able to handle the servicing of these devices, which is a problem. But we do need to do more there. And I assure you that we will be looking into this area.

Senator Kennedy. You have 88,260 amputees, of whom 5,000 have been assisted; is that right? That is according to the GAO report.

You have 36,890 blind and deaf people, of whom 100 have been assisted.

You have 8,360 paraplegics, of whom 360 have been assisted.

And you have 41,000 who have been burned or have other kinds of wounds, of whom 30,000 have been assisted.

Yet you are telling us that you are cutting back on these programs, and that the South Vietnamese are able to take care of themselves in this area. As I understand it, your current plans call for production of 10,000 prosthetic devices annually, or 850 per month. But you have 88,000 amputees, as well as 8,360 paraplegics, in need of help. If my arithmetic serves me correctly, it will take over 8 years to make all of the devices needed. This does not include the number of devices that need to be changed, and the number of children who have to have a device changed every 6 months.

Mr. Nooter. As I say, I agree that this is an area that we have to do more in. There is experimental work going on with a new kind of device which would speed up the production rate, if it works out. But that is not yet proven and established, and therefore it has to be considered experimental. Our information is that 25,000 artificial limbs have been provided so far, over the past few years. That still falls short of the need. I also understand, of course, that of the total requirements, some portion of those people will prefer not to have devices, for various reasons. Hence, they don't all represent an immediate backlog. But I will repeat once again, the present backlog is too large.

Senator Kennedy. What is the reason for this delay? This has been a recognized need for 7 years. Howard Rusk was over there 5 years ago and made a report as to how these needs were not being met.

Mr. Nooter. The increase in ability to serve in this area has been considerable, but is still short of the final requirements. In the last 2 years we have increased the Vietnamese ability to produce them in the country from something like 250 to 850 per month. And that still falls short of need.

Senator Kennedy. Why can't you simply import some devices into the country?

Mr. Nooter. These have to be individually fitted, and in some cases surgery done with the man before the device can be applied.
It isn't something that can be simply shipped over there and turned loose, it does require personal attention, and very skilled personal attention.

Senator Kennedy. We have an official estimate of 410,000 orphans, and an unofficial estimate of 700,000 orphans. What are you doing about these children?

Mr. Nooter. There are a number of programs to help provide assistance in these areas. First of all, of course, this represents children who in many cases have a parent, and in most of these cases they are being cared for within the extended family structure, which is the traditional Vietnamese way. But the Government of Vietnam, with support from us, does assist some 134 orphanages through the provision of food and financial support. There are about 18,000 children in these orphanages.

Senator Kennedy. 18,000?

Mr. Nooter. Yes. However, I think perhaps half of those in the orphanages are not in fact orphans, they are there because their parents have financial difficulties. At any rate, we and the Government of South Vietnam provide support to these orphanages. During the past year, we have indicated our willingness to increase that level of support. There are a number of new programs being worked out in this area. Our support is provided mainly through counterpart funds, and doesn't appear in our dollar budget as a separate line item.

Senator Kennedy. Can you tell us what is being provided for these children—and at what rate?

Mr. Nooter. Yes.

Perhaps Dr. Hoeber is in the best position to give you the details on that?

Dr. Hoeber. Of the 700,000 orphans which you mentioned, approximately 400,000 are orphans of the military. They receive, under the 1970 War Veterans Law, regular support and other benefits.

Senator Kennedy. What sort of benefits do they receive?

Dr. Hoeber. The benefits are computed as a percentage of the last pay of the father. Among the civilian war orphans—

Senator Kennedy. Approximately how much is that? What is the average payment?

Dr. Hoeber. I have some examples here.

Senator Kennedy. What do they receive and what is the American participation in that?

Dr. Hoeber. The American participation is through overall support to the GVN budget.

Senator Kennedy. There is no U.S. support to the war veterans?

Dr. Hoeber. The support or the benefits which persons receive under the war veterans law through the Ministry of War Veterans come out of the GVN budget, and the American participation comes from the overall support of the GVN budget.

Senator Kennedy. Under what provision? Is that through the Ministry of Social Welfare?

Dr. Hoeber. No, this is the general support for the GVN budget. There is no direct U.S. support to the Ministry of War Veterans. The benefit payments to orphans of the military are made by the Ministry of War Veterans, not by the Ministry of Social Welfare.
The civilian orphans are separate from this. A very large number of them are part of the refugee population and receive support through the refugee programs.

These are the two largest groups.

And then there is the direct support of the Government through the Ministry of Social Welfare to 134 orphanages, which is paid at the rate of approximately 600 piasters per month per child.

Senator Kennedy. What about the street boys program?

Dr. Hoebner. There is some support from the Ministry of Social Welfare, again out of the counterpart funds, for the very few rather small, street boys programs. In Saigon itself there are two or three American sponsored street boys clubs which receive financial support from voluntary contributions which they collect themselves.

Senator Kennedy. Could you tell us about that? That was a program that was talked about before. I was just interested in it.

Dr. Hoebner. I think Mr. Fustahl is in a better position to talk about that program.

Mr. Fustahl. There are two main clubs in Saigon, and there are some branches in the other main cities. One is the Dick Hughes street boys program in which he has, I think, five separate homes in Saigon. The other is the teen-age World Vision Program for street boys. The World Vision Program receives a subsidy from the Ministry of Social Welfare. The Dick Hughes program is handled strictly by contributions from the people in the United States. We assist both of those programs. We provide transportation to their branches in other areas, and they have APO privileges and various other support from the Ministry.

Senator Fong. Mr. Nooter, let me ask you this general question. Up to 2 years ago things were getting to be pretty quiet as far as refugee programs were concerned, is that correct? Now all of a sudden this invasion, this heated up activity, has brought in another 700,000 refugees, is that correct?

Mr. Nooter. That is correct.

Senator Fong. Would you say that within the past 2 or 3 years things have been simmering down largely because of inactivity on the Front?

Mr. Nooter. Yes. While military activity was at a relatively low level, there still were refugee problems. But it was possible to address the longer range problems of resettlement, returning people back to their villages.

Senator Fong. According to your table 1, in 1970 you returned 388,000 refugees to their homes, and in 1971, 586,000. You only had 94,000 refugees in temporary status in 1971.

Mr. Nooter. That is correct.

Senator Fong. With this present fighting going on on six fronts, do you anticipate that you are going to have a tremendous number of refugees in temporary status?

Mr. Nooter. Yes, we do at this time.

Senator Fong. Could you tell us now as to what has been planned for all of these refugees? How are you going to meet the problem?

Mr. Nooter. Obviously, of course, the urgent problem is how to deal with their immediate requirements, how to get them food and
shelter, such as tents, and so on. Perhaps Mr. Firnstahl can deal with that in more detail. The question of how to address the longer range problems is going to depend on the military situation. To what extent the territory is recovered and security is restored will determine to a large degree how long these people have to be refugees, or how long until they will be in a situation in which the long-range problems can be addressed.

Senator Fong. Would you say that this invasion has intensified the refugee problem all over again?

Mr. Nooter. Yes, indeed.

Senator Fong. Probably in greater magnitude, wouldn’t you say?

Mr. Nooter. Well, of course, this is the largest influx of refugees since the Tet offensive in February of 1968.

Senator Fong. How many refugees were there then?

Mr. Firnstahl. At that time we had about a million war victims, during Tet in 1968. The difference is that in 1968 the people, the war victims at that time, moved not far from their homes. Now, the problem is that these people are a Province or in some cases two Provinces away from their homes. So this is a different kind of problem to face.

Senator Fong. The problem is of more magnitude now and is more complex in nature, is that correct?

Mr. Firnstahl. Yes, sir.

Senator Fong. Do you contemplate asking the Congress for some more money.

Mr. Nooter. First we will undoubtedly need additional funds in the Public Law 480 portion of the program. I think that we will be able to obtain those funds by drawing on other programs. I don’t see any great difficulty there. Within the AID budget we will provide additional funds to the extent that they are needed. At the moment AID funds are principally for the U.S. advisors on the scene. To the extent that these people with their Vietnamese counterparts can handle the problem, then there is no large additional funding problem in that area.

Counterpart funding is available and budgeted in Saigon, and will be made available as required. I don’t see any immediate large-scale request for AID dollars at the present time. But, of course, if there is we will take the necessary actions to request it.

Senator Fong. Not knowing what the situation is likely to be from day to day, yet having to plan for it in advance, as you do, this very massive invasion really puts a strain on some of your planning; doesn’t it? For example—taking the problem of supplies—how much supplies do you calculate you have to store up, and how do you anticipate how much will be needed? And if you store up too much, things are wasted. If you store up too little, the people go hungry.

Could you address yourself to that problem? There is a report here that you wasted $3 million worth of foodstuffs.

Mr. Nooter. Over the last 5 or 6 years we provided something like $150 million worth of Public Law 480, title II, food commodities. In some years this ran as high as $50 million in a single year. This provided, among other things, for the stockpiling of these com-
modities around the country so that they would be available and be able to be used where and when needed.

As the situation quieted down during the past year and it was possible to do a much more thorough job of auditing and tidying up of our administrative requirements, we discovered some foodstuffs which had been in storage so long that they had spoiled. This was some $3 million worth of commodities—$3 million is a lot of money, but compared to the $150 million that had been handled, it was a relatively small percentage.

Senator Fong. Two percent?

Mr. Nooter. Yes, sir.

Senator Fong. Do you have much wastage in your storage program?

Mr. Nooter. The wastage on a percentage basis for this purpose is relatively small. Of course, the process of distributing food in small quantities all over the country to a great many people is very difficult to control administratively. But I would like to differentiate between kinds of wastages. Sometimes when a refugee receives a food allowance he may decide that what he needs is something else besides what he is given. He may trade it or sell it and use the money to buy something else that he requires. In a sense, in a technical sense, that is sometimes described as waste. In terms of giving the refugee something that he can use to meet his needs, however, in many cases it isn't wasted.

Senator Fong. Do you include in your figures on waste, foodstuffs which the refugees won't eat? I know we used to send cornmeal but they won't eat it. After you made noodles out of it, then they ate it.

Mr. Nooter. That is correct. One of the more controversial items in Vietnam has been bulgur wheat, which is something which many Vietnamese don't like. That may be true in this country, also. It is, on the other hand, very nutritious. It has a high protein content, and our technicians often feel that it is a very good commodity. However, in some cases, Vietnamese have either used it for animal feed, or traded it off, or sold it. And there has been some criticism of this.

For that reason, we have cut back on bulgur wheat. We have also tried to make it more palatable by showing the Vietnamese how they can prepare it in a manner that is more edible. In some cases that has been successful, and in other cases it hasn't.

Senator Fong. Do you see a change in the control of the refugee program with this new offensive, or will it be the same? Will the South Vietnamese Government be handling it and the U.S. Government be advising and helping where possible?

Mr. Nooter. We think the South Vietnamese are handling the situation extremely well—at least up to the present. And we see no reason at this time to suggest any change in the way that this is being carried out.

Senator Fong. How is your resettlement program working out?

Mr. Nooter. We do two things in resettlement. The first choice always is to send people back to their original village. That is, on the whole, the first choice of the Vietnamese and to the extent that security permits, this is the way resettlement is handled.
Large numbers of people, perhaps 2 million, have been returned to their original villages and resettled with assistance from the Government, financed in large part by ourselves. Roofing, food, and other things are needed while they are getting started in planting crops, and so on.

We have another program for resettlement that has been very controversial in the press. I would like to discuss that somewhat. There are some of the refugees in the northern part of the country who have been in camps for 4 or 5 years in some cases. They represent what you might call the hard core refugee problem, those who have not been assimilated in other parts of the society, and those who are not able to return to their home villages. Some of these people have been living in areas where the land is not adequate for farming. Land which can be used for cultivation in that part of the country is very scarce. We have been working with Vietnamese over a period of more than a year to try to find some way to make available some of the land which is more plentiful and unoccupied in the southern part of the country so that these people, if they wish, can go there and start over again in a different location.

Now, this program has been called "forced relocation". And it has been called "clearing free fire zones," and so on.

Senator Fong. Is it a voluntary relocation?

Mr. Nooter. Yes, but it is not any of the other kind of things that have been ascribed to it. It is a program to offer these people a chance for resettlement if they wish on a voluntary basis. The first movement under this program of about 2,000 people, took place a couple of months ago, and it was very carefully handled and arranged. The village chiefs were flown down to see the area ahead of time. And the people had a choice. A portion of several hamlets did make this move. Since then, there have been many other requests.

Senator Fong. I understand each man gets two hectares of land.

Mr. Nooter. Three hectares.

Senator Fong. That is about 7 acres.

Mr. Nooter. In rice farming terms, this is a relatively generous allowance. It is possible to do this in the central and southern part of the South Vietnam, because land is available down in that part of the country, but it is not available up north.

Senator Fong. Have you moved any other sizeable groups?

Mr. Frenstahl. We have moved about 2,300 Montagnards out of the Ashau valley down to Darlac province. These people were in marginal circumstances, and they moved in the past month just ahead of the invasion.

Dr. Hoebel. Mr. Chairman, I have now the figures for benefits that you requested for war orphans as of 1971. An orphan of a member of the popular forces receives 300 piasters per child per month; an orphan of an ARVN soldier to the rank of corporal, receives 900 piasters per child per month; and the orphan of an ARVN soldier over the rank of corporal, receives 1,100 piasters per child per month. In addition to the above benefits, orphans of military personnel killed in combat are eligible for a special educational allowance of 500 piasters per child per month. In 1971, 252,844 children received these allowances, estimated at 930,528,000 piasters.
Senator Kennedy. We have held these hearings periodically, and we have had the GAO go out into the field, and we find that the difficult conditions among civilians are never fully suggested by Administration spokesmen. And this includes Democratic Administrations as well as Republican. Now we hear again this morning about how funds are actually getting out to the refugees and how 80 percent of the children are going to primary schools, and all the rest.

But the GAO report on military region 2—which has not had the kind of military activity that I Corps has—talks about refugee facilities that do not meet the requirements of GVN criteria in the various camps that were visited. There were a total of six wells, and no latrines. And the report continues, saying, “they were promised additional U.S. Public Law 480 funds, and the refugees said they were in need of food and shelter. The people of Cay Cay have never received Public Law 480 commodities at all.”

It talks about no schools here, no dispensaries there, the lack of medicine, poor facilities, no latrines, camps that do not meet standards—even the standards set by the South Vietnamese Government.

Just reading randomly from the GAO reports—about conditions in II Corps where things have not changed because of the recent escalation—suggests things aren’t as rosy as you say. We always confront this discrepancy between actual conditions as found by the GAO and the optimistic reports cited by Administration spokesmen.

To listen to the comments here this morning about how they are setting up all these feeding sites and relocation camps in Danang and other places—I believe that is just the same kind of optimistic myth that we have heard stated here on other occasions. I don’t know. Do you want to make some kind of reaction? We can go through the GAO report on these camps, and I will hear you say, well, that was in September. In the last 3 months, there has been all kinds of changes and improvements. You can say those are old statistics, several months old, and that things have gotten much better. But we have heard that time and time again. The fact remains that this has been the story of the refugee program, as well as the program for civilian casualties, for 7 years.

Mr. Nooten. Perhaps Mr. Firnstahl can comment on some of those camps. But in addition to that, I would say that it is an auditor’s job to find the problems and the things that have gone wrong. Of course, we have recognized for some time now that the hard core group of refugees who have not been able to resettle adequately, and have not been able to return to their homes, represent most of the problem areas. This is perhaps 160,000 people who have not been reassimilated into Vietnamese life in a productive way. Obviously, we have to do what we can to make these camps liveable. But over the longer run these people have to be resettled in an area where they can live their own lives in a productive way. And of course that is what we have been trying to do in offering them the opportunity to move to new locations.

I am continually puzzled by some of the press criticism of that program, which is perhaps the best thing which can be done to help these people under the circumstances.

Do you want to comment, Mr. Firnstahl?
Mr. FIRNSTAHL. Mr. Chairman, I think with perhaps one exception all of the examples used by the GAO are Montagnard camps. And as we have admitted, there are problems with these camps resulting from the forced relocations of 1970 and 1971.

Senator KENNEDY. Do they get treated any differently than other refugees?

Mr. FIRNSTAHL. But one of the reasons why these camps are in poor conditions is that Montagnards don't use latrines and they don't use wells.

Senator KENNEDY. Do they use schools?

Mr. FIRNSTAHL. They use schools.

Senator KENNEDY. Do they use medicines?

Mr. FIRNSTAHL. They use medicines. And the problem with Montagnard camps are slightly greater than with other people.

Senator KENNEDY. Do they use food?

Mr. FIRNSTAHL. Yes.

Senator KENNEDY. Here is Region 1. The GAO report says:

**MILITARY REGION 1**

Nowhere in Vietnam are the problems of assisting refugees more noticeable than in Military Region 1 that comprises the five northernmost provinces in Vietnam. Although we had planned to visit sites in this region, a typhoon which had caused extensive damage during October 1971 precluded objective observations of site conditions. In March 1971, however, CORDS issued the results of a survey of 252 temporary and resettlement sites conducted during parts of 1970 and 1971. Although the survey had faults, it was a useful source of information that showed basic historical data and site adequacies or inadequacies and it could be useful in planning site changes. The survey noted that the region was beginning to take steps to develop the sites and recognized the immensity of GVNS task. Following are some of the overall deficiencies reported.

Of the work force, 40 percent was unemployed.

Shortages of teachers, low class attendance, and little opportunity for secondary education.

Few vocational training courses for disabled war victims.

Insufficient site visits by doctors and health workers.

Insufficient security.

Over 90 percent of the sites were listed as being normalized when, in fact, the survey showed that they did not meet the GVNS criteria.

For example, of the 252 sites surveyed, about 240 were listed as being normalized but the following deficiencies were found.

There were no latrines at 187 sites.

There were no schools at 82 sites, 31 other sites had no usable classrooms, and 50 had no teachers.

There were no first-aid stations at 34 sites, and 26 sites had first-aid stations located from 2 to 50 miles from the site. Only 20 had a permanent health worker. Visits by health workers were infrequent, usually not more than once a month; and no visits at all were reported for 65 sites.

Drinking water was inadequate at 111 sites and 298 sites had inadequate irrigation water.

GVN generally had not been responsive to the needs of many of the 450,000 refugees in the 252 sites, although the sites were in existence about 4 years. For example:

There were 1,500 persons who had lost one or more limbs but only 702 had artificial limbs.

There were about 5,200 disabled persons who were not able to work.

Over 84 percent of the sites reported that no land was available for cultivation. About 70 percent of the workers were farmers.

Only about 3,900 of the more than 85,700 families were reported as having garden plots.

Only 26 sites had water pumps, and only six sites had tractors.
This is a cruel indictment, not just of what has happened in the last year, but in all the previous years as well. And these aren't simply Montagnard camps.

Mr. FRINSTAHL. Mr. Chairman, may I point out that that survey to which you refer was made by our own officers for the exact purpose of assisting in the solution of some of the problems which you are bringing out. That is the reason why we had so much money for development projects put into the American Aid Chapter of the budget last year. And that is one of the reasons why most of the 434 million piasters to which I referred was spent in I Corps to alleviate some of these problems.

Senator KENNEDY. Maybe since this survey was taken these problems have all been answered. But we have found over the years that this hasn't always been the case. We have these critical reports, and then hold hearings, and we hear how everything has changed for the better between the time we get the report and the time we hold the hearings. We always hope that that is the case. But then we go out into the field and find the same old problems. It is difficult for me, given what has happened in the past, to believe that things have changed much.

I would like, if we could, just to consider the long-range plans which AID is considering for the time when we are able to end the war. What kind of planning is going on now for that hopeful and prayerful eventuality we can all agree on here this morning.

Mr. NOOTER. When we were planning to do what?

Senator KENNEDY. What kind of planning is being done to assist in the post-war reconstruction—human reconstruction primarily—of the Indochina people if we were able to get a cease-fire tomorrow? What is AID prepared to do then?

Mr. NOOTER. First, it seemed to me that the GAO report overlooked the many things that are going on now, and have been going on in some cases for several years, to deal with the long-range problems created by the war in social welfare and refugee and health areas. I have mentioned many of those today. I won't repeat them. But there is a long list of other activities that have gone on, such as vocational training for refugees.

Senator KENNEDY. How many are being trained? How many are graduating from vocational training schools in Vietnam?

I will let you get that for the record.

(Subsequent to the hearing, the following information was submitted):

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Ministry of social welfare programs</th>
<th>Ministry of education programs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2,906</td>
<td>945</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2,640</td>
<td>1,328</td>
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<td>1971</td>
<td>3,772</td>
<td>2,565</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>9,358</td>
<td>4,640</td>
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Ministry of social welfare estimates that 85 percent of the students in their programs are refugees.
Mr. NOOTER. Alright. This is a very difficult area to work in successfully. For example, war widows in many cases are assimilated into the population without being distinctly identified as a separate social problem. But perhaps the largest, the biggest effort to deal with some of these problems came very much from Vietnamese initiative, and is financed in their own budget. While we support their budget indirectly, to a large extent, this is not the counterpart funding in the usual sense. I am speaking of their law to provide benefits for disabled veterans, and dependents of the soldiers killed in the war. Over 5 percent of their budget now will be devoted to making payments for widows and war veterans, orphans, and parents of the people killed in the war.

So we have had, and are continuing to have, an on-going series of programs to deal with these longer-range problems. In addition, we have been helping the Ministry of Social Welfare work out the 4-year program that I referred to earlier. They now have a long-range program. And if you wish, I would be glad to provide that to the Committee. See text in appendix I. It shows an outline, and it is a financial forecast of what they will be hoping to do. Obviously, this will be adjusted as the years go on and the needs are more apparent. But it does give them a frame of reference as to how deal with these longer-range problems.

Senator KENNEDY. In the GAO report it says that:

The many years of U.S. assistance have increased the GVN capability to deal with emergency relief. It has not effectively strengthened or developed, however, an essential GVN capability to deal with the long-term problems of war victims—rehabilitation and reconstruction. The United States has not yet developed long-range plans for dealing with the long-term human problems of refugees and other war victims who continue to suffer from the social and economic disadvantages caused by the war.

Mr. NOOTER. I think that statement is in part correct, and in part not correct. It does overlook these programs which already have been started and put into effect. It is correct that the Ministry of Social Welfare, the Vietnam ministry, is a relatively new ministry, and Vietnam is a country where social welfare is a new concept. That Ministry started building up its capacity to meet the emergency situations, for obvious reasons. It has, however, now been turning to the longer-range aspects. At the risk of the kind of comment that you made earlier, I must say that the long-range plan, the 4-year plan, was worked out since the GAO report was completed. But it is true that the Vietnamese Ministry of Social Welfare did first try to set itself up to deal with the short-run problems, and the war situation made that inevitable. They will no doubt, under the present circumstances, be dealing with that primarily, and the longer-range problems will now be put aside, I am quite sure, until this emergency is over. But as soon as they are able, they do have plans for, and will be trying to address, the long-range problems.

Senator KENNEDY. As the GAO points out, the Minister said that: "It was difficult to make realistic plans without knowledge of the
amounts of resources available, especially when external assistance was declining.”

Mr. Nooter. That is true of all of us. But that doesn’t mean they are not making plans, or that they are not going ahead. They do have a plan, and they do have in that plan a certain financial forecast of requirements.

Senator Kennedy. And what do we have? What kind of planning are we doing? Are we doing anything at all to consider what the U.S. participation should be in meeting human problems in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, or even North Vietnam, after the war ends?

Mr. Nooter. Our planning in this instance relates to what the Vietnamese are doing in their budget, because, as we have pointed out several times, more and more of this assistance is being provided through their own budget. In my opinion, this is exactly the way it should be. This is the way for it to become a permanent part of their structure. If it is all provided for them from the outside, when we pull out it will be very difficult for Vietnam to continue the programs.

Senator Kennedy. Let us say that we are able to end the war. Are we planning to try and involve the international community in a post-war rehabilitation program? Are we making any effort at the present time to begin to start some kind of planning among the United Nations’ specialized agencies? If we are able to get an end to the war, say, tomorrow, are we developing the machinery by which we could go in there immediately and help and assist the people? Are we asking UN officials now to work with the countries involved in the development of a program? Are we trying to internationalize it? What thinking is going on, and what are the various considerations we should keep in mind, and what are the pros and cons?

Mr. Nooter. We are always encouraging the UN organizations to take over in any of these areas in which they are able. This year we did work out that WHO would take over the malaria program starting in 1973. We have worked with UNICEF, and have provided funds for its work in Vietnam in the child welfare area. We don’t have a master plan, because I don’t think we can predict at this time clearly enough, what is going to happen in the war, or what the United Nations will be permitted to do. We are constantly bearing this in mind as the more desirable way to meet requirements in this area when it is possible to do so.

Senator Kennedy. We are really unlimited in what those specialized agencies can do. I remember about 3 or 4 years ago visiting one of the specialized agencies in New York. They had a presence in Vietnam and they were willing to assume even a greater responsibility, at least that was what they said to me, if they were able to get additional funding—to get resources for a variety of programs in the areas you have suggested. But the amount of the U.S. contribution to such specialized agencies is really minuscule, certainly in relation to the dimension of the problem and their capacity for service.

Mr. Nooter. Our impression is that the U.N. is willing to do what they would normally do in a country of the size of Vietnam if there weren’t a war. But in addition to their funding limitations,
there are other reasons why they would prefer not to take on an overly large presence there.

Senator KENNEDY. You had a study that was done at Columbia University of some of the possibilities for an internationalization of the post war recovery and rehabilitation of North and South Vietnam.

Mr. Nooter. At Columbia University?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes, the School of International Affairs at Columbia University.

Mr. Nooter. And this was done for AID?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. Nooter. I am not familiar with that.

Senator KENNEDY. Excuse me. It was done under contract with the State Department.

Mr. Nooter. I am not familiar with that particular report.

Mr. Askew. I am sorry, I am not either.

Senator KENNEDY. As I understand, this study was the single program or contract that has been given to begin considering planning aid after the war ends in Vietnam. It was made available in March. And they get into the idea of an international trust fund, for example, under United Nations auspices, and it makes a number of other suggestions. I think it was imaginative of the department to begin to move into this area. My question runs as to what you are planning to do now and in the future to begin to assemble this kind of information—to talk to the various congressional committees and start ventilating this whole issue, so that we can begin to understand and know what the intentions are of this country, in the hope that we can assist.

Mr. Nooter. I am sorry, I am not familiar with it. We can review it and give you our comments.

Senator MATHIAS. May I ask a question at this point, Mr. Chairman?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes.

Senator MATHIAS. A minute ago there was some colloquy about the declining amounts of money available here. What sort of money troubles are we running into?

Mr. Nooter. Well, Senator Mathias, we have discussed the fact that more and more of the financing in this area goes through the Vietnamese budget, which is appropriate and desirable. Of course the funding of the overall economic assistance program is at issue here. To date these funds have been adequate, although not overly so, but nevertheless adequate to permit the Vietnamese to expand their budget in some of these socially desirable areas. Of course we are not certain what these current military events will mean in terms of that budget. Such things as the commercial import program, which is thought of as an importation of generalized commodities, is what makes possible the counterpart funds that permit the funding of these social programs as well as other things in the Vietnamese budget. So I would say that on the whole the Congress has not restricted us in providing funds in these social areas.

Senator MATHIAS. Leaving the Congress out of it for the moment, within the department is there a sympathetic attitude toward budget requests and the requests that you make for refugee programs?
Mr. NOOTER. Indeed there is. The principal restrictions on what can be done, and what finally ends up in terms of effective programs in this field, are the administrative restrictions of time and space, of getting materials to the site, and getting the funds distributed properly, and not financial. The decline in funding over the years represent declines in requirements rather than cutbacks made to free funds for other purposes.

Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman, at this point I might just comment very briefly. I am pleased that the Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees is continuing its examination of the terrible toll of the war in Southeast Asia to the people in that corner of the world. Thousands of refugees are fleeing their native towns and hamlets, adding their numbers to the rapidly growing throngs of displaced persons crowding urban centers in the South. Their fate is a matter which must concern this government.

Stepped up military operations in the past weeks have created countless new refugees. We may not have initiated these operations, and we may be responding to them in the national interest of the United States or perhaps in the long-range interest of some of the people who are today refugees. Both of these subjects are open to dispute. However, the fact remains that in the short range interest of the people immediately involved, there is a real and desperate tragedy in the attitude of our Government to the human side of the war.

I am confident that Congress will exercise its responsibility for ending U.S. participation in the fighting in Vietnam so that we can get on to assessing the human costs of the violence and making worthwhile steps toward easing the burden of those who have had to pay it through the loss of homes, families and health. I am proud of the fact that this subcommittee has been one of the few voices of Government that consistently, when the war was hot, and when it cooled off, has been interested in the welfare of the thousands of displaced persons who are at this point the pawns of fate.

But we have a long way to go toward meeting the needs of the refugees faced daily with disease, hunger and death. Resettlement will involve long-range planning and careful attention. The responsibility of our Government is clear—we must focus on these problems and make available funds, materiel and expertise necessary to solve them.

Mr. NOOTER. Those of us who work in this area have always appreciated the support of this committee. Obviously, you may think we are not doing a good job in this or that respect. But we do appreciate your support. It does help to make it possible for us to give these programs the priorities which they deserve.

Senator MATHIAS. You say that the cutbacks in funding which have taken place heretofore have been because the capital investments made early in the war are no longer necessary. But I would like to, I think, echo what I believe the chairman was reaching for, which is, what are you going to do about this new influx, what sort of requests are you going to make about the very large numbers of new refugees that are now suddenly thrust upon you, and which must create new demands that are far beyond what you may reason—
ably have planned for, but created an emergency for the people in­
olved, and should create an emergency for us who have to assume
some responsibility?

Mr. Nooter. The short range problems are being dealt with by
food stocks presently available in Vietnam and food stocks diverted
from other regions. The long-range problem is another matter. That
will depend on the progress of the war, whether the people can
return to their own areas relatively quickly, or whether they have to
be resettled. Obviously, if over the longer term large numbers have
to be resettled, that will mean some additional requirements. I don’t
think that there is any way that we can program for this at this
time. All I can say is that we will be alert to this problem, and we
will be making available any funds that are necessary.

Senator Mathais. I think the chairman really ought to receive
the commendation of the committee and of the corresponding
agencies for his consistent interest in this important area over a long
period of time. And I think it should be acknowledged, Mr. Chair­
man.

Mr. Nooter. Could I make one additional comment?

With your permission, I would like to read one paragraph from the
GAO report.

Senator Kennedy. Could you tell us which page you are on

Mr. Nooter. This is on page 16. For the benefit of those people
who work out in the field in this difficult area while the war is
going on, the last paragraph on this page says:

During our review we visited 38 refugee sites and met with CORDS per­
sonnel in Saigon, in the regional headquarters, and in many of the provinces. In
almost every case the U.S. personnel were sympathetic to the needs of war
victims and seemed to be dedicated to the objective of easing the suffering of
those displaced by the war. Often U.S. advisers in the field went about their
tasks at considerable risk to their personal safety. The problems described
elsewhere in this report are not intended as criticism of these efforts.

And I would just like, for the benefit of those dedicated people
who serve out there, to put that in the record.

Senator Kennedy. I would certainly underscore that. And I
think it is entirely appropriate that you mentioned it. I think any
of us who have had an opportunity to visit these camps—I have on
two different occasions, in 1965 and again in 1968—have been enorm­
ously impressed by the dedication and commitment of the people
involved. And I think that many of the questions that we ask and
the causes that we champion are a direct response to their frustra­
tion and their needs. Too often the kind of problems which they
have outlined to us as we visited, or as the staff has visited, or as it
comes back to us through the voluntary agencies, are misplaced
somewhere in the long reach between those refugee camps and the
halls of either the Congress or the executive branch. What we are
trying to do is to insure that they are given the kind of support
which they very richly deserve.

Finally, I think the sense of what we have tried to express here
this morning—what we have sensed over a period of several years—
is that it always seems to be possible for the United States to inter­
pose its will when it comes to the fighting aspects of a war. But
when it comes to helping heal or pick up the human debris of war,
we suddenly become shy and unable to act with the same sense of determination and priority as when we decide to drop bombs.

We will see, as we get into the Cambodia refugee problems tomorrow, where best estimates say 2 million people have been displaced by the war, that there is still no real refugee program, and we refuse to contribute to one. And in Laos, where nearly 300,000 refugees are on relief rolls, funds are diverted or used for paramilitary operations and to support paramilitary activities. We hear example after example, even in the well developed refugee programs in Vietnam, that too little of the benefits of the program actually get out to the people. Funds are misallocated, and others are stolen. In any event, it is a low priority item in the minds of the South Vietnamese Government, and tragically in the planning of our own administration. And I don't mean just the present one, but previous administrations as well. And I hope that as we—as the American people—begin to wrestle with our policy involvement in Southeast Asia, whether it was misguided or not—and I have expressed my views on that issue—that one central theme will be that we care what happens to human beings and our fellow citizens of mankind. I think regardless of whether we are a hawk or a dove about the war, certainly there is agreement that there is much more that can be done to alleviate human suffering there, and I believe the overwhelming majority of Americans want to see this achieved. I think that this is as true today as it has been since this tragic war developed.

I want you to leave this morning with the feeling of at least the members of this committee, of the great sense of urgency which we feel—which I know we personally share with you gentlemen—and which we want you to return to the Department with. Let them know that we are expressing this urgency because many members of the Congress and the Senate share this sense of urgency as expressed to them by the American people. Even though we have the kinds of exchanges, such as we have had this morning, which at times put us at odds, I am hopeful that you can let us know what assistance and support you need and can let us try to see if we can't battle for it. And I am sure that you will receive it.

Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add one brief footnote to that.

Don't be bashful about telling us about success in this area—even little specific human successes—because we want to know from a practical point of view that good work is done, and we want to help you do more. If you keep us advised of the areas that you feel are the areas of strength, we can perhaps reinforce your efforts, and support you where you are being successful. So don't be shy about giving us good news. We like to hear that side too. And we are not just looking for ways of nit-picking and criticizing.

Mr. Noot. I appreciate your comment. Often we become so embroiled with statistics that we do lose sight of those human stories that you refer to.

Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.

We will recess until 9:30 tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene Tuesday, May 9, 1972, at 9:30 a.m.)
APPENDIX I

TEXT OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE FOUR-YEAR PLAN FOR SOCIAL WELFARE

The following text of the Government of South Vietnam's "Four-Year Community Defense and Local Development Plan" for Social Welfare was submitted to the Subcommittee subsequent to the hearing by the Agency for International Development:

[From the Four Year Community Defense and Local Development Plan (1972-75)]

ANNEX III: LOCAL SELF-DEVELOPMENT

APPENDIX I: SOCIAL WELFARE

I. General

A. General Situation

1. Since 1968, the Ministry of Social Welfare has focused its major activities on the relief and normalization of war victims' lives. These include the wounded, the families of deceased victims, people whose houses have been destroyed, anti-communist refugees, repatriates from Cambodia, war orphans, widows and disabled people.

2. The Ministry of Social Welfare has endeavored to improve the services it provides to care for economically, mentally and physically handicapped people.

3. The Ministry of Social Welfare has cooperated with the Central Relief Committee in providing timely and urgent relief to the victims of Typhoon Louise in 1970 and Typhoon Hester in 1971.

4. In the field of social welfare, the Ministry of Social Welfare has obtained foreign aid for the improvement of orphanages and day nurseries, has increased the efficiency of the social cadre and has directed all services towards nutritional, educational and vocational training purposes.

5. In the domain of prevention and combat of social evils, the Ministry of Social Welfare has stepped up the education of delinquent youths and teenagers and has laid the foundation for programs of social education for uncared for teenagers (Homeless Children's Center).

6. In addition to routine relief, the Ministry of Social Welfare has sought to direct its activities towards the rehabilitation and development of deprived individuals, families, and communities through the Rehabilitation Center and the community center programs.

7. In general, during these last three years the Ministry of Social Welfare has partly solved the social problems caused by the war. However, in view of what has to be done in the coming years, we should admit that the government will have to make greater efforts to raise the standard of living of these people who are in need of essential social services.

B. Duties

1. War Victims.—a. In the next four years, the war will gradually wane and providing there are no sudden changes, Vietnamese society will move into a peaceful phase. The number of monthly war victims and consequent requirements for relief will decrease gradually, and the social program will center upon the objective of self-development. However, the consequences of the war will long exert an influence upon social activities.

b. According to statistics, the Government has brought normal life to 412,468 families whose houses have been damaged, 105,506 Vietnamese repatriates from Cambodia and 4,289,905 anti-communist refugees. Nevertheless, the standard of living of these families is still low because many of them have had neither land to till nor employment.

c. Thus, the Government should make unceasing efforts to develop a rehabilitation program which will provide more effective assistance to poor individuals,
families and communities among present war victims, and continue to plan for normalization of the lives of and relief for, future victims.

2. Economically, physically and mentally handicapped people.—a. For “Social Justice” to become a reality, it is necessary that the country care for its unfortunate, old, handicapped, poor and sick.
   b. For the blind, dumb and deaf and elderly inexpensive government restaurants and rehabilitation centers will be provided with funds and equipment to increase the efficiency of social services.

3. Victims of natural disasters and fire.
   Past experience indicates that the Vietnamese people will suffer yearly natural disasters such as typhoons and floods, the government has prepared for these disasters by establishing emergency relief machinery, and set aside funds and a quantity of articles for use in these emergencies.

4. The family.—a. In order to build sound and progressive societies, all nations in the world tend to give priority consideration to the family because it is the foundation of society. In Vietnam, due to the shortage of cadre, social services are provided only in a number of installations such as orphanages, day nurseries and boarding facilities for girl students.
   b. In the future, apart from improving the above facilities, the Ministry of Social Welfare will establish a new program of home day-care services; provide community centers with educational and vocational training services; and if possible, furnish each family with social services.

5. Victims of social evils.
   The war has given rise to many social evils in Vietnam. The duty of the Ministry of Social Welfare in this field is to cooperate with private and government agencies in preventing and minimizing social malpractices. The methods of educating and rehabilitating victims of socially corrupt practices will be refined and improved.

6. Village, hamlet and urban communities.
   The war has upset the social structure of Vietnam. The flight of the people from the communists, their return to war-stricken villages and hamlets, the establishment of new resettlement centers, and the movement of people to urban areas, have impaired the traditional community spirit of the Vietnamese people. Therefore, the Government should renew a sense of community among the people and urge them to implement development programs within the capability of each community, with technical, financial and material support from the Government.

II. Concept
  A. Objectives
   1. Social welfare activities aim to support those members of society who are disadvantaged so that differences among social strata may be reduced, and to provide social services for these people, their families and their communities so that they may have favorable opportunities to live comfortably and make spiritual and material progress.
   2. Under the country’s present circumstances social welfare activities are also aimed at providing effective support for the three objectives: Self-Defense, Self-Government, and Self-Development, in addition to the long-range objectives mentioned above.
   3. It is necessary to view the assistance to war victims, disaster victims, and socially deprived people as a form of social justice essential for the people’s confidence in the leadership of the Government. This will encourage the people to participate in the common national defense.
   4. The people are urged to directly determine their own needs and directly implement their self-development projects to acquaint them with the management of their own community.
   5. Finally, all operations ranging from the rehabilitation of handicapped people to family allowances, development of resettlement centers, return-to-village, etc., are aimed at the development of self-sufficiency.
  B. Guidelines
   1. The nation should assist unfortunate individuals, but this assistance must be rendered in such a way that it allows these people to help themselves.
   2. Social operations must proceed continuously from the relief stage through rehabilitation to the development stage.