3. Social operations must be coordinated by the Government, guided by cadre and participated in by the people.
4. Social operations need financial, material and personnel support from various charitable organizations in and outside the country. While Vietnam is moving to its development stage, requests for foreign aid in the social field are essential.
5. Social operations must be based on established procedures and criteria. Accordingly, social legislation must be amended to meet new concepts and policies.

III. Implementation

A. Social Welfare Plan

The Social Welfare Plan for 1972-1975 will be implemented through nine operational programs and a number of supporting programs. The ultimate objective is to bring well-being and prosperity to the socially deprived.

B. Relief Program for People Killed or Wounded by the War and People Whose Houses are Damaged by the War

1. Procedures for processing and paying allowance requests.—a. When a minor accident occurs and after assessment of house damage and loss of life has been made, relief will be started immediately with emergency funds allocated in advance to provinces (from VN$50,000 to VN$1,000,000) in accordance with Decision 204/TTXHT/2/KCT/ND, 13 September 1968, without awaiting advance approval from the Ministry of Social Welfare.
   b. Then, the province social welfare service will report, by the end of each month, on the relief situation in order that the Minister of Social Welfare may determine the necessity for reimbursing emergency funds. Forms NNOC/8 and NNOC/9 will be used for this report.
   c. In case of major relief for which emergency funds are inadequate, an urgent report must be submitted to the Ministry of Social Welfare for funds and material support. The report will contain the following information:
      (1) Cause of accident.
      (2) Date, time, and location of accident.
      (3) Number of houses damaged 20-50% and number of victims to be given allowances.
      (4) Number of houses damaged over 50% and number of victims to be given allowances.
      (5) Number of dead victims aged 15 and older, number under 15.
      (6) Number of wounded victims.
      (7) Present balance in relief fund.
      (8) Funds required for relief.
   d. District and village officials should show victims how to make requests for allowances when minor scattered accidents occur locally. However, in those cases in which victims have suffered large damages and losses, district and village officials will inventory and list the damages, then send the list immediately to the province administrative headquarters and province social welfare service (per Circular 10880/BXH/KCT/NNCC/TRC/TT, 19 November 1969).
   2. Officials at all levels, who are responsible for the management of the War Victims Fund, will comply with Decision 1234-ND/XH, 20 January 1971 and Circular 75/BXH/QLKT/QCTNNCC, 18 January 1972.

C. Program to Improve the Life of Anti-Communist Refugees

1. Tasks to be done.—a. Through the data processing reports system, a check will be made to determine the number of centers still lacking facilities and conveniences and in which the people have not been provided with enough support to be self-sufficient.
   b. Implement at the above-mentioned centers development projects to improve the people's health and education.
   c. Seek employment for these people.
   d. Complete the resettlement and return-to-village of temporary anti-communist refugees generated in 1971 and earlier years.
   e. Complete the self-resettlement or collective resettlement of Vietnamese who repatriated from Cambodia before 21 August 1970.
f. Provide timely relief and complete the resettlement and return-to-village of all anti-communist refugees generated during 1972, if any.


b. Carry out the military civic action program outlined in Circular 1771/P.Th.T/BDXD/KH, 12 October 1969, CPDC, to help the people in return-to-village hamlets, to raise their standard of living.

c. People will not be called on to move from their hamlets to government-controlled areas unless the achievement of the pacification objectives requires the movement of people as instructed by Directive 810/TT/PS/BD, 24 April 1969, JGS/RVNAF.

d. In the event people must be relocated, province pacification and development councils must submit their plan to OFCD, MSW and MR concerned; such a plan may be carried out only when approved by CPDC (Ref: Circular 1412/P.Th.T/HDP/P/KHII, 15 May 1971, CPDC).

e. RVNAF and Allied Troop participation in relief operations for anti-communist refugees and war victims will be requested as outlined in 1972 Combined Campaign Plan (AB 147, JGS/RVNAF, Annex E) and its successor plans.

3. Procedures for implementation of development projects in return-to-village hamlets.—a. Previously the Ministry of Social Welfare only allocated funds to provinces and cities for implementing anti-communist resettlement centers. During 1972, in order to realistically encourage and help anti-communist refugees who want to return to their home villages and hamlets, the Ministry of Social Welfare will allocate funds to provinces and cities for the implementation of development projects in hamlets where more than 300 anti-communist refugees have returned to their original villages.

b. These development projects will be implemented in compliance with the aspirations expressed through deliberation and voting procedures of the anti-communist refugees returning to their villages.

c. Province PD Councils are responsible for consideration of these development projects and for submitting them to the Ministry of Social Welfare. If the development projects are accepted, the Ministry of Social Welfare will allocate funds to provinces and cities for implementation. Province Chiefs and City Mayors will make these funds available to Deputy District Chiefs who will act as accounting managers. The implementation of these approved development projects will be under the supervision of Province PD Councils, Province Chiefs, District Chiefs and Province Social Welfare Service Chiefs. Construction projects must be implemented through state management control procedures; bidding for the construction of such projects is strictly prohibited. Anti-communist refugees who are returning to village may participate in these construction projects and assign representatives for the purpose of monitoring expenditures.

d. The above-mentioned procedures, entrusted to local authorities, for the implementation of development projects, are consistent with local self-management and community development principles. Moreover, they can help to avoid overlap with VSD projects.

e. In those hamlets where the anti-communist refugees returning to village have been settled in 1969, 1970 and 1971, but where as yet the development programs for these hamlets have not been implemented, requests may be submitted to the Ministry of Social Welfare for financial support of the most necessary development projects following the above-mentioned procedures.

4. Responsibilities.—a. At central level.

(1) The Ministry of Social Welfare is responsible for the overall management of the program for the relief of refugees under the supervision of the Central Pacification and Development Council.

(2) Close coordination will be effected between the Central Pacification and Development Council, Ministry of Social Welfare and other concerned Ministries in order that timely solutions may be found for important resettlement, return-to-village and evacuation problems.

(3) Ministries and services which support the “Brighter Life for War Victims” program will issue to their subordinate agencies the necessary directives for execution of this program.
b. At local level.

   (2) Province Pacification and Development Councils will comply with Circular 1294, 13 August 1969, and Circular 1889, 18 September 1969 of the Prime Minister's Office concerning the planning of resettlement and return-to-village.

   (3) Close coordination will be maintained among province, city councils, province headquarters, technical services, religious sects, political parties, social welfare and youth groups in the implementation of the "Brighter Life for War Victims" program.

   (4) Each province will organize seminars for village and hamlet officials (especially the cultural and social welfare commissioners) to train them in the procedures for the relief of evacuees, war victims, repatriated Vietnamese, war orphans and widows.

   (5) Village and hamlet authorities will quickly and accurately control resettlement, evacuation and repatriation in order to provide positive assistance to those in need and to prevent abuses.

   (7) District and village authorities will assist victims in completing requests for relief and will quickly forward these dossiers to province headquarters and social welfare services for consideration.

D. The Program for the Relief of the Incapable.

1. The incapable consist of:
   a. Physically incapable such as the blind, crippled, deaf-mutes.
   b. The destitute.
   c. The elderly without shelter.

2. Provisions for relief.—a. The incapable will be nourished and supported permanently at social charity facilities such as:
   (1) Homes for the aged.
   (2) Hospices.
   (3) Blind, deaf-mute Institutes.
   (4) Rehabilitation centers for the destitute.
   (5) Low-price meal houses.

b. Incapables may be granted subsidies in cash or in kind when they do not want to stay in these facilities.

   (1) At the beginning of the year, provinces and cities should check the patient load of these facilities and establish dossiers requesting daily or special allowances. These dossiers will be submitted to the Ministry of Social Welfare when requesting funds.
   (2) Saigon Capital, provinces and cities should encourage these facilities to develop self-help projects as a means of increasing revenue. The Ministry of Social Welfare will provide funds and gifts to these facilities when such funds and gifts are available.

b. The Blind/Deaf-Mute Institute. This Institute is supported by the Ministry of Social Welfare and provides room, board and technical training to its residents.

c. Rehabilitation Center for the Destitute. This Center is supported by the Ministry of Social Welfare and provides room, board and technical training to its residents.

d. Low price restaurants. Saigon Capital, provinces and cities may request the Ministry of Social Welfare to establish and manage low price restaurants or entrust them to private organizations or individuals in order to provide low price meals to the unemployed or very poor. The price for each meal will be fixed by a local price committee. The Government will subsidize each meal by providing 250 to 300 grams of rice.

e. Victims of traffic or labor accidents. Victims (or next of kin) or traffic or labor accidents and victims (or next of kin) of accidents involving drowning, suffocation or lightning, who do not receive compensation from other sources, will be entitled to compensation from the Ministry of Social Welfare.

f. Grant for purchase of coffin. This grant is given to relatives of those who die of sickness or old age to help them with the cost of burial.

g. For poor patients who are released from the hospital and run out of money while traveling. Each poor patient who is released from the hospital, who runs...
out of money while traveling, who has no means to return home or who has no shelter will be granted the following:

1. Foodstuffs and material stored at the province social welfare service.
2. Mess card to obtain free meals at the low price restaurants.
3. Assistance at hostels.
4. Issuance of cards authorizing free transportation.

For repatriated Vietnamese (not belonging to the program for relief of Vietnamese repatriated from Cambodia), and for Vietnamese nationals or students in foreign countries who become poor and cannot continue their livelihood or study abroad. Each will be provided a free ticket to return to Vietnam if he or she so desires. The request for repatriation allowance, with comments of the Vietnam Embassy at the concerned foreign country, will be forwarded to the Ministry of Social Welfare and request that local authorities investigate the individual’s financial situation. If the investigation determines that the individual cannot afford to return to Vietnam, the Ministry of Social Welfare will provide a ticket for his return.

E. Program for Relief of Victims of Disaster and Fire.

1. Typhoons, floods and fires are unexpected accidents which may severely disrupt the lives of their victims. Therefore, the Government both at central level and at localities, must be ready to support disaster victims in a timely manner with the facilities on hand. Furthermore, in order to effectively assist these victims and normalize quickly their activities, the Government will form relief committees at all levels to coordinate the activities of all private and public agencies.

2. Support for disaster victims requires the cooperation of public and private agencies, in the localities. When disasters occur, the local social service will coordinate with the local administrative agency to conduct an inventory of the damages; afterwards, the social welfare service will present the inventory to the Ministry. After consideration the Ministry will allocate funds to province and city administrative headquarters for distribution to the victims through the local social welfare service.

3. In Saigon and Cholon, the Capital Social Welfare Service will report to the Ministry each time a disaster occurs. Subsequently, the Ministry will issue a decision for support and allocate funds to the Capital Social Welfare Service.

F. Program for the Support of Children.

1. Measures taken—
a. Management of public agencies is provided by the Ministry of Social Welfare. Public agencies will be provided with funds for personnel, electricity, water, medicines, etc. The Ministry of Social Welfare will grant a monthly food and drink allowance which is based on the number of children and is dependent upon the capacity of the budget.

b. Private agencies will be supported with food and drink allowances to feed children in orphanages and day nurseries.

c. In addition, these agencies will be supplied with other items such as beds, mats, mosquito nets, blankets and domestic implements. Beginning 1973, the support rates will be increased in order to cope with inflation.

d. In 1972, public institutions which were built last year but which did not receive equipment will be supplied with equipment.

e. For a number of institutions constructed years ago, maintenance of rooms, sanitation and culvert systems, electrical and water systems is necessary. Additional facilities also are needed.

f. Assistance will be provided to institutions for organizing the agriculture, animal husbandry, fishery and handicraft projects so that they may develop a self-sufficient source of income and reduce the need to resort to government support or support from foreign charitable organizations.

g. Presently, most day nurseries are located in the Capital of province towns. Beginning in 1972, in order to help the families of poor workers in villages and hamlets, the Ministry will establish a number of day nurseries in the districts.

h. Most of the personnel working in “Aid to Children” social welfare organizations have not been trained technically. Therefore, the Ministry has organized training courses for nursing personnel. The personnel who have been trained when they return to work in their former agencies will be paid an allow-
ance of VN$1,500 each month. (It is planned that this allowance will be increased to VN$2,000 beginning 1973.)

1. The child care program will be expanded if additional funds become available. See TAB 9.

2. In the management and development of organizations assisting children, Social Welfare agencies and services at Central and local levels will be responsible for the following:
   a. Local.
      (1) Confirm valid requirements of each agency.
      (2) Establish dossiers or inspect dossiers and submit requests to the Ministry for issuance of funds or for authority to implement the operations.
      (3) Control and follow the implementation of the operations or the use of funds.
      (4) Report the results to the Ministry.
   b. Central.
      (1) Examine dossiers.
      (2) Send representatives to make an on-the-spot survey if necessary.
      (3) Issue decisions for support.
      (4) Follow up on the implementation of each decision in order to adjust it to valid requirements.

3. Increase the effectiveness of agencies assisting children.—a. Local.
   (1) Study the requirements of technical personnel of the agency.
   (2) Recommend personnel to be trained.
   (3) Send reports to the Ministry on the activities of the agencies in order to send in the supervisory teams to improve the operations.
   b. Central.
      (1) Organize technical training courses.
      (2) Issue funds for support of personnel who have been trained.
      (3) Assign supervisory teams to go to the field to look into the requirements of the local areas.

G. Program for Social Defense

Priority should be given to the prevention of social diseases. The social defense program aims to prevent young men and women from falling into the inherent corrupt practices found in all societies of the world: hooliganism, prostitution, narcotics. If the program is implemented efficiently, socially corrupt practices will gradually decrease. Capital, provinces and cities should do the following: Provide aid to the “But Doi Centers” which support abandoned children with food and lodging, give them the opportunity to learn the alphabet, a profession or return to their families. The Ministry of Social Welfare will encourage private charitable organizations to open additional centers in provinces and cities.

H. Program for Eradication of Social Evils

The Ministry of Social Welfare will coordinate closely with the Central Committee for Eradication of Social Evils. This program and the Special Program outlined in Annex IV: Appendix B: Eradication of Social Evils are intended to be mutually supporting. This program will stress the following:

1. Rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents. Beginning in 1972, the Ministry will increase its efforts to rehabilitate juvenile delinquents. The rehabilitation will be conducted in three phases.—a. During the first phase juvenile delinquents will live at the Chinh Hu Huy Center. While at this Center, they will be under strict control.
   b. During phase two juvenile delinquents will live at the Chinh Hu Huy Center. Controls will be less strict at this Center, and they will be allowed to leave the center on their own from time to time.
   c. During the third phase, juvenile delinquents will live at the Thu Duc Center. This Center can accommodate approximately 400. They will be free to leave the center when they are not engaged in a center activity.
   d. Each juvenile delinquent will receive treatment which has been tailored to his or her specific case.
   e. Each juvenile delinquent will receive vocational training (such as carpentry, blacksmithing, tailoring, printing, etc.) so that each will have a skill when released.
2. Rehabilitation of prostitutes. In 1972, two centers will be available, and each center will accommodate 200 girls. At these centers (Vinh Dong and Binh Dol) prostitutes will receive treatment especially designed to assist them. They also will receive vocational training.

I. Rehabilitation Program

1. The purpose of the rehabilitation program is to provide social services appropriate for each individual situation. Presently, this program serves 166,000 disabled people (civilians, war victims, veterans) and 389,000 war orphans and war widows. As social services are expanded the program will be placed under the management of an Inter-Ministerial Committee with the following components:
   a. Representative of MSW, Chairman.
   b. Representatives of Ministries of Health, Veterans, Labor, Defense and Education, and the National Rehabilitation Institute, members.
   c. The above Committee is responsible to fix policy and guidelines, coordinate operations, and assign technical personnel to rehabilitation centers.

2. Measures—
   a. Establish one center in each MR. (One rehabilitation center presently operates in Da Nang.)
   b. Each Rehabilitation Center will have professional orientation personnel from the Ministry of Education, job placement personnel from the Ministry of Labor, physicians from the Ministry of Health, Social Welfare personnel and personnel from the Ministry of Veterans.
   c. Handicapped people will be provided food and lodging upon their admission to a rehabilitation center and until they return to a normal life.
   d. After rehabilitation, the handicapped will continue to receive necessary care.

J. Community Center Program

1. Measures—
   a. Establishment of community centers. During the initial phase the Government will grant financial support to localities to construct model community centers; then the Government will encourage people in communities to establish and manage centers by themselves and with their own contributions.
   b. Popularize through books, magazines, broadcasting and TV programs the advantages of the community centers.
   c. Encourage people to form professional groups, mutual assistance and sports associations, etc., in order to create a medium of collective activity and a cooperative spirit in each community.

2. Guidance for Organization and Management—
   a. Initially social welfare cadre will publicize the advantages of collective activities, taking advantage of any good occasion to assemble people in a convenient location to discuss projects commonly useful to the community.
   b. After many joint planning sessions, the people will realize that they need an office for collective activity. Community centers then will be established at an existing office or at an office to be constructed.
   c. Each community center must be managed by a managing board whose members are local people and be composed as follows:
      (1) Chairman
      (2) Vice Chairman
      (3) Secretary General
      (4) Finance Commissioner
      (5) Social Welfare Commissioner
      (6) Other commissioners, if necessary.
   d. The Managing Board will have the following duties:
      (1) Recruit a number of permanent personnel to manage the center.
      (2) Survey the population and resources of the community concerned.
      (3) Define operational requirements of the center.
      (4) Establish operational projects.
e. Resources necessary for establishment and management of a community center.

(1) Will be contributed by the people.
(2) Or will be financially supported by Central or local government in necessary cases.

K. Coordinating Instructions.

1. Ministry of Information.—a. Instruct the province information services to publicize the programs for relief of anti-communist refugees, war victims, repatriated Vietnamese, war orphans and widows.
b. Provide information cadre to resettlement centers and return-to-village hamlets.

b. Instruct RD Cadre to coordinate with local authorities for the implementation of development projects.

3. Ministry of Health.—a. Provide cadre, medicine and equipment necessary for the management of maternities/dispensaries operating at resettlement centers and return-to-village hamlets.
b. Pay salaries of health cadre recruited in 1971 (medics, rural mid-wives) who are serving at resettlement centers and return-to-village hamlets.
c. Provide health services to Da Nang Rehabilitation Center.
d. Coordinate with community centers to popularize the Family Planning Program and to provide information and services as required.

b. Pay salaries of teachers recruited in 1971 and who are working in resettlement centers and return-to-village hamlets.
c. Assist in organizing vocational training courses at technical schools for war victims and handicapped people.
d. Assist in organizing adult education classes.

b. Provide refugees with seed's, fertilizer, agricultural implements, and fishery implements.


b. Seek jobs for war victims and handicapped people.


11. Ministry of War Veterans. Support Da Nang Rehabilitation Center as required.


## IV. GOALS AND FUNDS

### Programs and operations 1-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Goals (Person)</th>
<th>Funds (Person)</th>
<th>Goals (Person)</th>
<th>Funds (Person)</th>
<th>Goals (Person)</th>
<th>Funds (Person)</th>
<th>Goals (Person)</th>
<th>Funds (Person)</th>
<th>Goals (Person)</th>
<th>Funds (Person)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### A. Relief for mortally wounded, wounded and persons having houses damaged due to war

1. Allowances for mortally wounded:
   a. 15 years and over
   b. Under 15 years old
   c. Immediate allowances

2. Allowances for wounded:
   a. Under 15 years old
   b. Over 15 years old

3. Allowances for victims of natural disasters and war:
   a. Food allowances
   b. Rice allowances
   c. Allowances for construction and reconstruction
   d. Allowances for low-cost restaurants

4. Allowances for reconstruction:

### B. Program for improvement of temporary evacuees' standard of living

1. Reception of new temporary evacuees:

2. Settlement and return to village:

3. Clearing and leveling land:

4. Allowances for fire victims:

5. Maternities, first aid stations:

6. Vocational training (courses):

7. Agriculture and husbandry projects:

### C. Relief for victims of natural disasters and war

1. Allowances for fire victims:
   a. Mortally wounded and wounded
   b. Food allowances
   c. Reconstruction allowances

2. Allowances for flood victims:
   a. Mortally wounded and wounded
   b. Food allowances
   c. Reconstruction allowances

### D. Relief of needy and weak elements:

1. Allotments for members of 47 old folk homes and relief centers:

2. Rice allowances for G2 low-cost restaurants:

3. Allowances for construction and renovation of old folk homes and relief centers:

### Details of Relief Goals and Funds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Goals (Person)</th>
<th>Funds (Person)</th>
<th>Goals (Person)</th>
<th>Funds (Person)</th>
<th>Goals (Person)</th>
<th>Funds (Person)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### IV. GOALS AND FUNDS—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Persons)</td>
<td>($1,000)</td>
<td>(Persons)</td>
<td>($1,000)</td>
<td>(Persons)</td>
<td>($1,000)</td>
<td>(Persons)</td>
<td>($1,000)</td>
<td>(Persons)</td>
<td>($1,000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. 2. Elements living outside social welfare installations:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Victims of labor accidents and traffic accidents</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Purchase of coffins</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>1,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Patients discharged from hospitals without money for travel</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>2,870</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>14,600</td>
<td>12,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Needy elements</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>53,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>55,500</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>214,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>235,610</td>
<td>252,570</td>
<td>359,330</td>
<td>457,480</td>
<td>1,314,990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Reconstruction allowances</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>7,700</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>8,050</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>31,15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>8,140</td>
<td>8,510</td>
<td>8,880</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Mother and child protection:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Children)</td>
<td>3,230</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,443</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,562</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,687</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Allowances for private installations: (Installations)</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>184,275</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>272,178</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>304,887</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>335,372</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>1,096,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>35,505</td>
<td></td>
<td>39,054</td>
<td></td>
<td>42,958</td>
<td></td>
<td>47,253</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Consolidation of existing installations:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Add' equipment for newly completed installations</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Improvement of old installations</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>73,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### F. Program for Social Defense:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Support to houses for children living on city walkways</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>6,000</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9,000</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>12,000</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>15,000</th>
<th>42,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Support to houses for ex-convict children</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Social education through radio broadcasting and television networks</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### G. Program for Eradication of Social Evils:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Children's Re-education Center at Thu Duc</th>
<th>500</th>
<th>12,000</th>
<th>500</th>
<th>13,000</th>
<th>500</th>
<th>13,800</th>
<th>500</th>
<th>13,800</th>
<th>52,600</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Establishment of two additional reeducation centers at each MR</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Center for protection of women at Vinh Long</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>18,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Support Center for care of opium addicts</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2,150</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>8,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Center for protection of women at Binh Loi</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22,700</td>
<td>31,250</td>
<td>36,400</td>
<td>45,100</td>
<td>137,450</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Persons)</td>
<td>($1,000)</td>
<td>(Persons)</td>
<td>($1,000)</td>
<td>(Persons)</td>
<td>($1,000)</td>
<td>(Persons)</td>
<td>($1,000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Rehabilitation program:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Rehabilitation Center (MR 1)</td>
<td>$15,400</td>
<td>$16,940</td>
<td>$19,500</td>
<td>$23,400</td>
<td>$23,400</td>
<td>$23,400</td>
<td>$30,840</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Rehabilitation Center (MR 4)</td>
<td>20,885</td>
<td>16,940</td>
<td>19,500</td>
<td>23,400</td>
<td>23,400</td>
<td>23,400</td>
<td>63,825</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rehabilitation Center (MR 2)</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>23,400</td>
<td>23,400</td>
<td>23,400</td>
<td>44,400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Rehabilitation Center (MR 3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36,285</td>
<td>54,880</td>
<td>79,500</td>
<td>93,600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>248,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Community center programs:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Renovation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Management (Centers)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>$30,000</td>
<td>$15,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>63,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>87,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. Planning and reporting

A. Planning.

1. Based on the guidance of the Four Year Plan, all Social Welfare Services throughout the country will expedite the preparation of "Social Welfare Programs" and forward them to the Province Pacification and Development Coordinating Center which will in turn submit these programs to the Central Pacification and Development Council for consideration.

2. The Four Year Social Welfare Program of each province or city will be one of the Appendices of the Four Year Development Plan of that province or city.

3. Social Welfare Services which are responsible for administration in both province and city, such as Binh Dinh-Qui Nhon, Khanh Hoa-Nha Trang, Phong Dinh-Can Tho, etc. will prepare either a common program including operations of province and city or two separate programs, according to the desires of Province and City Pacification and Development Councils.

4. When the Social Welfare Program has been approved by the province, the social welfare service will immediately forward it to the MSW in three copies to be used as reference documents when reviewing and considering the Four Year Plan with the Central Pacification and Development Council.

5. Province social welfare programs will include the following points:
   a. General.
      (1) General Situation. Briefly recapitulate operations carried out in the past four years and specify the tasks to be continued or to be initiated in the coming four years.
      (2) Duties. Fix the goals for the coming four years and provide full details for the 1972 program. Programs for 1973, 1974 and 1975 may be mentioned in general terms.
   b. Concept. The concept of national programs does not have to be repeated; however, the concept of the province social welfare program should indicate the method by which the locality will implement the programs of the Central Committee. For example, if the province has no convenient place for establishment of settlement hamlets, what does the province advocate? What instructions will province give to district and village authorities for implementation?
   c. Implementation.
      (1) The Central has initiated nine operational programs:
         (a) Relief program for people killed or wounded and people whose houses have been damaged by the war.
         (b) Program to improve the life of anti-communist refugees.
         (c) Program for the relief of the incapable.
         (d) Program for relief of victims of disaster and fire.
         (e) Program for the support of children.
         (f) Program for social defense.
         (g) Program for eradication of social evils.
         (h) Rehabilitation program.
         (i) Community center program.
      (2) Each province or city program should aim at the following main points:
         (a) Principles for implementation. In addition to common principles specified by the Central, localities will prepare their own guidelines appropriate to the local situation.
         (b) Operations to be implemented.
         (c) Procedures to be carried out for each type of operation. Give instructions to technical agencies in the province and local administrative officials on how to operate jointly.
      (3) In provinces and cities having no rehabilitation center or community center, the estimate of funds required for operation will be based on the guidelines of provinces or cities.
   d. Goals and funds.
      (1) Province and city goals will be specified for the following programs.
         (a) Relief program for people killed or wounded by the war and people whose houses have been damaged by the war. Fix goals and funds required.
         (b) Program to improve the life of anti-communist refugees.
         (c) Program for relief of the incapable. Fix goals and funds required for social welfare facilities. For needy and weak persons not living in social welfare facilities, the fund will be estimated as in previous years.
(d) Program for relief of victims of disasters and fire. Estimate funds.
(e) Program for the support of children. Fix goals and fund required.
(f) Program for social defense. Estimate funds, if required.
(g) Program for eradication of social evils. Estimate funds, if required.
(h) Rehabilitation program. Estimate number of people to be supported.
(i) Community center program. Estimate funds for establishment of centers at localities.

(2) The forms at TABs 1 to 5 will be completed and submitted with province plan.

B. Reporting

Submit reports as prescribed in Annex V of the Four Year Community Defense and Local Development Plan (1972–75).

1. Monthly report.—a. All social welfare services must pay special attention to and carefully carry out the establishment and use of computerized reports under the guidance of the Central.

b. At the end of each month, province social welfare services recapitulate all data concerning funds, war victims (those who suffer losses due to the war, temporary evacuees, repatriates from Cambodia) and operational progress in settlement, return-to-village and development.

2. Quarterly report.—a. In regard to programs for which there is no computerized report, reports will be prepared each quarter or when requested by the Central through a radio message.

b. The following programs will be reported quarterly:

(1) Program for the relief of the incapable (See TAB 6).
(2) Rehabilitation program (See TAB 7).
(3) Community center program (See TAB 8).
APPENDIX II

"THE TRAGEDY OF INDOCHINA: TEN MILLION CIVILIAN VICTIMS"

By Senator Edward M. Kennedy

[From The 1972 Compton Yearbook, pp. 28-43]

The Indochina war confronts the world with a very serious regional crisis of people—millions of people—refugees, civilian casualties, war victims of all kinds. Over the years nothing has more accurately documented the intensity and spread of the conflict and the level and nature of military operations than the number of civilians killed or wounded or made refugees. By this measure, even today, the war is scarcely winding down for the peoples directly involved.

In South Vietnam, with an estimated population of 18 million, the United States Agency for International Development (AID) estimates that some 5.4 million persons have become refugees and war victims since 1964. This figure is based on an estimated 2.4 million refugees from 1964 to 1966—a period prior to the time that a registration procedure for refugees was developed—and the actual registration of war victims since then. As of mid-1971, the toll was continuing to climb. During the first six months of 1971, the flow of newly registered refugees and war victims averaged more than 33,300 per month. And despite the claimed resettlement of tens of thousands, the active case load of those still receiving benefits rose dramatically from some 483,300 in January to more than 587,200 in June. These 1971 figures represented a sharp increase in the flow of new refugees and war victims. It should be noted that over the years the General Accounting Office—the investigating agency for the U.S. Congress—has consistently reported that official statistics on the number of war victims are understated. The real toll is undoubtedly much higher.

The same is true concerning the number of civilian casualties in Vietnam. The official figures are based solely on hospital admissions. As of mid-1971, official figures reported 373,910 admissions since 1965. This is a misleading figure, although it is usually cited as the total figure by our government, because it omits civilian casualties treated elsewhere, those not treated at all, and those who are killed outright. If these additional numbers are added to hospital admissions, civilian casualties from 1965 through mid-1971 number some 1.1 million—including 335,000 deaths. These unofficial estimates represent the conclusions of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees after extensive inquiry over more than six years.

As of mid-1971 the toll of civilian casualties continued to climb. During the first six months of 1971, civilian casualties—based on hospital admissions alone—averaged more than 3,600 per month for a total of 22,085. The actual occurrence of civilian casualties, however, was probably at least 50,000, including as many as 10,000 deaths. In contrast to the sharp increase in the rate of new refugees and war victims during this period, the rate of civilian casualties had decreased, but was still comparable to the rate during 1967, one of the peak years of U.S. combat.

Inevitably, tens of thousands of the civilian casualties who have survived are physically disabled. Again, not all of them are reflected in official statistics. But as of late 1969 some 79,600 civilian amputees and paraplegics were registered with the Vietnamese government, as well as some 25,000 civilians who had become blind or deaf from war causes. Additionally, the official registration listed some 258,000 orphans and some 181,000 war widows.

In Laos, with an estimated population of some 2.8 million, at least 700,000 persons have become refugees over the years. As of mid-1971 the toll was continuing to climb. Despite the claimed resettlement of thousands, the official refugee relief case load rose from 283,000 in January to 317,000 in June. Estimates on the number of civilian casualties have always been difficult to determine for Laos. Conveniently or otherwise, few official records have been kept.

(83)
until recently. In what can only be called an understatement in response to my inquiry in April 1970, officials in the U.S. Department of State called the casualty situation "serious and getting worse." In September, after a field investigation and additional inquiry, the subcommittee on refugees estimated that from early 1969 through the summer of 1970—a period of intensive conflict and U.S. bombing—civilian casualties probably numbered some 30,000, including at least 10,000 deaths. During the first six months of 1971, civilian casualties—based solely on admissions to U.S.-assisted medical facilities—averaged some 100 per month for a total of 1,200. As in the case of Vietnam, however, the actual occurrences of civilian casualties undoubtedly were much higher.

In the simplest human terms the story of the Meo tribespeople in Laos is a profoundly tragic one. Nearly the entire Meo population has become refugees—either as civilians fleeing from battle or as paramilitary forces, under U.S. tele-ge, taking flight from defeat. The Meo have been running since 1962. Some families, if they have survived, have moved as many as 18 times. The mortality rate caused by their constant dislocation over rugged terrain, and by the general hardship and endemic malnutrition the war precipitated, has been incalculable. U.S. officials estimate, for example, that during a long move, such as the evacuation from the hills along the Plain of Jars in early 1970, one out of every family of five dies en route. Of an estimated Meo population of 400,000 in 1960, some observers conservatively estimate that some 80% of the men have been killed and some 25% of the women and children have fallen as casualties. After long years of fleeing and fighting, of moving and dying, Meo ranks are demoralized and tragically thin. The cost to the Meo for services to U.S. interests has been nothing short of the decimation of their tribe.

In Cambodia—as of mid-1971, after little more than a year of war—estimates on the number of displaced persons ran as high as 2 million, nearly a third of Cambodia's population. The capital city of Phnom Penh and the provincial capitals and district towns were bulging with refugees from the countryside. Medical facilities were overburdened with civilian casualties. Although both Cambodian and U.S. officials were long aware of the widespread dislocation of people, there was little evidence to suggest that they were much concerned about the situation. This attitude was hauntingly similar to attitudes voiced by the South Vietnamese and Laotian governments on the same subject. If such attitudes—and the conflict—continue in Cambodia, there is little doubt that human priorities will again get lost in the tide of war.

It is difficult to comprehend the aggregate statistics—more than 10 million—of civilian war victims in Indochina. It is even more difficult to comprehend the implication of these statistics—let alone some other aspects of the war—on the social fabric, economic viability, and political organization of nations confronted with massive upheaval and total war.

But the vast human costs of the war do tell something about its unique character and the nature of U.S. involvement. Why have the costs been so great? How could such a massive human tragedy develop—almost unnoticed by our national leadership? How have U.S. military practices and political strategies contributed to it? What must we understand about our obligations to a people devastated by a decade of war? And what are we to understand about our responsibility to salvage a broken society?

THE "PEOPLE'S WAR"

The basic problem and central question that has troubled the U.S. over its role in the Indochina war was stated in testimony before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees by Ambassador William E. Colby, former deputy for pacification to the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam, on Apr. 21, 1971: "The nature of the war waged in Vietnam has imposed a heavy burden on the population of that country...it has been a 'people's war'".

What Ambassador Colby said about the war in Vietnam is equally true about the conflict in neighboring Laos and Cambodia. And today there can be little doubt that the Indochina war has indeed been a war of the people, tragically dramatized in the horrendous toll it has taken in the lives and spirit of civilians throughout the region. In such a war, a revolutionary "people's war," the key to "victory" is the political allegiance of people, not the amount of territory captured. The people become both the primary objective and the first
target of this unconventional conflict. The people are the “hearts and minds” to be won. They are the “water” in which the insurgent “fish” swims. They are the “population resource” to be “denied the enemy.” People become the focal point of “pacification” and “civic action” and all those other proliferating strategies, tactics, and slogans that are associated with U.S. involvement in Vietnam and in all of Indochina. For the other side, the people are the object of “national liberation” and “political reeducation.” In traditional warfare “the people” have always been considered noncombatants, to be victimized as military targets only inadvertently. But in the “people’s war,” the people inevitably become the focus of the conflict.

The first “people’s war” in Indochina was directed against the French colonial regime. The seeds for the second “people’s war” were unfortunately buried in the settlement of the first—a fact of history that has been too little understood in the U.S. or, for that matter, in the South Vietnamese government or elsewhere.

One of the first manifestations of the unsettled character of the first conflict in Indochina was the large movement of refugees from North to South Vietnam in 1954. In the months following the partition of Vietnam by the Geneva accords of July 1954, approximately 7% of the population of the North, about 600,000 persons, sought refuge in the southern part of this former French colony. It is certain that additional numbers would have come, had they not been prevented from leaving by the authorities of North Vietnam after the end of the 300-day period for free departure permitted by the Geneva accords.

The refugees, mostly peasants who had experienced a harsh life in Viet Minh-controlled areas during the first Indochina war, fled mainly for political reasons. They were fleeing from Communism. A substantial number were Roman Catholic, often led into exile by their religious leaders. By 1957 the government of South Vietnam, with the assistance of the U.S. government and several private voluntary agencies, had largely completed the important task of caring for these refugees and integrating them into the society and economy of their new country. With that, the South Vietnamese, like many Americans, considered the Indochina conflict settled and began, again with U.S. assistance, to consolidate their government and to develop their country.

The perception of the North Vietnamese, under Communist leadership, was fundamentally different. To them the “people’s war” could not be considered concluded until all the people of Vietnam were unified under one government. And so, while the task of integrating refugees from North Vietnam was underway in the south, the North Vietnamese initiated a second phase of the “people’s war.” This was done through the political and guerrilla activities of the indigenous South Vietnamese Viet Cong. By 1959 this second phase of the “people’s war” was well under way, as a growing level of terrorism began to claim an increasingly heavy toll in the lives of local officials and ordinary citizens. It gnawed at South Vietnam’s village structure and precipitated a deterioration in the political, economic, and social stability of the countryside. Inevitably this situation produced refugees, who moved in growing numbers from insecure areas to seek safety and relief assistance in district and provincial towns.

Initially, Americans were told by their government that these refugees were simply people fleeing from Communism—that they were making an ideological choice and “voting with their feet.” Both U.S. and South Vietnamese officials declared that these refugees were really an opportunity—a sign of good faith in the South Vietnamese government. And of course, to a degree, these officials were right.

But to most refugees the experience was far more complicated. By the early 1960’s the average villager began to find himself squeezed from both sides. His life was being disrupted by Viet Cong activities—forced labor and coercive taxation to political terrorism and guerrilla warfare. But to this disruption of rural life was added the new pressure of increased retaliatory military operations by South Vietnamese government forces. Each year, ground operations and, more particularly, artillery fire and aerial bombardment increased. In 1965, with the introduction of U.S. ground combat troops, this military activity dramatically escalated. No longer were Vietnamese fighting Vietnamese.

It is not without significance that within nine months of the arrival of U.S. combat units, nearly a million refugees flowed out of the countryside. During
those few months the U.S. had introduced a level of firepower and ground combat activity never seen before in South Vietnam. And as this activity continued, a truly massive shift from the countryside to the urban centers occurred in the Vietnamese population. Also, a new rationale was introduced to explain this movement. No longer did we hear that the refugees were "voting with their feet." Refugees, it was now said, were really a "population resource" that could and should be denied the enemy and used to the advantage of the South Vietnamese government. It was explained that if the Viet Cong could not rely upon the food and protection of the population—if the proverbial "water" could be drained away from the Viet Cong "fish"—then the Viet Cong would be defeated. Although such refugees might pose a short-term relief burden to the government, the war, it was confidently stated, would be shortened. But the refugees were not cared for, and the war was not shortened. And so, in the main, Vietnamese civilians became merely pawns to be exploited by all parties to the conflict.

When I visited Vietnam for a second time, in early 1968, the condition of the people was deteriorating rapidly, mainly as a result of our military practices—such as "search and destroy," "free fire zone," "free strike zone," "H & I fire" (harassment and interdiction), and "forced relocation." Implicit in these practices, and more, was the basically indiscriminate, and often careless, treatment of civilians. In a "search and destroy" operation, for example, things were more "destroyed" than searched.

Confronted with the inability to tell friend from foe, yet required to achieve some quantitative measure of "success"—such as enemy "body counts" and the number of Viet Cong "neutralized"—U.S. and South Vietnamese forces unleashed a firepower that displaced millions of Vietnamese from their lands and homes. In pursuit of our "people's war" strategy—of trying to kill Viet Cong on a massive scale while also "winning the hearts and minds" of other Vietnamese—the U.S. really achieved neither. There was, and still is, a deadly incompatibility between programs of winning the hearts and minds of villagers and simultaneously killing or capturing many of the villages' young men. In the final analysis, in our use of the modern technology of war—of heavy bombing and extensive artillery support, of trying to do from the air what we can not do from the ground—the U.S. has been destroying the very land and people it set out to save.

To anyone who has spent a night in a Vietnamese district town, where 105-millimeter howitzer cannon continuously shatter the night's silence, it comes as no surprise that a majority of the refugees surveyed in Vietnam have, over the years, complained most about bombs and artillery fire as their principal reason for fleeing their villages. From pilots dumping leftover "bombs into "free strike zones" to the all too frequent use of "H & I fire," it is little wonder that the Vietnamese continue looking to the sky with trepidation.

The same can be said for the people of Laos and Cambodia. In Laos, especially, aerial bombardment has contributed heavily to the displacement, injury, and death of civilians and to the destruction of the countryside. A key element in our government's military activities in Laos has been the U.S.-sponsored and -controlled air war to support Laotian ground forces and to interdict North Vietnamese materiel and personnel moving down the Ho Chi Minh trail. According to most observers, the bombing of Laos evolved in four escalating phases. The first ran from the spring of 1964 into the fall of 1966. Bombing during this period was rather sporadic, carried out mainly by Laotian T-28's and directed mainly against enemy troop concentrations in jungle areas. Very few civilians were involved. In the second bombing phase, from the fall of 1966 to the early months of 1968, targets began to include enemy-held or enemy-threatened villages and towns. U.S. aircraft became increasingly prominent, refugee movements occurred in many areas, and the occurrence of civilian casualties was frequent. The third bombing phase began in 1968, shortly after a partial bombing halt over North Vietnam in March, with U.S. aircraft outnumbering Laotian T-28's for the first time. Bombing began to be conducted on a more regular basis and was directed increasingly against populated areas. Many villages and towns in the northern part of the country were evacuated during this period.

In the fourth bombing phase, which began very early in 1969, the most significant bombing increase occurred. It followed a complete bombing halt over
North Vietnam in November 1968. Numerous records of interviews with refugees report that during some of this bombing phase aircraft came over the countryside daily—dropping napalm, phosphorus, and anti-personnel bombs. In summarizing a series of interviews with refugees, one observer reported to the subcommittee:

They [the refugees] say the jets bombed both villages and forests, that they spent most of their time in holes or caves, and that they suffered numerous civilian casualties. They say that everything was fired on, buffaloes, cows, ricefields, schools, temples, tiny shelters outside the village, in addition to, of course, all people.

Over and over again in recent years such reports by qualified private observers and former U.S. government personnel in the field have been filed with the subcommittee. The thrust of these reports, summarized in the comment above, is fully substantiated in the findings of surveys conducted by the U.S. mission in Vientiane, the Laotian capital. The findings in a survey conducted in July 1970 among refugees from the Plain of Jars were dramatically instructive. Some of these findings were as follows:

- 97% of the refugees questioned said that they had seen a bombing attack—32% as early as 1964;
- 65% said they had seen someone injured by bombing;
- 61% said they had seen a person killed;
- 76% said their homes had been damaged by the bombing;
- 90% said the bombing made life difficult for them;
- 87% said they built a shelter in the woods after they first saw a bombing raid;
- 28% said the bombing was directed at people.

Over the years U.S. bombing of Laos undoubtedly achieved some of the goals of interdicting and harassing Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces—even though, in purely military terms, it did not prevent these forces from seizing more government-controlled territory. It is equally clear, however, that the bombing took a heavy toll among civilians and brought much devastation to the countryside.

U.S. forces have dropped nearly three times the tonnage of bombs over Indochina as they dropped during all of World War II. Of the estimated 6 million tons of bombs dropped over Indochina, about half have fallen during the last two or three years—a tonnage equal to the explosive force of more than 100 Hiroshima-type atomic bombs.

All of this underscores how tragically counterproductive much of our military and political strategy has been in Indochina. As I stated in a speech in Boston, Mass., more than four years ago: "The kind of war we are fighting in Vietnam will not gain our long-range objectives: the pattern of destruction we are creating can only make a workable political future more difficult." I felt that "if the current policies relating to the nature of the war were not changed, and the assumptions underlying civilian programs not revised, then the prospects of Vietnam... were dim."

Just how dim, we can see only now.

THE TRAGIC RESULTS OF FORCED RELOCATION

The scene is familiar. The army trucks arrive early in the morning near a village in the highlands of South Vietnam. The villagers, all Rhade tribesmen, have been told by the authorities that the trucks would come. Hurriedly, the villagers assemble as many of their few belongings as they can carry—small bags of clothes, some pots and pans, a few precious religious objects. Everything else must be left behind.

Slowly the soldiers begin to pile men, women, and children onto the waiting trucks. People squirm together in the hot dry sun, the red dust of the highlands baked on their clothes. A flash of flame adds to the heat as the soldiers begin to burn the village's longhouses and their furnishings.

A few hours later the villagers arrive at their new "settlement" site—a barren hill near a provincial road. The villagers are given only tin roofing. All other building materials for makeshift huts they must find by themselves. They search the nearby woods and, in a few days, put together an assortment of shabby structures made of gnarled logs, weathered planks of wood, and old tin sheetings—all topped by sparkling U.S.-supplied tin roofing.
Some refugees are able to find enough wood to construct their huts on piling, as is their tradition. But they bear only a sad resemblance to the well-constructed hardwood longhouses of their native village. The only food they are given is a few days' worth of corncake and bulgur wheat, neither of which they know how to cook.

This movement of Montagnard tribespeople in Darlac province a year ago is an example of forcibly relocating people in Indochina—for our strategic reasons rather than the interests of the people themselves. In the first six months of 1971, at least 40,000 Montagnard villagers were forcibly moved in the highlands of Vietnam. Additional numbers of people were moved elsewhere in the country. For years such forced relocations occurred in countless villages throughout all of South Vietnam. And always it was done in the name of bringing "security to the people."

The scenario for such operations was graphically portrayed in a statement submitted to the Senate subcommittee on refugees early in 1971. Written by a U.S. refugee official in central Vietnam—long after the policy of forced relocation was discredited by most observers—the statement said:

Each year the farce of "taking security to the hamlets" is blandly outlined in the official Pacification and Development Plans—and each year no such thing happens. Instead, the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) shows a certain number of hamlets evaluated as "insecure." Some general then says Darlac province will have no more low-rated hamlets. The province chief, knowing his forces are not about to take security to the hamlets, decides to bring them in under an "artillery umbrella," usually along one of the main roads in the province. At this point all [South Vietnamese] Ministry of Social Welfare regulations are violated and a group of hamlets are moved in, presumably at "their own volition," but with no planning either for the move or adequate provisions for their health or welfare.

About the time the statement was submitted to the subcommittee, Gerald Hickey, U.S. anthropologist with nearly two decades of experience in Vietnam, called forced relocations "one of the unlearned lessons of the Vietnam War." In a memorandum for the subcommittee's record be concluded, has many other expert observers, that "the gains in population and resource control resulting from such relocation projects are, for the most part, outweighed by the social and economic disruptions that affect the whole of Vietnamese society. The ever growing number of shoddy settlements of Montagnards who have forcibly, or even willingly, been relocated is a stark reminder of this disruption."

Unfortunately, the capricious movement of people has been one of the more tragic themes of America's participation in the war—repeated constantly throughout all of Indochina and with official blessing from nearly all quarters. Over the years these movements were always justified in the name of bringing "security" to the people. But the fact is that the meaning of "security" to a villager was dramatically different from its meaning to a U.S. or South Vietnamese official.

To most officials in South Vietnam, security is whether the computerized Hamlet Evaluation System rates a hamlet as "secure." Such a rating is based upon the extent and frequency of enemy presence. If government officials cannot go there, it is deemed "insecure." To the villagers, however, such enemy presence may not represent insecurity, even though they have to give some rice or service to the guerrillas. To the villagers this is a form of accommodation, not insecurity. And above all, they are not uprooted from their ancestral lands—one of their main concerns.

Indeed, as anthropologist Hickey and others have documented so well, far worse conditions of security are usually created for the villagers by the poverty and hardships imposed by forced resettlement. For example, of the more than 2,500 Montagnards relocated in a single resettlement area near Pleiku province early in 1971, nearly 16% died of diseases related to conditions at the new site. These were just some of the distressing findings of a U.S. medical official in the field. Yet, by official statistics the resettlement site was defined as "secure"—even though too many villagers had nothing but the security of the grave.

The same bankrupt policy of forced relocation has been pursued in Laos—least obviously because the "secret war" in Laos was hidden so long from public view. However, in part as a result of the subcommittee's inquiry and field visits, a number of things came to light—including official Internal
memoranda of the U.S. mission in Vietnam, which commented on relocation practices and made abundantly clear the tie between refugee movement and military objectives. One memorandum, written in early 1970, stated that "military considerations and decisions by our own friendly military commanders have been dominant in the action that have triggered refugee movements."

Just how manipulative U.S. officials have been when discussing the options involved in the forced relocation of people is evident in another memorandum, cited in a subcommittee report issued in September 1970. This memorandum discussed in some detail the arguments for and against the "mass evacuation" of tens of thousands of refugees from the Plain of Jars area in Laos just prior to a Pathet Lao attack against Laotian government forces in early 1970. Listed in favor of mass evacuation were such points as these:

- To prevent the people from being captured by the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese army and being used as porters;
- To give the people a chance to live under RLG (Royal Lao Government) administration; specifically so that their children will be educated and indoctrinated in the RLG school system and grow up as loyal citizens of Laos;
- Such refugee evacuation would clear the Plain . . . for unrestricted military strike operations against the enemy;
- It will deny the enemy control over a considerable population of villagers and their services under Communist forces.

Arguments listed against mass evacuation included the following:

- The move would further aggravate already crowded refugee conditions and pose a major socioeconomic problem for which there is no immediate solution, nor sufficient time to alleviate the personal deprivations of the refugees before they are properly resettled;
- In the case of the Communist indoctrinated Plain villagers, or in the case of the tribal peoples, if Vang Pao (Commander of irregular Lao forces supported by the U.S.) loses prestige and control, the dissension created by undesirable refugee conditions will soon reach a state in extremis. From an insurgency/security viewpoint, this can become a powder keg in areas under our control;
- the possibility of the fact that ethnic Lao of the Plain are of questionable loyalty would put them deep in "RLG territory" and would aid an insurgency effort being made on the Vietnamese Plain;
- If there be loyal elements within the group they can serve as a source of friendly intelligence as well as tying up enemy resources needed to control them;
- If the refugees are moved a possible vacuum will be created that the enemy will populate . . . by default.

The memorandum concluded—indeed, recommended—that "mass evacuation" from the Plain of Jars area was not a sound idea. Nonetheless, as so often before, a decision was made contrary to the recommendation, bringing with it much hunger, misery, disease, and death among the thousands of people involved.

For years our national leadership spoke solemnly of defending the right of self-determination for the peoples of Southeast Asia. This, Americans have been told, has been our principal objective in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Yet with each passing day of war, it became clearer that the kind of war we were waging really served to all but destroy the possibility of accomplishing this end in any meaningful way for the bulk of the people caught in the conflict. Because for the refugees and other war victims, a very significant cross section of the Indochinese people, "self-determination" is less a political aspiration than a simple human urge to return to their native villages in peace. This, a more fundamental kind of self-determination, was defeated by our officially sanctioned strategies and policies calling for, among other things, the forced relocation of people—an activity which has, over the years, produced masses of displaced and yet unsettled refugees.

WHAT CAN BE DONE TO END THE BLOODBATH

The record is clear on where the U.S. stands in Indochina: In 1971, as in earlier years, each day brought new violence. Each day escalated the human costs for all involved. There were more refugees. There were more casualties, both military and civilian. There were more prisoners of war and more missing
in action. Our national leadership has used the specter of a highly dubious Viet Cong "bloodbath" to justify the continuance of the war. We must not allow this to blind us to the bloodbath going on every day in Vietnam and so much of Indochina. This bloodbath started long ago and our country has been part of it. And the bloodbath will continue as long as the war continues, and so long as efforts to end that war are avoided and delayed for whatever excuse.

Few will disagree that the North Vietnamese, the Viet Cong, the Pathet Lao, and others have also been contributing to the bloodbath. But the question for most Americans in 1971 was: How much longer would we tolerate policies by our government that make easy the killing and maiming and dislocation of millions?

The devastation the war has brought to the peoples of Indochina is painfully clear. Less clear, however, is what we, as a nation, are going to do about it.

First and foremost, our country must help to end the violence, not simply "Vietnamize" it. Little progress will be made in rehabilitating the peoples of Indochina if war continues to tear at the very fabric of their society. The war must end— not just the most visible symbols of our participation in it.

Secondly, we must not permit the slogan of "Vietnamization" to submerge compassion and a sense of national responsibility towards helping substantially to ameliorate the truly massive social and humanitarian problems caused by the war. Our government's concern in this area has been meager all along. In fact, for Cambodia it has not existed. And in South Vietnam the limited concern built up over the years was being reduced in 1971. Not only were significant cutbacks being made in funds allocated to support South Vietnamese government programs for war victims but supplementary programs by private voluntary organizations were being phased out. At the same time, however, our national leadership was stating unequivocally that our government was allocating $1.5 billion for a new pacification program, which included absolutely no provision for social welfare and the rehabilitation of people.

Until priorities in U.S. policies and programs for Vietnam and all of Indochina are changed— until these priorities are reflected in the policies of the South Vietnamese government and the Cambodian and Laotian governments— until programs for people have the same concern and resolve as programs for security— little progress will be made towards rehabilitating the human debris of the Indochina war and repairing the fabric of a damaged society.

Thirdly, all channels of assistance to Indochina must be explored and, hopefully, utilized. The U.S. must not dominate the socioeconomic development of Indochina, even though we have an obligation and responsibility to participate in it heavily. Our government must do more to encourage and support international participation. Over the years a measure of such participation has occurred. And it is gratifying to note that in recent months, especially, concern and offers to help have grown on the part of private agencies, international organizations, and individual governments.

Today the highest priority should be given to involving the United Nations (UN) in the relief effort of the entire area, including North Vietnam. I have long believed that the UN secretary-general should be requested to convene as soon as possible an international conference on Indochina relief. The immediate and long-term needs of the people in Indochina can never be met through existing relief mechanisms or by the political authorities that finally assume effective control in the countries involved. Such a conference would lend fresh perspective on the possibilities of expanding emergency relief operations— especially in Cambodia— and on the approaches to the eventual task of social rehabilitation and reconstruction. Through the good offices of the secretary-general, the conference should make an effort to establish an international relief mechanism for Indochina. It should be the function of this body to receive and channel relief contributions, to appeal for the safe-conduct of mercy missions into difficult areas, to supervise and coordinate general relief operations, and to involve additional humanitarian and developmental agencies, including the Red Cross.

In this connection, a general comment should be made regarding the long-standing need for better international machinery for responding to human suffering as it occurs anywhere in the world. There is today no broadly based and continuing mechanism to render massive emergency assistance to populations ravaged by conflict and oppression or natural disaster. Although a large number of international public and private organizations—including those with-
in the UN—exist for this purpose, the fact remains that these organizations are too often limited in what they can do, by their individual mandate, tradition, political or regional association, and small resources.

In light of distressing developments involving humanitarian aid to victims of the conflicts in Vietnam, Nigeria, and East Pakistan, new initiatives must be taken within the UN to establish a UN Emergency Service, supported, perhaps, by a declaration on humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in armed conflicts and other disasters.

To establish a UN Emergency Service is a logical extension of UN activities in humanitarian questions—and, we hope, it would also be a means to blunt and overcome some norms of international conduct, bureaucratic inertia, and diplomatic complexities now reflected in the erratic and timid international response to massive human suffering in so many troubled areas. The distressing experiences in Indochina and elsewhere should compel all men of good will to do all they can to enlist the support of their governments in helping to accomplish this objective.

Fourthly, we must learn from our experience in Indochina a lesson regarding the use and deployment of our military power. The time is long overdue for our nation, at the highest levels of government to take stock of policies and attitudes that have contributed so heavily to the massive flow of refugees, the occurrence of civilian casualties, and the inexcusably low priority attached to the care and protection of civilians in combat zones. The record of hearings and inquiry of the subcommittee on refugees has confirmed time and again that the forced relocation of civilians, aerial bombardment, free fire zones, and similar practices have had a devastating impact on the civilian populations of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. There has been a vast gap between our government's official policy of concern for the welfare of civilians and the performance of our forces in the field. Events at My Lai come immediately to mind. Our nation must finally come to grips with this issue. We must finally come to recognize and understand the flagrant abuses of American power. And we must resolve that what has been done in Indochina, in America's name, must never happen again.

I have believed for some time that the President should create a permanent Military Practices Review Board to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff on standards and procedures designed to keep U.S. military policies and practices within the bounds of simple humanitarian and international legal obligations, and to monitor the implementing of the rules of engagement governing U.S. armed forces in active combat.

America's policies and actions in Indochina have too often made moral and humanitarian principles expendable. I, for one, believe that these principles—however elusive they may be—still matter. In the long run, the practice of such principles shapes international esteem and goodwill, and they represent those important foreign policy variables that diplomats may try to but cannot really ignore in the councils of government.

CONCLUSION

America is great and powerful. And as the recent history of Indochina illustrates so well, we freely use our influence and power in many ways and for many ends. But the power to heal, to salvage, and to rehabilitate the hapless victims of conflict—and the responsibility to minimize our contribution to the inevitable human toll of war—has never been exercised in a measure commensurate with the other uses of our power in Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.

We are conditioned, in the world we have created, to accept much suffering and injustice—especially in our time when violent conflict and oppression are active in so many areas. But the newer world we seek will not evolve if we ignore these challenges to leadership and take comfortable refuge in the mundane patterns and attitudes of the past.

There is much to be done for the war victims in Indochina. And there is much more our country must do to help.
APPENDIX III

STATEMENT OF SENATOR KENNEDY REVIEWING FINDINGS OF GAO REPORTS ON INDOCHINA

[From the Congressional Record, Senate, Wednesday, May 3, 1972]

THE INDOCHINA WAR

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I wish to discuss today what is labeled in "National Security Study Memorandum No. 1"—the so-called Kissinger memorandum—one of the "lesser issues" of the Indochina war. I refer to the people problems of this war—the plight of more than 10 million war victims—or what the memorandum calls "war damage to the civilian population."

The television and newspapers remind us every hour of the day, that the war continues. The bombing goes on, the violence escalates—from both sides. More civilians become casualties or die. More children are maimed or orphaned. More refugees flee devastated villages and towns.

Inevitably, the situation of civilians in Vietnam is taking second place to the political issues at stake—and to the interests of those who have much to lose, or to gain, by the outcome of the battle. But the people of Quangtri, of An Loc, of Kontum, and of the hamlets and towns throughout the area also have interests. For many, it is mere survival, and so, as governments and negotiators—on both sides—posture and bicker and threaten and ignore their responsibilities for peace and the lives of millions, a regional crisis of people builds and builds—in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam as well.

Up to 500,000 civilians are on the move today in Vietnam. Thousands upon thousands are being injured or killed. And the situation continues to deteriorate. This is all very familiar—only the latest chapter in a seemingly endless story of human suffering in Vietnam. This latest chapter finally underscores, dramatically and graphically, that what is called Vietnamization is not a plan for peace, but a plan for continuing war. It finally underscores the failure of the administration's policy, and the cosmetic approach our Government has used in defining hamlet security in Vietnam and success in pacification. Today, we do not hear about progress in pacification. We do not hear about security in the countryside. We do not hear all the statistical criteria of success in the countryside. This is not really because the North Vietnamese have launched a new offensive, which they have. Rather, to quote a 1970 report of the Subcommittee on Refugees, it is because Saigon has not had the capacity or will to really serve the people and sustain the peace.

Our country cannot do for Saigon what it cannot do for itself, and we should have ceased pretending this fiction long ago, by ending the war.

Mr. President, we really do not comprehend the implications of the human costs of the Indochina war on the social fabric and traditions of the small countries directly involved. The Kissinger memorandum reminds us of this fact.

Under the subtitle of "Lesser Issues" we find this paragraph:

"Every agency, except the military assistance command in Vietnam and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agrees that the available data on war damage to the civilian population is inadequate . . . C.I.A. concluded that even under the most generous interpretation of the available data . . . it must be admitted that the rural hamlets take a tremendous beating."

This section of the memorandum concludes by stating that the impact of the war on the civilian populations needs "further U.S. Government attention and analysis." That was in 1969.

But today, in 1972, the problem of war victims remains a "lesser issue"—and has yet to receive the "attention and analysis" recommended in the Kissinger memorandum.

In fact, by every possible measure—budgets, rules of engagement, long-term planning, and the official record of the present administration—the issue of war (98)
victims in Indochina is given less priority today than at any time since 1965. This would be bad enough if we were only dealing with the aftermath of war—if we had the peace long promised the American people. But each new day of war is adding heavily to the human toll, and putting more and more strain on existing relief programs.

Mr. President, since 1965, war-related civilian problems in South Vietnam, and all of Indochina, have been an item of primary concern to the Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, which I serve as chairman, our objective has been a continuing effort to document people problems in Indochina, and to upgrade official priority and concern for civilians suffering and for needed relief programs.

Field studies have been conducted. Numerous hearings and consultations have been held. Reports of findings and recommendations have been issued. And to supplement these activities, the General Accounting Office—GAO—has periodically filed expert reports with the subcommittee—the latest series of reports updating the situation in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia through the end of 1971. Let me say at this point, Mr. President, that the GAO teams, which have prepared the many reports since 1965, have made an important contribution and they deserve high tribute.

The most recent findings of the GAO are contained in a series of five reports. These reports document the “lesser issue” syndrome of this administration and, in the main, they are a devastating commentary on the low priority our Government attaches to the care and protection of civilians in Indochina. I would like to summarize these reports by dealing first of all with South Vietnam, second with Laos, and third with Cambodia.

**SOUTH VIETNAM**

Vietnam faces a massive refugee and social welfare problem—the accumulation of years of neglect and continuing war. Despite all the official talk in recent years of progress in resettling refugees and success in pacification—the GAO reports document, at the end of last year, that one overwhelming fact remained unchanged: A vast segment of Vietnam’s civilians was still not convinced that their villages were secure enough to live in, and they remained as refugees separated from their homes, their lands, and their regular source of livelihood. Moreover, many programs for war victims were in shambles, and our country remained saddled with the same dilemmas and the same problems of involvement which we were facing for several years.

Some discouraging findings of the GAO reports included the following:

- “That by the end of 1971 the Vietnam war had produced more than 6,000,000 refugees, more than a third of Vietnam’s population;”
- “That only about half of these refugees have ever received relief assistance;”
- “That the monthly average of new refugees ‘generated’ in 1971 ‘exceeded the average monthly level of the 2 previous years;’”
- “That top U.S. officials have continued to support ‘forced relocations,’ despite very strong opposition to this discredited practice by their colleagues at the ‘working level;’”
- “That future relocation plans’ includes the movement of 300,000 persons in 2 provinces of military region 1 during 1972;”
- “That U.S. humanitarian assistance to war victims is given low priority; in 1971 it only ranked 7th in a list of 10 items considered ‘important by AID;’”
- “That U.S. dollar assistance for GVN humanitarian programs is fast declining and will be phased out by fiscal year 1974;”

I might mention at this point, Mr. President, that in 1969 $16 million was appropriated for the refugee program in Vietnam. In 1970 it was down to $6.6 million. In 1973 it will be $0.2 million. There are no requests for the following year.

The administration is very effective in terminating U.S. involvement as it applies to refugees, civilian programs, those programs which are directly related to human beings, health programs, and refugee programs; but we see, on the other hand, the easy escalation of our military involvement in the war.

In spite of these very limited funds for civilian programs, the fact remains that approximately two-thirds of the money has never even been expended by the South Vietnamese Government. So there has been only a trickle, in terms of support for the people of South Vietnam, particularly the refugees.
When we realize that there are approximately 700,000 orphans in Vietnam, 145,000 war widows registered, and nearly 200,000 both civilian and military, personnel who have lost arms or legs and have to wait a period of up to a year to receive prosthetic devices. When we know children ought to receive a change of prosthetic devices every 6 months in order that they do not grow up with twisted or maimed bodies, we wonder what the real basis of our interest is.

Are we supposed to be in South Vietnam because of our concern for the South Vietnamese, or is our interest really based more on the great power struggle in Southeast Asia?

How interesting it would be to provide a small cottage industry to provide prosthetic devices for maimed people, people who have lost arms and legs, many of them older people and children. What we are talking about is a few hundred thousand dollars, but even under the previous administration we were unable to develop much interest in this area. That lack of interest, tragically, has followed into the Nixon administration.

Today we see that, with 700,000 orphans, there is a $1 million grant by AID for all the various orphanages in South Vietnam. There will be no support at all in terms of aid for war victims in 1973, and those people who have been maimed.

I think this is really a tragic situation in human terms when we see, night after night, the flow of refugees out of I Corps and realize the tremendous sufferings which they have experienced, and we see the virtual termination of our involvement in civilian problems that are already inadequately funded and supported.

The long-term planning for rehabilitation of war victims has all but been ignored. The fact is that President Johnson talked about the postwar period and how important it was to begin a program for health maintenance for the people in the whole Indochina peninsula.

Nothing was done to further that program. President Nixon has made a similar proposal. All we have to show for it is a study made by Columbia University, a very scant study, which was nevertheless worthwhile, but we have not come to grips with exploring different ways which we as a nation can effectively, through multinational channels, help aid human problems existing in the whole Indochina peninsula.

Certainly that planning ought to be done, particularly when we look back on our lack of planning in responding to humanitarian needs most recently in Bangladesh, and in the Nigeria-Biafra area, where 1 million, mostly children, perished for lack of food. A tremendous number perished in Bangladesh. Many of them did so because of violence, but many of them died because of the failure of the Western Powers to respond to humanitarian needs. So we know the importance of future planning at the present time.

I continue with the reading of the conclusions of the GAO reports.

"That long term planning for the rehabilitation of war victims has been all but ignored in studies 'dealing with the comprehensive policies and programs on the postwar development of Vietnam'—these studies have been conducted at the 'higher levels' of the U.S. Government and GVN;

"That millions of dollars worth of U.S. P.L. 480 food commodities and other supplies have rotted in warehouses;

"That pilferage and unauthorized distributions of U.S. commodities are common;

"That numerous community centers constructed with U.S. counterpart funds 'are not being utilized';

"That up to 75% of the funds programmed for various categories of war victims are not being spent;

"That 'long delays' exist in recognizing and registering new refugees, and in making relief payments."

One of the tragic results is that there are camps which might have 10,000 to 15,000 refugees. They are held on the list and categorized as refugees one day, and then when the Government of South Vietnam reaches a certain calling in terms of refugees, they fill out a form and they are no longer refugees; they are "resettled." It is just in writing—it is just a bookkeeping change, without changing the substance of conditions for resettlement or a better livelihood. Of course, as a result of this change of category, many of the people have other kinds of assistance terminated, such as provisions for food.
"Thus in some regions, more than 90% of refugee resettlement areas officially listed as 'normalized' are in fact substandard;"

"That civilian war casualties continue at a very high level—some 3,508 per month, by official count, based on hospital admissions alone;"

"That official statistics on civilian war casualties are understated because of unreported data."

Official statistics on civilian war casualties are constantly understated because of unreported data. For instance, they never report any casualties that never get treated in any of the hospitals, and it is usually true, as we have seen in the course of our studies and visits in Vietnam, that rarely do you ever see, in the provincial hospitals, people who have been wounded in the critical portions of their bodies, their chests or heads, because they never survive and rarely make it to hospitals and, so, they are never listed as war casualties.

The statistics never include people who go to outside clinics and fall to get formally admitted to a hospital. They are not included in hospital statistics, nor are those treated privately in South Vietnam, even, civilians wounded and treated with the limited resources available to the other side.

So even the GAO figures are understated.

The GAO also found:

"That, despite vast and growing need brought on by war, United States-supported health programs are being eliminated or drastically reduced;"

"That such eliminations and reductions are having an adverse effect on the level of civilian health care, causing serious problems in such areas as health equipment maintenance, and are closing needed health facilities throughout the country; and finally,

"That the inaccuracy of official records on the allocation and use of medical supplies is a major problem wasting thousands of dollars."

LAOS

As if the situation among the war victims in Vietnam is not enough, thousands of refugees and civilian casualties in Laos continue to document a shadowy war in which the purpose and degree of American participation are still being kept from the American people. The recent GAO reports on Laos document:

"That 'refugees' in Laos not only include civilians displaced by military conflict, but also military and paramilitary forces and their dependents;"

"That two-thirds of government territory has been lost to the enemy, thus making the successful resettlement of refugees, generally, 'difficult';"

"That there is 'no ready solution' to the problem of hill-tribe refugees, because there are no mountain areas in government territory large enough to support these people;"

"That official statistics on civilian war casualties remain 'incomplete and of doubtful validity'; as in the case of Vietnam, the actual occurrences of civilian casualties are much higher than official statistics;"

"That hospital facilities are often overcrowded, congested, dirty and without adequate facilities;"

"That the mortality rate in some villages is often extremely high, up to 900% above the accepted 'criterion' which requires 'special remedial measures';"

"That 'accidental bombings' continue;"

"That AID funds programmed for war victims continued to be used for CIA activities—after a 1971 assurance to the subcommittee by AID administrator John Hannah that the practice would be 'terminated' on June 30, 1971;"

"That 'steps' initiated by AID to eliminate management weaknesses documented in earlier GAO reports have 'not resulted in any readily discernible differences in USAID/Laos policies and practices;"

"That AID incurs 'excessive freight costs' in transporting commodities to Laos through Thailand—AID pays 'a premium of about 43 percent' to a Thai Government entity, express transport organization; and"

"That commodities shipped within Laos are often 'not accounted for at destination.'"

The GAO account clearly indicates the enormous pilferage and graft involved in many of these programs in Laos, much of it being "grafted" by Government troops.
Next was Cambodia. Mr. President, there are approximately 2 million people who are refugees in Cambodia today, and yet the United States fails to provide even one dollar of help and assistance for the refugees in Cambodia.

I can remember last year when we had administration officials before the committee to ask them about why we were not developing a program to help assist refugees in Cambodia. They said they have never received a request from the Cambodian Government for help and assistance.

Once again, we are prepared to send in military troops, American air support and American troops, whenever we feel it is in the military interest of the Government, but we fail to respond to the humanitarian needs of the people in Cambodia, the some 2 million refugees.

All one has to do is consider the results of this failure of policy to see that there are hundreds of thousands of children, women, and old people who are suffering, many of them dying, because of the lack of any kind of effective program.

Inevitably, the familiar pattern of Vietnam and Laos has been repeated in Cambodia. Massive bombing and ground military operations over the last 2 years have produced countless civilian casualties—and a rising tide of refugees, who now swell the normal population of the cities and towns, or cram make-shift refugee camps.

A Refugee Subcommittee report of September 1970—after a field investigation by members of the staff—states the following:

"The Cambodian Government did not anticipate any massive relief problems of the kind experienced in South Vietnam, and therefore was not engaging in any contingency planning. The Government would, of course, respond on an ad hoc basis should pockets of need arise. The Director (of the Commissariat for War Victims) suggested his optimism was based on the belief that the war in Cambodia would be a short one—especially if we have more weapons to get our territory back." He called this the 'pacification' of the countryside.

"This official Cambodian view of the refugee situation was apparently shared, in large measure, by the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh. Although U.S. officials were obviously aware of the widespread displacement of people, there was little evidence to suggest they were much concerned about the situation, its tragic potential if the war in Cambodia continued, or the impact of U.S. military activities on the civilian population. In fact, on the latter point—especially on the rising number of U.S. air sorties over Cambodia and their target areas—officials all but pleaded ignorance of them, as did high level U.S. military personnel in Saigon."

The report goes on to say:

"In early August the general view and attitudes of both Cambodia and U.S. officials in Phnom Penh were hauntingly familiar to earlier opinion out of Saigon and Vientiane. Needless to say, if such views and attitudes—and the conflict in Cambodia—continue, there is little doubt that human priorities will again get lost in the tide of war. Khmers will then pay a heavy toll in misery and death, which may very well exceed the toll being paid for many years by their neighbors in Indochina."

That judgment, Mr. President, was made in 1970. Today, after 2 years of heavy battle—which began with an American sponsored invasion from South Vietnam—a GAO report on Cambodia documents:

"That, it is the policy of the U.S. 'to not become involved with the problems of civilian war victims in Cambodia';

"That there are 'no specific programs' for providing relief to war victims;

"That between March 1970 and September 1971, official estimates put the number of refugees at more than 2,000,000;

"That civilian casualties numbered in the thousands;

"That, at the time of the GAO survey, refugees were 'being generated as a direct result of combat activity involving Cambodian and/or South Vietnamese forces and of Allied air strikes'; and

"That 'lack of sufficient food rapidly was becoming serious.'"

I would say, Mr. President, on the creation of the refugees in Laos, we saw a direct relationship between the increase in bombing to the increase in refugees
as well as civilian casualties. The one study that has been made was done by the Agency for International Development, AID in Laos. Their studies show that approximately 75 percent of all refugees were created by American military weaponry, and approximately 26 percent by the North Vietnamese. The overwhelming preponderance was by—

Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. SAXBE. Is the Senator intimating that these refugees flooding the roads today are caused by American action?

Mr. KENNEDY. I would say that up to 2 weeks ago, the conclusion of our committee was that 75 percent of civilian war casualties as well as refugees, particularly in the area of Laos studied, were created by American military firepower. The one study that was done by our Government documents that, and we stand by that.

Second, I think we will see that a very heavy proportion of the refugees and civilian casualties will have been created by American firepower in the current situation.

Mr. SAXBE. Well, now, the Senator has talked about the refugees flooding the roads as shown in the recent pictures. Are we the ones mining the roads? Are we the ones responsible for this invasion of the last 3 weeks, that is creating the millions of refugees and the casualties?

It bothers me that nowhere in the Senator's statement has he in any way referred to the fact that this situation has been caused by North Vietnam. The Senator's entire statement tends to make it appear that America is flooding the roads with casualties and killing the old women and children.

It seems to me that it is quite obvious that what is happening since the North Vietnamese violated the cease-fire line and came through there is that they are concentrating on these hamlets; they are concentrating on the civilian population by mining the roads used only by the refugees.

We know what happened the last time they went into Hue. They murdered approximately 7,000 people. They seem to be getting ready to do the same thing.

I do not know how the Senator can blame these refugees on us all the time.

Mr. KENNEDY. If the Senator had been present during the earlier part of my statement, he would know that I indicated that the bombing goes on, the violence escalates on both sides. Obviously, all of us deplore the impact of violence, no matter which side creates it. I mentioned that, and I do not think the Senator was present during the earlier part of my comments.

Mr. SAXBE. I have read the statement.

Mr. KENNEDY. If the Senator will look at the first page, he will note that I said that "the bombing goes on and violence escalates on both sides."

When the Senator talks about the killings in Hue, all of us deplore that as well as deploring the Phoenix program, which has been continued from the previous administration by this administration. It is a policy of assassination of the local infrastructure of the Viet Cong.

I think we ought to condemn all the violence and all those who support the creation of violence, whether it is the recent mining of roads by the North Vietnamese, or the kind of violence that has been done by the Viet Cong, or the violence of our Phoenix program, which was supported by the previous administration and has been continued by this administration. I do not think any of us are holding any kind of brief for any of this violence.

I think this is part of the broader question of when are we going to bring an end to all of the violence and bring an end to all of the killing. Quite obviously, that remains within our power. The quickest way to stop any kind of violence to the civilians in Vietnam is to end the war. I would be glad to debate that question. We can debate how best that can be done.

The point remains—and the American people ought to understand it—that at a time when the military was being escalated, all kinds of help and assistance for the people in Vietnam is being cut out, and this administration has been a part of that—cutting back on the resources to aid the humanitarian problems in Southeast Asia. There is not 1 cent for 2 million refugees in Cambodia—not 1 penny—and not 1 cent recommended for next year for the 6 million refugees in South Vietnam. There was $2.3 million this year, $6 million the year before, and $16 million 2 years ago.

We are all set to deescalate that aspect of the war, but we are not prepared to deescalate the other aspect of it. I think it is appropriate that we draw the
attention of the American people to those who do not have the strong voices here to speak out about what is happening to the civilians. There are those who will speak out in terms of the military, and yet they say they are interested in the people of Southeast Asia.

Look at what has happened and look at the record, and this is just as broad an indictment of the record of the previous administration as it is of this administration, on programs that vitally affect the children, the women, the old people, the civilian casualties, and the refugees; and you find that they are on the bottom of the priority list of this administration as well as of the previous administration. No one can take any kind of solace in the fact that the previous administration was putting out approximately $16 million for the refugees. That is the cost of approximately four of the jets that have been lost—perhaps a day’s loss, or 10 days of sorties over Laos.

Nobody is defending the violence that is perpetrated upon the civilian population by the North Vietnamese offensive. I am not doing so.

Mr. President, I have briefly summarized some of the principal findings in the recent GAO reports. However, in light of the widespread public and congressional interest in the problems of Indochina war victims, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, at the conclusion of my remarks, additional findings in the reports on Vietnam and Laos, and the full text of the report on Cambodia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, these reports and others tell us how Cambodia has gone the route of Vietnam, and how Laos traveled that same route of destruction and death years before. Yet the slaughter of innocents continues in Indochina. Each new day of war brings another day of human misery and suffering, and each day the statistics of death—both those recorded and those unseen—mount. And the people of Indochina, like the people of America, ask: How long?

It is time—it is past time—for our Nation to turn its policies around in Southeast Asia—to stop pretending that we can do from the air what we could not do from the ground, to stop the delusion that we can do for the South Vietnamese Government what it cannot do for itself, and to end the horrible spectacle of the greatest military power on earth bombing some of the smallest nations on earth.

Let us end this senseless slaughter.

Mr. President, I will just say finally that many Americans are constantly shocked, as I am, by what we see on television of the impact of this offensive, or aerial bombardment of the war generally in Indochina, and the impact it has had, and continues to have, on civilians.

The more tragic irony is the failure of this great Nation, during the period of this war, since we have seen pictures of women and children on the front pages of newspapers and on our television screens for years—to develop a program to help and assist these war victims. We develop great sympathy and great compassion when we see them on television and the pictures on the front pages of the newspapers. The tragedy is that we in Congress, and even the South Vietnamese Government, have failed to respond to these needs in a meaningful way.

I grew tired of listening—and this goes back through the mid-1960’s—to administration officials who would say, “As this problem involves the South Vietnamese, we have to let the South Vietnamese run these programs; we have to let South Vietnam develop a civilian war casualty program, or to look out after orphans, or to look out after refugees; we have to let them do it.” But when the time came to be making a military decision, we were all ready to take that responsibility into our own hands. I think that has been true from the beginning and it continues through today.

Why is it that the Air Force, for example, refuses to develop a set of rules—a manual of air warfare? The Army does. The Navy does. But the Air Force refuses to do it. They refuse to give instructions to the young men who are going out there—to make them sensitive and more cautious to civilian needs.

I wrote to the Secretary of Defense, asking him when they were coming out with better rules of engagement in civilian populated areas. I asked him other questions about the impact of the war. We waited 8 months before we got a response and it was completely inadequate because they do not have the informa-
tion. They are not getting it together. I think this has been true, as I have said repeatedly, not only of this but also previous administrations.

If we can try to suggest what we have to do in the future, obviously the first need is to end the violence by ending the war. I think, in the meantime, we should be planning a program for what this great Nation can do in consort with other nations, to insure a rebuilding process for the peoples who have suffered so much in so many ways on the Indochina peninsula.

EXHIBIT 1

CIVILIAN HEALTH AND WAR-RELATED CASUALTY PROGRAM IN VIETNAM—1 YEAR LATER

(Refugee Subcommittee's summary of the General Accounting Office report)

TREATMENT AND NUMBER OF CIVILIAN WAR-RELATED CASUALTIES

"1. 'One of the goals of United States assistance to Vietnam is to ease the suffering of civilians displaced or injured by the war; however, there is no special AID project in Vietnam solely for the care of civilian casualties.'

"2. 'There continues to be no reliable measure of the total number of civilian war-related casualties in Vietnam.' Official statistics are misleading and understated; for they reflect only the admissions to Ministry of Health and U.S. military hospitals. They do not reflect civilian casualties treated as outpatients in these hospitals, those treated elsewhere, those not treated at all, and those who die.


1968 (Tet)—87,522 admissions for a monthly average of 7,296.
1969—67,766 admissions for a monthly average of 5,647.
1971 (8 months)—28,061 admissions for a monthly average of 3,508.

"(Note) 1) the current GAO report does not reflect official statistics for 1967—48,724 admissions for a monthly average of 4,060. This increases the total official statistics on civilian war casualties to some 282,959 since figures were first compiled at the Subcommittee's request in 1967.

"2) Contrary to official statistics, estimates of the Subcommittee on Refugees place the total number of civilian war casualties since early 1962 at more than 1,200,000—including at least 350,000 deaths. These estimates are based on repeated field studies by subcommittee personnel and reported data from official sources.)

"4. Through 1970, Military Region 4 (delta area) reported the number of civilian casualties. Since early 1971, however, Military Region 1 (northern provinces has 'surpassed the delta region in the number of reported casualties.'

"5. Most of the information on hospital admissions was compiled by USAID/VN from monthly reports received from U.S. advisors in the field. These reports contain statistical data only. There is no regular reporting to USAID/VN Public Health Division from the field on actual conditions at Ministry of Health hospitals; the adequacy of Vietnamese staffing; the adequacy of logistical support; and the progress made in preventive aid medicine, malaria control, and environmental health. This type of information was reported to USAID/VN prior to March 1971, but at that time the reporting requirement was reduced sharply to include only statistical data.

"LEVEL OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

"1. 'From fiscal year 1968 through fiscal year 1971, AID obligated over $87 million to assist the Government of Vietnam in providing medical care to the civilian population of Vietnam. For fiscal year 1972; AID plans to provide $14.1 million—a reduction from the $20 million average of previous years.'

"2. 'Department of Defense provided $52.7 million in assistance to the civilian health program from fiscal year 1968 through fiscal year 1971. Over 40 percent of these funds have been spent by the Department of the Army for medical supplies and equipment under an agreement with AID.' Although this is still in
effect, the Army believes it 'is no longer equitable' because 'Army forces are not a significant contributing factor to (civilian) casualties . . .'

'2. Reflecting a general trend within the Department of Defense, its Medical Civic Action Program and Military Provincial Health Assistance Program teams—which have been in operation since 1963 and 1969 respectively—are being discontinued this year.'

'4. Since 1968, the Government of Vietnam has spent some 14.8 billion piasters ($123.6 million) for civilian health care. This includes some $2 million worth of Plasters provided from the United States—controlled local currency generated from other U.S. assistance programs. The amount of GVN funds used to support civilian health programs has increased since 1968. The health programs share of the Government of Vietnam's civil budget, however, has not kept pace with other civilian programs' shares; the health programs share of the GVN's civil budget decreased from 7.6 percent in 1968 to 4.5 percent in 1971.'

'5. Future reductions in U.S. financial assistance will place further burdens on the GVN civil budget. Also, financing of essential medical commodities and equipment, formerly provided by AID and the Department of Defense, will have come from GVN's foreign-exchange earnings unless other external sources of funds are obtained. Vietnam's foreign-exchange earnings are already insufficient to finance other essential imports. The shortage of foreign exchange will become more serious as further reductions are made in U.S. activities in Vietnam, a source of significant foreign-exchange earnings for GVN.'

"STAFFING AND MANPOWER"

'1. 'On the basis of our review, we believe that the shortage of qualified medical personnel in Vietnam remains a serious problem . . .'

'2. AID has decreased authorized health personnel by 50 percent since 1970 and plans to decrease them still further in future years.'

'3. The major factors contributing to a decline in U.S. personnel are the reductions in AID's Vietnam budget and a Presidential directive to effect reduction wherever possible in overseas personnel.'

'4. 'U.S. advisors generally agreed that the loss of (AID) Medical personnel may have an adverse effect on the level of medical care in Vietnam, particularly in rural areas where Vietnamese medical personnel are scarce and where Ministry programs are not well established.'

'5. The U.S. military health program decreased from 25 teams totalling 184 assigned personnel in June 1970 to 11 teams totalling 46 assigned personnel in September, 1971. As noted above, this program will be eliminated this year probably by July.'

'6. Like the reduction in the AID health program, the elimination of military medical programs will adversely affect civilian health in Vietnam. It will 'reduce the level of care' because the GVN cannot 'fill the gap.'

'7. Training Vietnamese medical personnel is a slow process. Two medical schools in Vietnam are expected to graduate 226 physicians in 1971. With free-world assistance the schools are estimated to have the potential of graduating 250 physicians per year. At that rate it would take over 10 years to attain the World Health Organization's minimum standard for developing countries of one physician for 5,000 persons.

'8. In June 1971 there were 1,520 licensed physicians in Vietnam, or one for about every 12,000 persons; however, 1,130 physicians, or 74 percent, were in the Army.'

"MEDICAL FACILITIES"

'1. The GAO reports that 'conditions had generally improved' over their last investigation in 1970. However, GAO also points out that requirements for medical equipment, personnel, and medicine at villages and hamlets where refugees reside will probably 'become serious problems as U.S. financial assistance is reduced and U.S. advisors and third-country-national technicians are withdrawn.'

'2. 'Health facilities, particularly those in rural areas, built in past years by GVN and the U.S., are now unused because of lack of staff.' Such facilities are 'prevalent throughout the country.'

'3. The GAO noted instances where hospitals were under construction or had recently been completed but no provisions had been made for either staff or equipment. The United States has turned down requests to equip these hospitals.
"4. 'In our review of assistance to war victims in Vietnam, we noted numerous refugee sites and former refugee sites that needed health-care assistance. At 88 refugee sites—which contained about 140,000 persons—that we visited in Military regions 1, 2, 3, and 4, we found that many had health-care deficiencies; some had no health care facilities and others had health facilities but had no health personnel and/or no medicine. A survey, conducted by U.S. advisors in Military region 1 during 1970 and 1971, indicated that a number of the 252 temporary and resettlement sites surveyed lacked medical facilities and personnel.'

"5. GAO reports that the shortage of manpower, facilities, and medicines can be only accentuated as the U.S. withdraws personnel and reduces its financial support.

"6. Despite improved conditions in some medical facilities, the GAO still found hospitals where 'drainage was bad', where toilets and showers were 'inoperable', where conditions were 'unsanitary', where there was a 'lack of running water', where 'wards were dirty and gloomy', etc.

"7. GAO reports that U.S. officials 'believe that when U.S. support is withdrawn after fiscal year 1972, equipment maintenance will become a widespread and major problem.'

"8. 'From May 1970, 12 DOD hospitals had ceased operations in Vietnam. Of these 12 hospitals, six were retained by the United States—two were mobile units and four were used for other purposes. The remaining six were offered to GVN; three were not considered suitable, and three were taken over and were being operated by the Vietnamese Army. The Ministry of Health has not received any hospital facilities from the U.S. military. We were informed that more U.S. hospitals probably will be turned over to GVN when the United States stops using them. The Ministry of Defense is interested in taking over four U.S. military hospitals having a total of 870 beds. The Ministry of Health also expressed interest in these four hospitals and in one other having 310 beds. Under existing turnover procedures, GVN Armed Forces have first priority on excess U.S. facilities.'

"9. The United States has been providing 86 percent of all medical and medical-related commodities used in the GVN Ministry of Health system. US commodity assistance will be reduced substantially this year, with no alternative source to fill the gap.

"10. A similar situation exists in most phases of health care in Vietnam. In the case of maintenance of medical equipment, the GAO reports that the need for qualified personnel is 'critical' and that the amount of equipment on hand in health facilities has increased 'to a point beyond the repair capabilities of Vietnamese repair technicians.' The GAO reports that 'the overall level of medical equipment maintenance probably will deteriorate when U.S. assistance is withdrawn.'

"11. Regarding general medical supplies, GAO found that the percent of active stock items for which a critical need existed—that is, either no stock was on hand or the stock on hand was less than enough to meet a thirty day demand—was 11.6 percent of stock items in fiscal year 1971 compared with 7.2 percent in fiscal year 1970. The situation is deteriorating.

"12. On the other hand, there are many items in excess of the desired 6 month stock level. The value of excess items uncovered by the GAO was some $1.7 million.

"13. The GAO is critical of the 'inaccuracy of records.' For example, the GAO reports: 'An error in records processing resulted in the needless destruction in January 1971 of one lot of penicillin solution costing $11,800. The penicillin, which was on hand in October 1970, was entered erroneously on a destruction authorization form. USAID-VN logistics advisors and the Ministry's Director of Logistics did not notice the error and approved the destruction of the penicillin.'

---

FOLLOW-UP REVIEW ON ASSISTANCE TO WAR VICTIMS IN VIETNAM

SUMMARY OF GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

"1. The Government of Vietnam (GVN) provides assistance to war victims under a refugee relief and social welfare program which receives financial, commodity, and technical assistance from the United States. The program has,
over the years, evolved from a program of assistance to persons displaced by the war (refugees) to a program intended to assist all persons who have suffered from the war (war victims)—refugees, widows, orphans, the physically disabled, the economically handicapped, and persons who have suffered personal injuries, loss of family members, or property damage.

"2. The Ministry of Social Welfare is the primary GVN organization responsible for refugee relief and social welfare activities.


"4. In prior years, GAO reports that ‘no formal list of priorities has been established for U.S. assistance activities in Vietnam . . . the allocation of available resources was considered by AID officials in Washington and Vietnam to be an indication of relative priorities. . . . By this measure, assistance to war victims has a very low priority in a list of 10 AID projects programed in dollars. In fiscal year 1971, highway improvement led the list with $62,500,000. Assistance to war victims was seventh on the list with some $6,300,000.

"5. Narrative reports on war victims are often inaccurate—statistical data has always been understated, etc., and continues to be ‘erroneous, misleading and confusing.

"6. The CORDS War Victim Directorate was aware of the apparent deficiencies of the reports. Many instances of inaccurate and unreliable data had been brought to the attention of American advisors in the field; in some cases corrective actions had been taken, but, in numerous instances, repeated notices to field personnel had brought little results. Inaccurate and unreliable data continued to be reported.

"LONG-RANGE PLANNING FOR THE REHABILITATION OF WAR VICTIMS

1. GAO states that ‘some progress has been made in meeting the immediate needs of war victims . . . The many years of U.S. assistance have increased the GVN capability to deal with emergency relief. It has not effectively strengthened or developed, however, an essential GVN capability to deal with the long-term problems of war victims—rehabilitation and reconstruction.

"2. The United States has not developed long-range plans for dealing with the long-term human problems of refugees and other war victims who continue to suffer from social and economic disadvantages caused by the war. Also the U.S. has not made projections as to the magnitude of effort that would be required to meet the long-term needs of war victims.

"3. Future levels of U.S. commitments in the areas of reconstruction and rehabilitation are unknown. The proposed fiscal year 1973 Mission project budget submission calls for U.S. dollar commitments to be phased out by fiscal year 1974.

"4. It appears that the GVN ‘would like to carry out a wide variety of programs’ to rehabilitate war victims. GAO reports, however, that ‘it was difficult to make realistic plans without knowledge of the amounts or resources available, especially when external assistance was declining.

"5. GAO notes that an October 1971 policy statement from the Department of State comments on meeting emergency refugee needs, but the GAO also observes that the policy statement ignores the massive long-term rehabilitation needs of Vietnam’s war victims.

"6. GAO also notes that ‘a 2-year study supported at the higher levels of the U.S. Government and GVN and dealing with comprehensive policies and programs on the postwar development in Vietnam recommended that the primary postwar objective should be the attainment of economic independence. No recommendation was made concerning overall objectives and policies for aiding all war victims.

"7. The concentration on short-run emergency activities ‘evolved from a policy decision made by AID in 1969 to eliminate Social Welfare as a separate project.

"8. Top AID officials feel that ‘problems of war victims would be solved by economic development.’ CORDS officials in the field, however, told GAO ‘that they did not subscribe to this position; instead they favor a separate program for humanitarian assistance. This, they feel, would give the human problems appropriate recognition and support.'
104

9. "CORDS social development officials have advocated in the past that GVN and the U.S. should identify the problems of the immediate and long-term future that may be experienced by physically disabled war victims, displaced citizens suffering property losses, war widows, and orphans."

10. "One of the most comprehensive studies was conducted as early as 1967 by an AID-financed social welfare task force. The resulting report indicated that there were recognizable social welfare problems, both short term and long term. The task force made many recommendations including social development planning that would establish goals and objectives, set priorities, outline programs, and estimate personnel and financial needs. The study, in general, was not acted on."

REFUGEE NUMBERS

1. At least 6,000,000 Vietnamese—more than a third of the population—have become refugees since 1965, according to official estimates.

2. Only 2,500,000 of the 6,000,000—little more than 40%—have been officially listed as having received emergency and temporary assistance. And only 3,200,000 of the 6,000,000—some 53%—have been officially listed as having received resettlement or return-to-village assistance.

3. Even though there was 'an overall reduction in the scale of the military operation throughout Vietnam in 1971, the number of refugees generated and placed in GVN-controlled areas ... exceeded the average monthly level of the 2 previous years.'

4. Statistical summary of new refugees since 1969:
   - 1969—115,000 for a monthly average of 9,750.
   - 1970—135,000 for a monthly average of 11,250.
   - 1971 (8 months)—120,484 for a monthly average of 13,387.

5. (Note: the figures above only represent the number of new refugees officially registered with the GVN for relief assistance. Based on the pattern of prior years, the actual number of new refugees is undoubtedly higher.)

FORCED RELOCATION OF MONTAGNARDS AND OTHERS

1. Over the years many relocations have occurred throughout Vietnam. The "forced relocations" of Montagnards and others in Military Region 2 are relatively recent examples.

2. From May 1970 through August 20, 1971, some 62,546 people were relocated in Military Region 2.

3. The relocations took place in the provinces of Pleiku, Binh Thuan, Darlac, Phu Bon, Kontum, Tuyen Duc, and Phu Yen.

4. The relocations were termed the campaign 'Gathering the People'.

5. The reasons given for the relocations were (1) to bring the persons to more secure areas and (2) to deny support to the Viet Cong.

6. A CORDS observer reported that many persons had been relocated against their wills—without adequate preparation and with the approval of the Central Pacification Development Council. Many of the Montagnards complained of being forced to leave behind their prized personal possessions, such as gongs, jars, and hardwood furniture. A Montagnard from Buon Kli B, located in Darlac province, told us that the GVN soldiers had killed some of their livestock and had stolen some of their personal possessions. We were told that many of the families had been moved—with only a few hours' notice—and that adequate transportation had not been provided. Most had been forced to walk either part of or all of the way to the relocation site.

7. CORDS officials at the working level opposed these massive relocations. Top officials in CORDS 'made no representations' to the GVN or anybody else to oppose the moves.

8. One CORDS official said that the desire to publicize the political propaganda that 95% of the population lives under GVN control is no justification for relocations. Another told GAO that he was opposed to the relocations because they did not materially enhance the economic and physical security of the persons moved.

9. Conditions at relocation sites were generally inadequate—lack of water, food, relief supplies and farmland—a general lack of medical facilities—numerous deaths because of exposure, malnutrition, etc.
7. For example, out of the 2,500 Montagnards 'forcibly relocated' in January 1971 to a resettlement site at Plei De Groi in Pleiku province, up to 300 had died in March.

8. 'GVN officials promised the relocated people that land would be made available; however, this promise has not always been kept. In Buon Ki B, Darlac Province, the relocated Montagnards were promised land surrounding their relocation site; however, other Vietnamese have moved in and are farming at least three quarters of the promised land. In some cases the Montagnards are returning to their original fields, which in some instances involves walking between 2 and 6 miles. Although the Montagnards moved from their land for security reasons, other Vietnamese in some cases moved in to farm the Montagnards' land.

9. Future relocation plans:
   a. One plan, according to GAO, involves the moving of 300,000 persons in 1972 from Quang Ngai and Quang Nam provinces in Military Region 1.
   b. One reason given for this possible relocation is 'the embarrassing situation' in Military Region 1, where refugees frequently had little or no land to farm and were caught in the fighting still going on.
   c. Another reason given is 'the worsening unemployment situation.'
   d. Still another reason is 'that the abandoned land could be turned into a free-fire zone to make it easier to fight the enemy.'
   e. GAO states that 'such massive relocation imposes refugee problems which may exceed the ability of GVN to effectively handle required relief operations.'

EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO NEW REFUGEES

1. 'Long delays have occurred' in recognizing and registering refugees and in making payments.

2. 'To be eligible for assistance, the refugee must live in a recognized GVN refugee site. Refugees living outside sites have not been recognized by GVN since the end of 1970.'

3. Typical of the delays in recognizing refugees and in making payments, is a situation in Darlac province. Some 736 Montagnards were relocated in 1968. GAO reports that these refugees were not recognized as such, and 'did not receive temporary assistance benefits until 1971.'

4. In a June 1971 memorandum, a CORDS refugee advisor stated: 'I cannot understand why the U.S. and the Vietnamese Governments spend so much on propaganda telling people about the 'good life' available to those who seek government protection, when in fact so little is actually done.'

ASSISTANCE TO RESETTLED AND RETURN-TO-VILLAGE REFUGEES

1. Assistance suffers from a number of 'deficiencies'.
   a. 'Payments of resettlement and return-to-village benefits are not promptly made.' Payments were 'at much slower rates during the first 6 months of 1971 than during the same period in 1970. Moreover, fewer refugees were paid in 1971, even though the actual active caseload increased.' In the 1970 period 183,000 out of 342,000 were paid. In the 1971 period 156,000 out of 409,000 were paid.
   b. Commodities, such as roofing are 'not provided when needed.' Moreover, no emergency stocks are provided to the provinces, 'although sufficient stocks for normal and emergency requirements' are on hand in Saigon.
   c. Site development (wells, latrines, teachers and classrooms, medical facilities, water pumps, etc.) falls far below 'development project criteria established by GVN to satisfy the needs of refugees in resettlement and return-to-village.'
   d. In 1971, about 539 million piasters were budgeted for resettlement and return-to-village site development. As of August 31, 1971 about 491 million had been allocated. But less than 26% of the allocation—about 127 million plasters—had been expended.
   e. GAO states that another problem was the fact that sites 'were stereotyped' and 'were not designed to meet the specific needs of the refugees. For example, we observed that schools were built and that wells were dug; yet the one overriding need of most of the refugees had not been provided by the GVN—land to farm. Also, the construction of a dispensary is of little value without provid-