3. Housing

Under the present circumstances, it is suggested that the main thrust of any housing policy should reside in assistance to self-help type construction, the furnishing of technical advice, the providing of necessary materials to the disadvantaged, and the installation by the government of the necessary infrastructure, viz., streets, water lines and sewage facilities. It would also be well to encourage local production of necessary materials (cement, bricks, tile, wood) and to arrange for the importation of those materials which cannot be produced here for the time being, viz., metal products, etc. Possibilities exist for the increased importation of these products through American aid.

Help should be extended by certain UN and other technicians to the “Committee for the Promotion of Low Cost Housing” in order to assist it in the construction of pilot villages and the renovation of certain sections of the city. Three important activities have already begun:

3.1 Pilot Villages—The attached request, made to the World Food Program (WFP) gives all necessary data concerning the cost of constructing a village of 200 houses and measures are indicated for financing such a program. It is to be feared, however, that although WFP help might be granted, that organization might still not be able to obtain rice in sufficient quantity, this in spite of the fact that world stocks of this grain happen to be in excessive supply. It would be useful to contact international and national organizations on the subject. Concerning the construction of these villages, it would be necessary also to try to obtain the help of certain countries in order to procure the following materials: tiles, wood, nails, etc.

3.2 Renovating Certain Sections of the City—At the present time, there is a study in process to renovate Beng Trebeek. Because of the usefulness of this project and of the data which will be accumulated to support future programs, it would be well to seek out sources of financing:

- Cambodian Development Bank
- Central Fund for Economic Cooperation
- Asian Development Bank

and also obtain free and voluntary types of foreign aid so that it will not be necessary to go into debt. It should be noted also that on an economic basis, the financing of productive works and collective investments would justify the fact that normal budgetary procedures might be relaxed.

3.3 Planning Entirely New City Areas—The decision to construct the northern dike will permit the clearing out of a fairly large zone, and after a study of a detailed master plan, to locate buildings there and the type of farming appropriate for marshland areas. As regards construction, the prototypes furnished by the pilot village will prove useful and, there again, it will probably be necessary to bring together public capital, domestic and foreign, as well as private capital and initiative. What is most important is that at the beginning, land speculation be avoided and a master plan followed.

It is probable that certain low areas will have to be filled in here, collected waste and refuse might be used as fill.

Mentioned here as a reminder is the fact that assistance has been provided to this operation by the U.S., which, during the work of this committee, increased the pool of heavy construction equipment belonging to the Ministry of Public Works, thus helping the operation to proceed rapidly and under satisfactory conditions. Regarding marshland cultivation, the granting of fertilizer and grain should help to get it off to a good start, and it might be well for the land to be distributed on a priority basis to refugees—without their having final claim to the land, however. Families will then have something to do and be able to earn extra income.

4. Centers and Official Camps for Refugees and Displaced Persons

The most pressing problem in this area is to ameliorate the health and sanitary conditions found in these camps and centers. Given the fact that the number of centers is limited to about 30 and that about 8,000 persons are lodged there, the task of providing health training and education to these people should not pose any major problems. We consider that this type of training could well be given by Kibner sanitation agents.

Certain centers are overpopulated, and relieving the congestion would improve the situation. It would thus be necessary to consider opening up new centers,
which, from the very start, should provide at least minimum health standards in order to avoid the problems encountered earlier.

The matter of employment and of work doesn’t appear to us to be alarming, given the fact that the great majority of the inhabitants of these centers are families of military men who, in principle, are receiving a regular allowance. Civilians are for the most part regularly employed.

One point which should not be overlooked is that of medical assistance, such assistance should absolutely be planned for and provided as these people do not have the means to go elsewhere for medical attention. Mobile and stationary teams presently provided by municipal health services need to be augmented. The furnishing of pharmaceuticals for use in the work of these teams should be effected on a regular and continuous basis.
Appendix II

A SURVEY OF CIVILIAN FATALITIES AMONG REFUGEES FROM XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCE, LAOS,

(By Walter M. Haney, IVS Volunteer, Laos, 1970-71)

INTRODUCTION

In December of 1970 and January of 1971 a survey of civilian casualties among refugees from the Plain of Jars was conducted. This was published in the Subcommittee's hearing of July 22, 1971. This first survey contained a sampling of 189 civilian casualties among a refugee population of approximately 8500. In an attempt to gain additional information on the plight of the refugees, a group of individuals in Vientiane decided to make further inquiry into the situation. The result of their effort is this report.

The individuals who contributed to this effort included both Lao and non-Lao. Unfortunately, due to the nature of the information and the positions held by some of these individuals it would be imprudent to reveal the names of all of those who participated. In consequence, throughout the remainder of this paper I shall use the editorial first person plural form even though I, myself, did not personally participate in all aspects of the study. Nevertheless, I personally can attest to the individual integrity and seriousness of purpose of all who helped in the study.

II. PROCEDURES

Names of Laotian civilians who had been killed in the war in Laos were obtained from lists of civilian fatalities given to us by officials from the Ministry of Social Welfare in Vientiane. All of the fatality lists had been drawn up from forms filled out by Laotian refugees. The forms entitled "Request for Aid for Death in the Defense of the Country," contained information on the name, home, age, occupation, date of death, and cause of death of each victim. These forms which we were shown came from many parts of Laos and covered a time span of roughly six years, 1964-1971. Each request form was counter-signed by the village chief, subdistrict chief, district chief, and Governor of the appropriate jurisdiction. Unfortunately, in most cases, the information contained in these forms regarding the cause of death was so vague as to be meaningless. For example, many forms indicated simply that victims had been "killed in the war" or "died in the fighting." Also, we subsequently found that information regarding the dates of death was often inaccurate.

In an attempt to gain more information on the exact causes of civilian fatalities we decided to carry out a survey. Given our limited access only to those refugees in the vicinity of Vientiane, and our limited resources we were only able to gather information among refugees from four subdistricts in two districts: Tasseng Kat and Tasseng Phiang in Muong Pek and Tasseng Pha and Tasseng Kang Sene in Muong Khoun. Officials at the Ministry of Social Welfare informed us that the fatality lists for these four subdistricts were probably incomplete. One official suggested, however, that the list for Tasseng Kang Sene was probably very nearly complete. With lists of civilian fatalities from these four subdistricts, Laotian members of our group visited the respective refugee camps and interviewed refugees as to the cause of death of each victim. In many cases it was impossible to locate immediate relatives of the victims and in such cases people from the same village or subdistrict as the victim were queried as to the cause of death. The accounts of how each of the victims died were written out in Laotian and later translated into English.


The need for keeping in confidence the names of those who participated in this study is, unfortunately, not just idle speculation. After one individual looked into the refugee situation in early 1970, an American official in Vientiane threatened in our presence to do everything he could to "get rid of the troublemaker".
III. FINDINGS

A. Tabulated Results

The tabulated results of our survey are shown in the following tables:

Table I, Total Fatalities; Table II, Tasseng Kang Sene; Table III, Tasseng Kat; Table IV, Tasseng Pha; Table V, Tasseng Phiang.

In each of the tables the numbers in parentheses represent the number of women who were killed in each category. The causes of death can be separated into two broad categories which are discussed below.

B. Fatalities Caused by Disease

The greatest number of civilian deaths were reportedly caused by disease or illness. While the exact location and time of death was not noted in most accounts, many fatalities caused by disease were said to have occurred in refugee camps in the area of the Plain of Jars. Specifically, refugees mentioned three camps: Thong Khoun, Lat Sene, and Khang St. Refugees said they had been gathered into these camps after Royal Laotian Government troops recaptured the Plain of Jars in the summer of 1969. Most often the death causing disease was called a fever (Khao) or common fever (Khai thammada) and occasionally refugees referred to an epidemic or contagious disease (nhat tit pek). Evidently this is the same epidemic-like disease as that reported by refugees from Tasseng Xieng. Those refugees reported that during July and August of 1969, the disease caused 200-800 deaths among the approximately 2600 from Tasseng Xieng and Tasseng Nheun while they were located in a refugee camp at Nalouang. They reported that the disease struck hardest at the children and the elderly. This is also the pattern indicated in Tables II and V. Evidently, the disease did not strike so heavily among the refugees from Tasseng Kat and Tasseng Pha. See Tables III and IV.

**TABLE I.—TOTAL FATALITIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Total Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 to 10</td>
<td>153 (77F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 to 20</td>
<td>109 (44F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 to 35</td>
<td>58 (16F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 to 50</td>
<td>55 (17F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 plus</td>
<td>62 (22F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>437 (176F)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Causes of death:**

- Disease: 84 (45F)
- Bombing: 38 (17F)
- Mines: 2 (1F)
- Artillery: 12 (7F)
- Small Arms: 8 (2F)
- Miscellaneous: 8 (2F)

**TABLE II.—TASSENG KANG SENE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Total Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 to 10</td>
<td>81 (45F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 to 20</td>
<td>69 (24F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 to 35</td>
<td>40 (3F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 to 50</td>
<td>26 (6F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 plus</td>
<td>35 (9F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>251 (92F)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Causes of death:**

- Disease: 55 (31F)
- Bombing: 17 (1F)
- Mines: 1 (0F)
- Artillery: 4 (3F)
- Small Arms: 1 (0F)
- Miscellaneous: 3 (0F)

**Note:**

1. Of the individuals whose death was attributed to bombing, 5 reportedly died while portering and 2 died as soldiers.
2. Of those who died from mines, 3 were killed while portering and 2 died as home-guard soldiers.
3. Four of the victims in this category died while portering, 2 as home-guard soldiers and 1 as a regular soldier.
4. Of the victims in this category, 2 were home-guard soldiers and 5 were regular soldiers.

### TABLE III.—TASSENG KAT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes of death:</th>
<th>0 to 10</th>
<th>11 to 20</th>
<th>21 to 35</th>
<th>36 to 50</th>
<th>51 plus</th>
<th>Subtotal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disease</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (2F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing*</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
<td>0 (OF)</td>
<td>4 (OF)</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11 (6F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (OF)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (OF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (OF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (OF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
<td>4 (2F)</td>
<td>6 (2F)</td>
<td>6 (1F)</td>
<td>2 (1F)</td>
<td>21 (7F)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Of the individuals whose deaths were attributed to bombing, 2 reportedly died while portering, 1 was a home-guard soldier, and 1 a regular soldier.
2. One of the victims in this category died while portering.
3. One of the victims in this category also died while portering.

### TABLE IV.—TASSENG PHA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes of death:</th>
<th>0 to 10</th>
<th>11 to 20</th>
<th>21 to 35</th>
<th>36 to 50</th>
<th>51 plus</th>
<th>Subtotal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disease</td>
<td>5 (2F)</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7 (4F)</td>
<td>13 (6F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing*</td>
<td>6 (2F)</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
<td>2 (2F)</td>
<td>7 (2F)</td>
<td>8 (4F)</td>
<td>26 (12F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
<td>2 (1F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery*</td>
<td>4 (2F)</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6 (3F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms*</td>
<td>3 (1F)</td>
<td>2 (1F)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (1F)</td>
<td>2 (1F)</td>
<td>11 (6F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>18 (7F)</td>
<td>14 (5F)</td>
<td>6 (3F)</td>
<td>7 (4F)</td>
<td>19 (9F)</td>
<td>64 (28F)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Of the bombing victims 1 was killed while portering and 4 died as home-guard soldiers.
2. Of those who died from mines 1 was a home-guard soldier, 1 a regular soldier, and 1 was killed while portering.
3. Of those killed by small arms 1 was a regular soldier and 1 died while portering.

### TABLE V.—TASSENG PHIAHNG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes of death:</th>
<th>0 to 10</th>
<th>11 to 20</th>
<th>21 to 35</th>
<th>36 to 50</th>
<th>51 plus</th>
<th>Subtotal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disease</td>
<td>24 (12F)</td>
<td>2 (1F)</td>
<td>5 (2F)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing*</td>
<td>14 (3F)</td>
<td>0 (1F)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines*</td>
<td>4 (2F)</td>
<td>3 (2F)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (1F)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9 (3F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery*</td>
<td>5 (4F)</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
<td>2 (1F)</td>
<td>10 (4F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms*</td>
<td>5 (2F)</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (1F)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11 (4F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>53 (24F)</td>
<td>22 (13F)</td>
<td>6 (3F)</td>
<td>14 (8F)</td>
<td>8 (3F)</td>
<td>101 (49F)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. In 11 of these accounts it was specified that individuals died of disease while in refugee camps on the Plains of Jars.
2. Two of the fatalities in this category occurred while the individuals were imprisoned in a Pathet Lao jail which was bombed. Also of the fatalities in this category 3 were regular Pathet Lao soldiers and 2 were home-guard soldiers.
3. In 2 of the incidents in this category the mines were reportedly placed by the "Meo soldiers." In 1 case an individual was killed while portering.
4. One of the individuals killed by artillery was reportedly a home-guard soldier.
5. Four of the small arms killings were attributed to the "Meo soldier" and 2 to the Pathet Lao.

### O. Civilian War Fatalities

The second broad category of fatalities was that of civilian war casualties or deaths caused directly by military action. The data for fatalities in this category may be compared with that from the previously conducted "Survey of Civilian War Casualties Among Refugees from the Plain of Jars," 8.

The findings of the fatality survey generally substantiate those of the casualty survey. In both surveys the majority of civilian war casualties were caused by bombing and lesser numbers were caused by mines, artillery and small arms.

### D. Soldier "Civilians"

Perhaps the finding of the current survey which is most divergent from those of the previous study is that some of the purported "civilians" were killed while they were actually either home guard or regular Pathet Lao soldiers. Such deaths are tabulated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEATHS OF &quot;CIVILIAN&quot; SOLDIERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cause of death:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This finding that 32 (or roughly 12%) of the 265 fatalities caused by military action were either home guard or regular soldiers is notably different from the findings in the previous survey on civilian casualties. In that study no reports of either home guard or regular soldiers' deaths were received. There are two possible explanations as to why there were no such reports in the casualty survey:

1. Refugees may have been afraid to tell a foreign interviewer about relatives who were Pathet Lao soldiers. In consequence, they may have reported some casualties as civilians when in fact they were not.

2. In the casualty survey the interviewer asked about civilian casualties only and specifically stated that he was not interested in casualties among soldiers. The refugees may therefore have complied with his wishes and simply not related to him accounts of casualties among home guard or regular Pathet Lao soldiers.

Regardless of which explanation may be correct, the inclusion of a small number of military and quasi-military personnel in the civilian statistics would seem to influence the findings only slightly. Note, for example, that if all thirty-two accounts of soldier "civilian" fatalities are subtracted from the remaining accounts, the portion of deaths attributed to bombing rises only from 52% to 53%.

### E. Other Significant Findings

1. Again, as in the casualty survey we received reports of the bombing of a Pathet Lao prison in which over 80 people were killed.

2. In one account we were told of the bombing of a primary school in Tasseng Phiang. Also, we were told of the bombing of a teacher training school for girls east of Xieng Khouangville in which four or five girls were reportedly killed.

3. Unlike the previous study we received no accounts of civilian fatalities caused by the North Vietnamese.

4. Twenty-one (roughly 8%) of the civilian fatalities were reportedly engaged in some form of porterage at the time they were killed. Porterage was also reported in the casualty survey.
IV. Conclusions

(1) The greatest single cause of civilian fatalities among the 487 cases surveyed was not any type of direct military action. Rather, it was disease and fever. While the exact nature of the disease(s) is not known, many fatalities reportedly occurred during the summer of 1969 when the refugees were gathered into camps which were ravaged by what some described as an epidemic.

(2) Of the 235 fatalities caused as a direct result of military action, a majority (or roughly 52%) were caused by aerial bombardment. In descending order of prevalence, other causes of civilian war fatalities were small arms (roughly 20%), artillery (10%), and mines (11%).

ANNEX A: CASE STUDIES OF FATALITIES AMONG LAO REFUGEES
TRANSLATED FROM LAOTIAN
CASES FROM TASSENG PHUNG

1. Sao Bounma, 39, Ban Nathao. Died when they attacked Phou Kout. Her village was just a little way from Phou Kout. One time at 8AM in the morning before anyone had awakened, there came the loud sound of a shell from the mountains. As everyone was running from their homes some bullets which they had shot in the mountains fell in passing and struck her. She was badly hurt and was sent to the hospital at Khang Khai. But she didn’t arrive in time because there was no vehicle. All they could do was carry her by hand. Along the way her heart gave out.

2. Thao Lu Hou, 55, Ban Nathao. He died from fever on account of sleeping in the holes all the time. Pustules had appeared on him more than three months before he died.

3. Thao Phomm, 9, Ban Nathao. Died from drowning after heavy rains. There was a sound of airplanes and he hurriedly ran across a bridge toward some holes far from the village. But the bridge had already been hit and damaged and when he came to the middle of the bridge it broke and he fell into the stream. He couldn’t swim and was swept away forever.

4. Thao Dai, 6, Ban Nathao. He died when his parents weren’t around. They had gone to work in the ricefield far from the holes. The child didn’t know enough to be careful. He wandered away in play. But at that time there were bomblets in the forest and around the edge (of the village) maybe 150m from the child. He wandered about and came upon a bombi. He picked up a stone and threw it at the bombi causing it to explode. It killed the boy and wounded some of his friends.

5. Thao Meung, 12, Ban Nathao. He died when he went to look for a cow which had broken its tether. He was walking along a path when he heard the sound of a 155mm shell from Muong Soui but he thought that it was not coming his way. But it fell about 15m from him. He was hit in the arm. There was no one with him and he fainted there in his own blood, all alone. After a long time he hadn’t yet died. His parents came looking and found him. They carried him back intending to send him to the hospital but the planes came all day so he couldn’t go. Until after a few days, his heart gave out and he died before (he could reach the hospital).

6. Sao Chandh, 85, Ban Nathao. She died during childbirth when the child didn’t come out. She was far from a hospital and died in about 20 hours.

7. Sao Ten, 30, Ban Nathao. She died when the airplanes bombed the hole she was in. She had gone to the village to make food. But there was a hole very near to her home. Then the planes flew over and she had nowhere to go so she went into the hole. Then the planes bombed the village causing her house to burn so she ran out to save some of her belongings, but after she returned to the hole a 250 kg bomb fell on the mouth of the hole causing it to cave in covering and killing her. She was dug out but was dead already.

8. Nang Kham, 10, Ban Nathao. She was a nurse in the hospital but she was sent to cure some people who were hurt at the front. She brought them back from the front. News was received that there were some other injured people at that place so she hurried to return. But when she went along the road there came an 3-P-4-H plane sowing bombi along the road. One bombi fell near her and injured her severely, almost killing her. Her friend who was also a nurse tried to help her but could not because she was too badly injured. She died within a few days.
9. Thao Boun Heuang, 14, Ban Nathao. He was a student in grade 5 in Ban Nyuan. He was selected to go study in Ban Nyuan in Tasseng Kat. But they had to study among the hills and streams in order to protect against the airplanes seeing them. But one time after school let out at 10 o'clock, and the students were walking along the stream toward home an Biler-10 plane saw them and shot four rockets at them. He was hit and died right there.

10. Sao Thong, 50, Ban Nathao. She died on account of illness which she had had for eight months. She died from this sickness of hers. Because she was very depressed and couldn't eat.

11. Thao Sen, 6, Ban Nathao. He died from fever and pustules. The pustules broke into pus and after about 10 days he died.

12. Thao Sim, 10, Ban Nathao. He died on account of playing with a 60 mortar shell which they left in the forest. The children found it and picked it up. They played with it and carried it about until it exploded, killing three people together with Thao Sim.

13. Thao Dal Nyai, 12, Ban Nathao. Killed by bombi when the planes came bombing in the night. He had gone to bring back rice to store in the forest. But just when he came to the road the airplanes dropped flares so he was unable to continue traveling. So he just stopped to sleep right there. But then an A-T-6 plane dropped bombi and shot rockets around the area, killing him and wounding his sister. When the planes left, someone coming along saw them, but he had already died because he had been hit by two bombs.

14. Sao La, 45, Ban Nathao. She was riding in a car going to Nam Thanh on the way to Phonesavanh. They reached the road and then stopped because they saw an airplane coming. But the airplane had seen them first and dropped down many many flares on parachutes making the people in the car very careful. There was no place for them to go so they fled into the forest and the grass as the planes shot Douchet rockets and fire bombs. She was hit by a rocket and severely wounded and before long she died.

15. Nang La, 12, Ban Nathao. She died when the Meo soldiers came to plunder her house. Her father fought back causing the Meos to throw two grenades into the house. She was killed and her father severely wounded.

16. Thao Keu, 6, Ban Nathao. This boy was deaf and couldn't speak so that if anyone warned him to go into the holes when the airplanes came, he wouldn't understand. On that day he had gone out to herd buffalo and a T-28 plane saw (them) and shot and killed him together with the buffalo.

17. Nang Pl, 8, Ban Nathao. She died after fleeing to Lat Sene. Died on account of the fever which she caught and before long died.

18. Thao Outta, 30, Ban Nathao. He was a regular soldier and was sent to attack mount San Loh. But after it fell they didn't flee in time. Eight F105 planes came shooting, causing them to flee but not in time. He was hit and killed at that time. He died there at the front in the fighting at San Loh.

19. Nang Out, 8, Ban Nathao. She died from a bad fever in the time after fleeing to Lat Sene. She couldn't be cured and died.

20. Sao La, 20, Ban Nathao. She was in the women's home guard and went on a month long porterage. But after three days they were ambushed along the way by Meo soldiers. She died on account of the bullets of the Meo soldiers.

21. Nang La, 4, Ban Nathao. She died when a car fell into a fast stream because the car was traveling at night without any lights because they were afraid of the airplanes. When the airplanes came they were afraid the planes would drop flares so they drove fast and didn't see the way and fell into the stream and Nang La was killed.

22. Sao Sing, 14, Ban Nathao. She was a student and had gone to study in the secondary school at Khang Khai. She had gone to buy food in the market in the afternoon but as she returned along the road four F105 planes flew up. She heard the sounds of the planes and the dropping of bombs, altogether 48 bombs at one time but she had nowhere to go because they surprised (her) and shot. She was hit by a large stone and fell down right there at that place. Then after about 3 hours she died.

23. Nang Meung, 16, Ban Nathao. She went to porter artillery shells to the Neo Lao (Hak Sat) on Phou Kut. At that time she had almost arrived at the mountain and the Meo soldiers blocked the way with mines, so three soldiers came back first and she was coming after. There was a sound of a mine and she fell because she had been hit by a mine fragment. But she took heart and was able to run down away from the mountain, after (them). But the three soldiers
fought back but then the Meo soldiers shot a (?) gun causing her to be hit again and she died right there.

24. Sao Phom, 80, Ban Nathao. She died after going into the forest to hide in the forest in a spot where it was heavily overgrown in a small shelter built in a small open space. That day it was raining and she thought that the planes probably wouldn't come. She lit a fire to boil rice. She came out of the hole to boil rice alone. The smoke went up through the trees and at that time three T-6 planes flew up returning from a mission. They saw that (the smoke) and circled around and ordered two F-4H planes to bomb the place where she was. Her hole caved in burying her and her belongings in the hole. Everyone in her family was in his own hole for safety so she alone was killed.

26. Sao Kha, 48, Ban Nathao. She was a hard working person and worked all the time in the garden or at some other work. Usually she just sent her children into the holes and she went to work in the village. But on that day the buffalo went into the garden and she went to chase them out. She didn't know that an L-19 plane flew overhead. The airplane shot a rocket at her. She then knew about the airplane. But then she was already wounded. She was able to sit up and call for villagers to come help her. But when they came to help her, her heart had already given out.

27. Luang Tha, 53, Ban Nathao. He died from illness because he worked a great deal. This caused the severe illness and was not cured well and he died.

25. Nang Koh, 9, Ban Nathao. She died on account of a stomach sickness in the time after fleeing to Lat Sene. And then she died.

27. Luang Tha, 53, Ban Nathao. He died from illness because he worked a great deal. This caused the severe illness and was not cured well and he died.

26. Sao Kha, 48, Ban Nathao. She died after going into the forest to hide in the forest in a spot where it was heavily overgrown in a small shelter built in a small open space. That day it was raining and she thought that the planes probably wouldn't come. She lit a fire to boil rice. She came out of the hole to boil rice alone. The smoke went up through the trees and at that time three T-6 planes flew up returning from a mission. They saw that (the smoke) and circled around and ordered two F-4H planes to bomb the place where she was. Her hole caved in burying her and her belongings in the hole. Everyone in her family was in his own hole for safety so she alone was killed.

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25. Nang Koh, 9, Ban Nathao. She died on account of a stomach sickness in the time after fleeing to Lat Sene. And then she died.

28. Nang Sot, 7, Ban Nathao. She was sick from a common disease and couldn't be cured because the airplanes were around and she was very hungry and died.

29. Thao Tum, 7, Ban Nathao. He died when he fell into a hole where there was a firebomb. He fell along the way where he was herding cows. The child didn't know enough to be careful. He fell into the hole and the fire bomb went off burning him. He could not be cured and died.

30. Nang Sivohn, 7, Ban Nathao. He died when she fled to Khang Si next to the Plain of Jars. She had been there for about a month when she became feverish. A doctor went to give her an injection and came back to give another injection and she died.

31. Thao La, 6, Ban Nathao. He died because he didn't get medicine in time. Because the child didn't know enough to be careful. He went to play and came upon some poison of the kind like salt and he picked some up to play with it and after about an hour became drunk like a drunk person and he came back to the village and reached his house and his heart gave out and he died. His parents didn't know but observed that he played with the poison which had fallen in that area.

32. Xieng Bounta, 47, Ban Nathao. He was captured by the Neo Lao (Hak Sat) when he tried to flee. He was put into jail and when he was in jail, he was shot by the airplanes, at the edge of the jail in Khang Khat. He went to dig and the bomb covered him partially with earth and he died within the next few days.

33. Thao Ot, 11, Ban Nathao. He went to look for mushrooms in the forest on the edge of the stream next to the road from Muong Soui and he went to look for mushrooms along the edge of the road. He didn't know that there were mines along the road. But those mines were very old and no one really knew about them and so they walked along looking for mushrooms. He stepped on an 81 mine causing him to lose his leg. His friends heard and ran to carry him back, but his heart had already given out because he had lost very much blood.

34. Thao Van Son, 9, Ban Nathao. He went fishing along the river and was bitten by a snake and died right at that spot because the poison was strong and there was no one able to help him.

35. Thao La, 9, Ban Nathao. The child was playing with a spade and went to look for a place to dig but along the way saw a bomb of the kind with six legs, but hadn't yet exploded. He threw a rock at it but it didn't explode, so then he took his spade and hit it hard. It exploded injuring the child. He was sent to the hospital but his bones were broken and he couldn't be cured. He became weaker and weaker and then died.

36. Nang Chan, 11, Ban Nathao. She died from goring by a cow when the cow had been shot and injured by the airplanes. She saw it and went to get her father to cure it and returned to watch a little but the cow was angry because it
was badly injured, so it charged Nang Chan and she fell down and it tramped her until she lost consciousness. Then the cow badly injured fell down at that place. Nang Chan was unconscious for a long time and then when she regained consciousness she was taken back to the house, but she was all swollen up inside and died the next week.

37. Nang Souttha, 8, Ban Nathao. She died during flight to Khang S1 when an artillery shell fell very close to where she was. It caused a very loud noise and she shook inside and threw up blood, because of the loudness and the strength of the wind which injured (?) her. But after arriving at Khang S1, she became sicker and sicker and then died.

38. Thit Nuan, 47, Ban Nathao. He was the chief of the home guard unit. He had the duty of defending the Tasseng. At that time some home guard soldiers came to report to him that some Meo soldiers had come to plunder and shoot-up some houses on the edge of the jungle. So he led 15 of his men out to fight with the Meos but he was too brave for he was very angry and wanted to drive the Meos away. But before the Meos fled they put in mines. So as he went after them he stepped on a mine which the Meos had put in. His body was all torn up. He ordered his men to chase and kill the Meo for him and then his heart gave out and he died.

39. Kang Oui, 50, Ban Nathao. He led many of his friends to go shoot deer but at that time there were some Meo soldiers who had come to set mines and set an ambush but when he ran he stepped on a mine which had already been set and the Meo shot at him and his friends. He was hit and killed and his friends returned the fire causing them to flee, then they took him (his body) back to the village.

40. Nang Pha, 10, Ban Nathao. She was hit by the Meo soldiers when they came down around the village at night. They suspected there were Neo Lao (Hak Sat) soldiers in her house so they shot into it causing her to die in the house from the bullets and wounding many other people.

41. Thao Phomma, 6, Ban Nathao. Died from fever when he came down (to Vientiane) because the change in climate caused the child to have the fever for many days and then he died.

42. Thao Khamsing, 10, Ban Nathao. He received an injection became “drunk” and died. When he had the fever a nurse from Region 2 came to cure him in Lat Sene, but after the injection he died.

43. Nal, 1g Si, 9, Ban Nathao. She was hit by a bullet during fighting around the edge of the village at night. She didn’t know what to do because she heard the loud shooting and just as she was going to the holes a bullet struck little Nal in the head and she died immediately because her brains came out.

44. Thao Remi, 17, Ban Nathao. He was encouraged to join a supply group for the army which had come almost a year earlier. He went to transport goods with a load in a vehicle, all the way. But they had to travel at night. And one night as they were returning from Phou Kut along the road, he thought that no planes would probably come because it was very dark and they couldn’t see the road. So the vehicle used its lights, to come along the way. But two AT-6 planes saw them and dropped 10 flares all at once. They didn’t know which way to flee so they stopped on the edge of the road. The airplanes dropped bomb and fire bombs. There was one bomb which hit behind them and exploded. He was hit and died right there. At that time an anti-aircraft team shot the planes to help them so those who weren’t killed hurriedly ran into the forest.

45. Thao Khudom, 6, Ban Nathao. He died after fleeing to Khang S1. He caught the fever and there was no medicine and he died.

46. Thao Sai, 9, Ban Nathao. He went to play with the soldiers in the camp on the edge of the village, in the evening, but at that time they heard the sound of a 155mm shell. Everyone jumped into the holes. He jumped in too but he didn’t get down in fast enough. The 155 shell fell behind him, wounding him. The soldiers tried to cure him but his condition was bad and he died because his wound was too big.

47. Luang Koh, 60, Ban Nathao. Her house burned when the airplanes shot it. She longed for her belongings so ran out of the holes to try to save them. But before she reached the house the airplanes came again and saw her run into the jungle. The airplanes shot after her. She was old and couldn’t go (fast) and was hit in the stomach by bomb fragments. It was most pitiful because her body was completely broken. Her body was all up in the branches of the trees.
Nang Neut, 9, Ban Nathao. She went to look for fish in the ricefield which was full of water. She took a short cut, through the water but that water had been hit by bomb which the airplanes had dropped and many hadn't yet exploded. The child didn't know about that and she took the short cut and approached the bomb and picked up one with wings. It exploded and she was hit in the stomach by fragments. She died.

Thao Bounta, 5, Ban Nathao. Died on account of fever because they waited for medicine and it didn't come in time. It was when they were in the forest in the holes. There was no medicine to help him and he died.

Chanwans, 40, Ban Nathao. A firebomb dropped by an AT-6 plane fell at the mouth of their hole. The gasoline (?) flowed into the hole burning them causing two people in this family to die, because they were burned. The others were able to go out another hole and weren't killed.

Thao San, 6, Ban Nathao. Died at the same time (as Chanwans) because he was in the same family.

Nang Deuan, 10, Ban Nathao. Rode in a vehicle, going to Phonsavan. But when it reached the road, the vehicle turned over killing her.

Nang Sudji, 8, Ban Nathao. Died on account of common fever. After fleeing into a cave.

Sao Da, 60, Ban Nathao. Died from old age and common fever. She was old and her years were simply all used up.

Thao Wansom, 9, Ban Nathao. He had gone to school at 5 in the evening and was returning. A single Eller 10 plane flew up. The children thought that it wouldn't see them and that it had already shot all of its rockets so they just walked along. But it dove and shot two rockets killing two children together and wounding one. He died when he was coming along the road.

Thao Rem, 18, Ban Nathao. Thao Rem went to be a soldier with an armored vehicle division, in order to protect the air. That day he had gone out to fight on the front with a 37mm gun. But they fought against F-4 jet planes, eight of them. And many bombs fell, and they fought against the airplanes for many hours. And the earth flew up and covered the vehicle, until it was impossible to clearly see the planes and shoot because the smoke of the bombs made everything dark until he was hit and died in the armored vehicle and a friend was wounded.

Xieng Bounta, 40, Ban Nathao. Died from falling out of a tree. He had gone up into a mango tree which had many fruits to search for fruit among the branches. He caused a branch to break and fell down to the ground killing himself.

Nang Naii, 10, Ban Nathao. Hit by 60mm mortar; she had gone to visit relatives in the evening. As she went along the way, the home guard soldiers met the enemy and they fought along the way. As Nang Naii ran back the enemy shot many mortar shells onto the road to protect themselves. One shell hit her. Her body broke and she died.

Nang Sam, 12, Ban Nathao. Died from fever and illness. Had been weak for many days and then died.

Sao La, 8, Ban Nathao. When they fought around the village an artillery shell fell into her village at night. She was hurt badly but there was no one able to help cure her because there was still fighting. The airplanes came so it was impossible to go anywhere. She couldn't suffer through her injury and died.

Nang Chum, 6, Ban Nahol. Died after red bumps came out (on her). She wasn't cured well and didn't get medicine in time and died.

Nang Bounta, 10, Ban Nahol. She had gone to work in the ricefield, at the edge of the forest. The Meo ambushed and killed her there in the ricefield. Her mother was badly wounded but was able to return home.

Thao Eh, 6, Ban Nahol. Little Thao Eh didn't know enough to be careful. He got up early one morning. A flare had fallen at the edge of the village and he went and brought it back. But the flare hadn't yet burned. He brought it to the house. When his father came and saw it, he went to take the flare, but he couldn't take it so they pulled it back and forth and it ignited and burned all of his (the boy's) body. He was sent to the hospital and they tried to cure him for many days but couldn't and he died.

Nang Bounta, 6, Ban Nahol. Died on account of fleeing to a cave. Became feverish and wasn't cured well and died.

Nang Pheng, 7, Ban Nahol. She died in late Sene from fever. Given an injection and then died.
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66. Thao Boun Louan, 5, Ban Nahol. He died from drunkenness from the silver and gold poison paper. The child saw it and thought it was pretty and played with it when his parents didn't see. He became drunk and wasn't cured in time and just died.

67. Sao Soin, 58, Ban Nahol. He went to search for wood to bring back and repair his house. He went into the forest and stepped on an M-15 mine which they put in the road. He died right there so that he didn't even see his children.

68. Thao Oui, 8, Ban Nahol. Died after fleeing to the Plain of Jars. He was sleeping in a soldiers' camp and that night a Neo Lao (Hak Sat) commando squad attacked the camp and threw grenades into (the camp) and Thao Oui was not in a good spot and two children died together (the second Nang Boun Waai) and many people were injured.

69. Nang Boun Waai, 11, Ban Nahol. Died together (with Thao Oui) because they were at the same place. There was no airplane to send them. So they didn't reach Lat Sene. They died first.

70. Xieng St Pho, 16, Ban Nahol. He had gone to be a district cadre. He went to work with (1) the people near the forest near the jungle where there were people who were newly liberated. When returning he was hit by a spy group. They knew and they ambushed and killed him along the way. But some friends who were with him fought back killing some of them (the spys) also.

71. Sao Som, 48, Ban Nahol. The Meo (soldiers) went down into her village and shot guns in before they came. Sao Som didn't flee in time. She was hit by a bullet and badly wounded. She couldn't be cured and so died. When they came into the village they saw she was wounded and they still cursed her saying she helped the Neo Lao (Hak Sat). So they took the ducks and chickens from her house and ate them all and they took and shot the cow.

72. Thao Ta, 7, Ban Nahol. Died on account of fever. He was still in the village and wasn't cured well and he died.

73. Thao Noi, 5, Ban Nahol. He died on account of planes bombing the village with 250 Kg bombs. A bomb dropped on the mouth of the hole causing Thao Noi to be buried. The airplanes were F-4-H's six planes. In the same hole three other people were also wounded.

74. Thao Vong, 6, Ban Nahol. Died after fleeing to Lat Sene together with many other people. He became sick and died because the weather was not the same.

75. Sao Chiang, 40, Ban Nahol. She died when she went to the market one morning at 5 A.M. At 7:00 o'clock she returned from the market and when she reached the road an Eller 19 plane flew over. Then they relaxed by a stream. Then three T-28 planes flew up. They saw that it wouldn't be safe because there was no hole so they ran for the forest. But when they had run only 200 meters the bombs fell both in front and behind them. The bomb exploded and Sao Chouang was killed immediately.

76. Thao Tui, 8, Ban Nahol. He was killed by an 105 artillery shell shot from far away. A shell fell north of Thao Tui's village. Then it began to rain and he went to bring the cows into the garden. After he brought the cows in he returned to the hole as usual. An 105 shell seemed to come from the mountains and Thao Tui didn't flee in time. He was hit by a fragment which cut off his leg and he died.

77. Nang Bouawai, 11, Ban Nahol. Nang Bouawai died when she went to school. Two A-D-6 planes flew back and forth over the school. The teacher sent all of the children to the holes. Bouawai was in such a hurry that she forgot her books. She stuck out her head just as a plane strafed. A fragment hit her in the head. She was sent to the hospital but died before she received any medicine. The school was hit and burned on this occasion also.

78. Nang Boun, 7, Ban Nahol. She died after her mother left her to carry fertilizer to the rice seedbed. Then she went to bathe. She left her things on the edge of the pond. At that time four A-D-6 airplanes flew past. When they saw (her) they strafed and shot three (rockets) but she wasn't hit. She hurried to run out of that place but just as she went out she was hit by a rocket which the planes shot. Her stomach burst and she died right at that spot.

79. Thao Phomm, 5, Ban Nahol. He died when they fled to Lat Sene. Then he caught the epidemic, became feverish and died very suddenly.

80. Thao Lu, 4, Ban Nahol. Died from fever when he didn't get medicine in time. He had a bad fever and then died right away.

81. Thit Thon, 54, Ban Nahol. He died when he went to look after the buffalo in the field. In that herd there were many animals. But there were both black
and white buffalo which made an easy target for the airplanes. An F-102 jet dived very suddenly and Thit Thon couldn't fly in time. He died with the buffalo. Many buffalo were killed at the same time.

82. Thit Kham Di, 36, Ban Nahal. Thit Kham Di was one of the home guard soldiers. He was very courageous in shooting down airplanes. That day he went up into the hills with eight of his friends. He thought that they would fight against the airplanes that day. He warned everyone to be ready. Then he saw four F-4-H planes coming very near. He came out and shot. But he didn't fling fast enough and became a target for the planes' bombs. He died because he was too courageous.

83. Xieng Thon, 40, Ban Houei. He was killed when he went to build a dam in the ricefield. Many people were working together to help build the dam. Then an F-106 flew over and as (everyone) ran four F-105 planes came over and bombed the dam. It caused Xieng Thon to run but not in time for he was hit and wounded by a bomb. He was sent to a hospital but he died along the way before he reached it. At that time many other people were wounded also.

84. Thit Donang, 41, Ban Houei. He died when he went to cut wood for his house. An 155 artillery shell shot from Muong Soul landed right on him and he died immediately.

85. Sao Bouavan, 25, Ban Phiang Luang. She died when T-28 planes came to shoot her village. While her village was burning, but after she saw the planes leave, she went to free the buffalos so they could flee from the village. But then three more T-28's came to shoot the village. But she ran to a hole near the village but a bomb fell right on the hole and she was killed.

86. Thao Boun Qum, 9, Ban Phiang Luang. He just died from a normal sickness. He didn't die on account of the bombs.

87. Thao Kham Kong, 7, Ban Phiang Luang. He died when they had fled to Lat Sene on account of the epidemic, together with many others. Truly the cause of his death was disease.

88. Thao Ell, 4, Ban Teng. He died when the B-52 airplanes bombed at night. It made the air foul like drunkenness. It caused the child to die within two hours.

89. Thao Pholm, 8, Ban Teng. When they left the village to flee from the airplanes there was a spooky which dropped a parachute and then shot douchet bullets (rockets?). A bullet hit Thao Phon in the leg and he died before the doctor came.

90. Thao Inta, 8, Ban Teng. Thao Inta died in the evening when he went out of the hole to herd the buffalo. He saw a bomb which hadn't exploded and was standing looking at it when it exploded killing him on the spot. Earlier, in the afternoon the planes had dropped the bomb.

91. Sao Thong Si, 10, Ban Teng. She died when she went to the forest to gather firewood. She went to get some string with which to tie up the wood and stepped on a mine which had been put in the path in the forest. It's purpose was to kill anyone who came along.

92. Nang Sida, 7, Ban Teng. Died from fever. It wasn't on account of anything else.

93. Than Tem, 9, Ban Teng. Died when they had fled to Lat Sene on account of the epidemic.

94. Nang Si, 11, Ban Teng. She died when the hole in which she was sleeping caved in. There were airplanes and artillery shells from Muong Soul. They fell near causing wood to close off the mouth of the hole and then it caved in killing her.

95. Thao Bouavan, 6, Ban Teng. Died while fleeing on account of drunkenness. Don't know what kind. It caused him to die right there on the road.

96. Sao Meung, 8, Ban Teng. Died while they were still at the village. They had been sleeping in the holes for many days on end. Then (without warning) he just died very suddenly.

97. Xieng Som Phan, 39, Ban Teng. Died when they (PL) took him into the jail at Khang Khat. Then the airplanes went to shoot up Khang Khat. Bombs dropped in the jail killing almost all of the prisoners. Also, some of the soldier guards died. Altogether 69 people died at the same time.

98. Nang Kham Meung, 15, Ban Teng. She went to carry eight 12mm shells up the mountain preparing to shoot the airplanes which came to shoot their village. During the fight with the airplanes many planes came together. She ran but was hit by a bomb and died in the road before she could reach the holes.

99. Thao Thong Di, 12, Ban Teng. He died from fever and disease. He didn't die from bullets.
100. Xieng Pheng, 18, Ban Teng. He died when he went to work in the upland ricefield in the forest. Some soldiers from this side were there in the forest and called them to come. But they didn't go to them (the soldiers) so they shot at him. But he just ran and didn't want anything to do with them. He was hit by a bullet and died right there in the ricefield.

101. Nang Ouan, 14, Ban Nahol. This girl was selected to be a dancer. She would go to perform in different places throughout the Tasseng. But on that day she went to perform on Phu Kut (mountain). While they were performing a 155mm shell from Muong Soui fell killing her and three of her friends at the same time.

CASES FROM TASSENG KAT

1. Sao Kham Phou, 55y, Ban Lat Houang. She was hit in her large village one night in 1967 when the village was heavily destroyed. That day in 1967 many airplanes had started to shoot the village in the afternoon. In the evening she came out of the holes into the village in order to boil some rice and then early the next morning she thought she would flee from the village. But after she went into her house, an airplane dropped flares all around. She thought that it would be impossible to flee. She was afraid that they would see her. And she thought that they probably wouldn't shoot the village because they had already shot it in the afternoon.

So she took care to stay there but in just a little while a fire bomb fell and started burning the house she was in. She saw that her position was no good so she ran to leave. But just then an airplane dropped some bomb and she was killed. She was the only one killed on this occasion. When the sounds of the airplanes were quiet, her relatives came out to look for her. They found her with her body badly mutilated.

2. Xieng Douangta, 57, Ban Thakhek. He was hit by an 82 artillery shell which they shot from the mountains in the evening (at night). He heard the sound and ran toward his hole in the ground. But because he was in weak condition and because he was old already, he couldn't make it to his hole in time. While still outside, a bullet struck him in the leg. He was wounded and fell down right there. Because he was an old man and weak, he lost a lot of blood and died.

3. Thao One, 19, Ban Nam Tom. In 1968, he was a teacher. He was sent to teach about 5 km outside of his village. After he dismissed school he usually tried to return along the road. One time there were some other people walking along the road with their buffalo and cows in rows. Then airplanes came and saw them and thought that they were a group of soldiers moving. So they dropped many fragment bombs. He saw that he couldn't stop there so he ran away fast. But one plane saw him and shot after him and dropped bomb. So he was hit by bomb. He was still able to run for about 10 minutes, until he collapsed on the road to the village. Then he was seen and brought back and he told us of his condition. Then they were sending him to the hospital and saw that he wouldn't make it so they took him into a house and in about 15 min. he died.

4. Sao La, 28, Ban Nang. She went to bathe at about noon. She bathed near the bridge for vehicles on the big road. In a little bit, a spotter plane came up in the sky. She didn't know which way to go because she was in the middle of a field. She hid in a bush. Soon four F-105's came with the spotter plane to tell the jets where the bridge was. She thought about what to do. She tried to crawl quietly away across the field but they shot up the bridge completely and then let bombies go all over the area near there. Some of the fragments hit her. She was in pain and couldn't move from her place. No one saw her. She suffered great pain. She lost a lot of blood until she couldn't get more than halfway home. Her people came looking for her and saw her but when they got her home she died.

5. Thao Boun, 18, Ban Nam Tom. He was called to be a soldier in 1966. He was sent to the region near Phou Kout. He went out and fought many times and many places. When he went to Phou Kout, he had the function of going out on guard. One day he went to bathe, some planes came up. He ran for his hole but couldn't get there because four F-105 planes saw him and came down shooting. He was hit by dirt and buried right there because the planes were shooting in many passes. His friends came to help dig him out but they couldn't get him and he died.
6. Xieng Vanna, 35, Ban Thakhek. He went to get a cartridge of an 85mm shell which is of beautiful copper (brass). He was going to make tools. He went to get it in a place where they had already shot and left. At the time he went to get it, a mine blew up and killed him. Several people who went with him were hurt.

7. Thit Vounta, 28, Ban Nan. He went to his Hai fields, and met some Meo soldiers who caught him and took him away. But he didn't cooperate and go with them and began to fight with them. The Meo soldiers shot him dead. Because he didn't cooperate and go with them or tell them anything.

8. Chan Nan Thu, 60, Ban Lak Houei. He was riding in a vehicle going to Xieng Khumang. They arrived at the (main) road at night because they were afraid of the airplanes, so they went at night. They arrived at the road and hit a mine and were ambushed and had to fight. He was a civilian and didn't have (a weapon?), and was hit by a bullet and died right there in the vehicle.

9. Thao Du, 25, Ban Nam Mou. He came as a refugee to Lat Sen. He was taken off to fight against the Neo Lao but only 15 days after being sent off to fight, he was in a battle and there was no way out at all. He was hit by an (artillery shell?), and killed, so that he had no chance to get away.

10. Thit Boun My, 49, Ban Houe1. He was in the Tasseng home guard. He went out to protect the village. At that time they came in shooting along with airplanes attacking but he didn't want to surrender but with his little strength and all his bullets finished he fled. An airplane was shooting in front, preventing him from going ahead. Along with that, bombs were coming. He had gone one part of the way when an airplane shot at him and he was hit by a 600 kg bomb and killed.

11. Sao Pheung, 43, Ban Lat Houei. She died when she came as a refugee to Lat Sen. She was just there when she fainted. There was no one to cure her, and she was unconscious and just died.

12. Thit Som, 45, Ban Pha Mou. He was going to dig a ditch for fish near his paddy fields. Three T-28's came up and began shooting his village. He thought he'd run away and take his things into a hole but he didn't make it. The plane shot him. He was hit by little bullets from the planes. His leg was broken, his arm gone. But he wasn't dead yet. They sent him to the hospital. He wanted water. Those who were taking him gave him some and he died right away.

13. Thao Thieng, 44, Ban Lat Houei. He was riding in a vehicle toward Tha Vieng on the road. There were three men who came to note everyone doing porterage. When they got to the place the men carried things to a stronghold. They had just come to a bridge when they stepped on a mine which exploded right there. The three men and he were all killed.
18. Sao Si, 25, Ban Houa Va. She went to harvest rice in the morning till 9 am when she came back. But when she got halfway, the planes came and saw a lot of people who had gone to harvest rice running into the forest. Four T-28's shot into the forest at the place they had run to, until all was destroyed. She couldn't run fast and fell into a ditch but the bombi pellets hit her and killed her in the ditch.

19. Sao Kham My, 15, Ban Yawn. She went portering, carrying bullets but she had bad luck. They shot 106's which fell near her. A fragment of a bullet hit her arm and head and she died right there. It was truly most pitiful.

20. Sao Khammy, 9, Ban Nouane. She went to the market with her elder sister in the morning, when two T-6's flew up and shot 20mm guns onto the road, hitting pretty Sao Khammy. She was sent to the hospital but the hospital was very far away. Before they got there they had to stop. In the daytime the planes came and they couldn't move. In the evening they took her on again but she died when they got to the hospital even though they gave her some injections.

21. Sao Pha, 13, Ban Nouane. She died from a fever. She didn't get medicine in time. She just got the fever and died.
Appendix III

STATEMENT ON ANTIPERSONNEL WEAPONRY

(By Fred Branfman, Director, Project Air War, Washington, D.C.)

The widespread use of antipersonnel weaponry in Indochina is one of the most striking and prominent features of today's air war. From 1969-71, for example, I interviewed several hundred victims of American bombing in Laos. The vast majority of these civilian casualties were caused by antipersonnel bombs. From our research on the air war both out in Indochina and with Project Air War here at home, from 1970-72, we would concur with Professor Pfeiffer and Westing's estimate that at least ½ the total tonnage dropped on Indochina is antipersonnel in nature. For example, I was told in November 1970 by an airforce captain in charge of the ordnance dump at Udorn Air Force base that about 75-80% of the ordnance on hand was antipersonnel.

But although the use of antipersonnel bombs has been reported since 1966, the American public to this date remains largely unaware of the full nature and extent of antipersonnel technology in use in Indochina. Few Americans are aware of the many kinds of antipersonnel bombs in use, the frequency with which they are deployed, and their effects on the human body.

We are not aware, for example, that any major newspaper or magazine in this country has ever published a major piece containing the information revealed in the supplement to this statement. The reason is clear. Almost all information about antipersonnel weaponry has been classified out of public reach.

This material does not appear to be classified because publishing it would aid the people against whom these bombs are directed. As the film "U.S. Technique and Genocide in Vietnam" makes clear, the DRV, PRG, Pathet Lao, and FUNK are fully aware of the technology deployed against them. It would appear, rather that secrecy has been followed for fear of the domestic repercussions that might result from full disclosure, and because much of the weaponry is outlawed by international law.

The U.S. Army Manual on the Laws of Land Warfare, for example, states that the use of "irregular-shaped bullets" and "glass-filled projectiles" is illegal. The United States is using both in the form of flechettes and plastic casings which break into hundreds of un-x-rayable jagged slivers, 1-8th by 1-16th of an inch at this very moment.

It is a sad commentary on the state of public knowledge of the war today that one must turn to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for knowledge of what our leaders are doing in the name of America.

It is even more distressing to note that the use of antipersonnel weaponry continues to increase under the Nixon Administration without public and congressional awareness or restraint.

Whether or not one agrees that the Administration has the right to employ this antipersonnel weaponry in Indochina, this much seems clear:

1. It is clearly antithetical to the laws of the land that any small group of men would unilaterally develop, produce and deploy such weaponry without the knowledge of consent of the public or Congress.

2. The unceasing refinement of weapons designed only to kill or maim human beings is one of the most important developments of our time. At the very least, it ought to be reported in full to the general public by the media, so that some kind of national debate can be undertaken.

ANTIPERSONNEL WEAPONRY

Antipersonnel weaponry is designed to kill or maim human beings. Although sometimes used in other ways, such weaponry cannot destroy a factory, a bridge, an anti-aircraft site. Its objective is human flesh.

(67)
American involvement in Indochina has been characterized by unceasing refinement of new ways to kill from the air. The varieties and variations of antipersonnel weaponry are innumerable. What follows are only some examples, divided into three main categories: antipersonnel projectiles, incendiary bombs, and antipersonnel mines.

**Antipersonnel Projectiles:** These are dropped by jets and B52s when there is some target in mind; intelligence justifying their use is generally some sign of human life: cut grass, tire tracks, smoke or heat from fires, ploughed fields, or metal sound, or movement picked up by electronic sensors or infra-red detectors. In a guerrilla war, such bombs are almost never dropped on a clearly identifiable military force out in the open:

1. The Pineapple antipersonnel bomb is a yellow-colored, cylindrical-shaped bomblet which contains 250 steel ball-bearing pellets which shoot horizontally on impact. One sortie with a full load carried 1000 such bombs, which means that one sortie sends 250,000 steel pellets shooting out horizontally over an area the size of 4 football fields. Anything above ground is hit.

2. The Guava antipersonnel bomb (BLU 24/26) is an improvement over pineapple. Gray in color and round in shape, without the pineapple's fins, the guava is thus smaller, allowing one plane to drop 4-500,000 steel ball-bearing pellets. It also rotates on its axis and will either explode in the air or impact with the ground depending upon the type of fuse. In either case, it avoids the pineapple's problem of sending its pellets out horizontally, which thus explode harmlessly over the heads of people hiding underground. The guava's pellets shoot out diagonally so they'll go into holes where people are hiding.

3. Fragmentation antipersonnel bombs, including the smooth orange, striated orange and BUL 63 fragmentation projectiles, are also designed as improvements over the pineapples and guavas. Unlike the latter two projectiles, they do not employ steel pellets. Rather they break into hundreds of jagged fragments which do more damage to the human body.

4. The Flechette Rockets are even more destructive to the human body. The flechettes, fired from rockets in the air war (as well as M70 grenade launchers and artillery in the ground war), are tiny steel nails with larger fins on one end and a sharpened point on the other. They peel off the outer flesh, enlarge the wound as they enter the body, shred the internal organs, and lodge in the blood vessels. Extremely delicate surgery is necessary to remove them.

5. The plastic bombs consist of a pressed plastic casing which breaks up into hundreds of tiny jagged slivers, 1/8th of an inch by 1/16th of an inch. These slivers are un-X-rayable so that if a person is hit with enough of them and they must be removed, he must be laid on the operating table (if surgical care is available), his body opened up, and the doctor then tries to pick through his body removing what slivers he can find.

**Incendiary bombs:** Interviews with pilots and other U.S. airmen and targeting officers have made it clear that incendiary bombs while designed for a wide variety of purpose, are in practice primarily used as an antipersonnel weapon. Since they cover such a wide area and destroy all human life above and often below ground through burning or suffocation, they are regarded as a particularly effective weapon.

1. Most Americans are aware of Napalm. Few, however, are aware of the fact that they are also using Napalm B, Supernapalm, Napalm Paragel, all improvements on the original napalm. These later variants burn at a higher temperature, explode over a wider area, and have greater adhesiveness.

2. Even fewer Americans are aware of white phosphorous and magnesium. These substances burn on an oxidation principle, which means that they cannot be rubbed out or even put out by water (they take the oxygen out of water and continue burning under the skin). In fact, the more one rubs, the more they burn. If a person is hit with incendiary bombs containing these substances, he must wait until they burn themselves out, which usually means they have to burn their way down to the bone.

3. And I have met no one who is aware of thermite, a substance which greatly increases temperature at which incendiary bombs burn.

4. These substances are all combined in the most destructive, incendiary bomb yet developed, the napalm-phosphorous-thermite bomb. It explodes over an extremely wide area, cannot be extinguished until it burns itself out, and burns at 3,500 degrees centigrade as compared with 900 degrees centigrade for conventional napalm.
Antipersonnel Mines: Unlike antipersonnel projectiles or incendiary bombs, antipersonnel mines are not used with any particular target—whether suspect or confirmed—in mind. Rather they are simply strewn over 100's of square miles as part of an officially-designated “Area-Denial” program designed to make whole areas of Indochina uninhabitable for human life. The scope of the use of these mines stagers the imagination. For example, a Honeywell contract that we have signed calls for the production of over 200,000 of one of these types of mines (the WAAPM) in a single month. In the November 1970 Electronic Battlefield Hearings, the Air Force Revealed that this area denial program has been installed throughout one-half of southern Laos. This is an area inhabited by over 200,000 people, according to the estimate of the U.S. Embassy in Laos. The area denial program has also been implemented in northeastern Cambodia, northern Laos, North Vietnam, and portions of South Vietnam. These mines include:

1. The Gravel and Dragontooth mines, which come in small cloth bags and metal containers disguised to look like leaves or animal droppings. One F4 sortie will drop 7,500 of such mines.

2. The WAAPM (Wide-Area-Antipersonnel-Mine) mines, which are round in shape and emit 8 cords each 8 yards in length. A person tripping on one of these cords will cause an explosion of a charge sufficient to kill or maim him. The other side has charged that some of these mines also emit a noxious gas.

3. The Button Bomblets are even smaller charges, strewn in the 10's of 1000's, and extremely difficult to detect with the human eye.

Nothing explains the nature of the air war today more than the expansion of the area denial program under the Nixon Administration. It is clear that these antipersonnel mines cannot distinguish between human beings and animals, let alone military and civilians. The deployment of the area denial program violates the very basis of international law calling for at least some minimal attempt to distinguish between military and civilians in time of war.

[From The Guardian (London), Apr. 27, 1972.]

US USING 'PELLET' BOMBS AGAINST HANOI

(By Harold Jackson)

A new type of antipersonnel bomb dropped on Hanoi by American aircraft is causing severe medical problems for the North Vietnamese, according to a British consultant physician who has just returned from the northern capital.

Dr. Philip Harvey, who works at St Stephen's Hospital, Fulham, arrived in Hanoi on April 8 to carry out an extensive medical education programme at the invitation of the medical faculty at Hanoi University. A week after his arrival — on Sunday, April 16 — 60 US aircraft bombed the city, causing extensive damage to eight residential districts.

Dr. Harvey said in London yesterday that he visited one of the areas, about a kilometre from his city centre hotel, and examined some of the dead and wounded.

"I saw the body of one woman—she was pregnant—and she had been riddled with plastic pellets from an antipersonnel bomb. This is a new development. The pellets used to be metal, but now that they are using plastic it is impossible to locate the pellets by normal X-rays. They can be found with the use of ultrasonic vibrations, but the North Vietnamese do not have such equipment."

Dr. Harvey said that the pellets penetrate the victims' bodies at 3,300 feet a second, creating such intense heat that they vaporise the flesh. "They can fracture a bone without even making contact with it," he said. A full ultrasonic vibration unit costs about £20,000. The wounded people seen by Dr. Harvey all had multiple penetrating wounds caused by cubic pellets.

The raid took place at about 9:30 in the morning, and involved three waves of 20 aircraft flying at about 25,000 feet. "It was impossible to see the planes," Dr Harvey said, "though the sky was completely clear. I did see the vapour trails of the ground-to-air missiles being fired against them."

He said that six or seven brick-built thatched houses had been destroyed in the area he visited. Two people were killed outright and 11 others injured, five seriously. Later two of the injured died, and another two bodies were located in the ruins.
The bombs dropped seemed to be an equal mixture of high explosive and antipersonnel. The latter, Dr. Harvey said, had no effect on property or structures. "I dug some pellets out of the brickwork and they had only gone in about a quarter of an inch."

The other areas attacked that morning were all within one or two kilometres of the city centre. "It was a public holiday, and the streets were teeming with people. At the moment Hanoi has about five times the population for which it was originally designed. Later the authorities started evacuating women and children."

Dr. Harvey said that this was the only raid on the city while he was there—he left on Saturday—though there had been one false alarm five days after the attack.

"So far as I could tell the morale seemed to be remarkably high and they carried on with my programme as though nothing had happened. It seemed to me that the bombing had much the same effect in Hanoi as it did in London during the blitz: it just strengthened people's determination to struggle on."

[From The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 14, 1972.]

MORAL REVULSION RISES AS BOMBINGS INTENSIFY

Washington, May 18—One of the things that bothers many Americans about the Vietnam War, now that American ground troops are pretty well out of it, is that the killing by the United States goes on, but in an even more long-range, antiseptic fashion than before.

Throughout the war, the emphasis of the American effort has been to substitute death-dealing machines—air strikes and artillery—for manpower. This has resulted in a saving of American lives, but sometimes at the cost of Asian lives, including those of women and children.

And the moral revulsion against slaughter by remote control has been intensified as the American air war against North Vietnam has been resumed with greater fury. At the same time, North Vietnam's leaders have been ruthless and stubborn, showing no regard for human life themselves, Administration leaders point out.

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird was asked at his press conference Wednesday about North Vietnam's charges that civilian areas were being bombed. "What precautions are we taking?" a reporter wanted to know.

Laird replied, "Every effort is made, of course, on behalf of the U.S. to minimize civilian casualties and that is, of course, the instructions that our pilots will operate under as they interdict the rail lines and they take out the POL (petroleum, oil and lubricants) facilities in North Vietnam as part of this interdiction campaign."

Laird gave assurances that in the American campaign to stop movement of supplies, called Operation Linebacker, the choice of targets would be such that civilian casualties would be kept to a minimum. "I do not want to say there will be absolutely none," he said. "We will certainly carry them out in that fashion."

To say that aerial bombing is an indirect, impersonal kind of warfare is to take nothing away from the bravery, skill and dedication of American pilots and crews operating from carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin and from air bases in South Vietnam, Thailand and Guam. The U.S. lost 15 aircraft over North Vietnam from April 6 through last Wednesday. And, as President Richard M. Nixon said in Texas two weeks ago, brave Americans are flying dangerous missions.

But the point about the nature of air warfare is that the man who drop the napalm and the bombs speed quickly from the scene and do not witness the consequences.

With primitive man, there were natural and technological limitations to the killing that could be accomplished in one day. The sword arm got tired; after
lopping off a dozen heads, a warrior might decide that he had done enough. But in modern warfare, the machine takes over, and there are no comparable restraints.

A soldier who bayonets an enemy knows what he has done. But a bomber pilot who misses a bridge and hits a civilian area may be back on the carrier within an hour, having a cup of coffee and not knowing where his bombs went.

As the American Air Force and Navy go after military targets in North Vietnam, there is no way, as Laird suggested, of avoiding some civilian casualties. Thus far, the bombing may accurately be called restrained in comparison with the all-out bombing of major cities that went on in World War II.

North Vietnam endured intensive bombings before President Lyndon B. Johnson halted air attacks on the north in 1968. Mr. Johnson’s sustained bombing, called Rolling Thunder, begun early in 1965, did not cripple Hanoi’s war efforts. In 1965 and 1966 alone it is said to have caused 36,000 casualties, of which 80 per cent were civilians.

A draft of a Pentagon memorandum for President Johnson in May 1967 on the bombing of North Vietnam said: “The picture of the world’s greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1000 noncombatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one.”

During the Johnson Administration many targets in North Vietnam were off limits. Restrictive circles were drawn around Hanoi and Haiphong. There was a buffer zone near the Chinese border. The North Vietnamese, of course, took advantage of these sanctuaries from air attack.

Now that President Nixon has ordered a new rain of bombs in the North, critics of the war have had difficulty learning whether the old restrictions still apply. Apparently they do not, at least in the same way. The Pentagon has been vague about it.

Laird said the U.S. would try to avoid injuring noncombatants. At the same time, he was emphatic in warning that this country would take “those steps that are necessary” to prevent delivery of supplies.

At hearings Monday and Tuesday Senator Edward M. (Ted) Kennedy (Dem.), Massachusetts, raised questions about civilian casualties in North Vietnam and the kind of weapons being dropped by American pilots in that country.

Kennedy, chairman of the judiciary subcommittee on refugees, wrote a letter to Secretary Laird early this month asking about the war’s impact on North Vietnam’s civilian population. The Pentagon makes estimates but does not publish them, his aids said.

There has been no reply to Kennedy’s letter, his staff said. He and his panel are expected to begin a public inquiry soon on the enemy noncombatant casualty issue. They will also go into targeting restrictions, if any, and the weapons used.

There are rules of land warfare and rules of naval warfare. What are the rules of air warfare? Judging by what a military witness told the Kennedy panel this week, there is no manual of aerial warfare at present, although there are self-imposed restrictions.

The horrenous arsenal of ingenious antipersonnel devices developed for air drop in the Vietnam War—not only the burning agents but guava bomblets, dragontooth mines, pineapples, and the like—has been called to the public’s attention by the Air War Study Group at Cornell University and the Indochina Resource Center in Washington.

Raphael Littauer and Norman Uphoff of the Cornell group are editors of a 289-page book called “The Air War in Indochina.” Using a term from economics, it calls the American strategy “capital-intensive” in that it depends heavily on expensive machines rather than manpower.

“Remote-controlled warfare,” the Cornell work says, “reduced the need for the public to confront the consequences of military action abroad. The cost of a fully automated war can be reckoned in dollars and machinery—a small price compared to the harvest of casualties.”

Another advantage, the authors point out, is that there is no longer as much need for conditioning the armed forces emotionally so that they can stand up to face-to-face killing. Just press the button, and there you are.
Washington, May 22—While the war in Vietnam rages on, the lovely Swiss city of Geneva is the scene of a little-publicized effort to make armed conflicts a bit less rough on civilians.

It bothers a great many persons that the United States, North and South Vietnam and others are busy making widows, orphans and cripples in Indochina.

The quiet conference near Lake Geneva, however, is not getting much attention.

Making rules about warfare is a slow, difficult business.

The U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense have representatives at the Geneva meeting, which opened May 3 and will continue through June 3, held under auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

About 70 nations are represented.

George H. Aldrich, deputy legal adviser at the State Department, heads the American delegation.

Officially, the meeting is called the "Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts."

The experts are considering a set of proposals prepared by the Red Cross and designed to improve the 1949 Geneva Conventions for protection of war victims.

The work of the conference will form the basis for a later international meeting of diplomats who will be in a position to reach official agreement on changing the rules of war.

Senator Edward M. (Ted) Kennedy, (Dem.), Massachusetts, a critic of the Vietnam War, has been trying to find out more about the United States posture in the Geneva talks. He would like to see a receptive attitude, on this country's part, toward changes calculated to reduce the impact of warfare on civilians.

For example, there is the problem of napalm and various antipersonnel bombs that the U.S. either uses or is accused of using in Indochina. Kennedy has been eloquent in voicing his revulsion at the indiscriminate use of such weapons.

The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, of which Kennedy is chairman, explored the napalm and related issues at its May 9 hearing. It is expected to go into the subject more thoroughly later—that is, the effect of modern weaponry on civilian populations.

Officially the U.S. says it is taking no position at the Geneva talks, insisting that Americans there are uninstructed at this point.

As a member of the American Society of International Law's panel on humanitarian law, however, Senator Kennedy had received a strong impression that the U.S. attitude on changing the rules was negative.

"I share the distress of many here tonight," Kennedy said at the society's annual meeting here late in April, "over the multitude of excuses which the Administration is putting out to oppose . . . legal controls over the use of napalm bombs and other incendiary weapons which may affect civilian populations. The position of our government defy[s] all reason . . ."

Kennedy said there had been a vast gap between the U.S. policy of concern for welfare of civilians and the performance of its military field forces.

President Richard M. Nixon, he said, should consider the establishment of a permanent "military practices review board." The function of the board would be to advise the joint chiefs of staff on standards and procedures, and to monitor what goes on in actual combat.

Kennedy said he hoped the Red Cross conference at Geneva would include provisions for more effective protection of civilians "despite the opposition of our government."

When the Geneva meeting opened early this month, Hans Blix of Sweden praised the Red Cross draft proposals but charged the Red Cross with a "negative attitude."

Blix criticized also what he called "passive resistance" on part of "some important states." It is not enough, he said, merely to outlaw in general terms "weapons, projectiles or substances calculated to cause unnecessary suffering, or particularly cruel methods and means."

"We need to define the dum-dum bullets of today," Blix said.
What the U.S. said, if anything, was not made available here. The sessions are not public. Because this country is waging war at present, using some of the horror weapons, the U.S. is not in a heroic role at Geneva.

On May 10 Sweden proposed a ban on napalm, phosphorus and splinter bombs. Joining in the move were Algeria, Austria, Egypt, Finland, Yugoslavia, Mexico, Norway and Switzerland. Blix again accused the Red Cross with being too passive.

Last Monday Blix urged an amendment banning “indiscriminate weapons and methods of warfare,” such as area bombing and other tactics that do not distinguish between military and civilians.

Blix noted that there had been warnings—he did not say from whom—against becoming too zealous and emotional in trying to write new war rules.

“In this regard,” he replied, “let me only say that the prospects of developing the humanitarian law relating to armed conflicts will be poor, indeed, if responsible officials do not allow themselves to be influenced by some restraints which are emotional, and which, I trust, exist in all human beings.”
Mountian War in Laos Grim

(By Tammy Arbuckle)

Vientiane—Lao government guerrillas are fighting North Vietnamese regulars on the steep mountain slopes at the south edge of the Plain of Jars in an attempt to relieve pressure on Long Cheng, the lynchpin in the defenses of north Laos.

The effort is the biggest the Lao have launched, employing 15,000 guerrillas who sneaked up to the Plain of Jars 10 days ago.

The operation has been an outstanding success as far as relieving North Vietnamese pressure on Long Cheng, the operation’s commander, Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, and American officials say.

Hanoi has moved parts of six regiments to defend its long-range artillery and road supply routes on the plain, leaving only parts of two regiments around Long Cheng to face numerically superior Thai and Meo forces.

The second part of the Lao guerrilla operation—to go onto the plain itself and destroy enemy artillery and supplies to buy another month’s time for Long Cheng—has stalled on a series of mountain peaks here on the plain’s south edge.

Vang Pao, dressed in a long, grey, woman’s overcoat and pacing round the campfire in his 8,000-foot-high mountaintop aerie, said he is “not certain” his troops can advance onto the plain.

During this past week spent with the troops, and in night conversations with Vang Pao, the reasons things are not moving became apparent.

One very important reason is the tenacity of the North Vietnamese defending the plain and the heavy firepower they have.

Vang Pao’s troops occupy a salient of mountains jutting onto the plain with Route 4 and the town of Xieng Khouang east of the salient. Hanoi’s main supply route to Long Cheng is to the west.

In front of the salient is Theung Mountain. Here the North Vietnamese have installed antiaircraft guns ranging from the lowly but effective 50 caliber machinegun to 23 and 37mm. anti-aircraft cannon. They have installed themselves in deep forest-hidden bunkers.

At the beginning of last week, Meo guerrillas and Lao Theung tribesmen slipped from helicopters on mountain top pads used for resupply down through old banana plantations.

The guerrilla goal was Phou Teung, but the unit was beaten back by North Vietnamese troops before it got very far. North Vietnamese anti-aircraft stopped all American helicopters from picking up the wounded, forcing the retreating troops to carry them.

Vang Pao has six B52s he can call on most of the time, he said. This is 20 percent of the B52s available in Indochina.

Sometimes he gets additional B52 strikes which are ordered by U.S. Ambassador G. McMurrrie Godley on targets of the ambassador’s choosing.

But the big bombing attacks don’t seem to shift the North Vietnamese from their positions. Last Wednesday, for example I watched two B52 attacks against Phou Teung at 8:30 a.m. and at 10:10 p.m. Phou Teung changed from a green hill to a mass of brown dust, but the Vietnamese were firing again from there later in the day.

They are still there.

Then the Vietnamese moved to cut behind the mountain salient of Vang Pao. With 15-mile range 130mm. guns and 120mm. mortars, direct fire rockets and
smaller mortars, they pounded Cobra Ridge overlooking their supply route to Long Cheng west of the salient.

A few hours before, I had talked to 16-year-old Bee Kar, a forward air guide. Bee Kar spoke good English, which he learned in Bangkok. He and other forward air guides are products of one of the best U.S. training programs.

The boys are taught how to spot targets and direct U.S. Air Force "ravens"—forward air controllers in light aircraft—onto the target.

Bee Kar and his fellow forward guides spend most of their time close to enemy positions calling in strikes.

Helping them to spot targets is a "magic box" about eight inches square. It has a round white plastic tube in front which Bee Kar points toward the enemy, then presses buttons and the distance is registered in hundreds of meters—up to 2,000 yards. It also registers whether the target is tanks, trucks or troops on a screen which lights up with a drawing of a tank, truck or soldier.

All this is transmitted to a U.S. Air Force "Spectre" gunship which automatically registers on the target.

Bee Kar, a Meo, claimed to be 18 years old, though the records showed it's 16. He was tough and forthright. "Yes, you must come up here to see the terrain properly to understand," were his first words when I reached his mountaintop.

He described how he watched the lights of North Vietnamese trucks moving across the plain toward Long Cheng last night.

From time to time Communist artillery opened up on his position.

Bee Kar said 10 troops with him were killed and 16 were wounded the day before by shells exploding in their bunkers.

That night the Vietnamese poured more than 500 shells into Bee Kar's position after I left.

One piece of mortar shrapnel entered Bee Kar's stomach but he walked out.

The next morning I was on an Air American helicopter to evacuate him. It was a special mission for there were North Vietnamese all around. But Bee Kar is an American favorite and everyone from Yang Pao on down wants to get him out.

He was in a patch of bamboo amidst North Vietnamese troops, but the helicopter went in with U.S. Air Force Sky Raiders flying cover in a box pattern.

When we touched down, Bee Kar lurched out supported by two other soldiers, one of them also wounded. Everybody dove into the helicopter and we were off.

Bee Kar was in shock and his clothes were covered in blood. The doctors at the hospital said he will die.

Bee Kar insisted "I won't die." Two days later U.S. officials said he was alive in Undorn Hospital in northeast Thailand.

Bee Kar's position was lost, however, and the North Vietnamese were behind the guerrillas and advancing into the Plain.

Every day last week Communist shelling increased. On a helicopter pad overlooking the plain known only as "uniform Uniform," there was a distant boom, then a whistle and a rush about 20 feet over our heads as the first of three 130mm artillery shells came in.

They overshot slightly and no one was hurt by these or by two other shells fired by a patrol 30 minutes later.

As the shelling continued sporadically, it became apparent that the Meo guerrillas were not all they were cracked up to be.

They were in open positions atop hills. In between the shells they stood in bunches on the ridge lines, usually to watch the U.S. Sky raiders and jet fighters and Lao air force T28s attack North Vietnamese troops who advanced behind our position from fallen Cobra.

As the Sky raiders zoomed up after a strike, Vietnamese submachine guns and a heavy 50 caliber machine gun hammered at the aircraft without success.

The troops lacked discipline and their commanders seemed to have no intention of moving forward to attack. "The only thing that will move these people is if Vang Pao comes up," a U.S. official said.

As Vang Pao climbed into the hills, the troops began moving forward again up the steep slopes of elephant grass bowed-down by their gear.

Many of them would throw away equipment afterwards when Vang Pao was not around. I've seen them toss away shells and other ammunitions.

When Vang Pao saw anything like that discarded, he picked it up and slipped it back into the troops' packs.
“The army here is something like the American revolutionary army,” said an American. “It fights for a while then the troops take off for two or three months. When you go to towns or villages there are a lot of deserters, but then you go to the front and you wonder why all these guys stay here and fight under these conditions for years and years.”

Vang Pao said the irregulars are no longer a Meo army, but are made up of many nationalities. In this operation, he said, he has his Meos, people from Nam Thu and Lao from Savannakhet in south Laos. To the rear are Thai troops.

“The Meo move fast,” Vang Pao said. “But the Savannakhet Lao are too slow. They go only three or four kilometers a day and they cannot carry food for 10 days on their backs. They eat it all, then ask for resupply by air and they stop and the planes give their positions away.”

Vang Pao continued, “The Thais shoot off all their ammunition when the enemy sends small rocket teams against them, then the enemy puts an antiaircraft round in a Thai position when they think all the ammunition is finished and hit the Thais from two sides with a main force and wipe them out.”

The enemy was getting smart Vang Pao said, and described how the Communists put radio aerials on a rock once to attract U.S. bombers then used the resulting caves for their headquarters.

American officials said the big problem is coordinating all the different nationalities and regions into a cohesive force.

All these problems—from stiffening North Vietnamese resistance to intertribal rivalries and poor discipline—combine to prevent Vang Pao’s further advance.

American officials said it was necessary for the guerrillas to remain on the offensive in the dry season to buy sufficient time to keep Long Cheng from falling. “It’s the first time Vang Pao has fought back in the dry season,” a U.S. source said.

“If any advance is to be made it is totally dependent on Vang Pao. If Vang Pao goes up to the front tomorrow and starts dropping shells into a mortar, the troops will move forward. If he doesn’t they will stay where they are.”

Long talks with U.S. officials and Vang Pao himself how that the only plans implemented will be ones Vang Pao supports or thinks he can carry out a close-up view of Vang Pao’s operations, the first ever provided to newsmen, indicates Vang Pao is the man who counts in the battle for northeast Laos on which the survival of the Lao government in its current form depends.

Yesterday the decision again rested with Vang Pao—go forward onto the plain to buy time for Long Cheng at a cost of possible heavy losses or hold off, satisfied with having drawn North Vietnamese infantry back to the plain from Long Cheng.

[From The Washington Post, Mar. 1, 1972.]

OIA-BACKED LAOTIANS FACE HANOI’S BEST AT LONG CHENG

(By Laurence Stern.)

(Washington Post Foreign Service)

Long Cheng, Laos—The little twin engine Piper gripped through the smoke haze that blotted out the craggy terrain just south of the Plain of Jars.

“It’s pretty bad today,” said the Greek, “but we’re flying by timed distance so we don’t have to see the ground to know where we are ... Wait a minute.” He leaned forward and shouted to the pilot, “there’s Peter Nob over on the right.”

The silhouette of a nob-shaped mountain outcropping peeked up through the haze and the plane took a steep dip toward a towering ridgeline which marks the vague boundary between the North Vietnamese infantry and the American-supported Laotian irregular army which have wrestled to a temporary standstill just northward.

“That’s Skyline Ridge,” said The Greek. “The North Vietnamese have their antiair on the other side.”

Another sharp dip and suddenly a valley popped into view, dotted with shacks, roads and a tiny air strip. The shacks were mostly deserted by the villagers who fled last month’s North Vietnamese offensive and are still hiding out some 15 kilometers southward.

“Long Cheng” unannounced The Greek.