A primary dike in the Red River dike system near Nam Dinh that was bombed but recently repaired (dotted lines indicate the new soil used in repairing the bomb damage to the dike).
A bombed-out wing of the Bach Mai hospital in Hanoi.
A bomb crater along a residential street in Hanoi.

A block of housing in Hanoi damaged by bombing.
A scene from a residential area of Nam Dinh.

Ruins of the Nam Dinh cultural center.
Mr. SULLIVAN. The Bach Mai hospital?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes, Bach Mai.

Mr. SULLIVAN. It was hit, we were told, on June 27, which was approximately a little over 2 weeks before we got there. It had been hit—my recollection was that it had been hit by three bombs and one rocket. There were two persons, two hospital personnel, who were killed in that raid and you will find in the photographs several interior shots where wards are rendered useless, and various other parts of the hospital are made useless until a great deal of repair work is done.

One of the things we did, Senator, was to go to St. Paul's Hospital in Hanoi. This is a large general hospital in the center of the city. There we were shown patients who had recovered from war injuries. The X-rays of their injuries were shown to us, and Dr. Perera went over them very carefully, as well as physically examining the patients.

The doctor in charge of that hospital told us that he and his staff—had handled many instances of personal injury to civilians resulting from ball and pellet weapons as well as bomb fragments, also burns and shock.

Senator KENNEDY. Dr. Perera as I understand it! was formerly the associate dean of the College of Surgeons and Physicians at Columbia University?

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is correct, so that we were able to verify with our own eyes, and by examination of the patients, and we offer the evidence of these photographs as well, that regardless of whatever the intentions may be, there is a great deal of very serious damage being done to the civilian structure of life in the north and to the people there.

One of the things that I would like to add, if I may, about the dikes: we were concerned and Dr. Perera was especially about what could happen if floods come in this rainy season and any of these dikes are breached. Obviously, and everyone is aware of this, there would be the problem of danger of food shortages and we were concerned about the possibility of epidemics. We talked with the North Vietnamese about that and they assured us that their health services had been alerted and were spread through the countryside so that there would be an opportunity to deal with epidemics if they occur.

However, we did have the opportunity to talk in private with physicians, Vietnamese physicians, and we got a somewhat different story at one or two points. One of the physicians we talked to said he was concerned about the insufficiency of medicines for dealing with amoebic epidemic that might occur as a result of flooding. So if the dikes are breached and if there is flooding and, of course, that remains to be seen, there is a very serious question that arises for us and that is whether there will be further, very damaging effects on the civilian population, both through food shortage, general dislocation, and the possibility of serious epidemic disease.

We talked about this with some of the North Vietnamese officials and they described to us in their words what they are doing in attempting to foresee these possibilities.

They said that they are getting in seeds for short-term crops, for water-grown crops, to deal with the food problem. They are encouraging the peasants to get important possessions to high places where they will be safe from the floods.
They said that every peasant has the ability to go and get material from bamboo and banana trees for making boats. Their health services have been dispersed through the countryside to deal with this and they expressed some confidence officially that they could deal with the situation adequately in their terms if a serious situation does arise; and, of course, that remains to be seen.

(Prepared statement follows:)

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN A. SULLIVAN, AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE

My name is John A. Sullivan of Philadelphia, Pa. I am Associate Executive Secretary of the American Friends Service Committee. In responding to the Subcommittee invitation to testify, I speak as an official of the AFSC and as a member of the Religious Society of Friends, but, of course, do not speak in the name of the Society of Friends. I have just returned within the month from Hanoi, where I visited July 15-22 in the company of another Quaker, Dr. George A. Perera, formerly associate dean of the College of Physicians and Surgeons at Columbia University. Travelling on passports validated for North Vietnam by the State Department, we brought $14,000 worth of a $80,000 shipment of heart surgery equipment for civilian use to Hanoi. This was one in a series of such shipments which we carry out under official export licenses of the U.S. Government. Our civilian aid to North Vietnam is part of our overall relief program for Vietnam which includes the operating and staffing of a physical rehabilitation center situated in Quang Ngai city, Quang Ngai Province, in South Vietnam. As a Quaker organization, we do not restrict our assistance to civilian victims to one side of a battle line but try to aid all regardless of political distinctions or loyalties.

During our stay in North Vietnam, we experienced 44 air alerts in which U.S. aircraft penetrated in a range anywhere from direct attack on Hanoi to flights up to 100 kilometers away. The alerts occurred morning, noon and night and we had to get up out of bed as many as four times during the night. On several occasions when we were conferring with doctors, neutral diplomats and North Vietnamese officials, we had to interrupt our conversations to take shelter for varying lengths of time. On the day we left we witnessed what were described as 10 Phantoms in a flight and were told that others came overhead while we were underground and we saw anti-aircraft shells bursting in their vicinity. The planes flew directly over us and wheeled over Hanoi. We took shelter, first in the single-manholes and then in a larger concrete underground shelter together with Vietnamese, Russians and Poles. While in the shelter, we heard anti-aircraft firing and felt the percussion of explosives. We were later told that the planes had bombed a candy factory in Hanoi.

The population of Hanoi, which is said to be about 50% evacuated to the countryside, appears to be taking the raids in stride. There was no evidence that we saw of panic, although obviously taking shelter and stopping work and traffic interrupts normal life.

It is a strange and unpleasant feeling to be an American on the ground while American planes are flying with hostile intent overhead. One's reactions are very mixed, since one is very aware of the fact that one is risking one's life under American bombs. Because it is difficult to describe in matter-of-fact prose, I have written a free verse poem which the Subcommittee may have if it wishes; it seeks to describe the feelings and thoughts of an American in that situation [see text below]:

"Hostile planes knife through cold and silent sky.
Terse loudspeakers signal the approach.
The sirens that I heard in London—
Another land, another time, another pang of history—
I hear again.
Theirs is the raucous call known well to ears that have heard them before."
Who goes there overhead? Is he
From the plains of Kansas, green slopes of Vermont,
The soft-voiced south, the uproar of New York,
The ever-greening Northwest U.S.A.

Who up there knows what I see here?
Look: There goes the enemy:
A sweet-eyed child chubby-legged on a bike.
A mother caring anxiously for her young.
A slender girl bent over green shoots in a paddy,
A rider off his bicycle and sitting by a hole—
The single-occupancy shelter designed to beat the bomb.

Men, women, children . . . the enemy is everywhere!
And the targets abound.
The factories, ports, rails, homes, hospitals, dikes
That hold the salted sea from land,
Or coursing rivers that bring green life.
Or death.

Who sits underground?
I sit in concrete shelter rooms
and talk of war.
With a Vietnamese surgeon whom war has forced
To new techniques of saving lives.
An Indian of supreme dignity who
Presides over the international group
named to control the agreement of men who
Decided 18 years ago to supervise a peace that hasn't come.
An actress who knows the studios of Paris, London, Hollywood,
Now to 2nd, falling asleep at night.
That her pillow is wet from tears
Brought forth by sights of war and thoughts of men
Her country has sent to ride the skies on tubes of death.

Oh, Vietnam, Vietnam.
I know your gentle, slow and graceful people in the south,
And now I see here, in Hanoi, the same soft sweetness,
The same deep love of life and land.
The same people, the same clothes, the same words,
As those I know beyond the Ha.

Oh, Vietnam.
In the enveloping heat of July, another flush comes to my face.
How can it be? When will it stop? Who will say the word?

—JOHN SULLIVAN.

In the streets of Hanoi during air alerts, we saw both military and civilian people, including men, women and small children from infants to teens. We were told both by North Vietnamese physicians and others that a tragic situation persists, namely, that many young children try to avoid taking shelter in order to witness the excitement of the planes and anti-aircraft fire. A result, they said, is that many of the casualties are children and their mothers who try to protect them, sometimes with their own bodies, when the bombs fall.

On July 20, we visited St. Paul’s Hospital in Hanoi and met Dr. Pham Van Phuc, the director of the hospital, and Mrs. Le Thi Linh, a doctor of pediatrics. We were told that since April 16 when the air bombardment of North Vietnam was intensified, the injured included many aged persons, women and children, and that many were treated at St. Paul’s. Many with serious wounds were 14 and 15 years old. They said many wounded had not taken shelter in time, or had been in rice fields, or had been hit on Sundays when many people were walking the streets on their day off. They maintained that, thanks to evacuation and other security measures, the casualty raids were not too high. A neutral newspaper correspondent, however, told us that he estimated the casualties in raids on Haiphong, for example, were perhaps double the number officially announced.

At St. Paul’s Hospital, with Dr. Perera participating, we examined patients and their x-rays. They included:
Nguyen Van Gia, aged 15, hit while tending a water buffalo in May when a plane rocketed his village. A fragment entered his head but he recovered after an operation. He was also burned on the leg. He could not walk and was paralyzed but is now walking with difficulty. He has memory lapses.

Mrs. Nguyen Thi Leng, 30 year old teacher, hit April 16 while in the street by a rocket fragment. She had a 14 month old child, Dinh Phuong, whom she covered with her own body. Her hands were cut and child’s buttocks were pierced. The child fainted and an emergency operation had to be performed on it.

Thien Tien Dat, 14, hit April 16 when a rocket pierced the roof of his house. He suffered internal hemorrhaging and wounds to the skull and temple. When he was operated on, blood was found in his abdominal cavity and there were intestinal cuts.

Le Quoc Khanh, 16, hit April 16, hemorrhaging as a result of damage to an artery. Fragments were found in his stomach and lower intestines and his right arm was fractured.

Le Quoc Tien, 14, hit June 8. His spleen was damaged and there was internal hemorrhaging.

The doctors also described patients and showed x-rays of children who could not be saved, including one where a shell fragment penetrated the skull, then ricocheted back from the other side of the skull to pierce the brain a second time.

Dr. Phuc asserted that the doctors have found both cubic and ball pellet damage to patients hit by anti-personnel weapons and said there were many cases of this in his experience. He also said many were hurt by burns, i.e., whether they were caused by blast or by incendiary contents. He said that Vietnamese doctors are building up extensive new experience in treating burns and noted that, unlike Western physicians, they avoid absolute sterile conditions for treatment, so that patients will have a strong resistance to bacteria and he claimed a very great ratio of success.

During our visit to Hanoi we toured a display of U.S. weapons used in aerial warfare and saw bombs and rockets of varying weights and purposes, incendiary weapons and numerous kinds of anti-personnel weapons used in air bombs or artillery shells. The non-military layman is struck, and may I say, horrified, by the ingenuity with which anti-personnel bomblets have been improved and made more effective, so that a single mother bomb can release scores of thousands of pellets or fragments calculated to go off at the height of a standing person, or to go off by a pre-set delay mechanism either by timing or vibration, and to cover a wide area very intensively.

While in Hanoi we visited the sites of recent bomb damage. This included:

Truong Dinh workers housing area, hit June 27 by air explosion that flattened or damaged eight apartment blocks with 20 living units each, as well as a primary school. Twenty-eight were reported to have been wounded, 18 killed, mostly aged and young.

Ming Khai Street, hit July 4, houses of 33 families destroyed or damaged, one dead, four injured, as the result of four bombs falling in the residential street. Textile workers living quarters, hit July 4, when 4 pressure bombs exploded in the air, destroying or damaging several large buildings, killed 4, injuring 15. Signs hand-lettered and posted on the ruins where workers were clearing the rubble read: "These crimes are engraved in our minds"; "despite difficulties and hardships, we are determined to win over the U.S. aggressors"; "for the sake of independence, we are ready to sacrifice"; "we are determined to make the U.S. aggressors pay in blood."

Bach Mai Hospital, hit June 27. This is a 1200-bed hospital, said to be Hanoi’s largest, which the director says is functioning though the bomb damage has harmed the hospital’s capability. He said there had been three bombs and one rocket that caused the damage. The following hospital sections were damaged: heart-lung-silver section; pharmacy section; obstetrics, eye-ear-throat, lying-in hall, pediatrics, physio-therapy. In addition he said the concussion of the explosion knocked out many doors and windows and damaged equipment. One physician and a laundry worker were killed. They both were in shelters at the time. Patients had been brought downstairs and did not suffer injury. Problems of infection had been increased. A number of patients have been evacuated but there are still others being admitted. As we toured the bomb-damaged hospital, it was evident to us that large sections of it would take a long time to clean up, repair, or reconstruct.

We travelled on July 18 to Nam Dinh city, capital of Nam Ha province, some 80-100 kilometers south of Hanoi, passing through Phu Ly which was virtually
flattened. While we were in Nam Dinh, an air alert was in progress and the all-day trip through the province which had been scheduled was curtailed out of concern for our safety. We were told Nam Ha province had been raided more than 200 times since April 15 and that thousands of shells had been fired from naval craft. We were told 20 planes had raided Nam Dinh the day before we visited (and we heard there was another attack the day after we visited). Damaged were residential areas, a factory and dikes, with casualties reportedly mostly women and children. We visited and photographed schools, pagodas, residential streets and the Number One Hospital, which was no longer functioning and largely lay in ruins. We were told there had been 40 raids on the Nam Ha province dike system in three months.

We stood on a primary dike at a bend in the Red River and observed where a large section was recently repaired. Pontoon boats used in repair were still floating at the base of the repaired section. There were no military targets visible to our eyes. It was stressed that the curve in the dike was a key point, since it was where the dike was weakest; the Vietnamese were sure the bombing was intentional. They said it took place July 8.

Running off the primary dike was a secondary dike which had been cut through in two places and which had not been repaired. I took photographs of these dikes. There was an air alert in progress and we either carried or wore helmets during this visit.

We cannot say whether the dike bombing was intentional, although a French news correspondent, a Swedish diplomat and a Cambodian diplomat gave us their opinions that it was. We consider the question of intent to be somewhat academic. As far as we are concerned, the bombing is happening and we stood with our own feet on two dikes that had been bombed.

If the dike system is so damaged or weakened through bombing that floods result during the rainy season now underway, we are fully aware of the potential hazard to the civilian population and of the serious risk of food shortage and of epidemic sickness that could result.

The North Vietnamese are also aware of this and we were told that many preparations have been made. Peasants are being encouraged to move possessions to high places and to prepare boats out of bamboo and banana trees. Foodstocks are being stored. Medical services are being spread through the countryside. Preparations for water-grown short-term crops are being made.

So much for what we saw and heard. I would now like to report on comments from North Vietnamese officials and on what we heard from U.S. officials when we visited Washington to report on our experiences. I will then offer my conclusions.

Conversations with Vietnamese officials stressed their anger at the air bombardment and blockade equally as strongly as their determination to survive and continue fighting. They said such things as:

- We have nothing left to lose. Why should we give up now?
- We have fought for years. We can fight for four more years if we have to.
- If your air force and navy flatten Hanoi and Haiphong and destroy the dikes, we will not give in. What can you do then?
- They expressed their belief that the air bombardment and naval blockade is prima facie evidence that Vietnamization has faltered in the south and that the ARVN forces would be defeated if an American air war was not being carried on. They added grimly: you have an incomparable air force; if we had it, we'd have won. They admitted that they could not break the back of U.S. air and naval strength, but they also said that the U.S. must defeat them in the short run and that it could not be done. They stressed that our PWs can return home when the U.S. withdraws completely and drops its support of President Thieu and one of them said, it seems to us that your President loves Thieu more than the PWs.
- They expressed their conviction that Mr. Nixon intends to maintain either an actual or what they call a neocolonial presence in Saigon, that it is part of the Nixon Doctrine and of Mr. Nixon's global strategy. But they said they would not give in. When asked what they could say that would be more convincing than mere words, they said that we were religious people and perhaps we could understand that their commitment to freedom and independence and belief in victory is like a religious belief to them, for which they will make any sacrifice.

When we returned to the United States, we made arrangements to visit Washington, D.C. on August 3rd and 4th. We talked with officials of the White House Executive Office and of the State Department, as well as with Senators and Senatorial aides on Capitol Hill, reporting our experiences, showing our photographs and asking questions.
We were told that the North Vietnamese are unwilling to make concessions in Paris and evidently, though hurting, are unwilling to relent in their offensive and their resistance. We reported the North Vietnamese statements that for them a coalition government in the South is not a negotiation ploy, but a historical and objective necessity in the existing conditions. We reported their statement that, though they would like to see a Communist regime in the South, they recognize that the objective conditions for that are absent. They did say that such questions as that are questions for the future, but what is needed now is for Vietnamese of all groupings to work together to establish a neutral, independent, peaceful country. The response of U.S. officials to that was one of disbelief. In fact, it was clear to us that the distrust of the North Vietnamese toward the U.S. Administration was fully matched by the distrust of the U.S. Administration toward the North Vietnamese.

We asked American officials if this were the case, if the gap in agreement over the government of South Vietnam is as wide as it has ever been, what could our government do to cut the Gordian knot and bring some hope of resolution of the problem to despairing and frustrated people on all sides. We were given no answer to our question, only told that the North Vietnamese had brought their plight on their own heads by starting an offensive and thus not allowing for a more complete U.S. withdrawal and that the North Vietnamese were the ones who would make no concessions, while our side had offered many.

It was our observation that these U.S. officials, while committed to their strategy, were frustrated and pessimistic about a resolution of the conflict. We told them of the horror we felt at the death and destruction being rained on civilians, not to mention a militarily and technologically very inferior army and air force and they assured us that they wanted peace, too, but it was clear to me that that was not their first priority.

We said that we could foresee years more of war in which America, while being pictured as withdrawing, was playing a primary military role and causing great death and destruction. They did not offer any hope that such would not be the case.

It is my personal conclusion, which I offer to you, that unless a drastic change in policy takes place, our country has an indefinite commitment to military action in Vietnam, that far from a withdrawal, we have had a substitution of one devastating form of warfare for another, and that until the question of the Saigon Regime of General Thieu is resolved, we will stay in the Vietnam quagmire.

It is long since past due time for a complete U.S. military withdrawal from all of Indochina, for the ending of U.S. guarantees of the survival of autocratic and repressive military regimes which have by any standard inadequate popular support, for the ending of the dishonorable situation in which the mightiest and most technologically advanced nation in the world rains death and destruction on a population whose chief pitiful defense seems to be to tell the story of what is being done to them. The soul of America is exposed in Vietnam and if it is to be saved and if the people of that tragic land are to be allowed to lick their wounds and try to restore some form of more or less normal life, our country must get out of there with the least possible delay.

STATEMENT FROM BRONSON P. CLARK, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE INC.

Two representatives of the American Friends Service Committee have just returned from Hanoi where they delivered a humanitarian shipment of heart surgery equipment. They are Dr. George Perera, former associate dean of the Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons and a recognized expert on hypertension, and John A. Sullivan, Associate Executive Secretary of AFSC. Our representatives brought home personal and photographic evidence of what some of the American bombs are now doing: wrecked hospitals, schools, homes and cultural buildings. They stood on and photographed a primary and a secondary dike at Nam Dinh which had been bombed with no visible military target nearby. Whether the bombing of civilian institutions, the maiming and killing of civilians and the damage and weakening of dikes is intentional or accidental is academic. The critical question is whether these things are happening, and the direct, first-hand evidence of AFSC observers is that they are.
U.S. bombardment and naval shelling of North Vietnam must be terminated. For a technologically superior country like ours to be raining sophisticated destruction on a relatively defenseless, essentially peasant people who are completely without the means of the slightest attack on our country brings dishonor to American ideals. Our representatives found in all their conversations and observations that the North Vietnamese people, far from being driven to defeat, are uniting more strongly under the pressure and putting their ability to adapt and survive to work to outlast and endure the bombing.

In the name of all that is holy, in the name of spiritual values, in the very name of America, this loathsome bombing and shelling must stop.

Senator Kennedy. Thank you for your formal statement. Could I ask you a little bit about evidence of antipersonnel weaponry that you saw; its impact on the civilian population? What can you tell us from your own eyewitness experience?

Mr. Sullivan. I can tell you two things, Senator: We were taken to see some of the collection of U.S.-made weapons that have been collected as a result of raids in North Vietnam. We saw numerous examples—I don't have them with me; they were not given to me—numerous examples of antipersonnel weapons that had been gathered. These included the type of bomb that Mr. Clark showed you yesterday, which they call the guava bomb. It included a perforating bomb—"guava"—which can pierce a shelter or a roof, and if my memory is correct, this was formerly used as an antitank weapon but it can be used for other purposes—and they say it is being used for other purposes.

We saw a variety of bomblets which had either ball pellets encased in a matrix of plastic, or—I don't know quite how to describe this—a bomblet which contained a metal interior which was scored both vertically and horizontally so that upon impact it would break up and these fragments would then fly out.

We were shown various types of nonmetallic mines which could be dropped in great numbers and which could only be set off by someone stepping on them or tripping wires which fan out from the mines.

We were shown incendiary weapons—

Senator Kennedy. Yes, but those collected weapons might have all been used outside populated areas; how do you know they weren't used against troops?

Mr. Sullivan. The thing that we specifically saw were patients at the St. Paul's Hospital in Hanoi and their X-rays which showed pellets and bomb fragments inside the bodies of the victims; and we examined the victims themselves.

Senator Kennedy. Were they troops; were they North Vietnamese troops?

Mr. Sullivan. They were mostly children from roughly the age of 10 to 16; they were not troops.

Senator Kennedy. What sort of wounds did they have?

Mr. Sullivan. They had wounds in various parts of their bodies. Some that we saw had operation scars on their abdomens where they had been opened up in order to remove these objects where they had gone in. Some of them had had colostomies where the fragments had pierced the intestines. We saw X-rays showing pellets in arms, legs, chests, body and, of course, in some victims who were no longer alive, we saw the X-rays and autopsy reports on people whose heads had been
pierced by the bomb fragments. One particularly gruesome one—that of a young boy who had a bomb fragment pierce his skull, go through the brain and ricochet off the other side of the skull and pass through the brain a second time; obviously, he is no longer alive, but those were the specific things that we saw with our own eyes of injury to civilians.

We saw a number of them; they are described in the written testimony I will submit. We saw the X-rays, the autopsy reports and talked to the doctors who had handled them and they said they had had many instances of anti-personnel-weapon injuries since the major raids started in April.

Senator Kennedy. I don't have any further questions. I am going to yield to Senator Fong and then after his questions we are going to hear from Reverend Lecky and then I thought you would be available after we see the film, to respond to perhaps some additional questions that might be raised, if you could.

Mr. Sullivan. Very well.

Senator Fong. Mr. Sullivan, were you allowed to go anywhere that you pleased?

Mr. Sullivan. In Hanoi, Senator, we were perfectly free and we did go from our hotel anywhere we pleased in the city. When we went to Nam Dinh we were escorted and we did say, “Let's go over there” but we were during that period, during that trip, always with people who accompanied us.

Senator Fong. I see.

Now, in Hanoi did you visit many of the dikes there?

Mr. Sullivan. No, I did not visit any of the dikes in and around Hanoi. The dikes that I visited were in Nam Dinh.

Senator Fong. Nam Dinh?

Mr. Sullivan. Nam Dinh.

Senator Fong. How far away from Hanoi is that?

Mr. Sullivan. Eighty to one hundred kilometers; I am not sure of that exact distance.

Senator Fong. How many bomb cuts did you see in these dikes?

Mr. Sullivan. Just what you see up on those photos, Senator. We saw the replaced section in the primary dike and we saw two cuts of the sort shown in the second picture in a secondary dike.

Senator Fong. Is that all the damage that you saw as far as the dikes are concerned?

Mr. Sullivan. Those are the only dikes we visited.

Senator Fong. I see. You visited this dike in Nam Dinh——

Mr. Sullivan. Right.

Senator Fong (continuing). And you saw the section there [pointing to photograph] covering approximately how many feet, would you say?

Mr. Sullivan. It is in the neighborhood of 100 feet, the replaced section at the top.

Senator Fong. I see the soil there is a little different from the other soil which was the old soil. Is that correct?

Mr. Sullivan. Yes, as you can see in the picture itself, the shading shows the new soil in the picture.

Senator Fong. Then, in the lower part of the picture, you have a cut there. That cut seems to be very, very nicely done. It could have been done by a bulldozer, couldn't it?
Mr. Sullivan. I sort of have a funny feeling, Senator, that they wouldn't have run a bulldozer through there for our purposes.

Senator Fong. What I mean is would that necessarily be a bomb cut?

Mr. Sullivan. That is what we were told.

Senator Fong. A bomb crater cut so nicely?

Mr. Sullivan. Yes; they sometimes cut very nicely, evidently.

Senator Fong. I see.

Then, as far as you were concerned, and as far as you saw, there were two cuts, one was that filled portion?

Mr. Sullivan. Since those are the only places we visited, yes.

Senator Fong. Did you ask to be taken to other spots where you could see damage to the dikes?

Mr. Sullivan. Yes, we did. We wanted very much to travel to other places and, in fact, when we visited Nam Ha Province we had been scheduled for a full day of touring throughout the province and we had been told we would see many dikes. When we arrived in Nam Dinh an air alert was in progress, off and on during the whole time we were there. You can see, perhaps on closer examination, that some of the people in that photo are either wearing helmets or carrying helmets. There was an air alert in progress at the time.

After we had been there 3 or 4 hours, our guides came to us and said that because of the fact that there had been air raids the day before and there had been many in the days before that, and because the alerts were now in progress, they felt that for our safety it was necessary to curtail the plans and to return to Hanoi, which we did with much disappointment on our part.

Senator Fong. You don't know whether the cuts were made by our bombs—or were made by, say, antiaircraft fire from North Vietnam's own guns?

Mr. Sullivan. We, of course, did not see the bomb damage occur.

Senator Fong. Exactly.

Mr. Sullivan. So that it is literally impossible for us to say exactly how the damage occurred. I don't personally see how an antiaircraft gun could create such damage, but certainly what I can tell you is that we were told that these were caused by bombs from American planes.

Senator Fong. Did you hear or see any U.S. planes when the alert was sounded?

Mr. Sullivan. Yes. On July 22 we were on our way to the airport to leave Hanoi and we got to the Red River to take the ferry across; we were—there had been two or three alerts already that morning—we were all on the ferry, all loaded, all the vehicles and all the people jammed in like sardines, and as we stood on the ferry we saw planes directly overhead and antiaircraft fire going off.

Senator Fong. Were the planes dropping bombs?

Mr. Sullivan. At that moment it was not dropping bombs. They were flying over; we were told they were Phantoms, directly overhead and they wheeled over us, over the city of Hanoi; at that point we were told to take shelter. We went first into those small, one-man holes and then were taken out of that because they felt it was not safe enough, and brought to an underground shelter of a larger size.
While we were in the shelter we heard the antiaircraft fire initially; we heard explosions and I can't tell you the nature of the explosions, of course, whether they were bombs or missiles coming down or ground-to-air missiles going up, but there were explosions which shook the shelter. There was percussion which you could feel with your ear-drums and it was quite evident that there was military action going on above us, but being underground we couldn't see it.

Senator Fong. Now, in your—

Mr. Sullivan. Incidentally, that lasted for something in the neighborhood of an hour to an hour and a half; there was a great deal of activity.

Senator Fong. I see.

You say the people in Hanoi take the alerts in stride; they don't seem to be bothered by it?

Mr. Sullivan. They certainly are bothered by it, Senator—I said they were not panicked by it. There was no evidence of panic.

Senator Fong. I understood you to say they would go to the bomb shelters and sit outside and read newspapers or even bicycle until—

Mr. Sullivan. Until there was either the sound of gunfire or the sight of planes; this happens so frequently in their lives that they have learned the pattern of the air bombardment and they conduct themselves accordingly.

The officials are constantly urging them and you can hear the loud-speakers, and you can see officials urging people to go into shelters and to protect themselves against the possible effects of bombing; but not all of them do. I was in the air raids in London in the Second World War and I saw exactly the same thing, Senator. I did it myself. There were many, many raids where I didn't take shelter because I had learned what was likely to happen. Of course, this is a little risky and there are people who get hurt because of it and there are people getting hurt because of it in North Vietnam. But I think that is kind of a human thing even when you are under so gross and terrible a thing as is happening there, that you learn how it works and you adjust your life accordingly, and that is what we saw happening.

Senator Fong. Isn't that an indication that the American planes were not bombing indiscriminately? Is it not because of the fact that they were not bombing indiscriminately that these civilians in Hanoi, for example, were just taking the matter in stride?

Mr. Sullivan. Well, I would say that if there wasn't evidence that people weren't being injured and killed, but they are.

Senator Fong. Now, are these people who were injured and killed, do you know whether they were injured when they were close to military establishments, supply depots, tanks?

Mr. Sullivan. Of course, I don't know that, Senator.

Senator Fong. You don't know that?

Mr. Sullivan. Of course I don't; no more than would you if you were there.

Senator Fong. Why would the Americans be releasing antitank bombs against civilians?

Mr. Sullivan. Something that was called a perforating bomblet which, as I say, my memory is that I was told that this had been at one time an antitank weapon and perhaps still is, were also being used in air bombardment, and were perforating shelters, roofs and so forth before detonating.
Senator Fong. You saw these victims of American air raids. Would you say they were much different from the victims that you saw in South Vietnam—or have you been to South Vietnam?

Mr. Sullivan. Yes, I have been to South Vietnam.

Senator Fong. You visited hospitals there?

Mr. Sullivan. Yes, sir; I have.

Senator Fong. You have seen victims in South Vietnam’s hospitals?

Mr. Sullivan. Yes, sir; I have.

Senator Fong. Victims who were injured by rockets fired by North Vietnamese into South Vietnamese cities?

Mr. Sullivan. I have seen victims of all sorts of firing by all sorts of people in South Vietnam—

Senator Fong. Yes.

Mr. Sullivan (continuing). Including American and South Vietnamese; yes.

Senator Fong. Were they much different, the victims in South Vietnam, caused by North Vietnamese guns?

Mr. Sullivan. Well, the ones I am most familiar with, Senator, in South Vietnam, are the patients in our physical rehabilitation center in Quang Ngai City and these are people who have lost arms and legs, sometimes two arms and two legs, or who have suffered spinal injuries from shell and bomb fragments. We keep records of those things in the rehabilitation center and the cause of those injuries is identified as far as we are able to do it as to whether it resulted from both North or NLF action, from South Vietnamese action, or from American war action. We submitted this material to the subcommittee during the hearing on May 8. [See Part I.]

Senator Fong. You would say that people suffer just as much in the South as people in the North?

Mr. Sullivan. I would say that anybody who is wounded or severely injured from war action is a suffering person, yes, indeed, and that is why we are carrying on a program of humanitarian assistance both in the south and in the north.

Senator Fong. Now you say you received a license from the American Government validated for North Vietnam so that your shipment of $30,000 worth of heart surgical equipment was in fact consented to by the U.S. Government?

Mr. Sullivan. Oh, yes; we are in full compliance with the U.S. Government law about what we are doing.

Senator Fong. The Government didn’t try to stop you from delivering these supplies?

Mr. Sullivan. Of course they didn’t. We got the export licenses; we have discussed this in advance many times with the Department of State. I have had personal conversations with Frank Sieverts, Ambassador Sullivan and others. I have had conversations with the U.S. Embassy officials in Vientiane just before going into Hanoi and just after coming out of Hanoi.

As far as I am concerned, the American Friends Service Committee acts in a very open and public way and the U.S. Government knows that and I think respects it.

Senator Fong. Would you not say, however, that this official sanctioning of your efforts to bring medical supplies and medical equipment to North Vietnam is inconsistent with the views as stated by
some that we are deliberately killing innocent children and bombing dikes and bombing nonmilitary targets.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, you know, I really don't want to get into the question of intention of what I have seen in North Vietnam. There is no way in the world that I can say that this was intentional, accidental or otherwise. What I can tell you, and I can tell you very flatly, is that it is happening and I think that that is the important question.

To me the question of intent is pretty academic. It may be important to propagandists but to me the important thing is that civilians are being killed and injured in an undeclared war by our arms and our Air Force that shouldn't even be there in the first place.

Senator FONG. Let me ask you, Mr. Sullivan, who started this massive fight?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Are you asking me to review the history of the—

Senator FONG. You are now stating that this is happening. Who started it now? Who invaded the south? Who started the massive invasion of the south?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I don't know how far back you want to go, Senator. Do you want to go back to 1954—

Senator FONG. Everything was decelerating—

Mr. SULLIVAN (continuing). Or 1960 or 1965?

Senator FONG. Everything was decelerating until this massive invasion of the south; is that correct?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Everything was accelerating?

Senator FONG. Decelerating. By that I suppose you mean we were in the troop withdrawal process?

Mr. SULLIVAN. We were bombing the north; there was something described in the papers—described as preemptive strikes that General Lavelle gave some very interesting testimony that was going on before April.

Senator FONG. But even those were very, very few in comparison to what is happening today. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is what I am concerned about, what is happening today, Senator.

Senator FONG. Now, if the North Vietnamese had not mounted this tremendous invasion of the south, this present bombing wouldn't have happened, would it?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, and if we hadn't been there in the first place maybe that massive invasion wouldn't have happened; I don't think there would be a war going on there today if our military involvement didn't exist.

Senator FONG. Yes, but who started it?

Senator KENNEDY. Here we go—

Mr. SULLIVAN. I am sorry; I didn't want to get into a long history of the Vietnam war which I am—

Senator FONG. You seem to come here and feel that we are the bad guys in this whole picture. You seem to present a picture that here are victims in a hospital, victims of our bombing. Have you considered that sometimes they may be victims of their own antiaircraft guns? You say that these are people who are suffering because of what we
have done. We had to do these things because they were mounting this tremendous invasion of the south and they were creating a million refugees; it was they who were sending people to the hospitals in the south. Now these things could easily be stopped if they would just sit down and negotiate and stop firing.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, and they could easily stop if we would stop doing them.

Senator FONG. We told them we would stop, but they refused to negotiate.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, Senator, you may be an expert on the negotiations going on but I certainly am not; all I know is what is happening in the field. All I know is what I saw with my own eyes and all I know is that I am distressed and horrified by what I saw.

Senator FONG. But we must remember that there are also distressing tales of 1 million refugees moving away from their homes in the south because of the massive invasion.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, what has that got to do with my testimony?

Senator FONG. I just want to present a balanced picture here. I want to present a picture that the present situation is the result of the massive invasion of the south by the north.

Mr. SULLIVAN. All right, and I responded that this thing would be over if we would get out of it.

Senator FONG. Yes, if they would start negotiating, we would have a cease-fire. We have asked them to do this but they have not done so.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, when I returned from Hanoi to the United States, one of the first things I did, and Dr. George Perera was with me, was to go to visit officials in the Executive Office of the President, to visit officials of the State Department, to visit U.S. Senators and senatorial aides on Capitol Hill, to give an immediate and direct report of what we had seen and witnessed and heard and learned in the north. We, of course, raised the question in conversation with these officials about the negotiations; we talked with officials of the White House and we said, “Given the fact that North Vietnam is insistent on certain conditions in the negotiations which our side evidently is unwilling to agree to, given the fact that there is terrible destruction going on in both ends of Vietnam, not just in the north, and given the fact that there is almost no one left in the world who wants this war to go on, what is it that our Government, which is an outside party to this, what is it that our Government can do to cut the Gordian knot and, Senator, I have to tell you frankly that I got no answer to that question.

Senator FONG. Well, the answer was stated in the proposals made by the President. These proposals, I think, are pretty generous: stop firing; we negotiate.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, I guess we are both entitled to our opinion. I think if we got out there wouldn’t be any great need for this thing to go on.

Senator FONG. And if we got out of there, what would happen to the civilians in South Vietnam?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, I suppose something would happen to them—

Senator FONG. Then would you be called upon again to go to South Vietnam?
Mr. Sullivan. Some good things and some bad things might happen to them in South Vietnam, but all I can tell you is that some mighty bad things are happening to them now.

Senator Fong. Three thousand people were killed, massacred in Hue.

Mr. Sullivan. And American bombs have killed many, many more thousands, Senator.

Senator Fong. These were killed and massacred after the North Vietnamese got control of these cities.

Mr. Sullivan. There is a great deal of talk of massacres by all sorts of causes and I deplore every one of them, whether they occur as the result of the north or the NLF or the south or the Koreans or the Americans. I deplore every one of them, not just one side of them.

Senator Fong. But not the massive massacre of 3,000 to 4,000 people in Hue?

Mr. Sullivan. I will grant you the deliberate, cold-blooded massacre of anyone whether it is by Vietnamese soldiers, by one side or the other, or by American troops, and we have had records of all of those things as you know, that massacres of those sort capture the public attention, capture the attention of the media and they certainly become the center of controversy and propaganda. But for anyone who is concerned about human life, such massacres have to fit into the pattern of what is happening to all the people concerned and there are many, many, many more people being killed by other means than massacres, and I think that we ought to be concerned about all of that, Senator, not just selected aspects of it which have particular propaganda value.

Senator Fong. I hope you don't mean that you are willing to let thousands and perhaps millions of South Vietnamese be massacred if the North Vietnamese came in?

Mr. Sullivan. If it was in my power, I wouldn't have anyone massacred—

Senator Fong. I am glad you say that.

Mr. Sullivan (continuing). By any side.

Senator Kennedy. I hope you will remain with us, Mr. Sullivan—

Mr. Sullivan. I'd be glad to, Senator.

Senator Kennedy (continuing). To perhaps respond to some other questions later.

Mr. Sullivan. Thank you.

Senator Kennedy. I suppose—if I could just make this final observation, for we want to move right along because we are going to run out of time—I think the point which I gathered from your testimony is that there has been an escalation in human suffering in Vietnam on both sides.

You can talk about negotiations in Paris, or wherever the President's representatives are going, but there remains massive human suffering affecting innocent civilians in North Vietnam and South Vietnam alike, and this is a story that if the American people fully understood I think they would no longer tolerate. And I think from your eyewitness report, from what you have seen, from what you have heard, and from the pictures that you supplied, you have helped provide a better understanding of this for all Americans. I don't think the American people would tolerate this war for one minute more if they really understood it.

I want to thank you very much for coming this morning.
Mr. SULLIVAN. May I just say, Senator, that if other Americans could have the opportunity to see what I have seen they wouldn't tolerate this war another day indeed.

Senator KENNEDY. We will now call on Reverend Lecky, who is a former associate executive director of the Department of Ministry of the National Council of the Churches of Christ and currently a codirector of Clergy and Laymen Concerned.

Reverend Lecky will present a film and then respond to some questions.

STATEMENT OF REV. ROBERT S. LECKY, CODIRECTOR, CLERGY AND LAYMAN CONCERNED, ACCOMPANIED BY DR. WILLIAM ZIMMERMAN

Reverend Lecky. Sir, I would just like to say just a few words about how the film came to be.

We went into North Vietnam on May 20, and we took this film with 8 millimeter cameras. I had never taken film before and I don't think my other colleagues who were on the trip had, either. We were the first Americans who were allowed to take undeveloped color film out from North Vietnam and we brought it back with us and had it developed here.

We visited three provinces centered around Hanoi, Haiphong and Nam Dinh, and I think the film will speak for itself. I would like to show it now.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you; you may proceed.

(Film presentation.)

Dr. ZIMMERMAN. This is the village of Phuc Loc—

Senator KENNEDY. Would you give your name?

Dr. ZIMMERMAN. I am Dr. Bill Zimmerman. I accompanied Reverend Lecky on this trip and took some of the footage.

This village is near Haiphong. We visited it on the morning of May 23, 1972. It has been described in the press by Tony Lewis and yesterday at these hearings by Mr. Clark.

On the morning of April 16, at 2:30 a.m., this area was "carpet bombed" [see following illustration] by B-52 bombers dropping 500-pound demolition bombs. The village is a square kilometer in area. We drove into it from Haiphong and passed only through rice fields in areas of dikes and canals.

The man that you will see standing in the center of one of these craters in a moment is one of the villagers—one of the members of the village; he is 70 years old. There were 17 members in his family before the attack. This is the man here.

During the attack, 10 members of his family were killed; the other seven seriously injured. Of the 10 killed, nine were dismembered beyond recognition by the impact of the 500-pound bombs.

Part of the village was being rebuilt when we were there which was approximately 6 weeks after the attack.

The Vietnamese told us that there were 142 bomb craters and from our observations all of those bomb craters were within the village perimeter. We didn't see a single bomb crater outside this one square kilometer area.
B-52's and diagram of bomb bursts are superimposed on map of Haiphong to indicate area covered by typical rectangular pattern of bombs dropped by three-plane mission. B-52 missions are usually flown by three planes. Bomb pattern is more than mile long.

In the surrounding fields there was only evidence of antipersonnel weapons, very small holes in the ground made where these antipersonnel weapons detonated.

This is a scene of destruction in Haiphong, also shot on May 23. In a moment there will be on the screen an interview with Quang Thao who is the chief administrator of Haiphong, the equivalent of one of our mayors. He is describing the attack on the city that took place on April 16.

The map in front of him is the city plan of Haiphong and the dark symbols on the map, which are a little difficult to see, represent areas where demolition bombs fell on the city on the 16th. The first raid on the 16th was at 2 in the morning, 2 a.m. It hit the harbor and several housing projects—three housing projects, to be exact.

At 9 a.m., 7 hours later, the planes attacked and hit the same housing projects a second time, injuring people who had returned to their homes.

Senator Kennedy. You will give us later the names of the housing projects, if you know?

Dr. Zimmerman. I believe I have them in my briefcase; yes.

The planes attacked, hit the same housing projects a second time in order to wound, the Vietnamese told us, the people who had returned to sift through the wreckage of their homes.

On the 16th they attacked a third time at 4 p.m. and again hit the same housing projects and the harbor.

We visited the harbor and our observations indicated that damage to the harbor was far less extensive than the damage you see before you now, which was to urban residential areas.

During the second attack on April 16 at 9 a.m., there were two additional targets besides the harbor and the housing projects—the Ky Dong Hospital and the Vietnamese-Czechoslovakian Friendship Hospital. Here you see the Czech Hospital; the little pockmarks in the wall there were made by antipersonnel weapons.
These are victims of those raids who were being treated in the hospital.

This is the head of surgery in the hospital who is describing this particular boy who is 10 years old and who was injured in his bed in one of the housing projects at 2 a.m. on the 16th, brought to this hospital, and was on the operating table at 9 a.m., when the second attack occurred, and on that operating table was injured a second time.

The planes hit the operating room and the surgical ward of the hospital as well as the staff residences for the nurses and doctors.

Senator KENNEDY. What is this scene?

Dr. ZIMMERMAN. This is the Vietnamese-Czechoslovakian Friendship Hospital in the center of Haiphong, about one-half kilometer from the housing project and about a mile or so from the harbor.

The physician told us after describing the case of this young boy that their outrage at the American pilots, who would attack even children, is increased by the happiness they feel after saving this boy's life.

Their medical services in the hospital seem to be excellent.

All of the patients that we saw in the hospital were civilians. The vast majority were children and older people, and we were told that these are the principal victims of the attacks on urban areas because they have the most difficulty in getting to shelters during the attacks. There isn't as much warning before an attack in Haiphong as there is in Hanoi because the Phantoms from the 7th Fleet come directly off the sea and there are no plane spotters out at sea, Vietnamese plane spotters.

We were in one attack in Haiphong on May 23, the day these pictures were taken, and were able to see 10 Phantoms divebombing over the city.

The footage we will see immediately after this shot is from the city of Nam Dinh, also described in Mr. Sullivan's testimony. This city was attacked on May 23, 1972. We were there; we arrived late at night on the 23d and this footage was taken on the morning of the 24th.

The area the film is showing now is an urban residential area in the center of Nam Dinh. This man is standing at the bottom of a very deep crater made by a 500- or 1,000-pound demolition bomb.

Nam Dinh the day before was severely attacked; we saw——

Senator KENNEDY. Did you see any other factories or machines or plants destroyed in these communities?

Dr. ZIMMERMAN. Not in this area, Senator. There are many textile factories in Nam Dinh and we saw one that was destroyed on a previous attack and one that was still functioning.

Senator KENNEDY. Is this a church?

Dr. ZIMMERMAN. This is a church, yes. This is Our Lady of Peace Church in Nam Dinh.

Most of the damage from the raid depicted here, which occurred the day before, as I said was in urban areas. There seemed to be, to me, about 8 acres of rubble of this sort in the center of town.

Senator KENNEDY. As I understand, the policy is not to drop those 500-pound bombs in any area where there are civilian populations.

Dr. ZIMMERMAN. That is what the Pentagon told us, too.

This is a housing project; it was a complex of four buildings: three were apartment buildings and the fourth was a secondary school and they are all arranged around a campus area. These buildings were in
Haiphong, not in Nam Dinh. The footage is out of order here. All four buildings in that complex, the three apartment buildings and high school, were all wrecked by demolition and antipersonnel bombs.

This is the backyard of our hotel in Nam Dinh; three hours before this footage was taken Rockeye antipersonnel bombs, described in Mr. Sullivan's testimony, were dropped on this hotel in Nam Dinh. This hotel is in the center of town. There is a textile mill adjacent to it and the people in the background are workers on a lunch break. The Vietnamese are in the process of defusing some of the weapons that had not gone off. That—you can't see it clearly—but that is a Rockeye bomb, manufactured by the Honeywell Corp., that that person is holding.

It was formerly an antitank device. These bombs are designed to penetrate underground shelters as they used to penetrate tanks. They have the secondary function, if they don't hit a shelter directly, of driving into the ground, as we are about to see, down to a depth of about 60 centimeters. At that depth they explode and set off an underground shockwave. If there is a shelter nearby, the walls of that shelter might collapse as a result of the shockwave, crushing the people inside.

We saw evidence of these Rockeye bombs in several areas around Nam Dinh, but this particular attack, as I said, occurred just before we got there. We were asked not to walk around this yard because there were a number of undetonated bombs there. There is a fragment from a demolition bomb that was also found in the backyard of that hotel.

During the 24th when we were there, there were three additional raids on Nam Dinh. This is the village of Bao Ngu, about 30 kilometers from Nam Dinh. It has been attacked on May 12, just about noon. In the attack, eight people were killed and 23 injured. Most of the killed and injured were students or teachers who were returning from a lunch break from the village day-care center and were caught outside the center as the planes swooped in on the village. The little holes in the pot being held up are made by the steel pellets from antipersonnel weapons. There was quite extensive damage of that sort in this village, little holes and pockmarks in buildings and furniture, cooking utensils and so forth, all over the village, indicating that a very large number of antipersonnel pellet bombs had been dropped on this village.

Senator Kennedy. What was the military significance again of this village?

Dr. Zimmerman. It was surrounded by miles and miles of rice paddies. We saw no targets that could be construed in any way to be of military significance.

This man had been injured by an antipersonnel weapon and we could see several small puncture wounds on his legs made by them.

This is a monument of outrage to the American pilots erected by the villagers, and it describes the date and time of the attack, number of people killed and injured.

Here we just walked through the village and you will see against some of these walls evidence of the antipersonnel bombs which are incapable of—the pellets of which are incapable of penetrating the walls. There will be a couple of pockmarks and we are now panning to one of the holes in the wall that was made by a Rockeye bomb itself. These are the penetrating or perforating bombs. The little pockmarks
up there are made by the pellets and you are able to dig the little steel ball-bearing pellets out of some of those holes in the buildings.

I might add, since this footage, since this section of the film we are showing you is about to end, that some of this footage was shown on CBS TV on June 18 and on that date an Air Force colonel who was assigned to the Pentagon information office denied that the Air Force or Navy had ever dropped bombs on the village of Phuc Loc which you saw in the opening sequence of the film. They claim to have aerial recon photos from April 17, the day after the attack on Phuc Loc, indicating that there had been no attack.

They also denied to CBS TV on June 18 that they had ever dropped antipersonnel weapons on Nam Dinh, stating it was their policy not to drop such weapons on urban areas.

Reverend Lecky. Senator, I asked Dr. Zimmerman to narrate this film since he had been working closely with the development of the film since we returned and had to cut small sections out from the three or four hours of film; that is why I asked him if he would help.

Senator Kennedy. Tell me, of the pictures that we saw here of schools, homes, churches, or hospitals; were any of these buildings in any way associated with military targets?

Reverend Lecky. Our invitation—I had applied to go to Hanoi—but the invitation came to inspect civilian targets, and we only saw in a sense one military target and that was the harbor in Haiphong. We saw certain things on the roads and trains but we saw nothing in any of these situations which you saw today which would resemble a military target, and particularly in the villages where the roads to them were very narrow; they tended to be usually many kilometers away from major urban residential areas. It seemed to be totally a kind of peasant society. So we saw nothing of a military nature that would indicate the reason for the ferocity of some of these attacks.

Senator Kennedy. I suppose they would say that a textile mill might be a military target, and you saw textile mills?

Reverend Lecky. We saw textile mills and, of course, Nam Dinh is the center of the textile industry in North Vietnam, and I guess if that is rated as a military target then that would explain the bombings in and around Nam Dinh and which included residential areas and the hotel in which we stayed.

Senator Kennedy. Powerplants!

Reverend Lecky. I saw none of those in these areas.

Senator Kennedy. Cement factories?

Reverend Lecky. No, as I say, most of the places we were shown were so typically residential and so typically related to civilians that there was no indication of military targets and, believe me, we looked. I mean, the obvious question was why, and there was no answer to that.

Senator Kennedy. Were there any concentrations of troops around any of these areas?

Reverend Lecky. We saw very, very few military people at all, and the only time we saw even the emergence of small arms was when during a raid, people who had been performing civilian tasks would put on helmets and grab a rifle and go out into the street and shepherd people into shelters and so on. But we saw at no stage any contingent of troops at all.

Senator Kennedy. Did you have accessibility to visit areas or communities that you wanted to?
Reverend Lecky. Within, it seemed to me, within the bounds of personal safety, we did. We roamed the streets of Hanoi, but there was always a question being asked about our personal safety and so there were times, particularly in Nam Dinh and Haiphong, where raids were almost daily, there were restrictions placed on us, but I had the sense they were for our personal safety, and whenever we traveled that seemed to be uppermost in their mind.

I would like, Senator, if I could, to just make two very brief observations: One is when we went in and around Hanoi, we noticed through the major bridge across the Red River had one single span blasted out of it, which is a photo which we have all seen in the press, which was, I thought, a clear indication of the Air Force’s or the Navy’s ability to hit a very, very small target very accurately. But literally within a few hundred yards of that were housing areas which had been blasted very badly, indeed, and I had to say, why is it that we can hit the bridge so accurately and yet at the same time blast very large areas of housing?

Senator Kennedy. Did you see any missile sites while you were there?

Reverend Lecky. None at all.

Senator Kennedy. Did you ask to see any?

Reverend Lecky. I didn’t. We asked for certain things, and I think all that we asked to see we were allowed to see, particularly schools, hospitals, captured pilots.

Senator Kennedy. In an interview in the New York Times recently with some of the pilots, they indicated that during the prestrike briefings, the pilots say they pore over detailed maps, and reconnaissance photographs, dikes, and other “no-noes” — hospitals, churches, clusters of homes, and POW camps, for example — are pointed out, and the paths for approaching and departing the targets are planned so as to minimize collateral damage.

How successful would you say that that procedure has been in relationship to what you have seen?
Reverend Lecky. We didn’t see the military targets so I don’t know how successful they have been with the military targets; but all we can say is what we saw, and we saw extensive damage to what were only schools, only hospitals, only residential housing—and it was extensive. There is no way even with our film that you can capture the magnitude, particularly in Haiphong and Nam Dinh, of areas which have been leveled, and I mean we are not talking about, you know, a few isolated bombs; we are talking about street blocks.

Dr. Zimmerman. With respect to the pilots, later on in this film there is an interview with the eight pilots that we saw, and they all said that the bombing attacks placed them, and I quote, “in very real, very imminent personal danger.”

Senator Kennedy. Since you have been back, have you had the opportunity of talking with anyone in the Defense Department to ask them about any of these particular villages, their possible military significance, and have you been able to get any response from them?

Reverend Lecky. I was the one who did most of the work with CBS, and they did speak specifically and directly to the Defense Department about some of the claims we make in the film, and Dr. Zimmerman referred to their denial of it; and I guess I want to say it seems to me in terms of the argument about the date of bombing of Phuc Loc that it is absolutely immaterial. For there is no question at all that that village was bombed almost to smithereens, and I don’t believe that their own missiles fell so accurately on their own village.

Senator Kennedy. Senator Fong?

Senator Fong. Reverend Lecky, what was your purpose in going to North Vietnam?

Reverend Lecky. My purpose, Senator, was part of my function as a codirector of a group called “Clergy and Laymen Concerned”—I am editor of a weekly newspaper called American Report which deals extensively with issues of religion and power, and so I have written a lot and read a lot and published a lot about the situation in Vietnam and I wanted to go for myself and that was the reason I applied to go.

Senator Fong. You were given permission to go to North Vietnam for what purpose?

Reverend Lecky. I was given permission to inspect and look at civilian bomb damage.

Senator Fong. Just civilian bomb damage?

Reverend Lecky. Yes, sir.

Senator Fong. That was specifically designated?

Reverend Lecky. Yes, sir.

Senator Fong. You were not allowed to see any other damage?

Reverend Lecky. As I said, the only serious military target I thought we saw was the harbor in Haiphong, I did not see missile sites; I did not see, apart from the airport at Hanoi, any airfields or anything like that.

Senator Fong. So, specifically, your guide just took you to civilian targets?

Reverend Lecky. Yes.

Senator Fong. In fact, you were prohibited from seeing military targets except while passing by?

Reverend Lecky. Yes, and I would just like to say, Senator, that we were there in a time of war and, therefore, even our presence there was a certain cost to them because it meant that people had to be taken
away from other tasks, to translate for us, to escort us, and so on. The
limitations of the war were always present whether it was for our own
personal safety or in the kind of resources they could offer to us.

Senator Fong. How large is the Port of Haiphong?
Reverend Lecky. How large is the Port of Haiphong? Do you mean
in terms of—

Senator Fong. Area, square miles.
Reverend Lecky. I don't know; I wouldn't like to hazard a guess.

Senator Fong. Is it a big port?
Reverend Lecky. I would say it was a fairly big port, yes. There are
a number of very large ships that were tied up while we were there.

Senator Fong. The apartments that you saw bombed in Haiphong,
how far were they from the waterfront?
Reverend Lecky. The major area that we saw bombed in Haiphong
was about a mile from the harbor, and that was this complex of a
school and workers' quarters which was very, very badly damaged. It
was absolutely unusable anymore.

Senator Fong. Approximately a mile from the harbor?
Reverend Lecky. Yes.

Senator Fong. Did you photograph any civilian damage in Hai­
phong more than a mile from the harbor?
Reverend Lecky. Well, the village of Phuc Loc is 7 kilometers from
Haiphong, from the city, and we photographed there.

Senator Fong. So, these civilian targets which were damaged in
Haiphong were approximately 1 mile from the waterfront, which was
a military target, wasn't it?
Reverend Lecky. I am assuming we are calling the waterfront a
military target, and this was about a mile, yes.

Senator Fong. You have no idea whether there were any antiaircraft
guns or SAM missile sites which were in back of the waterfront?
Reverend Lecky. Back of the waterfront?

Senator Fong. Conceivably they could have been.
Reverend Lecky. Conceivably they could have been, yes. Let me
say I did stray away from our party to go around the back of those
buildings because we were in the center of the road and there were
buildings to the right and left badly damaged and I went around the
side to ask the very question you are asking—whether, behind this
very large building, there was an antiaircraft gun or missile site or
something like that. There was nothing there that I could see and
they started to shout out to me and I thought, "Aha, I am finding
something out," and so I kept going and then they continued to shout
and then I heard the sirens and saw the planes and that is why they
were shouting at me.

Senator Fong. I see. Now, in this village that you talk about, that
was 1 kilometer from Haiphong—
Reverend Lecky. Roughly, yes.

Senator Fong (continuing). Which was bombed out, did I not hear
you say there were some guns close by?
Reverend Lecky. No, you did not. We never saw any guns close by.
Senator Fong. Not a single one?
Reverend Lecky. Not a single one, and we saw no villagers with guns. You know in Hanoi we would see, as I said before, we would see when the air raid siren went people don a helmet and grab a rifle, who until then had been a waitress or something else as part of their defense procedures, but certainly not in Phuc Loc.
Senator Fong. Now, apart from Phuc Loc, and apart from Hai-phong, these pictures you have shown us, where else were they taken?
Reverend Lecky. Where else were the pictures taken?
Senator Fong. Yes.
Reverend Lecky. We took pictures in and around Hanoi—well, we took pictures everywhere we went and, as I said, in the beginning we went to three sections of North Vietnam centered in Nam Dinh, Hai-phong, and Hanoi, which forms a kind of triangle, and we took pictures everywhere we went, and there were very few times when we were not allowed to take pictures.
Senator Fong. So you concentrated in Haiphong, Nam Dinh—
Reverend Lecky. And Hanoi.
Senator Fong (continuing). And Hanoi?
Reverend Lecky. Right.
Senator Fong. In Haiphong you took these pictures which were approximately a mile from the waterfront?
Reverend Lecky. Yes.
Senator Fong. In Nam Dinh, I understood you to say there were textile mills there?
Reverend Lecky. Yes; we took pictures in the center of the city, on the edge of the city, and in the villages around it.
Senator Fong. I see. Where are the textile mills located?
Reverend Lecky. I beg pardon?
Senator Fong. Where are the textile mills located in Nam Dinh?
Reverend Lecky. Well, it is a textile city. There was one next to our hotel and then there was a large complex which had been totally flattened several—I guess I would say a half mile away from where we were in the hotel; and around that were workers’ quarters, day care centers, schools, and these had all been bombed, too.
Senator Fong. In Hanoi, where were these pictures taken?
Reverend Lecky. We took pictures in the city of Hanoi; we went out to its environs; we went across the Red River to this area that I described which was a few hundred yards away from the bridge, and we went, well, we went literally all around the city; and we took pictures of the medical school which had been bombed on the other side of the city. I could give you street names but I don’t have it here sitting in front of men.
Senator Fong. Are there many bridges in Hanoi?
Reverend Lecky. I beg pardon?
Senator Fong. Are there many bridges in Hanoi?
Reverend Lecky. We saw several; yes.
Senator Fong. Were they all hit?
Reverend Lecky. All that I saw were hit; yes. They were now operating on pontoon bridges or ferries.
Senator Fong. Then, it was the area surrounding these bridges that was hit?
Reverend Lecky. In most cases.

Senator Fong. I have no further questions.

Senator Kennedy. It has been suggested that for reasons of morale, that Hanoi understates the amount of damage to civilian populated areas. Did you form any impression about that?

Reverend Lecky. It is my personal opinion and I asked that question of journalists and diplomats in Hanoi, that this is true, that they do underestimate.

Now, I think that it is not just for questions of morale; I think there are other factors at work. First of all, there was a good deal of local autonomy in regions and so the local groups are responsible for supplying the statistics of how many people were killed, and I really think that just given the energy and effort that is required following a raid, that these statistics have to err on the side of being too few rather than too many. Also, I think that they kind of want to tell Hanoi, the central Government, that things aren’t as bad there as they might seem, so as not to worry them. I think there is some of that at work from what they were saying.

Then there is also simply the question of morale, but some of the statistics that were given to us about eight people were killed here, and you could see several blocks flattened—I just personally couldn’t believe that either they had such extensive warning and their safety was so immaculate that that was all that were killed.

Senator Kennedy. It seems that the underestimation of the impact of the war on civilians is really used to serve different interests, whether it is in Hanoi, underestimating because of the impact that it might have on their morale, or in South Vietnam, where we have seen in the course of our hearings of 7 years, and our investigations of various hospitals, that they always underestimate the number of civilian casualties because they don’t want to admit Vietnamization is a failure in a given area.

So everyone, on both sides it seems, suppresses the impact of the war on civilians. I think we see that today, in the idea that this war is de-escalating. Even after what we hear from you here, and from Mr. Clark yesterday, and other respected leaders, clergymen, business leaders, public officials, Nobel prize-winners, after these reports of massive damage to civilian areas because of the escalating bombing, we hear Administration spokesmen announce the reduction of combat troops, and they show pictures of the last American combat troops leaving South Vietnam, and the impression is given that the war is winding down. They never mention or show pictures of churches, schools, homes, and villages that are being destroyed. They never mention the number of bombs that are being dropped, which has certainly escalated. In fact, more bombs have been dropped during the first 7 months of this year than during the whole Korean war.

So we are seeing an escalation of civilian casualties on both sides—in the north as well as in the south—and we can argue about who created the million refugees in the south and who is to blame for the casualties. But our review, and the statistics we have seen from the USIS study in Laos, point out that approximately 75 percent of the refugees are created by aerial bombardment. The bombing is driving people out from the countryside and into the cities.
I think what this country has to recognize is rather than condemning those who visit the north and bring back these pictures—like yourself and Mr. Clark and other distinguished citizens who go and visit the north and bring back the evidence of the awful destruction in terms of civilian lives, schools, churches, hospitals—rather than condemning those individuals, what we ought to be doing is condemning the policy that is perpetrating and prolonging this destruction. We ought to recognize and acknowledge that this is the result of our escalation of aerial bombardment in the north.

No matter how many pronouncements and press releases that show we are only bombing military targets, you can't get around the kind of evidence that you have brought here, and other eyewitness reporters have brought to us. If the American people understood this, then they could make a determination whether they want to continue to support this policy or change it. Senator Fong and I each have our own views about that particular question, but you can't get around the kind of evidence that you have made here and the eyewitness presentation that you have made and recorded on film.

It is important, I think, that the American people simply understand what is going on. I take little satisfaction from the fact that because violence and brutality may be a part of the policy of one country that, therefore, we have to duplicate it as a policy of our own. I am certain we like to believe that we have a higher standard of conduct.

So I want to thank you very much for your presentation here, and for the information that you have provided to us, and I am hopeful that we can be helpful in trying to find out why these various civilian areas were targeted and we are going to try. We are hopeful that we will have some response from the administration, and we intend to give them an opportunity to review with us the reasons for it and the justification for it, because I, for one, believe that it is outrageous that we can't get this, if there is any justification. But I think it is going to be extremely hard to be able to justify such extensive bombing of civilian areas.

Senator Fong, Mr. Chairman, may I ask that the press report, "Dike Bombing Denied by U.S. Carrier Pilots," appearing in the New York Times on August 12, and the statement released by the Department of State on July 28, 1972, relating to "North Vietnam: The Dike Bombing Issue," be incorporated into the record?

Senator KENNEDY. It will be made a part of the record.

(From the New York Times, Aug. 12, 1972)

Dike Bombing Denied by U.S. Carrier Pilots

(By Joseph B. Treaster)

Aboard U.S.S. Saratoga in the Gulf of Tonkin, Aug. 8—The pilots aboard this aircraft carrier swear that they have never tried to bomb the dikes of North Vietnam and they say they are hurt and irritated that so many Americans at home do not seem to believe them.

The pilots are troubled, too, they say, that some Americans apparently think they are deliberately bombing other civilian targets like schools and hospitals and residential areas.

"The thing that hurts us," said Comdr. Richard Bardone of Pittsburgh, the stocky, curly-haired leader of the pilots on this ship, "is that we make every effort to avoid the dikes. We do not, absolutely not, go after dikes."
Lieut. Comdr. Lew Dunton's eyes flashed, "There are a lot of prisoners in the Hanoi Hilton," he said, "because they were shot down trying to avoid civilian targets. It really excites me."

The pilots and their senior officers scoff at the foreign visitors to North Vietnam who have been quoted as saying they have seen dikes damaged by bombs and that they believed the United States had "deliberately tried to destroy the dikes."

The airmen argue that only isolated damage has been reported—the kind that might likely result from an accident—and they say none of the visitors so far appears to have been qualified to determine whether the damage was done by bombs or other explosives.

"The absurd part about it," one senior officer said, "is that somebody comes up with a hole in a dike and he translates that as meaning we're going after the dikes."

"If we were hitting the dikes with malice or aforethought," the officer continued, "we could clean all of them out in a week without many bombs."

The dikes, the pilots say, are not in well-defended areas and "they'd be a piece of cake."

It seems important to the pilots that they be believed. They put their lives on the line every day and they stand together under an old-fashioned code of military honor. They see themselves as patriots in the service of their country and their President. They would like to have been respected and appreciated. Now they will settle for being believed.

They insist that the President has proscribed the dikes as targets and that they have sometimes increased the risk to themselves to comply with his orders.

An insight into the minds of the pilots came from one senior air officer who said, "Probably the best reason for not hitting the dikes is the fact that the President of the United States has advertised to the whole world that we're not hitting the dikes, and we don't want to make a liar out of him."

Not only are the pilots under standing orders not to bomb the dikes, they say, but before each mission they are specifically told again to stay away from them.

During prestrike briefings, the pilots say they pore over detailed maps and reconnaissance photographs. Dikes and other "no-no's"—hospitals, churches, clusters of homes and P.O.W. camps, for example—are pointed out and the paths for approaching and departing the targets are planned so as to minimize "collateral" damage.

In some instances, the pilots say, the North Vietnamese have incorporated into the dikes system roads, gun positions and missile sites which the United States generally regard as fair game. But, the pilots say, these targets are "off limits" when they are on a dike.

Still, Bardone concedes, "there can be mistakes, especially in a hot environment"—where there is heavy antiaircraft fire.

There is a possibility of a dike being hit," he said. "But I think this is very remote. I feel that it would be purely accidental."

One pilot on the Saratoga is said to have reported that he accidentally bombed a dike, but reconnaissance photographs showed no damage.

Discussing the effect of the bombing on the civilian population of North Vietnam, Commander Bardone said, "most of the targets are isolated, but some are near the civilian population. There is a tremendous amount of secondary explosions and there is debris. There is a lot of overflow and I'm sure this gets over into the populated areas."

"I can't say absolutely that we do not put bombs outside the target area," he continued, "if we put a bomb a couple of hundred feet away from the target it might get into civilian areas. But I'd say 99 percent of the time it's debris overflow that gets into the civilian areas."

The pilots say that the so-called "smart bombs" that are guided by laser beams and television have greatly reduced the margin of error in bombing. But, they add, even the smart bombs sometimes go astray.

It is routine procedure for pilots under attack by enemy planes to jettison their bombs so they can pick-up speed. These bombs are not armed and are not supposed to explode when they land, but since they weigh several hundred pounds they may have damaging impact.

Another danger to the civilian population, the pilots say, is debris and flak from North Vietnamese antiaircraft guns and missiles. "It all has to come down," said Commander Dunton, who is from Melrose, Mass. "And sometimes it comes down on their heads."
At least once foreign diplomats in Hanoi have said that damage attributed by the North Vietnamese to American planes had actually been caused by Communist missiles.

Citing an example of the official concern for civilian casualties, one senior officer said that before the first big raid this year in the Hanoi-Haiphong area, the attack plan was routinely reviewed in Washington and "they knocked off some targets—some damn fine targets, because they were too close to civilians."

Lt. Comdr. Grady Jackson, a bombardier-navigator from Indianapolis, said that he and his pilot turned back from a target in the vicinity of Haiphong a few weeks ago because they felt it was too close to civilians.

The pilots know, though, that no matter how painstaking they are, some civilians are likely to be killed.

"Let's face it," said Commander Duton, who is a boyish-looking 32, "some of the military targets are probably manned by civilians. If you rolled in on the Boston navy shipyard there'd be a lot of civilians hurt. But they are working for the Government war effort. We don't go after those people in their suburban homes and supermarkets."

NORTH VIETNAM: THE DIKE BOMBING ISSUE

[As issued by the Department of State]

In recent weeks Hanoi has tried to convince the world that its elaborate dike system is a direct and deliberate target of US attacks. This is not true. Photographic evidence shows conclusively that there has been no intentional bombing of the dikes. A few dikes have been hit by stray bombs directed at military-associated targets nearby. The damage is minor and no major dike has been breached. The damage can be easily repaired—in a matter of a few days—and has not been sufficient to cause any flooding. No damage has been observed in the Hanoi area or against the primary dike system protecting that city. Hanoi no doubt is genuinely concerned about the dike system. North Vietnam's rainy season will soon reach its peak and damage in the dikes caused by last year's very extensive flooding have not yet been fully repaired.

North Vietnam's Water Control System

1. North Vietnam's elaborate network of dike's dams, and locks controls the water of the heavily populated Red River Delta. The delta farmlands depends on irrigation during the dry months and is endangered by flooding in the wet months. The country's major transportation waterways—the Red River, the Thai Binh River, and the connecting Canal des Rapides and Canal des Bambous—link the principal urban centers. Fertilizer, foodstuffs, petroleum, and other commodities are moved, in part, by these waterways, as is the coal mined in the Hong Gai and Cam Pha areas. Southern North Vietnam also contains rivers necessitating a dike and lock system for water control and navigation, but the system is less important than that of the delta.

2. Dikes to control flooding and the course of the waterways are most fully developed along the Red River. The Red River system begins near Viet Tri, only 43 feet above sea level, although about 100 miles inland. The great amount of silt brought down from the mountains and deposited along the river beds in the delta has raised the waterways above the surrounding countryside in many places and requires a constant elevation of the restraining walls. In some areas—particularly around Hanoi—the height of the dikes reaches 40 feet. Some are as broad as 80 feet at the flood line and spread to 200 feet at the base. A secondary system between 4 and 22 feet high running parallel to the main dikes is designed to localize and minimize damage if the primary dikes are breached. A tertiary system of smaller dikes divides the rice-growing plains into compartments, assists irrigation, and controls the level of small streams and local waterways. In addition, small natural or man-made dikes along the coast keep out brackish sea water.

3. Dams and locks play a lesser role. Only a few large dams are constructed of concrete with gates to permit passage of watercraft, and only one major waterway in the Red River Delta has navigation locks to control water levels and facilitate transport.

Recurring Floods:

4. The rivers rise to a seasonal peak during July and August, when unusually heavy rains frequently cause breaches in the levees. Extensive floods and destruction to property and agricultural crops result. Although there have been
only a few major breaches since the mid-1940s, minor breaks occur almost every year.

5. The floods of last August rank with the most serious ever recorded. Four major breaches occurred in the primary dikes along the Red River. An estimated 1.1 million acres of rice land—a quarter of the country's rice acreage—were seriously flooded and the entire crop in that area destroyed. Storms took out a half-mile section of a levee outside Hanoi and closed the railroad north to Dong Dang. The area of heavy flooding continued to expand through late September, probably because prolonged soaking and high water pressure had undermined the secondary dike systems.

6. Apart from immediate rice losses, the floods produced extensive longer term physical damage. The enormous force of water unleashed through breaches in the primary dikes caused widespread erosion far beyond obvious scouling effects near the breaks. Long stretches of irrigation canals were cut, and the press reported many washed-out pumping stations. Flood water everywhere deposited silt in drainage ditches. The prolonged inundation during the floods may have caused subtle undermining of the primary dike systems that will not show until late this summer. The possibility that the dike system has been weakened thus adds to this year's flooding threat.

Resilience of the System to Bombing

7. North Vietnam's water control system includes a large number of widely dispersed individual components which could be substantially affected only by a large-scale, coordinated air offensive. Such attacks would be necessary against specific locations, dams, and dike areas, and bomb damage would have effect only during the relatively short periods of high water. Even then, the North Vietnamese, long accustomed to battling against floods, could be expected to act promptly to mend breaches in the system.

8. Damage to the locks would have little effect on either North Vietnam's transport or its water control systems. Inland craft could be diverted to waterways not dependent on locks, and some cargoes could be sent by the many alternative land routes. Accidental bomb damage during the 1965-68 period made some locks inoperative, but had little effect on water transport or flooding in the area. Similarly, breaching of dams, even during periods of high water, would not cause significant disruption because most are small and easily repaired.

9. Dikes are particularly resistant to bomb damage. Those in the primary system could be breached only by a series of overlapping craters across the entire top of a dike, and the lips of the craters would have to be sufficiently lower than the river surface to initiate the flow and subsequent scouring action of water rushing through the breach. The dikes along the Red River near Hanoi are approximately 80 feet wide at the flood line.

Hanoi's Claims Versus Actual Damage

10. North Vietnam's official press agencies and radio services have repeatedly described alleged US bombing attacks on the dike system. In April and May, the North Vietnamese made more than 40 specific allegations, and on 30 June the official press quoted the Deputy Minister of Hydraulics as saying that 20 bombing attacks had been made on dikes during that month. Foreign diplomats, news¬men, and, most recently, actress Jane Fonda have been escorted to dikes to view damage—most of it around Hai Duong, southeast of Hanoi.

11. A detailed examination has been made of photography of mid-July of the North Vietnamese Red River Delta and bomb craters were detected at 12 locations. None of the damage has been in the Hanoi area, where destruction of the dikes would result in the greatest damage to North Vietnam's economy and logistics effort. Nearly all the damage has been scattered downstream from Hanoi, as well as downstream from the areas of major breaks resulting from the 1971 floods.

12. There are no signs of destruction of vital dike portions stretching to a length of several kilometers—as reported by Hanoi-based newsmen. In comparison to the dikes, the craters are small, and no flooding has occurred as a result of the damage. Although water levels are not yet at their highest, the absence of leakage through the craters indicates that damage was limited.

13. All identified points of dike damage are located within close range of specific targets of military value. Of the 12 locations where damage has occurred, 10 are close to identified individual targets such as petroleum storage facilities, and the other two are adjacent to road and river transport lines. Because a large number of North Vietnamese dikes serve as barriers for roadways, the maze they
create throughout the delta makes it almost inevitable that air attacks directed against transportation targets cause scattered damage to dikes.

14. The bomb craters verified by photography can be repaired easily with a minimum of local labor and equipment—a crew of less than 50 men with wheelbarrows and hand tools could repair in a day the largest crater observed. Repairs to all the dikes could be completed within a week, as the necessary equipment is available throughout the delta. Local labor historically mobilizes to strengthen and repair dikes to avoid serious flooding. An occasional bomb falling on a dike does not add significantly to the burden of annual repair work normally required. North Vietnam must, however, complete the repair of damage caused by the 1971 floods before next month when this year’s rainy season will reach its peak.

Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

The subcommittee will stand in recess.

(Whereupon, at 10:35 a.m., the hearing was adjourned, the subcommittee to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.)