WAR-RELATED CIVILIAN PROBLEMS IN INDOCHINA
PART I—VIETNAM

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES
OF THE
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Statement by:

Ambassador William E. Colby, Deputy to the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command/Vietnam; accompanied by Robert H. Nooter, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Vietnam, USAID; Dennis Doolin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Dr. Malcolm E. Phelps, Director, Office of Public Health, Bureau for Vietnam, USAID; and Dr. Johannes U. Hoeber, Senior Refugee and Social Welfare Officer, Bureau for Vietnam, USAID

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(III)
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m. in Room 6226, New Senate Office Building, Senator Edward M. Kennedy (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Kennedy, Fong, and Mathias.

Also present: Dale S. deHaan, counsel, and Jerry M. Tinker, staff consultant.

Senator KENNEDY. The subcommittee will come to order.

The Indochina war not only continues to tear at America's national life and spirit; it is also heightening the agony of a rapidly growing number of civilians in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

We are confronted today with a very serious regional crisis of people—millions of people—refugees, civilian casualties, war victims of all kinds. Each day of war produces more of the same. In fact, nothing more accurately documents the continuing intensity and spread of the conflict, and the level of military operations—whoever they are—than the number of civilians killed or wounded or made refugees. By this measure we see that the war is scarcely winding down for the peoples directly involved. And more than our Government cares to admit, American military activities—especially the unrestricted air war—are contributing heavily to this growing human problem.

In little more than a year, up to 1,800,000 persons in Cambodia—nearly one-third of the population—have apparently become refugees. Medical facilities are overburdened with civilian casualties.

In Laos, with an estimated population of nearly 8 million, at least 700,000 persons have become refugees in recent years. Tens of thousands have fled from battle areas over the past weeks, adding heavily to the thousands of refugees already on official relief rolls. Comprehensive data is not available on the number of civilian casualties.
in recent years—mainly because the problem has been conveniently ignored by our Government, and questions raised by Members of Congress and others have gone unanswered. Since the heavy air war over Laos began in early 1969, however, conservative estimates put the number of civilian casualties at over 30,000 including as many as 10,000 deaths. Moreover, the Meo tribe is nearly decimated—from combat, or the hardships brought on by their service to our cause.

An official military survey of civilians in 96 villages in Laos last July tells a tragic tale:

- 97 percent of the people said they had seen a bombing attack;
- 61 percent said they had seen a person killed by bombing;
- 75 percent said their own homes had been damaged by bombing;
- 23 percent said they thought the bombing was directed at civilians.

As if the situation in Laos and Cambodia were not enough cause for urgent concern, the long-standing problem of refugees and civilian casualties continues to fester in South Vietnam. Despite official statements to the contrary, there is much to suggest that the basic situation has changed very little in recent years. Over the past few months, the monthly flow of refugees has been higher than at any time since the Tet offensive in 1968. The numbers include at least 40,000 Montagnards forcibly moved from their villages along the Laotian-Cambodian border, and at least 16,000 new refugees as a result of yet another sweep through the familiar and devastated area of My Lai.

Civilian war casualties continue at a high level. In 1970 hospital admissions alone accounted for nearly 51,000 civilian casualties. This misleading figure, however—which is usually cited as a total by our government—omits civilian casualties treated elsewhere, those not treated at all, and those who are killed outright or die before reaching treatment facilities. If these additional numbers are added to hospital admissions, civilian casualties during 1970 probably numbered at least 125,000 including some 25,000 to 35,000 deaths. The cumulative total of civilian casualties since 1965 numbers some 1,050,000, including at least 325,000 deaths.

Inevitably, tens of thousands of the civilian casualties who survive are physically disabled. Again, not all of them are reflected in official statistics. But, as of late 1969 some 80,000 civilian amputees and paraplegies were registered with the Vietnamese Government, as well as some 25,000 civilians who have become blind or deaf from war causes.

The record, I feel, is clear on where we stand in Indochina. Each day brings new violence. Each day escalates the human costs for all involved. There are more prisoners of war. There are more missing in action. There are more military casualties. And with each additional loss, we should be reminded that we cannot allow the specter of a highly dubious “bloodbath” of the future to blind us from the “bloodbath” that is going on today—every day—in Vietnam and all of Indochina. This “bloodbath” started long ago—and we are part of it—and it will continue daily as long as the war continues, so long as efforts to end that war are avoided and delayed.

No one here disagrees that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
are also contributing to this bloodbath. But the question for most Americans today is how much longer we will tolerate policies by our Government which make easy the killing and maiming of millions? How much longer will we fuel and finance what our military planners so glibly call "saturation bombing," "protective reaction," "close-air support," and other strategies and labels—devoid of much moral restraint and responsibility—devoid of much apparent concern for the plight of civilians who continue to bear the brunt of this endless war? And how much longer will we permit our national leadership to continue its policy of violence—of a "no-holds-barred" air war—of "incursions" and "sanctuary operations" which take the conflict into new areas?

Since 1965 the impact of the Indochina war on the civilian population has been a primary concern of this subcommittee. Field studies have been conducted; hearings have been held; reports of findings and recommendations have been issued. Throughout these activities we have offered our help and suggestions to the executive branch and others.

Over and over again we have tried to make the case that the war victims in Indochina must be a matter of vital concern to our government.

A measure of progress has been made over the years in meeting the relief and humanitarian needs of the people of Indochina. But it is also true that whatever priority our Government has attached to these needs has too often been measured by the degree of congressional and public pressure, than by an active moral and political concern at the highest levels of our national leadership.

Our national interest does not lie in the continuation of the Indochina war. It does not lie in the further destruction of the countryside in Vietnam or Laos or Cambodia. It does not lie in the serious crisis of people spreading from one country to another.

Rather, it lies in the very urgently needed effort by our Government to stop the violence and extricate ourselves from the war through appropriate decisions at the highest levels of our Government. It lies, as well, in a far greater effort to meet the vast human needs generated by the conflict.

I now would like to recognize Senator Mathias.

Senator Mathias. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am glad that you have called this hearing to examine the refugee problem. I think it is high time that we took stock of the refugee question in Southeast Asia. It is going to be a painful task because the magnitude of the destruction visited upon hapless civilians in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia is shattering to contemplate and defies the capacity of language. The stark realities constantly elude our words. Yet we must persist and try to take stock of the toll of this war to the people of Southeast Asia. We must do so in order to address ourselves with efficiency and vigor to the task of building and healing.

Mr. Chairman, you and I have been active in the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, and in that effort we have observed how long it has taken to deal with the problems of refugees in Europe from World War II, a period now over nearly a quarter of a century and yet the upheaval and disruption of
European society that came about as a result of World War II is still creating refugees somewhere between 25,000 and 50,000 a year.

So we have to, I think, face very squarely the fact that this is a practical problem in which the United States is involved. It is one in which we will be involved for many years. It is a task that we had better address ourselves to seriously. As Americans we have long claimed the principle of a higher moral concern for human life. This precept is the essence of our political philosophy. It is the belief that each human being is special—something individual and indeed sacred. This concept has become tarnished in the war. There has arisen the tragic picture of Asian lives being measured on a different moral register, making the task before us the more urgent.

Now we are at the very center of a decisive and historic crossroad. It seems possible for the first time that the war we have pursued for so long, for good cause or bad, has gained enough opponents to bring it to a speedy end. Hawks have joined doves in urging an early end to the war. And though their motives may be vastly different, their objective is the same—and our involvement in this losing conflict.

For my own part, I believe we should have done so earlier, and that we have too long brought destruction to Southeast Asia in the name of defense. But this debate has no place here. Our aim at these hearings should be to take stock of the damage in order to best set about fixing it. So, let us, in this spirit, get on with the task of examining these questions.

Senator Kennedy. Senator Fong.

Senator Fong. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, these are the first hearings this subcommittee has held on the refugee problem in Southeast Asia since last May. What we are seeking is information on the situation in Indochina, I trust that all witnesses will provide the subcommittee with facts and opinions and judgments based upon their personal observations so that we may piece together the true picture of what is happening in Indochina.

I am here today to listen and ask questions, so I shall not take further time to make a comment.

Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, Senator Fong.

We are very glad to welcome at this time Deputy to the Commander of U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam, Ambassador William E. Colby, accompanied by Robert H. Nooter, assistant administrator, Bureau for Vietnam, AID, and Dennis Doolin, deputy assistant secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

You may proceed. You have a rather extensive statement here, Mr. Colby, and I want, at the outset, to commend you for making it available to us so that we have had a chance to review it. It is valuable and helpful, I think, for our better understanding. Too often the various committees, I think, only get statements immediately before the hearing and it is a little difficult.

You can handle it whichever way you would like to proceed, and then we will see as we move along whether there are matters of particular importance we might ask you to amplify and develop as we go along.
Mr. COLBY. I thought, Mr. Chairman, I would read off a little bit of it and summarize most of the complicated parts.

Senator KENNEDY. We will have the statement included in its entirety at the end of today's record. You may proceed.

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, the nature of the war waged in Vietnam has imposed a heavy burden on the population of that country. By Communist appellation it has been a "people's war." The fundamental premise of the enemy's strategy has been to attempt to seize control of the people, pull them from under the government in power and thus cause its collapse. The stages and techniques of this new form of war were developed on the China mainland and in Vietnam during the late 1940's and early 1950's. After the 1954 Geneva Agreement truce, the process was again initiated with an organizational stage during the years 1957 through 1959, conducted by operatives trained in and directed from North Vietnam. This was followed from 1960 to 1964 by a guerrilla stage, designed to erode the presence and programs of the government from the countryside. By late 1964, assisted by the fall of the Diem regime, the situation had matured sufficiently to move to the third, or military stage, marked by the infiltration into South Vietnam of North Vietnamese battalions, regiments, and divisions. Their success was forestalled by the introduction of U.S. combat forces in 1965. Behind the military shield they supplied, the Vietnamese and American Governments over the next years organized the policies and programs appropriate to conducting a people's war on the government side, reflecting the realization that the people are, indeed, the key to success. These programs were gathered together during 1967 and in the aftermath of the convulsive military effort by the enemy at Tet 1968, and the government assumed the initiative in the people's war, expanding out into the countryside, reestablishing security for the local communities.

The realization of the people's nature of the war on the government side brought a variety of new programs and tactics to the effort. These included the distribution of some 500,000 weapons to the population to participate in their own defense on a part-time and unpaid basis, elections of local leadership and the revival and expansion of the rural economy. These all became considered as parts of "one war," with all programs reflecting the essential popular and political nature of the overall effort. These programs have been integrated into Vietnamese national annual plans. They began as "Pacification," or bringing security to the people, and expanded to "Pacification and Development." The 1971 Plan is now entitled "Community Defense and Local Development," since expansion of government protection is no longer the main theme. It reflects the Vietnamese Government's focus on participating local communities
as the key to defense against Communist attack and to the future independence, stability and growth of the nation. The anomaly is that the Communists developed the concepts and initiated the people's war but in 1968 turned most of their effort to a military and psychological war. In the early 1960's, the government had initially reacted to their threat by strengthening its military forces. By 1968, however, it had put together the programs and strategy to fight a true people's war. The results are to be seen in the roads, the markets, and the schoolhouses, opening and bustling in many parts of Vietnam which 2 and 3 years ago were deserted and overgrown. Many of the people who had huddled in refugee centers seeking respite from battle are now in their original villages shiring tractors and growing the new miracle rice.

The Communists have called for a return to the people's war tactic through a "protracted" war. The contest is thus by no means over. Village chiefs are assassinated, refugee camps are mortared, and self-defense units are attacked. However, the military level of the war has been pushed away from most of the population of Vietnam, which is now participating in local elections and local development programs while its regular soldiers fight on the frontiers or in the enemy sanctuaries rather than among the farms and households of the people.

It is important to appreciate this substantial difference in the overall picture in Vietnam, since it is the context in which the refugee program is now being conducted. The military situation is substantially different from that in 1965, when the subcommittee so-effectively pointed out the need for a refugee program. The Vietnamese Government now has a different constitutional base and fundamental policies as to its relationships with its population. The political, economic and psychological atmosphere today is markedly changed from earlier days.

Thus, while a refugee problem remains and new refugees appear, the government is undertaking programs to rebuild a war-torn society rather than meeting only the daily crises of refugee handling and care.

Senator Kennedy. At this point, Mr. Ambassador, with the greatest respect, we have been hearing these kinds of comments for some 6 years. Let's go back to 1965. We started our hearings where Ambassador Lodge was saying, as Ambassador to Vietnam, "This is the top of my list and I intend to do everything to be helpful to this question of refugees." John McNaughton said: "These are the people of South Vietnam, therefore, they are the price that is being fought over in South Vietnam, therefore they are very important, these refugees."

Then in 1966, William Gaud, Administrator of USAID, and also Secretary Rusk, said "In the past 6 months the Vietnamese government has made an increasingly effective response to the refugee problem." In 1967, Mr. Gaud reiterated "AID's recognition of the important role which effective programs of health care, particularly for civilian casualties, refugee relief," et cetera.

Again, in 1968, John Harnah, the head of USAID said: "This situation has evidently improved since 1967." in speaking of the
war casualties. "We feel, barring a major flood of new injuries, the problem of reasonably adequate care for civilian casualties is well on the road to solution." He also said in 1969 that "The quality of reception centers and temporary camps for new refugees has shown marked improvement."

So, the statement you have made is almost identical to the things we have been hearing about refugees for the last 6 or 7 years. I know that covers other administrations. I know you can understand the kinds of frustrations that must be apparent to those people who are really sincerely interested in the problem, as I am sure you are, about the kind of comments that always say the situation is finally getting better. Because we have been hearing that for years, and still a desperate situation exists in which these millions of people now live and it hasn't really improved significantly.

Mr. Colby. Well, I think the key, Mr. Chairman, is that it has been a gradual growth process, and I think there has been improvement over this extended period of time. I think the improvement has accelerated in the last couple of years as a result of the failure of the Communists in their massive military effort in 1968 and the corresponding acceleration of the Government's programs aimed at getting the people to participate in the overall effort. I think this has produced a difference which you can see by driving along the roads and visiting the farms and in the local communities of the nation.

Senator Kennedy. Just on that point, let me—I am sure you are aware of the GAO report—they had an opportunity to visit a number of these refugee sites 2 years ago and then to go back last year. They talk about An My in Quang Nam Province, the settlement site that was previously visited by GAO in 1967, and they report that: "During our current review we found no significant improvement has been made."

Mr. Colby. I visited that site last week, Mr. Chairman. It is essentially a rural community, a small, little hamlet out in the middle of Quang Nam Province. The houses there are normal farmhouses. There is a schoolhouse. There is a small shopping center, small market center, and it, frankly, is not terribly different from many of the other farm communities in that area.

Senator Kennedy. Our conclusion is that there has been much improvement. I am talking not about the subcommittee's findings—I am talking about the findings of an independent agency, the GAO. They visited Phu Lac in Quang Ngai both in 1967 and 1969. They list, as you have probably seen, in terms of this report we have made public, they have listed some camps in 1967 and again in 1969. They talk about: "During our last review we find it was overcrowded, inadequate drainage, no dispensary. During our current review the above conditions have not improved."

I don't question that there is a lot of paperwork done—that you can take a refugee "camp" and reclassify it into a "resettlement site," but still you have the same kind of conditions.
This GAO report is full of these kinds of examples, and what we are trying to do is to determine the true conditions of the people over there, that is why this committee is here, why we are here this morning. And, frankly, we always look with somewhat of a skeptical eye at comments that conditions are getting better, because we have been listening to that since 1965. You have not been involved in all of these comments, obviously. Still, we find a deterioration in the refugee's quality of life.

Mr. Colby. Frankly, with regard to that particular site I would be inclined to agree that it is not much better than it was. That site is a center in which a large number of people from the western part of Quang Ngai Province took refuge while some major battles were going on between the North Vietnamese Third Division and our troops. This center has been overcrowded. There are, however, wells in that center. I saw one last week. I saw two or three of them, but it is not a good site, and there is a lot more that needs to be done in that area.

Senator Fong. Mr. Chairman.

Senator Kennedy. Senator, Fong.

Senator Fong. What you are saying now is that the South Vietnamese Government is taking a different attitude relative to refugee problems?

Mr. Colby. Relative to the entire problem, its relationship to the people, including the refugees, Senator.

Senator Fong. What you are saying is this: That the South Vietnamese Government in the early years was concerned with survival?

Mr. Colby. I think so, Senator; yes.

Senator Fong. Now that it has been insured survival it has now turned its attention to many of the other problems which need attention?

Mr. Colby. Yes, Senator; I believe that is true. They have been able to provide increased effort and increased attention to some of these long-term problems and very serious human problems.

Senator Fong. So, when you say the situation is substantially different from that in 1965 you are referring to the whole situation of South Vietnam?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Senator Fong. Not only to the refugee problem?

Mr. Colby. I am indeed.

Senator Fong. Thank you.

Senator Kennedy. Let's take that as a start. We can take the amounts which are being spent, not that that is always a firm indication as to the degree of the commitment the South Vietnamese give to their own problems or to the extent of the commitment of the United States, but we can't get around the fact that even in terms of expenditures since 1968 you have a total of $100.2 million for the refugee and social welfare budgets. These are all the programs. It goes up in 1969 to $104 million. It then starts down; it goes to $99 million in 1970; then to $89 million for 1971. So during this period the AID commitment has dropped by more than half since 1968.

Now take the area of public health, the figures that go back to 1966 regarding the Vietnam public health program. We find it is almost
one-half of what it was in 1966. You can say, well, there has been
some gradual increase in terms of the South Vietnamese govern-
ment's participation in this budget. But let's look at what GAO says
about that.

They say "our review shows that notwithstanding an acknowled-
ged need for a social welfare program, very small amounts of funds
have been provided for the program, and the funds made available
were expended at an extremely low rate for various reasons, including
the relatively low priority assigned to the social welfare program,
to limited organizational and manpower capabilities within the GVN
Ministry of Social Welfare, and the apparent reluctance on the
part of the GVN, to assume funding responsibilities." They go on
to report that only 4 percent of the counterpart funds in 1969 for
the Ministry were provided for social welfare activities. Then the
GAO report says that apparently the 1970 funds will not be ex-
pressed much faster. For example: Of the 112 million piasters, about
953,000, programed for social welfare in calendar 1970, only 1.6
million piasters, approximately $14,000 had been—

Mr. Colby. If I may clarify, Mr. Chairman—

Senator Kennedy. —which had been expended as of June, 1970.

Mr. Colby. If I may clarify that, Mr. Chairman, that refers to
the social welfare part of the Ministry budget. It is a very small
part of the total budget, the main budget being for refugee care
and handling. This is where the major effort of the Government has
gone. It is only in the past year or two that they have been able to
build up the social welfare program for a longer term growth of
a social welfare capability in Vietnam. I mention this later on in
my statement.

I think it is certainly true that the Vietnamese Government's con-
tribution to the total expenditure for refugees has not been a very
large one. The government's own budget has largely been spent to
pay the salaries of the staff of the Social Welfare Ministry, which is
charged with handling the refugee problem.

I think this comes from the overwhelming priority of taking
care of the refugee problem which has preoccupied the government's
time over the past several years. It is only in the past year or so that
this has been relieved a bit.

They first built up this staff in 1967. It was then overwhelmed
by about a million refugees or war victims during Tet. They then
paid these off during 1969, and in 1970 they had two major events
which again preoccupied a great deal of their time, the arrival of
some 200,000 ethnic Vietnamese from Cambodia and a flood of
rather major proportions in the northern part of the country, which
made about 300,000 people homeless. These all had an impact on the
priorities of the government in its effort.

But I think that that shows why the Vietnamese Government has
paid comparatively less attention to this longer-term social welfare
area in its total effort.

Senator Kennedy. In 1967 the administration sent a rather pres-
tigious group to South Vietnam to make recommendations in the
whole social welfare area. It was led by James Dumpson, from Ford-
ham University's School of Social Services. They made a series of
recommendations. Then Mr. Gaud, Administrator of USAID, testified in terms of these recommendations that "We now have specific recommendations on the study and expect to act favorably on a number of them in the very near future."

Now we come back 4 years later, on what is an enormously significant and important recommendation in terms of the whole social welfare program, and we find that virtually nothing is being done or has been done about it.

Mr. Colby. As I said, the intervening years were taken up by immediate needs of the refugees, the impact of the Tet attacks, the emergency of the Cambodian repatriates and the flood disaster in I Corps.

Senator Kennedy. What we are trying at this point to do is to get some kind of meaningful evaluation as to whether any real progress has been made just in terms of these social welfare recommendations. It is difficult for me to see, in terms of these recommendations, that very much has been done.

Mr. Colby. I point out, incidentally, that during 1970 the Vietnamese Government also passed a rather sweeping bill for veterans' benefits, including particularly benefits for disabled veterans, veterans' widows, and orphans.

Senator Kennedy. Yes.

Mr. Colby. This has been a very substantial effort that they have undertaken this past year, which fits into this general category, you might say.

Senator Fong. Would you mind presenting that bill for our record?

Mr. Colby. I would be glad to, Senator.

(The text of law 8/70 follows in Annex L.)

Senator Kennedy. Why don't you continue?

Mr. Colby. The subcommittee has received ample testimony on the enormous refugee burden suffered by the population of South Vietnam. A variety of statistical evidence has been offered, none sufficiently precise or reliable, but all of which indicates that something on the order of 25 to 30 percent of the 17,500,000 population of South Vietnam have at one time or another been in refugee status or directly hurt by the war during the past 7 years.

The problem of attending to the needs of this overwhelming number of refugees was made more difficult by the government's need to build a structure and procedures to deal with them, in the face of competing demands for national survival imposed upon the small Vietnamese leadership corps. As has been outlined previously to the subcommittee, the first flood of refugees in Vietnam caught the South Vietnamese Government without established structures or procedures for handling the problem itself and there were many weaknesses and failures in the process. Just when a program was being constructed in late 1967, it was overwhelmed by the impact of the Communist 1968 Tet offensive.

Last year the problems were aggravated again by the influx of over 100,000 repatriates from Cambodia in the spring of 1970 and the floods in military region I and parts of the military region II which made 300,000 people homeless in the fall of 1970.
These problems have caused the refugee program in Vietnam to be concentrated on payments to individuals included in certain broad categories of beneficiaries. This had the positive value of ensuring the receipt of at least some actual assistance by individuals and families. It had the drawback, however, of complex bureaucratic procedures of registration, authentication and financial accounting. The focus on these procedures sometimes limited the ability of the government to give any other form of substantial assistance to refugee communities, camps, etc.

It is important to recognize the function and frailty of the statistics used in this program. The statistics were designed as management tools, identifying numbers of individuals to whom payments were due. Counts of those applying and eligible for the standard benefits have been the key to distributing resources to assist them. These statistics have been a source of considerable misunderstanding of the whole refugee problem over the years. The outside observer has thought of them as representing the number of refugees in the country. The staffs working with them have thought of them as representing the current number of refugees to whom payments are due. Consequently, the current caseload might go up because of a delay in payment, even though those who were refugees had achieved a new economic basis for their lives or returned to their original homes.

Similarly, the caseload could be low because of a failure to register claimants, although many had become eligible for payments. In the figures used in this presentation, I have attempted to clarify our effort and the scope of the problem in Vietnam. We are in no sense trying to obfuscate the very real problems there, but I would like to show what has actually been done in the course of a most extensive effort.

The subcommittee in previous hearings has raised questions as to the priority the refugee program receives from the Vietnamese and American Governments. During the past 3 years, the refugee program has been one of the major areas of concentration affecting all levels of government, as an aspect of the pacification program.

During 1969 and 1970 the pacification program included eight primary objectives, from territorial security through local government improvements to the improvement of the rural economy. The refugee program was one of these eight. All eight programs were constantly reviewed by and reported on to all levels of Vietnamese leadership in the course of regular reports and examinations in the field. Virtually all villages in Vietnam kept track of progress in this area, which was included in a prepared presentation showing achievement of the village in reaching the eight objectives.

A clear showing was made at all levels of government of the benefits granted, the refugees returned to village, and the remaining problems. Through this integration of the program into the overall national effort, the refugee program was given the personal attention of leadership at national, regional, provincial and district levels, instead of being left to specialist but subordinate staffs.

Despite the overall improvements in security, new refugees have continued to appear during the past years, although at a considerably
reduced level. In some degree, the very improvement of the staffs and procedures for registering and giving assistance to refugees has contributed to the apparently large number of recent new refugees.

Senator Kennedy. Mr. Ambassador, on that point there, to what degree has that been effective? Could you amplify on that in terms of improvement of staff procedures? I would like to draw your attention to the 40,000 or more refugees generated by the U Minh forest operation and relocated; the 16,000 refugees generated in the area of My Lai in recent months. All of this has happened in the last 6 months. Could you put that in some perspective, because those are newly-created dislocated people.

Mr. Colby. I mention the U Minh problem further on in the statement, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Kennedy. How many refugees were involved in that?

Mr. Colby. In the U Minh there are in the neighborhood of 35,000 at the moment. There may be some more. I couldn’t say that for sure.

Senator Kennedy. How about the relocation of Montagnards?

Mr. Colby. In the Montagnard relocation the figure used is 44,000, but that actually includes some Vietnamese, so it is actually a little less.

Senator Kennedy. How about My Lai?

Mr. Colby. Again, a point of clarification, Senator. That is not in the My Lai area. It is about 30 or 40 kilometers from My Lai. It is in the western part of Quang Ngai province, rather than the east coastal area.

Senator Kennedy. Well, how many refugees?

Mr. Colby. There was an original estimate in the press that some 13,000 to 16,000 people would be involved. I have talked to the people involved last week, and they estimate that something like 1,500 people will be involved in that particular area, and another 1,100 people involved in the area to the south of that, the valley a little bit south of there. Two or three thousand, something of that nature is what they are presently working on.

Senator Kennedy. Well, if you add these together, plus other reports, it comes close to about 140,000, 150,000 new refugees since last November; isn’t that correct?

Senator Kennedy. New refugees.

The Audience. Senator Kennedy, excuse me—

Senator Kennedy. I would like to let the Ambassador continue. We welcome you Vietnam Veterans. If you want to come in—if we pull those chairs up maybe these fellows can sit in, in the back row, and they can come to the back of the hearing room.

Using your figures, Mr. Ambassador, I think you see that of the 150,000 refugees that have been created since last November, a great majority of those have actually been generated by U.S. action in terms of movement?

Mr. Colby. Not U.S. action.

Senator Kennedy. U.S.-supported action?

Mr. Colby. Vietnamese action primarily.

Senator Kennedy. This isn’t reclassification?

Mr. Colby. No, no.
Senator Kennedy. New listings. These are newly-dislocated people as a result of.

Mr. Colby. My point, Mr. Chairman, was that many of these new refugees some years ago never would have actually been registered in a somewhat similar situation. They had a very weak staff, so they might not have even registered them at that time, whereas I think, the additional staff and the additional efforts they make to register these people now produces a higher count of what is actually there. I am not saying they aren’t there; they are there.

Senator Kennedy. What you are saying is that the situation was terrible before; we didn’t have them all registered, and we have got a better staff operation so they are registering more, but it hasn’t increased by as great a degree as before.

Mr. Colby. I think it has actually decreased in terms of newly generated refugees. I think the point here in my statement, the estimate of the numbers generated over the years will show very clearly the decline in the generation during the last couple of years.

Senator Kennedy. Well, now, just in terms of new refugees since November of last year, they jumped from what, 400 or 500 to 27,000, I believe, and the same way in December; is that right? These are AID figures.

Mr. Colby. But it is something in that neighborhood—I don’t have the figures right in front of me, sir.

Senator Kennedy. Well, those are new refugees, aren’t they?

Mr. Colby. They are newly registered refugees.

Senator Kennedy. They are not reclassified?

Mr. Colby. No.

Senator Kennedy. The point we are trying to develop here is that it would appear from your statement there is just a reclassification and registering and giving assistance to refugees because of improved staff operation, when actually there has been a rather significant increase in new refugees—certainly from October of last year to the present; about 150,000 refugees.

Most of those have been created or generated through U.S.-supported operations, and I just—is there anything you disagree with?

Mr. Colby. I did not attempt to give the impression of reclassification, and I don’t think I actually said that, sir. I said that there were a number of refugees which accrued during that period and that we probably actually register a higher percentage of them than we would have sometime ago. That is my only point there.

I do also mention that perhaps during the early part of 1970 our numbers of new refugees were somewhat lower than actually occurred. That could explain to some extent that apparent increase.

Senator Kennedy. Just so that we understand the current flow of refugees, the monthly flow of refugees since November of last year, that it is at the highest level at any time since Tet—the spring of 1968. That is using USAID figures, and I think they are conservative figures, but just using your own figures, you have got the highest generation of refugees since Tet.

Mr. Colby. I think if you said since 1968 it might be better.


Mr. Colby. All of 1968.
Senator KENNEDY. Spring of 1968.
Mr. COLBY. Well, I would go through the earlier period.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, I think the point is that the war, in regards to refugees, is not winding down—because that is what one might conclude from your statement.

Mr. COLBY. There is still a problem of giving assistance to people whose lives are disrupted by the war and certainly as I indicate, I believe that we are probably registering somewhat a higher percentage of new refugees than those earlier figures might have included.

Senator KENNEDY. These are just new refugees, Mr. Ambassador?
Mr. COLBY. I say we probably would be registering a higher percentage of those new refugees than we might have some time ago.

Senator FONG. Mr. Ambassador, when was the Cambodian incident? When did that occur?
Mr. COLBY. The Cambodian repatriates coming over?
Senator FONG. Yes.
Mr. COLBY. Last spring, Senator, from about March and April to July, August.
Senator FONG. 1970?
Mr. COLBY. 1970, yes.

Senator FONG. That generated how many refugees?
Mr. COLBY. That generated—they don't actually call them refugees in that sense—repatriates, ethnic Vietnamese coming back to Vietnam. That is about 210,000.

Senator FONG. That increased the number of refugees since Tet; is that correct?
Mr. COLBY. I think so; yes.

Senator FONG. Would you include that in the number of refugees that you—
Mr. COLBY. I include them in the overall total of people disrupted by the war, yes; and therefore I think that would account for a larger figure during that period.

Senator FONG. Would you say that this increase in the number of refugees was generated because of U.S. operations?
Mr. COLBY. No; I think this move was generated by the Communist attack in Cambodia and the Cambodian reaction to Vietnamese threats there, which grew from a reaction against the North Vietnamese Communists to a reaction against all Vietnamese living in Cambodia. There were a lot of Vietnamese who consequently felt obliged to leave Cambodia in that circumstance.

Senator FONG. The Chairman referred to these refugees generated by U.S. operations.
Senator KENNEDY. U.S. supported—
Senator FONG. U.S. supported operations. Does that imply that if the United States did not support these actions that these refugees would not have been generated?
Mr. COLBY. Not necessarily, Senator. They might have been generated in any event, or they might not have; it depends on the situation.

In the U Minh forest campaign the United States did agree with the Vietnamese to go ahead with that campaign. This was a cam-
paign against the last major Communist base area in the Delta, and it involved moving in with the better part of a Vietnamese division supported by U.S. helicopters. In the Montagnard area most of those relocations are done purely by the Vietnamese with some incidental U.S. assistance, either by helicopters or by the provision of food for the people relocated.

Senator Fong. What part of the number of refugees from Tet to the present would you say have been generated by U.S.-supported operations, and what part have not been generated by U.S.-supported operations?

Mr. Colby. A very substantial part have been generated by Communist activity in such events as the recent attack on Duc Duc, a district town in Quang Nam Province in which the Communists made an attack on that town and actually killed about 100 civilians in that attack, and they generated a lot of victims who are now being classified as refugees in that area.

There are similar situations throughout the country where the Communists attack and the people are thereafter treated and assisted as refugees. I can't give you a percentage breakdown of that.

Senator Fong. In other words, these refugees are generated by both sides, or three sides; that is, from the Communist side, from the South Vietnamese side, and maybe also from U.S.-supported operations?

Mr. Colby. Well, I think that I would put the three sides this way: sometimes they are driven out by the Communists; sometimes they are actually moved by the Vietnamese or ourselves; and sometimes they just move away from the area without it being possible to identify which side is causing the move.

Senator Fong. So, in your opinion, who is responsible for creating these refugees?

Mr. Colby. Well, I go back to who started the war, Senator; that the war started by the infiltration of people from North Vietnam and that is where the war actually began. I think that is the basic cause of the whole difficulty over there.

Senator Fong. In other words, when there is action from one side or the other, refugees are created; is that not correct?

Mr. Colby. Yes; refugees will be created by a conflict and the conflict originated from North Vietnam.

Senator Fong. As long as the conflict continues there will be refugees?

Mr. Colby. As long as the conflict continues, until the enemy forces are driven out of the area. There are no refugees being generated in large parts of southern South Vietnam at this time because the Communist forces have been pretty well driven out.

Senator Fong. You have in your table here from 1964 to 1966, 2,400,000 estimated refugees. Of that number, how many of them are resettled?

Mr. Colby. I don't think we have a firm figure on that, Senator. We have a figure further back as to the number who have received resettlement benefits, but I would not like that to be used as necessarily indicating they are totally resettled, because some of those...
who have received resettlement benefits are in places like that Phu Loc hamlet which the chairman mentioned a moment ago. I think that there have been about 900,000 people returned to their own villages, for instance. There have been large numbers of others who have actually resettled in the towns or in other areas.

But, I don't think we have a definite figure.

We have a figure that 1,600,000 were given resettlement benefits. We have a figure of 600,000 who were given return-to-village benefits. We have a figure that 1,800,000 were given war victim benefits.

So that the total of benefits given, including the temporary benefits given to various categories of refugees, is some 5,900,000 individual payments made or benefits provided to these refugees. Now, that does not mean that they are all resettled, however.

Senator Fong. You stated that many of them received monetary payment; is that correct?

Mr. Colby. Yes; almost all of those received some form of monetary payments plus tin roofing, or some kind of commodity or some rice or some cement. It depends on the particular character of their status.

Senator Fong. Staffing and registering during these past few years have not been too good.

Mr. Colby. As I say, that 2,400,000 estimate of 1964 to 1966 is really an estimate, because those were not really registered. That is just a guess.

Senator Fong. Since when did you start to register?

Mr. Colby. The GVN began to register effectively during 1967. The registrations proceeded, but as I said, during the past couple of years their staffs have been improved and they do such things as sending a team out to register people when they hear of some incident that has happened. They will send a team out to make sure that everybody is registered.

In the fall of 1968 they went out and made a special effort to register people who were entitled to some refugee benefits, but who were not living in camps. There have been improvements in that kind of effort in the past few years.

Senator Fong. What is your estimate of the percentage of people who are possible refugees verses those that are registered?

Mr. Colby. I would say in the last year or so it is pretty high, Senator. It is up in the 95 percent area, I would guess, in the last year or so; 95 to 100 percent. Prior to that time I am pretty sure they missed a lot of them, but I couldn't give you a percentage figure on that.

Senator Fong. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to be excused. I have a nomination before the Judiciary Committee.

Senator Kennedy. Very good. Thank you very much Senator Fong.

Just in terms of the general kinds of conditions of the refugees, I have here the conclusion of a refugee survey sponsored by JUSPAO/Saigon where it talks about the economic conditions of various refugee camps; it says "bad in all camps." I will give you the reference; it is on page 6.
As I understand it, it is a confidential survey conducted in the spring of 1970. Again, I am reading from page 6. It talks about conditions being “bad in all camps.” This is in I Corps; they surveyed 12 camps. It says economic conditions are bad at all camps. Housing, education, public health facilities are clearly inadequate in most camps; some nonexistent. Disease is a problem in most camps; an epidemic could easily break out.

It says only 12 percent of the refugees have received refugee payments from GVN. Now, I don’t know what is happening to all that other money we talk about distributing.

Then on the cause of the generation—the reason for the creation of refugees—and, again, this is from an in-house document—it says that in all hamlets in the group B category, whatever that means, most respondents said they were forcibly evacuated by U.S. troops. They sometimes have seen their homes burned and were not allowed to take along their possessions. It says Vietcong strength is considerable.

Mr. COLBY. Senator, we made that survey to give us a very precise idea of what our problems were up there. We selected 12 camps and divided them into two groups: group A which we thought were pretty good resettlement sites, and group B, which we thought were pretty bad. In group A we found later that two of the sites that we thought were pretty good actually turned out to be pretty bad. We found that of the seven sites that we had chosen as bad ones, that two of them we couldn’t get to because of security conditions.

The references you cited were to the group B sites, the worst cites—the areas that we recognized were bad and we identified the problems that lie in there.

Senator KENNEDY. This is a refugee report covering a period from May 21 to June 20, 1970. It talks about refugees in I Corps. It says: “The war victims, 18,414 new war victims, were generated in the period May 21 to June 20; about the same number in the preceding month.”

Mr. COLBY. I think that the war victim category was designed in order to give some benefits to people who do not actually move away from their homes and become refugees. There is very little doubt—

Senator KENNEDY. These are war victims?
Mr. COLBY. War victims; that is right.
Senator KENNEDY. That is refugees?
Mr. COLBY. No.
Senator KENNEDY. Everybody?
Mr. COLBY. No. It is a term of art, designed to include in the program people who are not sent away from their homes. The purpose was to extend to these people who were not actually refugees some help, and to distinguish the pure refugee who moved away from his home from people who suffered losses, but stayed in that area.

Senator KENNEDY. That is a pretty fine distinction.

Mr. COLBY. It was just a category. Frankly, I think it is an unfortunate term, but the concept I agree with, the concept of extending the benefits to people who do not actually have to move away from their homes.
Senator Kennedy: Suppose if your house is only knocked half way down or something and you decide to stay, you are in one category. If it is leveled you are in another category?

Mr. Colby. Not necessarily. This is part of the classification business, because in the category of “war victims” you get certain benefits if your house is 50 percent or more destroyed and slightly less benefits if your house is less than 50 percent destroyed.

Senator Kennedy. I suppose, once again, in terms of the destruction of houses, that it has some correlation to the creation of civilian war casualties. This report shows that “most of the damage to houses and a substantial portion of the deaths and injuries resulted from friendly actions and stray fire from the enemy and U.S. forces.” Is this correct?

Mr. Colby. In June 1970, Senator, in Quang Tri Province, what that stemmed from was an effort by about three companies of North Vietnamese to sally down onto the lowlands.

Senator Kennedy. Doesn’t it appear those are the ones—

Mr. Colby. When they got there the friendly forces, including the local self-defense and local territorial forces, held them and fought with them and the ARVN came and chased them out and destroyed them. In the course of that kind of a fight you do get that kind of damage to the houses, because there was a lot of shooting going on and a lot of shooting done by our forces and by the Vietnamese forces.

I don’t think there were any American forces involved in that one. But I think that is the origin of that particular incident in Quang Tri Province.

Senator Kennedy. Do you have any feel about how many deaths occurred in that category of new war victims—the 18,000?

Mr. Colby. I don’t have the figures on that.

(The following information was later supplied.)

(Mr. Colby subsequently provided the following information. Of the 18,000 war victims, 649 persons were killed and 1,088 were wounded.)

Senator Kennedy. Please continue with your statement.

Mr. Colby. To review, Mr. Chairman, in statistical terms the new refugees and other war victims in Vietnam, I have outlined in a table but I would like to summarize a couple of points.

In 1964 to 1966 we estimate 2,400,000 refugees generated in 1967, 485,000; in 1968, 340,000; in 1969, 115,000; in 1970, 185,000; and in the first quarter of 1971, 79,400; for a total of about three and a half million refugees. To these we add the 210,000 repatriates from Cambodia, and we add the individuals included under this “war victim” category that we were discussing a moment ago. Primarily the million people temporarily displaced during the Tet offensive of 1968, about 290,000 in 1969 and about 200,000 in 1970, and about 45,000 thus far this year. If you total all of these categories together you end up with a total of about 5,300,000 people affected by the war in this way during the past years in Vietnam.

Senator Kennedy. I would agree. The figure of the committee, which was put out in our last report estimated 5 million. So it looks like we are rather conservative in our estimates of some of these things.
Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman, if you would yield.

What is the present status? What are people that have been reduced to refugee status at some point in the war? What is your figure?

Mr. COLBY. This is the question Senator Fong asked. As I say, I have a figure for the number of people who have received benefits of one kind or another which comes to a total of 5,900,000, but it is not identical with the number of those who have become refugees and war victims, because a number of individuals received two or more benefits.

Senator MATHIAS. So the answer is, you really don't know?

Mr. COLBY. We have an estimate that about 900,000 people have returned to their home villages. We have paid resettlement benefits to about 1,600,000. That is two and a half million, more or less.

But there are many, many others that have resettled on their own, gotten jobs in various places, gone to the cities. There are in the refugee sites, or resettlement sites today, however, a number that have not yet become economically self-sufficient or have returned to their villages.

So, I frankly do not have a precise answer to that question, and I rather doubt that we can organize it for you.

Senator MATHIAS. In some cases it would come down to the objective question of whether somebody had made up his mind to stay where he was or whether he still had the intention to try to go home?

Mr. COLBY. Exactly. We have run some attitude surveys among these people. Normally they say they would like to go home if security will let them. In some of the city areas they don't reply that way. They say, no, they think they will stay in that new area. There are some areas where we have actually invited them to move to a resettlement camp from a refugee camp, and they say: "No thanks; we would rather stay here; it is in the center of town and we have a job down on the corner here and we would rather live here." These attitudes are a natural kind of effect of the disruption that has been caused over the years.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you ever, in your poll, just ask them if they would like to go on back just as——

Mr. COLBY. Yes, and most of them would like to go home if there is security. They usually say that if there is security they would like to go back to their home village. There is no question about it.

Senator KENNEDY. They just want the war to end, don't they?

Mr. COLBY. In essence. They talk in terms of security and whether it is safe to go back there, safe from all the aspects of the war, safe from the enemy attack and pressure and safe from the artillery and so forth.

Senator KENNEDY. Continue on——

Mr. COLBY. The figures from 1964 to 1966 are only general estimates, as at that time registration of these refugees was not developed. Figures for 1967 through 1971 include those actually registered. The 1970 figures after midyear may be below the actual number generated. This stemmed from the fact that President Thieu at one point remarked that he did not wish to have any more
refugees. The context in which he made this statement was that refugees should no longer be generated in view of the high degree to which the Government now provides security for the population.

To some extent, however, this statement was misinterpreted by some local officials, who refused to register actual new refugees. When this problem became apparent, a special procedure was arranged by which central government teams were sent to areas where such individuals appear, to authorize their recognition and registration for refugee benefits. This has happened in a number of cases.

The overall reduction in refugees generated, however, is a real fact. While part of this has certainly been a result of increased security in the country as a whole, part is the result of a variety of military directives restricting the use of firepower to protect the population. Early in the conflict, detailed rules of engagement were issued by MACV and by the GVN Ministry of Defense to control the use of firepower by military units. These call for care in the use of weapons, prescribe the specific levels at which approval must be obtained for the use of different types of weapons. In 1968 they were further refined, especially in urban areas where the enemy appeared in great force during Tet. When the rules are not followed, of course, an investigation is made to determine the facts, fixing blame, and arranging for compensation in appropriate cases.

Senator Kennedy. Just on that point there, we have been very interested in these rules of war for some time. We had our hearings last May in terms of what happens in Laos. We asked Ambassador Sullivan what happens when incidents are reported of the accidental dropping of ordinance, or bombing villages.

He indicated at that time—and I know we are going to talk about the Laotian situation tomorrow—but I asked him to give us some idea as to the kinds of reports that were made available to him on accidental bombings and what steps were taken. Then we waited, the committee did, for 4 months for a report on that; we received it and made it a part of our hearings.

I will get into this somewhat in more detail tomorrow. But, they said in Laos the records do not show specifically what actions were taken against individual pilots. It gives really no idea as to what action was taken, if any. I would hope you would be able to outline for us this morning what procedures are being followed now in South Vietnam in light of the changes you have announced.

How many reports do you have of accidental bombings? What disciplinary action has been taken, if any, against them? What kind of compensation?

You know, the extraordinary thing in Laos—in terms of only the "friendly" villages—is that they have paid compensation in only half the cases. And the kind of compensation they talk about is incredibly small; for example, "in January 1968, accidental bombing of Ban Nalan Wapikhamthong Province, resulted in 54 persons killed and 31 wounded; compensation was 1,507,000 kip and other claims have not been processed by the Lao Ministry of Defense." That works out, if you have 500 kip to the dollar, to $85 per person killed. That is what we are compensating, the dead let alone what compensation went to those who were wounded.
I would like to know what is happening on this in South Vietnam.

Mr. Colby. I don't have a summary here for you, Mr. Chairman, but an example occurred in the U Minh forest a few months ago. There was a helicopter incident in which they shot up some fishing boats. The fishing boats were in a restricted zone, but there was considerable doubt as to whether they really should have been shot at. The various procedures were followed to some degree, but there was a complaint from the neighborhood, from the people, the fishing community there, that this had happened; and the local officials reported this complaint up the line.

A joint investigation by the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense, and by our own military command, was undertaken and it went into considerable detail. It was a very thorough investigation. They did determine, in the final disposition of it, that they should not have been fired at in that manner, and we have arranged for some compensation, I can't give you the figure on that, either, but they did arrange for compensation for the people killed and for the boats which were sunk.

Mr. Doolin. Mr. Chairman, with regard to the Laos situation, we will have that information for you tomorrow. We are still getting information from the field.

Senator Kennedy. Could you, at your earliest convenience, give us the kinds of reports that have been made and the incidents that have been reported on accidental bombings, and what compensation has been paid and what procedures have been followed? I would like for you to submit that at a later time.

Also, I am interested in what kinds of sanctions are involved—how do you show responsibility. If it is an accident, that has to be considered; but if it is not, what kinds of restrictions you do place on bombing? Can you tell us anything about that, or would you rather submit that later?

Mr. Colby. I would rather submit that later. I would say I have been in the company of General Abrams on a number of occasions in which he has rather forcefully stated to his commanders the need for care in the use of weaponry and to be certain of what they are shooting at and so forth, and the avoidance of this kind of a problem. He has put on a great deal of pressure on this over the past several years.

Senator Kennedy. Well, if you could substantiate that or give us any kind of written regulations or orders—that kind of thing.

Mr. Colby. Right.

Senator Kennedy. And the number of instances where these have been violated.

Mr. Colby. Such indicators as the following demonstrate that these rules have actually reduced the use of fire power:

(a) Artillery.—During the years 1969 and 1970 a decrease of over two-thirds took place in the expenditure of U.S. Army Vietnam 105 and 155 millimeter artillery rounds. Some of this reflects the reduction of U.S. Army Vietnam artillery pieces, but the figures indicate that artillery pieces were reduced by only about a half while expenditure of artillery rounds was reduced over two-thirds. The figures include the rounds fired outside Vietnam during the Cambodian and Laos
operations by American artillery. The ARVN artillery over this period increased its expenditures of artillery rounds by about 30 percent, but the effect of the policy of restraint can be seen by the fact that its artillery pieces increased by about 55 percent in the same period, as a result of the Vietnamization program. The expenditures also included very substantial expenditures in Cambodian and Laos operations. The ARVN increases were considerably smaller than the United States decreases so that there has been a net decrease to about 60 percent of the January 1969 total artillery round expenditure level.

(b) Air strikes.—Total U.S. air strikes in South Vietnam similarly decreased very substantially. Tactical sorties were reduced to about one-fifth from January 1970 to February 1971. B-52 strikes were reduced over the same period to less than 5 percent of their previous level.

Senator Kennedy. This is a good deal different from the Laotian situation, this reduction in the use of firepower; obviously bombing is dramatically different.

Mr. Colby. The bombing on the Ho Chi Minh Trail is substantially different.

Senator Kennedy. There is a rather significant contrast. I don’t mean to—

Mr. Colby. A number of the air strikes, of course, were moved from South Vietnam to the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Senator Kennedy. Before discussing the U Minh forest, I was wondering if you could tell us just a little bit about whether you have any kind of calculation for the creation of refugees from various different kinds of operations in which American servicemen or South Vietnamese forces are involved in South Vietnam. I think of, for example, free fire zones. Do you have any way of evaluating whether, when you are about to declare an area a “free fire zone,” about how many refugees, or civilian war casualties might be created or the effect this might have on the civilian population? You know, there are cases where intelligence reports of Vietcong activity force us to make a judgment as to whether we are trying to kill the Vietcong versus what will happen to the civilian population. We would be interested in determining what kind of restraints—what the creation of refugees and civilian war casualties have in terms of restraints on these kinds of operations.

For example, such things as “reconnaissance by fire,” “free fire zones,” “search and destroy,” “protective encirclement,” “country fair operations,” and many more. Can you tell us what effect these kinds of military operations have in terms of the creation of refugees?

Mr. Colby. I don’t think we have any kind of percentage breakdown, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Kennedy. What creates the most number of refugees?

Mr. Colby. Well, the single greatest source of refugees in the past few years was the Communist Tet attack in 1968.

Senator Kennedy. Are we talking about American policy?

Mr. Colby. American.

Senator Kennedy. Well, let’s take what the official U.S. survey in Laos says, which you are probably aware of, in July 1970. They asked refugees why they moved. We will just mention these figures to find
out if you think there is a different set of circumstances which are applicable to the creation of refugees in South Vietnam.

This report says that 71 percent of the 238 respondents indicated they thought the United States responsible for the bombing; only 17 percent laid the onus on the Royal Lao Government (RLG). It says 97 percent of the people said they had seen a bombing attack; 32 percent as early as 1964; 49 percent said they could not count the number of times they had seen bombs dropped, and 48 percent said they had seen bombs dropped frequently; 68 percent of the 168 responses tabulated indicated they had seen someone injured by bombing, and 48 percent said they had seen someone killed.

Is it different in Vietnam?

Mr. COLBY. I think Ambassador Sullivan will discuss that particular report tomorrow, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, let's just say [disturbance in audience]—we have to have order, please.

Mr. COLBY. In Vietnam, as I mentioned a little earlier, I think that the generation of refugees comes in part from those fleeing Communist control and in part from those fearful of American and Vietnamese artillery and airstrikes, and in part from those who just want to get away from the war, without any particular identification as to which side. We do not have a similar kind of breakdown that I am aware of, similar to that particular one.

Senator KENNEDY. I gather they don't flee just because of the presence of the Vietcong, but because of the military activity associated with their presence?

Mr. COLBY. No; some flee because of the Vietcong.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, what percentage?

Mr. COLBY. Well, a substantial number of people that you are talking—

Senator KENNEDY. Do you have any figures on that?

Mr. COLBY. I do not have a substantial figure on that at the moment.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you have a less substantial, an insubstantial figure?

Mr. COLBY. I don't have a figure on that at the moment. I will look and see if we have one. If we do I will provide it to you.

(Mr. Colby subsequently indicated that "there are no statistics available showing why people become refugees in Vietnam.")

Mr. COLBY. But, as I said, I think that there are three sources of refugees' attitudes. One is their fear of the enemy and one is the fear of our effort, bombing and artillery; and one is of the war without any identification as to which side it is.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, could you, for the record, give us at least a glossary of those military terms which I have identified here, and others, which you feel have an impact on the creation of refugees or civilian casualties?

Mr. COLBY. Well, the major area of refugees has, of course, always been the first region up in the northern part of South Vietnam. There you have had the most substantial military action, the contest between the North Vietnamese and Vietcong divisions and the Vietnamese and our own divisions. That has been an area of very major military action.
Now, with the artillery and the airstrikes and everything else, this has been the area of the greatest number of refugees over the years.

I think that there are various ones of those individual kinds of operations that create some kinds of refugees. The only one that I think of particularly among those you referred to are the specified strike-zones. In some areas, in the highlands there were in the past situations in which they did move people out of certain areas so that they could go and attack the enemy there.

There were certain provinces where they actually moved people out of those areas with the idea that would free the areas.

Senator KENNEDY. Let's say like "reconnaissance by fire", would you tell us what happens in that kind of operation?

Mr. DOOLIN. I have some information on it, Senator.

With regard to reconnaissance by fire, U.S. forces are specifically precluded from such activity.

Senator KENNEDY. They are precluded?

Mr. DOOLIN. They are precluded by the rules of engagement from undertaking reconnaissance by fire.

With regard to free fire zones, we have no areas established as free fire zones. They are specified strike zones.

Senator KENNEDY. Is there another term which is used?

Mr. DOOLIN. Specified strike zone, I believe, would come a lot closer.

(The following information was later supplied:)

[Specified Strike Zones: The regions terms "Specified Strike Zones" (SSZ) are configured to avoid populated areas, and contain no known friendly forces or friendly populace; they generally contain enemy base areas or infiltration routes. Within such SSZ all enemy targets and target areas may be engaged without GVN clearance; however, air strikes (including helicopter attacks) and unobserved fire can be delivered only after notifying the appropriate U.S. or Free World Military Force clearance authority—field force commander, corps senior advisor, or the equivalent.

The first terms used to refer to these designated areas were "free-fire" or "free-strike" zones. Because of a later erroneous connotation, i.e., uncontrolled, indiscriminate firing, a USMACV directive was published in late 1965 which changed the name to Specified Strike Zone. Regardless of the term used, the same definition applied—an area where strikes might be made, for a specified period of time, without the approval by the GVN authorities, which otherwise was required for each fire mission. In these areas, as in all areas in Vietnam, full adherence to the laws of war regarding engaging targets is prescribed. The directives specifying the Rules of Engagement also contain detailed interpretation of the application of these laws.]

Mr. COLBY. The difference, Mr. Chairman, is that for any action in those zones you do have to make contact with the local province or the local district, whoever has tactical authority over the area, in order to get authority. I have been in a number of headquarters where those requests have come in and they have looked at the board to see if there is anybody there.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you know of any instance where they have been denied?

Mr. COLBY. Oh, yes.

Senator KENNEDY. Because of the local population?

Mr. COLBY. Because of the local population, yes. I know a number of province chiefs who have taken a negative position on this on the grounds that there were people there.
Mr. Doolin. Mr. Chairman, I would like to give you another example. We have completed an analysis concerning the proximity of South Vietnamese population outside the area of Saigon to airstrikes during the months of January 1969 and January 1971. The results— we ran three basic criteria. The first being what percentage of the South Vietnamese population less the residents of Saigon were within 1 kilometer of an airstrike; what percentage within 2 kilometers, and what percentage within 3 kilometers, and we broke it all down by military region.

In January 1969, 3 percent of the South Vietnamese population was within 1 kilometer of reported air strikes; 8.7 percent of the population within 2 kilometers; and 23.1 percent within 3 kilometers.

The figure for January 1971 are respectively: 0.9; 3.0; and 5.8. The reduction shows throughout all military regions, including the first military region that Ambassador Colby indicated was one where the intensity of the war is still relatively high.

I will be pleased to provide this for you, Mr. Chairman.

(The information referred to follows.)

An analysis has just been completed concerning the proximity of the South Vietnamese population (less the residents of Saigon) to air strikes during the months of January 1969 and January 1971. The results are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERCENT OF POPULATION</th>
<th>January 1969</th>
<th>January 1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamlet within 1 kilometer of reported airstrike</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamlet within 2 kilometers of reported airstrike</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamlet within 3 kilometers of reported airstrike</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military region I:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamlet within 1 kilometer of reported airstrike</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamlet within 2 kilometers of reported airstrike</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamlet within 3 kilometers of reported airstrike</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military region II:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamlet within 1 kilometer of reported airstrike</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamlet within 2 kilometers of reported airstrike</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamlet within 3 kilometers of reported airstrike</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military region III:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamlet within 1 kilometer of reported airstrike</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamlet within 2 kilometers of reported airstrike</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamlet within 3 kilometers of reported airstrike</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military region IV:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamlet within 1 kilometer of reported airstrike</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamlet within 2 kilometers of reported airstrike</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamlet within 3 kilometers of reported airstrike</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mr. Colby. In the U Minh forest of the Delta, the GVN has moved into the last long-established major Communist base area of the delta. A number of families and individuals who had lived in this region under Communist control have moved or have been moved to avoid the conflict between the Communists and Government forces. These people have been received and settled along the central canal running through the forest. Many of these individuals make their way during daylight to their own fields which they continue to cultivate. In the long term, it can be confidently asserted that their lives will be improved by increased access to medical care, education, and economic improvement. When the North Vietnamese and Vietcong military forces are ejected from the area, the people there will be assisted to return to their original communities.

The other major source of recent new refugees has been the relocation of certain communities in the highlands. During the last 6
months, 44,000 have been relocated in military region 2. Such relocations have long been a subject of debate and difference of opinion among various observers. Both Vietnamese and Americans have been responsible for relocations which have been badly handled and where injustice, misery, and failure have resulted. At the same time, other Vietnamese and Americans have been responsible for relocations which have been effectively handled, such as in Kontum Province, and which have resulted in Highlander communities with improved security and greater accessibility to Government benefits, contributing their full and willing participation to their own defense, local government, and local improvement. An evaluation of such relocations must consider the geography of the region, with isolated communities scattered through a vast area. It must also include the nature of the war being conducted by the enemy, using the local population as porters, suppliers, and recruits. Vietnam is not the first nation which has responded to a deadly threat by measures to assemble and secure its population more effectively.

Senator Kennedy. What happens in the poor handling and what happens in the better handling?

Mr. Colby, A poorer handling will be accompanied by a very short notice to the community that they are going to be moved. Poor preparation on the site which they are being moved to, in terms of whether adequate shelter is available, and adequate food is available and so forth. Sometimes a poor transport of the belongings and even the rice that the community has.

A good relocation will consist of some prior warning, considerable prior warning, perhaps taking one of the leaders to the new area, making sure that there is equipment there, the housing is there; that there is food there, that there are arrangements for the planting of land and so forth.

Senator Kennedy. Why do we have bad movements now? With all our sophistication in planning and training of staff, why do we read or hear about these stories of ill-planned evacuations of refugees?

Mr. Colby. Because there are failures at the lower levels of the officialdom in some areas. They get overly hasty about a decision to solve some problem. They move in faster than they ought to.

The government's policy calls for prior approval of such movements, prior planning and so forth, and the question is how effectively can we have that policy carried out.

Senator Kennedy. You have been in this for a considerable period of time. Do you think a forced evacuation is really a viable policy?

Mr. Colby. In some of those areas there is very little other solution over the long term, as long as the North Vietnamese are operating in that area, because if you don't do it you are going to hurt a lot of innocent people in the course of the fighting, among other things, and you are never going to be able to solve the problem of getting the enemy out.
On the other hand, if you do it badly, you are not going to benefit yourself at all. If you do it well, the people will sincerely be satisfied at their new location. The Province of Kontum is perhaps the best example, because there you have the major part of the population of the province living along the roads, along the few roads, limited roads, and they have been given a high degree of security, although they are right next to the Cambodian border, from which the annual attack of the North Vietnamese comes across. They have been well handled in the actual location and the people have remained in the new locations. They have schools; they have markets; they have a new life in those areas.

Senator Kennedy. Aren't you really just basing these relocations on strategic considerations—the importance of these people to the enemy? But don't you have to balance that versus the welfare of the people?

Mr. Colby. Well, it is a war between two sides; the North Vietnamese side and the government's side. These people are in the middle. The question is:

Senator Kennedy. They don't want to move out, evidently.

Mr. Colby. Some are quite happy about it and some aren't.

Senator Kennedy. Look at the others; they are forced—I mean, you just—

Mr. Colby. In some areas—

Senator Kennedy. Some are forced?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Senator Kennedy. And they are rounded up even if they want to stay where they are. Still, we believe the strategic and military reasons justify forced relocation; it is still a part of our policy?

Mr. Colby. As I say, Vietnam is not the first nation that has responded to this kind of a threat by measures to assemble

Senator Kennedy. Because it is done in other places doesn't justify it; does it?

Mr. Colby. As I say, Mr. Chairman, I think the question comes down to how it is done, and if it is done well, the people involved will eventually be satisfied.

Senator Kennedy. Can you reach any kind of decision as to the success of forced evacuations? Our information is that they are disastrous failures, and I am just interested in what your information is.

Mr. Colby. As I say, Mr. Chairman, there are situations in which it has been a disastrous failure and there are situations in which it has been quite successful.

Senator Kennedy. Now, let's get into—

Mr. Colby. Largely it depends upon the way it is done in any case. You have had a little bit of both, but you don't solve the problem by hoping it will go away; it won't. The North Vietnamese units are there and there will be fighting in that area, and it will involve the population. The population will be hurt as a result.

Senator Kennedy. It is my information that many of those that are working most actively in this program, especially lower echelon people in the field, share the view, as do many voluntary agency people, that forced relocations are disastrous.

Mr. Colby. Many people are opposed to it completely—who would never relocate—that is correct, Mr. Chairman. But I think in the
context of the 'overall war' there are a lot of things that have to be done, and it is a question of how well they are done. If they are done well they can satisfy the people and the people can understand why they are done. If they are done badly they cannot be justified under any circumstances.

The GVN's policy calls for security to be brought to the people rather than the people brought to security, whenever this is possible. When it is not deemed possible, the GVN's directives call for proposals for relocations to be submitted to the central government level for prior approval by the Central Pacification and Development Council, together with a plan showing how the operation is to be accomplished. The object is, of course, to restrict local official enthusiasm for such relocations to those cases which offer substantial justification, and to ensure adequate 'prior' planning to care for the people affected. I would not pretend that the policy or the procedure have always been followed. As a result, in a number of cases, action has been initiated and then reversed or special ex post facto efforts have been necessary to assist the people involved.

I do believe that such cases have become the exception rather than the rule. We are currently involved in further discussions with the GVN on various aspects of this problem and have agreed with the commanding general of military region 2 that no additional projects will be launched in the highlands this year, although some movements will take place on projects previously approved. We will attempt in the future to ensure that such relocations are only undertaken where necessary, and that, where undertaken, they are done with prior planning and sensitivity.

There has been some erroneous discussion in the press recently of possible plans for longer range relocations of Vietnamese. This is a totally different subject from that involving highlander relocation. It stems in part from the fact that a number of refugee communities in Central Vietnam have little or no hope of returning to their original areas or of attaining economic viability in the areas in which they now reside. An example is the settlement of Ha Thanh in Quang Tri Province, whose inhabitants came originally from the demilitarized zone. This settlement formerly comprised about 20,000 people. Of these, some 12,000 have been resettled in new areas within Quang Tri Province. About 8,000 remain in Ha Thanh, most of whom have very little hope of return to their home areas.

Senator Kennedy. Return to their home areas? Well, I would like to read very briefly from an excerpt of a letter written to me by a refugee advisor in military region 2, dated March 1971, concerning the forced relocation of Montagnards in Darlac Province:

"... The estimate now of all Montagnard peoples having been displaced at least once ranges from 65% to 80%. So we have two problems: One, what to do to reestablish those people already moved and now dwelling in a precarious existance with no basic economic means of subsistence and self-development and two, those who will yet be moved for military reasons of 'security,' namely for the HES manipulations..."

"Each year the force of 'taking security to the hamlets' is blandly outlined in the Pacification and Development Plans; and each year no such thing happens. Instead the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) shows so many hamlets
evaluated low and some general says Darlac province will have no more D.E.V. hamlets. So the Province Chief, knowing his forces are not about to take security to the hamlets, decides to bring them in under an artillery umbrella, usually on one of the main arterial roads in the province. At this point all Social Welfare Relief regulations are violated and a group of hamlets are moved in—at their volition—with no planning either for the move, i.e.: provisions for personal property read security so villagers can herd in their livestock, etc.—and no survey is made to determine how much land is available at the new site for their future crops. No development plan is made for other needs either. I've seen this happen often: the old, well built buo.n (hamlets) are burned behind the people so that they have nothing to go back to; ARVN and R.F. forces rob the old buons first and drive off, kill or neglect the livestock. The people are ‘stuck’ with their new lot... 

"This then, is the plight of many already moved peoples—supposedly put into permanent resettlement sites. Many of these permanent sites are now turning out to be very impermanent, mainly because of the scarcity of land or good soil—and the refugees are about to be moved again—like the planning in Region I to move 50,000 people into Quang Duc..."

Senator Kennedy. You have also received a copy of a letter sent to you, and also sent to the Social Welfare Minister of South Vietnam, from the voluntary agency people protesting these kinds of movements. There has been no answer received. I would like to read a part of the letter.

(The full text of the letter follows:)

COUNCIL OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES, 
March 15 1971.

DR. TRAN NGUON PHIEU,
Minister,
Ministry of Social Welfare,
1 Dinh Tien Hoang,
Saigon, S. Vietnam.

DEAR MR. MINISTER: Recently, a number of foreign voluntary agencies received a copy of a memorandum transmitted from Colonel Le Huy Layen, Assistant Commander, Military Region II, to Mr. Hugh O'Neill, Social Welfare Advisor in the CORDS War Victims Division at Nha Trang. That memorandum, dated 17 February 1971, asked Mr. O'Neill to intervene with all relief agencies to provide social support for the relocated Montagnard villages in Region II.

The member agencies of the Council of Foreign Voluntary Agencies working in Vietnam have had considerable experience over the last ten years with the displacement of Vietnamese citizens. We are not military experts. We are not political, analysts. We are simply social workers. As such, some of us have gone to the aid of Montagnards in the early 1960's, to the assistance of Vietnamese in I and III Corps in 1967, and to the aid of people throughout the country after Tet Mau Than (1968). Some of these people were driven out of their homes by the heat of battle or by the fear of military action. Others were dislocated by government design.

In recent weeks, we have observed the Government program to relocate thousands of Montagnards in Pleiku, Darlac and Phu Bon provinces. According to Colonel Layen's memorandum, the program is called the "Plan for Gathering people for Hamlet Establishment."

Some member agencies of the Council have made the following observations of the relocations that have taken place to date:

(1) Since July 31, 1970, about 150 Montagnard hamlets have been relocated. Prior to that, 722 of the total number of 1401 Montagnard hamlets had been relocated. Some hamlets, such as Tam Bo in Lam Dong province, have been relocated twice.

(2) Vietnamese Government troops burned the hamlets of Buon Ka, Buon Y Tung, Buon Wing A, Buon Wing B and others in Darlac province. In Phu Mok hamlet, Phu Bon province, the gardening tools of the inhabitants were burned along with the houses. In another hamlet in Darlac the rice crops were destroyed with herbicides at the time of relocation.
Mr. COBY. I am not familiar with that letter yet, Mr. Chairman. Senator KENNEDY. I will make a copy available to you. It is written by Mr. Douglas Cozart, who is Chairman of the Council of Foreign Voluntary Agencies in Vietnam.

Mr. COBY. It hasn't been received.

Senator KENNEDY. I will make it available.

I think, in any event, they are entitled to a response. Our files are just full of these kinds of reports. They have come from people...
in the lower echelons of CORDS; we are also to have expert testimony on this this afternoon.

Mr. Colby. There are cases in which this happens; I agree with you. There are also cases in which precisely the opposite happens.

Senator Kennedy. These voluntary agency people are people who I have the greatest admiration and respect for.

Mr. Colby. I do, too.

Senator Kennedy. To me they perform a wonderful service, and they are really a superb group. Yet, here is the head of these agencies, talking about these forced relocations, with great concern and compassion and not making these judgments idly. But still, we have a policy of forced relocation. I am sure there is a question in their minds, as well as in ours, as to the reason for it.

Mr. Colby. I think the question comes down as to whether the government is moving away from that kind of policy toward a better policy, or whether it is continuing a bad policy. I think there are very definite steps being taken by the government to improve its procedure and its activities. But also, I believe it feels it is essential in some cases which are approved at the central level for such steps to be taken in view of the war that is going on in the country.

Senator Kennedy. If you would like to move onto the questions of Vietnamization, you may—or you may continue, whatever—

Mr. Colby. Well, I thought I might clear this one item up, Mr. Chairman, because I think it has been a matter of some misunderstanding in the press.

I was mentioning the settlement of Ha Than and that about 8,000 people are still there after 12,000 have been resettled in new areas. They have very little hope of being able to return to their home areas in the DMZ, nor is there adequate land elsewhere in the province for them.

In the southern part of Vietnam, especially in the almost empty provinces just north of Saigon, there are sizable tracts of empty land which are available for development and growth. From time to time, there has been talk of assisting individuals and communities to move into some of these virgin lands and to establish new lives there. At the moment, however, there is no settled program to move refugees or other people from MR 1 into the other regions.

The GVH has established a new directorate of land development and hamlet building. This constitutes an attempt by the GVH to take a longer term look into the future development of the land, both virgin and abandoned, of the Nation to strengthen its economy and give better lives to its people. The thought is that such lands might be developed in kibbutz-like communities, by released soldiers, disabled veterans, refugees, residents of the urban concentrations caused by the war, Vietnamese released from U.S. employment, and other needy people.

The resettlement of refugees is not the prime objective but may well be an element of this directorate's program. Its chief is resolved to conduct such movements on a voluntary basis, bringing leaders of the communities to view the new sites before offering the remainder of the community a chance to move. Many of the proposed sites have
in their neighborhood flourishing communities of North Vietnamese refugees of 1954 or Cambodian repatriates of 1970. On the ground it can be seen that the potential for a new life is there. No decision has yet been made with respect to U.S. support of this program.

In my prepared text, Mr. Chairman, I have outlined the different categories of benefits paid to refugees and war victims and the number of individuals who received these benefits over the years. We had misunderstandings about some of these in the past, for example, when our earlier bureaucratic shorthand reported individuals who had received resettlement benefits as “resettled.” When this misunderstanding was pointed out we changed the reporting title to refer only to “resettlement benefits paid.”

The program of assistance to refugees centered primarily on the payment of benefits or allowances to individuals meeting certain standards of eligibility. The attached chart outlines the various categories of these benefits to refugees and to an additional category, developed in 1968, called “war victims.” (See Annex A.) The “war victim” category was developed in order to provide benefits to individuals who did not become refugees, i.e., did not move away from their home area, although they did need assistance to overcome some injury or damage from the war.

A recapitulation of the various types of benefits paid to refugees and war victims shows that some 5,900,000 persons have received benefits over the years. This figure contains, of course, some duplication, because many persons received more than one type of benefit. The figure does show, however; the great extent to which assistance has been provided. This subcommittee is entitled to a substantial share of the credit for having urged and stimulated this effort, although none of us can be fully satisfied with the depth of the assistance or its gap in coverage.

To these benefits must be added such additional assistance as the distribution of Public Law 480, title II surplus food commodities. Public Law 480 commodities have been distributed in Vietnam for many years. During the past year a careful review of the program was undertaken. It was determined that bulgur wheat, cornmeal and rolled oats are so rarely actually used by Vietnamese recipients that their further transport to and distribution in Vietnam is not warranted, as the Vietnamese have shown a compelling preference for rice. Also, tighter controls have been established over other commodities and individual feeding projects are being curtailed in favor of institutional projects in which the food is prepared in common kitchens.

As a result of these decisions, a reduction in the size of the Public Law 480 surplus food program is taking place. We believe this is appropriate in view of the revival of the rural economy as well as the decline in the number of new refugees as a result of improved security. Continued assistance, however, will be provided to needy persons as well as to certain categories of war victims.

The total expenditure on behalf of refugees and war victims for the current year is approximately $600 million. A more detailed breakdown of these figures for earlier years is given in the annex to my statement.
Senator Kennedy. That is less than 1970; is that right?
Mr. Colby. It is less; yes.
Senator Kennedy. And that is less than 1969, and less than 1968?
Mr. Colby. It reflects, as I say, the decline in the number of new refugees, the fact that many of the payments have been made of resettlement benefits and of return to village benefits and the improved situation in the countryside generally, plus our estimate that we will not be faced with the size of the problem that we had in the past.

If we should be proved wrong, of course——
Senator Kennedy. There has been no corresponding increase, has there, in funds for social rehabilitation? Nothing really substantial?
Mr. Colby. Social rehabilitation?
Senator Kennedy. Yes; rehabilitation in terms of—well, let’s take prosthetic devices.
Mr. Colby. Well, there have been increases in this area in the social welfare program. We get into these in some degree here, the establishment of regional social service centers for war victims.
Senator Kennedy. As I understand, in terms of this whole civilian area, this administration’s budget is on a downward trend; is that right? Certainly in terms of the expenditures——
Mr. Colby. I think our estimate, Mr. Chairman, is that the requirement is down from what it was before.

Senator Kennedy. Well, as I understand it, from just the dollar contribution—to the extent that this reflects the budget—that it is a reduced budget, reduced last year over the year before, and they are reducing next year’s budget over this year’s.

Mr. Colby. There is a reduction but the Vietnamese Government is able to pick up more of the load.
Senator Kennedy. The South Vietnamese Government can pick up more of the load? But their contributions in this are extremely modest. It amounts to about 8 or 9 percent, which is really small, isn’t it? I mean, it is only 8 or 9 percent of the total estimated budget expended for civilian war casualties or rehabilitation for refugees?
We read this morning, however, that funds for improving the police, the public safety division, are being increased. It looks like they are going to get a good deal more money.

Mr. Colby. It is not going to get a great deal more money. This budget this year is slightly up.

Senator Kennedy. But funds for police control is going up while what is spent on civilian casualties is going down—even by the figures you use here.

Mr. Colby. What is being spent on the development of a modern and responsible police force is going up somewhat, a slight degree.

Senator Kennedy. How about for a responsible medical system?

Mr. Colby. The medical program is going down largely because construction projects were the main element of some of the costs earlier, and these construction projects have been completed, the construction of surgical suites at provincial hospitals and things like that. We have also withdrawn some of the extra personnel that the United States was providing in some medical programs, as our be-
lief is that again the caseload requirement is reduced, and therefore it has gone down.

The AUDIENCE. How can this man sit at this desk and tell people he is concerned about people when it is the policy to commit genocide in that country?

Senator KENNEDY. Order, please.

Senator FONG. Mr. Ambassador, the Vietnam war in 1968, 1969 at its height, entailed approximately $29 billion; is that correct?

Mr. COLBY. I believe so.

Senator FONG. And the present expenditure is what, $14 billion?

Mr. COLBY. For fiscal 1968, the total expenditure was roughly $28.5 billion; for fiscal 1969 $28.8 billion; for fiscal 1970 $23 billion; for fiscal 1971, $15.3 billion. That includes—that is full costs; that includes the incremental also for defense.

Senator FONG. Actually the Vietnam war expenditure has been cut almost 50 percent since its peak?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

Senator FONG. So therefore you can anticipate a cutting of all phases of the program in South Vietnam; is that correct?

Mr. COLBY. All departments; yes.

Senator FONG. And the reason for the decline in expenditure by 50 percent, $29 billion to $15 billion, is that the war is deescalating?

Mr. COLBY. I believe so, and the requirement has gone down; yes, sir.

Senator FONG. Then the number of refugees has declined also?

Mr. COLBY. The number of refugees who need to be paid benefits has declined considerably. The chairman pointed out there has been a number of new refugees generated in the past few months as a result of particular operations. But the military situation which generates a large number of refugees is quite different today than what it was some years ago.

Senator FONG. You have mentioned that the Government of South Vietnam, instead of encouraging the refugees to come to refugee camps, now tries to bring security to the places where people are living. That has really transformed the program from one in which there is a concentration of refugees in refugee camps to one where they can be left at their homes and provided security?

Mr. COLBY. The overall policy is certainly that, and the overall policy of extending the protection of the Government to the millions of people rather than removing those millions to a secure area has been carried out. The extension of security in the Delta and the regions around Saigon and even in the lowlands of military region I have been very considerable over the past year, in part as a result of that policy of gradually extending security and providing security to the people in the places where they are.

Senator FONG. Would that change in policy reduce the cost of the program?

Mr. COLBY. It certainly has avoided the generation of substantial numbers of new refugees.

It has involved the payment of return to village benefits to a certain number of people who have gone in the opposite direction of
where they used to go. They no longer move into camps but they are now moving back to their original homes.

Senator Fong. Thank you.

Senator Kennedy. Could you give us any information on what the new pacification program is going to cost?

Mr. Colby. We have some very general estimates. The problem with this THE problem, Mr. Chairman, is that part of it is the Vietnamese cost, part of it is American cost, part of it Defense, part of it USAID.

Senator Kennedy. The contribution from Vietnam is small, isn't it?

Mr. Colby. Oh, no, sir. The salaries of the RF and PF, 500,000 people are paid from the Vietnamese budget; the salaries of the police, for instance, the salaries of the various local officials—this is all part of their budget.

Senator Kennedy. You do not mean to suggest the United States does not underwrite very heavily the South Vietnamese budget?

Mr. Colby. The United States assists the South Vietnamese overall budget, but these costs are on that budget. With respect to the direct funding of the pacification program either by dollars or by piasters, there is a substantial amount involved. I don't want to indicate that it isn't. But I also want to indicate that the Vietnamese budget also does bear a heavy burden.

Senator Kennedy. Well, then what kind of range of figures are we talking about, just approximately? You can submit more specifically later.

Mr. Colby. The dollar budget which is both DOD and USAID, which includes the support of the local forces, the territorial forces, the regional and popular forces, comes up to about something in the neighborhood of $700 million. The piaster budget comes up to a total of about $900 million. Of the 900 about 125 or 130 is on the counterpart side and about 700 and—well, about 800 is on the Vietnamese budget side.

So that you come to a total of about a billion and a half. As I say, that includes a lot of salaries of people involved.

Senator Kennedy. I suppose the point that I think has to remain with us is that there is a new pacification program and it will involve very sizable amounts of money, there are increased expenditures in terms of strengthening local police organizations. But while all those figures are going up, the resources we are committing to refugees and war victims are going down. I suppose you can hopefully point to a reduction of violence in Vietnam—which this administration suggests is the case—as the reason for cutting funds. But shouldn't there be an increased sense of responsibility in terms of rehabilitation. I mean, as we halted the expenditures in World War II for the war, we didn't halt all funds for reconstruction. That is when it really started—the Marshall Plan and others.

It seems to me that if we are really seriously interested in the people—the civilians, the civilian war casualties, in reconstructing people's lives in that country—then our funds should not be going down in these areas, but should be going up and strengthened.

Mr. Nocter. Mr. Chairman, if I could speak to that in terms of the relative budget for various programs, these budgets for refugees
and various health programs are set by the needs of the field and as dictated by the requirements out there.

They are not set as alternatives as between the national police and the health programs. These are not competing alternatives as such.

The refugee and health budgets have gone down somewhat over the last couple of years as the Vietnamese take over these programs. It is expected they probably will continue to drop to some extent as Americans are withdrawn and Vietnamese doctors man the hospitals and so on.

This is not done as a matter of policy, to give a higher priority to one area over another. Refugee and health needs have a very high priority and requests, as the requirements are seen in the field, are responded to. To my knowledge we have never rejected or turned down a request in the refugee or health field because of funding requirements for other programs.

Senator Kennedy. Well, Mr. Nooter, with all respect to the rhetoric, the facts, I think, speak stronger as to the direction of the budget.

Now, you can say you can reduce expenditures in these areas when the South Vietnamese are able to assume a greater responsibility. But as of now they contribute about 10 percent, a little less than 10 percent, in terms of the civilian budget this year. So it is unrealistic to assume they can or are assuming a significant responsibility in this area. The GVN social welfare budget is $8.7 million. In the past they have spent less than half of that, usually, even if it is in the budget; the GAO report substantiates that.

Mr. Nooter. A good deal of the refugee program is indeed supplied by us and will continue to be.

My point is we have not turned down requests from the field for funds for programs in these areas.

Senator Fong. In 1969 you stated 502,000 temporary refugees. According to the chart, page 24, you stated that 586,000 were resettled. Now, when they are resettled, does that mean they are able to take care of themselves?

Mr. Colby. That was the point, Senator, I wanted to clarify. These are resettlement benefits. It does not necessarily mean they are totally able to take care of themselves.

We have a program going on now of improving some of the communities in which they live. These are individual benefits. Rather than resettling them and cutting all ties these individuals have, there is a continuing program of assisting that particular community to get back, really.

Senator Fong. I see, that means resettlement is a continuing process.

Mr. Colby. Some of them are totally all right. Some of them are not.

Senator Fong. That means varied degrees of resettlement?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Senator Fong. 188,600 in 1969 returned to their village? Does that mean they are completely cut off?

Mr. Colby. They received those benefits. Now, they also will be receiving certain special benefits to reestablish some of the commu-