

Vietnamese government and people are demonstrating increasing self-reliance, we believe it is important that we continue our support as long as it is needed."

Letter to Senator Edward M. Kennedy,  
March 25, 1974

*Sullivan* (Kissinger's deputy at the Paris Conference on Viet Nam) :

"We think it is essential for the United States to retain its military presence precisely as it can be seen. We are not abandoning our friends or leaving the area (SEA).

Manila, AP, Sept. 15, 1973

*Nguyen Van Thieu* :

"In South Viet Nam, there can be only one government and one army... The name 'provisional revolutionary government' cannot exist..."

"I wish to remind you, countrymen, brothers and sisters, of this : what is this ceasefire agreement ? An agreement to have a ceasefire in place, neither more nor less. I have said that it is not because there is the word Peace in it that we shall have peace. It is only a ceasefire in place, neither more nor less.

"I want to remind you, countrymen that a ceasefire in place means to maintain the status quo : where

our administration, army and people are, we shall reign as a king. There everything will depend on us. We shall maintain our laws, our administration ; everything will be done as in the past, there's no change...

"This is a ceasefire in place. A ceasefire in place does not mean that the Communists can go to Saigon market to take a soup or that they can go back to their villages to see their wives, fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters...

"If a Communist comes to a village and the villagers do not recognize him, if his name is not registered and he has no identity card delivered by the village, blow his brains out on the spot.

"Besides the strangers who come back from the maquis, any fellows in the village who raise their heads and speak in a communist way also transgress the laws of the State. We must kill them exactly as we have done so far."

Televised speech, January 28, 1973

"...Who can accept a coalition government with three components ? And why three components and not fifteen, seventeen, eighty-five ? Has it fallen from heaven or issued from the earth, that third component ? And these Communists, what do they have here to demand one-third ? And what are they claiming for the third component that they can demand another third for it ? That is a solution imposed on us... The question of three components is an absurd formula.

It has no foundation. And what they call an "equal part" is but a low trick."

Televised speech in Saigon, October  
24, 1972

"No general elections, no peace, no political settlement, the negotiations with the Communists may be suppressed."

Statement made at Vung Tau on  
December 28, 1973

## U.S. AID TO SAIGON

"Military aid is a less dangerous and less costly method to replace the direct involvement of US forces".

Secretary of Defense Schlesinger  
*Voice of America*, May 23, 1974.

"America continues to help finance the materials of war, to ship the bombs and the bullets that continue to kill Vietnamese... The fact remains that America is involved in the war, even though the dying has been Vietnamized".

Senate report — "Relief and Rehabilitation of war victims in Indochina : One year after the cease-fire" by Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Refugees.

"The United States Army is supplying South Viet Nam with almost as much ammunition as it did when

the fighting still raged immediately after the cease-fire one year ago.

"The statistics on monthly shipments to South Viet Nam made available at the Pentagon Friday gave an indication of the ebb and flow of the fighting since the Jan. 27, 1973, cease-fire.

"Altogether, the military has given Viet Nam 1.1 billion dollars worth of equipment and supplies in the first 12 months after the cease-fire...

"For the first three months after the cease-fire, the fighting was known to continue at a high level and shipments averaged 33,000 tons of ground ammunition in each of those months.

"The shipments tailed off sharply, averaging 7,000 tons a month from July to October.

"Shipments then rose again, hitting 9,000 tons in November, 16,000 in December and 22,000 in January, the last month for which figures were available...."

*Saint Louis Post Dispatch, March  
17, 1974.*

"The total budgeted cost of military aid to South Viet Nam is 813 million in this fiscal year, and the Pentagon has asked Congress for 1.45 billion next year, with most of the increase probably going for ammunition, which the South Vietnamese forces had expended at a high rate.

The true costs of the military support probably rise considerably above the official figures. Some of the aid, for example, comes in through economic

programs that dump millions in cash into the Saigon Government's defense budget. And other costs — salaries of Pentagon technicians who make special visits, for example — are hidden in the vast budgets of the United States Air Force, Army and Navy and are not labeled "Vietnam".

These valuable military goods and services have a sharp political impact. They are indispensable to the South Vietnamese Government's policy of resistance to any accommodation with the Communists. Militarily, the extensive aid has enabled President Nguyen Van Thieu to take the offensive at times, launching intensive attacks with artillery and jet fighters against Vietcong-held territory.

Furthermore, the American-financed military shield has provided Mr Thieu with the muscle to forestall a political settlement. He has rejected the Paris Agreement's provision for general elections, in which the Communists would be given access to the press, permission to run candidates and freedom to rally support openly and without interference from the police..."

*The New York Times*, Feb. 25, 1974

"The Nixon Administration has quietly violated congressional intent to cut economic aid to Indochina in FY 1974. The original Administration request was for 827.8 million. Congress cut this back to under 700 million. By the end of FY 1974, however, the Administration has wound up allocating 1.1 billion in economic aid to Indochina.

The Administration allocated a total of 3.2 billion in FY 1974 for Indochina, almost as much as was allocated for specific countries in the rest of the Third World combined. This figure, for example, is 6 times what went to Africa and Latin America combined for economic aid and this was part of the Administration's continuing commitment to combating local insurgencies, despite a clear public and congressional mandate for non-interventionism in such insurgencies.

... Military and "Indochina Post-war Reconstruction" requests have jumped 45%. FY total spending saw only 0.3% actually going toward "humanitarian", "reconstruction" or "development" projects. The FY 1974 budget, therefore was a war budget — caused by the structural unviability of the GVN and Lon Nol regimes. Administration claims that US aid will allow them to "stand on their own" are myths.

The Administration's FY 1975 program, moreover, offers even more the same. Its proposed FY 1975 military and economic aid requests total 3.28 billion — or 27% more than what was allocated last year.

Once more, over 90% of this aid is destined neither for reconstruction nor humanitarian needs, but for the maintenance of the war machines in Cambodia and South Viet Nam"...

Statement made by Mr. Fred Branfman, co-director of *Indochina Resource Center* before the Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the House of Representatives, May 1, 1974 (Congressional Record, Proceedings and debates of the 93rd Congress, second session).

"Several years ago, Congress took into account the military needs of the South Vietnamese and Cambodian governments and permitted both countries to use 80 per cent of these local "counterpart" funds generated by the sale of US commodities (provided by CIP and Food for Peace) "to procure equipment, materials, facilities and services for the common defense including internal security".

Last October (October 1973), an adjustment permitted South Viet Nam to spend 100 per cent of these counterpart funds for "common defense".

Saint Louis Post Dispatch, June 10,  
1974

## AMERICAN MILITARY ADVISERS IN SOUTH VIET NAM AFTER THE PARIS AGREEMENT

Even as the United States military is packing up for its expected exit from Viet Nam, American officials here are secretly planning a major post-war presence of United States civilians in Viet Nam, with many of them doing jobs formerly done by the military.

About 10,000 American civilian advisers and technicians, most of them under Defense Department contract, will stay on in South Viet Nam after a cease-fire, according to well-informed sources. These civilians will do everything from running the South Vietnamese military's personnel and logistic computers to teaching the Vietnamese Air Force how to fly and maintain newly provided planes and repairing the complex military communications network left behind by the United States Army.

About half of these civilian workers are already in Viet Nam, with others beginning to arrive almost

daily at Saigon's Tan Son Nhut under new contracts signed confidentially in the last few weeks.

*The New York Times, Nov. 27, 1972*

According to both American and South Vietnamese officials, the American civilians — both employees of private companies and those of the Defense Department — who help with supply activities not only see that the South Vietnamese get the equipment and ammunition they ask for but also advise them on what to ask for.

What is not clear is whether they confine their observations to such matters as the condition of equipment and the rate of ammunition expenditure, or whether they evaluate military tactics and strategies and go so far as to suggest alternatives.

What is fairly certain is that their reports end up in the hands of the South Vietnamese, perhaps providing indirect advice of one sort or another.

A South Vietnamese officer in a position to know said recently that normal procedure called for an American and a South Vietnamese to make an inspection or auditing tour of a military unit together. Then they write up their reports, sometimes separately, sometimes together. The reports, he said, are forwarded up the chain of command in the United States Defense Attache's Office, which then relays copies of them to Lieut. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen, head of the Logistic Command for the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff.

More direct, overt advice is sometimes given by zealous Americans who are still stationed in every province. An embassy official reported recently that an American based in one province boasted to him about a successful military operation: "I told them to clear the communists out of there."

David K. Shipler — *The New York Times* — Feb. 25, 1974

## VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE

“... Major causes (of violations) have included the fact that the South Vietnamese Government has continued to fight to regain all positions it had lost just before the cease-fire and that it has continued to seek and attack Communist units whenever it could find them.”

*The New York Times* — Feb. 28, 1973

“The Saigon administration continues to mobilize large armed forces, coordinated with aircraft, tanks and artillery to launch nibbling operations.”

*Washington Post*, Jan. 30, 1973

“Vietnamese Air Force pilots in the Mekong Delta have orders to strafe and bomb any village flying Viet Cong flags.”

Unidentified US official, *Newsweek*,  
Feb. 19, 1973

"The US Administration has not denied that South Viet Nam (Saigon) has committed violations of the ceasefire accord."

*The New York Times*, April 21, 1973

"The Saigon government has pressed hard on the Communist forces in South Viet Nam, recapturing many of the areas which it seized just before the cease-fire went into effect, and circumscribing and obstructing the Communist side in its operations throughout South Viet Nam in the last three months. Privately, some very authoritative South Vietnamese sources concede just that.

Breakdown of the Viet Nam Cease-fire : the Need for a Balanced View, *Indochina Resource Center*, p. 39

"Much of the fighting in the delta has been touched off by Saigon Government troops sweeping through areas long held by the PRG"

Unidentified authoritative Western sources, *The New York Times*, June 27, 1973

"Much of the fighting in the military region III, which envelops Saigon, has been initiated by South Vietnamese commanders..."

*The New York Times*, Oct. 21, 1973

"Thieu has ordered his forces to make preemptive strikes to forestall attacks, and field reports indicate the Saigon army is engaged in what the Viet Cong call land-grabbing operations in some areas".

*Chicago Tribune, Nov. 4, 1973*

"The South Vietnamese have officially admitted that they have broken the January cease-fire, including the air raid against the PRG town of Loc Ninh."

*London Observer, Oct. 11, 1973*

"The Saigon Government has launched continual attacks against Viet Cong-controlled areas within what it regards as its territories."

*Newsweek, Nov. 26, 1973*

"Thousands of South Vietnamese troops swept across the lower Mekong Delta..."

*AP, St Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 27, 1973*

"During our two weeks with the Vietcong, we saw planes on bombing runs or heard the shelling every day

and on several occasions had to scramble into bunkers in the middle of the night."

Ed. Bradley, CBS correspondent in South Viet Nam, reporting on CBS News in the US on November 14 and 16, 1973 about the situation in the PRG areas.

"Three battalions of South Vietnamese Rangers and ARVN troops were carrying out major military operations recently to "pacify" and hold vast areas of Quang Ngai province. These areas have consistently been controlled by the National Liberation Front (NLF) for over ten years.

"An integral part of the operations is forcing civilian farmers from the region to precede the troops to clear away bush and trees which are laced with booby traps and mines. Scores of civilians were killed or injured in the operations.

"... According to a Ranger battalion commander, the object of the operations is to organize the people presently living there into villages and hamlets under Saigon government control. A ranking officer predicted that the troops would stay in the area for at least six months.

"'We will pacify the area and build outposts which will in time be taken over by local military forces,' he said."

*Guardian*, June 19, 1974

## THE NEWLY LIBERATED AREAS

From March 13 to April 4, 1975, 16 provinces have been liberated :

Order number	Province	Area (sq. kil)	Population	Provincial capital	Date of liberation
1	Darlac	12,800	277,000	Buon Me Thuot	March 13
2	Pleiku	8,860	283,000	Pleiku	March 18
3	Kontum	11,230	139,000	Kontum	March 19
4	Phu Bon	4,800	61,300	Hau Bon (Cheo Reo)	March 19
5	Quang Tri	4,740	300,000	Quang Tri	March 19
6	Binh Long	2,240	27,720	An Loc	March 20
7	Quang Ngai	4,300	720,000	Quang Ngai	March 24
8	Quang Duc	5,740	30,000	Gia Nghia	March 24
9	Thua Thien	5,670	600,000	Hue	March 26
10	Quang Tin *	4,000	400,000	Tam Ky	March 27
11	Quang Nam *	8,000	1400,000	Hoi An	March 28
12	Lam Dong	4,700	58,000	Bao Loc	March 28
13	Binh Dinh	7,000	900,000	Qui Nhon	April 1
14	Phu Yen	4,200	350,000	Tuy Hoa	April 1
15	Khanh Hoa	4,300	300,000	Nha Trang	April 3
16	Tuyen Duc	4,770	250,000	Da Lat	April 4

\* Quang Tin and Quang Nam correspond respectively to Quang Nam and Quang Da in the administrative division of the PRG.

Below is some information about the most important areas recently liberated.

## THE TAY NGUYEN HIGHLANDS AND THE TRUONG SON RANGE

### Land and Natural Resources

The Tay Nguyen Highlands include from north to south five high plateaus called Kontum, Pleiku, Darlac, Lang Biang and Upper Dong Nai. At present they are divided into seven provinces :

Kontum	Capital : Kontum
Pleiku	Capital : Pleiku
Phu Bon	Capital : Cheo Reo
Darlac	Capital : Buon Me Thuot
Quang Duc	Capital : Gia Nghia
Tuyen Duc	Capital : Dalat
Lam Dong	Capital : Bao Loc

The area along the Truong Son includes the western parts of the coastal provinces of Central Trung Bo, from Quang Nam to Binh Thuan, which are closely related to the Tay Nguyen Highlands in the ethnic, geographical, linguistic and historical fields.

The area is about 80,000 square kilometres, of which 48,000 belong to the Highlands.

The Truong Son mountain range runs north-south ; it is dominated in the north by peaks of over 2,500

metres (A Tuat, Ngoc Linh), and in the south by 2,000-metre peaks (Chu Yang Xin, Vong Phu, Lang Biang).

The Tay Nguyen Highlands have an altitude of 1,000 metres in the north, 500 metres in the centre, and 1,000 metres in the south where it gently slopes down to 500 metres at its tip.

They have about 700 kilometres of common frontiers with Laos and Cambodia, adjacent to the Boloven Plateau in Laos in the north and to the northeastern part of Cambodia in the west. This tri-border region is of great strategic importance as it commands the whole of southern Indochina.

Many rivers watering South Viet Nam (Ba River and Dong Nai River) and the big tributaries of the Mekong River (Serepok, Krong Pocoo) have their sources in the Tay Nguyen Highlands and the Truong Son range; many rivers have powerful waterfalls such as the Da Nhim and Krong Pha waterfalls, which are a huge potential source of hydro-electric power for the whole of South Viet Nam.

The Tay Nguyen Highlands are crisscrossed with an extensive network of strategic roads.

— Highway 14 runs through the highlands, linking Hue city and Da Nang port in the north to Saigon in the South;

— Highway 5, from Mo Duc (Quang Ngai) to Kontum, is connected to the road leading to Attopeu in Lower Laos;

— Highway 19 links Qui Nhon port to Pleiku town, and goes as far as Stung Treng, a Cambodian town on the bank of the Mekong river.

— Highway 7 links the coastal town of Tuy Hoa to Pleiku ;

— Nha Trang port and Ninh Hoa are linked by Highway 21 to Buon Me Thuot and the mountain resort of Dalat ;

— Highway 11 and a parallel railway line run from the coastal town of Phan Rang to Dalat ;

— Highway 8 runs from the coastal town of Phan Thiet to Di Linh town where it meets Highway 20 linking Saigon to Dalat.

By their situation, the Tay Nguyen Highlands are regarded as an important strategic area.

The Truong Son range and the north of Kontum province are covered with forests on hundreds of thousands of hectares where can be found such precious timber trees as : *xa nu*, *lim* (ironwood), *trao* (dalbergia), *kien kien* (*Hopea pierrei* Hance), besides a wide range of forest products and wild animals (elephants, deer, gaurs, tigers...)

In the Tay Nguyen Highlands, only 1.5 million hectares of land have been brought under cultivation. The valleys and areas around Ho Lak (southeast of Buon Me Thuot) lend themselves perfectly to the growing of wet rice. The basaltic soil in the highlands is suited for the growing of coffee, tea, rubber, tobacco, jute, sugar cane. According to preliminary estimates, there are in the highlands over 150 plantations (dating back to the French period) and agricultural settlements (set up by the Americans and the Saigon quislings). Darlac contains 123 of these estates (60 plantations and 63 agricultural settlements), the biggest being Dak Mil, Katum, Mewan.

Phu Bon province (formerly Cheo Reo district of Pleiku province ; population : 61,300 ; area : 4,800 square kilometres) has 500,000 hectares of cropland, of which 60,000 hectares in the valley of the Ba River are most suitable for cotton growing. In 1960-1962, French planters obtained 8,417 kilograms of cotton per hectare from experimentation fields. 50,000 hectares of fertile red soil at Boun Blech are suitable for the growing of mulberry trees, rubber, coffee..., while the remaining 300,000 hectares are covered with forests.

The high plateaus in the West have also immense grasslands suitable for the breeding of oxen, sheep, goats, horses... West of Highway 14 in the provinces of Gia Lai and Darlac, grasslands cover hundreds of square kilometres.

The subsoil of the Tay Nguyen Highlands contains such ores as gold (extracted at Bong Mieu, 100 km southwest of Da Nang), lead, zinc (at Bao Loc, Lam Dong province).

The Tay Nguyen, besides their strategic value, have also a great economic potential.

### **The people**

Up to now there are no accurate figures of the population of the Tay Nguyen Highlands (owing to the constant demographic fluctuations). A rough estimate puts it at more than one million inhabitants, of whom 850,000 are members of 30 minority nation-

nalities belonging to two linguistic groups (the Malayo-Polynesian or Indonesian, and the Mon-Khmer) and two cultural currents :

— The Cham culture : it penetrated into the Highlands in the 11th century by the Ba valley and influenced such nationalities as the Ede (Darlac), Jarai (Pleiku), Raglai, Coho (west of the provinces of Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, and the provinces of Lam Dong, Tuyen Duc.)

— The Mon Khmer culture : it influenced greatly the people living at higher altitudes, who were not influenced by Cham culture : Katu, Kor, Hre' (West of Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh), Sedang, Gie, Banar (Kontum), M'ngong (Darlac), Ma, Satieng in Upper Dong Nai, etc.

The life of the minority people is also influenced by the Viet and Lao.

Those various tribes live mainly in a primitive economy. Except for a few nationalities who grow rice in flooded fields (west of Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh), in the Lak region (northwest of Buôn Mê Thuôt...), the overwhelming majority live by slash-and-burn farming, hunting, and gathering of forest products. A very small number work in plantations.

As farming methods were backward, and farm tools rudimentary, the rice yield was only about one ton per hectare. That is why under the old regime, people ran short of food for 5-6 months a year. Today, in the liberated areas, farming technique has been improved, and productivity has risen two or three times; in many localities, virgin land in the valleys has been cleared for rice planting.

Handicrafts, such as weaving, metal-working, earthenware, are little developed.

Under French rule, only four ethnic minorities had their own scripts (Banar, Ede, Gia Rai, Cobo). Very few people could afford to go to school; the majority of highlanders were illiterate. Today, almost all the minorities living in the liberated areas possess their own scripts; many highlanders have learnt to write and read; in many villages illiteracy has been liquidated among the cadres and the youth; many of the latter have become teachers, engineers, doctors.

The highlanders have a rich folk culture which however has not yet been fully developed; many ethnic minorities have a treasury of ballads and dances and many traditional musical instruments (gong, xylophone, flute...).

#### **Tradition of anti-imperialist struggle**

The best-known movements were :

Insurrection of the Ede, Gia Rai, led by chieftains Ama Val, Ama Dhao, Ama Trang Gun and Patan Pui in which many French soldiers and administrators were killed (1885-1905).

The 18-year struggle (from 1914 to 1932) of the M'ning and other nationalities led by Ama Trang Cong against French penetration into the mountain regions, against corvées and pressganging.

The Sam Bram uprising (1937-1939) which spread from west of Phu Yen to north and south of the Truong Son range, and east of the Tay Nguyên High-

lands, during which many military posts from western Quang Nam to southern Binh Dinh, eastern Kontum and Upper Dong Nai, were wiped out.

The victorious uprising which annihilated the Ba To post (west of Quang Ngai), set up revolutionary power and established a resistance base against the Japanese (March 11, 1945).

General insurrection in August 1945, leading to seizure of power in various provinces.

During the resistance war against the French (1945-1954) :

Following the French occupation of the Tay Nguyên Highlands in July 1946, the patriotic forces established guerilla bases and resistance bases, even behind the enemy's lines : Stor (Gia Lai), Soap Dui (Sedang), De Leya (Darlac)...

In 1954 : cooperation with the people's armed forces in the liberation of Kontum province, nearly all the province of Gia Lai, and other localities.

— Struggle against the US and its quislings :

From 1954 to 1958 : consolidation of the bases along the Truong Son range and in Kontum ; development of bases in all provinces in the highlands, in the towns, and west of Highway 14. Struggle against "denounce communists", campaigns, against penning up of the population.

In 1959 and early 1960 : Destruction of concentration camps in the western part of Ninh Thuan, western Binh Dinh, and Quang Nam.

Armed insurrection at Tra Bong and west of Quang Ngai (August 28, 1959) and other provinces in Trung

**Bo** : liquidation of cruel enemy agents, suppression of the puppet administrations, setting up of revolutionary power.

Attacks on many posts, armed uprisings in mountain provinces in October and November 1960, shattering of the puppet rural administration.

From 1961 to 1965, fighting against the US "special war", "pacification" plans, the penning up of the local inhabitants in strategic hamlets and concentration camps, which were all destroyed by the end of 1965 ; 500,000 people liberated.

Foiling the plan to set up "special units of montagnards" and to "arm montagnards" in villages and hamlets.

1965-1968 : Cooperation with the people's armed forces to counter "search and destroy" and "pacification plans" :

At Pleime (Gia Lai) : 1,700 enemy troops wiped out (from October 19 to November 18, 1965).

At Plei Jirang (Gia Lai) : 2 American battalions and 8 companies annihilated from February 15 to March 31, 1967.

Uprising in January 1968 : occupation by the patriotic forces of the towns of Kontum, Pleiku, Buôn Mê Thuôt, Dalat.

1969-1972 : fighting against Nixon's "Vietnamisation" of the war :

Campaigns of Dakto, Bu Prang - Duc Lap (1969), campaign of northern Daksieng (1970), campaign of Dakto (1971).

Offensives and uprisings in 1972 : breaching of the Dakto-Tan Canh line (April 1972), annihilation of the system of strategic hamlets, of the concentration area west of Gia Lai, occupation of part of Kontum town (October 1972).

1973-1975 : Struggle against pacification and land-grabbing by Saigon troops, and for the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

#### PROVINCE OF QUANG TRI

Quang Tri is South Viet Nam's northernmost province, just below the Ben Hai River at the 17th parallel (provisional military demarcation line).

Area : 4,740 sq. km with 610 sq. km of plain.

Population : 300,000 inhabitants.

Capital : Quang Tri (1,274 km from Saigon) ; 20,000 inhabitants.

The province comprises 7 districts : Gio Linh, Vinh Linh, Trieu Phong, Hai Lang, Huong Hoa, Cam Lo and Ba Long.

Mountains cover more than half of the territory. Highest peak : Ta Linh or Voi Mep. Lao Bao (350m) is the lowest pass of the Truong Son Range. Principal rivers : Thach Han (or Song Han), Ben Hai, Cam Lo.

The coasts, 40 km long, are flat. They shelter two ports : Cua Viet, 10 km from Quang Tri city, accessible to 1,000-ton vessels, and Cua Tung.

Principal communication routes :

— Highway 1, flanked by a railway ; runs through the province from North to South and past Quang Tri city and the districts of Dong Ha, Hai Lang, Gio Linh and Trung Luong.

— Highway 9 links Dong Ha (on Highway 1) to the Lao border, crossing over the Huong Hoa and Cam Lo Rivers.

Rivers and canals form a dense network of waterways.

Airfields : Quang Tri city, Xun Cam, Cam Lo and Cua Tung.

Economic resources :

— The population lives chiefly by farming. Principal crops : rice and other food plants, coconut, coffee, tea, tobacco, pepper, sugar cane.

— 195,000 hectares of forests including 129,000 ha. of reserves : bamboo, pine, palm, cinnamon.

Forest products : rattan sandalwood, asarabacca, mushroom, precious woods in the western jungle.

— Fishery is fairly prosperous at the river-mouths.

Products of small industry and handicrafts : lime, bricks, tiles, wood articles, ceramics, wickerware, mats, oil, etc...

### *Historical data*

1885 : From Tan So, whither he had retreated, the Emperor Ham Nghi launched the Edict of Anti-French Resistance.

August 23, 1945 : triumph of the general insurrection in the province.

The Resistance forces won victories at Tan Lam, Dong Duong, Nam Dong, Ba Doc, Cau Dai, Huong Hoa.

— 1960 : Uprising and establishment of a revolutionary base.

— 1964 : General uprising.

— 1966 : The PLAF defeated US Operations Hastings, Prairie and Deckhouse in the Cam Lo, Gio Linh highlands.

— 1967 : An attack in depth behind the enemy lines by the PLAF on the night of April 5 destroyed the base camp of the 2nd Regiment, Saigon First Division, at La Vang.

Attack on Quang Tri city.

— 1968 : General offensives and uprisings on the night of January 30.

February : Lang Vay position was taken.

July : the Khe Sanh system of strongpoints, following a 170-day siege (January 21 to July 9), was liberated.

— 1971 : In coordination with Lao patriots in southern Laos, the PLAF frustrated Operation Lam Son 719 by US-Saigon troops (January 30 — March 31).

— 1972 : In the Spring offensives, the PLAF breached the strongest US-Saigon defence line. In 30 days of fighting, they put 20,000 mercenaries out of action and took 3,500 prisoners of war.

## PROVINCE OF THUA THIEN — HUE

### Thua Thien

The province forms a narrow stretch of land, 100 km in length and 50 km in width, 1,100 km north of Saigon.

Area : 5,670 sq. km.

Population : 600,000 inhabitants.

The Van Kieu, Ta Oi, Catu, Paco and Buhy ethnic minorities inhabit some districts. There are six districts altogether : Phong Dien, Quang Dien, Huong Tra, Huong Thuy, Phu Vang and Phu Loc.

The province is mostly mountainous, especially to the West and the Northwest.

Principal river : Song Huong with its source in the Truong Son Range.

The coast is deeply indented by Thuan An channel, 13 km from Hue.

Principal communication routes :

— Highway 1, north — south, flanked by the railway.

— Highway 14, strategic road linking Highway 1 (20 km South of Hue) to the Tay Nguyen Highlands.

— River transport is favoured by a thick network of waterways.

— Airfields : Pho Trach, Van Xa, A Luoi, Huong Thuy and Phu Bai.

— Mineral resources : iron, titanium and copper ores have been prospected.

There exist hot springs at Huong Binh and Thanh Tan.

The forests, which cover 376,000 hectares, supply timber and precious woods.

Agriculture is the major source of income. Rice is the main crop. Some fruits are renowned: citrus, longane, peach, lotus seeds, etc...

Fishing is the second most important economic activity. Rivermouths, sea branches and lagoons are teeming with fish and crustacea.

Handicrafts cover a wide range of trades: silk weaving, copper work, wood and ivory carving, mother-of-pearl inlaid work, basket and mat making, etc... The province is renowned for its palm-leaf conical hats.

### Huê

Attached to Viet Nam more than 6 centuries ago, Huê was the capital of the last feudal dynasty from 1802 to 1945.

Area : 13 sq. km.

Population : 225,000 inhabitants.

South Viet Nam's second political centre after Saigon, Huê is also a cultural and religious centre: Huê University which comprises several faculties, the Institute of *Han* (classical Chinese), etc. Buddhism is flourishing. Huê and Thua Thien count not less than 70,000 faithful and 400 pagodas, spread virtually all

over the province. The Catholic Church is also very active. Huê, a bishopric, possesses seminaries which trains the clergy for Central Viet Nam.

### *Scenic spots and monuments*

Thua Thien is ringed by picturesque mountains and hills : Kim Ngoc, Tam Thai, Thien Tho, Tam Thanh, Kim Phong, Truoi, etc... The Perfume River, Mount Ngu and Lake Tinh Tam make Hue a poetic city. The tourist is entranced not only by the beauty of these natural sites, but also by the charm of architectural works of art such as the citadel, the palaces, the royal tombs, the Thiên Mu Pagoda.

### *Historical data*

1802 : Huê became the capital of the Nguyen dynasty.

1946-1954 : Thua Thien — Huê constituted, together with the provinces of Quang Binh and Quang Tri, the Binh Tri Thiên front. Their armed forces contributed to wiping out many important forces of the French Expeditionary Corps and incapacitating others.

1963 : A powerful movement launched in mid-year by the population of Hue, particularly the Buddhists, contributed to the fall of Ngô Đình Diêm (November 1).

July 1964 : Popular uprising. The puppet village administrations were dismantled in the whole of the province.