numerous other groups and individuals, thousands of new homes have been built, and farm plots are planted and producing.

About 214,000 people went into resettlement programs in 1973, and some 207,000 additional joined their ranks during the first five months of 1974. Some resettlement programs involved inter-regional moves from the crowded camps of Region 1 to unused land in Regions 2 and 3. With almost all of the in-camp Vietnamese refugees resettled or returned home by June 30, 1974, emphasis in the resettlement program has been gradually changing. The main target groups for resettlement during the remainder of 1974 and in 1975 are unemployed city dwellers and former refugees currently living in unviable areas.

Resettlement is entirely voluntary and leaders of resettlement groups usually take part in the choice or approval of sites. A longer period of time is required for resettlement communities to become viable than for RTV communities. While land at RTV sites was once in use and some roads, wells, etc. may still exist, the resettlement site must start from zero. Clearing land for farm plots often proves to be a community’s biggest, most time-consuming problem because some sites are in such areas as government forests which have never before been farmed. Thus, the regular six-month food allowance is often extended several months for resettlers and, before they are able to plant crops on their new land, settlers sometimes make charcoal or engage in other work to earn additional money to support their families.

These long-range programs of return and resettlement—both strongly supported by the U.S. Government—provide major humanitarian and economic benefits to South Vietnam as a whole as well as to the individual refugees. The programs offer the country an efficient, effective, and popular method of increasing agricultural production. Abandoned and virgin land is put to use, as is excess manpower which might otherwise require continued welfare assistance for many years.

The final major category of relief assistance is that provided to in-place war victims. The GVN, with U.S. support, determined that a new type of aid was necessary following the battles of Tet, 1968. Although more than a million South Vietnamese civilians were caught up in the nationwide fighting at that time, suffering property damage or the death or injury of a family member, the majority quickly returned home to rebuild. For the most part, their crops were still in the fields and some of their goods could be salvaged. They did not require long-term support, just a small amount of food to tide them over and government help in rebuilding their homes. The GVN provided this type of assistance then and has continued it. Because of the widespread, hit-and-run fighting experienced in many areas of Vietnam at or since ceasefire, the in-place war victims program was very important in 1978. While 246,000 people submitted claims in 1972, the number doubled to nearly half a million in 1973. Compensation was provided to some 600,000 people during the year for claims submitted in 1973 or in previous years.

1973 and the first half of 1974 was primarily a time of rebuilding and return to a normal life for the nation’s refugees. Assuming no change in the security situation, program emphasis during the remainder of 1974 is expected to be focused on new resettlement movements and the improvement of those sites already established, plus continued assistance to in-place war victims. A number of international voluntary agencies and other nations, in addition to the GVN and the U.S., are assisting in reconstruction efforts and have pledged continued material and financial support to the overall relief and rehabilitation program.

A table showing numbers of newly registered refugees, registrants returned home and registrants resettled from 1964-1974 is shown at Annex A.

For FY 75, A.I.D. has requested $76.5 million to meet the costs of assisting some 100,000 refugees to return home and 550,000 to resettle on new land and to compensate approximately 150,000 people who were affected by the war, including death of family members, injury or damage to their homes. In addition, $30 million has been requested in resettling on productive land 300,000 displaced persons who are now living in overcrowded urban areas. The Government of Vietnam has received applications from more than 600,000 families.

Annex B gives a fairly comprehensive picture of assistance given since the ceasefire by donors other than the U.S. Government. The Government of Japan with $20 million heads the list, but substantial aid has also been given by
Canada, West Germany, South Korea, France and others as well as a large number of voluntary bodies.

It will be noted that the International Red Cross has made substantial inputs. UNICEF's greatly expanded program in South Vietnam is expected to reach $10.5 million for the three years ending in 1975. UNHCR is also seeking some $4 million in funds to help finance a proposed program of refugee resettlement for 60,000 families.

The prospects for assistance in the future from non-U.S. sources are of course uncertain. Present indications are that, if conditions are favorable, it will continue to increase.

U.S. Support of Child Welfare Services in Vietnam

The United States Government's policy in the field of child welfare has been to support the policy of the Government of Vietnam (GVN). The GVN considers that children born in Vietnam to Vietnamese mothers are Vietnamese citizens regardless of parentage or legitimacy. It provides social welfare benefits to them when needed without racial distinction and insists that foreign assistance be provided on the same basis. It opposes large scale overseas adoptions and approves such adoptions only on a case-by-case basis when it determines that the best interests of the child will be served.

In the overall area of services for disadvantaged children in Vietnam, the U.S. Government's support has been substantial. We estimate that some 50 percent of the beneficiaries of the refugee and public health programs are children under the age of 15. Grant food donations under PI-480, Title II have also contributed primarily to child welfare programs. Therefore, we believe it reasonable to attribute at least 50 percent of humanitarian assistance programs as contributing to the support of children. On this basis, we arrive at an estimated 31 million dollars in FY 1973 and 43 million dollars in FY 1974. Our plans for FY 1975 would increase the total for child care to approximately 64 million dollars.

A.I.D. in 1974 initiated a new program designed to place greater emphasis on the needs of Vietnamese children disadvantaged by the war. In carrying out this program, the Government of Vietnam (GVN) and A.I.D. are seeking the maximum participation of United States voluntary agencies and international organizations. For fiscal 1974, A.I.D. programmed $7.6 million in support of this effort, and has requested $8.2 million for FY 1975.

The child welfare program is designed to satisfy two main objectives. The more immediate objective is to provide basic and urgently needed assistance to indigent children requiring food, clothing, shelter and medical care. The longer range objective is to provide services which strengthen the family unit, the traditional provider of social welfare in Vietnamese society. Some examples of the assistance provided to child care are: pediatric care for infants, food allowances for orphans, assistance to agencies processing adoptions, the refurbishing of orphanages, support for day care centers and the expansion of the training of child welfare workers.

Child welfare services in Vietnam are under the jurisdiction of the Vietnamese Ministry of Social Welfare to implement the child welfare program. The GVN agreed to use voluntary agencies to the maximum extent possible. As a result, A.I.D. and GVN entered into a series of grant agreements with nine American voluntary agencies to carry out specific undertakings in the child welfare program. The allocation of funds is set out in annex C to this information note. Of the total of nearly $7.6 million, approximately $5.6 million will be spent through the voluntary agencies. The remaining $1.9 million will be administered directly by the Ministries of Social Welfare and Health.

The major elements of the $7.6 million program are summarized below:

A. Orphanage Support and Improvement

Assistance in the form of food and clothing allowances, health care, equipment, improvement of facilities and staff training is being provided for some 130 institutions caring for approximately 17,000 children. To date orphanages have received food supplementary cash allowances, Food for Peace (PI-480, Title II) commodities and a limited number have received funds for facility improvements.
B. Handicapped Children

Assistance will be provided to improve custodial care and therapy in seven centers caring for some 2,000 children. The seven centers have not received U.S. support heretofore.

C. Pediatric Clinics

Two clinics, one in Saigon, the other in Danang have been established to provide diagnostic and therapeutic care to children disadvantaged by hostilities. Particular emphasis will be placed on children selected by agencies processing Intercountry adoptions and also on severely-ill children from orphanages and other child care institutions. The first clinic, with 70 beds/incubators, began operations in Saigon in January 1974. The Danang clinic with 30 beds began operations in May. The International Rescue Committee is the coordinating voluntary agency with World Relief Commission as the primary sub-grantee in Danang.

D. Day Care Centers

It is planned to provide assistance in the form of equipment, additional food and staff training for 275 existing day care centers and support in the development of 140 new centers. These 415 centers will serve approximately 88,000 children from four to six years of age while their parents work. To date, food supplements have been provided for about 23,000 children in the existing day centers, and also some funds have been provided for improvements.

E. Civilian Widows' Assistance

This activity is designed to provide support, vocational training and small scale capital assistance to 6,000 widows, and indirectly through them to an estimated 25,000 children. A pilot project for vocational training was launched in November 1973.

F. Foster Care

Foster home care services will be provided for about 4,500 children as an alternative to their abandonment, institutionalization or adoption. Foster families will be provided funds to cover food, clothing and medical expenses for each child.

G. Home Nursery Care

It is planned to provide day nursery services for about 9,500 children who are too young for day care centers. A side benefit is the estimated 2,000 jobs it will create for widows or other unemployed women.

H. Nutrition Centers

It is planned to expand three existing nutrition centers and create nine additional centers to care for about 7,800 seriously malnourished children. The nutrition centers will provide intensive medical care with special feeding for up to 60 days of severely malnourished or diseased children and return them to their families once they are restored to health.

I. Prevention of Infant Abandonment

Counseling service will be provided to emotionally distraught expectant mothers who might abandon their children. Trained counselors working in hospitals or maternity centers can identify these mothers and provide the advice and assistance necessary to prevent them from abandoning their children. A small pilot project has been initiated.

J. Midwife Pediatric Training

It is planned to expand three existing nutrition centers and create nine additional nutrition to midwives so they can assist mothers. The midwife is the health worker most respected by and accessible to lower income Vietnamese.

K. International Adoption

This activity is designed to assist four agencies, Travelers Aid International Social Service of America (TAISSA), Holt Adoption Program, Catholic Relief Services and Friends for All Children, to expand and improve their Intercountry adoption programs and related child welfare activities. Because of the special problems related to children of mixed parentage, a sub-grant of
$96,000 has been given to Interagency Vietnam Adoption Program. Annex D shows progress in intercountry adoptions since 1970.

L. Training Child Welfare Workers

This activity is designed primarily to strengthen the role of the Ministry of Social Welfare in developing and implementing family and child welfare services. This will be done by the training of child welfare workers and the upgrading of those already employed. Some initial training has taken place.

The nine voluntary agencies receiving A.I.D. funds are only some of the agencies engaged in programs which benefit children and their families. Altogether there are about 20 American voluntary agencies, more than ten private Vietnamese organizations and a number of foreign voluntary agencies working in this field, many of which are dependent entirely on their own resources. A.I.D. is also encouraging other bilateral donors and international bodies to assist the Government of Vietnam in this sector.

UNICEF, which has worked in South Vietnam for over 20 years, is substantially increasing the scope of its activities and plans expenditure of about $10.5 million over a three year period in child health, welfare, education, water supply and related projects in South Vietnam. In addition to the regular U.S. contribution to UNICEF, A.I.D. proposes a special contribution of at least $3 million toward the $44 million overall program which UNICEF has announced to meet the needs of children in the Indochina Peninsula.

Humanitarian Assistance in Health and Rehabilitation

The United States has been involved in the health program since 1965. During this period of time more than $100,000,000 has been invested in various projects in the health program. In addition numerous personnel have been involved both on a direct hire and a contract basis. Also there have been many volunteer personnel on an individual and team basis from the U.S. and other countries.

Health Personnel

These were as follows:

A. Direct Hire.—Beginning in 1966 there was an intensive recruitment for physicians, nurses, technicians and administrators. They formed a nucleus for the aid program.

B. United States Public Health Service.—They supplied two specialty teams who were assigned to provincial hospitals for varying periods of time. Then teams had a staff of surgeons, nurses, and other technicians who were needed to staff a hospital.

C. U.S. Military.—Each of the services—Army, Navy and Air Force—supplied nine complete teams composed of surgeons, technicians, and nurses who worked in provincial hospitals. Later these teams were redesigned to become public health orientated so that they could work principally in preventive medicine. In addition certain critical specialists were detailed on an individual basis.

The Armed Forces also cooperated with the provisional hospitals in accepting Vietnamese patients and many of the military were granted permission to work in the hospitals during their free time.

D. Other Donor Countries.—Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Iran, Japan, Netherlands, Philippines and China supplied medical personnel. Some of these countries were supported through A.I.D. contracts; others were financed by their own country.

E. Contracts.—Several agencies had contractual arrangements with A.I.D. including the American Medical Association, American Dental Association, Catholic Conference, National Rehabilitation Institute (NRI), Children’s Medical Relief International (CMRI).

Projects

A. Construction.—Since 1966 construction projects included eight new and reconstruction of 11 provincial hospitals, 20 surgical suites for provincial hospitals, nursing schools, a laboratory school, a medical school, numerous dispensaries, a National Center for Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery, and sub-units of the National Rehabilitation Institute.
B. Medical Care.—The medical personnel were deployed both on a team basis and an individual basis to work in various health facilities. Initially they worked directly with the patients but as the staffing of the facilities by Vietnamese increased the other personnel assumed an advisory role. Through the American Medical Association, Volunteer Physician for Vietnam program played a very important part in this program and during the life of the program they supplied more than 1,000 volunteers who spent from one to three months in Vietnam.

C. Medical and Dental Education Project.—These projects were conducted through contracts with the American Medical Association (AMA) and the American Dental Association (ADA). Physicians and dentists have served at the schools in a teaching and advisory capacity. In addition numerous Vietnamese have received training in the United States. Currently there are 68 Vietnamese students in the U.S. attending various schools. The number of graduate doctors has increased from 50 to 200 per year and their qualifications and specializations have been modernized.

D. Logistics Project.—A major medical depot was established in Phu The and three subdepos were established in Regions I, II and IV. Medical supplies were obtained from Okinawa through the U.S. Army supply system. The Department of Defense has contributed 50 percent of the financing and A.I.D. contributed the other 50 percent plus 22 percent transportation fees.

E. Other project activities include Population and Family Planning and Malaria Control.

Rehabilitation

Through A.I.D. efforts, the National Rehabilitation Institute in Saigon has been enlarged to provide more facilities for the building of prosthetic devices, braces, training of the blind and care of paraplegics. A.I.D. has also assisted in the establishing of three other centers which are fully operational. In addition six satellite centers have been completed and are ready for operation with four more centers to be completed by the end of 1974. The total output of these centers will be 30,000 devices per year including major repair.

A.I.D. has proposed for FY 1975 a new and expanded rehabilitation project which will include rehabilitation of the crippled, blind and paraplegics.

National Center for Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery

In 1967 A.I.D. entered into an agreement with Children's Medical Rehabilitation, Inc. to develop a National Center for Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery. Originally this center was established to provide plastic and reconstructive surgery for war wounded children under 16 years of age.

A two story facility was constructed on the grounds of Cho Ray Hospital to provide there services. Since there were no trained technicians in this field, the Center (also referred to as the Barsky Unit) provided the staff of highly skilled plastic and orthopedic surgeons and ancillary personnel. Since that time progress has been made in training Vietnamese personnel and the Ministry of Health has assumed much of the financing. In order to expedite the opening of the Center a contract was entered into between A.I.D. and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) to operate a convalescent center. This center is a 120 bed facility located at some distance from the Center. Its purpose is to receive patients who are referred by the Center and prepare them for surgery. Patients are also discharged from the Center to the convalescent center for postoperative care.

Currently a convalescent facility is being developed by CMRI and will be completed in the fall of 1974. This facility is adjacent to the Surgery Center and will facilitate the care of patients. In order for the Center to operate as a burn unit it is necessary to enlarge the original building by adding a third floor. This expanded facility will require remodeling of the other two floors by enlarging the laboratory, kitchen facilities, laundry and nursing quarters. In addition it will be necessary to extend the stairwells and elevator shaft. Currently $712,000 has been allocated by A.I.D. and authorized by the Congress to complete this construction and for operating expenses for FY 1975.
### Newly registered refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Newly registered refugees</th>
<th>Registrants returned home</th>
<th>Registrants resettled</th>
<th>Refugees in temporary status at end of year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964-66</td>
<td>1,678,000</td>
<td>325,000</td>
<td>543,000</td>
<td>810,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>436,000</td>
<td>215,000</td>
<td>137,000</td>
<td>794,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>494,000</td>
<td>302,000</td>
<td>148,000</td>
<td>1,329,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>590,000</td>
<td>189,000</td>
<td>432,000</td>
<td>268,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>122,000</td>
<td>388,000</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>137,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>121,000</td>
<td>265,000</td>
<td>127,000</td>
<td>94,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>675,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>59,000</td>
<td>284,500</td>
<td>214,400</td>
<td>233,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>148,000</td>
<td>3432,000</td>
<td>5388,000</td>
<td>129,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. A single refugee may be listed in more than one column and/or several times within a single column if displaced more than once.
2. Without aid.
3. With GVN assistance.
4. Paid all RTV allowances.
5. Survey registrants paid 1-month rice allowance.
6. Paid all resettlement allowances.
7. With certificate for RTV program.
8. Large numbers of the estimated 1,320,000,000 people forced to leave their homes at some time during 1972 were not officially registered. However, an estimated 300,000 took refuge at official GVN temporary sites, the normal criteria for registration noted in the top line of each previous year.
9. Most or all allowances paid.
11. Through July 5.

### Other Donor Humanitarian Assistance (Part I)

1. Since the ceasefire in January 1973, twelve nations other than the United States have contributed to the resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees, according to a list obtained from the Directorate General for Land Development and Hamlet Building. The countries and their contributions, with the equivalent dollar or plaster value where available are:

   A. **Japan.**—Equivalent of U.S. $20 million in commodities, primarily 30,000 wooden houses, 1,000 steel frame houses; 4,200 prefabricated houses; 200,000 shovels; 200,000 hoes; 50,000 hand saws; 50,000 axes; 300 tractors; and U.S. $1.942 million in drugs.

   B. **Republic of the Philippines.**—Equivalent of U.S. $10,000 to purchase 10 steel frames for public buildings in Quang Tri.

   C. **Republic of China.**—20,000 sets of farm tools; 10,000 kg of vegetable seeds and fertilizers; 15 tractors; 15 pumps; 10 insecticide sprayers; and 2,488 cartons of drugs.

   D. **Republic of Korea.**—10,000 tons of cement; 24,922 blankets; and U.S.$ 1 million worth of drugs.

   E. **Denmark.**—369,874 roofing sheets. U.S.$ 1 million worth of roofing sheets given through UNICEF.

   F. **West Germany.**—507,027 kg of corrugated iron sheets.

   G. **Great Britain.**—5 steel frames for building a temporary hospital in Quang Tri; 1,625 kg of vegetable seeds and fertilizers for flood victims; and 8,810 blankets for Montagnard refugees resettled in Lam Dong.

   H. **Canada.**—42,067 cartons of canned fish.

   I. **France.**—VNS 118 billion for the purchase of farm tools, tractors, and drugs.

   J. **Australia.**—109,000 roofing sheets plus clothes and nylon fabrics for mosquito nets.

   K. **Laos.**—U.S.$ 4,286.

   L. **New Zealand.**—VNS 65 million for rebuilding Bong Son Hospital.

2. International organization contributions listed by LDHB are:

   A. **UNICEF.**—250 tents and plastic rolls; VNS 151 million to buy 101 steel frame houses; and VNS 94.9 million to repair schools in Thua Thien, Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Provinces. The following projects are approved in principle by UNICEF and plaster figures are estimated: VNS 160 million for a vocational training center in Quang Tri; VNS 1.815 billion to establish a potable-
water system for 25 resettlement sites; VN$ 250 million for a Vietnamese Classic Art Training Center in Thu Thien; and VN$ 200 million for an integrated program of child welfare in Quang Tri.

B. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.—U.S.$ 200,000 to assist Khmer refugees in South Vietnam.

C. World Food Program.—Proposed Food for Work project distributing VN$ 300 million worth of food to compensate resettlers for 320,000 man-days of repairing dikes and dredging canals in Quang Tri.

D. Indochina Operations Group.—VN$ 500 million in cash and in commodities, primarily to reconstruct schools and clinics in Quang Tri, build a clinic in Song Pha Resettlement center and aid flood victims and Khmer refugees.

3. Foreign voluntary agency contributions are:

A. Japanese Red Cross.—193,293 roofing sheets.

B. The Maltese Aid Service.—Services to two experts for supervising the building of Hai Lang City, and construction of Hoa Minh village for 2,100 war refugees.

C. Free Swedish Church.—VN$ 55 million for Ninh Thuan resettlement sites.

4. Because there is no central clearing house for contributions and because funds or commodities are sometimes given to individual projects, through international agencies, or directly to Vietnamese groups, it is likely that additional countries or organizations made contributions and that those mentioned above contributed other items as well. Of course, many U.S. voluntary agencies also provide large amounts of humanitarian assistance to a wide variety of programs throughout South Vietnam.

Other Donor Humanitarian Assistance (Part II)

1. Many other countries, foreign voluntary agencies and international organizations have provided humanitarian assistance to South Vietnam over the years and have made an important impact on the areas and people they have served, whether through small commodity donations or major programs such as the building and equipping of schools and hospitals. The need for humanitarian aid is so great that Vietnam can easily and usefully absorb contributions from many areas without being oversupplied. Country by country, project by project assessments of objectives and accomplishments in various project categories are not now available and could not be compiled without prohibitive expense of time and manpower. Information provided in Part I and in this paper details the data readily available from a number of sources.

2. For a number of reasons, it is impossible to accurately categorize projects determine exact dollar equivalents of funds and commodities, or describe all of the projects undertaken through "other donor" assistance because:

a. There is no central clearing house for full information on "other donor" aid.

b. Scattered data collected by one office or another in either the GVN or USAID is sometimes contradictory and always subject to omission.

c. Countries often give aid through international organizations or a consortium. Some of these donations are then double-counted, once by the country and once by the organization, in some assistance compilations and left out entirely by others.

d. Overlap in the type of assistance provided sometimes leads to confusion or double-counting in categorization of projects—for example, the provision of medicines to refugees could easily come under the topic headings of either health or refugee relief.

e. Donations are sometimes assigned a dollar equivalent by the contributor, other times by the recipient, and still other times by various offices charged with describing assistance given.


4. The following "humanitarian assistance" columns appear in a chart on bilateral assistance in the GVN's "Annual Statistical Report of South Vietnam, 1978." The chart gives no descriptive information on activities undertaken, and provides no indication as to whether they are long-range or emergency. It merely lists topic headings and estimated dollar equivalents of goods and cash provided. There is undoubtedly some overlapping between categories. Some discrepancies between the chart, the information given in Part I, and the health
information provided in paragraph 5, below are readily apparent. A few examples: part of the $20 million Japan officially agreed in 1974 to give for refugee relief and resettlement was actually provided in 1973; the GVN chart shows no health contribution from the United Kingdom, yet that nation is listed in paragraph 5, as providing 35,000 doses of measles vaccine. At any rate, the chart shows the following aid given in CY 1973:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Refugees and relief</th>
<th>Social welfare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>$249,000</td>
<td>$173,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1,534,000</td>
<td>408,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>$230,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>$4,968,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5,440,000</td>
<td>4,308,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>885,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>4,086,000</td>
<td>216,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,002,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>2,923,000</td>
<td>96,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>462,000</td>
<td>161,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>114,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>321,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>391,000</td>
<td>301,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. In addition to the other donor assistance input mentioned in Part I, the following countries/organizations have contributed money, equipment, etc. to the GVN Health Sector during CY 1973.

a. England—35,000 doses of measles vaccine valued at 10,000 pounds sterling. This was a one time donation for immediate needs.

b. Korea—Construction is completed on the 500-bed hospital in Saigon (Cho Quan). Korea previously donated over US$ 2 million dollars for this project. Two of the four floors of the hospital are in use now; the remainder will be opened as staff requirements are met (at least by December 1974). We consider this a long-term project since Korea has stated that they will have an advisory staff assigned to the hospital for some time in the future. It is too early for an evaluation of the impact of the program.

Korea also dispatched ten physicians for short-term assignments to MOH hospitals in Saigon, Danang, Vung Tau, Binh Hoa and Can Tho. Beginning in 1974, these physicians will be part of the advisory staff at Cho Quan.

c. Canada—Funded construction (over US$ 1 million dollars) of the PH Field Training Center in Long Xuyen. This long-term project provides a facility for field training of Public Health Assistant Technicians from the National Institute of Public Health. A Canadian advisor is also assigned to this facility.

Other donations—1,200 metric tons of milk powder for the Maternal/Child Health program valued at 750,000 Canadian dollars; C $700,000 worth of drugs for civilian casualties; vaccines; 256,000 doses of DT, 400,000 polio and 1,500,000 DPT.

d. Japan—Construction continues on the new Cho Ray Hospital in Saigon (to be completed by December 1974). Approximately 288 million yen were programmed for purchase of equipment for this facility. This is a long-term project that cannot yet be evaluated. An advisory staff will be provided.

Japan has also continued their neurosurgery program at Cho Ray consisting of one physician and one x-ray technician.

Twenty scholarships in nursing service and two for x-ray technicians were also offered.

e. New Zealand—Constructed an out-patient dispensary in Gia Dinh province; a nurses' dormitory at the nursing school in Binh Dinh; supplied 514 pounds of dental supplies for the Dental Technician School in Saigon; donated four ambulance boats; and supplied $12,000 of medical equipment.

The eight member surgical team continues their efforts at the Binh Dinh Province Hospital. We feel that they have made a significant input to the surgical capability at this hospital. They have been in place for ten years.

Scholarships in the following fields were offered: 1 in ophthalmology; 4 for dental technicians; 2 in nursing; and 2 in health inspection (sanitation).

f. Switzerland—Donated ten clinicmobiles valued at $386,670. These vehicles arrived in Vietnam in February 1974; we, therefore, cannot evaluate impact at this time.

g. Australia—Constructed an out-patient facility in District 8, Saigon valued at VN$ 112 million. (Funded in 1972). A neurosurgical technician was
assigned to Cho Ray Hospital as an advisor. Fifteen scholarships for in-service training were offered.

h. German Initiative Assistance Overseas—Began Phase I construction (15 million piastres) of a new children’s outpatient dispensary at Quang Tin Province Hospital.

i. Denmark/Vietnam Association—Supplied US $15,000 worth of medical equipment and supplies for MOH hospitals.

j. Swiss Red Cross—Four gifts of equipment (unknown composition) and incubators for the Danang Hospital.

k. Vietnamese Red Cross—500 beds for MOH hospitals in Bien Hoa, Can Tho and Ninh Thuan.

l. Maltese Aid Service—Continued operation of the German-Vietnam Hospital in Danang. They have agreed to continue support at this facility for two more years (thru CY 76) at an expected cost of about five million dollars. Their advisory assistance at this facility has been significant.

The following projects have been confirmed for CY 74:

a. Canada—453,000 pounds of powdered milk and 1,750 pounds of skim milk powder.

b. United Nations Development Program—$7,500 for short-term consultant (1) in drug quality control; one expert for advisory services in Social Development Planning (60,000) and one scholarship in that field (2,350). In anticipation of WHO support of the malaria control program, UNDP has budgeted $245,000 for this project. It will fund three advisors, 12 man-months of training and $16,000 worth of equipment/supplies. A total of $182,000 has been programmed for Environmental Sanitation improvements (water supplies and sewage and pollution control). This will include four advisors, equipment and scholarship. UNDP programs could have a significant impact on MOH development. However, at this time an evaluation is not possible.

The MOH has requested the assistance of other countries for programs during CY 1974 in the areas of vaccine production (Australia), drug production (Japan), construction of health facilities (German Red Cross, France) and malaria control (Switzerland). These projects have not as yet been confirmed.

6. The following “other national” or international voluntary agencies are involved in social welfare and other activities in Vietnam:

a. Community Development Foundation/Save the Children Foundation—Supports community development and self-help projects for refugees and indigent families; administers U.S. sponsored scholarships for needy children; and aids in the reconstruction of war-damaged school and homes.

b. German Initiative Assistance Overseas—Operates an orphanage and a Montagnard boarding school in Quang Tin; provides medical care for refugees and inmates of detention centers in the province.

c. Institute for International Solidarity—Provides social and youth activities and medical services at eight social centers in My Tho, Go Vap, Binh Duong, Bien Hoa, Oia Dinh and Saigon; sponsors family planning courses; assists vocational training programs in Tan Hoa and Thu Dau; operates a juvenile correction center at Thu Dau; provides subsidies to an orphanage in Saigon, a kindergarten in Quang Ngai City, and a day care center in Quang Ngai.

d. International Social Service—Provides family counseling; processes foreign and domestic adoptions; provides foster family care for orphans; and assists in reuniting families with mixed nationalities.

e. League of Red Cross Societies—Provides subsidies and commodity support for the relief and medical activities of the Vietnam Red Cross Society, benefitting refugees, the indigent, and victims of natural disasters.

f. Norwegian Missionary Alliance—Provides 60 homes, a school, a church, food and medical services for 300 lepers and their families at their village (Long Thanh District, Bien Hoa Province); also has constructed 16 homes for refugees and a student hostel at Binh Tuy City.

g. The Ockenden Venture—Provides food, medical services, 60 houses, a school and a church for 300 lepers and their families at their village (Long Thanh, Bien Hoa Province) and also has constructed 16 homes for refugees and a student hostel at Binh Tuy City.

h. OXFAM—Provides grants for orphanages, day centers, vocational training schools and medical facilities.

i. Save the Children Fund—Provides medical treatment and nursing for orphans and other children convalescing from injuries or illness; and sponsors child health training for mothers.
j. SOS Kinderdorf Vietnam—Operates “Children Villages,” (modern small unit orphanage complexes) in Go Vap (Gia Dinh) and Dalat.

k. Terre des Hommes/Germany—Provides subsidies for orphanages and medical facilities, particularly the Minh Quy Hospital in Kontum.

1. World Alliance of DMCA, Vietnam—Promotes youth activities and leadership training programs; community service projects and seminars; nutrition and self-help projects for refugees; vocational training; literacy programs and reading rooms.

7. Additional humanitarian assistance information from international organizations shows:

a. UNICEF—Contributions totaling $791,000 in CY 73 and plans for a greatly expanded program in CY 74 and 75. The program is directed toward the continuation and expansion of health services; aid to orphanages, day care centers, handicapped children’s centers and the National School of Social Work; provision of water and sanitation facilities to rural maternities and primary schools; school equipment, medicines and food for refugees; emergency assistance to flood victims. UNICEF project proposals by category for 1973, 1974 and 1975 are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>$523,000</td>
<td>$492,000</td>
<td>$300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,890,000</td>
<td>1,927,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water supply, selected services (social welfare, nutrition, rehabilitation)</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>330,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergencies (relief and resettlement, etc.)</td>
<td>68,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>785,000</td>
<td>4,412,000</td>
<td>6,087,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. COREV—Cooperation to the Reconstruction of Vietnam, funded by Catholic groups in many parts of the world, has taken resettlement and Return to Village as its top priority project, with other projects involving rural development, handicrafts, schools, dispensaries, emergency relief, aid to the handicapped and to prisoners, and many more. COREV has committed $5.2 million to a wide variety of projects from January 1, 1973, to date and is considering project proposals for an additional $1 million.

ANNEX C.—AID FUNDED CHILD CARE PROGRAM IN VIETNAM, 1974, ALLOCATION OF FUNDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Funds</th>
<th>Date of agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercountry adoption and related child care services.</td>
<td>Traveler’s Aid—International Social Service of America.</td>
<td>$224,000</td>
<td>Nov. 1, 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interagency Vietnamese Adoption Committee</td>
<td>Holt International Children’s Service</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>Apr. 1, 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Holt International Children’s Service</td>
<td>143,000</td>
<td>Jun 10, 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Friends for All Children</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>Jun 10, 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interagency Vietnamese Adoption Committee</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>May 17, 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interagency Vietnamese Adoption Committee</td>
<td>1,355,000</td>
<td>Dec. 31, 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World Relief Commission</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>Dec. 31, 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World Relief Commission</td>
<td>118,000</td>
<td>May 24, 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family assistance and foster care</td>
<td>Holt International Children’s Service</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family assistance and foster care</td>
<td>Holt International Children’s Service</td>
<td>417,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family assistance and foster care</td>
<td>World Vision Relief Organization</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family assistance and foster care</td>
<td>World Vision Relief Organization</td>
<td>419,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family assistance and foster care</td>
<td>World Vision Relief Organization</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prevention of infant abandonment</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Handicapped children</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Welfare</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Handicapped children</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Welfare</td>
<td>1,335,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Child health services</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>324,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical assistance</td>
<td>USAID Personnel</td>
<td>360,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,513,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td>87,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,600,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX D.—ADOPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total adoptions</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adopted in the United States</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Orphan statistics

Full or partial 'orphans' in Vietnam .......................... 1,000,000
Children of fallen servicemen being cared for by Ministry of War Veterans (estimate) ............................................................... 705,000
Children in registered Vietnam orphanages 179 institutions (estimate) 17,000
Children in nonregistered Vietnam orphanages 7 institutions (estimate) ............................................................... 400
Mixed orphans in orphanages (estimate) ............................................................... 700
Children fathered by black Americans in orphanages (estimate) .......................... 276

CAMBODIA

The Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) estimated that as of the end of May 1974, there were over one million war-displaced persons in Cambodia—446,000 registered in Phnom Penh, 488,000 in the provinces and 245,000 not registered. Of this number about 27,000 are in ten government camps and centers and the remainder are living with friends and relatives or, for a limited period, in temporary shelters. An estimated 479,000 were receiving U.S. assistance in the form of food, shelter, clothing, tools and fertilizer at the end of May 1974.

The assistance being provided by A.I.D. to the GKR takes the form of (a) grants to U.S. voluntary agencies and to international agencies working in the field of refugee relief; and (b) grants of CIP generated counterpart funds to a semi-autonomous agency of the GKR—the Resettlement and Development Foundation (RDF).

The U.S. voluntary agencies (volalgs) have concentrated their efforts to date mainly on providing immediate humanitarian relief while the recently chartered RDF's efforts have been directed toward the longer term resettlement of refugees on economically viable farm plots. (A description of the RDF is attached.)

A.I.D.'s grants to the volalgs and a summary of the programs of each are outlined below:

Catholic Relief Services (CRS).—CRS has received grants from A.I.D. totaling $1,926,000 since May 1973. In addition CRS has received $11.4 million in rials from A.I.D. since February 1974. CRS has fielded a 35-man team of U.S. and Third Country Nationals (TCN) to help distribute food, clothing and household items; dispense basic medical care; provide materials and supervise emergency housing construction; and provide in-place vocational training for refugees. CRS is currently caring for about 250,000 refugees.

World Vision Relief Organization (WVRO).—WVRO has received grants totaling $525,000 from A.I.D. since June 1973. In addition WVRO has received $2.0 million in rials from A.I.D. since February 1974. WVRO has fielded an eight-man team to conduct a refugee relief program similar to CRS's, but with a greater emphasis on medical care for refugees and resettlement. WVRO is currently caring for about 55,000 refugees.

Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, Inc. (CARE).—CARE received a $500,000 grant from A.I.D. in May 1973. In addition CARE has received almost $2.9 million in rials from A.I.D. since February 1974. CARE has fielded a five-man staff to conduct a refugee relief program similar to that described for CRS except that CARE does not provide medical aid. The CARE program has tended to emphasize resettlement including community development projects. CARE is currently caring for about 36,000 refugees.
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).—The ICRC has received grants totaling $1.8 million from A.I.D. since December 1972 for its refugee relief program in Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. In addition it has received $300,000 in riels from A.I.D. since July 1974 exclusively for its program in Cambodia. While the ICRC's program is similar to that described for CRS, by far the greatest emphasis has been on providing medical care. ICRC has fielded seven medical teams, comprised principally of one doctor and three nurses each to date. Three of the teams are in the provinces and the balance are providing care in the Phnom Penh area. In addition to its more normal work in refugee relief, the ICRC has established four offices for tracing missing persons. The ICRC is currently caring for about 100,000 refugees. Although ICRC functions in the three countries of the Indochina Peninsula, its principal activities are in Cambodia. This is also evident from the fact that ICRC has 30 expatriate staff in Cambodia as against 14 in South Vietnam and 15 in Laos. The total contributions to this program from international donors including the USG as of March 18, 1974, was in excess of $17 million dollars. We calculate that over $8.5 million of this total will have been devoted to refugee relief in Cambodia by September 1974. The USG plans to make another $2 million contribution to the ICRC for its Indochina program in FY 1975.

UNICEF.—The UNICEF program of assistance to children and mothers in Indochina will direct about $3.6 million to Cambodia during the period May 1973, through December 1975. The UNICEF program in Indochina, if fully subscribed, will total $44.2 million, including a proposed special USG donation of $3 million over and above the regular USG contribution to the UNICEF general budget. UNICEF is currently assisting about 32,000 Cambodian refugees. The British Save the Childrens Fund is currently caring for 6,000 refugees in Cambodia and the Asian Christian Service has recently fielded two refugee relief medical teams.

Turning to the second thrust of A.I.D.'s assistance to the GKR in meeting the problem created by the presence of large numbers of war-displaced persons, A.I.D. provided some of the leadership and organizational talent needed to create the Resettlement and Development Foundation (RDF). In addition, after its creation, the RDF received an initial grant of about $4.2 million in riels from A.I.D. in March 1974. The RDF initiated its resettlement efforts with four projects one each in Phnom Penh, Kompong Thom, Siem Reap, Oudon Mean Chey. The first of these projects was to have resettled 5,000 families (about 30,000 persons) by August 1974. The other three projects envision re-establishment of 7,500 families (about 45,000 persons). Apart from resettlement per se, the RDF is also exploring the possibility of increasing available protein supplies through refugee managed fowl, swine and fisheries projects. American direct-hire personnel providing technical guidance to the Foundation include a construction engineer, an agriculturist, a health administrator and two refugee advisors.

A summary of past and a preliminary estimate of A.I.D. assistance to war-displaced persons is provided:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Contribution fiscal year 1972-74</th>
<th>Estimate fiscal year 1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRS Plus</td>
<td>$1,926,000</td>
<td>$650,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVO Plus</td>
<td>11,400,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE Plus</td>
<td>521,000</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC Plus</td>
<td>2,300,000</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDF</td>
<td>2,928,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,350,000</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 In riels.
2 Prorata share of AID’s dollar contribution to ICRC.
3 AID contribution to ICRC made in riels.

In addition to the above, A.I.D. plans to provide about $5.0 million in FY 1975 for grants to UNICEF and the UNHCR, U.S. direct-hire technician costs, resettlement equipment and materials, and relief services and food.
Health

A.I.D. assistance in the health area in Cambodia has been to provide medical teams through the Indochina Operations Group and the Catholic Relief Services. The Lutheran World Service has recently completed a survey and will propose to send medical teams which A.I.D. will help to finance. A.I.D. has also provided ten emergency hospital units which have been placed in conjunction with the medical teams.

Other donors such as Asian Christian Service and World Vision Relief Organization are also providing medical personnel.

The World Health Organization in the past six months has reviewed the health situation in Cambodia and in close cooperation with UNICEF and the U.S.A.I.D. has undertaken to expand its activities involving control of communicable diseases through mass inoculations, health planning advisory services to the Ministry of Health, and operational assistance to the major hospitals in Phnom Penh. A.I.D., through its health administration advisors is exploring how it might expand medical assistance such as improving the present hospital facilities, and expanding the medical supply system. Of considerable concern to all parties is the declining nutritional base for the total population but especially the refugees and urban poor.

Rehabilitation

The World Health Organization has an advisory team working with orthopedic units. A new building has recently been completed with financial assistance from the international community including the Japanese and German Governments, the Association of International Women, Rotary International, the United Nations, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (which is partially financed through a grant from A.I.D.). The National Center services 200 patients per day with 26 technicians trained in the construction and repair of prosthetic and orthopedic devices and in the physical rehabilitation of the disabled.

CAMBODIA—PHNOM PENH MILITARY HOSPITAL BED STATUS: BED SITUATION IN MILITARY HOSPITALS, PHNOM PENH, APR. 11, 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of hospital</th>
<th>Number of beds</th>
<th>Beds occupied</th>
<th>Percent occupancy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monivong</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>701st Evacuation</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400th Station</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,344</td>
<td>2,040</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figures furnished by office of Surgeon General, Khmer Armed Forces.

CAMBODIA INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES MEDICAL ASSISTANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presently in country and location</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Country/organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sway Rieng</td>
<td>Surgical</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Belgian Red Cross.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
<td>Pediatric</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Swiss Red Cross.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kompong Chhnang</td>
<td>Surgical</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Belgian Red Cross.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kompong Thom</td>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Norwegian Red Cross.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee camps in Phnom Penh</td>
<td>Medical and administrative</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Philippines, CRS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>France, Bangladesh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee camps in Phnom Penh (on part-time basis)</td>
<td>Medical and administrative</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>British/New Zealand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kompong Spei</td>
<td>Medical/surgical</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>World Vision Relief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kompong Som</td>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Philippines, CRS.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note.—CRS presently has a total of 17 medical personnel in the country with 3 more on the way. In addition to the teams listed above, CRS will organize mobile teams to service Neak Neak Focoung hospital and refugee sites as the need arises.
### BED SITUATION MINISTRY OF HEALTH CIVILIAN GENERAL HOSPITALS, PHNOM PENH, APRIL 10, 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of hospital</th>
<th>Number of beds</th>
<th>Beds occupied</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent occupancy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proah Ket MealeL</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>1,377</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klimero-Sovietique</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>525</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>1,456</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td>1,036</td>
<td>1,247</td>
<td>2,783</td>
<td>252</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### BED SITUATION IN CONVALESCENT HOSPITALS, APRIL 6, 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of hospital</th>
<th>Number of beds</th>
<th>Beds occupied</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent occupancy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satheanak Ratha, ex-Chinese Embassy</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussey Keo</td>
<td></td>
<td>265</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Laos**

It is estimated that, since 1962, over 700,000 Laotians have been on the refugee rolls at one time or another. As of June 30, 1974, over 190,000 were receiving assistance. Until very recently the possibility of conducting a large-scale resettlement program for these refugees was inhibited, at best, or precluded, at worst, by the continuous fighting that has engulfed Laos.

For some years, USAID/Laos has been devoting about one-third of its funds to refugee assistance of one type or another.

The earlier emergency relief and long-term sustenance character of AID’s assistance to the Royal Lao Government in meeting the refugee problem will be phased down as the prospects for permanent resettlement of refugees improve under the new Provisional Government of National Unity (PGNU). AID’s assistance to the PGNU will increasingly stress the necessity for permanent resettlement of refugees in both new and former home areas. This is not to suggest that none has taken place. In fact, 53,000 refugees were resettled during FY 1974, 37,000 are currently in the process of resettlement, and as of June 15, approximately 76,000 refugees had returned to their former homes during FY 1974, with the bulk of these being in the southern panhandle areas.

The northern portion of Laos controlled by Vientiane side, which currently contains 154,000 refugees, constitutes a very difficult problem if one assumes that refugees will remain within this area. Refugees in this area have little prospect of attaining self-sufficiency in a reasonable period of time given the paucity of agricultural land and/or other means of livelihood available. It is hoped that intensive economic and agricultural development efforts which are currently being pressed in this area, coupled with an increasing tendency of refugee groups to resettle in regions to the north and east which were previously subject to military activity, will gradually reduce the problem to minor proportions.

U.S. AID has made arrangements with the Ministry of Social Welfare to provide, on a one-time basis, food and other commodity support for those refugees wishing to return to Pathet Lao (PL) controlled areas.

To date, the PL have not encouraged refugees to return to PL controlled areas. This policy may, however, change in the period following the harvest prior to the new planting season.

AID’s refugee relief assistance in FY 1974 totaled $13.5 million plus $2.5 million in PL 480 Title II food stuffs. A refugee assistance program of $15.3 million plus PL 480 Title II foods is proposed for FY 1975.

Approximately $250,000 of AID’s FY 1974 $2.0 million grant to the ICRC was directed by the ICRC to refugee relief in Laos, AID plans a similar FY
1975 grant to the ICRC. In addition, A.I.D. contemplates grants to two United Nations agencies in FY 1975. One is to UNICEF which is already operating in Laos and plans expenditure of some $5 million for child welfare, health, education and related activities in 1974 and 1975. The other grant would be made to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees which has been asked by the PGNU to use its “good offices” to assist the Government in a program of refugee assistance.

Health

Within the limits imposed by disruptions during many years of strife, U.S. A.I.D. has supported extensive programs in medical activities. In conjunction with other donors, U.S. A.I.D. health experts have been deeply involved in maintaining continued high nutrition standards in the refugee food support program. These efforts have received praise from international health and nutrition experts. In the past seven years the number of refugees assisted by this feeding program has ranged from a low of 86,000 in 1968 to a high of 379,000 in 1973. As a result, there is little indication of malnutrition in the refugee population mass although secondary malnourishment does exist to some extent. Between FY 1972 and FY 1974, U.S. A.I.D. has supported a well construction program that has provided approximately 1,550 wells yielding potable water. Tens of thousands of mosquito nets are distributed yearly to refugees in endemic malarial areas. A joint Royal Lao Government (RLG), World Health Organization (WHO) and U.S. A.I.D. pilot program in malaria control, begun in 1969, has been expanded to refugee areas this year as part of the RLG United Nations Development Program (UNDP), WHO and U.S. A.I.D. five-year malaria control program.

Through the USAID Public Health Development project, services provided since 1963 included over 200,000 inpatient and about 16,000,000 outpatient visits. Refugees account for over a third of the patient visits in recent years. In 1973 U.S. A.I.D. supported seven RLG hospitals and 210 rural dispensaries. Assistance to improvement of the Lao public health services capability has included construction and equipping of facilities, training of medical personnel, and provision of medical commodities. A contract with Operation Brotherhood provides Filipino medical personnel to help staff the RLG hospitals and assist in on the job training for Lao personnel. A Maternal and Child Health project contributes to the development of a healthy Lao population as well as providing support to the RLG formal population policy. A 200-bed maternal and child health hospital (which will also serve as a training center) was built in Vientiane, and provincial centers added to hospitals in other cities. In addition, over 130 clinics offer family planning services.

In cooperation with the WHO and United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), approximately 600,000 vaccinations are given yearly against smallpox, cholera and typhoid in areas controlled by the Viengtiane side. Additionally, polio vaccine has been provided for a mass campaign three times in the past ten years and is included in vaccines supplied to the expanding Maternal Child Health Program, along with diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus vaccines. The U.S. Government (USG) has provided about 90 percent of the above vaccines. Success of the program can be demonstrated in that there has been no significant outbreak of these diseases since 1963. WHO is in the process of developing a countrywide BCG program against TB with the RLG.

Through joint efforts with the Mekong Committee, the Senemea Tropical Medicine Institutions, the Smithsonian Institution, the Rockefeller Foundation and WHO, significant progress has been made in gathering necessary basic epidemiologic data on prevalent parasitic diseases such as liver fluke, lung fluke and, among others, schistosomiasis. This cooperative effort will permit development through international organizations of appropriate control and treatment programs for these endemic diseases.

The USG participant training program has been responsible for sending approximately three hundred Laoitians out of country for courses in midwifery, family planning, sanitation, nursing and post-graduate medical training for doctors. With U.S. A.I.D. support, the WHO/RLG medical educational system has expanded to the point where all under-graduate education can be accomplished within Laos. The output of various professionals has nearly tripled the past five years from 110 resident students in 1968 to 310 in 1973.
With specific reference to leprosy, the French Mission supplies a well-qualified leprologist to the RLG. He has over the past years coordinated case findings and establishment of a series of leper villages throughout the country where those afflicted may receive care. The actual support of these villages comes from Catholic and Protestant organizations with minor commodity input by U.S. A.I.D., such as bandages and simple drugs. Over 3,000 patients are presently under care in this system.

**Rehabilitation**

Official RLG records of calendar years 1968 to 1972 (we have no PL data) reveal approximately 2,500 persons with war-related disabilities, of whom 90 percent are amputees who have received or are in process of receiving care. In addition, about 1,000, reported prior to that time, have already received care.

An independent 1973 house-to-house survey covering a population of 85,000 in Region II, the most war-ravaged area of Laos, recorded 394 disabled. Of the total, 346 were military personnel and 48 were civilians. Age distribution of the disabled was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 to 4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 to 12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 to 25</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 to 35</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 to 40</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 to 55</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note.—The survey results support the RLG records in terms of incidence of disabled personnel.

The physical rehabilitation center for the handicapped (the Orthopedic Center) in Vientiane is the result of a joint effort by the RLG, UNDP, WHO and the USG with significant input from voluntary agencies (World Vision, Dallas Community Chest Trust Fund, International Voluntary Services) and the American Women's Club. This facility, which treats both civilian and military, is quite adequate and capable of catching up on the backlog of disabled requiring orthopedic care now that a ceasefire exists. However, the capacity may well be expanded since the ICRC and UNICEF are studying the feasibility of establishing provincial subcenters.

U.S. A.I.D., through the narcotics rehabilitation program, is in addition assisting in the detoxification and rehabilitation of the Laos addict population.

We have consistently encouraged increased other donor assistance to Laos and fully support the study report's recommendations for greater involvement of ICRC, voluntary agencies, UNICEF and other international organizations.

Although the ICRC is presently active in Laos, the current program is limited and not entirely related to refugee assistance. Non-refugee projects include dispensaries at Pak Lay and Muong Name. According to the ICRC representative, the ICRC as an organization is accepted by both the Vientiane side and the PL, and is prepared to continue and to increase activities as its financial capacities increases. ICRC is willing to assist in programs in any areas of Laos.

We feel other donor and U.S.A.I.D. participation in the field of health has been both effective and well-coordinated, thereby avoiding duplication of effort. This has been evident in both short-term medical care programs conducted mainly by U.S.A.I.D., ICRC and voluntary agencies, and assistance in long-term institution building in support of national health development given by UNDP, WHO, UNICEF and U.S.A.I.D. Other donor input has increased from 18 percent of total health expenditures in Laos (estimated at $9.5 million in FY 1974) to 23 percent in the past six months. Negotiations are presently underway for considerable expansion of UNICEF programs.

**GAO REPORTS ON INDOCHINA**

Mrs. Parker. The only other thing I would like to have for the record—I understand or recall slightly that there was a quotation from a GAO report on Cambodia earlier in the day by Dr. French.
Would you like to comment on that? Have you seen these reports on Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, from GAO?

Mr. ZIMMERLY. We have the GAO report on Laos. We received the report, I believe, on the 8th of July, for the Laos GAO report. We have transmitted that to our mission in Laos and asked for their comments. We have not yet received the report on Vietnam or on Cambodia, but we are looking forward to receiving those; and when we get them, we will be pleased to respond to their comments.

Mrs. PARKER. Would you supply that for the record so that we have your comments on those reports? ¹

Mr. ZIMMERLY. Yes, we will.

Mrs. PARKER. And what you found the situation to be.

I do not think that there is anything else that I particularly feel the record is missing. I think we have gone into great detail, and the hour is late.

Mr. de HAAN. We would like to feel free to submit some additional questions.

Mrs. PARKER. If you would send us a copy of them, we would be very happy to see if we have any after that.

Mr. de HAAN. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

¹The text of the GAO reports can be found in appendix III. The reports have subsequently been submitted to AID for comment by the subcommittee chairman, Senator Kennedy.
APPENDIX I.—TEXT OF CORRESPONDENCE ON UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS INDOCHINA BETWEEN SENATOR KENNEDY AND SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER

I. TEXT OF SENATOR KENNEDY'S LETTER TO SECRETARY OF STATE

HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you know, there is continuing and, I feel, growing congressional and public concern over the course of American policy toward Indochina. Inquiry by the Subcommittee on Refugees and other committees of the Congress, an unclassified cable of March 6 from Ambassador Graham Martin in Saigon, other statements by officials in the Executive Branch, the supplemental appropriation request for the correct fiscal year and the anticipated requests for FY1975, news dispatches from the field, and various private reports, raise troubling questions for many Americans over the character and objective of our policy toward Indochina and over the kinds and levels of our current involvement in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

In light of the growing concern over American policy toward Indochina and the contradictory and incomplete information currently available, I would like to request comprehensive comment and reviews on the following items:

(1) The general character and objectives of American policy toward Indochina as a whole and towards each government or political authority in the area;

(2) The general content and nature of existing obligations and commitments to the governments in Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane;

(3) The kinds, categories and levels of support and assistance given or projected to the governments in Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane for fiscal year 1973 through 1975—including (a) a breakdown of the number, distribution, activities and agency/departmenal association of official American personnel, as well as those associated with private business and other organizations under contract to the United States government; and (b) a breakdown from all sources of humanitarian assistance, police and public safety oriented assistance, general supporting and economic development assistance, and military assistance;

(4) The current status and problems of reported efforts to establish an international consortium for general reconstruction assistance to the area;

(5) The current status and problems of the Administration's stated intention to encourage internationalizing humanitarian assistance to the area;

(6) The current status of negotiations between Washington and Hanoi on American reconstruction assistance to North Vietnam;

(7) The Department's assessment on the implementation of the ceasefire agreements for both Vietnam and Laos;

(8) The Department's assessment of the overall situation in Cambodia and the possibility for a ceasefire agreement; and

(9) Recent diplomatic initiatives, involving the United States, aimed at a reduction of violence in Indochina and a greater measure of normalization in the area.

In addition to the above areas of inquiry, I would also appreciate very much the Department's comments on a series of recommendations contained in a recent report based on the Subcommittee's Study Mission to Indochina last year. Lengthy excerpts from this report, including some of the recommendations, were issued in late January and informally made available to

(103)
officials in the Executive Branch. The recommendations focus on the relief and rehabilitation of war victims, but also include comment and suggestions on the broader aspects of United States policies and programs in the area.

In light of persisting hopes among all our citizens for peace in Indochina, and to clarify our country's commitments and continuing involvement in the area, I feel it would be extremely helpful if definitive information on our government's policy, involvement and future planning could be made available to the Subcommittee. I am hopeful, Mr. Secretary, that the Subcommittee can anticipate a response at an early date, and that appropriate officials from the Executive Branch will also be available for consultations or hearings.

In conclusion, let me express my personal dismay over a theme in Ambassador Martin's cable of March 6. For him to suggest a tie between alleged decisions in Hanoi and the views of Members of Congress and their staffs about the course of American policy towards South Vietnam and Indochina, is the worst kind of innuendo and regrettably ignores the many legitimate questions and concerns of the Congress and the American people over our commitments to the government's of Indochina and over the continuing level of our involvement in the political and military confrontations of the area. And I would appreciate very much your comment on the Ambassador's cable.

Many thanks for your consideration and I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,

EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees.

2. TEXT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER'S LETTER TO SENATOR KENNEDY

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to your letter of March 13 on various aspects of United States policy toward Indochina, I am enclosing our comment on the nine specific items you have outlined. I hope this information will be useful to you. As to the recommendations of the Subcommittee's Study Mission to Indochina last year, which were enclosed with your letter, I have asked Governor Holton to review these and to prepare our comments for submission to you as soon as possible.

Your letter also expresses concern over a March 6 cable by Ambassador Martin commenting on a recent press article on the United States role in Viet-Nam. I do not believe the Ambassador is suggesting a cause-and-effect relationship between decisions in Hanoi and the views of any individual Members of Congress or their staffs. What he is describing is a very real and sophisticated propaganda effort by North Viet-Nam to bring to bear on a wide spectrum of Americans its own special view of the situation in Indochina. The Ambassador believes, and in this he has our full confidence and support, that we must counter these distortions emanating from Hanoi and continue to provide the best answers to the concerned questions many Americans have about our Indochina policy.

Warm regards,

HENRY A. KISSINGER.

Hon. Edward M. Kennedy,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees,
Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to your letter of March 13 on various aspects of United States policy toward Indochina, I am enclosing our comment on the nine specific items you have outlined. I hope this information will be useful to you. As to the recommendations of the Subcommittee's Study Mission to Indochina last year, which were enclosed with your letter, I have asked Governor Holton to review these and to prepare our comments for submission to you as soon as possible.

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Warm regards,

HENRY A. KISSINGER.

Enclosure

"The general character and objectives of American policy towards Indochina as a whole and towards each government or political authority in the area:"

There are two basic themes in our policy toward Indochina. The first is our belief that a secure peace in Indochina is an important element in our efforts to achieve a worldwide structure of peace. Conversely, we believe that an evolution toward peace in other troubled areas helps bring about the stability for which we strive in Indochina. Consequently, our Indochina policy has been geared to bring about the conditions which will enable the contending parties to find a peaceful resolution of their differences.
A resolution of differences can, of course, be achieved by other than peaceful means. For example, North Viet-Nam might seek to conquer South Viet-Nam by force of arms. Such a resolution, however, would almost certainly be a temporary one and would not produce the long-term and stable peace which is essential. Therefore, a corollary to our search for peace, and the second theme of our policy, is to discourage the takeover of the various parts of Indochina by force. Forcible conquest is not only repugnant to American traditions but also has serious destabilizing effects which are not limited to the area under immediate threat.

We would stress the point that the United States has no desire to see any particular form of government or social system in the Indochina countries. What we do hope to see is a free choice by the people of Indochina as to the government and systems under which they will live. To that end we have devoted immense human and material resources to assist them in protecting this right of choice.

Our objective with regard to the Government of Viet-Nam, the Government of the Khmer Republic and the Royal Lao Government is to provide them with the material assistance and political encouragement which they need in determining their own futures and in helping to create conditions which will permit free decisions. In Laos, happily, real progress has been made, partly because of our assistance. The Vientiane Agreement and Protocols give clear evidence of the possibility for the peaceful settlement our policies are designed to foster. We have supported the Royal Lao Government and, when it is formed, we will look with great sympathy on the Government of National Union. We welcome a peaceful and neutral Laos, and, where appropriate, we will continue to encourage the parties to work out their remaining problems.

In Cambodia we are convinced that long-term prospects for stability would be enhanced by a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement among the Khmer elements to the conflict. Because such stability is in our interests we are providing diplomatic and material support to the legitimate government of the Khmer Republic, both in its self-defense efforts and in its search for a political solution to the war.

Our objective in Viet-Nam continues to be to help strengthen the conditions which made possible the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam. With this in mind we have supported the Republic of Viet-Nam with both military and economic assistance. We believe that by providing the Vietnamese Government the necessary means to defend itself and to develop a viable economy, the government in Hanoi will conclude that political solutions are much preferable to renewed use of major military force. The presence of large numbers of North Vietnamese troops in the South demonstrates that the military threat from Hanoi is still very much in evidence. Because of that threat we must still ensure that the Republic of Viet-Nam has the means to protect its independence. We note, however, that the level of violence is markedly less than it was prior to the cease-fire and believe that our policy of support for South Viet-Nam has been instrumental in deterring major North Vietnamese offensives.

Our objective with regard to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and its southern arm, the Provisional Revolutionary Government, is to encourage full compliance with the Paris Agreement. We have been disappointed by North Viet-Nam's serious violations of important provisions of the Agreement. However, we still believe that the Agreement provides a workable framework for a peaceful and lasting settlement, and we will continue to use all means available to us to support the cease-fire and to encourage closer observance of it. Our future relations with Hanoi obviously depend in large part on how faithfully North Viet-Nam complies with the Agreement.

We have also undertaken our assistance to Laos and support for the Royal Lao Government because of our own broad national interests, not because of any formal commitment to that country. The most important and visible of our interests is our desire for a just settlement of the tragic war in Indochina. Laos plays a key role in this effort to achieve the peace. Indeed, Laos is the bright spot in Indochina where the fruits of our efforts to assist and support the Royal Lao Government are most clearly seen. A cease-fire based on an agreement worked out by the two Lao parties has endured for more than a year. The two parties have together organized joint security forces
in the two capital cities of Vientiane and Luang Prabang and a coalition
government may not be far away. We feel that these large steps toward a
lasting peace in Laos would probably not have succeeded but for our steady
support for the efforts of the Royal Lao Government.

(2) "The general content and nature of existing obligations and commit­
ments to the governments in Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane;"

The U.S. has no bilateral written commitment to the Government of the
Republic of Viet-Nam. However, as a signatory of the Paris Agreement on
Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam, the United States com­
mitted itself to strengthening the conditions which made the cease-fire possible
and to the goal of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination.
With these commitments in mind, we continue to provide to the Republic of
Viet-Nam the means necessary for its self-defense and for its economic vi­
ability.

We also recognize that we have derived a certain obligation from our long
and deep involvement in Viet-Nam. Perceiving our own interest in a stable
Viet-Nam free to make its own political choices, we have encouraged the
Vietnamese people in their struggle for independence. We have invested great
human and material resources to support them in protecting their own as well
as broader interests. We have thus committed ourselves very substantially,
both politically and morally. While the South Vietnamese Government and
people are demonstrating increasing self-reliance, we believe it is important
that we continue our support as long as it is needed.

Our relations with the Government of the Khmer Republic also do not
stem from a formal commitment but are based on our own national inter­
ests. Recognizing that events in Cambodia relate directly to the bitter hos­
tilities in other parts of Indochina, we have sought to help create stability
in that country as a part of our effort to encourage the development of peace
in the entire region. We, therefore, support the legitimate government of
Cambodia, in the hope that its increasing strength will encourage the Khmer
Communists toward a political settlement rather than continued conflict.

(3) "The kinds, categories and levels of import and assistance given or
projected to the governments in Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane for
fiscal year 1973 through 1975—including

(a) a breakdown of the number,
distribution, activities and agency/departamental association of official Ameri­
can personnel, as well as those associated with private business and other
organizations under contract to the United States government; and
(b) a breakdown from all sources of humanitarian assistance, police and public
safety oriented assistance, general supporting and economic development
assistance, and military assistance;"

(a) U.S. Economic Assistance

Our annual Congressional Presentation books provide the data requested
here in considerable detail. These Congressional Presentation books for FY
1975 will shortly be delivered to the Congress. We provide these first, as a
matter of course, to the authorizing and appropriations Committees of the
Senate and the House and then routinely make them available to all Mem­
bers as well as the interested public. We will be happy to provide your Sub­
committee on Refugees with copies as soon as available.

The Congressional Presentation books focus, of course, on our proposals
for the coming year, FY 1975, but also contain data on both the current fiscal
year, FY 1974, and the preceding, FY 1973. This year, as last, we are pre­
paring a separate book providing the details of our economic assistance pro­
grams for the Indochina countries.

These Congressional Presentation books form a partial basis, of course,
for extensive Hearings held each year by the authorizing committees in the
Senate and House, and then by the appropriations Committee. We would
expect the question you pose, as well as many others, to be further explored
in considerable depth during the course of these Hearings.

(b) U.S. Military Assistance

Our military assistance to South Viet-Nam and Laos is provided under
MASF. The breakdown of this assistance for the period you requested is as
follows:
The level of official U.S. military/civilian personnel in South Viet-Nam during the same period is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1973</td>
<td>23,516</td>
<td>730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1974</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1974</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>936</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Assigned.
2 Authorized.

The number of U.S. civilian contractors has declined from 5,737 in January, 1973, to 2,736 in January, 1974. This number is expected to decrease further to 2,130 by June 1974. We do not yet have a projected level of U.S. civilian contractors for FY 1975.

Our military assistance to Cambodia is furnished under MAP. This assistance totalled $148.6 million in FY 1973 and $325 million in FY 1974. The level of our military assistance for FY 1975 is now under review. The amount to be proposed will be included in the Congressional presentation documents on military assistance which we expect to submit to Congress shortly.

U.S. military and civilian personnel in Cambodia during the period you requested is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1972</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1973</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1974</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Data not available.

U.S. military and civilian personnel in Laos during the period you requested is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1972</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1973</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1974</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Based on the assumption that a coalition government will be formed in Laos before the end of this year.
2 Data not available.

(4) "The current status and problems of reported efforts to establish an international consortium for general reconstruction assistance to the area."

In April 1973, President Thieu asked the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to help form an aid group for the Republic of Viet-Nam. The IBRD agreed to make the effort, providing that this would be acceptable to the Bank membership and that the group could be organized in association with both the IBRD and the Asian Development
Bank. In May the World Bank sent a study mission to Viet-Nam to review the situation. In August, Japan suggested that the Bank arrange a preliminary meeting to exchange views on aid to the countries of Indochina. The Japanese also proposed that the member countries discuss the formation of a loose Indochina consultative group for the area wide coordination, with sub-groups for any of the four countries concerned which might request such a group and where conditions were satisfactory.

An initial meeting was held at the Bank's Paris office in October. The United States supported the Bank's efforts as well as the Japanese proposal. The Bank sent a second mission to Viet-Nam in November and subsequently proposed that a follow-on meeting be held in February of this year to discuss the formation of the Indochina consultative group. However, the reactions of participating countries to the energy crisis and to the Congressional decision on IDA replenishment led the Bank to postpone the meeting, tentatively until late Spring. In February, at the request of the Lao Government, a World Bank team also visited Laos to assess the situation and to discuss a possible consultative group for that country.

The United States continues to support efforts to form a Indochina consultative group. We also favor the proposal that there be sub-groups for each recipient country to which donors may contribute as they wish. The sub-groups would be formed when considered appropriate by donors and at the request of the recipient. We remain in close consultation with the World Bank and other interested parties on this matter. We are hopeful that a second meeting of participants might be held in the near future and that such a meeting might lead to the establishment of the groups in question. A reversal of the negative Congressional action on IDA replenishment would clearly enhance the possibility of success in this regard.

The current status and problems of the Administration's stated intention to encourage internationalizing humanitarian assistance to the area:

In addition to U.S. bilateral humanitarian assistance to the Indochina countries which totals $111.4 million for FY 1974, the Department and the Agency for International Development (AID) continue to encourage other donors, including international organizations, to provide such assistance. AID made a grant of $2 million on November 1, 1973, to the Indochina Operations Group of the International Committee of the Red Cross and discussions are continuing about an additional grant to that organization. UNICEF has recently completed its study of the problems in the Indochina countries and has just submitted its proposed program to possible donor countries. We have encouraged UNICEF in its study and are pleased that it is now prepared to expand its activities in all three countries.

The World Health Organization has had meaningful programs in Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam which supplement and do not overlap with activities supported by the United States. We have encouraged that organization to play an even more important role, particularly in the malaria control program, and we at the same time would phase out our activities in that field.

Our discussions with the Indochina countries have stressed the desirability of establishing plans and priorities for programs and projects which require assistance so that other donor countries and organizations can fit their assistance efforts into the host country requirements.

The current status of negotiations between Washington and Hanoi on American reconstruction assistance to North Viet-Nam:

Following the conclusion of the Peace Agreement last year, preliminary discussions of post-war reconstruction were held in Paris between U.S. and North Vietnamese members of the Joint Economic Commission. These talks have been suspended since last July. The Administration's position, which we believe is shared by the great majority of members of Congress, is that the U.S. cannot at this time move forward with an assistance program for North Viet-Nam. To date, North Viet-Nam has failed substantially to live up to a number of the essential terms of the Agreement, including those relating to the introduction of troops and war material into South Viet-Nam, the cessation of military activities in Cambodia and Laos, and the accounting for our missing-in-action. Should Hanoi turn away from a military solution and demonstrate a serious compliance with the Agreement, then we would be prepared, with the approval of Congress, to proceed with our undertaking regarding reconstruction assistance to North Viet-Nam.
"The Department's assessment on the implementation on the cease-fire agreements for both Viet-Nam and Laos."

The cease-fire in Viet-Nam has resulted in a substantial decrease in the level of hostilities; for example, military casualties since the cease-fire have been about one-third the level of casualties suffered in the years preceding the Paris Agreement. Nonetheless, it is unfortunately evident that significant violence continues to occur and that the cease-fire is far from scrupulously observed. The fundamental problem is that the North Vietnamese are still determined to seize political power in the South, using military means if necessary. To this end they have maintained unrelenting military pressure against the South Vietnamese Government and have continued widespread terrorism against the population. In particularly flagrant violation of the Agreement North Viet-Nam has persisted in its infiltration of men and material into the South, bringing in more than one hundred thousand troops and large quantities of heavy equipment since the cease-fire began. South Vietnamese forces have reacted against these attacks by North Vietnamese forces and several sizable engagements have taken place.

Despite these serious violations, we continue to believe that the Paris Agreement has already brought substantial benefits and continues to provide a workable framework for peace. After more than a quarter century of fighting it would have been unrealistic to expect that the Agreement would bring an instant and complete end to the conflict. What it has done, however, is to reduce the level of violence significantly and provide mechanisms for discussion. The two Vietnamese parties are talking to each other and are achieving some results, even if these results are much less than we would like to see. The final exchange of prisoners which was completed on March 7 is illustrative.

We assess the cease-fire agreement in Laos as being so far largely successful. The level of combat was reduced substantially immediately following the cease-fire and has since fallen to a handful of incidents per week. There is hope that if developments continue as they have, the Laos cease-fire will work and the Lao, through their own efforts, will be able to establish a coalition government and a stable peace in their country.

"The department's assessment of the overall situation in Cambodia and the possibility for a cease-fire agreement."

Despite continued pressure by the Khmer insurgents, now generally under the control of the Khmer Communist Party, the Khmer armed forces have successfully repulsed two major insurgent operations, one against Kompong Cham and, more recently, against Phnom Penh, with no US combat support. Serious military problems remain, and continued hard fighting during the next few months is expected, both in the provinces and around the capital.

A broadened political base, a new Prime Minister and a more effective cabinet offer signs of improvements in the civil administration. The enormous dislocation of the war, destroying production, producing over a million refugees and encouraging spiralling inflation, face the leaders of the Khmer Republic with serious problems.

Nonetheless, we are convinced that with US material and diplomatic support the Khmer Republic's demonstration of military and economic viability will persuade their now intransigent opponents to move to a political solution of the Cambodian conflict. The Khmer Republic's Foreign Minister on March 21 reiterated his government's position that a solution for Cambodia should be peaceful and not forced by arms or capitulation. Instead, his government will continue to seek talks with the other side. His government hopes their efforts for peace will achieve some results after the current insurgent offensive.

"Recent diplomatic initiatives, involving the United States, aimed at a reduction of violence in Indochina and a greater measure of normalization in the area."

Since the signing of the Viet-Nam cease-fire agreement, the United States has been in constant liaison with the interested parties, including those outside of the Indochina area. While it would not be useful to provide details of all of these contacts, we can assure the Congress that we have used every means at our disposal to encourage a reduction in the level of violence and an orderly resolution of the conflict. We believe these measures have had some success. The level of fighting is down substantially from 1972 and the Vietnamese
parties have taken at least beginning steps toward a satisfactory accommodation. Further, the interested outside parties remain basically committed to building on the framework of the cease-fire agreement.

When Hanoi established a pattern of serious violations of the Agreement shortly after its conclusion, Dr. Kissinger met with Special Adviser Le Due Tho and negotiated the Paris Communiqué of June 13, 1973, with a view to stabilizing the situation. Secretary Kissinger returned to Paris in December, 1973, to again discuss with Special Adviser Tho the status of the implementation of the Agreement. We will continue to maintain such contacts with Vietnamese and other parties in the hope that Hanoi will eventually be persuaded that its interests lie in peaceful development rather than in conflict.

In Laos we have offered every encouragement to an evolution toward peace. At this time the Laotian parties are making great progress in the formation of a government of national union. We can help in this regard with our sympathy and encouragement while properly leaving the issue in the hands of those most interested, the Lao people.

The Government of the Khmer Republic, with our complete endorsement, has made notable efforts to terminate the hostilities in that country. Following the cease-fire in Viet-Nam, the Cambodian Government unilaterally ceased hostile activity by its forces in the hope that the other side would respond. Unfortunately, that striking gesture was rebuffed. On frequent occasions thereafter the Khmer Republic made proposals designed to move the conflict from the battlefield to political fora, with our strong support in each instance. Although all of those proposals have been ignored by the Khmer Communists, we continue to hope that the current relative military balance will make apparent to the other side what the Khmer Republic has already perceived, that peace is a far more hopeful prospect for Cambodia than incessant conflict.

3. TEXT OF DEPT. OF STATE LETTER TO SENATOR KENNEDY.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As you will recall, Secretary Kissinger in his letter to you of March 25 stated that we would forward to you the Department's comments on the recommendations of the Subcommittee's Study Mission to Indochina. These comments are enclosed.

If I can be of further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

LINWOOD HOLTON,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

Enclosure:

COMMENTS ON SUBCOMMITTEE'S STUDY MISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) "Study on bombing.—The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other officials in the executive branch should seriously consider a survey of American military practices in Indochina along the lines of the Strategic Bombing Survey undertaken in Europe and Asia following World War II. In light of the airwar's devastating impact upon civilians and civilian facilities, and the sharp controversy over the military effectiveness and political purposes of the airwar and other military practices, such a survey for Indochina by a broad spectrum of appropriate experts from both government and the private sector could provide a useful basis for future American military, diplomatic, and humanitarian policies and actions."

The Department of State agrees in principle that it could be useful to undertake a broad "survey" of past U.S. military operations in Indochina. The Department of Defense and the individual Services have already conducted numerous studies of particular aspects of our military activities in the countries of Indochina. Unlike the situation at the end of World War II, however
we have no access to large areas that would be critical to such a study, particularly the parts of North Viet-Nam and Laos that were bombed in the campaign to halt North Vietnamese infiltration of men and supplies into the South and to convince Hanoi it could not prevail by force. Access to parts of South Viet-Nam and Cambodia is also limited at present by continuing combat operations in those countries.

Furthermore, such studies in the past have relied heavily upon data and information, either captured during and subsequent to the conflict or provided by officials of the Government and Armed Forces of the former enemy. It is unlikely that either of these essential ingredients for a more meaningful detailed study will, for the foreseeable future, be available to historians who might conduct any such official survey.

(2) "Diplomatic Conferences on Geneva Conventions.—A Diplomatic Conference on Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 opens in Geneva in late February 1974. On the agenda are two draft protocols concerning prisoners of war, the protection of non-combatants, the protection and relief of war victims, weaponry and other matters. The experience of recent conflicts—especially the Indochina War, which so heavily and tragically involved the United States—makes it incumbent upon the President that he instruct the American delegation to maximize its efforts in behalf of meaningful changes in the Conventions of 1949, and to support continuing efforts by the International Committee of the Red Cross and others in pressing for restraints on "conventional" and other weaponry not covered by the agenda of the Conference. The present conflict of views on these matters between the Departments of State and Defense must be resolved for an effective American contribution at the Conference."

The United States Delegation to the Diplomatic Conference went to Geneva prepared to work for improved implementation of the existing Geneva Conventions and to establish new rules of humanitarian law, including improved procedures for the accounting for the missing and dead in armed conflict. Unfortunately, the Conference became bogged down on procedural questions and on the issue of the applicability of the draft protocols in so-called "wars of national liberation." As a result of extended debate on these matters, little progress was made on such matters as prisoners of war, protection of civilians, accounting for the missing and other substantive issues.

The International Committee of the Red Cross plans to convene a meeting of government experts this June in Lucerne to study the question of weapons which are indiscriminate in their effects or which cause unnecessary suffering, in which an American delegation from the State and Defense Departments will participate. We are presently examining with the Department of Defense the weapons that may be involved. We shall wish to study the results of the meeting of government experts before determining the position of the United States Government.

(3) "New policy and diplomacy toward Indochina.—The President must finally break with the patterns and failures of the past and chart a new beginning in our relations with Indochina. We must further change the character of our involvement in the area, embark on new policies, and practice some lessons of the past. First, in line with Congressional directives in 1973, the Administration must finally shed its obsession with weapons deliveries and give top priority to humanitarian and people concerns in our allocation of aid to Indochina.

"Second, new efforts, as outlined below, are also needed on the diplomatic front. The lingering and bloody war in Cambodia deserves better of our diplomacy. The breakdown of the cease-fire agreement in Viet-Nam demands more than a threat of new bombing. The fragile peace in Laos requires our more active support, as well as more rapid changes in the character and purpose of our presence in Vietnam. And the deadlock in our relations with Hanoi must be broken."

The Department of State agrees that new policies must constantly be evolved to cope with new realities and to further the national interest of the United States, consistent with the principles which are fundamental to our society. We are aware, however, that successful policy formulation does not usually depend solely on unilateral action; the actions and policies of other parties to a particular situation must necessarily influence our own approach. In Indochina we must recognize that many of the patterns which produced our policies
have not changed as substantially as we would have liked. In Viet-Nam, for example, we are forced to consider the fact that North Viet-Nam remains the aggressor. Very large North Vietnamese forces remain in the South and continue to exert heavy pressure on the South Vietnamese Government and people. Prudence and realism require us to be aware of the existence of that situation in our policy reviews. We would welcome policy shifts in Hanoi which would ease the tension and thus permit us to review policy in the light of a new situation.

The Administration does not have an "obsession" with weapons deliveries in Viet-Nam. The Administration does recognize, however, that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, in the face of unrelenting attack, needs the means to protect itself. We believe that denying such assistance would not contribute to peace but would inevitably lead to the greater use of force by North Viet-Nam. We believe that the demonstration of continued South Vietnamese abilities for self-defense will eventually bring the North Vietnamese authorities to the realization that political accommodation is preferable to endless violence.

Specific programs of humanitarian assistance receive high priority in our planning for Viet-Nam. We would note, however, that the development of the South Vietnamese economy toward self-sufficiency will have a major effect in meeting humanitarian aims. Unemployment and underemployment are significant problems which affect refugees and non-refugees alike. Low wages and high costs cause hardship for the entire population. Many of our assistance programs are designed to provide the stimulus necessary to correct these large economic distortions which cause suffering for all segments of the society.

Thanks to the cessation of fighting in Laos the Administration is giving top priority to humanitarian and people concerns. From a high of $375 million, U.S. military assistance has dropped to $20.6 million in FY 74. For FY 75, the Administration is requesting $90 million, a slight increase which reflects largely the rise in cost of petroleum products, increased delivery costs and some pipeline items. On the other hand, at least one-third of the aid budget is directly devoted to humanitarian and "people" concerns and the balance is devoted to stabilization, support and development activities which are a prerequisite for the well-being of the entire population. A total of $40.6 million currently is budgeted for FY 1974 for economic assistance and $50.0 million is requested for FY 1975. PL-480 food for Lao refugees in the estimated amounts of $3.5 million and $2.5 million are additive to those figures.

In Cambodia, because of the continued heavy fighting resulting from the refusal of the Khmer Communists to accept a cease-fire and enter into negotiations, the military aid program has continued at a high level of $325 million so far for FY 74 and will have to remain at that level in FY 75, unless a cease-fire, which is our aim, is achieved. Refugee relief assistance for Cambodia has increased from $1.2 million in FY 73 to $13.4 million in FY 74, and $20 million is being requested for FY 75. To counter the sharp drop in domestic production of rice, some 111,000mt of PL-480 rice had to be imported in FY 73, and for FY 74 the total will rise to some 265,000mt. Agency for International Development (AID) is raising the number of direct hire personnel dealing with refugees from one to six. These people will supplement the work currently being carried out by voluntary Agencies.

The suggestion that new efforts on the diplomatic front are needed on the part of the Administration to settle the Cambodian War is one of which the Administration has always been fully conscious. Regrettably, just as it takes two to wage war, it takes two parties to make a peace. In Cambodia, the Government of the Khmer Republic has offered a unilateral cease-fire and negotiations with anyone, anywhere and at any time but has been rebuffed since the Paris Agreement of 1973. Despite those offers the Khmer Communists have increased the intensity of their attacks and have repeatedly rejected, in public and in private, all efforts by ourselves and the Khmer government to achieve a peaceful settlement. In Laos, it is recognized that the U.S. has steadfastly supported the efforts of the Prime Minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma, to achieve a lasting peace. It is now our policy to continue to support, together with all other parties, the efforts of the new Provisional Government of National Union to maintain a lasting peace, to resettle and rehabilitate the many displaced Lao and to begin the serious development of the nation.

(4) "Internationalizing aid—International Red Cross.—To the maximum degree practicable, our government should finally pursue the internationalization
of relief and rehabilitation needs in Indochina through United Nations agencies and other channels. In this connection, our government should finally give its strong support to the Indochina Operational Group (IOG) of the International Red Cross. The IOG is currently the only international humanitarian agency with representatives or communication in all the war affected areas of Indochina. The IOG’s demonstrated expertise and effectiveness deserves a special emergency contribution of $10 to $15 million for immediate humanitarian purposes in Indochina.”

The U.S. Government made a $2,000,000 grant in FY 1974 in support of the operations of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Indochina (ICRC). We plan to make an additional grant at the request of the ICRC in FY 1975 and we will seriously consider any future funding requests advanced by the ICRC. The ICRC has currently raised about half of its $33 million target for the program in Indochina being funded by donations from both governments and National Red Cross organizations. We oppose a larger USG donation at this time for two reasons:

1. A larger USG donation to the total planned would almost certainly reduce the pressure on the ICRC to successfully pursue donations from other potential donors, thus diluting the international character of the ICRC program.

2. We question the ability of the ICRC to mount and sustain a program of the size they are planning. More specifically we are seriously concerned that the quality of the persons available to manage the program would suffer from a too rapid expansion and, hence, the quality of the program itself would suffer.

UNICEF is expanding its programs in the countries of Indochina, and we have encouraged this interest. While we have not yet received a firm proposal, we anticipate making a grant to UNICEF for activities in South Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos.

As indicated in an earlier response, the World Health Organization has had meaningful programs in Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam which supplement and do not overlap with activities supported by the United States. We have encouraged that organization to play an even more important role, and we at the same time would phase out our remaining activities in that field.

Our discussions with the Indochina countries have stressed the desirability of establishing plans and priorities for programs and projects which require assistance so that other donor countries and organizations can fit their assistance efforts into the host country requirements.

Additional information was provided the Subcommittee by Mr. Robert H. Nooter, A.I.D.’s Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Supporting Assistance, in a statement subsequent to the Subcommittee’s August 1, 1973, hearing.

(5) “Needs of orphans and children.—The special needs of orphans and other children disadvantaged by the war have a long record of neglect on the part of the governments in Indochina and the U.S. Mission in Saigon, Vientiane and Phnom Penh. Given this record of neglect and the documented needs among millions of children in the war-affected areas, our government should make every effort to increase the priority of concern over children—in both our assistance to the area and in our representations to the governments in Saigon, Vientiane and Phnom Penh. In the case of South Viet-Nam, the Department of State and the Agency for International Development must finally cut red tape and expeditiously implement its new program to aid the process of adoption of orphans by American citizens, and to upgrade support for child welfare and health programs. The outline of the new program was recently communicated to the Subcommittee. Meeting the urgent needs of the orphaned, the homeless, and all disadvantaged children in Viet-Nam in long-overdue. Special emphasis in the adoption process should be placed on American-fathered children. It is unconscionable to delay this effort in behalf of children in need.”

Child welfare programs mounted by each of the governments of Indochina are tailored to the realities of the individual country. Accordingly, the programs supported by the U.S. Government are different in each of the three countries and are presented below as discrete undertakings, which, indeed, they are.

South Viet-Nam

Agency for International Development’s (AID) new $7.5 million program, previously reported to you, is progressing as designed to improve the welfare of Vietnamese children disadvantaged by the war, particularly orphans. The program provides almost $5.5 million for the participation of U.S. voluntary agencies in assisting an estimated 160,000 disadvantaged children, including
114

17,000 children in orphanages. The program is making improvements in child
nutrition and in the management and physical condition of orphanages and
child care centers and in the processing of orphans for inter-country adoptions
as well as improved health services for malnourished, diseased and handi-
capped children.

The priority target is being accomplished, namely, providing immediate as-
sistance to orphans and other institutionalized children requiring food, clothing,
safety and medical care. Also, action has been initiated to provide services
which strengthen the family unit by developing alternatives to child abandon-
ment through the expansion of home nursery and day care center programs
and foster home care. The program activities are:

**Orphanage support and improvement.**—Food and clothing allowances, health
care, equipment, improvement of facilities and staff training. ($1,736,000, with
$1,355,000 for voluntary agencies and $381,000 for the Ministry of Social Wel-
fare)

**International adoption.**—American agencies expanding and improving inter-
country adoption programs and related welfare activities. ($470,000, all for
voluntary agencies)

**Pediatric clinics.**—Medical care for disadvantaged children with priority to
those pre-adoption cases requiring special medical attention. ($940,000, all for
voluntary agencies)

**Day care centers.**—Equipment, food and staff training for existing day care
centers and support in the development of new centers. ($1,428,000, with
$1,150,000 for voluntary agencies and $248,000 for the Ministry of Social Wel-
fare)

**Home nursery care.**—Day nursery services for infants. ($760,000, all for volun-
tary agencies)

**Nutrition centers.**—Expansion of existing nutrition centers and creation of
additional centers for seriously malnourished children. ($630,000, all for volun-
tary agencies)

**Handicapped children.**—Improved custodial care and therapy. ($178,000,
with $140,000 for voluntary agencies and $38,000 for the Ministry of Social Wel-
fare)

**Foster care.**—Foster home care services for children as an alternative to
their abandonment, institutionalization or adoption. ($570,000, all for volun-
tary agencies)

**Prevention of infant abandonment.**—Counseling service to emotionally dis-
traught expectant mothers who might abandon their children. ($41,000, with
$25,000 for voluntary agencies and $16,000 for the Ministry of Social Welfare)

**Civilian widows assistance.**—Support, vocational training and small-scale
capital assistance to widowed mothers. ($76,000, all for the Ministry of Social Wel-
fare)

**Training.**—Pediatric and nutrition training to midwives and other medical
personnel. child welfare service training to Ministry of Social Welfare em-
ployees. ($520,000, with $324,000 for the Ministry of Health and $228,000 for
the Ministry of Social Welfare)

*Laos*

The Agency for International Development (AID) assistance which can be
categorized as “humanitarian” contributes either directly or indirectly to the
well-being of children, including orphans. The humanitarian part of the AID
program is involved in the resettlement of refugees, the development of health
and education facilities and the provision of food, other relief supplies and
medical care.

PL-480 Title II food assistance (both direct to the Royal Lao Government
and through Catholic Relief Service) is aimed at meeting a portion of the
emergency food needs of refugees and disaster victims, including children.

The primary voluntary agencies operating in Laos concentrate on medical
assistance (personnel, services and commodities) and provision of food assist-
ance (CRS), with emphasis on assisting refugees and meeting other emergency
needs.

Through World Vision, Inc., private donors support up to 2,000 school chil-
dren each year. most of whom are orphans or children of disabled war veterans.

The Asian Christian Service (ACS) concentrates on refugee relief activities,
but has expanded its work to include activities in rehabilitation, reconstruction and development as well. ACS children-oriented programs include the distribution of about 25 tons of dehydrated milk supplements (provided by Switzerland and Holland) per year.

**Cambodia**

The needs of orphans and children are being met as part of the emergency refugee relief programs being conducted with Agency for International Development (AID) grant support by the voluntary agencies (CRS, WVRO, CARE and the ICRC) in Cambodia. These programs are currently being expanded at a rapid rate and are being directed primarily toward assuring that the emergency shelter, food and medical needs of all refugees are being provided and only secondarily toward improving the care of especially vulnerable groups such as orphans and children. However, a beginning has been made by WVRO (in the establishment of a children’s nutrition center near Phnom Penh) and by CRS (in the assistance now being provided two orphanages), and we anticipate that more care will be devoted to orphans and children as the emergency circumstances permit.

(6) **Refugee resettlement in South Viet-Nam.**--To help normalize civilian life and avoid a festering refugee problem, as experienced in the Middle East and elsewhere, our government should strongly encourage and support—at the highest levels of the Saigon government—the voluntary resettlement of refugees in secure areas or their “return to village” in any area of South Viet-Nam where their native village is located. The cease-fire agreement provides for “freedom of movement”, including the return of refugees to hamlets and villages now controlled by the PRG. Our government should strongly discourage and withdraw any support from programs using the refugees as pawns and “trojan horses” to expand Saigon’s control in contested areas of the countryside. The strategic and forced movement of people—a key element in pacification—should play no role in American policy and programs in South Viet-Nam.

The U.S. Government has supported and continues to strongly encourage and support—at the highest levels of Viet-Nam’s government—the voluntary resettlement and return-to-village of South Viet-Nam’s refugees. As evidence of this, the U.S. Government played a major role in helping the Government of Viet-Nam return nearly 355,000 refugees (most of them generated during the 1972 NVA offensive) to their home areas and resettle an additional 214,000 refugees to secure areas during 1973. These individuals receive food and housing allowances and a wide variety of community development benefits to help them restore their lives and once again become productive citizens. The U.S. Government certainly supports the principle of “freedom of movement” stated in the cease-fire agreement and has communicated this support to the Government of Viet-Nam. To our knowledge, no group of refugees has ever requested permission or assistance from the Government of Viet-Nam to move to “PRG” areas. Some, of course, may have returned to their homes in areas now controlled by the PRG. The decision is an individual one, as is the movement. The overwhelming majority of refugees displaced from areas taken over by the North Vietnamese or Viet Cong do not wish to return to those areas. Hundreds of thousands of these refugees have volunteered for resettlement programs in Government of Viet-Nam territory in preference to returning to their old lands where these are under NVA or VC control. Several different sites are ordinarily offered for resettlement, and in most cases refugee leaders have a hand in the selection or approval of a site. Self-resettlement benefits of NV$100,000 to 150,000 are often provided to those who do not wish to accept the sites offered, and families then leave camps to live in a place of their choice. Neither the U.S. Government nor the Government of Viet-Nam condone forced relocation of people. Additional information on resettlement was provided to the Subcommittee in a letter dated July 31, 1973, from former AID Administrator, John A. Hannah.

(7) **Physical rehabilitation.**—Tens of thousands of amputees, paraplegics, blind persons, deaf persons, and others with serious physical limitations resulting from the war, languish unattended in many parts of Indochina. Virtually no physical rehabilitation programs exist in Cambodia. The situation in Laos is little better. And in South Vietnam, despite documented needs and years of good intentions on the part of the Thieu Government and the
U.S. Mission in Saigon, the situation among the physically disabled remains one of appalling neglect. The continued lack of meaningful progress in providing prosthetic devices for the lame civilians of South Vietnam is fast becoming a scandal of distressing proportions—especially when measured against the expeditious American delivery of weapons and materials of war. The time is long overdue for new initiatives and a greater measure of official concern in this important area of rehabilitation.

As in the response to recommendation Number 5, the status of the physical rehabilitation programs in each of the three countries varies with the nature and gravity of the individual country circumstance. The programs supported by the USG in each of the countries accordingly are different and may be outlined as follows:

South Viet-Nam

While there remain a significant number of Vietnamese disabled who have not yet received definite rehabilitative care, the GVN medical rehabilitation program, with USAID assistance, has continued to expand and to improve its efficiency. Dr. Howard Rusk, of the World Rehabilitation Fund, recently said of this program: "Viet-Nam's program for the construction of Prosthetic Devices has grown to become the largest of any program of this type in the world. The pilot project initiated for the Rehabilitation of the Blind has had enormous success and is comparable to some of the best programs in the United States, using methods developed at the Catholic Guide for all the blind in the state of Massachusetts."

In 1966, the total output of Prosthetic Devices by the National Rehabilitation Institute was 1,615, with an additional output of 691 braces and 383 repairs. In 1973, the total production of prosthetic devices was 7,756 with 2,061 braces produced and 4,679 repairs. The NRI's capability is being further expanded at the present time by the addition of ten new satellite rehabilitation units being constructed at selected province hospital sites. These units, scheduled for completion by the end of FY 1974, will more than double the present annual output of prosthetic/orthotic devices and repair services. Of equal importance, the province hospital satellite units will provide the mechanism for more effectively extending rehabilitation services to rural populations who found the previous central rehabilitation locations to be relatively inaccessible.

By the end of FY 1974, when the ten additional hospital units reach full capacity, it is expected that total production of the NRI system, including prosthetic/orthotic devices and repairs, may reach 30,000 per year.

Recognizing that there still remains a backlog of disabled people requiring specialized treatment and rehabilitative care, the Mission is currently re-examining the entire GVN medical rehabilitation program to determine the feasibility of expanding USG assistance to this area still more if the overall level of funding being sought from the Congress in FY 1975 is made available.

Cambodia

As noted under the response to Recommendation 5, virtually the full attention of the voluntary agencies now working in Cambodia under A.I.D. grants has been devoted to assuring that the emergency shelter, food, and medical needs of refugees is being provided and little, or no, attention has been devoted to more sophisticated treatment requirements. We anticipate that physical rehabilitation programs will be evolved and put into practice, by the voluntary agencies but only after other more immediate priority programs—such as intensified care for orphans and children—are attended to. This is based on two considerations: 1) The number of persons permanently disabled by war wounds to date is still relatively small; and 2) The large number of refugees must be afforded a higher priority of attention.

Laos

U.S. support for physical rehabilitation programs in Laos has been largely in conjunction with other bilateral and multilateral assistance. In addition to official assistance (A.I.D. and D.O.D.), many U.S. personnel have provided informal assistance in support of Lao physical rehabilitation programs. The primary institution is the Orthopedic Center in Vientiane. It has been funded
and operated by the Directorate of Veterans' Affairs with assistance from UNDP (two technical advisors) and USG-DOD (USAID-R.O.), with approximately $80,000 a year in medical supplies and commodities. It is staffed by Forces Armecl Royale (military) personnel. Present capacity is 50 amputees per month, the majority being military with about ten percent being civilian.

The International Red Cross is assisting the RLG in establishing a second orthopedic center at Savannakhet. WHO has provided a training course for physiotherapists.

(8) "Defusing the bombs in the countryside.—By conservative estimate, there are some 300 million to 600 million pounds of undetonated explosives strewn today throughout the Vietnamese countryside—unexploded mines, booby-traps, and bombs. Little or no effort has been made to launch a systematic program of ordnance removal. In fact, the official view expressed to the Subcommittee is that 'the clearing of ordnance, according to preliminary reports, has so far not been a major problem.' Yet, hospital admission statistics tell a different story, as Vietnamese civilians continue to lose life and limb to mines and booby-traps in the field. America clearly has a responsibility to help support and fund a program to defuse these mines and bombs, many of which we left behind. To date, our government has given this responsibility little thought, and even less action."

The Chief of the Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam (ARVN) Logistics submitted a report on exploded ordnance, and also our four Consulate Generals have thoroughly reviewed the situation in their areas. During 1973 there were no known incidents in Region 2 as of October 1, few if any in Region 4, and three in Region 3. In Region 1 the statistics are not available except for the most affected province of Quang Tri, which reported that eight had been killed and thirty-five wounded by unexploded ordnance between February and October 1973.

The Government of Viet-Nam (GVN) normally follows standardized ordnance clearing procedures in refugee areas, having military units conduct preliminary clearing operations before the people arrive. Such operations are thorough at housing sites and along roads, although of necessity, less so over the hundreds of thousands of hectares of farmland. Later, if farmers uncover ordnance, they report it to the local authorities, who have National Police, regional forces or popular forces dispose of it. However, if a great deal of ordnance is found or large explosive devices are involved, local authorities then contact district and province chiefs, who may request ARVN forces in the vicinity to handle the disposal.

The GVN does not maintain regular reports on the clearance of unexploded ordnance, the number uncovered and disposed of, the number of troops involved, or the number of injuries and deaths resulting from explosions. The disposal of unexploded ordnance is regarded by the GVN as one of the many normal tasks it undertakes in the return of refugees to their original village or resettlement sites and, therefore, special and separate reports are not kept. Moreover, there is often no way of knowing whether unexploded ordnance predates the January, 1973, agreements or was subsequently placed by North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong (NVA/VC) forces. The ARVN is equipped for ordnance disposal so no United States assistance has been requested for current ordnance clearing operations and none is expected to be requested.

The continuing problems of deaths and injuries in some refugee resettlement areas arises from the present campaign of NVA/VC forces to harass these areas by planting of mines, indiscriminate mortar attacks, and the use of long-range rockets. Recently the Republic of Viet-Nam delegation to the Two Party Joint Military Commission proposed cessation of the use of these weapons which result only in indiscriminate killing and maiming of innocent civilians and children. The proposal was immediately rejected by the Communist side. Additional information was provided the Subcommittee by Mr. Robert H. Nooter, Assistant Administrator of A.I.D.'s Bureau for Supporting Assistance subsequent to the Subcommittee's hearing on August 1, 1973, and in a letter dated February 13, 1974, for Mr. Matthew J. Harvey, A.I.D.'s Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs.

(9) "Prisons and political prisoners in South Viet-Nam.—The record is clear that political prisoners exist in South Viet-Nam. And the record is also clear that the Thieu government has been thwarting a resolution of the prisoners’ plight. But the complicity of our own government in the abuse of
justice and fairplay is also clear. And this should outrage the conscience of all Americans. Americans should yield to no one in condemning the cruelty to civilians by the PRG and its allies. But what they do cannot relieve our responsibility to help minimize and remedy the hardship and distress of civilians, including political prisoners, in South Viet-Nam.

"(a) In line with the letter and spirit of a 1973 congressional directive, the President should rapidly phase-out all American sponsored or supported public safety oriented programs in South Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia—and immediately divert unexpended funds for such purposes to meet humanitarian needs among orphans and other victims of the war.

"(b) The United States should make immediate and strong diplomatic representations to the Thieu government in behalf of the humane and just treatment of all civilians detained for political reasons. Among other things, the United States should firmly counsel the Thieu government to invite a full inspection of prison facilities under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and to provide for the orderly due process and/or release of those detainees not covered by the repatriation and return provisions in the prisoner protocol of the cease-fire agreement.

"(c) The United States should make diplomatic representations—through various channels and in cooperation with other governments concerned over the future of South Viet-Nam—to further encourage and facilitate negotiations between the Thieu government and the PRG, as provided for in the cease-fire agreements, for the repatriation and return of those political prisoners on both sides covered by the agreement."

The Department of State cannot agree with the Study Mission's assertion that "the record is clear that political prisoners exist in South Viet-Nam."

One of the principal sources of confusion in this highly complex matter is the definition of the term "political prisoner." We interpret this term, as applied to South Viet-Nam, to refer to individuals of non-communist, non-violent persuasion who are imprisoned only for expressing their criticism of the Government. We note in this regard that the Government of Viet-Nam's (GVN) stated policy does not permit the arrest of anyone for mere political dissent. However, when an act of political dissent is coupled with actions that violate public order or threaten national security the responsible person or groups of persons are subject to detention.

We also do not agree with the Study Mission's statement that the South Vietnamese Government has blocked resolution of the civilian prisoner's plight. While progress in resolving this issue has been slow, a review of the record clearly shows that the performance of the Vietnamese Government has been markedly better than that of the Communist side. For example, we note that on the basis of the initial lists exchanged by the parties following the cease-fire, the GVN has now turned over 5,051 civilian prisoners to the "PRG" (Viet Cong) in return for only 637 of its own civilian personnel. In other words the GVN released almost eight Communist prisoners for every one of its personnel received from the Viet Cong.

The GVN's willingness to accept this unfavorable exchange ratio, in spite of the Viet Cong's continued refusal to provide an accounting for the published list of names of some 70,000 Government officials and private civilians kidnapped or otherwise detained by the Communists during the course of the war, appears to us as a compelling indication of its interest in resolving the civilian prisoner problem. We would also note, that GVN authorities have offered to release to the Viet Cong any remaining civilian prisoners identified by the Viet Cong as Communist cadre. In addition to those released to the Viet Cong, since the beginning of 1973, the South Vietnamese Government has granted amnesty to approximately 9,100 civilian prisoners.

What has been the performance of the Viet Cong? As noted above they have consistently refused to release or give an accounting of the many thousands of South Vietnamese civilians they have abducted or otherwise detained during the war. Furthermore, unlike the GVN, the Communists have also refused to provide any information about the number or location of their civilian detention camps, the conditions of the camps or the number of prisoners held therein. Also on several occasions during the first phase of the prisoner exchanges the Viet Cong sparked demonstrations at the release sites which led to the interruption of the exchanges for several months.
In sum, it seems evident to us that the primary responsibility for the "abuse of justice and fairplay" with regard to civilian prisoners rests squarely with the Communist side. The Study Mission's contention that the U.S. is an accomplice in thwarting a resolution of the civilian prisoner issue is unfounded. Since the ceasefire the U.S. has consistently encouraged the two South Vietnamese parties towards an early resolution of this matter in accordance with Article 8(c) of the Agreement. As an outside power our ability to influence events in this sensitive area is clearly limited, but we will continue to do what we reasonably can to secure the humane treatment and prompt release of prisoners of both sides. We have on a number of occasions since the cease-fire conveyed to the GVN our great interest in the humane treatment of prisoners, civilian and military alike. In this regard we note that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continues to conduct visits to GVN military POW camps as it has since 1966. (In notable contrast to the attitude of the GVN, the Communists have never permitted ICRC visits to their prison camps.)

We would add that the extensive evidence available to us simply does not sustain the highly publicized charges that civilian prisoners are subjected to widespread, systematic mistreatment in the jails of the Republic of Viet-Nam. No one claims that abuse of prisoners has never occurred in the GVN prison system; nor for that matter, could such a claim be made for penal institutions in the United States and many other countries. Certainly, this claim could not be made for North Vietnamese and Viet Cong penal institutions, considering the passions aroused over two decades of war in Viet-Nam it would be remarkable if some incidents did not occur. However, based on our past advisory experiences and the current observations of our Embassy in Saigon, it is clearly evident that most published reports about abuses are highly exaggerated.

With reference to the Study Mission's recommendation in subsection (a), we are presently terminating U.S. public safety programs in South Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia as required by recent legislation. These programs will be ended well before the legislative deadline of August 17, 1974.

We are enclosing for the Subcommittee's information a copy of a comprehensive survey of the civilian prisoner population in South Vietnamese jails prepared by the U.S. Embassy in Saigon.

(10) "Emergency Relief Needs in Cambodia.—In the absence of a ceasefire agreement for Cambodia, and in light of the massive toll of civilian casualties and refugees from continuing war, the emergency humanitarian needs of war victims must be a matter of very urgent concern to our own government and all involved. Despite belated efforts to meet these needs, conditions among war victims continue to deteriorate. Food and shelter and medicine are still in short supply. Private voluntary agencies and the Indochina Operational Group of the Red Cross provide the most effective mechanism for additional relief efforts. It is imperative that the United States generously support, in cash and kind, the emergency relief programs of these agencies."
An additional $8,058,000 is also being granted this FY to the RDF and to cover direct hire costs related to refugees.

4. We have requested $20,010,000 in FY 1975 for our refugee program of relief and resettlement.

(11) "Relief and rehabilitation in Laos.—In support of the cease fire agreement for Laos and the continuing progress anticipated in forming a government of national union, the United States should move more rapidly in changing the character, personnel and purpose of our presence in Vientiane. Moreover, in light of the enormous humanitarian and reconstruction needs among the people of Laos, the United States should strongly encourage expanding programs of relief and rehabilitation in all parts of the country, and generously contribute to these programs. In this connection, a special effort should be made to encourage and expand the work of voluntary agencies, the Indochina Operational Group of the Red Cross, UNICEF, and other appropriate international channels."

Recognizing that the rapidly evolving post-cease-fire environment in Laos is creating a situation whose parameters are quite different from those of the wartime era, the USAID is currently redirecting its economic and humanitarian assistance efforts. Programs are being shifted from emergency wartime objectives to longer term post-war humanitarian, reconstruction and development oriented activities, some of which already have been noted favorably by the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF). With the Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU) now formed, U.S. aid will be given to and through the PGNU. The future thrust, extent and degree of country-wide coverage of U.S. aid will be determined in conjunction with officials of the PGNU.

Although the U.S. is continuing to encourage the participation of voluntary agencies in rehabilitation and relief efforts, most organizations appear to prefer to wait until sometime after the formation of the new government before making any commitments. With the formation of the PGNU, the atmosphere for their future involvement should be greatly enhanced. Because of both budgetary and manpower limitations however, it is doubtful that voluntary agencies will assume a major share of current U.S. humanitarian activities. The Indochina Operations Group (IOG) of the International Committee of the Red Cross, of course, is currently operating in Laos as well as in the other Indochina countries, although the current program in Laos is not related entirely to refugee assistance. In Laos, the IOG has provided some medical supplies and equipment to the LPF. Although we certainly support the expansion of IOG, as well as other donors' relief and rehabilitation efforts in Laos, it is important that any expansion not outstrip their ability to maintain the quality of their operations.

(12) "Relations with Hanoi—Relief and rehabilitation in North Vietnam.—In the context of recognized understandings between Washington and Hanoi, and of continuing efforts to implement the ceasefire agreement and protocols for Vietnam, the United States should take new initiatives to break the apparent diplomatic deadlock with North Vietnam. Such activity is needed to help chart a new beginning in our relations with Indochina—and could usefully serve many ends, including the following:

(a) An accounting of Americans missing in action;

(b) An accounting of American and other journalists missing in Cambodia;

(c) A ceasefire agreement for Cambodia;

(d) A de-escalation of military conflict in South Vietnam, and a new emphasis on the political framework and objectives of the ceasefire agreement for Vietnam;

(e) A renewal of negotiations on American contributions to the reconstruction of North Vietnam—primarily humanitarian assistance for medical facilities and housing and general rehabilitation needs;

(f) A beginning toward the normalizing of relations between Washington and Hanoi, as expressed by Secretary of State Kissinger on January 24, 1973: "And therefore it is our firm intention in our relationship to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to move from hostility to normalization to conciliation and cooperation. And we believe that under conditions of peace we can contribute throughout Indochina to a realization of the humane aspirations of all the people of Indochina. And we will, in that spirit, perform our traditional role of helping people realize these aspirations in peace."
U.S. relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), including prospects for a U.S.-financed reconstruction program for that country, have been treated in Secretary Kissinger's letter of March 25 to Senator Kennedy. As the Secretary noted in his letter, our relations with the DRV depend to a large extent on Hanoi's observance of the January 27, 1973, Cease-fire Agreement. We have made it clear to the North Vietnamese that we stand ready to proceed with steps towards normalization of relations once Hanoi provides evidence of its intention to comply seriously with the Agreement's provisions. We have emphasized this position on a number of occasions both publicly and privately at the various levels of contact that have been uniformly rebuffed by Hanoi.

In light of the DRV's persistent failure to observe the cease-fire provisions, our options for new initiatives toward Hanoi are limited. Furthermore, it is our belief that new U.S. initiatives to remove the obstacles toward a more normal relationship with North Viet-Nam cannot be one-sided if they are to have a reasonable chance of success. They should be based on some indication that the DRV is genuinely interested in helping to establish the conditions of peace in Indochina necessary for such a relationship to develop. In this regard it is sobering to note that several Government of Viet-Nam initiatives during the past year, designed to break the diplomatic impasse with the communists, have been uniformly rebuffed by Hanoi.

Nonetheless we have not abandoned hope of eventually moving towards a better relationship with North Viet-Nam. Through our various channels of communication with Hanoi, we will continue to seek means for developing a more fruitful dialogue with the North Vietnamese leadership. However, we will also continue to impress upon the North Vietnamese the fundamental importance we attach to compliance with the Cease-fire Agreement as the primary condition for the normalization of relations with us.
API'EXDIX 11.—TEXT OF SENATOR KENNEDY'S AMENDMENT ON INDOCHINA ASSISTANCE

[From the Congressional Record, July 11, 1974]

AMENDMENT OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZATION ACT—
AMENDMENT NO. 1350

AMENDMENT ON INDOCHINA AID

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I am submitting today an amendment to S. 3394, the administration's pending foreign assistance authorization bill for fiscal year 1975. The amendment involves the bill's provision on “Indochina postwar reconstruction.”

I am offering this amendment because reports from the field, and the administration's foreign aid presentation to Congress, tell us once again that the President has failed to redirect or change, in any meaningful way, the basic character and purpose of our aid policies toward the countries of Indochina.

The amendment is an effort to help remedy some serious shortcomings in the administration's proposal for Indochina. It is the result of extensive inquiry by the Subcommittee on Refugees, which I serve as chairman, and of discussions we have had in many quarters and with many experts in this country and overseas. The amendment continues and strengthens some initiatives taken by Congress last year, and reflects what I firmly believe broadly represents the will of the American people on the issue of future assistance to the countries of Indochina.

PURPOSES OF THE AMENDMENT

The amendment seeks these basic objectives.

First, it affirms the President's authority to furnish assistance for the relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction of the peoples and countries of Indochina.

Second, it provides that people problems—especially the needs of refugees, civilian casualties, orphans, and others disadvantaged by the war—and the reconstruction of civilian facilities—such as housing, hospitals, clinics, and schools—shall be the overriding concern and objective of American assistance to the area.

Third, it provides that, “wherever practicable,” American assistance to Indochina shall be distributed “under the auspices of and by the United Nations, other international organizations or arrangements, multilateral institutions, and private voluntary agencies with a minimum presence and activity of U.S. Government personnel.” In this connection, the amendment also “urges the President to solicit the cooperation of other governments” to support and participate in such international efforts.

Fourth, the amendment reaffirms and strengthens last year's congressional ban on American support “of police, or prison construction and administration, within South Vietnam.” The amendment states that—

No assistance shall be furnished under this section or any other provision of law, and none of the local currencies accruing under this section or any other provision of law, shall be used to furnish funds, commodities, equipment, advice, training, or personnel for the support of detention facilities, prisons, police, other internal security forces, or any program of internal intelligence or surveillance in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

Fifth, the amendment seeks to establish a firm ceiling, within the Foreign Assistance Act, on funding for Indochina postwar reconstruction. It provides that no funds may be transferred by the President from other parts of the act, including part I for development assistance, for use in Indochina during fiscal year 1975. This is necessary, Mr. President, in light of the administr-
tion's record last year of transferring some $55,524,000 in development and other funds, for use in Indochina, rather than for the purposes these funds were intended.

Thus, while Congress acted in 1974 to reduce the administration's request from some $630 to $504 million, we find at the end of the fiscal year that the administration, by robbing other foreign aid accounts, violated the intent of Congress. Moreover, if there had been no supplemental of $49 million, the administration was even prepared to transfer an additional $60 million to Indochina from AID's worldwide program loan fund. This is a distressing commentary on the administration's attitude toward the will of Congress and the American people, and underscores the need again for Congress to establish guidelines for the allocation of tax dollars.

Clearly, a ceiling is required on our authorization for funding in Indochina. And what my amendment recommends on this issue is at least a start. Hopefully, the Foreign Relations Committee will pursue the concept further. Perhaps the committee will consider funding restrictions along the lines of section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which was sponsored in 1971 by the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri (Mr. Symington).

Section 655 sets an absolute ceiling on assistance to Cambodia. Perhaps this section should be extended to all of Indochina, and for all funding sources. The importance of section 655 can be measured by the administration's attempt, in this year's bill, to nullify section 655 as it applies to the granting of excess defense articles to Cambodia. I urge the committee to reject this effort by the administration and instead move to apply the restrictions of section 655 to all of Indochina, so as to control this administration's ability to do and spend as it pleases.

And finally, the amendment reduces by one-half the administration's budget request for assistance to South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Instead of the $945,300,500 requested by the President, the amendment authorizes some $475 million.

This is an ample American contribution for humanitarian purposes—as well as for the general support of Saigon, Vientiane, and Phnom Penh—in their transition from nearly total dependence on American aid, to belt tightening on their part and growing assistance from others in the international community.

Mr. President, we must finally end the master-client relationships between Washington and the capitals of Indochina. We must finally disengage from our direct and often manipulative involvement in the remaining political and military confrontations of the area. We must finally chart some new beginnings in helping to repair the damage of conflict and heal the wounds of war. And we must finally shift our focus from fueling death and destruction to accomplishing the political goals of the cease-fire agreements.

Along with continuing congressional initiatives—and appropriate diplomacy by this administration—the amendment I introduce today contributes to these ends.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL

Mr. President, a crucial issue for Congress—and all Americans—is the character, purpose, and massive level of the administration's budget request this year from Indochina. Every indicator—including reports from the field, my correspondence with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger earlier this year, and the administration's foreign assistance presentation to Congress—suggests that we are continuing to maximize American presence and influence in the area. Every indicator suggests that the administration is prepared to continue our client relationships with governments and political factions in Indochina—and our direct involvement in the confrontations among political elements throughout the area. And so today—after more than a decade of war, and after cease-fire agreements that afforded the opportunity for change—foreign aid remains a hostage of an unreasonable obsession with Indochina, because the administration needlessly chooses to continue the tired patterns and attitudes of the past.

Instead of coming clean on where we stand in our assistance to Indochina, the administration persists in misleading Congress and the American people on the true purpose and nature of our involvement in the area. There is much talk, for example, about how we are reducing our involvement in Indochina.
But the fact remains that the administration’s budget request of some $943 million for fiscal year 1975 is at least a third more than the same request for fiscal year 1974.

The congressional presentation says that the administration’s proposal this year “is consonant with the objectives for relief and reconstruction, especially humanitarian assistance, in Indochina set forth in section 801 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973.” But a closer look at the presentation suggests that while the humanitarian assistance allocation to South Vietnam has increased in absolute terms, it has actually decreased as a percentage of the total assistance requested. The situation is the same for Laos— as well as for the total budget request for all Indochina.

Moreover, this year, as last year, new cosmetics and euphemisms have been found in an apparent effort to meet congressional and public concerns, and to cover up the tired patterns and policies of the past. Nowhere is this more evident than in the administration’s presentation on South Vietnam. What was called “supporting assistance” in 1973, was labeled “stabilization” assistance in 1974—and today it is called “support for specific sectors.”

A first look at the presentation tells us that the controversial commercial import program has been abolished. But a second look tells us that this program is merely covered by new labels. And in the absence of any meaningful efforts to carry out the political goals of the cease-fire agreement—which is all but ignored in the administration’s presentation—the purposes of the massive expenditures are not, in the main, to carry out “postwar reconstruction” or development, but to buy more time for the Thieu government and to keep Saigon’s war-economy afloat.

In this connection, Mr. President, I would like to comment briefly on a claim being made by our Ambassador to Saigon and others in the administration. Again and again we are told by these officials that we must not let up on our support for South Vietnam. If we can spend as the President requests, they say—for 2 or 3 years more—we can finally disengage, because South Vietnam will have “taken off” and become economically self-sufficient. As others before them, these officials see light at the end of new tunnels—and needlessly perpetuate America's heavy involvements in Indochina.

Given our past experience with such speculation over developments in Vietnam, Congress and the American people have good cause for skepticism. Moreover, we are confronted with an interesting anomaly as we consider the administration’s justifications for the different sectors of our assistance to South Vietnam. For example, in past weeks, during the Senate’s consideration of various military aid requests, the administration was suggesting that a critical military situation existed in South Vietnam. We were even told of a possible invasion by North Vietnam, and dire predictions were made if Congress failed to meet the President’s budget requests. But at the same time the administration was suggesting relative calm in South Vietnam to justify its massive request for postwar reconstruction and “take-off” funds. The presentation to Congress was suggesting that “the fighting in South Vietnam has subsided,” and that “the military situation is relatively stable.”

But the administration cannot have it both ways—on the one hand portraying South Vietnam as facing a desperate military threat, and on the other hand suggesting conditions are ripe for investment, economic development, “take-off,” and self-sufficiency. On this point, as well, World Bank reports deserve consideration. According to their estimates, South Vietnam, even under the best of circumstances, will be dependent upon massive levels of outside aid until at least the 1980’s.

One of the most glaring omissions in the administration’s budget request relates to promoting and strengthening international cooperation in helping to heal the wounds of war. As I suggested in this Chamber on June 27, an important theme in discussions over assistance to Indochina—especially over humanitarian assistance—has been the hope in many quarters that a good share of this effort could be carried out under some form of international auspices—if not on a regional basis, then at least for some of the special people problems and needs which exist in the separate war-affected areas.

I have shared this hope. And, along with other Members of the Senate, I have long advocated that our Government actively encourage and support initiatives for the expanding participation of the United Nations, its specialized