1974 will require more funds than the $4 million proposed in its 1974 congressional budget presentation.

Emphasize refugee resettlement to provide minimal adequate housing on land near cities, which will afford opportunities for employment and subsistence farming. Approximate costs of this endeavor will be determined after needed basic planning and engineering work has been done. Planned work includes building dikes and improving roads, power, and basic sanitation. AID anticipated that refugees, when given tools and materials, would do much of this work. Cambodia will provide such essentials as plans, land, civilian engineering, and public services.

In November 1973, AID approved six refugee-related positions, including the prior Embassy position of general refugee adviser. These positions, when filled, will include a senior refugee resettlement adviser, a medical administrator, a voluntary agency coordinator, an agricultural adviser, a civil engineer, and a secretary.

AID anticipates being better able to describe the scope of refugee resettlement activities after its expanded staff begins to function in Cambodia. AID estimated in November 1973 that such activities could cost from $2 million to $3 million (not including grants to voluntary agencies) during the remainder of fiscal year 1974.

CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD CIVILIAN WAR VICTIMS

In October 1973 U.S. Embassy officials reported it was Cambodia's policy to provide only emergency and temporary relief to war victims and, in general, to manage the problem so that refugees do not become dependent on the Government.

The U.S. Embassy stated that Cambodia has established the position of First Vice Prime Minister. His responsibilities include the activities of the recently established Ministry of Social Action and Refugees. Creating that position indicates that, although Cambodia has not developed an overall program to effectively deal with the refugee problem, it recognizes a need for greater coordination. Cambodian refugee relief continues on a case-by-case basis.

FUNCTIONS OF CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES CONCERNING WAR VICTIMS

According to an AID official, there is still no systematic approach to the total problem of civilian war victims—either to provide temporary assistance or to assist in refugee resettlement. The U.S. Embassy reported that six Cambodian agencies contribute, in some way, to the relief of such victims. Functions and responsibilities of these agencies are still fragmented, and there is little coordination among them.

The Ministry of Social Action and Refugees is the focal point for the war victims problem and directs the Director General for War Victims (formerly known as the Commissioner General). Reportedly, the chief constraint to a comprehensive and effective refugee relief program is its lack of experience. The Director General is responsible for temporary relief, such as refugee camps in Phnom Penh and provincial capitals, to war displaced persons. He also (1) coordinates the receipt and distribution of donations from private persons and organizations, (2) records claims for war damage losses, and (3) makes payments for civilian war casualties.

Our last report noted that the then-Commissioner General had developed a plan to assist refugees wishing to return to their villages. The plan called for providing 45 sheets of roofing—either metal or fiber cement—to each returning family whose home had been destroyed. We also reported that the Ministry of Community Development was developing a plan to assist a number of refugees to resettle on Government-owned land in the Phnom Penh area.

An AID official informed us in October 1973 that the back-to-village project had not been used. The other resettlement project has been superseded by a similar program implemented by World Vision Relief Organization, Inc., one of the voluntary agencies receiving U.S. financial assistance.

AID has no separate mission; however, its employees assigned to the Economic Sections at the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh administer AID programs.
CHAPTER 3—REFUGEE LIVING CONDITIONS AND WAR DAMAGE CLAIMS

NUMBERS OF REFUGEES

Our last report noted that Cambodia had no system to register refugees. It started a registration system in April 1972, but the U.S. Embassy reported in October 1973 that not all refugees had been registered. Registration will continue to be the local authorities' responsibility until it is transferred to the national government.

No reliable statistics are available on the number of ethnic Vietnamese remaining in Cambodia. Only those in camps are considered refugees. Cambodian statistics show that those in camps are limited to about 5,000 in the Battambang province and 600 in the Cao Dai camp in Phnom Penh. Our last report showed that an estimated 200,000 ethnic Vietnamese were in Cambodia at the end of August 1970.

That report commented on the number and the living conditions of military families in Phnom Penh as of August 1971. The U.S. Embassy stated in October 1973 that no data was available on the number of military families and dependents or the centers in which they lived. Cambodia had no central record containing such information.

We have been unable to obtain data on the number of civilian refugees remaining in Communist-controlled areas. Refugees still fleeing from those territories are mostly farmers whose rice crops have been confiscated, making it impossible for them to survive in the regions. The U.S. Embassy also said the Communist forces continue to forcibly move large numbers of people from one area to another.

Registered refugees

In September 1971, 220,000 refugees were living in Phnom Penh and provincial capitals in Cambodia.

As of August 1973, statistics from Cambodia's Director General for War Victims showed a total of 702,802 registered refugees, including 732,891 refugees in Phnom Penh and 23 provinces and 30,101 in 4 foreign countries.

The Embassy reported the following breakdown of the number of refugees as of August 1972 and 1973:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered refugees</th>
<th>August 1972</th>
<th>August 1973</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inside Cambodia:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phnom Penh, in camps</td>
<td>2,137</td>
<td>9,913</td>
<td>7,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phnom Penh, out of camps</td>
<td>290,642</td>
<td>393,398</td>
<td>102,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provinces</td>
<td>228,036</td>
<td>329,580</td>
<td>101,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Cambodia:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2,652</td>
<td>2,652</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>1,496</td>
<td>1,496</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Vietnam</td>
<td>23,917</td>
<td>25,917</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total registered refugees</td>
<td>493,875</td>
<td>762,992</td>
<td>269,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of unregistered refugees</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>693,875</td>
<td>962,992</td>
<td>269,117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 We previously reported that as of August 1970 an estimated 200,000 ethnic Vietnamese had been relocated in South Vietnam from Cambodia.

The registered Cambodian refugees in South Vietnam are expected to return to Cambodia when the security situation there improves. As late as June 1973 most of them were in the province of Chau Doc and were assisted under the Government of Vietnam refugee program. Vietnam requested assistance for these refugees from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees.

LIVING CONDITIONS

We did not visit Cambodia and, therefore, did not observe refugee conditions. However, the U.S. Embassy reported in July 1973 that, as the influx of refugees

1 According to the Subcommittee Study Mission's findings, this breakdown seriously under-estimates the actual number of displaced persons in Cambodia—both in and outside of government controlled areas.
in and around Phnom Penh continued, living conditions deteriorated, food became more expensive and in short supply, unemployment increased, and overcrowding became acute in some areas. The Embassy also reported that despite these conditions, the general health and morale of refugees were surprisingly good but that unless the military situation improved and some of them could return home, their plight could quickly become desperate.

As late as November 1973, AID officials in Washington said that, due to recent fighting (1) the job market was unable to keep pace with the increasing number of refugees, (2) food and health problems were becoming even more apparent, and (3) the extended family system (refugees moving in with relatives) had visibly reached its saturation point in Phnom Penh.

An AID official who made extensive visits to refugee sites in Cambodia in November 1973 said that certain changes—such as increased numbers of refugees, new temporary housing, increased numbers of available doctors—had occurred in recent months. However, the general living conditions of refugees were similar to those described in the AID report which the Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees used in its hearings on April 16, 1973.

WAR DAMAGE CLAIMS

Cambodia's Director General for War Victims records war damage claims. As of October 1973 the Director General had recorded more than 44 billion riels (equivalent of $176 million) in property damage claims. The U.S. Embassy said this figure is only 4 billion riels less than Cambodia's total budget for 1973.

At the time of our review, no war damage claims had been paid. The U.S. Embassy reported that Cambodia's budget did not provide for paying these claims and that the Ministry of Social Action and Refugees estimated that the value of filed claims was only about 30 percent of the total value of civilian war damages. The Embassy commented that, because there was little expectation of even token payment, not all damages were claimed.

CHAPTER 4.--U.S. RELIEF TO WAR VICTIMS

LEVEL OF U.S. ASSISTANCE

The U.S. Government, as of October 1973, had provided four U.S. voluntary and international agencies with $2.5 million to assist civilian war victims in Cambodia. U.S. assistance began in fiscal year 1973 and the voluntary agencies received $1.2 million. Through the first 4 months of fiscal year 1974, additional grants totaling $1.3 million were made to these agencies.

According to an AID official, U.S. grant assistance beneficiaries are to include refugees, displaced persons, and other war victims with no precondition that such persons be registered. As previously mentioned, Cambodian assistance is on a case-by-case basis and only registered refugees are eligible to receive assistance from Cambodia.

At the time of our review, the U.S. refugee assistance program also included one refugee adviser assigned to the Economic Section of the U.S. Embassy to monitor the implementation of the grants to the voluntary agencies and to keep AID informed of refugee matters. An AID official informed us that monitoring AID-financed refugee activities involved reviewing the voluntary agencies' periodic reports and vouchers and inspecting the refugee camps.

Early in fiscal year 1974, AID began to restructure and expand its program to assist war victims in Cambodia.

PROGRAMS OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

The $2.5 million AID granted to four voluntary agencies operating in Cambodia includes $150,000 to the International Committee of the Red Cross; $500,000 to Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, Inc. (CARE); $1.3 million to Catholic Relief Services; and $525,000 to World Vision Relief Organization, Inc.

About one-third of the refugees are believed to have received benefits directly or indirectly from the AID grants to the voluntary agencies. The lack of military security is a major cause for limited distribution of this assistance.

Jeffrey Millington, "Refugees in the Khmer Republic" (Feb. 10, 1973), prepared for USAID-Phnom Penh.
According to an AID official, coordination among the voluntary agencies has been a problem but progress is being made. In the initial stages their services overlapped; but weekly meetings have resulted in coordinating separate relief efforts, passing new information, and exchanging ideas.

**International Committee of the Red Cross**

AID grants to the International Red Cross were made in December 1972 and April 1973. The December grant of $50,000 was used primarily for household, medical, clothing, and food items. Although it distributed some of the goods directly, the Khmer Red Cross, the International Volunteers for Help and Assistance (VIARR--abbreviation of French translation), and the Director General for War Victims distributed most of them in Phnom Penh and the provinces.

The April 1973 grant of $100,000 was used mainly to construct and/or add to temporary resettlement areas; $25,000 was used for equipment to make prosthetic devices for use at a rehabilitation center in Phnom Penh.

Projects completed under the April 1973 grant included 221 temporary shelters in the Phnom Penh area and 8 infirmaries and numerous sanitary facilities in Phnom Penh and the surrounding areas. After the accidental bombing of Neak Loeng in early August 1973, an emergency distribution of bedding and powdered milk was made to affected refugees.

Projects in process in August 1973 included the completion of 132 temporary shelters in and around Phnom Penh and 2 water facilities in Phnom Penh. A cleaning team of refugee laborers has been formed to circulate among the various camps in the Phnom Penh area.

The International Red Cross has given and will continue to give VIARR bedding items and powdered milk for distribution to the refugee camps. Future plans of the International Red Cross call for constructing more temporary shelters and sanitary facilities.

**Catholic Relief Services**

In May 1973 Catholic Relief Services received a $500,000 AID grant. Amendments in August and September 1973 increased the grant to a total of $1.3 million. The Catholic Relief Services used VIARR services for its program in Cambodia.

Completed projects under the grant include the procurement and distribution of food and clothing in Phnom Penh and the provinces. Construction materials were furnished to six camps in the Phnom Penh area and to refugees living in three provinces. In addition Catholic Relief Services gave construction materials to VIARR for projects in two camps, one in Phnom Penh and one outside the city. The Catholic Relief Services distributed agricultural products in four provinces.

Projects in progress in August 1973 included the distribution of construction materials and a resettlement project in the Northern Dike Region of Phnom Penh. The resettlement project included sanitation and water facilities, schools, and administration buildings. Seven soup kitchens were operating 5 days a week. Two kitchens provided supplementary feeding to children on weekends; but in October 1973 Catholic Relief Services planned to reduce those feedings when adult refugees obtained employment. In addition Catholic Relief Services gave VIARR food to distribute at one camp in Phnom Penh and at VIARR's resettlement project site and also started five vocational training programs. Through VIARR, Catholic Relief Services helped start a school (classroom) project accommodating 280 students and a monthly hygiene-disinfection campaign at one of the Phnom Penh camps.

The Catholic Relief Services project plans for the future include the distribution of construction materials and more vocational training programs. It receives requests for assistance from private organizations and provincial representatives in Cambodia, and project planning provides for this assistance to those provinces that have the best plans and reputation, and the greatest need.

**CARE**

The grant to CARE for $500,000 was signed in May 1973. Most of CARE's efforts under this grant were in the provinces. Projects completed include distribution of food, agricultural items, reception kits, and school kits. A barracks
was built to replace one that was destroyed, and school equipment was given to one of the camps in Phnom Penh.

Projects in progress in August 1973 included construction at a resettlement project—24 barracks, sanitation and water facilities, a school—and the completion of barracks that the Japanese Government donated to one of the camps in Phnom Penh, using refugee labor.

Future plans call for constructing barracks and schools in Cambodia and sponsoring public works projects using refugee labor. Also included are the continued distribution of agricultural items, livestock, and poultry. CARE intends to continue distributing (1) food in Phnom Penh and the provinces as the need arises and (2) school and household kits on demand.

World Vision Relief Organization

This organization received two AID grants totaling $525,000. With the first grant of $25,000 in June 1973, it ordered a mobile medical unit for use at refugee camps in and near Phnom Penh. This unit was expected to arrive in December 1973.

The second grant for $500,000 in August 1973 provided for resettling 1,000 families in 20 village complexes in the Northern Dike Region. According to plans, each complex will have a school, medical clinic, administrative office, and sanitation and water facilities. The organization will give the refugees from camps around Phnom Penh the necessary materials and guidance for building their own houses and preparing plots of farm land. Payments for the refugees' labor will be in the form of rice. Government-owned land has been made available for this project, and the refugees will be permitted to till this land until peace returns.

In January 1974 an AID official said that some of these complexes were already completed.

CHAPTER 5.—OTHER FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO WAR VICTIMS
CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT RESOURCES FOR CIVILIAN WAR VICTIMS

Cambodia's Ministry of Social Action and Refugees handles civilian war victims' problems. The Ministries of Health, Community Development, Public Works, Agriculture, and Defense also contribute to this effort.

The Ministry of Social Action and Refugees total budget for 1973 was 31 million riels (about $125,000). This represents less than 1 percent of the total Cambodian budget. The U.S. Embassy was unable to determine the amounts budgeted to the other ministries.

For 1972 Cambodia budgeted 898 million riels (about $5.6 million)—$106,000 for direct assistance to war victims and $5,417,125 for other humanitarian activities. Public health received $4,087,000, the largest amount, and veterans received $906,000, both identified as humanitarian activities.

The amount budgeted for the Directorate for Refugees and War Victims was only 12,604,800 riels (about $79,000). Data provided us showed that, of this amount, 10,798,810 riels (about $67,491) was disbursed by the Directorate, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[in riels]</th>
<th>Total disbursed</th>
<th>Average monthly disbursements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugee relief</td>
<td>3,280,000</td>
<td>273,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians killed</td>
<td>2,777,000</td>
<td>231,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians wounded</td>
<td>1,277,000</td>
<td>106,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military wounded</td>
<td>1,080,000</td>
<td>88,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative expense</td>
<td>2,464,812</td>
<td>205,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,798,810</td>
<td>899,901</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In September 1972 the Commissioner for War Victims (now the Director General) had a staff of 150, including 2 professionals. That agency had estimated, before September 1972, that over $163 million (2.6 billion riels) was required to meet the needs of refugees in Cambodia.
ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES AND VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

Before U.S. involvement, voluntary agencies and other countries bore much of the refugee relief and humanitarian assistance in Cambodia. According to U.S. Embassy records, such donors contributed at least $3.4 million to assist civilian war victims from January 1972 through May 1973. The exact value of all assistance provided could not be determined because some donations were in the form of commodities to which no cash value had been assigned.

The U.S. Embassy reported contributions from various external donors totaling at least $367,698 from January 1 through May 31, 1973. The contributions included medical supplies, food, shelter, and cash to the Khmer Red Cross, VIARR, and the Cambodian Government.

Although we were unable to obtain information on the value of all humanitarian assistance from external donors in 1972, the U.S. Embassy provided us with a list of all donors (excluding the United States) and the approximate values of supplies. Donors included the International Red Cross and the Red Crosses of Canada, France, Japan, Korea, Australia, United States, Denmark, Thailand, and Germany. Total values of supplies given was at least $3.05 million.

In addition, the Directorate for Refugees and War Victims reported the following donations were channeled through that organization in 1972:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Equivalent U.S. dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asian Parliamentary Union</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Veterans of Indochina</td>
<td>1,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thai Buddhist Association</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,516</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER 6.—CIVILIAN WAR-RELATED CASUALTIES

RECOMPENSATED CASUALTIES

Data on the number of civilian war-related casualties was incomplete. Cambodian statistics show, however, that through July 1973 about 29,000 civilians were wounded and 12,561 killed. These numbers include the casualties identified in official requests for financial aid to surviving family members. Cambodia acknowledges that actual losses are far greater.

We reported previously that as of March 31, 1971, the then Commissioner General for War Victims had paid the equivalent of about $42,266 to wounded civilians and $23,569 for 262 civilians killed. The 1972 expenditures reported by the Director General for War Victims included $17,356 for 539 civilians killed and $7,981 for 1,277 civilians wounded.

PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES

The U.S. Embassy did not provide us with the total number of medical facilities in Cambodia. In October 1973, however, an Embassy evaluation of five major Cambodian Ministry of Health hospitals indicated that (1) an adequate number of doctors and medical personnel were available, (2) sanitation, methods of treatment and the quality of medical personnel were generally below average for SouthEast Asia, but this might have been true before the war, and (3) 25 percent of the major equipment was inoperative due to age (most items were over 20 years old), and (4) maintenance facilities and practices were inadequate.

According to the U.S. Embassy, more pharmaceuticals were available in March 1973 than at the time of our last review. Almost $1 million worth was financed and imported in 1972 through the Exchange Support Fund.1

In July 1973 the U.S. Embassy reported that more medical equipment was urgently needed to meet the increasing needs of refugees in Cambodia. Because

1 A multilateral fund established on March 1, 1972, so that other countries could provide assistance to Cambodia. Of $34.5 million contributed to this fund during calendar year 1972, the United States provided $12.5 million; of $31.0 million for 1973, the United States provided $16 million. Other contributors are Japan, Australia, United Kingdom, Thailand, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Cambodia.
of this, 10 medical hospital equipment sets were ordered, 9 under the AID Commodity Import Program and 1 under the World Vision Relief Organization grant. Each set is a prepackaged, 200-bed hospital, including surgical and dental facilities, X-ray and sterilization equipment, electric generators, and medicines.

In January 1974 an AID official said the 10 hospital sets had been delivered.

CHAPTER 7.—SCOPE OF REVIEW

We made our review during August, September, and October 1973 and held discussions with officials at the Department of State and AID headquarters in Washington, D.C. We examined available records on refugee matters at the AID Office of Cambodian Affairs. These records included grant agreements with voluntary agencies, official messages transmitted to and from the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, activity reports from the voluntary agencies, and other data on refugee matters. We also reviewed data from (1) AID's Office of Technical Development, Bureau for Supporting Assistance, (2) AID's Office of Commodity Management, Bureau for Program Service, and (3) the Department of State's Office of Laos/Cambodian Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Our review was limited in two areas. First at the start of our review, an AID official informed us that files would be reviewed to remove documents other agencies had prepared and sensitive information which required higher levels of review for release. Second, because hostilities made personnel security uncertain in Cambodia, we did not visit the country. We did, however, obtain data through communications with the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh.

Although we have no knowledge of data being withheld that concerns the matters discussed in this report, we cannot be certain that we have had access to all relevant information.

APPENDIX I.—EXTERNAL DONORS' CONTRIBUTIONS (OTHER THAN THE UNITED STATES), FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN CAMBODIA, FROM JAN. 1 THROUGH MAY 31, 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
<th>Estimated dollar value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assistance provided through the Cambodian Red Cross:</td>
<td>Medicines, 55 cartons, Antipolio vaccines, 7 boxes, Antileukemic vaccines, 13 boxes, Baby clothes, 36 cartons, Condensed milk, 155 cases, Multivitamins, 3 cartons, Medicines, 5 cartons, Cash</td>
<td>$168,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Red Cross</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Red Cross</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Red Cross</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Red Cross</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss Confederation and Red Cross</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance provided directly to the Cambodian Government:</td>
<td>Cash, New clothing, 220 packages, Bread, 220 packages, Clothing, 220 packages, Clothing, food, and 29 prefabricated barracks</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Buddhist Association</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance provided directly through International Volunteers for Help and Assistance:</td>
<td>Cash, Cash, Medicines, 11,506, Cash, Cash, Cash, Medicines, 12,300, Cash, Cash, Cash, Medicines, 100, Relief supplies, medical teams salaries, and miscellaneous</td>
<td>$367,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Ambassador</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Ambassador</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotary Club of Geneva</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dooley Foundation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Gravelle Foundation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Vision</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance provided directly through the International Committee of the Red Cross Indochina Operations Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Based on exchange rate of 4.3 French francs to $1, as of Sept. 31, 1973.
2 Not available.
3 Based on exchange rate of 231 Cambodian riels to $1, as of Mar. 31, 1973.
APPENDIX IV.—POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION IN VIETNAM:
THE CASE FOR AN URBANIZATION POLICY

(By Dennis A. Rondinelli from Asian Forum)

POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION IN VIETNAM: THE CASE FOR AN URBANIZATION POLICY
(By Dennis A. Rondinelli*)

With the declaration of a formal ceasefire and the termination of American
ground force involvement in South Vietnam, the attention of both American
policy advisors and Vietnamese leaders turns increasingly to the complex prob-
lems of planning for that nation’s economic recovery, social modernization and
physical reconstruction. Intensive fighting since 1965 has destroyed much of the
nation’s infrastructure, including community facilities and private homes. With-
drawal of American troops has produced severe economic repercussions on
Vietnamese employment prices and currency values. Substantial postwar de-
velopment assistance to the North as well as the South—will follow imple-
mentation of a peace settlement. But with the end of formal hostilities, whether
the military situation lapses into pre-1963 guerrilla action or bargaining leads
to a stable political compromise—and regardless of American participation in
postwar recovery—the reconstruction of a battered nation will rank high on
the priority list of whatever regime eventually controls Saigon.

Extensive studies, begun as early as 1966, produced initial redevelopment
strategies. A joint effort by the South Vietnamese Postwar Planning Group,
headed by Professor Vu Quoc Thuc, and the American Development and Re-
sources Corporation directed by David E. Lilienthal, provides an extensive set
of policies and programs. Similar efforts have been undertaken by the Brookings
Institution and the State Department. Current pacification programs and future
reconstruction plans, however, focus almost exclusively on rural development.
The Thuc-Lilienthal study, while recognizing the dominant role of the Saigon
Metropolitan Area in the Vietnamese economy, devotes scant attention to the
future development of cities and makes no recommendations for an urbaniza-
tion strategy in the overall development plan. This aspect of reconstruction
is passed over with suggestions that growth limits be placed on Saigon and that
its population and economic activities be decentralized. The Brookings study
fla\tly recommends—without supporting analysis or discussion—“de-urbaniza-
tion and resettlement” of large segments of the urban population. The severity of
current problems in Vietnam’s major cities is cited by most analysts as evidence
of “overurbanization” and the need to send migrants back to rural villages. The
Thuc-Lilienthal plan prescribes a policy of agricultural development supple-
mented by selective industrialization.

Yet, nearly half of South Vietnam’s eighteen million people live in cities or in
peripheral refugee villages. Most of the migrants—from rural hamlets threat-
ened by destruction in the crossfire of combat and bombing—who sought refuge
in relatively more secure urban centers have assimilated into urban life, built
semi-permanent houses, found employment and skills in a war-inflated economy,
and raised children who know the city as their only home. Saigon, Hanoi, Danang,
Dalat, Qui Nhon, and smaller urban places are the commercial and industrial
centers of the Vietnamese economy. Whatever amount of educational, political,
social and cultural progress takes place in a nation that allocates more than
70 percent of its annual budget to defense—occurs in Saigon and the regional
capitals. The rapidity of war-induced urbanization has created a dilemma that will
plague Vietnam’s development efforts for years to come. The majority of urban
refugees, acclimated to city living for nearly a decade, cannot merely be

See footnotes at end of article, p. 174.

(164)
returned to rural agricultural areas at the cessation of hostilities and survive as tenant farmers. But at the same time, the prerequisites for effective urban living are not available to them in cities. The war has produced a new class of Vietnamese, a group in socio-economic transition; their ties to the rural tradition forever served, they must secure new roots in a modernizing urban culture. "The life of the peasantry is almost as foreign to them as it is to Americans," Frances Fitzgerald observes, "and yet they lack the very foundations upon which American society rests. These new city people have no capital... and they have no industrial skills. They are not producers, but go-betweens who have engaged in nothing but marketing and services."

Moreover, the history of war-induced urbanization in Asia—Taiwan, Korea, Japan—yields little hope that a nation can de-urbanize in postwar recovery. Nor, despite the alleged success of the Green Revolution, is there much evidence that a nation can develop a strong and viable economy without an extensive urban base. Whether Vietnam pursues an agricultural or an industrial strategy—or some combination—urbanization is an inextricable component of successful postwar reconstruction. Postwar planning requires a strategy that not only anticipates, but deliberately seeks to induce, urban development.

### Importance of an Urban Strategy

Cities are critical to Vietnam's future. Unless means are found to deal with the severe problems plaguing its urban areas, the prospects of attaining postwar political and economic stability are bleak. Populations of Saigon and the regional centers of Hue, Danang, Nha Trang, My Tho, Dalat and Can Tho have swollen in the last decade beyond the totals reported in official census surveys. Official records show a population increase of more than a million in the Saigon Metropolitan Area between 1963 and 1971; local observers estimate the accretion at more than a million and a half. Few dispute the assertion of the Doxiadis Report that Saigon, with nearly 29,000 people per square kilometer, is one of the most densely populated cities in the world. Saigon's "urban sprawl" long ago enveloped neighboring Cholon and Gia Dinh and new moves easterly to absorb the industrializing city of Bien Hoa. Unofficial estimates place the population of metropolitan Saigon at nearly five million. Danang's population approaches 500,000; Hue, Quy Nhon, Rach Gia, Nha Trang, Can Tho, Bien Hoa, and Cam Ranh are well past the 100,000 mark. (See Table 1.)

#### Table 1—Population and Growth Rates of Major Urban Areas, South Vietnam, 1963-71

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban area</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Percent Increase</th>
<th>Average Annual Growth Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saigon-Gia Dinh</td>
<td>2,113,514</td>
<td>3,150,305</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danang</td>
<td>148,600</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hue</td>
<td>153,563</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
<td>52,660</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quy Nhon</td>
<td>48,739</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>29,760</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can Tho</td>
<td>59,910</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>104,666</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rach Gia</td>
<td>49,590</td>
<td>104,314</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Xuyen</td>
<td>24,830</td>
<td>191,505</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>30,337</td>
<td>99,896</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My Tho</td>
<td>53,650</td>
<td>97,891</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalat</td>
<td>55,160</td>
<td>86,636</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pham Thiet</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>76,652</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trai Giang</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>75,224</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanh-Hung</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>70,456</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>13,510</td>
<td>67,893</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tay Ho</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>65,087</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Me Thuot</td>
<td>30,050</td>
<td>64,589</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 1970 data.


In the Central Government's struggle to claim political support and counter Vietcong insurgency, cities are potentially the nation's most volatile areas. Much of American pacification policy aims at "winning the hearts and minds"

See footnotes at end of article, p. 174.

38-562—74—12
of rural peasants, but the economic and political discontent of urban dwellers falls on deaf ears. Although cities have been relatively secure from external attack, pressing problems of housing, unemployment, lack of public facilities, and overcrowding generate internal violence and reinforce dissatisfaction with national government policies. Vietcong bombings and terrorism in the cities during the late 1960's and early 1970's produced resentment among urban residents. But the inability of the Central Government to overcome daily social and economic adversities prevented that resentment from being transformed into political support for the incumbent regime. An American Pacification Attitude Analysis administered by Vietnamese interviewers in Saigon, Danang, Can Tho and Qui Nhon early last year reported that, despite Vietcong urban terrorism, only about 12 percent of the respondents in the sample “felt more loyalty” to the Saigon Government. Nearly 70 percent believed that national leaders have been ineffective in dealing with economic problems. Less than a third of the respondents reported “some improvement” in their economic conditions in the past five years. Moreover, the closing of American military installations exacerbated these problems, creating rates of unemployment that Economics Minister Pham Kim Ngoc, in a recent interview with the New York Times, called “nothing less than catastrophic.” By 1973, with the American Military withdrawal, unemployment reached 13 percent in Saigon while rising substantially higher in other urban areas.

Cities have been the only centers of political expression in Vietnam since the Diem Regime. Rural provinces are organized to deliver overwhelming electoral support for the national government by a network of military appointed Province and District Chiefs; coalitions of opposition can form only in major urban areas. Political dissension is suppressed in the cities at higher cost to the government, and often only through extreme pressure or outright force. Organized demonstrations by Buddhist, Catholic, student, and disabled veterans groups, even during the peak of hostilities, found sympathetic audiences in Vietnam's largest cities. Opposition political factions draw their resources, leadership and support primarily from urban intellectual and religious groups.

Urban-rural differences in electoral behavior have characterized Vietnamese politics for two decades. The percentages of votes cast in support of the incumbent government are significantly lower in cities than in rural provinces. Refusal to vote in Presidential elections, often the only means of registering opposition to one-action states, was prevalent in 1971. Even official counts—which report participation by 87.7 percent of the eligible voters for the nation as a whole and up to 90 percent for many rural provinces—show voter turnouts of only 72 percent in Saigon, 76 percent in Danang, 75 percent in Dalat and 67 percent in Hue. In Qui Nhon, where official records show 87 percent participation, a reporter for the Far Eastern Economic Review monitoring the polls with a Vietnamese counterpart, estimates that not more than 40 to 60 percent of those eligible actually voted. Rural migrants, military veterans, urban unemployed, and ethnic minorities crowded into congested cities, living at bare subsistence levels in shacks, or squatting on the street, do not make for staunch supporters of a government that cannot or will not take action to improve their condition.

Despite the severity of urban problems, little evidence supports the hope of American and Vietnamese development planners that in the postwar period large numbers of urban immigrants can be induced to return voluntarily to rural villages. Many of the family and ancestral ties that held Vietnamese to their native hamlets have been irreparably destroyed by the war. Although living conditions for most urban migrants are minimal, they rival the dung and straw huts and subsistence farming economies of the villages. Throughout most of the war, cities offered opportunities for employment, acquisition of skills and training, and access to consumer goods unavailable in rural hamlets. Even the poorest migrants were exposed to, if they did not possess, a myriad of luxuries—radios, television sets, appliances, Hondas. Scattered evidence indicates that a large portion of urban squatters will remain in cities. A small-sample survey taken by the Human Science Research Corporation in 1967 revealed that less than 24 percent of the respondents in one refugee district of

See footnotes at end of article, p. 174.
Saigon definitely planned to return to their villages. One third were uncertain; nearly 45 percent were determined to remain, or to leave only if there were no possibilities of finding employment. Of those urban refugees who did find jobs during the war, opened shops or provided services, few are eager to return to rural hamlets as tenant farmers. At least half of Saigon’s population is under twenty years of age; its youthful inhabitants will have had no real experience with rural life when the war is over,” argues John Montgomery. “In the long run, unless Viet Nam differs from all other countries in this respect, the likelihood is that the squatters will not want to go back to the farms once they have seen ‘gay’ Saigon.”

Economically the future of industrial development in Vietnam will be inextricably tied to urbanization. Industrialization and urbanization are concomitant phenomena. Industrialization requires an adequate supply of skilled and semi-skilled workers living in close proximity to plants and factories. Major industries must have access to raw materials, both domestic and imported, and proximity to related industries producing semi-finished goods, professional and commercial services, educational institutions that produce managerial manpower and applied research, and a well-developed public infrastructure—utilities, energy, communications and transportation. These prerequisites are generated in cities. Entrepreneurship, experimentation with modern management techniques and receptivity to new ideas are characteristic of the urban sector.

Moreover, if rural areas are to develop agricultural capacity beyond the subsistence level, markets must exist for agricultural surpluses. Any attempt at creating agricultural export sectors to achieve a favorable balance of trade will require expansion of port cities, especially Danang, Cam Ranh and Qui Nhon. Maintenance and development of the Saigon port are essential. Import substitution strategies entail indigenous industrial growth at regional capitals to supply durable goods for rural residents whose income would increase from expanded agricultural productivity. National economic development therefore depends on an effective system of exchange between urban and rural areas, among cities within the country, and between local industrial and agricultural centers and foreign markets. The financial and administrative resources and talents needed to create and maintain such a system will be generated by and located in cities.

COMPONENTS OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Three elements are essential to a postwar urban development strategy in Vietnam. First, consideration must be given to macro-urban development—to roles of and relationships among cities in the national economic system. The functions that each city performs in national development are based on urban ecological characteristics: population composition, distribution and density, social and economic resources, organizational infrastructure, existing commercial and industrial base, locational advantages and development potential. Second, plans must focus on micro-urban development—short range, immediate and viable programs and projects for ameliorating pressing problems within Vietnamese cities. Micro-urban development policies would aim at reducing critical problems to “tolerable levels,” not only to overcome pressures generated by housing shortages, unemployment, and inadequate facilities but also to mollify political discontent and to build political stability. Development planning cannot solve urban problems finally and absolutely, even at the micro-urban level; planning must be a continuous process responding to changing socio-economic, political, and physical parameters. Nor can programs be designed to apply equally to all Vietnamese cities; each urban area must be treated in the context of current problems and future potential. But the adversities of rapid social and economic transformation can and should be ameliorated. Finally, serious reconstruction strategy cannot ignore the need to create administrative capability to manage urban governments and to deal continually with urban problems. Development of administrative capability entails creation of public service attitudes among local government officials. Political and administrative tools must be fashioned to determine public service requirements and to meet those needs efficiently. (See Table 2.)

See footnotes at end of article, p. 174.
TABLE 2.—COMPONENTS OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macro-urban development</th>
<th>Micro-urban development</th>
<th>Development of administrative capability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delineation of urban areas</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Determination of appropriate urban government organizational structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categorization by size, population concentration, and comparative development resources</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>Organization of national and local planning agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determination of socio-economic differentiation, resource specialization, and existing economic base</td>
<td>Infrastructure and utilities, Educational services and facilities</td>
<td>Creation of effective tax collection procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of potential for creating comparative economic advantages at each urban area</td>
<td>Industrial and commercial development, Public transportation</td>
<td>Creation of efficient local budget and expenditure procedures, Development of effective local government training programs and civil service standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delineation of roles of cities in a system of economic exchange, Identification of growth poles and locations for export industries</td>
<td>Crime and security, Social welfare services, Health services and facilities, Land tenure and allocation</td>
<td>Professionalization of technical services, Establishment of formal and informal linkages among urban, province, and national Ministry officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification of regional market cities and province centers</td>
<td>Sanitation and waste disposal</td>
<td>Creation of reliable data-gathering, and information analysis capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of inter-urban transportation, communication and power facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MACRO-URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Few nations have set upon a course of deliberate urbanization to induce national development. Such efforts in Vietnam would have few models upon which to pattern their plans. A primary task is simply to delineate urban areas. As in many developing countries, cultural and political alienation exists between urban and rural populations in Vietnam. Cities, for most Vietnamese, are highly symbolic. Urban areas traditionally have been the home of the imperial elite, the refuge of Mandarins, the headquarters of successive colonial governments, the source of taxation, and not infrequently of oppression. Yet, legally and administratively, Vietnamese rarely distinguish between rural and urban; cities are considered large villages or agglomerations of hamlets. Recent legislation established "autonomous cities," but even they are governed as village-hamlet structures. National Ministry officials consider large cities as merely small provinces; indeed, if an autonomous city is also a province capital, the Province Chief may serve concurrently as the city's mayor. The concepts of the city as a unique entity or of urbanization as a vehicle for economic modernization and social transformation are fixed neither in national law nor in the Vietnamese mind.

Planning for a system of cities would begin by delineating a hierarchy of urban centers based on social differentiation, natural and human resources and economic specialization. From such an analysis, the potential for creating comparative economic advantages at each urban place could be determined. Functions would be assigned to each city in the national system of production and exchange. Regional growth centers would be designated for the location of export industries, public infrastructure investment and construction of import-substitution industries, higher educational facilities, and commercial trade markets. Smaller urban places would serve as processing and marketing points for agricultural areas. Finally, macro-urban development would include construction of a network of inter-urban transportation, communication and power facilities to link urban areas together and to provide interchange between urban centers and rural hinterlands.

Saigon will remain dominant in the hierarchy of South Vietnamese cities well into the future. It houses one-fifth of the nation's population, produces 80 percent of total electrical energy, consumes nearly 90 percent of the pumped water supply, provides half of the country's industrial and commercial employment, and raises the overwhelming proportion of national tax revenues. The capital city contains more than one-third of Vietnamese manufacturing plants, nearly 40 percent of all commercial establishments, and employs 5 percent of utility workers, 80 percent of transportation and communications personnel and two-fifths of all government employees. It is not only the seat of national government, but also the center of educational, cultural and social activities.

See footnotes at end of article, p. 174.
Projections indicate increasing population growth in the Saigon Metropolitan Area-reaching more than 11 million over the next 25 years—even assuming a substantial decline in average annual growth rates. (See Table 3.)

### TABLE 3.—PROJECTED POPULATION OF SAIGON METROPOLITAN AREA 1975-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Projected urbanized population</th>
<th>Percent urbanized population</th>
<th>Average annual growth rate</th>
<th>Urbanized population density (people per hectare)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3,300,000</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>4,364,364</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>5,562,371</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>6,934,684</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>8,440,411</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>9,844,899</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>11,229,586</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>2.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A second level of cities within the hierarchy could be developed, with appropriate public capital investment and inducement for location of private industry, into important regional centers. Danang and Hue in the northern provinces, Nha Trang and Dalat in the central region and Can Tho and My Tho in the south already possess sufficient population, infrastructure, locational advantages and potential to be developed for specialized economic roles. Other existing cities would also have high priority for public investment. Danang, Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh are major ports for seagoing vessels. Dalat is located amid some of the richest agricultural land in Southeast Asia—and even now serves as an important food distribution and marketing point. In addition, Dalat is considered one of the nation's most desirable resort locations. Dalat and the coastal cities of Vung Tau and Nha Trang can be developed into profitable tourist and resort attractions. My Tho and Can Tho, southern administrative and commercial centers, have the potential of becoming processing and shipping points for the highly productive rice paddies of the Mekong Delta. Finally, the hierarchical network would include a larger number of smaller urban places to serve as sub-regional and province administrative centers, agricultural exchange and commercial trade markets, and to perform specialized functions related to unique resource or locational advantages. Rach Glia, Phan Thiet, Ban Me Thout, and Bien Hoa in the southern and central provinces would constitute a system of sub-regional and province growth centers.

### MICRO-URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Saigon and the major regional capitals suffer all of the adversities of rapid urbanization unaccompanied by comparable rates of national modernization. The need for housing, utilities, sanitation and waste disposal facilities, electric power, public transportation and social services is great. Twenty years of intermittent warfare has disrupted the maturation of social programs and has destroyed not only military installations, but public infrastructure and private homes as well. An estimated total of 150,000 private homes were destroyed by bombs, mortars and ground fighting in 1968 alone. Fewer than 7,000 of Hue's 17,000 houses survived the 1968 Tet offensive; half of My Tho's 60,000 population were left homeless. The crush of migrants in urban squatter settlements proliferated make-shift dwellings on land unserviced by even basic sanitation facilities. The Saigon-Bien Hoa highway is lined with hives of squatter shacks built with flattened beer cans, cardboard, canvas, tin sheets and any other material that can be scavenged or stolen. Homeless squatters on the streets of Saigon and Cholon live a day-to-day existence. Whole villages of ramshackle dwellings have emerged nearly overnight on the periphery of Danang.

Services and facilities installed prior to 1968 are now severely overstrained. "A consequence of the rapid increase in population density in Saigon is that living conditions have rapidly and widely degenerated to squalor," observed David Dupuy in his study of a Saigon squatter district:

See footnotes at end of article, p. 174.
Public utilities, which were mostly constructed when the French controlled Vietnam, are no longer adequate. Presently, people in many areas, such as District 8, must obtain their water from fire hydrants, canals, or from water dealers. Many areas do not have electricity, and where it is available, the wires are old and overloaded, creating considerable fire hazards. Sewer lines do not run into the squatter areas of District 8, and those families rarely have any private sanitary facilities. Community facilities exist in the form of crude privies that line stagnant canals.

Despite the installation of modern water treatment plants and electric supply facilities in Saigon, demand continues to outstrip supply. Water consumption quadrupled from 24 or 95 million gallons per day between 1965 and 1972. Demand for electricity in the capital city more than tripled between 1961 and 1971 from 63 to 200 megawatts. Water and power services are provided to wealthier residential and commercial areas of the city, while low income residents continue to live in primitive conditions.

Physical deterioration is accompanied by the intensification of social problems. With rising unemployment, theft, muggings, and prostitution increase steadily. Security becomes more lax. A secret Pacification Attitude Analysis Survey obtained by the New York Times early in 1972 indicates that in cities theft is listed “as the most severe urban problem, exceeding housing, traffic, flooding in slum areas or poor utility services.” The streets of Vietnamese cities are clogged with Hondas, bicycles, small taxicabs, motorized cycles, and diesel trucks, polluting the air and creating chaotic traffic jams. Traffic control is minimal—vehicles spill onto sidewalks, and clog all entrances to an intersection at the same time. Peak-hour traffic jams often erupt into street brawls and shouting matches. None of the major cities have public transportation systems. Educational, social welfare and health services are minimal. Where they do exist they are often provided by poorly financed private organizations. Only about 25 percent of the eligible age group (12 to 18 years old), according to USAID estimates, are enrolled in public secondary schools. While nearly 86 percent of those eligible are officially enrolled in elementary schools, attendance is sporadic, classrooms are overcrowded and teaching techniques are primitive.

Industrial and commercial development, public utility construction and housing improvement are inhibited by complex land tenure laws, the lack of land use planning and control, and the occupation of public and private land by squatters. Although the government has acted to remove squatters from more visible public lands, legal rights to property become clouded once squatters build even makeshift homes. The government is slow to clear occupied land, as Montgomery notes, because many of the urban private land-owners are foreign nationals—Chinese, French, Indian—and repatriated North Vietnamese. Refugee resettlement heavily drains the public treasury.

Urban development will be expensive. The Joint Development Group estimates the cost of adequate sanitary and sewerage facilities for all major provincial cities at about $500 million. Reconstruction of all physical infrastructure in Saigon alone would require nearly $10 billion over the next thirty years. Urban reconstruction will demand the concerted efforts of both public and private sectors, with substantial foreign financial and technical assistance.

DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE CAPABILITY

The success of postwar reconstruction rests on the development of Vietnamese administrative capability—creation and expansion of structures, processes and trained manpower to formulate and implement recovery plans through an organizationally complex decision-making system. Current administrative capacity is inadequate for modernizing either rural or urban sectors of the national economy.

A new set of organizations will be needed to govern Vietnamese cities. Municipal government structures and functions are based on traditional village activities, often not reflecting the needs of rapidly urbanizing areas. An integral part of organizational development would be the creation and operation of local planning agencies, closely tied to the mayor and technical service bureaus with strong linkages to national reconstruction planning bodies.
Sporadic efforts have been made since the early 1960's to generate urban land use and physical facilities plans, but the planning function has not been integrated into Vietnamese local government.

Perhaps the most crucial requirement of administrative development is creation of an effective local taxing and budgeting system. Local governments are not economically self-sufficient. The centralization of functions under the Diem Regime discouraged initiative by village authorities in tax collection and provision of services. Property taxes, exploited by both the Vietcong and local governments, are politically unpopular among Vietnamese. The land tax, difficult to assess and collect, represents only a fraction of local government revenues, even in Saigon. Rents from public property, business license taxes and administrative charges, ancient sources of government revenues, still provide a substantial proportion of local government income. The primary source of local revenues, however, is the National Budget subsidy. (See Table 4.) Nearly a third of Saigon's municipal budget is subsidized by the national government, while from 50 to 65 percent of local revenues received by second-level major cities comes from Central Government sources. The effectiveness of local tax reform laws enacted in 1972 has yet to be tested.

Vietnamese local administrators have little experience with resource allocation and budgeting. Administrative salaries and basic public works—road and utility building—absorb nearly all local expenditures. (See Table 5.) Substantive services, even in major urban areas, either are not provided or are financed by national ministries. Only within the past few years, and with strong American financial and technical support, have local officials been given budget training and control over some development money through the Village Self-Development Program and the Province and Municipal Development Funds. See footnotes at end of article, p. 174.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban area</th>
<th>Total revenues (in thousands of piasters)</th>
<th>Land tax</th>
<th>Additional 1 percent of license taxes</th>
<th>Assimilated direct taxes</th>
<th>Public property occupancy taxes</th>
<th>Other taxes</th>
<th>Revenue from rent and excises</th>
<th>Administration revenue</th>
<th>Revenue from private property</th>
<th>Subsidies contributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danang</td>
<td>119,850</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hue</td>
<td>97,100</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can Ranh</td>
<td>264,240</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalat</td>
<td>64,740</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>61,990</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5.—MUNICIPAL BUDGET EXPENDITURES, MAJOR URBAN AREAS, SOUTH VIETNAM, 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Areas</th>
<th>Total expenditures (in thousands of dollars)</th>
<th>Percent Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total expenditures</td>
<td>Municipal councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danang</td>
<td>110,850</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hue</td>
<td>97,100</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh</td>
<td>264,240</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalat</td>
<td>64,740</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>61,990</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The quality of administrative and technical management in cities is poor. Since the early 1950's village chiefs and council members have been symbolic, ritual leaders; the offices are held by village elders and notables. Village elections and the traditional autonomy of local governments under imperial rule, severely weakened by French colonial governments, were abolished by the Diem Regime. After a short experiment with local elections in the late 1960's President Thieu, in May 1972, suspended them again and reinstated Central Government appointment of village and hamlet chiefs.

University-educated administrators and French-trained civilian officers, removed in the 1960's as Province and District Chiefs, were replaced by politically appointed military officers. Many technical service personnel were drafted into the armed forces and reassigned to other duties. Turnover of military personnel in local managerial positions is rapid, corruption is rampant, and standards of performance and accountability are ambiguous. Where civilians remain in administrative positions, lines of responsibility, supervision and control are complex and confusing. The mayor, for example, is accountable for the quality of technical services provided in his city. But technical service personnel working for the city respond to functional supervisors and politically powerful section chiefs in the national ministries. Coordination and communication among local officials, province and district leaders and national ministry bureaucrats tend to be highly formalized and sporadic. Communication takes place through the issuance of and response to legislative decrees, administrative mandates, and written reporting requirements. The training of local officials, reinstatement of a professional civil service, and improvement in the quality of technical service personnel are essential for postwar reconstruction. Establishment of effective formal and informal linkages of communication and interaction among local, province and ministry administrators, is prerequisite to coordinated planning and implementation of development policy.28

Finally, if urban areas are to be efficiently planned and managed, a reliable data gathering and information analysis capacity must be created within the Vietnamese government. The paucity of statistical information concerning Vietnamese cities is rivaled only by the unreliability of existing data. Demographic, economic, social, political and physical information are collected sporadically, manipulated to reflect existing political policies, and scattered among a multitude of government agencies.

CONCLUSIONS

The three components of the proposed postwar urban development policy are inextricably related. Macro-urban strategy can provide the context for investment in public infrastructure and private enterprise, establishing a set of locational priorities for the distribution and concentration of directly productive and social overhead capital. But economic growth, social modernization and individual opportunity evolve through micro-urban development—provision of facilities and services that make city life tolerable and urban amenities accessible to a cross-section of the Vietnamese people.

Development theorists have long endorsed a strategy of comprehensive national planning. Although elements of the three components of urban development intertwine, the prospects for a comprehensive approach to urban reconstruction in Vietnam are dim. Few nations, including the United States, have

See footnotes at end of article, p. 174.
formulated a comprehensive urban policy or successfully executed a symptomatic plan for economic development. Only incrementally, through a series of successive steps, at pace with steady transformation in Vietnamese social, cultural, economic and political institutions, can a postwar reconstruction policy emerge. The lesson of two decades of American involvement in Vietnamese affairs should be clear: if a postwar reconstruction policy is to succeed, the Vietnamese must be committed to it and generate the internal resources required to implement it. Foreign advisors can provide technical assistance and financial support, but the motivation, manpower and economic resources must be primarily Vietnamese.

By whatever means postwar plans evolve, however, reconstruction policy cannot ignore the role of cities in economic redevelopment and social modernization. Recognizing the lack of even minimal guidelines for dealing with pressing urban problems in the postwar period, the National Government has hurriedly established a Central Urban Development Committee (CUDC). Composed of major Cabinet Ministers and chaired by the Prime Minister, the CUDC will soon begin identifying critical urban problems and attempting to shape urban development policies. Despite the deurbanization recommendations of the Thuc-Lillenthal report and the Brookings study, the Vietnamese are slowly coming to realize that the probabilities of inducing massive emigration from the cities to rural villages are low. Vietnam has a growing urban population, substantial urban infrastructure and a seminal system of cities that can provide the base for both agricultural specialization and industrial expansion. The task for the next decade is to design a postwar reconstruction policy by which Vietnam can modernize its social system, reconstruct its physical infrastructure and create the comparative advantages required to participate in a competitive Asian economy.

FOOTNOTES


6 Ibid.


175


20 DuPuy, op. cit., p. 4.


22 The New York Times (February 6, 1972), p. 3.


25 Joint Development Group, op cit., passim.


28 The introduction of Western administrative and management techniques and procedures in South Vietnam has met with mixed success. Those leading to greater productivity and efficiency in merely technical matters were incorporated into management practice. Others, aimed at altering Vietnamese work habits, social values, political procedures, and formal relationships were generally unsuccessful. See Nguyen Quoc Tri, "Cultural Receptivity to Induced Administrative Change—The Case of Vietnam," paper prepared for delivery, Joint Planning of the Southeast Asia Development Group (SEA-DAG), Hong Kong, January 1971.

SAIGON POLICE FIGHT SUBVERSION BUT ALSO CURB POLITICAL DISSENT

(By David K. Shipler)

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Aug. 17—On the floor of a Saigon hospital ward a young seamstress named Dang Thi Hien lay handcuffed to an olive-drab stretcher. Her legs, covered with a blanket, were paralyzed—a result, she said, of beatings and torture during police interrogation.

In a small office a student activist, Nguyen Xuan Ham, drew deeply on a cigarette while he described being forced to watch three friends tortured as policemen tried vainly to make him admit that he was a Communist.

A high-school philosophy teacher, Tran Tuan Nham, who was jailed after his unsuccessful run as an anti-Government candidate for the National Assembly, hunched over his drawing of the layout of cells in the Saigon municipal police headquarters to show where he saw the head of the Private Bank Workers Union, Phan Van Hi, meet death—not by suicide, as the Government reported, but after days of beatings.

Beyond the well-known war of tanks and planes and infantry there is another war in South Vietnam—a silent, hidden war that runs its course out of the public view. It is waged in interrogation rooms, in prisons, in courtrooms. It is fought in tiny print shops and large universities, in churches and pagodas, in the cramped offices of opposition politicians and the shabby headquarters of dissident union leaders.

FAR FROM PUBLIC VIEW

Some portray the struggle as a monumental clash between free ideas and governmental suppression; others see it as the Saigon Government's rightful battle for survival against a potent campaign of Communist subversion.

In fact it is both, for its major roots are in the civil war that has consumed South Vietnam for two decades, taking some two million Vietnamese lives, touching virtually every family, seeping into every crevice of society.

The Government, to defend itself against Communist attempts to seduce and convert the civilian population, and to combat infiltration, sabotage and assassination by the Vietcong, has assembled—with American financial and advisory help—an extensive police apparatus and a military judicial system that are waging this second, simultaneous war.

But those caught in the web of arrest, torture and imprisonment include not only Communists who pose as dissent but non-Communist dissidents as well; not only sophisticated Vietcong officials but apolitical peasants suspected of Communist sympathies; not just Communist labor organizers but tough, aggressive union leaders; not only Vietcong propagandists but poets and writers who have simply opposed United States policy and called for peace.

In recent months a picture of the Government’s police and judicial systems has emerged through interviews with former prisoners and their families, student activists, labor officials, teachers, journalists, authors, opposition politicians, Roman Catholic priests, Buddhist monks, lawyers and police officials.

Such inquiries by foreign correspondents are possible in Government-held areas, where outsiders have relative freedom. The Vietcong, in contrast, have permitted only strictly guided tours by newsman, so little is known of the
actual workings of their security and judicial systems. The sketchy outlines provided in captured documents and the interrogation of defectors indicate that recalcitrant civilians in Vietcong areas are subjected to arrest, trial, "re-education" and even execution.

As a result of the police activity on both sides, no neutralist sentiment has been allowed to gain momentum. The Government machinery designed to fight the Communists has actually eaten away the middle ground between the two warring camps.

NO PLACE TO TURN

Those politically active South Vietnamese who dislike both sides find themselves with no place to go. Some who were anti-Government dissidents have turned reluctantly to the Communists. Others hate and fear the Communists so much that they have grudgingly accepted President Nguyen Van Thieu although they do not like him either.

Yet the Government's system is not a massive, ever-present police operation comparable to that of the Soviet Union, nor does it suppress dissent so thoroughly that the country can present a public image of unity, as does North Vietnam.

It creates, instead, a mosaic of free expression and fear, of political opposition and political conformity, of gentle conference and harsh punishment. Within this mosaic the heavily censored South Vietnamese press often displays a streak of irreverence. And a few vitriolic politicians can berate President Thieu and have their views reported—not domestically indeed, but by the foreign press.

On the other hand, dissidents who are free to speak out often contend that they are mere ornaments, that whenever they begin to accrue political power the police arrest the lesser figures around them, break up their meetings and leave them isolated.

By the same token the police rarely make mass arrests of student dissidents, some students report, but prefer to infiltrate quietly and then choose carefully those leaders whose imprisonment will sap an opposition movement of its vigor.

DISTINCTIONS OFTEN IGNORED

The distinctions between Communists and non-Communists are not always apparent to the police, some of whose principal officers insist that all dissidents are really Communists. In any given case the military judicial system—whose judgments rely chiefly on police dossiers—does little to establish the truth, which may be known only to the accused.

Those expressing antiwar sentiments have long been targets of police scrutiny, both because such views are regarded as Communist views and for fear that they will spread among a war-weary population. Consequently, many people put themselves in considerable danger by opposing United States involvement in the war.

Mr. Pham, the teacher, was arrested shortly after his unsuccessful 1971 campaign for a National Assembly seat, run on the theme "Fight the Americans and save the country,"—a slogan also used by North Vietnam. He was released in March after nearly two years in prison.

"At the beginning of the campaign, my election pamphlets were confiscated right at the print shop," he said in an interview four days after his release. "And on the first day of the campaign, in the morning, I began putting up my posters. By six o'clock that night the police were tearing them down."

Every day, he recalled, five or six of his campaign workers were arrested, held for a few hours and released. He said that after the election—he finished eighth in a field of 87 candidates running for six seats—about 20 of his workers were put in jail, where some remain.

ANTI-U.S. ARTICLES CITED

A journalist who asked not to be identified related that he had been arrested, beaten and tortured with electrical shock by policemen who cited several of his anti-American articles as evidence that he was a Communist.

He had translated American antiwar writing and had written a newspaper series about the My Lai massacre, the effects of defoliants and the use of antipersonnel bombs against North Vietnam, all based on books and articles
published in the United States. He was released several months ago after about a year and a half.

A well-known author, Nguyen Buc Dung, who uses the pen name Vu Hanh, was arrested in 1967 and held for three years after he had written newspaper and magazine articles arguing that Vietnam's national culture must be preserved against Americanization. He advocated the establishment of a political movement with that aim.

During interrogation, he said, policemen beat him, forced soap water into his mouth and tortured him by applying electrodes to his body.

In 1969, when his 18-year-old son, Nguyen Anh Tuan, protested the imprisonment, he was arrested and is still in prison. In January 1973, Mr. Dung's 15-year-old daughter, Nguyen Thi Phuong Thao, was arrested and held for six months for allegedly possessing antiwar music. The police said she was a Communist.

Now Mr. Dung's small house, tucked away in a compact garden off a back alley in Saigon, is stripped of his books and writings, all seized by the police. He has written two novels since his release, both so heavily censored that he does not think it worth trying again.

On Jan. 1, 1974, the police surrounded a Saigon cafe and, it is reported, arrested three young people connected with the clandestine publication of a small book of short stories entitled "Pink Hearts."

The stories are intensely antiwar, portraying the Government as the prime cause of a conflict that separates lovers and shatters families. One of those said to have been arrested, Tran The Hung, a student at Van Hanh University in Saigon, wrote of a peasant named Sao Do, who fought the French and was now opposed to both sides in this war.

Sao Do reflects happily on the forthcoming marriage of his daughter, but worries that his two sons might kill each other.

Suddenly Government planes attack with "thousands of fragments of bombs and bullets surrounding and swooping down on Sao Do's hiding place, where his neighbors also try to save some fragment of life amid the net of death."

"After the careless terrorization," the story goes on, "the planes flew away, leaving behind a scene of destruction, torn houses, rows of bamboo with their heads bowed low to the ground, smoke rising up from burning houses. The smoke rose and disappeared like the incomplete dream of Sao Do."

"I DON'T LIKE THIS FLAG"

Another author reportedly arrested was Hoang Thoai Chan, who wrote a bitter story about a Saigon taxi driver's happiness upon hearing of the cease-fire. He expected his three sons to return from the army, but when he entered his house he found that only one son had come home, in a coffin draped with the South Vietnamese flag.

"Why don't you bring home something different from this flag?" the man asks his dead son. "I don't like this flag."

Many former prisoners, although by no means all, describe being subjected to torture, usually for one of two purposes: to force them to provide intelligence information or to force confessions, to which the military judicial system attaches great value.

A number who have been imprisoned in the Saigon municipal police headquarters, including a student leader, Ha Dinh Nguyen, report seeing a slogan on the walls and on signs on desks: "If he is not guilty, beat him until he renounces. If he does not renounce, beat him to death."

Mr. Nham, the teacher and opposition candidate, said he was never tortured, but in the first week in March, when he was in a cell at the Saigon municipal police headquarters, he recalled, he saw many people from the countryside, mostly women, who had been beaten so badly that they could no longer walk and had to be carried from cell to interrogation room.

LINKS TO THE OTHER SIDE

"I had a chance to talk with some of them," he reported, "and it seems they were people who had husbands or relatives on the other side, and so they had been brought here. Other people were suspected of trading with the other side."

He recognized among the prisoners a former student. Thuy Dung, a frail woman in her early twenties who leaned weakly against the wall of the
corridor as she walked to and from interrogation. Through a student who was
serving as a sweeper in the cellblock, she conveyed to Mr. Nham her concern
that she was suffering from an injury caused when an eel was put in her
underpants.

When Mr. Nham was first arrested, he went on, students in his cell had
painfully swollen fingers because policemen had inserted pins under their
fingernails, then run rulers back and forth across the ends of the pins during
questioning.

One of those in the cell, a law student named Trinh Dinh Ban, had been
beaten so badly that he could not sit upright, Mr. Nham related, adding, “He
screamed all the time because he was in pain all over his body.”

Other people have described similar situations. An American physician who
works in a provincial hospital reported that prisoners were often brought into
the wards with bruises that they attributed to police beatings. The doctor, who
asked not to be identified, told of a woman who was near death, having been
severely beaten on the stomach: “She had internal injuries, bleeding, she
couldn’t eat. I thought she was going to die, but she survived.”

JUST ROUTINE QUESTIONING

Dr. Tom Hoskins, an American who works in Quang Ngai, on the central
coast, reported that one of his clinic’s regular patients, a 45-year-old woman,
came in suffering from bruises. “She had been picked up for routine question­
ing,” he said, “and was severely beaten around the arms, chest, legs.”

The patterns of arrest envelop certain aggressive labor unions as well—
those that threaten to translate serious economic concerns into sharp political
issues.

In April, 1973, a number of prominent union officers were arrested and
accused of being Communist agents, among them Mr. Hi, head of the bank
union; Dang Tam Si, secretary general of the bank union; Nguyen Than
Nghiep, president of the Petroleum and Chemical Factory Workers Union,
and Hoang Xuan Dong, secretary general of the Railway Workers Union.
Mr. Dong was among 27 union members arrested in April, 1973, after an
illegal two-hour strike by clerical and repair workers seeking a wage in­
crease. During interrogation, according to a source close to the case, he was
blindfolded and his wrists were handcuffed behind his back and water was
forced into his nose and mouth until he could not breathe. The police asked:
“Who gave the order for this strike? Do you have contacts with Mr. Nghiep
or Mr. Hi?”

HE DIED IN PRISON

Mr. Hi, arrested at about the same time, was accused of being a Com­
munist agent for 25 years. Five days after his arrest he died in prison; the
Government said he had hanged himself

Mr. Nham, the teacher, whose cell was across the corridor, has a different
version.

“I could see him carried out for interrogation and carried back,” Mr. Nham
recalled. “The person who brought rice to the cells said he was being beaten
really severely and he didn’t know whether he would be able to bear it much
longer.”

On the night of April 22, Mr. Nham continued, he heard a noise from Mr.
Hi’s cell.

“A guard came over and opened his door and pulled him out head first so
his legs were still in the cell and his body outside,” Mr. Nham said. “He had
no clothes on. One arm was across his chest. His arm was swollen and it
was black like a piece of putrid meat. On his chest was a little bit of blood,
his side along his ribs was just beaten into hamburger.” Mr. Hi was dead.

Last March, Mr. Nham said, he shared a cell with a union man named Trang.

TORTURE OF STUDENTS DESCRIBED

“He had been there seven or eight months,” Mr. Nham continued. “He was
being strung up by his arms daily and beaten on his legs, his back, his chest.
When I left there he was unable to walk because of the beatings on his legs
and his knees were so swollen.

“He was arrested for having known a Liberation Front official who had
responsibility for having lent him his pickup truck to go around in.”
According to Mr. Nguyen, the student leader and a former student chairman at the Saigon university, torture was a common aspect of the wave of arrests in which he and about 250 student leaders were caught early in 1972. They had assembled a "peace movement" to oppose the American presence in South Vietnam and President Thieu's one-man election in 1971. One activity was burning American vehicles.

Mr. Nguyen described himself as one of three students tortured in front of Mr. Ham, the activist leader, who was chairman of an association of Catholic students at the University.

Mr. Ham said the others were Huynh Tan Mam, head of the South Vietnam Student Union, who is still imprisoned, and Phan Nguvet Quon, who has which he insists he is not. The police began by torturing him alone.

"Sometimes they tied me to the chair," Mr. Ham recalled. "Sometimes they blindfolded me. During the first week I was beaten every day." He also reported being shocked by means of an old hand-cranked telephone generator connected to his nipples with clips.

This failing to elicit a confession, the police brought in his friends one at a time, he said, adding:

"It terrorized me. I was very angry that they beat a girl in front of me. They tied her ankles to a chair, tied a rope around her stomach and blindfolded her. They had a long rubber baton and they beat her knee caps. Then they thrust their hands in under her ribs and pulled them out. They had her lie down and forced soapy water into her mouth."

"They attached one wire to an earlobe and one to her breast or to her genital area and then they would crank. When the crank was turned and produced a burst of electricity, she would strain at the chair and slump back."

The policemen took turns, Mr. Ham recalled. Some were in uniform, and he could see that they were high-ranking officers—majors and lieutenant colonels—while others were in civilian clothes or bare-chested.

"ORDINARY JOB, NO EMOTION"

"It was like an ordinary job with no emotion," Mr. Ham commented. "They had many Coca-Cola bottles and cigarettes. They would beat a little, drink a little Cola, smoke a cigarette, speak to each other in quiet voices—no emotion, very professional. Most were not angry or hateful but were just doing it very coolly."

There were times, he said, when he considered "saying anything to relieve the suffering," but he thought that they would have asked him for details he could not provide, "so it just would have prolonged the torture."

Miss Quon never begged him to confess, he said, "but she did shout at them, asking them why they were so savage."

SCARS ARE OFTEN BURIED

It is hard to see the scars of torture. Sometimes they are in the eyes, but not always. Often they are hidden far beneath the steady gaze and self-control learned, perhaps, in the interrogation rooms. For some, curiously, it is not the thought of the torture itself but the recollection of that dreadful time of waiting to be summoned that stirs the old taste of fear.

Nguyen Viet Tuan can still taste it, and he was never tortured. The president of a group called the Young Catholic Workers, he was arrested for helping workers striking at a Saigon factory. He was treated gently, he said, but his cell was full of those tortured.

The tension is still real—the extreme fear of the long, silent.

"After 10 P.M.," he said, "We would wait for a sound, a bell. Then the guard gets up, climbs upstairs—then the sound of the key. The interrogators in the daytime were not severe, but the interrogators at night were hard."

SAIGON'S MILITARY COURTS DOMINATE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

(By David K. Shipler)

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Aug. 18—The small courtroom is lit dimly by a few bare bulbs on the ceiling. From behind the heavy black judicial bench five army officers in battle fatigue peer out at the prisoners, who stand silently
among their families and friends. In an aisle a military policeman fingers half a dozen handcuffs, getting them ready. The chief judge, a lieutenant colonel, reads the verdicts.

Three months to the young man for selling canned milk and soap to the enemy. Five years in absentia to the three women for treason. Four months, three months and three months to the three men for using heroin. A year to the boy for deserting, but no sentence for his mother, who is charged with helping him.

In just two hours on a recent morning the court tried 15 people without witnesses, without cross-examination. Nine were jailed and six released.

This is the Military Field Court in Saigon, one of four in South Vietnam. Over the last 20 years, little by little, these courts, which began as emergency and temporary institutions on the battlefield, have expanded their jurisdiction and have become major instruments of judicial power, even though the Supreme Court declared them unconstitutional in 1970.

MOST MAJOR CASES

According to lawyers, policemen and judicial officials, they now handle virtually every case of pro-Communist or anti-Government activity—plus many purely criminal matters—in which some scrap of evidence exists. Most cases without sufficient evidence go to panels of army officers known as Provincial Security Committees, which conduct their proceedings in secret, without defense attorneys and sometimes without even the defendants present.

Together, the Military Field Courts and the Provincial Security Committees form the judicial arm of an extensive police system that operates in a twilight zone between military and political warfare.

It evolved as a weapon against what the Government saw as the Communists' immense skill in infiltrating and wooing the civilian population. But dissidents charge that this potent machinery is also used to jail students, labor leaders, writers and political opponents of the Government who have no connection with the Communists.

The police and judicial systems operate within a framework of martial law, which was declared in South Vietnam in 1965 and renewed in 1972.

Under martial law President Nguyen Van Thieu has used his powers to issue decrees that, in effect, prohibit all political parties except his own Democratic party; prohibit strikes and demonstrations; forbid the assembly of seven or more persons without a permit; outlaw organizations and associations not approved by the Government; prohibit the possession and distribution of any the police to search homes without warrants, detain anyone considered dangerous and assign citizens to forced places of residence.

The entire structure is designed to deal swiftly with emergencies, and its judicial arm has dispensed with the time-consuming observance of defendants' rights and rules of evidence. The system relies heavily on confession and thereby, in the view of a number of South Vietnamese lawyers and legal experts, provides a firmly institutionalized motive for torture during interrogation.

Some weeks ago Phan Van Ban stood before the military judges in the Saigon court, whose proceedings are usually open to the public. He lived in Tay Ninh Province north of Saigon, where patches of Vietcong and Government control blur into each other just off the major highways. He was accused of buying a tractor to sell to the Vietcong. He denied the charge.

"Then why did you sign here?" asked the chief judge, a lieutenant colonel, pointing to Mr. Ban's confession in the police dossier.

"Because I was tortured so I just signed," he replied. There was no reaction from the judges, no murmur of surprise in the crowded courtroom.

"THEY BEAT ME TOO MUCH"

"Did you plan to buy it and sell it to the VC?"

"No."

"Then why did you admit you planned to sell it to the VC at the police interrogation?"

"Because they beat me too much so I admitted it."

"According to the dossier, this is the second time you tried to buy a tractor."