THE WORLD HEROIN PROBLEM

REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY MISSION
COMPOSED OF
MORGAN F. MURPHY, Illinois, Chairman
ROBERT H. STEELE, Connecticut

Pursuant to
H. Res. 109

Authorizing the Committee on Foreign Affairs to conduct thorough studies and investigations of all matters coming within the jurisdiction of the Committee

June 22, 1971.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

This report has been submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs by a special study mission conducted between April 3 and 23, 1971. The findings in this report are those of the special study mission and do not necessarily reflect the views of the membership of the full Committee on Foreign Affairs.

THOMAS E. MORGAN, Chairman.
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,

Hon. Thomas E. Morgan,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: There is transmitted herewith a report of a special study mission conducted between April 3 and April 23, 1971, by the undersigned, both members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. We were accompanied by Dr. John J. Brady, Jr., staff consultant, Committee on Foreign Affairs. Mr. Fred Flott, Department of State, acted as escort officer.

The purpose of the study mission was to gather information pertaining to the illegal international traffic in heroin.

During the course of the trip, which took us around the world, we met with United States diplomatic and military officials, parliamentarians, foreign law enforcement officials responsible for narcotics control and other foreign governmental leaders responsible for narcotics matters in Switzerland, France, Italy, Turkey, Iran, Thailand, South Vietnam, Hong Kong, and Japan. Prior to our departure we met with officials from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Treasury, concerning various aspects of this problem.

We would like to express our thanks and appreciation for the assistance, cooperation and hospitality extended to the members of the study mission by Departments of State and Defense personnel in the countries visited.

In particular, we would like to thank the agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, U.S. Department of Justice, with whom we met in the several countries. It was largely through their efforts that we were able to learn as much as we did concerning the illegal production of, and traffic in, heroin around the world.

It is hoped that the information contained in this report will be helpful to the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Congress in their deliberations on the legislation pending on this subject.

Morgan F. Murphy, Chairman,
Robert H. Steele,
Special Study Mission on
the World Heroin Problem.
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(VII)
THE WORLD HEROIN PROBLEM

JUNE 22, 1971.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. Murphy of Illinois, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs submitted the following

REPORT

[Pursuant to a resolution (H. Res. 109, 92d Cong.) authorizing the Committee on Foreign Affairs to conduct thorough studies and investigations of all matters coming within the jurisdiction of such committee.]
THE WORLD HEROIN PROBLEM

INTRODUCTION

Drug abuse around the world is increasing. Of particular concern is the alarming rise in the use of opium-based drugs, particularly heroin, in the United States, and the rapid increase in heroin addiction within the United States military forces in South Vietnam, where the best estimates are that as many as 10 to 15 percent of our servicemen are addicted to heroin in one form or another.

To combat this growing menace around the world and at home the United States must use every resource available. It must work through international organizations; it must exert pressure on its friends and allies to convince them of the need to take strong action either to control or eliminate the growing of opium poppies or to increase their efforts to stop the illegal traffic in narcotics. Our Nation must provide the leadership to make international cooperation to control the illegal traffic in narcotics and other dangerous drugs more effective.

The battle to stem the alarming increase in heroin addiction will not be easy, nor will victory come quickly. But the war against heroin must be sharply accelerated—now. Given the increasing use of heroin among our youth, immediate action is crucial. Unfortunately, time is not on our side, and as this report is being written more young Americans are becoming addicted to heroin.

Equally distressing is the fact that the United States alone cannot bring an end to the waste and devastation that drug abuse, particularly the use of opium and its derivatives, is causing among the youth of the Nation. We must have the cooperation of the entire world.

For example, only a small percentage of the illegal heroin that reaches the United States is confiscated by the authorities. There are simply too many ways of hiding heroin, from small containers secreted in various body orifices to hollow ski poles and food containers. There are literally thousands of places to hide illegal heroin on board ships entering U.S. ports. International air travel has complicated the problem even further for it enables the courier or trafficker to move quickly from continent to continent, arranging pickups and payoffs personally, in addition to providing places to secrete illegal shipments.

Once the poppy pod is cut and the opium gum extracted and sold on the illegal market, the battle to prevent the end product, heroin, from reaching the addict is lost. The problem must be attacked at the source—in the poppy fields of the Near and Far East, principally in Turkey, Thailand, Burma, and Laos.
We must be willing to devote more resources, human and material, to fight the illegal international traffic in heroin, including the exercise of economic and political pressures where necessary. If that means the imposition of economic sanctions or the exercise of political initiatives, we must be willing to follow that course of action. We are fighting to save generations of young Americans from the scourge of heroin. As in any war, we must bring all of the weapons available to the point of decision.
THE HEROIN PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES

The problem of heroin addiction in the United States

The National Institute of Mental Health estimates that there are 250,000 heroin addicts in the United States. One-half of these are located in the New York City area.

In 1970, 1,154 persons died as a result of drug addiction in the Nation's largest city. One-half of these deaths occurred among young people 23 years of age, or less.

In a 1970 survey in the District of Columbia, heroin addiction was estimated at 10,400 persons. In 1971, this estimate had risen to 16,880, an increase of more than 60 percent.

There are approximately 9,000 heroin addicts in Chicago, according to the Narcotics Squad of that city.

Heroin addiction among U.S. military forces has reached alarming proportions. Reliable authorities estimate that as many as 10 to 15 percent of the troops in Vietnam are using heroin in one form or another. Some smoke it, some sniff or "snort," and approximately 5 to 10 percent inject.

Five years ago the heroin problem was restricted to the ghetto areas of our major cities. Now it is spreading to the suburbs and is found among the children of the wealthy and well-to-do as well as among the poor.

The heroin problem is also affecting U.S. industry. The Wall Street Journal, quoting from a study conducted by the New York Chamber of Commerce, reported last summer that "drug abuse in business—a problem which was rare, indeed, two years ago has overnight become—in qualitative terms—almost as serious as that of alcoholism."

"The increase in drug abuse on company premises stems partly from the spread of illegal drugs through high schools and college campuses and U.S. troops in Vietnam," the report concluded.

And the number of addicts is increasing rapidly. In a statement to the United Nations Commission on Narcotics at Geneva in September 1970, John E. Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) said that "the list of addicts is growing by several thousand each year and, in 1969, the number of new addicts doubled from the preceding year. Every time one addict is cured, more take his place because of the ever-increasing amounts of heroin available. Among the other debilitating consequences of the addiction problem is that in New York City alone, persons are dying of drug related causes at the rate of three per day."

Even these statistics, alarming as they are, may not tell the whole story. Unfortunately, the extent of the addiction problem is difficult to measure. There is no central agency in the United States which collects all of the intelligence on the number of drug users and the figures
provided by BNDD are minimal estimates since they are based only on reporting from law enforcement agencies.

The statistics that are available, therefore, are only educated guesses and the number of addicts may be greatly in excess of the estimated 250,000.

**Consumption of heroin in the United States**

Based on the estimates that there are at least 250,000 heroin addicts in the United States, it would take between 4 and 5 tons of heroin to support the addict population.

Estimates of the cost of the heroin that the average addict requires daily varies, however, from $30 to $100 per day.

**Heroin addiction and crime in the United States**

The habit of the narcotics addict is not only a danger to himself, but to society as a whole. Narcotics have been cited as a primary cause of the enormous increase in crimes committed over the past few years.

Whatever the price, the cost in property stolen by the addict to support the habit is tremendous.

The estimated amount of money spent by heroin addicts in the United States is $7.5 million per day. This figure is based on the fact that there are 250,000 addicts, with an average habit (minimum) of $30 daily. For this year, the estimated figure would be approximately $2,737,500,000.

To support the habit, reliable authorities estimate that the addict would have to steal goods worth at least 4 or 5 times the cost of his habit per year.

If 75 percent of those addicted resorted to crime, using the above figures, then, the cost in crime committed to sustain the habit would be in excess of $8 billion per year at a minimum.

**The source of illicit heroin**

Most world poppy cultivation takes place within a zone extending from the Plains of Anatolia in Turkey to Yunnan Province in China. The international illegal traffic in opium has two major production areas. The first area of importance for the United States is in the Near East where opium produced in Turkey for legitimate medical requirements is diverted to illegal channels. The opium is smuggled to Syria and Lebanon where it is processed into morphine base. (A certain amount of morphine base and heroin is also produced in Turkey.) The morphine base is then smuggled to the Marseilles area of France where it is refined into heroin in clandestine laboratories. The bulk of the heroin entering the United States is grown in Turkey and processed in Marseilles.

The second important area is in the Far East, particularly in Laos, Burma, and Thailand, and to a lesser degree, Yunnan Province in China.

At least 1,000 tons of raw opium are produced in the Shan states of Burma, the border area of Yunnan Province in China, northern Thailand, and northwestern Laos. This production is illicit and is grown in areas where there is little or no governmental control by either Burma, Laos, or Thailand.
The central collecting point for the majority of this opium is at a point where the borders of Thailand, Laos, and Burma meet. A large proportion of the opium is designated for Southeast Asian opium addicts. The remainder is either exported outside of Southeast Asia or is refined into morphine base, the basic ingredient of heroin, or heroin itself in laboratories located in the Burmese-Laotian-Thailand border area, in Vientiane, Laos, in Bangkok, Thailand, and at other points along the Mekong. The heroin labs manufacture both No. 3 purple smoking heroin, which is used by Asian addicts, and No. 4 white heroin, which is produced primarily for the U.S. market and for U.S. troops in South Vietnam.

The main flow of No. 4 heroin to U.S. troops in South Vietnam is through Laos and Thailand. In addition, large quantities of opium and morphine base are smuggled into Hong Kong, where it is both consumed locally and refined into No. 4 heroin for the U.S. market. U.S. narcotics experts regard Hong Kong as of increasing importance as a source of the heroin being smuggled to the United States from the Far East. Current estimates are that at least 10 percent of the heroin entering the United States comes from the Far East and that the percentage is growing. There is also evidence that some of the No. 4 heroin appearing in Saigon also has its source in Hong Kong.

A Chinese traveler from Hong Kong was arrested at Ton Son Nhut in April carrying 3.5 kilos of heroin. This could be the beginning of a trend. When the heroin dealers in Hong Kong realize that a lucrative market exists among the Americans in South Vietnam, they will undoubtedly attempt to get into the market.

There has recently been an increase in the amount of No. 4 heroin smuggled directly from Thailand to the United States. Narcotics experts attribute the increase primarily to the expanding activity of a number of ex-servicemen and U.S. nationals who have served in Southeast Asia and have set up smuggling operations in Thailand.

A certain amount of heroin is also produced from opium poppies grown in Mexico. It is estimated that Mexico accounts for about 15 percent of the heroin which is smuggled into the United States. There is no evidence available to suggest that the Chinese Communists are actively engaged in the illegal international traffic in opium or its derivatives.

The major sources and flow of illicit opium is shown in figure 1.

Profits from the production, processing, and sale of illegal opium

One of the fundamental facts mitigating against solution of the heroin problem in both the United States and abroad is the tremendous profit involved. From the prices paid to the poppy grower to the
retail price for pure heroin sold in New York, there is a $219,975 dollar mark-up as shown in the following table:

**DEVELOPMENT OF RETAIL PRICE OF HEROIN IN THE UNITED STATES, 1969**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>U.S. dollars per kilogram</th>
<th>U.S. dollars per kilogram of raw opium equivalent</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Price to farmer for opium (in Turkey)</td>
<td>$25</td>
<td>$500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale price for heroin (Marseilles)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border price for heroin (New York)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale price for heroin (New York)</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail price for heroin (New York)</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>22,000</td>
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</table>

1 When raw opium is converted to morphine and heroin the volume is reduced by a ratio of 10 to 1.

Because of the tremendous profits that are realized as a result of the illegal traffic in narcotics, there is always the possibility that governmental authorities and police at all levels "can be bought." Above all, some way must be found to take the profit out of heroin smuggling.
Figure 1
WORLD: Major Illicit Opium Sources and Flow

- From Hong Kong
- To U.S.
- To Europe and North Africa
- To other areas
- PHILIPPINES
- To U.S.
- AUSTRALIA
- TERRITORY OF NEW GUINEA
- NEW ZEALAND
- MONGOLIA
- CHINA
- JAPAN
- TAIWAN
- TO FAR EAST
- CEYLON
- TO U.S.
- UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
- EASTERN EUROPE
- NORTH AFRICA
- INDIA
- SOUTHERN RHODESIA
- UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA
- MALAGASY REPUBLIC
- ETHIOPIA
- REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
- MADAGASCAR
- SOUTH AFRICA
- TERRITORIES OF PAPUA AND NEW GUINEA
- NEW ZEALAND
- PROPAGATION IN FRANCE: 1867-1917
THE SITUATION IN FRANCE AND ITALY

FRANCE

Heroin production in France

Heroin is produced in illegal laboratories primarily in the Marseilles area although some may also be produced in Paris and Le Havre. The principal area is Marseilles because of the port facilities and the large criminal element located there. Marseilles is also closer to the source of supply, Turkey, than either Paris or Le Havre, although there is evidence that increasing amounts of morphine base are being smuggled into West Germany by Turkish nationals employed in that country. If this trend continues, other areas of Europe could be used to produce heroin. This will be particularly true if current efforts to close down the illicit laboratories in Marseilles prove successful.

It has been estimated that 80 percent of the heroin entering the United States originates in Turkish poppy fields and is processed in France. French authorities question this estimate. From the discussion which the study group has had with authorities in France, Turkey and the United States, this estimate is undoubtedly high. It is fair to say, however, that the bulk of the heroin entering the United States does originate in Turkish poppy fields and is processed in France. According to the experts, French heroin is among the best grade made due to the expertise of the French chemists who process the morphine into heroin. By the time it reaches the addict in the United States, it has been reduced to 4 to 6 percent purity.

The Marseilles heroin operation

Most of the illegal heroin producing laboratories are located on the southern coast of France, between Nice and Marseilles, and possibly in Corsica.

These laboratories are not large and a number are believed to be mobile. They do not operate continuously as it does not take long to process a shipment of morphine base into heroin. According to the best estimates, there are probably only 5 to 10 laboratories operating at any one time.

The poppy is grown in Turkey and the opium smuggled to Marseilles by sea, air, and overland. Once it arrives in Marseilles it is picked up by the purchaser and turned over to a chemist for processing.

The chemist usually operates his own laboratory, frequently on a free-lance basis. There is no one central organization commanding the entire operation although cooperation among groups is not unusual. If a shipment to one group is seized by the police, another group will help by loaning it some morphine base to tide the losing group over until it can arrange for another shipment from Turkey.

(7)
It is estimated that there are five, and possibly ten, groups operating at any one time with up to 100 individuals employed. Each group appears to have its own courier and trafficking and purchasing operations. Over the past 10 years every narcotics case in Marseilles has involved one or more of four Corsican families: the Venturi brothers (Jean and Dominic), Marcel Francisci, Antoine Guerini and Joseph Orsini. (Orsini himself served a prison term in the United States and was deported in 1958.) There are offshoots of these four families and ad hoc groups may appear from time to time, but these four families are the heart of illegal heroin production in Marseilles. The problem is that in France, as well as in the United States, the police must have evidence upon which to base a case. The police cannot put the finger on the families or people involved. French authorities are hampered by the secret Swiss bank accounts as much as are U.S. authorities.

French mechanism for control

Though France does not suffer to the same extent from heroin abuse as the United States, there is a problem developing in that country. This has been a major factor in prompting French authorities to increase their efforts to combat the availability of heroin in France. An indispensable element in this endeavor has been a growing willingness to cooperate with the United States in its efforts to fight heroin abuse.

A French-American agreement setting up close cooperation between the agencies specializing in the fight against the illegal traffic in drugs in France and the United States was signed on February 26, 1971, by Raymond Marcellin, French Minister of the Interior, and U.S. Attorney General John M. Mitchell. Under the terms of the agreement both governments have agreed to exchange narcotics agents in order to facilitate cooperation. Very considerable credit belongs to Mr. Marcellin for assigning high priority to the anti-heroin effort.

The fight against drug abuse in France is centralized in the Office of the Chief of National Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Bureau. There are three groups which deal with narcotics matters: the Central Office, the Marseilles Service, and the Narcotics Service in Paris. In 1969 there were 40 agents assigned to narcotics duties; today there are 120 with the probability that this number will be increased shortly.

In addition, between 6,000 and 7,000 police and gendarmerie and others have been given training in narcotics control practices. It was pointed out that under the centralized French system, numbers were not as important as emphasis.

If any information becomes available to any French authority, it will be transmitted to the Central Office, although at the present time French authorities are working largely from information provided by the United States.

The French authorities believe that the effort against drug traffickers must be secret. In their opinion the nature of the problem is such that the less known about police methods and tactics, the better the chances are for successful results. As a result, police throughout the country sometimes work on narcotics cases without being completely
aware of all the facts surrounding the case. This approach also serves to prevent police corruption.

French police do very little undercover work. Under French law even police officials are not permitted to get involved in narcotics traffic. If they do, they are liable to criminal prosecution. In addition, if it could be shown that the evidence was provoked by police activity the case would be thrown out of court. As a consequence, the French police depend upon U.S. personnel for their information.

Difficulties in controlling illegal heroin production in France

The French police have been able to locate and close only 13 laboratories over the past 20 years. Two were closed in 1969; one in 1964. One of those closed in 1969 was located in a villa approximately 25 kilometers outside of Marseilles. Finding this one was a result of fine police work by both the French police and United States BNDD agents working closely with the police. A man suspected of being implicated in the narcotics racket was released from arrest. He went directly to the villa and was followed by the authorities. When the police raided the villa, the laboratory was in full operation.

The study mission inspected another building in the suburbs of Marseilles which had housed the illicit laboratory that was closed in 1964. It was an innocent looking building, and if the authorities had not been told by an informer that a laboratory was located in that particular building it would not have been discovered.

As a result of visiting these two locations, it became evident to us that looking for an illegal heroin-producing laboratory is like looking for a needle in a haystack. They can be set up anywhere in a short period of time and they can be moved just as quickly.

At present, the only practical method by which they can be located is through the use of informers. This takes time and money. Money must also be available to pay the informer as well as for making a purchase of the heroin from illegal sources in order to develop leads.

Both French and American authorities voiced confidence that their efforts were progressing satisfactorily and that the Marseilles Service and the Central Office were developing a force capable of effective action in discovering and closing the illegal laboratories. There is a steadily increasing spirit of aggressiveness on the part of the French authorities in their efforts to stop the illegal production of heroin in France.

The French authorities were also hopeful that scientific and technological developments would greatly assist them in their investigations. For example, now in the process of development is a sensory device which, when perfected, will “smell” illegal laboratories in operation. These devices will be mounted in helicopters which will be used by the police to patrol the area. Unfortunately, the device must be in an area when a laboratory is in operation if it is to be useful to the police.

Helicopter-borne patrols are of considerable assistance to the police and should be used. If nothing else, they can increase the sense of police pressure that the narcotics manufacturer is beginning to feel in France. The authorities were emphatic in their belief that, because of French narcotics laws and police pressure, the laboratory oper-
ators are beginning to “panic.” Police pressure should, therefore, be increased.

Consideration should be given to making helicopters and trained pilots available to the French until they develop their own capabilities. If arrangements can be made with French governmental officials it might be possible to place U.S. helicopter units assigned to U.S. Forces in Europe on temporary duty in the Marseilles area. While this would be only an interim solution to the problem, it would be useful and it would enable the authorities to utilize one more weapon in the struggle to stamp out illicit heroin production during the period when the French are developing their own airborne patrol capability.

ITALY

Italy is a transshipment point. It is estimated that 30 to 40 percent of the raw material used to produce heroin either passes through Italy or is hidden in vessels destined for France which stop at Italian ports.

There is also the probability that some of the heroin produced in France and elsewhere returns to Italy where it is then smuggled to the United States. There are no firm estimates on the amount involved, but it is considered to be substantial by knowledgeable experts. The number of known heroin traffickers seen in Italy, plus the deep involvement of a number of known Mafiosa in the United States form the basis for this judgment.

There is also the possibility that heroin is being produced in Sicily and Sardinia.

Italian efforts to control the illegal traffic in narcotics

Efforts by the Italian Government to control the illegal traffic in narcotics have not been successful. For example, it is estimated that the Italian authorities seize only about one-tenth of 1 percent of the narcotics which reach that country.

There appear to be a number of reasons for this.

First, the Italian police agencies are fragmented and cooperation depends upon personalities rather than institutional procedures. There are three distinct national police agencies: The Finance Police, the Public Security Forces, and the Carabinieri. Each is jealous of its prerogatives.

In addition, a Central Narcotics Office (CNO) has been set up in the Ministry of the Interior. Charged with the responsibility for coordinating efforts to control narcotics traffic, the CNO does not always get the cooperation of the police agencies or high-ranking government officials.

Second, the Mafia is deeply involved in the narcotics traffic, and high-ranking Italian Government officials aid that organization throughout Europe. A commission has been appointed to determine the extent of Mafia infiltration of the Italian Government. It will take some time, however, before the results of this study are known.

Third, the Italians do not recognize the seriousness of this problem. According to police authorities throughout Italy, there is no Italian heroin problem. Consequently, there is no feeling of urgency to take
immediate and effective action to coordinate their efforts to combat this problem.

Fourth, the Italians will not take action to improve international cooperation to stop the illegal traffic of heroin. They do not coordinate their activities with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) in spite of the fact that that organization maintains complete files on all known international criminals. Nor will they pass information to Interpol. They have also refused to put any pressure on Turkey to do anything about this problem. Another indication of Italian attitudes is their refusal to participate in the Special Drug Abuse Control Fund established by the United Nations until at least three-fourths of the members have contributed.

Italian cooperation with the United States

There are BNDD agents in Italy working with the Italian authorities in an effort to interdict morphine passing through Italy and to stop heroin from returning. These efforts are hampered by the need to coordinate activities within the several Italian police agencies. Nevertheless, BNDD is helping and encouraging the Italians to improve their capability to halt the drug traffic while waiting for the Italian Government to centralize its operations in this area. Right now, there is little or no cooperation between the Central Narcotics Office and the several police agencies, including the local police. As a matter of fact, the only successful seizures and arrests made in Italy since 1962 have been made with BNDD assistance.

Ambassador Graham Martin has met with Italian Government officials on at least three occasions requesting more cooperation from the Italian Government, to no avail.

These efforts must be intensified. The United States must keep the pressure on the Government of Italy to take effective action and should be prepared, if necessary, to supply aircraft, helicopters, vehicles, communication and other equipment to help increase Italian capabilities to deal effectively with the illegal traffic in narcotics.

If there were no opium production in Turkey, however, the illegal laboratories in Marseilles could not exist. Nor could the illegal trafficker profit in Italy. Solution to the problem has to be found in Turkey. If efforts to close the illegal laboratories in Marseilles, or to stop the Italian trafficker are successful, the operation will move some place else. Without morphine base it is impossible to produce heroin. The Middle East-European aspect of the illegal international traffic in narcotics can only be stopped at the source—in the poppy fields of Turkey.
THE ROLE OF TURKEY

Background

Poppy cultivation is a tradition in the Anatolian region of Turkey dating back to about 1900 B.C. During the 19th century, as world trade greatly expanded, the demand for opium increased and between 1850 and 1900 cultivation spread and expanded throughout the entire country as a cash crop and an important export. In addition to opium gum, other important by-products include seeds for flavoring and oil, both of which have become a standard part of the Turkish farmer’s diet.

Although by 1900 the addiction and abuse of opium and its derivatives had become a serious world health problem and the need for controls was recognized, the political, cultural, social and economic differences between nations made achievement possible only through a progression of treaties, culminating finally in their codification in a Single Convention in 1961. The Single Narcotics Convention which came into force in 1964 was ratified by Turkey in December 1966 and by the United States in 1967. Under this agreement Turkey is recognized as an opium exporter to the legal market.

Attempts to control opium production

Since 1967 Turkey has reduced the number of provinces legally permitted to cultivate poppies from 21 to 7 for the 1971 harvest. It has announced a further reduction to four provinces for 1972. During this same period the legal production of opium gum has been reduced from 368 tons to an estimated 100 tons in 1970. It is estimated by reliable authorities, however, that illegal production could be at least as much and possibly twice that amount—more than enough to satisfy the 4 to 5 tons of heroin required by the addict population in the United States.

Turkey has also tightened procedures for surveillance of poppy fields, purchase from farmers, and curbing of illegal traffic, and instituted efforts to encourage crop substitutions.

Under current practice, worldwide opium trade requirements are determined by the United Nations Control Board. Based upon this, the Turkish Government estimates how much opium Turkey should produce in the following year. The Ministry of Agriculture then determines how much acreage should be planted and in which provinces. The Cabinet then passes an approving decree. The Ministry does not tell the farmer how much land he can plant. Instead, the farmer declares to the village headman how much he intends to farm and the expected yield. These estimates are then passed to the Ministry of Agriculture. The farmer is expected to abide by his declaration, but under present law he is not required to obtain a license.

Control teams will be organized in each of the four provinces to monitor the growing of poppies. These teams will inspect the fields continually from the time of planting through the harvest. The con-
control team will also be responsible for inspecting those areas where poppy cultivation is not permitted. To insure that the provincial control teams are managing the program properly other inspection teams will be periodically sent from Ankara. To facilitate the inspection process the United States will probably loan an airplane to the Turkish Marketing Organization (TMO) to help in the surveillance. The control teams will also educate the farmer on the reasons for and the need to eradicate poppy growing in Turkey.

The Government of Turkey has also increased its efforts to purchase the total opium crop being produced this year. Special instructions have been given to the TMO which is the agency responsible for all purchases and sales of opium. In addition, the governors of the provinces currently harvesting opium have been instructed to assure the closest cooperation between TMO, Ministry of Agriculture, and law enforcement agencies in their provinces.

The basic problem in any collection system is to get an accurate measure of how much is actually planted and how much opium gum is produced. If the above system is effective, the illegal production of opium should be reduced. These procedures are not, however, a substitute for a licensing law. Under this procedure the only penalty is to deny the farmer the authorization to grow poppies. These steps, however, do represent an effort to bring poppy cultivation under control.

Hopefully, once poppy cultivation is brought under control, the next step should be a decision to stop growing poppies entirely. To do this, the farmer must be taught to grow other crops. This should not be an insurmountable problem. Poppy cultivation represents only a minor portion of the crop land. The poppy grower seldom devotes more than one hectare to poppies. The poppy takes so much out of the soil that there is a need to rotate crops. If modern farming methods could be introduced and crops that are easier on the soil developed, the incentive to grow poppies might be removed.

To encourage crop substitution, the Ministry of Agriculture has appointed at least one extension agent to each county in the poppy cultivation area. Depending upon soil and climatic conditions, farmers are being encouraged and assisted to switch to other cash crops, including fruits and vegetables, safflower, sunflower, alfalfa, vetch and wheat. A new high yielding winter wheat seed has been introduced on the Anatolia Plateau which includes some of the poppy growing provinces.

The matter of crop substitution is a long-term problem. The Government of Turkey has yet to develop any particular crop that would pay the farmer the same amount of income as that derived from the legal and illegal production of opium. While there are crops that would pay the farmer the same amount of money that he now derives from the legal cultivation of poppies, there is no other crop which would equal the total income from both legal and illegal production.

In an effort to induce the Turkish farmer to grow other crops, consideration should be given to discontinuing poppies as a cash crop. It is one of two crops grown in Turkey for which payment by the Government is immediate. The other is sugar beets.
If the Government were to increase the payments for sugar beets and encourage the substitution of wheat or some other crop for the poppy as a cash crop, the results might be encouraging. If necessary, the United States should help in this effort by vigorously pressing the Turkish Government to consider this alternative and by furnishing financial and technical assistance to implement such a program.

Consideration should also be given to the feasibility of increasing the price that the Government pays the farmer for opium gum. This action, combined with a strict licensing laws and other measures which would make possession of, and trafficking in, illegal opium or its derivatives a crime punishable by death, as in Iran, could produce positive results.

**Economic factors involved in Turkish poppy growing**

If Turkey stopped growing poppies completely there would be slight impact upon the Turkish economy. According to official Turkish Government statistics, Turkey's total export earnings in 1969 were 4.8 billion Turkish lira (TL) or approximately $534 million, at the rate of 9 lira to the dollar. Legal exports of opium products—opium gum and poppy straw—in that year were valued at only TL 23.6 million or $2,622,196.

Illegal sales of opium do not show up in these figures. If illegal opium sales netted the Turkish farmer even three times that amount or $7,866,588 this is an insignificant item in a total export earning of approximately $534 million.

There are now approximately 80,000 farmers engaged in growing poppies for opium production. In the late 1960's the average annual earnings per farm was between $700 and $800. Ten percent of this was derived from the sale, legal and illegal, of opium gum. This represents approximately one-half of the total annual cash income of the Turkish farmer. The Government pays between $10 and $15 per kilogram for legal opium. On the other hand, the farmer can sell opium on the illegal market for at least $25 per kilogram. Thus, the incentive is to sell to the illegal purchaser.

There is another problem. At present the farmer takes the opium gum to the Government collector in his area who is supposed to weigh the gum and pay the farmer on the spot.

In practice, the farmer is very often cheated. The TMO representative responsible for the purchase of the opium gum from the farmer frequently waits 6 weeks before he weighs the opium gum. During this time moisture in the gum has evaporated and the weight reduced. As a consequence, the farmer gets less money and he feels cheated. Under the circumstances it is no wonder that the farmer is more interested in selling on the black market.

**What Turkey has not done**

In 1966 Turkey ratified the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Article 23 of the Convention requires that all parties enact licensing laws to control the growing of poppies. To date, Turkey has not passed a licensing law.

The principal reasons given are that domestic political realities (approximately 80,000 farmers grow poppies) do not permit passage, and that passage as a result of U.S. pressure would give the impression that the Government of Turkey is a “puppet of the United States.”

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3 This is the basic document controlling the legal production of opium around the world.
The Committee on Foreign Affairs has been studying this problem since July 1970. At that time passage of the licensing laws was thought imminent, before the Turkish Parliament adjourned during the first week in August. No action was taken.


It is now May 1971 and no positive action has yet been taken by the Turkish Parliament. In response to questions by members of the study mission, a high-ranking Turkish official expressed strong belief that a licensing law would be passed this year.

The Demirel Cabinet fell in March 1971 and a new Cabinet has been installed under the leadership of Prime Minister Nihat Erim. This government is a non-Party government and is more broadly based than was the Demirel government. If it had the will to do so it could pass quickly a law licensing the growing of poppies.

And while there are indications that the Prime Minister intends to take action to control the growing of poppies, the study mission is of the opinion that there is no sense of immediacy on the part of the Turkish Government.

An extract from the Erim government’s program fully illustrates this. “Our Government is of the opinion that opium smuggling, which has become a destructive disaster of the youth of the world, is hurting above all our humane feelings; therefore, due importance shall be attached to this problem. Opium producers shall be provided with a better field of occupation in farming.”

Certain Turkish legislators questioned the inclusion in the program of remarks on opium. The full response of Prime Minister Erim is not available; however, observers present report that he took a strong position in favor of opium production controls and then explained that opium production would not be discontinued completely until the farmers engaged in poppy farming and opium production were provided with means of attaining a higher level of subsistence.

While it is reassuring to learn that the Government of Turkey is aware of the problem, it is well to remember that actions speak louder than words.

If the United States is to solve the problem of heroin addiction at home, it must have the active and effective cooperation of the Turkish Government, for only the Turks have the power and the authority to control the growing of poppies. And while the United States can’t tell the Turks what to do in this matter, it must employ every available leverage to persuade the Turkish Government to take whatever steps are necessary to control and eventually discontinue the growing of poppies.

As a measure of Turkish sincerity in acting on this problem, it is essential that legislation controlling the growing of poppies be enacted as a meaningful first step. While passage of a licensing law will not solve the problem, it is required if the Government of Turkey is to inhibit the flow of opium to the illegal market. Passage of this legislation would also demonstrate Turkey’s desire to fulfill her treaty commitments under the provisions of the Single Convention—commitments that were made in December 1966.
United States-Turkish cooperation

In September 1966 the United States began discussions with the Government of Turkey to find ways to better control the production of opium in Turkey. At that time poppy cultivation was permitted in 21 provinces. Although production was prohibited throughout the rest of Turkey, enforcement agencies were poorly equipped and relatively untrained for this type of control, resulting in an estimated 200 tons available for the illegal market.

By 1967, as a result of U.S. efforts and decreasing world opium requirements, the Government of Turkey concluded that opium production would not be an economic crop in the future and that steps should be taken to reduce production. At the same time, the Government decided that it needed to upgrade its enforcement capabilities as well as to provide assistance to farmers to switch to other crops.

To assist in this effort, in 1968 the United States made $3 million available from AID funds. Approximately $1.5 million of the loan is being used to finance vehicles and equipment for enforcement agencies and the remainder to finance research to develop alternative crops and vehicles and equipment required by the Ministry of Agriculture to assist the farmer in switching to other crops.

All of the commodities programed under this loan have not been received in Turkey. Bureaucracy and redtape have held up the clearing of the commodities through Turkish customs, with the result that much of the equipment sits around on the dock for substantial periods of time. Steps are now being taken to insure that equipment and commodities shipped for the use of the National Police and gendarmerie will not be subjected to customs clearance.

In connection with this loan, the Government of Turkey has reorganized the Turkish National Police and the gendarmerie in order to develop a 750-man narcotic law enforcement group. The headquarters of this group is located in Ankara and when fully developed, it is expected that there will be 51 regional offices. At the present time it is estimated that half of the 750-man group has been trained and deployed in the field.

Cooperation between the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and Turkish enforcement agencies has been excellent. BNDD agents are now in Turkey working with their counterparts on narcotics control. U.S. agents have reported little evidence of illicit production in provinces where poppy cultivation has been prohibited, and such crops, when found, have been immediately destroyed.

There have been suggestions that the United States make money available to Turkey to buy up the entire poppy crop. They have been rejected on the grounds that it would result in every farmer increasing the land that he devotes to poppy cultivation.

The suggestion has also been rejected by the Turkish Government on the grounds that the domestic political situation in Turkey made it impossible. If this obstacle could be overcome, it is estimated that it would cost about $5 million to buy up the entire crop.

Another proposal worthy of consideration has been made that the U.S. attempt to purchase the entire illegal crop through the use of undercover agents. This would have the effect of drying up the source of morphine for the laboratories in Marseilles and if entirely success-
ful would dry up the heroin supply to the U.S. market, at least temporarily. Consideration might be given to this expedient as a stop gap measure while other programs, such as crop substitution, are being developed.

It was also suggested to the study mission by a leading Turkish parliamentarian that a parliamentary group be established between the Congress of the United States and the Turkish Parliament for the purpose of discussing mutual problems in the field of narcotics control. In the opinion of the study mission such a group would be beneficial and would provide a useful forum for a meaningful exchange of views on the subject. It should not, however, become merely a discussion panel.

It has been argued that if the supply of opium from Turkey is shut off completely, those engaged in the illegal production of heroin would transfer their operations someplace else, possibly to Afghanistan, India, Iran, Thailand, etc.

There are valid arguments against this line of reasoning. In the first place, the heroin obtained from poppies grown in Afghanistan is low quality and cannot be produced in the quantities needed by the international heroin dealer. Secondly, most of the opium grown in Afghanistan is consumed either in Afghanistan or in Iran.

Iran has strict licensing laws and efficient collection procedures, and most of what she produces is also consumed domestically.

India also has strict licensing laws and efficient collection procedures. There is little evidence of a leakage of opium gum to the illicit market from India.

Thailand, Burma, and Laos do present a problem. But it is a problem that will have to be faced under any circumstances, regardless of whether Turkey produces opium gum or not. If the source of illegal opium can be compressed, more resources can be applied to a smaller area. This would enable the United States and the international community to concentrate its effort in Southeast Asia.
THE PROBLEM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Heroin addiction in the military services in South Vietnam

Heroin addiction in the military forces of the United States is increasing rapidly, particularly in South Vietnam where the best estimates available are that 10 to 15 percent of all U.S. troops currently in South Vietnam are addicted to heroin in one form or another. It is estimated that in some units heroin addiction might be as high as 25 percent. Some smoke it; some sniff or “snort.” From 5 to 10 percent of these inject. In the eloquent words of one concerned young American currently serving in Vietnam: “It is ironic indeed that in the last two years of the war our biggest casualty figures will come from heroin addiction, not from combat.”

Contributing to this epidemic use of heroin is its ready availability, the frustrations and boredom growing out of the war, and the fact that the drug culture in the Armed Forces reflects American society as a whole. It is realistic to assume that many young Americans have used heroin prior to induction into the military services.

However, most of the addicts in South Vietnam become addicted in that country—usually within the first 30 days after entry. Because of the quality of the heroin available in South Vietnam, it is possible to become addicted through smoking or sniffing. The “high” does not develop as quickly as when injected, but smoking or sniffing does develop a physical need for heroin. Unfortunately, most of those who smoke or sniff are under the dangerous illusion that heroin taken in this manner is not addictive. Nothing could be further from the truth.

There is also a widespread belief among many American servicemen in Vietnam that this heroin is actually cocaine, a non-addictive drug. This, again, is not true.

Of the heroin users among the U.S. military in South Vietnam, it is estimated that 40 to 45 percent sniff, 50 percent smoke, and between 5 and 10 percent inject. Because of the purity of the heroin all are addictive, although according to medical authorities those who inject become physically dependent sooner than do those who sniff or smoke.

Those who have become addicted to the high quality heroin available in South Vietnam will have no choice but to inject the much more diluted heroin that is available in the United States. The military services should, therefore, make every effort to detect and rehabilitate addicts before returning them to civilian society.

U.S. deaths from heroin abuse

The rate of deaths resulting from drug abuse in South Vietnam is increasing. Between August and December 1970, there were 90 deaths which were suspected to have been drug related. Autopsy confirmed that 59 of these had died from an overdose of heroin.

In January 1971 there were 17 deaths which were suspected to have been drug related. In February there were 19 such deaths. Figures for March and April are not yet available, but if this trend continues over 200 young Americans will die of heroin addiction in 1971.
Ready availability of heroin in South Vietnam

Heroin is readily available to American servicemen in South Vietnam, particularly in Saigon. And it is cheap.

One quarter gram sells for as little as $2.50 and as much as $10, while an eighth of a gram will sell for as little as $1.50 and as much as $5. Most is purchased, but a large amount is obtained by military personnel who barter cigarettes and other post exchange items for the drugs.

Contributing to the availability of heroin in Saigon is the large number of U.S. military deserters who are engaged in every form of criminal activity, including the selling of heroin.

According to figures provided by United States Army Vietnam (USARV) there are 875 such deserters, although the figure varies.

Between 400 and 500 of these live in an area of Saigon which is called Soul Alley. This area is “off limits” to U.S. personnel and one enters at his own risk. Military police and others who have entered the area have been assaulted, robbed, stripped of their clothing and weapons and otherwise mistreated.

United States military efforts to conduct raids into Soul Alley have failed.

The intelligence gathering capability of the inhabitants of Soul Alley is excellent, and they are usually “tipped off” when a raid is being planned.

Nevertheless, U.S. authorities in South Vietnam should surround and raid Soul Alley and apprehend all U.S. deserters. While this would not solve the heroin problem in Vietnam, certainly it would help.

Heroin production in Southeast Asia

Virtually all of the heroin being used by United States military personnel in South Vietnam, and an increasing amount of the heroin entering the United States, is produced from poppies grown in the remote mountain areas of Burma, Laos, Thailand, and parts of Yunnan Province in Communist China.

Unfortunately, no government exercises effective administrative or political control over these areas.

Poppies are grown in areas occupied by hill tribesmen who have been growing poppies for centuries. Some of the areas of Laos and Thailand are infested with Communist guerrillas, if not actually controlled by them, while rebel bands and remnants of the Kuomintang inhabit the poppy-producing areas in Burma and Thailand.

Burma, Laos, and Thailand produce an estimated 1,000 tons of raw opium, or more than one-half of the world illicit output. Most of this is consumed in the Far East and Southeast Asia. Practically all observers are agreed that the largest group of users and addicts consists of overseas Chinese. Burma, Laos, and Thailand may together account for three-quarters of a million users and addicts, with Burma having the largest share. Hong Kong may account for another 150,000.

Two different types of heroin are produced from the poppies grown in this area—white and purple. There is little or no indigenous requirement for white heroin in Southeast Asia—purple heroin is smoked there.

The production of white heroin in quantity is a comparatively recent development. There are no reliable statistics available to indicate what proportion of opium production is processed into heroin, but it
must be concluded that production is increasing in direct proportion to the growing demand among Americans in South Vietnam.

The major flow of illegal traffic

The major flow of the traffic from the producing areas of Burma, Laos, and Thailand is directed through the Mekong River Valley in the latter two countries. Major cities in these two countries, such as Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Bangkok, serve as final markets, heroin processing centers, and transshipment points, principally to South Vietnam and Hong Kong.

The first major collections of the raw opium in Burma are made by Kounintang irregulars and guerrilla armies of the Shan tribal insurgents who themselves convoy the product southward for delivery to wholesale operators in the cities. The latter arrange for conversion to heroin and for the domestic and export distribution of both opium and heroin. Often these wholesalers are prominent local businessmen.

In Laos, Government armed forces are major wholesalers of opium and heroin and have been directly involved in large-scale smuggling activities.

The major conduit, however, is Thailand.

From the American viewpoint, Thailand is as important to the control of the illegal international traffic in narcotics as Turkey. While all of the opium produced in Southeast Asia is not grown in Thailand, most of it is smuggled through that country. Some of this is processed into heroin which is smuggled to the United States by couriers on commercial or military aircraft. Some is mailed to the United States by U.S. military personnel using both commercial and military postal services. Most, however, is smuggled into South Vietnam through both Laos and Thailand.

Recently American citizens, mostly ex-military, have moved to Thailand and have entered the business of smuggling heroin to the United States.

According to U.S. narcotics agents, the Bangkok operation is led by an ex-U.S. serviceman, William Henry Jackson. Jackson operates a place called the Five Star Bar in Bangkok, which is patronized chiefly by black U.S. servicemen. According to the narcotics agents, Jackson is assisted by other ex-military men, some of whom have moved from Europe to Bangkok. According to the agents, the Jackson group recruits patrons of the Five Star Bar as heroin couriers to the United States and utilizes other active duty military personnel to ship heroin to the United States through the Army and Air Force Postal System. According to the narcotics agents, the Jackson group recruits patrons of the Five Star Bar as heroin couriers to the United States and utilizes other active duty military personnel to ship heroin to the United States through the Army and Air Force Postal System. According to the narcotics agents, the Jackson group recruits patrons of the Five Star Bar as heroin couriers to the United States and utilizes other active duty military personnel to ship heroin to the United States through the Army and Air Force Postal System.

Jackson is now wanted in the United States in connection with a heroin seizure case, and American authorities are working with the Thai Government to have him deported.

BNDD agents in Bangkok are of the opinion that Jackson is probably paying a Thai legislator for protection.

Bangkok is also the source of heroin for another major system engaged in smuggling heroin into the United States—the Okinawa sys-

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1 The Bureau of Customs announced on May 6, that it made 248 seizures of narcotics through Army and Air Force post offices from the beginning of March through April 24, 1971. It also announced that it had seized 17 pounds of heroin in a piece of military mail from Bangkok, Thailand, on April 5. The package, seized at Fort Monmouth, N.J., contained heroin valued at an estimated $1.75 million on the street.