This system is composed of U.S. military and ex-military personnel allied with a few Okinawans. Efforts to contain this system are hampered by the inability of authorities on Okinawa to initiate adequate customs procedures at the civilian airports. Most U.S. authorities are convinced that this will change once Okinawa reverts to Japan and Japanese law enforcement officials assume customs responsibility for Okinawa.

These Americans who are engaged in this most despicable crime of modern times carry U.S. passports with all of the privileges attendant. They are enemies of the American people who do not deserve the rights accorded to law-abiding citizens, and serious consideration should be given to withdrawing the passports of these international criminals.

Above all, the United States Government should inform the Thai Government that a refusal to deport known U.S. heroin traffickers could prejudice Thai-American relations.

**Smuggling into South Vietnam**

Heroin is smuggled into South Vietnam in a variety of ways. Some is carried in commercial aircraft, some is air landed or air dropped. Some is probably carried overland by North Vietnamese or Vietcong using trail areas used for transporting supplies, and some is carried in South Vietnamese vehicles and aircraft.

It is believed that the Laotian and South Vietnamese Air Forces are deeply involved in this activity. Heroin has also been smuggled in Air America aircraft although there is no evidence that any official of a U.S. agency has ever been involved in the smuggling of heroin into South Vietnam.

It is also possible to rent private aircraft in Southeast Asia and the use of private aircraft for smuggling purposes is increasing.

It is assumed by the U.S. military that this activity reaches high levels of command, to include the politicians, both in Laos and in South Vietnam. We were told that there is information available that high-ranking Vietnamese officials, including military, are mixed up in drug operations.

Heroin is smuggled into South Vietnam from Bangkok by Thai soldiers either returning from leave or those beginning a tour of duty in South Vietnam. Many of these soldiers travel in U.S. military aircraft. Unfortunately, there are no adequate customs procedures in effect and the Thai soldier enters South Vietnam unchecked. Some is also carried in Thai aircraft, both military and commercial, and some is thought to be mailed by Thai military personnel through the postal system which the United States operates for the Thai military serving in Vietnam. As one American official told us, “This is an ideal situation for shipping heroin to Vietnam.” Finally, some heroin is thought to be carried in by American military personnel returning from R. and R. Recent evidence indicates that Hong Kong may be a limited source of the heroin reaching U.S. troops in South Vietnam.

Once the heroin reaches South Vietnam from these various sources, it becomes readily available in the streets of Saigon. The street peddler who sells heroin is the low man on the totem pole. The structure of
the illegal heroin market can be illustrated as a pyramid consisting of four tiers:

I
Financiers and Backers

II
Producers, Smugglers and Importers

III
Drug Distributors

IV
Street Peddler

If the financiers and backers who finance the narcotics business can be uncovered and prosecuted, severe damage could be inflicted on the entire operation, especially if strong measures are taken to deal with the bottom three tiers of the pyramid simultaneously.

The problem of corruption

Official corruption plays an important part in the worldwide traffic in heroin. The extent of corruption in Southeast Asia is difficult to assess. Reliable sources report that at least two high-ranking Laotian officials, military and governmental, including the chief of the Laotian general staff, are deeply involved in the heroin business.

In Thailand, a former diplomat and member of one of the most respected Thai families is reputed to be one of the key figures in the opium, morphine base, and heroin operations in that country and throughout Southeast Asia.

Recently, a member of the South Vietnamese legislature, and friend of high-ranking governmental officials, was arrested smuggling heroin into Vietnam. The U.S. Military Command has supplied Ambassador Bunker with the names of high-ranking Vietnamese officials it suspects of involvement in the heroin trade, and believes that the corruption has reached the point where only forceful intervention by President Thieu can succeed in checking the traffic.

There have also been reports that Vice President Ky is implicated in the current heroin traffic. The study mission was unable to find any evidence to support this allegation.

In general the wholesale organizations trading in opium and opiates seek to involve government officials in their activities by corruption. Essentially, the wholesalers want both legal protection for themselves and insurance for the dependability of their business operations. In order to provide deliveries of contraband in large volumes and with regularity, the wholesalers seek to corrupt officialdom at fairly high levels if possible. At the same time, officialdom itself may be vulnerable to corruption because of the relatively large compensation it can get for collaborating with the major traders. For this reason, some officials are undoubtedly involved in illegal narcotics traffic.
The involvement in the traffic of individual officials and military officers in some other countries has also been reliably reported, as has the use of diplomatic pouches for smuggling opium and heroin. In no country, however, is there likely to be a flourishing illicit trade in opium or heroin without the complicity of at least a few key civil servants or police officers.

What the governments of Southeast Asia are doing

SOUTH VIETNAM

Most of the heroin in Southeast Asia is produced for Americans. Until recently this led many governments to look upon heroin usage as strictly an American problem and little was done to help stop the illegal traffic. Addiction, however, is being discovered among the indigenous population, and the various governments are responding to U.S. initiatives in order to begin to get some control over this problem.

This is particularly true in the South Vietnamese military forces. We were told that during the South Vietnamese invasion of Laos, that some South Vietnamese troops who had been transferred from other areas of Vietnam on short notice had to be treated for withdrawal symptoms. Some U.S. personnel supporting the operation were also treated for withdrawal pains. The theory is that these troops were moved so rapidly and on such short notice that it was not possible to obtain sufficient heroin to satisfy their needs. As a result, one high-ranking South Vietnamese official told the study mission that whereas he had formerly looked upon the drug problem as an American problem, he now realized that it was becoming a Vietnamese problem.

Proper enforcement of South Vietnamese law would put a stop to a large part of the illegal traffic in heroin in that country. Particular emphasis must be placed on ending corruption in the customs service, which has been responsible for large quantities of heroin entering South Vietnam.

The possession of and the sale of heroin in South Vietnam is illegal. Yet sales on the streets of Saigon are so blatant that several attempts were made to sell heroin to members of the study mission as they walked the streets of Saigon, accompanied by a uniformed member of the United States Army.

As a result of American pressure the national police are becoming more aware of the need to do something about this problem. The national police commander has promised to take action.

In this context, combined narcotics suppression committees have been established in each military region. The membership consists of two U.S. officers and two inspectors from the national police. The committee collects and evaluates information on narcotics smuggling and informs the national police agencies of the need to take action to arrest and prosecute offenders.

It is too early to measure the effectiveness of these committees. In spite of the fact that heroin addiction has been a growing problem for over a year, the committees were not established until February 1971.

The study mission was assured by U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker that both President Thieu and Vice President Ky were con-
cerned with the problem and are interested in stopping the illegal traffic in heroin.

Promises and interest are not enough, however. Strong action must be taken to stop the heroin traffic in South Vietnam. We are not optimistic that the Government is either willing or able to take such action.

One of the major reasons for pessimism is the internal political situation in South Vietnam, where differences between President Thieu and Vice President Ky inhibits effective action being taken.

Vice President Ky was especially critical of the efforts being taken by the Government of South Vietnam to solve the problem of heroin, and stated that if he were given the responsibility of cleaning up "the drug mess" in South Vietnam, he would produce concrete results within 2 or 3 months.

The implication of this statement is that the Government is not doing all that it can, or should. Some way must be found to convince the South Vietnamese of the urgency of this problem and the absolute necessity to solve it.

In the final analysis, neither South Vietnam nor the United States can solve this problem alone. Both need the cooperation of the producing countries: Burma, Laos, and Thailand. Of the three, Thailand is the most important, and the most able to take action.

THAILAND

According to United States officials in Bangkok, the Thai Government is taking some action to stem illicit heroin production.

Since producing opium is illegal in Thailand, there are projects aimed at encouraging the hill tribesmen to grow other crops. These programs consist of education and training in new farming techniques and improved enforcement of Thai law.

The study mission visited a tribal research center which is situated on the grounds of Chiang Mai University in Northern Thailand. The research center is the research branch of the Hill Tribe Division, Department of Public Welfare, Ministry of the Interior. One of the problems which led to the creation of the research center was the illegal cultivation of poppies in Northern Thailand. The Government was desirous of eliminating the growing of poppies, yet the economy of some of the hill societies is based upon the income derived from opium sales. Prohibition, without the promotion of alternative cash crops would have caused considerable hardships. In addition, the inability of the Government to exert effective administrative control over these areas would have doomed the project to failure.

In 1967 and again in 1970, the Thai Government requested the United Nations to help by conducting a study on the economic and social needs of the opium producing areas in Thailand.

There have also been efforts to resettle the hill tribes to other areas, but this program has not been overly successful.

The Thai Government has initiated efforts to destroy the poppy crops, but without great success. The areas are too remote and enforcement almost impossible because of the Communist inspired insurgency in the area.
In 1962, the Thai invited U.S. BNDD agents into Thailand to assist them in their efforts. Relations between BNDD agents and the Thai police are improving. The Thai now permit BNDD agents to operate undercover and to appear in court in narcotics cases.

BNDD efforts, at least until 1969, were hampered because funds needed to do an effective job were not available. This situation has also changed and sufficient funds are now being made available.

Much more cooperation on the part of the Thai government is required, however. The Thai must devote more resources to improvement of their capability to intercept illegal shipments of opium, morphine, and heroin.

The Thai Government must also institute adequate and effective customs inspection, especially in the case of Thai troops and aircraft going to and from South Vietnam.

The study mission was also of the opinion that the United States Mission in Thailand should be more forceful in convincing the Thai Government that the United States not only needs, but expects, rapidly increasing action to stop the illegal traffic in opium and its derivatives.

Strong and effective measures by the Thai Government, however, would not completely solve the problem. Poppies are also grown in Burma and Laos.

BURMA

Poppies are grown in Burma under uncontrolled conditions. Due to economic, social, and political factors, the Government is not able to apply control measures required to implement their policies or intentions of prohibiting, or to supervise and control the growing of poppies and the production of opium. While much of the opium produced in Burma is consumed locally, a considerable amount appears in the illicit traffic. It is bartered for goods or sold for cash. Opium is very often the principal cash crop.

Burma has few economic, political, or cultural contacts with the outside world as a result of the Government's acute sensitivity to foreign influence. Because of this, U.S. relations with Burma are not close, although they are "correct and friendly."

Any reduction in the amount of opium produced in Burma will take time. The Government must be strengthened and some way found to convince the opium producers to grow other crops.

There is little that the United States can do unilaterally to bring this about. It can, and must, however, urge the United Nations to help.

LAOS

The Laotians are deeply involved in the growing of poppies and in the production of heroin. Opium is the principal source of income of the ethnic minorities in Laos.

The possession of opium in Laos is not illegal at the present time. There is a law being considered which would make such possession illegal. Even if the law passes, enforcement will be next to impossible because of the inability of the Laotian Government to exercise effective political control over most of Laos. A copy of the proposed legislation, including the note of presentation, is included in the
appendix. This proposal, which was first drafted in 1963, will be presented to the National Assembly, hopefully in May 1971.

There are other steps that the Laotians can take to assert some control over the illegal traffic in opium and its derivatives. From the evidence available, there is no doubt that the Laotian military is deeply involved in the international traffic in heroin. Heroin is processed in laboratories located in Laos, and what is not smuggled through Thailand is smuggled through Laos, primarily by air in Laotian Air Force planes. While there is little likelihood that the Laotian Government will gain control over its territory in the near future, it can, and must, take action to reform its air force and eliminate the corruption which permits the drug traffic to flourish.

It should also be pointed out that tribesmen who grow poppies in the non-Communist part of Laos are some of the most effective resistance fighters against the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao. They depend for their livelihood upon opium production. The United States should consider the feasibility of buying up the opium crop each year, while encouraging and assisting the tribesmen to grow other crops. Such a program would probably cost at the most $10 million annually. In 5 years, however, it would not equal the amount of military assistance that the United States gives to Laos annually to enable it to remain non-Communist. If it is in the national security interests of the United States to save 3 million Laotians from communism, it certainly is in the national security interest of the United States to spend whatever is necessary to save generations of young Americans from heroin addiction.

In summary, the heroin problem in Southeast Asia is a regional problem. It transcends national boundaries and the operations in one country are dependent upon the operations in the other. Efforts to combat it must, therefore, be regional in scope. And the United States must push the fight against heroin as vigorously as it has conducted the fight against Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

For years the United States has been encouraging regional economic development in Southeast Asia. It is discouraging that the most successful regional commercial development has been the illicit production and sale of heroin.

What the United States is doing to attack the heroin problem in South Vietnam

Steps are being taken by the United States Government in South Vietnam at both the diplomatic level and the military level to combat the growing heroin problem.

The study mission learned that the United States has made a strong appeal to the Government of South Vietnam to take action in this area. In a strongly worded memorandum, the U.S. Ambassador pointed out that "continuation of illegal traffic in drugs, particularly heroin, will have a serious impact on American support of the national effort."

Because there has been criticism of U.S. diplomats for not pressing the narcotics issue forcefully enough with host governments, it is only fair to say that the study mission wholeheartedly supports the efforts of the Embassy in South Vietnam. Following is an extract from the paper:
Accordingly it is suggested that the following goals be established:

1. Recognition by all Vietnamese officials and citizens of the magnitude of the drug problem and the serious impact that a continuation of illicit traffic in drugs, particularly heroin, will have on the American support of the national effort.

2. Development of a national will to eradicate trafficking in drugs.

To achieve these goals it is specifically recommended that the President of Vietnam:

1. Issue a circular in the immediate future, through both civilian and military components of the government, indicating your concern over the accelerating drug problem and the apparent involvement of large numbers of Vietnamese in drug trafficking. This circular should specifically mention the trafficking of heroin and the danger this highly addictive narcotic currently poses to the physical well-being of Americans as well as the future danger it poses to Vietnamese citizens. This circular should be followed by a decree which specifically legislates against trafficking in heroin and which imposes severe penalties for doing so.

2. Appoint a Presidential Task Force of highly qualified, dedicated and honest investigators to ferret out, investigate and prosecute the financiers and backers who comprise the powers behind drug trafficking. These men are responsible for manipulating, fostering, protecting and promoting the illicit traffic in drugs. They include influential political figures, government officials and moneyed ethnic Chinese members of the criminal syndicate now flourishing in the Cholon sector of Saigon.

3. Initiate action to establish a comprehensive drug training program for all law enforcement elements within the Republic of Vietnam, to include prosecutors. Such training would be directed primarily at heroin, its characteristics and the danger it poses to the physical well being of users.

4. Initiate immediate action to arrest all importers, distributors and street peddlers involved in the distribution and sale of drugs, especially heroin. Further, that stringent penalties be levied against these people to preclude their return to these activities.

5. Initiate action to form a specialized narcotics section within the Customs Fraud Repression Service. Such a section would devote its energy to combat the smuggling of drugs, especially heroin.

6. Take immediate action to have existing customs regulations enforced. Specific actions that must be taken are:
   
   (a) Unauthorized personnel must not be allowed to handle any items of cargo or baggage until such items have been properly cleared by customs officials.

   (b) Existing customs regulations pertaining to the actual processing and searching of individuals and all classes of cargo/personnel must be adhered to rigidly.

7. Initiate action to enforce existing health and welfare laws as they pertain to the sale of pharmaceutical products (dangerous drugs) throughout Vietnam. No such products should be sold to American servicemen without the required prescription.

U.S. military authorities in South Vietnam are also aware that the problem of heroin addiction has reached epidemic proportions and must be solved. To do this, a four-point program has been developed, consisting of education, amnesty, rehabilitation, and suppression.

Education programs have been expanded at all levels of command where the consequences of drug abuse are stressed. There are also programs aimed at educating noncommissioned and commissioned officers in the detection and control of drug abuse in their units.

An education program to be effective must stress the dangers inherent in the illegal use of drugs and the dangers it poses to the health and future of the user. It must be current, accurate, and hardhitting.
There has been criticism that material provided for use in Vietnam does not fit these requirements. According to one recognized authority, more use should be made of films which "tell it like it is." These films should be kept up to date and they should focus on the problem in South Vietnam.

Amnesty programs have been instituted. Basically, amnesty is a promise of freedom from punishment in exchange for accepting medical treatment and rehabilitation. Under this program when an addict requests rehabilitation treatment and medical assistance, he is admitted to a rehabilitation center where he undergoes treatment for his addiction. To prevent the amnesty program from being used as a vehicle to escape from combat and to discourage resumption of the habit, an individual is permitted to request amnesty only one time.

While there has been no success in curing those who inject, there have been some successes in curing those who sniff or smoke. There are very few statistics available concerning rehabilitation programs. They must, therefore, be used with caution.

For example, during the first quarter of 1971, 3,458 heroin users participated in the rehabilitation program. Of this number, there were at least 703 known unsuccessful participants. There are no figures available which estimate the rate of cure of those participating. From statistics that are available, the rate of cure is not encouraging. For instance, of 532 addicts treated at Pioneer House, an amnesty and rehabilitation center located in Long Binh, between October 1970 and March 1971, there were reported 149 successful cures, 94 failures, and 249 in the unsure category.

An important part of the rehabilitation program is the counseling received during the treatment period. Even here, the program is vulnerable. For instance, the week before the study mission visited Long Binh, two counsellors at Pioneer House were arrested, one for using LSD; the other for using heroin.

Another problem emanates from the requirement that the amnesty and rehabilitation program is entirely voluntary. The individual is free to leave the center at any time. In the past, people have walked out of the rehabilitation center before they were cured. They will probably do the same in the future.

But perhaps the most serious shortcoming of the drug rehabilitation program is that there is not a coordinated Vietnam-wide effort to establish rehabilitation centers. Responsibility is delegated to major commanders. Some commands support the effort fully. Some distrust the concept and take little or no interest in the program.

Several steps have also been taken to suppress the use of drugs, particularly heroin, in South Vietnam. Drug-abuse councils have been formed in every unit down to battalion/squadron level to provide analysis, evaluation, and monitoring of all aspects of narcotics and drug suppression. A combined antinarcotics enforcement committee, composed of Vietnamese and American forces, has also been established in each military region to eliminate the illicit traffic in narcotics within the civilian community of the Republic of Vietnam. In addition, a Joint United States/Republic of Vietnam Narcotics Investigative Detachment will concentrate its efforts on the illegal
drug supply and trafficking problem to interdict and eradicate drug sources before the heroin reaches military personnel. This detachment is made up of representatives from the several U.S. military investigative organizations, the Vietnamese Military Police, and the Vietnamese National Police.

Simultaneously, a Joint U.S. Customs Group has been established to assume responsibility for all military customs operations in Vietnam to include postal, household goods, unaccompanied baggage, and the processing of accompanied baggage and personnel arriving or departing South Vietnam. This unit is responsible for all customs enforcement, including narcotics.

Hopefully, these steps will help reduce the availability and use of heroin by U.S. personnel in South Vietnam.

There is one other aspect of the problem which is of concern to military authorities in South Vietnam—they have no adequate and reliable procedures for detecting the heroin addict. As part of the drug-suppression program, new and more complete surveying techniques are to be employed and statistical data will be collected and compiled on a commandwide basis.

Measures must be taken to improve the reliability of addict detection procedures. If possible, the development of a simplified urinalysis test should become a matter of first priority for medical authorities. If this is not feasible, adequate laboratory facilities should be furnished down to battalion and squadron level. Every soldier should be required to undergo periodic urinalysis, especially before his return to the United States and absolutely before his separation from the military service. If the serviceman who has become addicted using 94- to 97-percent pure heroin in South Vietnam enters the drug scene in the United States where the heroin available is 4 to 6 percent pure, the ominous implications are obvious for himself, his family, and for American society. In the absence of the heroin available in South Vietnam, the only alternative for one who has become addicted through sniffing and snorting will be to inject.

Implementation of the above program must receive the highest priority at every level of command, and it must be pushed with a greater sense of urgency than has been the case. In spite of the fact that drug abuse has been a growing problem in South Vietnam for over 1 year, the directive setting out the program to combat it was not issued until December 1970.

While U.S. military and diplomatic personnel in Southeast Asia are concerned about the problem, the study mission is of the opinion that a greater sense of urgency is needed.

For example, when we arrived in Bangkok, we were told that there was a regional conference being held to discuss the problem of drug addiction among U.S. military personnel in Southeast Asia. All U.S. agencies responsible for the drug problem were represented at the meeting. This included military, Bureau of Customs, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and U.S. diplomatic personnel.

While it was encouraging to note that this conference was finally held, such action should have been taken much sooner to mobilize the resources available to take strong coordinated action to stop the illegal traffic in heroin.
IRAN AND JAPAN

The study mission also traveled to Iran and Japan in an effort to determine what impact, if any, those countries had upon the heroin problem in the United States. We are happy to report that there is no evidence to suggest that either contributes in any way to the illegal production and smuggling of heroin into the United States.

What was of particular interest to us was the approach that the two countries have taken, and are taking, to control heroin addiction.

In both, these procedures are aimed at suppression of the illegal traffic, rehabilitation of the addicts when found, and strict justice for those convicted for illegal possession of, or trafficking in, heroin.

IRAN

Iran has one of the largest heroin using populations in the world—approximately 50,000. Unlike the United States, 90 percent of the heroin used in Iran is produced illegally in that country. The remaining 10 percent required by the Iranian heroin addict population originates in the poppy fields of Turkey.

In 1955, because opium addiction was undermining the health of the nation, Iran banned the growing of poppies.

By 1969, discouraged by the lack of movement on the part of Turkey and Afghanistan, and alarmed by the gold drain which covered the cost of illicitly imported opium, Iran authorized limited poppy cultivation under strictly controlled conditions.

Iran has strict opium collection procedures and the poppy crop is closely monitored from planting until the harvest of the opium gum. And whereas the Government of Turkey pays the farmer $10 to $15 for opium gum, the Government of Iran pays $90. This, of course, explains in part why there is little or no leakage of opium gum from the licit to the illicit market in Iran.

There are other reasons. If the farmer in Iran violates the law, he forfeits his license to grow poppies. And if an individual in Iran is convicted of possession or trafficking in heroin, he is executed. (Since 1969, 86 people have been shot for offenses involving heroin.)

In the past, Turkish smugglers moved raw opium into Iran. As a result of strict enforcement of Iranian narcotics legislation and efforts by both Turkish and Iranian Governments to combat smuggling, the amount of opium introduced from Turkey has been reduced dramatically. Now, however, instead of smuggling raw opium, the Turks are smuggling morphine base and heroin. This is a new development.

It is easier to deal in morphine gum or heroin which has one-tenth the bulk of opium gum. In addition, opium gum has a distinctive odor and in hot weather is extremely difficult to conceal while morphine base or heroin is almost odorless.

This poses a potential problem of severe dimensions for the entire international effort to control the illegal traffic in narcotics.
The evidence suggests that the drug traffickers in the Marseilles area of France are becoming concerned at the increasing pressure being applied by the French authorities in cooperation with U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drug agents. It is thought that they may be looking for other areas in which to operate their illicit laboratories. If heroin is produced in Turkey, at the source of the opium gum, it will remove the necessity to smuggle opium gum or morphine base to France. The long, circuitous route from Turkey to Marseilles provides an opportunity for law enforcement agencies to intercept the shipment at any step along the way and particularly in Marseilles where it is halted long enough to be turned into heroin. If, on the other hand, heroin production takes place in Turkey on a scale large enough to provide the illegal heroin formerly produced in Marseilles, interception will become much more difficult.

It is obvious that Turkey must introduce effective opium production controls and work toward a complete abolition of opium production. The heroin problem in Iran and the United States is fueled by the opium that originates in Turkey, and it is that country that can do the most toward helping to solve the heroin addiction problem.

**Japan**

The Japanese have been able to control heroin addiction. Since 1964 they have succeeded in reducing their heroin addict population from approximately 50,000 to only several thousand.

The success of Japanese efforts to control addiction is due to effective Japanese police work and to strict penalties dealing with the narcotics pusher.

The maximum penalty is 10 years in prison for smuggling or selling heroin.

If a man is arrested for heroin pushing, there is no bail permitted. He must be charged within 48 hours, however. The police can hold the suspect for 10 days during which preindictment investigations are conducted. At the end of 10 days, he is turned over to the prosecutor who has an additional 10 days to bring the accused to trial. If necessary, the prosecutor can request an additional 10 days before commencing trial. Therefore, an individual arrested for possession of heroin can be held for 30 days without bail.

It is the opinion of the study mission that law enforcement officials and legislators in the United States should study the methods used by Japan to deal with this problem.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO CONTROL ILLEGAL HEROIN TRAFFIC

It is obvious that if the illegal traffic in heroin is to be brought under control international cooperation is needed. The most immediate problem is to control the cultivation of poppies and the production of opium.

The production of legal opium is regulated by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) through the provisions of the Single Convention of 1961 which became internationally effective December 13, 1964.

The Board is entrusted with enforcing the provisions of the Single Convention. The Board asks both parties and non-parties to the Convention for estimates of drug requirements and existing stocks and statistics of production, consumption and seizures each year, and by article 12(3), if estimates are not forthcoming, the Board can fix them. Among the weapons which the Board has are requests for information and explanations, public declarations that a country has violated its obligations, and under article 14(2), a recommendation to parties that they impose embargoes on imports and exports against an offending country.

Member states are also required to license the growing of poppies and to control trade by granting export licenses only when the importer produces an import certificate from the importing country. A third country is not to allow drugs to pass through its territory without a copy of the export authorization.

The provisions of the Single Convention, however, apply only to the control of legal production of opium. They provide essentially voluntary restraints on parties with respect to cultivation of the opium poppy, production of opium, manufacture of opium-derived drugs and import and export of these substances. The United States has proposed amendments which, if adopted, would provide the INCB with authority to control production and illegal traffic in narcotic drugs.

It is hoped that a conference to consider the proposed amendments would meet early in 1972.

While the study mission fully supports U.S. efforts to strengthen the ability of the international community to restrict narcotics activity to legitimate medical and scientific purposes, it is of the opinion that such a conference should be convened as soon as possible and not wait until early in 1972. Time is essential and the United States should impress this fact on the international community at every opportunity.

The problem, however, is not the control of legal production, but to find ways to stop leakage of opium to the illegal market. Some countries such as India, Iran, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia have been relatively successful in accomplishing this. Others such as Turkey have not.
Complicating the problem are those areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burma, Laos, and Thailand where opium poppies are grown illegally and under uncontrolled conditions.

Because of the amount and quality of heroin produced from the poppies grown in Burma, Laos, Thailand, and Turkey, international efforts to control the illegal traffic in heroin must be concentrated on those four countries.

Experience has demonstrated that the only way to control this problem is to control it at the source—in the poppy fields.

The United States can, and should, exercise what bilateral diplomatic and economic pressures it can to encourage its friends and allies to take action to stop opium production. It is also necessary to obtain the cooperation of the United Nations.

Acting upon the initiative of the United States the United Nations did agree to establish a Special Fund for Drug Abuse Controls, to be made up of voluntary contributions and used to develop short-term and long-term plans and programs to bring the problem of drug addiction under control.

The United States pledged $2 million and on April 1, 1971, the Permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations made the first $1 million payment. Unfortunately, the United States is the only country to have pledged any money, although one other, West Germany, has announced unofficially that it will pay approximately $350,000 into the fund.

This is disappointing. With addiction increasing around the world, particularly in the United States, there is an immediate need for effective action and cooperation.

According to the Secretary General, the purpose of the drug abuse fund will be to develop short-term and long-term plans and programs and to provide assistance in the execution of those plans and programs. During the initial stages of the Fund, pending the completion and submission of a proposed long-term policy and plan of action which would deal with all aspects of the problems related to drug abuse control, the voluntary contributions to the Fund will be used for specific projects to be included in a short-term program without prejudice to on-going projects. The short-term program will consist of projects to expand the research and information facilities of United Nations drug control bodies; to plan and implement programs of technical assistance in pilot projects for crop substitution purposes, the establishment and improvement of national drug control administrations and enforcement machinery, and training of personnel, and in setting up or expanding research and training centers which could serve national or regional needs; to enlarge the capabilities and extend the operations of United Nations drug control bodies and their secretariats; to promote facilities for the treatment, rehabilitation and social reintegration of drug addicts; and to develop educational material and programs suitable for use on high-risk populations.

While this is a commendable program and should be encouraged it does not go to the heart of the problem—how to stop the illegal traffic in heroin now or how to get Turkey to honor her international treaty obligations by passing a law licensing the growing of poppies; or what is to be done to control the growing of poppies and the production and smuggling of heroin in the Far East.
These are the basic problems and, if necessary, the United States should be willing to make funds available to the United Nations, or to the individual countries, so that they might begin to deal with them.

The United States also must convince the world community of the urgency of this problem.

**International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)**

Essentially, the purpose of Interpol is to enable police forces in the different countries to coordinate their work effectively in the double aim of law enforcement and crime prevention.

Interpol is not an enforcement body, nor is it an investigating body. It collects, collates, stores and disseminates information on known international criminals.

It has a staff of 107, of which 12 devote full time to narcotics matters.

Interpol is hampered in its efforts to assist in the control of narcotics by—

1. Bad communications between police units in the member countries;
2. Corruption in the police units or on a higher national level; and
3. Poor administrative and police control over large parts of the country such as in Thailand, Laos and Burma.

Another problem is that Interpol does not receive a great amount of intelligence from member countries concerning the smuggling of narcotics. If a foreign national is arrested for a narcotics offense, the national police are required to provide Interpol with all of the information surrounding the case. This is not always done. Until January 1971 one of the greatest offenders was the United States.

The United States is also currently behind in its dues to Interpol. The dues were increased in 1969 from $28,500 per year to $48,780. The United States needed legislative authority to pay the difference—authority which has not yet been granted.

There have been a number of suggestions made that Interpol could increase its effectiveness by improving its communications facilities and by computerizing its operations. The Study mission discussed this with Interpol officials at some length. Although it was the considered opinion of those experts that such improvements would make Interpol operations more efficient, they pointed out that there were no funds available for this: Interpol operates on an annual budget of less than $1 million and any additional equipment would require an increase in the annual dues.

It has been suggested that the United States should make money available to Interpol to introduce these modernization programs. This could be done but it should be done with caution and in such a way as to preclude the assumption that the United States is trying to “take over” Interpol.

The United States should consider ways to improve the communications capabilities of Interpol and the member countries, either on a bilateral basis or through the Interpol apparatus.
Other international organizations

In addition to action in the United Nations and increased cooperation with Interpol, the United States should also consider putting pressure on our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Both are mutual security treaties and both pledge action against a common foe. Heroin addiction is an enemy of mankind and all the world's resources should be mobilized against it.

The United States furnishes approximately $100 million military assistance to Turkey annually to enable that country to fulfill her commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO was organized to protect the security of the North Atlantic area, including the United States. During the 22 years that NATO has been in existence, the United States has contributed well over $20 billion to insure its survival. Money is no object when it comes to the defense of the free world. The U.S. defense budget in 1971 will be approximately $79 billion, plus another $2 billion for military assistance.

But how well will we have defended America, if we lose a generation of young Americans to heroin addiction in the process?

Europe depends upon the United States for its security. It should be willing to do what is necessary to help solve this problem, including putting pressure on Turkey to take effective action to first control and then to stop the growing of poppies.

The same situation applies in Southeast Asia. Thailand is a SEATO partner and Laos and South Vietnam fall under the U.S. security blanket. They must all be persuaded to join in the battle against heroin now.
CONCLUSIONS

1. As of May, 1971, there are an estimated 250,000 heroin addicts in the United States and an additional 30,000-40,000 addicts among U.S. troops in Southeast Asia.

2. The problem is how to stop heroin from reaching American addicts in the United States and in Southeast Asia. Once the poppy is cut and introduced into illegal channels, the battle to prevent the end product, heroin, from reaching the addict is virtually lost.

3. Heroin addiction is essentially an American problem and most countries view it as such. As a result, there is a great deal of talk about cooperation with the United States but there is very little action.

4. There is no sense of urgency on the part of most governments that action must be taken immediately to stop the illegal production of, and traffic in, heroin. U.S. diplomatic personnel must assign top priority to gaining the full cooperation of host governments in attempting to solve the heroin problem.

5. Turkey must stop growing opium poppies if this problem is to be brought under control. Most of the heroin entering the United States originates in the poppy fields of Turkey.

6. Prospects for stopping poppy cultivation and the production of heroin in Southeast Asia in the near future are dim. Efforts must be directed toward stopping the illegal flow of heroin into South Vietnam. If these efforts fail, the only solution is to withdraw American servicemen from Southeast Asia. Above all the U.S. diplomatic community in the several countries must be aware that their job is to represent United States interests rather than to appease the host government.

7. The United States can and should exert pressures on the Governments in Southeast Asia in order to gain their cooperation in the fight against heroin. The survival of Laos and South Vietnam depend upon continued military and economic assistance from the United States and the ability of Thailand to defend itself would be seriously weakened if the United States were to discontinue military assistance to that country. While the effectiveness of threats to cut off military and economic assistance are debatable, there can be no disagreement that because of this assistance the United States has a right to expect full cooperation from these countries in efforts to stop illegal traffic in heroin.

8. Corruption plays an important role in the illegal heroin traffic, particularly in Southeast Asia. Governmental and military officials at all levels are implicated. If graft and corruption are to be eliminated, some way must be found to take the profit out of the production and sale of heroin.
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the President take personal command of the struggle to eliminate the illegal international traffic in narcotics, particularly heroin, and commit the full resources of the country to that battle.

2. That every U.S. department and agency engaged in the conduct of foreign policy be instructed to participate in a broad-based diplomatic offensive to gain the full cooperation of foreign governments in eliminating the illegal traffic in opium and its derivatives. These instructions should require each U.S. country team to draw up a comprehensive and specific plan for gaining greater cooperation from the host government. Such plans should entail the escalating use of all available political and economic levers and each foreign government should be put on notice that failure to cooperate would prejudice bilateral relations. To buttress the efforts made abroad, the Department of State should undertake a concerted campaign to impress on foreign ambassadors in Washington and at the United Nations the seriousness of the U.S. Government's concern.

3. That the U.S. Government immediately and forcefully exercise the special levers it has with the South Vietnamese and Royal Laotian Governments by virtue of our enormous military, economic, and political support of those governments to gain their cooperation in cracking down on the illegal heroin trade in their countries and the official corruption that contributes to it.

4. That the U.S. Government underwrite an accelerated research program to find a nonaddictive substitute for opium, which continues to have important medicinal applications.

5. That the United States negotiate with other countries to better control and, where feasible, stop the cultivation of opium poppies. To help accomplish this, the United States must be prepared to undertake a multimillion-dollar bilateral program to assist those countries to develop substitute economic activities for their opium farmers.

6. That the permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations continue his initiatives to gain greater U.N. participation in the fight against illicit narcotics and dangerous drugs, emphasizing efforts to:
   (a) gain the strong support of the Secretary General in this struggle;
   (b) push vigorously to insure adoption of amendments to the Single Convention which have been proposed by the United States;
(c) gain participation by all nations in the U.N. Special Fund for Drug Abuse Control; and
(d) initiate proposals designed to upgrade the capabilities of the United Nations Division on Narcotic Drugs and the International Narcotics Control Board in terms of personnel and funding. Special emphasis should be placed on the development of programs by the U.N. Division on Narcotic Drugs to provide alternate economic activities for opium farmers.

7. That U.S. military authorities in Southeast Asia undertake all appropriate policing measures to reduce the flow of heroin to U.S. troops in South Vietnam, including increasing the surveillance of mail entering South Vietnam through APO channels. Customs procedures must also be expanded to include inspection of Thai soldiers entering South Vietnam aboard U.S. military aircraft.

8. That the Department of Defense improve its capability to identify military heroin addicts by instituting an extensive program of urinalysis; that it provide acute care and detoxification for all military addicts; and that it provide basic rehabilitation services for those addicts. That in cases where military rehabilitation efforts prove unsuccessful, the unrehabilitated addict's commanding officer should be permitted and required, prior to the addict's discharge from the military, to civilly commit the addict to the Administrator of the Veterans' Administration for a period of 3 years for treatment and rehabilitation. That the Veterans' Administration in turn contract with civilian multimodality treatment centers at the community level with the purposes of utilizing the centers' expertise within the VA hospitals and ultimately turning the patient over to such centers for reintegration into society.

9. That the United States substantially speed up the withdrawal of military draftees from South Vietnam. The draftees have proven far more susceptible to heroin addiction than nondraftees and are estimated to have an addiction rate of over 15 percent.

10. That the Congress consider legislation which would provide for preventive detention, in the form of a nonbailable offense, for those arrested for the illegal possession of, or trafficking in, heroin, who are not addicted themselves. This legislation should also consist of a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 20 years upon conviction with no possibility of parole.

11. That the Congress consider legislation which would ban the manufacture, distribution, sale, or possession with intent to use, drug materials for illegal purposes.

12. That the United States consider canceling the passport of any American known to be engaged in the illegal traffic in heroin.

13. That U.S. customs authorities increase the surveillance of mail entering the United States through APO channels.

14. That the United States utilize its worldwide intelligence collection apparatus, including the use of satellite photography, to
gather information on all aspects of the illegal production of and traffic in heroin.

15. That substantial new funds be made available to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for discretionary expenditure.

16. That the United States consider making additional funds available to Interpol to improve its operations.

17. That the United States seek greater cooperation from the Government of Switzerland to identify individuals who utilize secret Swiss bank accounts to finance the traffic in heroin.

18. That Congress extend an invitation to the Parliament of Turkey to join in the creation of an interparliamentary group to consider ways and means of attacking the illegal production and sale of opium and its derivatives.

19. That the Committee on Foreign Affairs conduct an in-depth series of hearings to consider the several legislative proposals that have been made to deal with the illegal international traffic in narcotics.
WASHINGTON, D.C.—March 30 and 31:
Mr. Frank A. Bartimo, Assistant General Counsel Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Health and Environment, Department of Defense.
Mr. Kenneth Giannoules, Interpol Bureau, Department of the Treasury.
Mr. Fred T. Dick, Chief, Saigon Office, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
Mr. Andrew C. Tartaglino, Assistant Director for Enforcement, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND—April 4–5:
United Nations:
Dr. Dale C. Cameron, Chief, Drug Dependence Unit, World Health Organization.
Mr. S. P. Sotiroff, Officer in Charge, U.N. Division of Narcotic Drugs.
Mr. Leon Steinig, U.S. Member, International Narcotics Control Board.
Mr. S. Stepczynski, Deputy Secretary, International Narcotics Control Board.
Dr. Braenden, Director of U.N. Narcotics Laboratory.
Dr. Carl Blood, World Health Organization.

U.S. Mission to the European Office of the United Nations:
Hon. Idar Rimestad (AEP), U.S. Representative.
Mr. Edward J. Gaumond, Counselor for Administration.
Mr. Edward G. Misey, Legal Officer, Control Officer.

PARIS, FRANCE—April 6:
Mr. Jean Nepote, General Secretary, International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and staff.
Hon. David K. E. Bruce, (AEP), U.S. Representative, Paris Peace Talks.
Mr. John Cusack, Chief, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Europe, and staff.
Mr. Marcell Carrere, Chief, French National Narcotics Squad, and staff.
Mr. Louis F. Janowski, Control Officer, Consular Officer, U.S. Embassy.

Marseilles, France—April 7–9:
Mr. Philip H. Chadbourn, Jr., Consul General.
Mr. Albert Habib, Chief, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Marseilles.

1 Congressman Steele only.
Mr. Anthony J. Morelli, Special Agent, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
Mr. Stephen M. Swanson, Special Agent, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
Mr. Robert Mattei, Chief, Narcotics Division, Marseilles.
Mr. Francois Goujon, Asst. Chief, Commission Principal.
Mr. Antoine Comiti, Chief of Narcotics, Marseilles Regional Services.
M. Henri Armand, Member, French Chamber of Deputies.
M. Hubert Louis, Commission Division, Ministry of the Interior.
Mr. Herbert Moza, Dir. of American Studies, University of Aix, Aix, France, and selected students.
M. Jean Laporte, Regional Super. Prefect, Marseilles.

Rome, Italy—April 9-10:
Mr. Michael A. Antonelli, Chief, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Italy.
Mr. Wells Stabler, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy.
Bishop Paul C. Marcinkus, Vatican Diplomatic Corps.
Mr. Mario Cozzi, U.S. Customs Liaison Representative, Rome.

Ankara, Turkey—April 10-12:
Hon. William J. Handley, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey.
Mr. Henry P. Schardt, Political Officers, U.S. Embassy.
Mr. Joseph S. Toner, Dir., U.S. Agency for International Development, Turkey.
Dr. Harry R. Varney, Agricultural Attache (visit to poppyfield in Afyon).
Mr. Morris Draper, Political Officer, Control Officer.
Mr. James W. Spain, Principal Officer, Istanbul.
Mr. John Warner, Special Assistant to the Director, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
Mr. Bernard J. Rotklein, Mutual Security Affairs Officer, Control Officer.
Maj. General Dudley Faver, USAF, Commander, Turkish-U.S. Logistics Command (TUSLOG).
Mr. Robert A. Lincoln, Public Affairs Officer, USIA.
Hon. Kasim Gulek, Presidential Quota Senator.
Hon. Mustafa Ustundag, Republican Peoples Party Deputy from Konya.
Hon. Mukadder Oztekin, Republican Peoples Party Deputy from Adana.
Hon. Ali Ihsan Balim, Justice Party Deputy from Isparta.
Hon. Osman Meric, Under Secretary, Ministry of Interior.

1 Congressman Steele only.
2 Congressman Murphy only.
Mr. Altemur Kilic, Press and Publications Director General, Prime Ministry.
Mr. Ekren Gunay, Assistant General Director, Ministry of Agriculture.
Mr. Orhan Eralp, Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry.

_Tehran, Iran—April 12–13:_

Mr. Donald R. Toussaint, Political Officer.
Col. Warren Bovee, Chief of Mission to the Iranian Gendarmerie.
Mr. Arnold L. Raphel, Political Officer (Narcotics Reporting Officer), Control Officer.
CWO Danny Boyd, Genmish Narcotics Adviser.
Mr. James P. Cavanaugh, Regular Administraton Specialist, Security Officer, U.S. Embassy.
General Roohollah Amini, Chief, Narcotics Division, Iranian Gendarmerie.
Dr. Amini-Rad, Director General, Narcotics Control Administration.
Col. Naser Gholi Shirani, Chief, Narcotics Division, National Police.
Dr. Jahanshah Saleh, Iranian Senate.
Mr. Mohammad Saidi, Iranian Senate.
Mr. Hill, Community School, Tehran.
Dr. Morrone, Tehran, American School.

_Thailand—April 14–17:_

Mr. George S. Newman, Deputy Chief of Mission.
Mr. Rey M. Hill, Director, United States Operations Mission, Agency for International Development.
Mr. William Wanzec, Chief of Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
Mr. Keith S. Shoestrom, Chief, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Hong Kong.
Mr. Joseph Jenkins, Agent in Charge, United States Customs Bureau, Southeast Asia.
Mr. Laurence G. Pickering, Political Officer.
Mr. Michael A. Burns, Political Officer, Control Officer.
Brig Gen. John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, Commanding General, Support Command, Thailand.
Mr. Louis J. Lapham, Political Counselor.
Wever Gim, Consul General, Chiang Mai.
Mr. James Pettit, Bur. of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Chiang Mai.
Hon. Rajawongse Thongthang Thongtaem, Director General, Customs Department.
H. S. H. Prince Bhisatej Rajani, His Majesty's Hilltribe Project.
Mr. Chit Posayanonda, former Director General, now Counselor, to the Bureau of Narcotics.


Mr. Sayom Ratanawichit, Chief, Social Studies & Planning Division, Dept. of Public Welfare.


Visit to Hilltribe Research Center, Chiang Mai University.

Visit to Border Patrol Police Hilltribe Handicraft Center.

Flyover Mae Kong Soon poppy-growing area.

Also participated in a Staff Conference on Control of Drug Abuse and Traffic with representatives from U.S. Mission in Southeast Asia.

Saigon—April 17-19:


Mr. Samuel D. Berger, Deputy Ambassador.

Mr. John E. McGowan, Special Assistant.

Mr. Terrence G. Grant, Political/Military Affairs Officer, Control Officer.

Mr. Stephen Winship, Political/Military Affairs Officer.


Col. George Webb, Deputy Chief of Staff II FFV.

Col. James H. Hyndman, Provost Marshal General II FFV.

Lt. Col. Frank H. Chamberlin, Surgeon General, II FFV.

Specialist John Backoven, Coordinator, Pioneer House.

Sgt. Tim Jaqua, Coordinator, Pioneer House.

Lt. Col. Alfred R. Jefferson, Deputy Provost Marshal, MACV.

Lt. Col. James M. Parrack, Commanding Officer, Joint Narcotics Investigation Detachment, 8th MP Group (CI), 18th MP Brigade.

Maj. James J. Reilley, Control Officer, Drug Abuse Suppression Division, Provost Marshal Office, MACV.

Maj. Robert Schwartz, Joint Customs Section, Security and Investigations Division, Provost Marshal Office, MACV.

Hong Kong—April 19-20:

Mr. David L. Osborn, principal officer, U.S. consulate.

Mr. David Dean, International Relations Officer General.

Mr. J. Donald Blevins, Consular Officer, Control Officer.

Mr. Keith S. Shostrom, Chief, Bur. of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Hong Kong.

Cdr. R. L. Vomies, Liaison Officer, 7th Fleet, Hong Kong.

Cdr. R. L. Stanford, Officer in Charge, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Phil. Det. Hong Kong.

Mr. Wayne Crawford, Resident Agent, Naval Investigative Services.
Mr. Vincent E. Durant, U.S. Customs, Foreign Liaison Officer, Hong Kong (TDY).

Tokyo—April 21–22:

Mr. Lester E. Edmond, Economic/Commercial Officer.
Mr. Ronald A. Gaiduk, Consular Officer, Control Officer.
Mr. Rustam Aruslan, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Tokyo.
Mr. William J. Cunningham, Political Officer.
Mr. Thomas C. Stave, Economic/Commercial Officer.
Mr. Segoro Usukura, Police Superintendent and Chief of Second Vice Section, Tokyo Metropolitan Police Dept.

1 Congressman Steele only.
APPENDIX

NOTE OF PRESENTATION (TRANSMITTAL SHEET TO LAO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY) CONCERNING THE DRAFT LAW ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE GROWING OF THE POPPY, OF THE MANUFACTURE, CONSUMPTION, SALE, PURCHASE, AND POSSESSION OF OPIUM

Importance of the opium problem is manifest equally from the domestic and the international point of view. On the domestic side, the economic aspect of the problem is tied to its political aspect by the fact that the culture of the opium poppy constitutes the principle source of revenue of our ethnic minorities.

However, it would be useless in the present state of affairs to think that we would be able to avoid international control of drugs. The idea of considering opium as an important source of revenue is best rejected.

Traffic in drugs in Laos was formerly an administrative offense governed by the Decree of Hauassaire [High Commissioner] No. 247/3101 of 3 September 1948 which is no longer in effect.

The Royal Government, by letter No. 2595/PC/AG of December 10, 1958 addressed to the Ministry of Finance gave its agreement to the principle of the complete revision of their legislation concerning drugs to replace the Decree of 3 September 1948 of the High Commissioner of France in Indochina, regarding the establishment of the opium regulation.

Such is the draft text prepared by our experts, and followed by an explanation of the rationale attached to this note.

In view of the events which continuously preoccupy us it would be appropriate to develop a clear policy concerning the campaign against illicit traffic in drugs. It is recalled that in 1963 the Royal Government decided to withdraw the membership of Laos in the Single Convention of 1961 regarding drugs.

DRAFT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION CONCERNING THE PROHIBITION OF THE CULTIVATION OF THE POPPY, OF THE MANUFACTURE AND CONSUMPTION, SALE AND PURCHASE OF OPIUM

Article 1.—For a period of five years following the publication of this law the mountain dwelling population who traditionally devote themselves to the cultivation of the opium poppy may only continue to consume the opium which they produce.

Authorization to grow and consume may be granted by provincial governors only to men over thirty years of age.

The area of land to be cultivated will be determined in relation to the needs of the person requesting it by a provincial consultative commission chaired by the provincial governor and including a representative of the Ministry of National Education. This area will be reduced each year so that at the expiration of the five year period indicated above no authorization to cultivate the poppy and to consume the opium which may be drawn from it will be granted.

Article 2.—With the exception of the specific cases covered by the preceding Article, the culture of the opium poppy, the manufacture, possession, consumption and the vending of opium are forbidden throughout the territory of the Kingdom.

The sale and purchase of opium are forbidden to all persons including those exceptionally authorized to cultivate the opium poppy and who may consume only the product of their cultivation.

Article 3.—With the exception of medicinal products containing opium or such products intended for the manufacture of medicines which remain subject to regulations regarding the sale, conditions and use of poisonous substances, importation, even with the intention of reexportation, transit, storage and transshipment of opium are prohibited.

(45)
Article 4.—Any person who shall cultivate the poppy or shall consume opium without the authorization specified in Article 1 or who shall not respect the limits of such authorization as he shall have received, shall be punished by a fine from 5,000 to 200,000 kip and by imprisonment of three months to three years, or by one of these two penalties only.

In case of repetition of the offense, the maximum fine shall be applied.

Article 5.—Any person who shall be punished by a fine from 5,000 to 10,000 kip and by imprisonment from six months to five years or one of these two penalties only, who shall have:

1. Manufactured opium outside of the special cases covered in Article 1;
2. Transported or possessed or given opium either freely or for payment, or who will have bought or received free;
3. Forged, false authorization to cultivate or to consume or who will have falsified authorization granted by provincial governors by the substitution of names, of photographs, or by false notification or false declarations of civil status;
4. Participate in the preparation and the introduction into circulation of false authorization or falsified authorization;
5. Sold of an authorization or who will have given such authorization free;
6. Bought an authorization or will have received it free;
7. Who will have obtained or tried to obtain more than one authorization;
8. Who will have imported opium, stocked it, had it transshipped, or had it transited in Laos territory.

Further in the cases covered by sections 5, 6 and 7, the authorization will be withdrawn.

In case of repetition of the offense, the maximum fine will be applied.

Article 6.—Any keeper of an opium smoking den will be punished by a fine from 10,000 to 1 million kip and be imprisoned from six months to five years or by one of these two penalties only.

In case of repetition of the offense the maximum fine will be applied.

Article 7.—Infradlons covered by this law will be prosecuted by the Department of the Public Prosecutor.

In every case opium seized will be confiscated and destroyed. Means of transportation will be seized and sold on behalf of the state if it is established that their owners are the perpetrators of the infractions, prosecutors or accomplices of such perpetrators.

Materials, furniture and special objects such as beds, sofas, lamps, pipes, etc. . . . found in the possession of keepers of opium dens will be seized, confiscated and destroyed.

Opium found abandoned in Lao territory will be seized and destroyed on demand of the Public Prosecutor.

Article 8.—All previous dispositions contrary to the present law are annulled.

Certified that the present text is adopted by the National Assembly at its meeting of _____________.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.