that People's Republic of China plays in the illegal production of and trafficking in opiates, particularly heroin.

THE ROLE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

There is no reliable evidence that we have been able to uncover that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has engaged in or sanctioned export of opium or its derivatives, or of PRC involvement in the opium trade in Southeast Asia. The PRC has officially prohibited the production, consumption, and distribution of opiates.

The PRC adopted stringent control over opium production and use in February 1950. The law enacted at that time banned private importation, processing, and sale of opium and other narcotics. Government-controlled production continues, and small quantities of raw opium and poppy husks are legally exported from time to time. The tight political control exercised by the PRC Government over its citizens has probably made enforcement of such laws effective in most areas of the country.

Through control over opium production and trade in southern border areas of the PRC, particularly Yunnan Province, have been made difficult, there is no confirmed evidence that the PRC is illicitly exporting opium or its derivatives across its borders, despite occasional reports of cross-border movements of opiates between PRC and Southeast Asia.

Nevertheless, there are persistent rumors and allegations that the PRC is deeply involved in illegal international narcotics trafficking. These charges emanate from several sources, including the Government of the Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and from refugees from the mainland.

Since the late 1950’s, the GRC has insisted that the Chinese Communists were deeply involved in illegal international narcotics trafficking.

Supporting this position have been statements by a number of refugees who have fled the PRC. One such individual, Miss Yuan Moun-Ru, a political refugee from mainland China, who told the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 17, 1972, that she saw the Chinese Communists Liberation Army growing opium. She further stated that, “It is illegal to sell opium or other narcotics in Communist China, although a blackmarket exists. The Government controls all the opium for exports, especially for the United States.”

Another was Mr. Wu Shu-jen who escaped from the PRC in 1971. On July 10, 1973, Wu testified before the House of Representatives Committee on Internal Security, Subcommittee on the Theory and Practice of Communism, that poppies were grown on collective farms and that he had been told that heroin was produced in a laboratory in Canton for export.

U.S. narcotics officials cannot verify these reports. The official U.S. Government position has been outlined by the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control in the World Opium Survey, 1972. In that document, the Cabinet Committee stated:

There is no reliable evidence that China has either engaged in or sanctioned the illicit export of opium and its derivatives nor are there any indications of
government participation in the opium trade of Southeast Asia and adjacent markets. British authorities in Hong Kong believe that most of the opium and related narcotics seized in Hong Kong in recent years comes into the colony by sea from Southeast Asia.

This was also the conclusion of U.S. officials in Southeast Asia in August 1973.

Nor have British authorities in Hong Kong been able to obtain evidence that any of the opium or its derivatives entering Hong Kong originates in the People's Republic of China.

However, as long as the PRC adopts the aloof attitude they have in the past, and refuses to cooperate with the United States and the United Nations in the combined effort to stop the illegal traffic in narcotics, there will be continuing suspicion that the PRC is involved.

The Government of the People's Republic of China could remove great doubt and reduce the suspicion that it is engaged in illegal international narcotics by becoming a signatory of the Single Convention in Narcotics, by making full and complete reports to the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) relative to the production and disposition of opium in China, and by contributing to the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control. Solution to the narcotics problem requires positive action not pious platitudes about being against drug abuse.

In particular, the PRC should initiate vigorous measures to prevent trawlers from unloading opium in Chinese-controlled waters.

It should be pointed out that the finger of suspicion has also been pointed at the Republic of China by the Government of Burma, who accused the GRC of sending over 1,400 agents of the Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense (IBMND) into eastern Burma. According to a spokesman for the Burmese Government, the IBMND agents gave money and arms to Khakwyei groups in the Shan State and engineered a triple alliance between Lo Hsing Han, remnants of the 3rd KMT Army, and the Hkun Hsa Khakwyei group who together planned and carried out the kidnapping of two Russian doctors.

The Burmese also charged that some IBMND agents are in contact with other Chinese, many of whom are unscrupulous drug traders, smugglers, black marketeers, and vice kings.

A spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense, General Li Chang Hao, vigorously denied the allegations that Chinese intelligence agents are working in Burma.

The study team was unable to determine the authenticity of these allegations, or the fate of the two Russian doctors.
JAPAN

The Japanese have an effective narcotics and dangerous drug suppression program. The laws are strict and enforcement vigorous. Recently, the abuse of hallucinogenic drugs such as cannabis and LSD and organic solvents such as thinner and glues have been increasing among the younger generation, as has the use of sleeping pills, tranquilizers, and stimulants.

Japan does not produce opium or its derivatives, except for a small, controlled quantity for experimental purposes. However, Japan does play a role in the international narcotics picture. As a major world producer of chemicals it is a source of chemicals required to produce heroin in Golden Triangle refineries, particularly acetic anhydride. As a major crossroads in the Far East, its seaports and airports provide a potential conduit through which drugs can be routed to the United States.

ACETIC ANHYDRIDE

Acetylation is the key process in converting morphine base to heroin and can be accomplished by using either acetyl chloride or acetic anhydride. Acetyl chloride is flammable, irritating to the eyes, reacts violently with water or alcohol, and requires careful handling in laboratory processes. Although acetic anhydride is corrosive and requires care in handling, it is less hazardous to the user than acetyl chloride and hence is the preferred chemical used in illicit processing.

Enormous quantities of acetic anhydride are produced annually in the world's industrial countries. U.S. output alone was on the order of 750,000 tons in 1973, with comparable amounts being produced in Western Europe and Japan.

Acetic anhydride is relatively inexpensive. Recent prices range from 21 cents per kilogram in the United States, to 26 cents in France, to 39 cents in Japan. Between 80 and 90 percent of the world output is used to manufacture synthetic fibers, with the remainder going to pharmaceutical compounds, primarily for the manufacture of aspirin. It is also used to produce plastics, perfumes, flavoring materials, and dyestuffs. As a general rule, the production of 1 kilogram of heroin requires 1 kilogram of acetic anhydride. Given the chemical's abundance and cheapness, both the quantity and value of acetic anhydride used in illicit narcotic production is miniscule. These factors make government monitoring and control of acetic anhydride production and distribution difficult in industrialized countries.

In a report on the acetic anhydride situation in Japan a staff survey team reported to the Foreign Affairs Committee that given Japan's role as a primary producer of acetic anhydride for Southeast Asia's heroin laboratories, the U.S. Government should request the Government of Japan to adopt procedures to identify producers, exporters, and purchasers of this vital chemical.

(25)
This question was of primary interest to the Study Mission during our visit to Japan.

**ACETIC ANHYDRIDE—THE CURRENT SITUATION**

The Japanese Government does not exercise control over the export of acetic anhydride, primarily because the Japanese Government does not consider acetic anhydride to be a precursor of heroin or to be a controlled substance. In the opinion of Japanese officials it is easier to monitor and to control the importation of acetic anhydride than it is to control and monitor its exportation.

According to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, in Tokyo, there are only four companies producing acetic anhydride in Japan, as follows: Chisso Corp.; Teijin, Ltd.; Daicel, Ltd.; and Nippon Synthetic Chemical Industry Co., Ltd.

In 1972, these four companies produced 103,721 tons of acetic anhydride. Approximately 90 percent of the total production was consumed by the producing companies while about 8.6 percent was sold to wholesalers in Japan. A small amount of acetic anhydride, 159.2 tons (about 1.4 percent) was exported to the following four countries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Tons Imported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>159.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In comparison, the United States exported approximately 280 tons of acetic anhydride in 1972 out of a total production of 750,000 tons. This represents approximately 65 percent of total world production of 1,105,000 tons.

Like Japan, the United States does not control the production or exportation of acetic anhydride although export data is available from the Department of Commerce.

The fact that the United States does not control the export of acetic anhydride put U.S. diplomatic and narcotics officials in Tokyo at a disadvantage when they discussed the need to monitor the production and exportation of the chemical.

The Japanese simply asked "why would the Japanese do anything to control acetic anhydride if the United States doesn't."

In spite of this attitude, the study team was instrumental in getting pertinent information relative to the production and exportation of acetic anhydride in and from Japan. Of even greater significance the study team was advised by representatives from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and that in the future this data would be made available to the U.S. mission in Tokyo on a regular basis.

The study team recognizes that it would be almost impossible to control the export of acetic anhydride and that only a minute quantity is required to produce heroin. For example, it takes approximately 1 ton of acetic anhydride to produce 1 ton of heroin. Thus only 10 to 12
tons of acetic anhydride would be required to produce the estimated 10 to 12 tons of heroin consumed in the United States annually, that is, less than .001 of a percentage of total world production.

Nevertheless, a concentrated effort should be made to compile export data with respect to shipments of acetic anhydride including the destination and recipients, whether such shipments are made to manufacturers or wholesalers, and insofar as possible, what disposition is made by importers and users of acetic anhydride. Parallel with these measures, the United States should initiate diplomatic steps to induce all producers of acetic anhydride to adopt procedures to compile the same data with respect to the disposition, use, and export of the chemical. The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) adopted a resolution calling for international cooperation in monitoring the exportation of acetic anhydride at the 42nd General Assembly in Vienna in October 1973. (See appendix 1.)

Success in this endeavor, however, will also require the cooperation of trade, industry, and commercial agencies in every country that produces acetic anhydride and a coordinated intelligence effort to identify the importers of acetic anhydride.

In order to determine the willingness of the producers in such a program, the study team has written to the major producers of acetic anhydride in the United States requesting their views. Unfortunately, the answers have not been satisfactory.
HONG KONG

The British Crown Colony of Hong Kong occupies a critical position in the world narcotic problems. It serves as a conduit, processing point, and market for opiates originating in the Golden Triangle. In addition Hong Kong is a primary source of the chemists who process raw opium into morphine base, and heroin, in clandestine laboratories in the Golden Triangle and in Hong Kong.

The well organized criminal groups that exist in the Ch'ao Chu community provide the organization and financing required in the production of, and trafficking in narcotics throughout Southeast Asia.

The enforcement of antinarcotics legislation in Hong Kong is extremely difficult. Hong Kong, which is widely used as an international free port, provides the trafficker with an excellent transshipment point for heroin and other drugs to their ultimate destination.

Over 20 million tons of cargo either originates in, enters or passes through Hong Kong each year. There are more than 7,000 oceangoing vessels entering the Hong Kong area annually and over 30,000 smaller boats, including junks, operate in the adjacent waters or in the waters off the Chinese mainland. Compounding the enforcement problem is the fact that over 1 million airline passengers move through Hong Kong annually. Customs inspections, which are difficult under the best of circumstances, cover a relatively small number of travelers and transients and cargo. There is little doubt that an unknown quantity of heroin passes through the Hong Kong Airport, destined for the United States.

Because of the great volume of ocean and air freight and traffic freight through Hong Kong, British and U.S. officials in Hong Kong told the study mission that it is impossible to determine if narcotics in any large amounts are being transshipped through Hong Kong to the United States. According to a high ranking U.S. Consulate official, an extensive investigation by U.S. and Hong Kong narcotics enforcement officials failed to uncover any evidence to indicate that Hong Kong "is a major center of drug trafficking to the United States."

In the opinion of the study mission the inability to determine the quantity being smuggled to the United States is an intelligence gap which is inexorable and one that must be filled quickly.

This lack of intelligence points out the need to establish a narcotics intelligence organization in Hong Kong which will be able to utilize the resources of all intelligence collection elements in the Hong Kong Government.

Such an organization would enable Hong Kong authorities to deal more effectively with the narcotics addicts' problem in Hong Kong and would make a valuable contribution to the worldwide struggle against drug abuse.

Intelligence on the activities of the narcotics trafficker is essential if the struggle against him is to be successful. That intelligence must
also be shared with other antinarcotics enforcement agencies throughout the world. A gap such as exists in Hong Kong weakens the entire suppression effort.

SYNDICATES' CONTROL OF DRUGS IN HONG KONG

The arrival of and wholesale distribution of drugs in Hong Kong are controlled primarily by five large syndicates with the leadership protected by family loyalty and an organizational structure that enables them to share in the profits without getting involved in the operation. Heroin refineries, which are not always directly controlled by the syndicates, are small and spread throughout the densely populated area, usually on the upper floor where the odor cannot be detected without scientific equipment which is not yet available.

To deal with the syndicates Hong Kong authorities should organize undercover operations to penetrate and destroy these organizations.

It is believed that the smuggling of narcotics from Hong Kong is conducted by individuals and organizations independent of these syndicates, but nobody is quite certain. For example, some U.S. and Canadian traffickers and some servicemen have been arrested after buying No. 4 heroin from different local sources. It is also likely that an unknown number of the approximately 1 million air travelers using the Hong Kong airport also carry narcotics through en route to the United States.

THE HONG KONG DRUG ANTINARCOTICS EFFORT

The use of opiates has been illegal in Hong Kong for over 30 years. Nevertheless, Hong Kong has one of the largest opium addict populations in the world. Estimates range from 80,000 to 100,000 and even as high as 150,000. Most are users of opium although a substantial number use No. 3 smoking heroin. According to Hong Kong authorities, very few addicts inject No. 4 heroin although it is possible that many either smoke or sniff No. 4 heroin.

This large market is supplied from Southeast Asia, particularly from Thailand. While some morphine and heroin is smuggled by air the bulk enters in the form of opium and morphine aboard trawlers from Thailand. It is processed into the drug of choice for the user in the many clandestine laboratories that are located in Hong Kong and its environs.

As recently as 1971 there was little focus on international narcotics trafficking by the Hong Kong Government. Hong Kong was more concerned with its own drug abuse problems, and was of the opinion that it was capable of solving its drug abuse problem without outside assistance.

By mid-1972 it had become apparent that Hong Kong played a significant role in the illegal international traffic in narcotics. Even more obvious was the fact that Hong Kong authorities could not solve their own narcotics problem through local police measures alone and that there was a need for cooperation with other governments.

To cope with this multipronged problem the Hong Kong Government created the post of Commissioner of Narcotics in mid-1972 and
named Mr. N. G. Rolph (then Deputy Commissioner of Police) to fill the post.

To push the fight against narcotics Hong Kong authorities have increased the size of the Narcotics Bureau from 100 to 200. On the international level, Hong Kong officials are in the process of creating a mechanism for closer cooperation with the governments of Southeast Asia and in June convened an international meeting (United States, United Kingdom, Hong Kong) to discuss various aspects of the narcotics problem in Southeast Asia.

Two of the more important topics discussed related to:

(1) Determining what measures should be undertaken to control the trawler traffic; and

(2) How best to obtain the cooperation of the People's Republic of China in curbing illicit traffic in opium in Chinese coastal waters.

Thai trawlers have been a constant problem for Hong Kong authorities. The vessels usually transfer their deadly cargo in international waters off the Chinese mainland where it is picked up by junk and other small vessels and carried into Hong Kong for distribution.\(^1\)

Recently the trawler traffic appears to have been interrupted.\(^2\)

While there is no official explanation as to the reason for this stoppage, many authorities believe that stepped-up enforcement efforts in Thailand and the recent capture of two trawlers by the South Vietnamese has caused the traffickers to reassess the situation. The result of this has had a definite impact in Hong Kong.

On August 1, 1973, British enforcement officials said that no opium had entered Hong Kong for 7 weeks and the opium stocks had been depleted. Morphine base was in short supply and the price had increased to over $1,000 per pound, an increase of about 214 percent. Hong Kong authorities also said that there was a shortage of opium and heroin and that the cost of opium was up 35 percent; No. 3 heroin 65 percent and No. 4 heroin had increased in price by 100 percent. Furthermore, the heroin content was down and the opium diluted.

Most officials, United States and British, are of the opinion that this situation is only temporary. The profits are too great and it is expected that the international trafficker will either reorganize in Thailand or move his operations to other areas of Southeast Asia.

Every effort should be made to prevent the trawler traffic from resuming. The United States should encourage the Thai Government to prohibit Thai registered trawlers from passing above the 10th parallel unless specifically authorized by the Thai Government. Any unauthorized vessel above that line would be subject to interception.

The United States should also propose a conference of Southeast Asian nationals to mark out an international agreement with the Thai Government permitting the governments of the area to stop, search, and seize if necessary unauthorized Thai trawlers in waters above the 10th parallel.

Air surveillance of the waters surrounding Hong Kong should also be continued and if possible the number of flights increased.

Above all, the People's Republic of China must be made aware that it has a responsibility to the nations of the world to cooperate in

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\(^1\) There are unsubstantiated reports that some of the trawlers drop their cargo in People's Republic of China waters near the Lushan Islands.

\(^2\) According to U.S. narcotics control officials the last Thai registered trawler departed for Hong Kong on June 4, 1973.
efforts to help end the production of and trafficking in narcotics and other dangerous drugs.

UNITED STATES-HONG KONG COOPERATION

According to U.S. officials in Hong Kong there is an increasingly close working relationship between U.S. officers, particularly DEA agents and Hong Kong officials. “During the past 2 years we have never been refused assistance, investigations information, and cooperation which we have requested from the Hong Kong Narcotics Bureau, the customs service, and other authorities in Hong Kong,” said one U.S. official.

The authorities in Hong Kong have also been cooperative in helping U.S. military officials put an end to the number of deaths resulting from an overdose of drugs.

There were six such deaths among U.S. military personnel in 1972 and one in early 1973 and it was evident that the situation was getting out of hand.

A coordinated program was adopted which involved the use of U.S. naval personnel under charges of narcotics offenses as informants and intensified briefings on the evils of drugs on board U.S. naval vessels before personnel were permitted to go on leave. Hong Kong authorities cooperated by taking steps to break up the distribution process by arresting the bar girls and pimps who were pushing the drugs and by concentrating the enforcement effort in the Ch’ao Chu area where drugs were being pushed.

The study team agrees that cooperation on the part of Hong Kong authorities has gotten better. We believe, however, that cooperation could be improved. For example, Hong Kong authorities permit U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents to act only in an informational and advisory capacity. This is a waste of a valuable resource and demonstrates at least a lack of a spirit of full cooperation. There is no reason why Hong Kong authorities should not be willing to utilize the services of U.S. agents. Undercover operations as developed by U.S. enforcement agencies would be of great benefit to the overall antinarcotics efforts and could be of tremendous value to the Hong Kong enforcement agencies.

While in Hong Kong, the study team was subjected to adverse publicity which was the result of a misinterpretation of a statement made at an unscheduled press conference which was arranged without the prior knowledge of the study mission. In reply to a series of hypothetical questions concerning the “determination to go all out” to stop the flow of drugs into the United States, the chairman suggested that the United States should use every weapon including the invoking of trade sanctions. Trade is essential to Hong Kong, and this implication led to unfavorable newspaper publicity and a number of critical editorials.

In an effort to put things in perspective, the chairman issued the following statement upon departure from Hong Kong:

The United States, in dealing with the problem of the manufacture and smuggling of narcotics, has no desire to impose itself on the autonomy of Hong Kong or any other government.
The problem we find is not a lack of cooperation from the Hong Kong Government. Rather it is a question of interpretation as to what cooperation infers. We find there is no solid evidence available as to the amount of drugs transiting Hong Kong that are going to the United States. This is partly because of the nature of Hong Kong as an entrepot port and inability to exercise sufficient surveillance to control the drug traffic. Hong Kong is a free port with a great volume of travelers and freight passing through. It is an area of great potentiality to the drug trafficker who can utilize the air traffic and ship traffic stopping over in Hong Kong.

During my stay here, I have had ample opportunity to talk with both Hong Kong and American officials about the problem of trafficking in drugs. I leave here optimistic that our friendly discussions have paved the way for continuing and increased cooperation that will operate to our mutual advantage, and through our coordinated efforts, we can greatly reduce this scourge.

The United States could also improve the capability of its antinarcotics organization in Hong Kong. There are not enough Drug Enforcement Administration agents to do the job, and those that are assigned are required to go on temporary duty to other parts of Southeast Asia from time to time, thus weakening the effort in Hong Kong. Furthermore, there are four agents authorized for Hong Kong, with only three assigned. The fourth slot has been vacant for over 1 year because "DEA is looking for a Chinese linguist and can't find one." Four agents are not enough to do the job, and the fact that only three are assigned is difficult to explain or to understand.

The United States must realize that it is asking Hong Kong officials to intensify the battle against narcotics and that it must demonstrate a willingness to devote the necessary resources to that struggle. It does no good to speak of the need for more agents in Hong Kong when the United States has not even filled the slots already authorized.

The study team is also of the opinion that the attitude of Hong Kong officials is too complacent given the magnitude of the narcotics problem in Hong Kong as well as in the United States.

In keeping with the "threat or promise" made to gain further cooperation from areas where it was not forthcoming, the chairman of the mission offered an amendment to the Trade Bill of 1973 "cutting off trade with those nations, who in the judgment of the President, fail to fully cooperate with U.S. drug enforcement efforts." This amendment passed in committee and has passed both Houses of the Congress.

THE U.S. ANTINARCOTICS EFFORT

Every U.S. diplomatic mission in the countries visited has established narcotics control teams. While membership consists of all U.S. Government agencies which can make a contribution to the antinarcotics effort, the heart of the operation is the enforcement and intelligence collection agencies.

Relations within the respective control teams is harmonious and cooperative. Occasionally a complaint is raised that one or another group is withholding information from another but the study team was unable to uncover any hard evidence to support such complaints.

The one common complaint was that the U.S. Agency for International Development is not as responsive to requests for assistance as the situation warrants. Narcotics enforcement procedures must be current, constant, and vigorous. Delay enables the trafficker to change his:
methods and procedures, as well as traffic patterns. When the U.S. missions in the various countries indicate that equipment will be made available, the bureaucracy in Washington cannot be permitted to engage in long delaying feasibility studies. Assistance promised must be equipment delivered, if the United States is to convince other nations that it is seriously engaged in an all-out war against narcotics.\(^3\)

Another problem area is the unequal status of the Drug Enforcement Administration agent vis-a-vis his Department of State counterpart. He is not entitled to rest and rehabilitation leave or to emergency return to the United States. Nor is he on the diplomatic list.

Promotions are slow and infrequent. The DEA agent becomes more effective as time passes. It takes him at least 1 year to develop the contacts necessary to do his job. If he leaves at the end of 2 years when his tour has ended (because he is dissatisfied) the antinarcotics effort suffers a severe setback. Personnel procedures must be adopted by the Drug Enforcement Administration to induce the agent to extend his overseas tour so that he will remain on station for an extended period.

Steps must also be taken to increase the number of DEA agents throughout Southeast Asia. In particular, the standard operating procedure should be to assign two agents to each post. No law enforcement official should be required to work alone on a daily basis. He should have a support agent so that each could supplement and protect the other.

Perhaps the most serious shortcoming, however, is that too many Drug Enforcement Administration agents do not speak the language of the country in which they are stationed. This is a problem that only the Drug Enforcement Administration can solve. U.S. citizens with a language capability, who have some ethnic ties to an area, must be recruited. To send an American without a language capability to Southeast Asia to gather information on narcotics traffickers is not fair to the agent nor is it likely to provide usable intelligence.

\(^3\) On November 16, 1973, the President delegated authority for the management of international narcotics control funds authorized and pursuant to Section 482 of the Foreign Assistance Act to the Secretary of State’s Senior Advisory for International Narcotics Matters. (See appendix 2.)
CONCLUSIONS

1. As a result of increased Burmese-Thai cooperation and more vigorous enforcement in both countries, drug trafficking in the Golden Triangle has been disrupted.

2. There was a reluctance on the part of some individuals to discuss certain aspects of the international narcotics problems with the study team. Failure to discuss or refusal to provide information to congressional inquiries can only lead to doubt and distrust between the executive and legislative branches. The war against narcotics is too vital to the security of the United States to allow this to happen.

3. The Government of Burma has started to take action against drug trafficking in Burma due partly to an alarming increase in drug abuse among Burmese youth. So far this action has helped to disrupt the production of, and trafficking in narcotics in the Golden Triangle.

4. The Government of Burma has indicated a willingness to accept narcotics assistance from the United States. While such assistance would be helpful in the fight against the narcotics producer and trafficker, the United States should get an agreement from the Burmese that such assistance will be used only in the struggle against those involved in the production of and trafficking in narcotics.

5. The governments in the countries visited now seem to appreciate the dimensions of heroin abuse in the United States and have taken action to inhibit the illegal production of trafficking in opiates with varying degrees of success.

6. The United States has been slow to realize that the enforcement effort, while important, must be coordinated with a well conceived, well executed crop substitution program.

7. There is a need to develop a marketing mechanism simultaneously with the crop substitution program. It does no good to develop alternate crops if the farmer is unable to get the product to the market.

8. Success of the crop substitution program in Thailand is dependent upon a reliable aerial survey of the opium poppy growing regions.

9. The narcotics enforcement effort in Laos is not as effective as it must be because of a laxity toward known offenders and a reluctance to apply the law equally.

10. As a result of the relative success of the enforcement effort in Burma and Thailand there is a distinct possibility that the narcotics trafficker will move his operations into Laos.
11. Although neither the Philippines, Republic of China, nor Korea play a significant role in the illegal production of and international trafficking in narcotics, the potential is there and every step must be taken to insure that the international trafficker is not able to transfer his operations into those countries.

12. There is no evidence that the People's Republic of China is involved in the illegal production of and trafficking in narcotics. However, as long as the PRC refuses to cooperate with the United States and the United Nations in the combined effort to stop the illegal traffic in narcotics, there will be a suspicion that the PRC is involved, rightly or wrongly.

13. The Japanese Government does monitor the production of and exportation of acetic anhydride although there are no controls. The United States does not exercise any control over the production or exportation of acetic anhydride.

14. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration effort throughout the Pacific area is short of personnel, particularly those with an oriental language capability.

15. The authorities in Hong Kong do not give the impression that they recognize the important role Hong Kong plays in the illegal production of and international trafficking in heroin.

16. Although U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents are integrated into the country team in the various Embassies, they are nevertheless treated as second-class citizens when it comes to being on the diplomatic list. Furthermore, the DEA does not provide funds for emergency home leave and rest and rehabilitation leave.
RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

1. The executive branch initiate procedures which will insure that information relating to the struggle against the production of and trafficking in narcotics is made available to the Congress.

2. The United States does not provide aircraft and other narcotics control assistance to Burma unless that Government agrees to use such assistance solely for antinarcotics activity.

3. The United States intensify its effort to convince the Government of Thailand that an aerial survey of the poppy growing regions is essential if a viable crop substitution program is to be successful.

4. The United States provide whatever assistance is needed to help the Government of Thailand, and the United Nations, in the combined effort to develop suitable alternate crops for the opium poppy.

5. The United States secure the consent of the Government of Thailand to increase the number of Drug Enforcement Administration agents in that country by a minimum of twelve. Efforts should also be made to increase the number of agents throughout Southeast Asia, particularly in Singapore and Malaysia.

6. The United States apply whatever pressure is required to encourage the Government of Laos to prosecute those individuals, who are known to be involved in illegal drug activities, particularly Moua Xu.

7. The United States use whatever leverage it has to encourage the Government of Laos to step up its antinarcotics program, particularly in the Golden Triangle to preclude drug traffickers moving to Laos from Burma.

8. The United States reconsider the decision to reduce the number of U.S. Customs agents in Laos from seven to four.

9. The United States provide the assistance and training needed to insure that the Philippines, Korea, and Taiwan do not become major heroin transshipment points to the United States.

10. The President take action to insure that narcotics control assistance promised by the United States is provided and shipped as rapidly as possible.

11. The President take whatever steps are required to encourage the Peoples' Republic of China to cooperate in the international struggle against narcotics.
12. The President initiate procedures designed to monitor the production of and exportation of acetic anhydride by calling an international conference of producing countries to work out the details.

13. The United States stress to the Government of Hong Kong that it contributes significantly to the U.S. drug abuse problems and that failure to cooperate in every way could prejudice relations with the United States.

14. The Drug Enforcement Administration take immediate steps to fill all authorized positions in Hong Kong. Efforts should also be made to obtain the approval of the Hong Kong Government to allow U.S. agents to be operational.

15. The Drug Enforcement Administration change its administrative procedures and permit the use of funds to defray emergency leave expenses for DEA agents and to authorize rest and recuperation leave for DEA agents serving in hardship posts.

16. The Drug Enforcement Administration initiate training and recruiting programs to insure that agents serving abroad are able to speak the language of the country in which they are serving.
PART II

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC

Although drug abuse does not appear to be a serious problem in the Pacific area, there is no doubt that the situation is tense. Drugs of all kinds are readily available at low prices and U.S. military officials must exercise constant vigilance if the Vietnam experience is to be avoided.

As of June 1, 1973, there were approximately 199,000 U.S. servicemen stationed in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia as follows:

**Southeast Asia:**
- Thailand: 42,000
- Afloat: 11,000
- Total: 53,000

**Western Pacific:**
- Japan: 19,000
- Ryukus Islands: 38,000
- Philippines: 16,000
- South Korea: 42,000
- Taiwan: 9,000
- Afloat: 22,000
- Total: 146,000

**Overall total:** 199,000

As a result of the escalating use of drugs in the United States and abroad, the President in June 1971, directed that urgent and immediate attention be given to development of a national counteroffensive against drug abuse. In turn the Secretary of Defense, in June 1971, directed the Secretaries of the Military Departments to give urgent priority attention to developing plans designed to meet the problem of drug use, particularly heroin use among members of the Armed Forces in Vietnam. The objectives of the program were threefold:

1. To prevent drug abuse and drug use;
2. To attempt to restore to effective and reliable functioning all individuals with problems stemming from drugs; and
3. To administratively separate from the military service those individuals who cannot be effectively restored to military duty within a reasonable period.

Basically, the Defensewide program can be broken down into five main categories: (1) Education; (2) identification; (3) evaluation; (4) treatment, and (5) rehabilitation.

Responsibility for implementation of the program rests with the local commanders who appear to be aware of the fact that the production and flow of narcotics and dangerous drugs is a threat to the military readiness of U.S. Forces throughout the Pacific area.
There are serious problems which must be overcome however. With the end of U.S. military activities in Southeast Asia the likelihood of boredom becomes a reality. Soldiers with nothing to do are ingenious when it comes to finding unsupervised activities to occupy their time. Commanders at all levels must adopt programs which will keep their troops occupied. Intensive training programs must be coordinated with interesting off-duty recreational, educational, and athletic activities which will attract the servicemen.

Leave policies should be liberal. Before a soldier goes on leave, however, the normal command drug education program should be augmented by a comprehensive period of instruction on the dangers of drug abuse.

Particular emphasis must be placed on the Philippines, Thailand, and Okinawa. Hong Kong is a unique problem area. It is a leave center and servicemen visit that colony from all over the theater. Drugs are easy to obtain either in Hong Kong or in Kowloon and there is a temptation to attempt to smuggle drugs from the colony aboard ships back to their units.

United States and Hong Kong authorities are cooperating in an effort to discourage the use or purchase of drugs by U.S. servicemen with some success, particularly since the beginning of 1973.

The drug situation in countries visited is outlined on the following pages.

PHILIPPINES

There are approximately 15,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in the Philippines. Of this about 8,800 are Air Force, about 5,000 are Navy and the remainder Army.

Prior to the imposition of martial law in September 1972, drugs of high quality and cheap prices were readily available. Subsequently, prices of heroin have gone up and the purity has been reduced from about 50 percent to 5 percent, when it can be found.

Drug abuse does not seem to be widespread among U.S. military forces. Authorities attribute this to the fact that most servicemen in the Philippines are volunteer; they are older and more settled than the draftees. Another reason cited is the vigorous identification and customs programs conducted by U.S. military authorities, particularly in Olongapoa, where the Subic Bay Naval Base is located.

**Pill cases**

In addition to the random urinalysis testing system the Navy conducts a random body search of personnel returning from liberty. Actually, about 1 out of every 40 is searched, but the fact that the search is random keeps most servicemen honest.

In those cases where narcotics are discovered the individual is referred for investigation. These are called “pill cases.”

This program has been successful. In the 3 months prior to September 1972, the number of “pill cases” averaged about 87 per month, and of those tested 90 percent tested positive for narcotics, with about 30 percent being heroin. In January and February 1973, the number of pill cases averaged one per day and tested about 65 percent positive with three cases being heroin. In June and July there were a total of 35 cases, with 24 percent testing positive, none being heroin.

In addition to preventing the use of narcotics, U.S. programs are
also designed to discourage the smuggling of narcotics by U.S. military personnel within the theater on to the United States.

**The customs program**

The U.S. military customs program resulted in the recovery of large amounts of U.S. Government property but only small amounts of narcotics and other dangerous drugs.

The procedures followed by U.S. military customs inspection at Subic Bay involves the on-site inspection and examination of all household goods, personal property, all privately owned vehicles being processed, handcarried and hold baggage of personnel departing the Philippines by the Culic Point Air Terminal.

At Clark Air Force Base the military customs program has resulted in the seizure of significant amounts of drugs and narcotics. In order to maintain program integrity, random inspections are also conducted in the United States in addition to the full checkage in the Philippines.

While the study team was in the Philippines, there was a U.S. Customs Service adviser assigned on a 90 to 120 day period covering Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines and Taiwan and Guam. We were told that there were plans to have a U.S. Customs adviser assigned permanently to the Philippines.

**THAILAND**

There are approximately 38,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in Thailand. Most are assigned to Air Force units.

Drugs of all kinds are available and the specter of a heroin epidemic such as raged in Vietnam during the 1970-71 period haunts military commanders.

A 45-milligram vial of 98 percent pure heroin can be purchased for as little as $2.50, while a vial containing almost 1 gram can be purchased for about $10.

The U.S. Armed Forces are actively engaged in attempting to both reduce the use of drugs by servicemen in Thailand, and to stem the flow of drugs out of Thailand to other U.S. servicemen in the Pacific area and to the United States via military transportation systems.

**Efforts to stop narcotics smuggling out of Thailand**

The U.S. Air Force transportation system provides an attractive vehicle for the narcotics smuggler. Operational aircraft, air freight systems, Army Postal Office and passenger operations are all accessible to military personnel.

The enforcement effort which is designed to deny the use of these systems to the drug trafficker consists of two basic programs: Identification and apprehension of military drug traffickers and an effective military customs program which seeks to inspect or examine all personnel departing Thailand together with accompanied baggage; all household goods, including unaccompanied baggage; all mail; all Department of Defense controlled aircraft, ships and watercraft, to include their crews, and all privately owned vehicles being shipped from Thailand.

There are a total of 185 trained military customs inspectors located at 13 different locations in Thailand, and 52 marijuana detection dogs. There are no heroin dogs although there was one being trained while the study team was in Thailand.
The customs programs appear to be relatively successful. For example, during the last quarter of fiscal year 1973 a total of only 94 customs violations were detected as a result of customs inspections of 54,700 passengers, customs examinations of 5,814 passengers and customs inspections of 13,859 household goods/hold baggage shipments.

There is room for improvement, however. Drugs are being smuggled from Thailand to the U.S. military installations throughout the Pacific area, including marijuana which has been laced with opium. Some is body carried, some is mailed, while the bulk is hidden aboard aircraft.

The primary emphasis of the military antinarcotics effort is being placed upon apprehending the traffickers in preference to the documentation of offenses by users.

The drug abuse problem in Thailand

According to military sources, identification and detection techniques employed in Thailand are similar to those followed elsewhere in the military services. The most effective technique is the random urinalysis test, which is designed to test every man in a unit.

Initially there were many ways of beating the system. Some drug users failed to give a specimen, others got their friends to take the test, while others simply failed to show up for the tests.

According to the authorities, the scope of the testing process has been widened and the number of those failing to take the test is diminishing. This statement is particularly true of Udorn Air Base. For example, in February of 1973, almost 8 percent of those selected for urinalysis failed to take the test. By July of 1973 the number of no-shows had been reduced to zero.

Usable statistics on the extent of drug abuse among U.S. military forces in Thailand are not available. According to military authorities, a total of 379 drug cases involving 557 suspects were investigated by U.S. agencies in fiscal year 1973. Of those suspects, 18.5 percent (103 individuals) involved heroin and 0.3 percent (17 individuals) involved dangerous drugs. The remaining 78.5 involved the use of marijuana, which like opium is grown in Thailand. The proximity of the two crops has resulted in a new headache for the military commander—opiated marijuana.

Opiated marijuana is addictive and U.S. authorities are concerned over its appearance. In an effort to educate the servicemen and to discourage the use of opiated marijuana, U.S. military authorities have distributed instructions on how to test marijuana for opiates. Because of the danger that opiated marijuana may be introduced to the United States, those detection instructions are as follows:

**Testing Marijuana for Opiates**

**Is My Joint Laced?**

You may have seen the warnings we've put out about all the laced grass that's been showing up locally. It can be a real bummer getting into Smack unintentionally. Marijuana usage is illegal in the Air Force and under Thai law, however, many people take a chance on a bust and take up anyway. In order to keep the number of Smack freaks down we're putting out these instructions on testing for opiates.

It is relatively simple to determine if grass has been laced. Each individual normally has all the laboratory equipment necessary to test grass for most
drugs—his eyes, hands and tongue. Using these three anyone can probably determine if the grass he has is laced.

Marihuana has a bland, vegetable-like taste, much like dry leaves (who eats dry leaves?) when it is clean (uncut). Colorwise, it is normally various shades of green, or a light golden-colored brown. This is also dependent upon how old the grass is. The grass may stick together, but will not be extremely sticky (like wet glue) if it is clean.

To test for opium cured grass, first check color; if the grass has been treated with opium it should be very dark, almost black in color, or splotched with black or dark spots. The grass will be very sticky to the touch and have a very bitter aspirin-like taste. (All opiates taste very bitter.)

If the grass is in the bulk or brick form, and has been laced with redrock or white heroin, there will be either small chunks of redrock on or in it, a reddish powder on the grass, or a white powder on it. Heroin tastes extremely bitter, and greatly changes the taste of the grass. It also, needless to say, will be very apparent that it has been cut just from the drug's effects.

There are also a fairly large number of the prerolled packs of joints that have been opium cured or heroin laced. With a preroll, take one joint (you can afford it), cut it open, and dump out the contents. Look at the inside of the cigarette paper to see if there appears to be any reddish or white powder on it. If this proves negative, lick on the tip of your fingers and run it across the cigarette paper, check your finger for either a white or reddish powder and then taste it. If there is any redrock or white heroin on the grass, taste will tell, and lastly so will using the drug. There is a very distant difference between the effects of marihuana as opposed to the effects of opium or heroin. Marihuana is a mild hallucinogen; opium and heroin are strong depressants. The difference is easily distinguishable.

The grass here is far stronger than most grass found in the States and can sometimes act as a depressant. Because of this, it may be difficult for an inexperienced user to tell the difference between the "clean" grass locally available or the laced grass. While opium and heroin are stronger than grass and would increase the hassles one might not expect to face from marihuana (physical addiction and detection through urinalysis to name a few.)

It's your head.

Unfortunately, the resourceful U.S. servicemen are smuggling opiated marihuana to U.S. military forces throughout the Pacific area.

KOREA

The use of heroin and other dangerous drugs by U.S. servicemen in Korea is under control at the present time. Military commanders, however, are aware that drugs are available and have developed programs designed to detect and identify individuals who may be using or trafficking in drugs. Parallel education programs are also conducted to discourage the use of drugs by U.S. military personnel.

There are four categories of drugs available in Korea: Marihuana including hashish, dangerous drugs which include amphetamines and barbiturates, hallucinogenic and opiates, including heroin or any of its derivatives.

The opium poppy grows in Korea and several fields have been located and destroyed by the Republic of Korea and U.S. investigative agencies. These fields are normally located in rugged, almost inaccessible terrain. There are persistent, but unsubstantiated reports that there is at least one heroin laboratory in Korea although no processing facilities have been located and no confiscated heroin has been traced to a Korean source.

There are also numerous reports that heroin is being smuggled into Korea by American merchant seamen, Japanese tourists and others. Because of the small amounts of heroin being found within Korea, U.S. antinarcotics authorities place little credence on these rumors.
Approximately 3 pounds of raw opium which had been smuggled into Korea aboard a Military Airlift Command (MAC) flight from Thailand was confiscated from a soldier addict. There have been no indications of the shipment of heroin into Korea nor have there been any indications of the transshipment of heroin from Korea to other countries.

Amphetamines, barbiturates, and other dangerous drugs can be legally manufactured and imported into Korea and distributed to pharmacy customers. U.S. military forces have on occasion gotten Korean friends to purchase these drugs for them. This situation may change as a result of a new law which provides for a comprehensive regulatory scheme for licensing legitimate businessmen, pharmacists, physicians and researchers handling drugs. Reports must be filed with the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare and stringent controls on drugs must be kept by the licensees.

Small amounts of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) have been confiscated in Korea. U.S. authorities have no reliable information, or even rumors, as to the source of LSD although two U.S. soldiers were apprehended for possession of 1,345 LSD tablets 2 days before the study team arrived in Korea.

The following table shows the number of drug-related investigations conducted by U.S. Army authorities in Korea during the first 7 months (January 1-July 31) of 1973.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marihuana</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangerous drugs, including amphetamines and barbiturates</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hallucinogenic (LSD)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opiate (opium and heroin)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

U.S. Army efforts to suppress drug use and trafficking.

Of the approximately 42,000 U.S. military forces stationed in Korea, over 34,000 are Army, about 7,700 are Air Force and less than 300 are Navy.

Because the Army is the predominant service in Korea the study team concentrated its interest on the drug problem as it relates to U.S. Army Forces in Korea. We were pleased to learn that all elements of the U.S. country team are committed to the struggle to eliminate the use of narcotics and other dangerous drugs.

The U.S. Ambassador in Korea is a dynamic, capable individual who not only understands the nature of the drug problem but is willing to devote every resource to the struggle.

As a result of the country team organization and management, techniques that have been developed to provide direction for drug related activities in Korea are excellent.

TAIWAN

There are approximately 9,000 U.S. servicemen stationed on Taiwan. While narcotics and other dangerous drugs are smuggled in from time to time, principally by U.S. servicemen from other areas of the Pacific, the use of opiates and other dangerous drugs is sporadic and limited to a small community of American servicemen.

One of the basic reasons for the lack of a serious narcotics problem on Taiwan is a strict enforcement program on the part of both the
local and national police and U.S. agencies. For example, at CCK Air Base, where the bulk of U.S. air traffic is flown to and from Southeast Asia, a 100-percent inspection of all aircraft is conducted by U.S. personnel.

The picture is not as bright, however, when it comes to amphetamines, barbiturates and other chemically developed pills produced legitimately for medicinal use.

Only small quantities of these drugs are locally produced. The capability for increased production is there although at present it is apparently more economical to import large quantities of these drugs from Germany, the United States and Japan. Imported drugs and locally produced drugs are easily obtainable at any drug or department store for prices as low as 10 cents per capsule.

Technically, Chinese law requires a prescription for purchase. It is only illegal, however, to sell without a prescription, not to consume or to possess, and the enforcement is lax. According to U.S. officials, Chinese police will fine or close down drugstores which are known to be dispensing cheap pills to U.S. military personnel but, on the whole, this particular problem is treated as an American problem and is not taken seriously by Chinese authorities.

To combat this potentially serious problem, U.S. diplomatic and military authorities have been attempting to educate officials of the Republic of China as to the danger involved and the necessity for increased emphasis on stricter enforcement of present restricted drug laws and the need for the enactment of new legislation.

U.S. military officials on Taiwan have instituted a comprehensive antinarcotics and dangerous drug program consistent with Department of Defense directives. That program involves education, identification, evaluation, treatment, and rehabilitation.

In implementing the program, military authorities on Taiwan believe that the strongest deterrent against drug abuse is the urinalysis random testing system.

In Taiwan, as elsewhere, all military personnel under the age of 29 are tested randomly three times per year. With a target population of approximately 4,000 individuals and a test intensity of three tests per year, this amounts to approximately 12,000 urinalysis tests per year. Results of those tests since January 1973 have been encouraging to U.S. authorities. In January, 1.2 percent of those tested were confirmed positive as drug users. By October 1973, the number of confirmed positive was 3/10 of 1 percent of the 300 servicemen tested.

Once the authorities on Taiwan know who the drug abuser is, there are rehabilitation programs designed to restore him to duty.

In summary, U.S. military leaders on Taiwan believe that there is a minor, controlled, though not eradicated, problem with drug abuse. The study team agrees with this assessment.

JAPAN

There are 19,000 U.S. servicemen stationed in Japan and an additional 38,000 on Okinawa. By far the most serious drug problem is on Okinawa. Unfortunately, there have been cases where some soldiers suspected of drug abuse have been absent without leave and have committed crimes against Japanese citizens. This has led to strained
relations between the U.S. military community and Okinawan authorities.

Actually, the situation on Okinawa is far from satisfactory. Japanese customs inspections are not thorough and U.S. inspections are not complete.

According to U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents, some military authorities object to a 100-percent search of U.S. personnel entering Okinawa aboard Defense Department transportation on the grounds that such a program would cause the smuggler to hide the "stuff" aboard the airframe.

As a result, an unknown quantity of 75 to 80 percent pure heroin is carried into Okinawa principally from Thailand. U.S. authorities told the study team that most of the heroin is carried aboard aircraft from Utapao Air Base south of Bangkok. The evidence available suggests that little or no heroin is being smuggled from Okinawa to the United States.

In spite of the difficulties on Okinawa, Japanese and U.S. officials are of the opinion that the major heroin traffickers have been arrested and their organization destroyed.

The saga began on December 14, 1972, when two former Special Forces soldiers were arrested in Koza, about 14 miles north of Naha. One, a former master sergeant, was arrested entering a bar with seven $100 bags of heroin in his possession. The second was arrested after a tin can full of narcotics was found buried in a field in Koza. A neighbor had seen him burying the can and notified the authorities.

Their arrest culminated a 5-month-long operation conducted jointly by the then Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), Japanese Health and Welfare Ministry, U.S. Air Forces Special Investigations, and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division.

Then, on June 2 and 3, three more Americans were arrested and heroin, valued at $6.9 million, was confiscated. This group, whose leadership comprised a former U.S. Army medical officer then employed at the Camp Kue U.S. Army Hospital as a doctor; a retired Special Forces master sergeant, and the manager of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) Club in Naha, and smuggled heroin worth $61.9 million (including the $6.9 million which was confiscated at the time of their arrests) into Okinawa during a 10-month period beginning in May 1972. These arrests were made possible because another ex-serviceman who was involved turned informer, and close cooperation between U.S. and Japanese officials.

According to a Japanese spokesman, the ring obtained the heroin in South Vietnam and shipped it to Okinawa in boxes marked "medical equipment." The drug was packed in plastic tubing concealed beneath paper packing in the crates. Marks indicating that the crates had been cleared by U.S. military customs officials were visible on the boxes.

The study team has been assured that U.S. customs procedures on Okinawa have been tightened considerably over the past year. Hopefully, this will go a long way toward eliminating narcotics smuggling into Okinawa. Meanwhile, U.S. diplomatic officials in
Tokyo must continue their efforts to encourage the Japanese to expand their customs inspections procedures on Okinawa.

Otherwise, those involved in drug trafficking will still be able to smuggle drugs into Okinawa for consumption by U.S. personnel.

In addition to the major trafficking operations which have been stopped, drugs are also smuggled into Okinawa by individual soldiers on a small scale.

One method is to load the drug on a U.S. aircraft in Thailand and just as the aircraft is landing on Okinawa to open the door and eject the container to a confederate waiting on the ground.

Another successful method has been to utilize the services of Thai massage girls who were given passports and visas for Okinawa by airmen stationed at Utapao Air Base.

One factor inhibiting completely effective antinarcotics enforcement is the fact that each service conducts separate operations. In fact, only the U.S. Marine Corps has assigned an antinarcotics non-commissioned officer to full-time duty with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration office on Okinawa.

To counter this shortcoming the DEA and the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo have recommended that a task force be established on Okinawa to work only on narcotics matters with authority to operate across service lines and with Japanese officials.

The study mission endorses this recommendation fully. U.S. authorities on Okinawa must take steps to close off every possible source of drugs before drug abuse becomes an epidemic and before the drug trafficker attempts to use that island as a transshipment point for smuggling narcotics to the United States.
CONCLUSIONS

1. There is not now a serious drug abuse problem among U.S. military personnel in the Pacific area. Constant vigilance on the part of military commanders is required, however, if the Vietnam experience is not to be repeated.

2. Potentially, the most critical areas where special efforts must be exerted to prevent widespread drug abuse among U.S. military personnel is in Thailand and Okinawa. There are comparatively large contingents of forces stationed in those two areas and drugs of all kinds are readily available at cheap prices.

3. With the end of U.S. involvement in hostilities in Southeast Asia, realistic training, educational, recreational, and athletic programs must be developed so as to relieve boredom and frustrations which contribute greatly to the kind of situation in which widespread drug abuse can develop.

4. U.S. military authorities in Okinawa must learn to work together. Separate enforcement weakens the overall effort and only abets the drug trafficker.

5. Each service on Okinawa should assign an antinarcotics agent to the Drug Enforcement Administration office on a full-time basis.

6. U.S. Air Force officials must be especially vigilant so as to prevent widespread drug smuggling aboard military aircraft.

7. Opiated marihuana is becoming available, and educational programs should stress the fact that this is a narcotic which is addictive.

8. While drug abuse among U.S. personnel stationed in the Republic of China and in Korea is minimal, every precaution must be taken to prevent these countries from becoming transshipment points for narcotics and other dangerous drugs. Traffic patterns have been disrupted in other points of the Pacific, and the international drug smuggler may be tempted to transfer operations to those two countries where there is a potential market of approximately 51,000 U.S. servicemen.

9. There are about 33,000 U.S. Navy personnel serving afloat in the Pacific area, most of whom visit Hong Kong at least once per year. Therefore, U.S. naval officials must continue to coordinate educational programs aboard ship with forceful diplomatic efforts to get and maintain the cooperation of the Hong Kong Government.
RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

1. U.S. military authorities take effective measures to relieve boredom which was a major contributor to the widespread use of heroin in South Vietnam by developing coordinated training, recreation and leave programs.

2. U.S. military and civilian authorities create a Narcotics Task Force on Okinawa to coordinate the antinarcotics effort. The Commander in Chief Pacific Command should initiate this action by directing military commanders to assign permanent investigators from each of the services to the Office of the Special Agent in Charge, Drug Enforcement Administration.

3. The search of military aircraft be improved and expanded to include a complete and thorough physical check of all military aircraft operating within the Pacific Command, particularly those flights that originate in Thailand and South Vietnam.

4. U.S. diplomatic officials in Japan intensify their efforts to encourage the Japanese Government to expand and improve customs search and inspection procedures in Okinawa.

5. U.S. military commanders throughout the Pacific Command incorporate into their narcotics training programs detailed instructions on the fact that opiated marihuana is addictive. Such instruction should also include how to detect and identify this drug.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION (INTERPOL) RESOLUTION RELATING TO THE CONTROL OF TRADE IN ACETIC ANHYDRIDE

Noting that heroin is the most dangerous drug trafficked and abused internationally;

Recognising that acetic anhydride is the one substance essential to the illicit transformation of morphine base to heroin;

The I.C.P.O.-Interpol General Assembly, meeting in Vienna from 2nd to 9th October 1973 at its 42nd session:

Recommends that in countries where the illicit manufacture of heroin exists and there is little or no industrial need for acetic anhydride, the importation and internal distribution of that chemical be placed under strict control;

Recommends further that in countries where illicit heroin manufacture exists but the heavy industrial utilisation of acetic anhydride renders its control impractical, the narcotic control authorities develop the co-operation of the legal distributors of this substance to trace suspicious sales as a means to discover clandestine laboratories;

Recommends further that countries which manufacture and export acetic anhydride take every practical measure to prevent its export for illicit heroin manufacture and co-operate with the authorities of countries where heroin is illicitly produced in their efforts to monitor the trade in acetic anhydride for the purpose of detecting illicit heroin laboratories.

Adopted unanimously

(51)
APPENDIX 2

DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY No. 104-9

Department of State, Office of the Secretary

[Public Notice 408; Delegation of Authority 104-9]

SENIOR ADVISER FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS

Delegation of Authority

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (75 Stat. 424) (hereinafter referred to as the Act), Executive Order 10973 of November 3, 1961, entitled "Administration of Foreign Assistance and Related Functions" (hereinafter referred to as the Executive Order), and section 4 of the Act of May 26, 1949, as amended (63 Stat. 111; 22 U.S.C. 2658) State Department Delegation of Authority No. 104 of November 3, 1961 (26 FR 10608), as heretofore amended, is hereby further amended as follows:

1. Section 3(a) is amended as follows:
   a. There are hereby allocated to the Administrator the funds allocated to the Secretary of State by subsection (a) of section 501 of the Executive Order, except such funds as are appropriated for purposes of section 481 of the Act.

2. Section 6 is amended by adding the following paragraph:
   (b) (5). To the Senior Adviser for International Narcotics Matters:
   (A) those functions conferred upon the President by section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended together with all those authorities contained in the Foreign Assistance Act, to the extent necessary or appropriate to accomplish the purposes of Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act.
   (B) the functions of negotiating, concluding and terminating international agreements relating to international narcotics programs subject to the concurrences required by the State Department Circular 175 procedure.


KENNETH RUSH,
Acting Secretary.

[FR Doc. 73-28227 Filed 12-10-73; 8:45 am]

(This Delegation of Authority was published in the Federal Register as Public Notice No. 408, F.R. 34130, Dec. 11, 1973.)
APPENDIX 3

JOURNAL

August 6
Departed Andrews Air Force Base aboard U.S. Military aircraft 9:30 a.m.
Arrived Hickam Air Force Base, Honolulu 1:35 p.m. Congressmen Lester L.
Wolff, Charles B. Rangel and Congresswoman Bella Abzug.

August 7
Meeting with U.S. Pacific Command Drug Abuse Control Team on the narcotics
situation among U.S. forces in the Pacific.
Mr. John E. Kelly, Deputy Political Adviser, U.S. Pacific Command.
Center.
Lt. Col. A. M. Harris
Lt. Col. T. F. Aschenfeld.
Lt. Col. A. A. Ackerman.
Cdr. G. D. Ellis.
Maj. J. R. Johnson.

August 8
Departed Hickam Air Force Base via U.S. Air Force aircraft 9:00 a.m. Arrived
Anderson Air Force Base, Guam 12:30 p.m. August 9, 1973 (crossed interna-
tional dateline).
Meeting re narcotics situation in Guam.
A. P. Crisostomo, Government of Guam Customs.
Lt. (jg.) Robert A. Woo, U.S. Navy, Marianas, Director/Staff Prog Programs,
officer.
ABF.
Guy W. Cline, Organized Crime Unit Guam, Police Department.
Cdr. J. E. Beamon, USN, Director, Human Resources Development Unit.
Mr. A. W. Perrin, Supervising Agent, Naval Investigative Services Officer,
Marianas.
Lt. Larry N. Bonhill, Executive Officer, Naval Investigative Services Office.

August 10
Departed Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, aboard U.S. military aircraft 9:30
a.m. Arrived Manila International Airport, Philippines 11:45 a.m.
Meeting with President of the Philippines Fernando Marcos (Congressman Wolff
only).
Meeting with U.S. Embassy Narcotics Control Committee.
Mr. William C. Hamilton, Deputy Chief of Mission.
Mr. Michael G. Picini, Acting Regional Administrator, Drug Enforcement
Administration.
Mr. Robert L. Rainsberger, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator, Drug
Enforcement Administration.

(53)
Lt. Col. Roger Cook, Office of Special Investigations, Clark Air Base.
Mr. James L. McMahon, Chief, Public Safety Division, USAID.
Mr. Robert D. Long, Public Safety Adviser for Narcotics, USAID.
Mr. Joe M. Little, Regional Security Officer.
Mr. Robert F. Slutz, Jr., Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.

Meeting re drug abuse and treatment problems in the Philippines:
Secretary of Health Clemente S. Gatmaitan.

August 11

Meeting re U.S. antinarcotics activities and cooperation with Philippines antinarcotics officials:
Mr. Robert L. Rainsberger.

Meeting re U.S. Public Safety narcotics activities:
Mr. Robert D. Long.

Lunch at the Presidential Palace hosted by President and Mrs. Marcos (Congressmen Wolff and Rangel only).

August 12

Meeting at the National Bureau of Investigations re narcotics problems in the Philippines:
Dr. Manuel Sanchez, Officer in Charge, National Bureau of Investigations Treatment Center.
Mr. Eligo Songco, Executive Office, Narcotics Bureau.
Mr. Julian Atienza, National Bureau of Investigation Regional Division South.
Miss Judy Pacificador, Research—Narcotics.
Mr. George Mella, Executive Office, Narcotics Bureau.
Mr. Abelardo Tolentino, Deputy Director—Administrative Branch, National Bureau of Investigation.
Mr. Lorenzo Sunico, Deputy Director, Technical Services Branch.
Mr. Antonio Mecaro, Office of the Director—National Bureau of Narcotics.
Mrs. Rosa Manalod, Chemist—National Bureau of Narcotics.

Departed Manila International Airport via Pakistan International Airlines 4 p.m. Arrived Bangkok, Thailand 6:30 p.m. Congressmen Morgan J. Murphy and Fortney H. Stark joined the Study Mission.

August 13

Meeting with Ambassador Unger regarding general narcotics, political and economic situation in Thailand.

Meeting with U.S. Embassy Narcotics Control Team:
Mr. Edward E. Masters, Deputy Chief of Mission.
Mr. Fred T. Dick, Regional Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration.
Mr. Tom Barnes, Political Counselor.
Mr. Tom Finn, Public Safety, U.S. AID.
Mr. John Reagan, Special Assistant, Embassy.
Mr. Edward Holland, USIS Press Officer.
Mr. Paul Samaduroff, Drug Enforcement Administration.
Mr. Jonathan L. Sperling, U.S. AID Program Officer.
Mr. Bill Kushlis, Political Officer, Control Officer.
Mr. Carl Fritz, U.S. AID.
Lt. Col. R. A. Burke J-1, Military Assistance Command, Thailand.
Lt. Col. Bryan S. Spencer, Staff Judge Advocate, Military Assistance Command, Thailand.

Mr. David E. Reuther, Political Officer.

Meeting regarding United Nations Drug Abuse Control Fund Projects in Thailand:
Mr. Chit Posayanond, Project Leader.
August 14

Departed Bangkok International Airport via military aircraft at 8 a.m. Arrived Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base 9:30 a.m.

Meeting with U.S. Air Force Narcotics Control Team Udorn (Congressman Wolff visited U.S. Embassy in Cambodia during this period and rejoined the group in Vientienne, Laos at 1 p.m.):

- Col. Robert W. Clement, Commander, 432nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Udorn.
- Col. Kenneth E. Harrison, Commander, 432nd Combat Support Group (Base Commander), Udorn.
- Maj. Richard E. O'Grady, Executive Officer, 13th Adven, Udorn.
- Maj. David Hetzel, Commander, 432nd Security Police Squadron, Udorn.
- Capt. Jack R. Miller, Drug and Alcohol Abuse Control Officer.
- Mr. Robert E. Cunniff, Commander, Office of Special Investigations.

Departed Udorn via U.S. military aircraft at 12 noon. Arrived Vientienne, Laos, 12:30 p.m.:

Briefing by Chargé John G. Dean.

Meeting with country Narcotics Control Action Team:
- Mr. Robert Myer (DCM Rep), Chairman (State).
- Mr. Charles A. Mann (ID Mission Director).
- Mr. Anthony J. Morelli (DEA), Narcotics Attaché.
- Mr. William LeClar, U.S. Bureau of Customs.
- Maj. W. McBee, Public Safety Division.
- Dr. Charles Weldon, M.D., Public Health Division.
- Mr. Charles Saunders, Agriculture Division.
- Mr. Harry M. Allison, U.S. Customs Adviser.
- Mr. Robert Dakan, Program Coordinator.

Meeting regarding narcotics controls programs in Laos and cooperation with the United States:
- Brig. Gen. Khamhou Boussarath, Director General, Groupé Specialé d'Investigation.

August 15

Departed Vientienne, Laos via U.S. military aircraft 9:30 a.m. Arrived Chiang Rai, Thailand 10:30 a.m.

Congresswoman Abzug departed Vientienne aboard U.S. military aircraft 3 a.m. Arrived Utapao Air Base, Thailand, at 8 a.m.

Flyover of the Mai Sai, Thailand-Tachilek, Burma area of the Golden Triangle via Thai Police helicopter.

Landed in Mai Sai and inspected the Thai-Burma border area.

Returned to Chiang Rai via Thai Police helicopter.

Meeting regarding narcotics law enforcement problems in Northern Thailand:
- Col. Chavalit, Thai National Police Department.
- Col. Prasat, Thai National Police Department.
- Col. Cuson, Commander, Special Narcotics Organization (SNO).
- Mr. James Montgomery, U.S. Consul, Chiang Mai.

Departed Chiang Rai via military aircraft 12:30 p.m. Arrived Chiang Mai, Thailand 1:30 p.m.

Meeting regarding U.S. anti-narcotics activities in Northern Thailand:
- Mr. James Montgomery, U.S. Consul, Chiang Mai.
- Mr. Vern Parker, Drug Enforcement Administration, Agent, Chiang Mai.

Meeting regarding U.N. crop substitution programs in Northern Thailand:
- Mr. Sam Williams, United Nations.
- Mr. Nusit Chindorsi, United Nations.
- Mr. W. E. Manis, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Meeting regarding other narcotics assistance programs in Thailand:
Mr. Garry Oughton, Technical Adviser, Tribal Research Center, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.
Departed Chiang Mai via Thai Airlines 5:30 p.m. Arrived Bangkok 7:10 p.m.

August 16
Meeting regarding Thai-U.S. narcotics control cooperation:
Field Marshal Prapat Chatusaththi, Deputy Prime Minister.
Dr. Malai Huvanandana, Deputy Minister of Interior.
Lt. Gen. Prachab Suntrakun, Deputy Director General of Police.
Maj. Gen. Pov Sarasin, Secretary General, Central Narcotics Bureau.
Police Colonel Chavalit Yodmanee, Deputy Chief, Foreign Assistance Program, Thai National Police Department.
Closing conference with U.S. Ambassador Leonard Unger.
Briefing on Joint Casualty Resolution Center (Congressman Rangel only.)

August 17
Meeting regarding Shan State Army proposal to sell opium:
Mr. Edward Masters.
Mr. John Doyle, Deputy Regional Director, Drug Enforcement Administration.
Departed Bangkok via Japan Airlines 10:55 a.m. Arrived Hong Kong 5:30 p.m.
Congressman Morgan F. Murphy remained in Thailand on narcotics matters and rejoined the study mission in Hong Kong on August 19, 1973.
Congresswoman Abzug went to Saigon, South Vietnam to look into the problem of political prisoners in South Vietnam. Rejoined the group in Hong Kong on August 19, 1973.
Press conference Kai Tak Airport Lounge, Hong Kong.

August 18
Meeting regarding narcotics problem in Hong Kong and U.S. Hong Kong cooperation:
Mr. N. G. Rolph, Commissioner of Narcotics.
Meeting with U.S. Consulate Drug Abuse and Narcotics Coordinating Committee:
Mr. David Dean, Acting Principal Officer.
Stanley Wagner, Commission on Foreign Policy.
Richard C. McClem, Commission on Foreign Policy.
Wever Gim, Political Officer.
Ivan Izenberg, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Information Service.
Robert H. Leeper, Information Officer, USIS.
J. D. Blevins, Chief, Consular Section.
Congresswoman Abzug separated from the group and returned to the United States aboard U.S. military aircraft.

August 19
Press Conference by Congressman Wolff:
Mr. Robert L. Green, NBC News.
Mr. Keith Kay, CBS News.
Mr. Don Webster, CBS News.
Mr. John Stephen, Hong Kong Star.
Congresswoman Abzug separated from the group and returned to the United States.

August 20
Departed Hong Kong via Cathay Pacific Airlines 3 p.m. Arrived Taipei, Taiwan 5:55 p.m. Congressman Morgan F. Murphy remained in Hong Kong and returned separately to the United States.
August 21

Meeting regarding general political, economic and narcotics situation in the Republic of China:
Mr. William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Chargé d'Affaires.
Mr. Harvey J. Feldman, Political Officer.
Mr. Sterneman, Drug Enforcement Administration, Philippines on TDY in Taiwan.

Meeting regarding narcotics situation among U.S. military forces:
Capt. Edsel Carson, Alcohol and Drug Abuse Officer, Taiwan Defense Command.
Maj. Innes, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Taiwan Defense Command.
Congressman Wolff along with premier Chiang Chin-kuo regarding political matters in the Republic of China.

Meeting regarding narcotics policies in Taiwan:
Chow Shu-Kai, Foreign Ministry.

August 23

Departed Taipei via Cathay Pacific Airlines 10:30 a.m. arrived Seoul, South Korea 1:40 p.m.
Joint Military/Embassy meeting regarding U.S. narcotics control activities in Korea:
Mr. Larry Delaney, Chief Tokyo Office, Drug Enforcement Administration.
Mr. Paul Cleveland, Political Officer.
Members, U.S. Forces Drug Abuse and Alcohol Control Team, Korea:
Lt. Col. Granger.

August 24

Congressman Wolff met with President Park alone.
Congressman Wolff addressed the Korea American Association regarding U.S.-Korean relations, Host Lee Won-son, President Korean American Association.
Congressman Wolff met with Yu Chae-Hung, Minister of Defense.

Meeting regarding drug trafficking in Korea, new Korea drug laws, cooperation with U.S. officials enforcement problems and activities of customs officials:
Hon. Yi Kyong Ho, Minister of Health and Social Affairs.
Mr. Kong Chong Kwan, Vice Minister of Health and Social Affairs.
Sin Yang Sik, Director Pharmaceutical Administration.
Yi Chang Ki, Chief, Narcotics Division, Ministry of Health.
Choe Sok Won, Director of National Police.
Yi Taek Kyu, Director of Customs Administration, Ministry of Finance.

August 25

Congressman Rangel visited 2nd U.S. Infantry Division and the 314th Air Division.
Congressman Wolff held a press conference.
Congressman Stark separated from the group and returned to the United States independently.

August 26

Department Seoul, Korea via Northwest Airlines 2:30 Arrived Tokyo, Japan 4:30 p.m.

August 27

Meeting regarding U.S. narcotics control activities in Japan and U.S. Japanese cooperation:
Mr. Thomas P. Shoesmith, Deputy Chief of Mission.
Mr. Thomas E. Cummings, Consul, Narcotics Control Officer.
Mr. Larry J. Delaney, Special Agent in Charge Drug Enforcement Agency, Tokyo.
Meeting regarding Drug Enforcement Administration program in Tokyo:  
Mr. Larry J. Delaney, DEA.

Meeting regarding narcotics situation among U.S. military forces on Okinawa:  
Mr. Charles D. Casey, Special Agent in Charge, Drug Enforcement Administration, Chairman.

Meeting regarding U.S. Narcotics Action Control Team activities in Japan combined with examination of the drug situation among U.S. military forces:  
Thomas P. Shoessmith, Deputy Chief of Mission.
H. L. Child, Legal Attaché.
C. P. Kleebauer, Provost Marshal Liaison Division.
Thomas E. Cummings, Consul, Narcotics Control Officer.
Richard W. Petree, Political Counselor.
William J. Holda, Embassy Security Officer.
Daisy L. Clawson, Embassy Nurse.
John Sylvester, Sr., Counsellor General, Naha-Okinawa.
Charles D. Casey, Drug Enforcement Administration, Okinawa.
Larry J. Delaney, Drug Enforcement Administration, Tokyo.

Meeting regarding narcotics control in Japan:  
Dr. Nobuo Motohashi, Director Narcotics Division Pharmaceutical and Supply Bureau, Ministry of Health and Welfare.

Meeting regarding export control of acetic anhydride:  
Mr. Kiyoshi Takahashi, Director, Basic Chemical Division, Basic Industry Bureau, Ministry of International Trade & Industry (MITI).

Meeting regarding Japan's participation in the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control:  
Mr. Fumihiko Suzuki, Director General, United Nations Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

August 28

Congressman Wolff returned to New York City; Congressman Rangel returned to Washington, D.C.