CAMBODIA

The lingering, senseless war in Cambodia is perhaps the saddest legacy for America's presumably successful diplomacy to leave behind in Indochina. Since the United States invasion in 1970, which brought the Indochina war to Cambodia, we have watched the tragically familiar pattern of Vietnam and Laos repeated—in the destruction of the countryside, the creation of refugees, and the occurrence of civilian war casualties. As Cambodia continues to bleed, a stalemated war creates a mounting level of human suffering that, proportionately, surpasses the worst the world has seen in Vietnam.

1. The Refugee Situation

The effect of the war on Cambodia has been to force the countryside to move into the city. A rural people, once self-sufficient, have been pushed into a falsely urbanized situation where they must beg for work and food. This is most obvious around Phnom Penh—one a lovely city of only 600,000 people—now filled and surrounded with refugee shanty-towns, doubling the population. Over half of Cambodia's six million population have become refugees since the war began.

Accurate statistics on the movement of refugees in Cambodia are impossible to gather. The American Embassy conservatively reports that there are currently some 1,240,000 officially registered refugees in the less than 15 percent to 20 percent land area now controlled by the Khmer Government. According to the Embassy, the refugees represent well over 25 percent of the total population under government control.

Other estimates, including those of the Subcommittee Study Mission, indicate that the cumulative total of refugees is considerably higher. Table 12, indicates the cumulative total of refugees in Cambodia since 1970.

Table 12.—Cumulative total of refugees in Cambodia (as of December 1974)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Officially registered refugees:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
<td>502,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provinces</td>
<td>678,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos, Vietnam, Thailand</td>
<td>58,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,239,050</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Estimated nonregistered refugees</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,389,050</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 3. Ethnic Vietnamese forced to flee to South Vietnam in 1970-71 |                     |
|                                                                | 250,000              |
| 4. Military dependents displaced                                  | 400,000              |
| **Subtotal**                                                    | **3,389,050**        |

| 6. Estimated 35 percent of total population of Cambodia is outside government areas, half being displaced |                     |
|                                                                 | 1,000,000            |
| **Total**                                                       | **3,389,050**        |

(31)
This estimate of the cumulative total of refugees in Cambodia includes both the 1,239,050 refugees officially registered—in Phnom Penh, the provinces, as well as neighboring countries—also an estimated 500,000 non-registered refugees. These are refugees who have moved with the ebb and flow of the conflict, who now crowd around provincial towns for safety, or drift into the shanty-towns of Phnom Penh and are never registered. In addition to these civilian refugees, one must also count some 400,000 military dependents, women and children, who have been displaced from their homes by the tide of war.

Finally, there are at least two million people living under the control of the Khmer Rouge. No refugee or population statistics are available for this sizeable group of people. However, it is known that the other side has dealt harshly with the civilian population under its control and that extensive forced movement of people has occurred for political and military purposes. This, combined with the insecurity and violence in the countryside, suggests that at least half of the civilian population under non-government control must be classified as refugees or displaced persons.

These are the cumulative statistics of refugee movement in Cambodia since 1970. The actual number of refugees now in camps or receiving emergency and general assistance is, of course, somewhat smaller in number. This is due, in part to the fact that some refugees have been resettled, some have been absorbed into the general population, or received the benefits available to them and since removed from the rolls, as is more likely the case, some have never received any assistance.

According to reports of USAID, based upon government and voluntary agency statistics, the total number of formal refugee camps in Phnom Penh is 63, housing 70,392 refugees. The total number of refugees actually receiving emergency and general assistance from all sources is only 533,950, broken down as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Number of refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodian government</td>
<td>3,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary agencies:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Relief Service</td>
<td>204,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Vision Relief</td>
<td>79,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>134,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International agencies:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOG/Red Cross</td>
<td>92,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>533,950</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. CONDITIONS IN THE FIELD

Since early 1973 the refugee population has almost doubled its previous size. To quote a recent Embassy report: “The refugee problem has been compounded by a commensurate drop in production as refugees move from the land into and around urban areas. This in time has led to a shortage of many basic food stuffs and is one of the contributing factors in the hyperinflationary situation which exists in Cambodia today.” The report goes on to say that “The key to the refugee situation then is not only to provide immediate assistance but
also to resettle as many of the refugee population as possible on productive land.” But the tide of war has permitted little progress in this area. Indeed, conditions steadily deteriorate.

To provide a point of reference for a discussion of present conditions, it is useful to note the findings of last year’s Study Mission report:

To summarize the refugee situation, the prognosis is dismal. Neither our government nor the Cambodian Government have any organized refugee program. Adequate housing, sanitation, and medical service are either nonexistent or in short supply. Increasing numbers of refugees are being generated by an accelerated level of military activity and intensified American bombing. The repression on both sides is increasing with the government losing its precarious control and relying more and more on American intervention. And in the midst of this are over a million refugees, half of them children. They are receiving virtually no assistance and face malnutrition, serious food shortages and, in some areas, the real specter of starvation.

The military and economic situation has been further eroded since then, and the conditions of refugees are more serious today than at any point during the war. In fact, within the first three weeks of 1975, the Cambodian government estimates that some 60,000 new refugees were displaced during the recent fighting.

The land area controlled by the Lon Nol Government has further decreased in 1974, so that it now controls less than 15 percent of the nation’s territory. Into this is squeezed between 60 percent to 70 percent of the population. The agricultural system of this once rice-rich nation is now so thoroughly disrupted, that instead of exporting rice, as it once did on a sizeable scale, Cambodia is close to starvation and wholly dependent on the United States for close to three-fourths of all the rice it consumes.

Farmers now form the increasing mass of the unemployed in Phnom Penh and other provincial cities. The war has totally incapacitated the economy. War damage alone amounts to over $2 billion. Nearly half of the hospital facilities have been destroyed by bombing and shelling. Over 45 percent of the roads are destroyed or damaged. Some 45 percent of the bridges are down. Communications and transportation are severely disrupted, with all highways to the capital blocked, and the river passage up the Mekong risky. An estimated 50 percent of all vehicles in Cambodia before the war are now destroyed or damaged, and its meager industrial capacity has been shattered.

3. Refugee Assistance Program

For the first three years of the war, there existed no effective program for assisting refugees. Few government services, and even less government aid directly reached the hands of the vast majority of the displaced persons. As a result, there were few formalized refugee camps in Phnom Penh or in the provinces until 1973. Refugees were forced to shift for themselves, with little or no help, and seemingly even less concern, from the Khmer government or the United States. This neglect was the object of Subcommittee criticism and concern for three long years, and hearings during this period are replete with references to the failure of the American government to help the Cambodians respond to the escalating refugee crisis.

However, by late 1973, and throughout 1974, USAID has rapidly increased its support for refugee assistance, and the recent responses
of the United States and Khmer governments to the refugee problem are encouraging. Because of statutory limitations on the number of official American personnel who can be in Cambodia at any given time, and because the voluntary agencies represent an excellent resource, the U.S. Government has contracted with World Vision, CARE, and Catholic Relief Services to provide emergency refugee assistance, medical services and resettlement assistance to the refugee population. Although these agency's programs reflect different priorities, and their programs are at different stages of development, each is operational and making a significant contribution. Together they utilize 67 international staff and 278 Khmer staff. In addition, the Indochina Operational Group of the International Red Cross (ICRC and LICROSS) has five highly effective medical teams operating in Cambodia, involving 25 international and 60 Khmer staff. All of this is a quantum jump from the level of assistance given the previous year.

On its part, the Khmer Government has begun the difficult task of reorganizing its response to the refugee crisis. The new Minister of Refugees, M. Kong Orn appears both concerned and competent. He faces a difficult task and deserves all the support that the U.S. Government can provide. Although the present government structure is clearly inadequate to deal with the enormity of the refugee problem, (a reality recognized by both governments), it is, nonetheless, important that U.S. Government and private agency efforts be undertaken in consultation and coordination with the Khmer Government. This is a matter of both principle and practical effectiveness.

In response to a suggestion from the American Embassy the Khmer Government has recently organized the Resettlement and Development Foundation, a semi-autonomous body where membership is drawn from the Khmer business community. With U.S. funding the R.D.F. will concentrate on refugee resettlement. Although it only received its first funding in April the Foundation is now at work in Phnom Penh, and Kompong Thom.

While the unfortunately belated responses of the United States and Khmer governments are quite clearly insufficient to meet the escalating refugee problem, the Study Mission found that a positive beginning has been made and both governments appear to be moving forward as rapidly as circumstances permit. Yet obviously, much more is needed as long as the war drags on. It is to be hoped that future planning and program expansion will reflect the urgency that the Cambodian tragedy demands.

While the U.S. Embassy now has six positions allocated to refugee personnel, an additional two, or preferably three, slots are needed, particularly in view of the increasing logistical support both the voluntary agencies and the Resettlement and Development Foundation will require. In addition, if one or two additional voluntary agencies are interested in working with the refugee problem, and if they are professionally competent to do so, they should be actively encouraged to participate in the program with substantial U.S. funding.

4. Civilian War Casualties

Unlike refugees, who can at least be counted if anyone cares, civilian war casualties are usually buried, or, if they survive, are admitted to
hospitals or treated at dispensaries. Because few records are kept, the full number of Cambodians who have died as civilian casualties will never be known, and because hospital admissions are not always noted, the number of war victims who survived their wounds will never be fully known.

Thus, the available statistics on civilian war casualties are grossly incomplete, particularly prior to 1973. The only statistics the Khmer government has available are those on survivors who have applied for government assistance. On this basis, as of mid-1973, government reports indicate that at least 29,000 civilians had been wounded and 12,661 killed because of the fighting. However, USAID reports that last year the Ministry of Public Health estimated that the number of civilian war casualties averaged at about the rate of 7,000 per month, or 84,000 dead and wounded over the year. Unofficial estimates, however, place the toll close to 100,000, and the cumulative number of civilian war casualties since the war began is well over 450,000—an inexact but probably more realistic figure.

A further measure of the impact of the war on the people is what has happened to the medical system of Cambodia. According to official statistics, the hospital capacity has been reduced by half, so that the pressure of treating war injured—both civilians and military personnel—has overwhelmed the remaining facilities. Because of age, the lack of replacement, the poor maintenance, 25 percent of all medical equipment is inoperative. Were it not for outside assistance—most of which arrived some three and a half years after the war began—the medical situation in Cambodia would be far more serious than it already is.

This past year, the U.S. and the IOG have rapidly increased aid to the medical system. USAID moved ten fully equipped 200-bed Mobile Emergency Surgical Hospitals to Cambodia. Nine of these units are now in place and are operating at the Ministry of Health’s provincial and Phnom Penh hospital sites. In support of emergency relief, the voluntary and international agencies in Cambodia have also greatly expanded their medical programs and in total they now have a combined Khmer/International Medical Staff of more than 200 people who, on an average, treat more than 40,000 patients a month.

5. Orphan Problem

Before the war there was no “orphan problem” in Cambodia. Children of parents who died or were abandoned were sheltered by the joint family. For a Khmer to refuse to take in the orphaned children of a relative was considered a denial of family responsibility and would more than likely bring down the criticism of the whole community, especially in the closely-knit rural areas. Sometimes, however, when there were no relatives to raise an orphaned child, the child would be turned over to the pagoda for the monks to raise. As in other Asian countries the Government played only a minor role. Orphanages were rare, and the Government itself only operated the Sangkum Reastr Niyum Orphanage in Phnom Penh, which was considered more of a political training center than anything else. Though adoptions were not uncommon before the war, most were arranged by relatives and members of the family, and the only role played by the Govern-
With the outbreak of the war, the orphan problem quickly grew in size and seriousness. For the most part, the increase in the number of orphans came as the result of parents being killed by the actual fighting. Another cause was the increasing economic problems besetting the country. Before the war, the cost of living in Cambodia was relatively low and many Cambodians could quite easily raise a large family. With prices rising (280 percent inflation in 1973 alone), jobs harder to find, and food becoming less plentiful, children are now being abandoned.

Besides the increased number of orphans caused by the spread of hostilities, the orphan problem has been further aggravated by Cambodia's decreasing ability to support these children. Again, a primary factor is the economic situation. Where before the war, a Khmer family could quite easily take on the economic burden of supporting an orphaned child, many are now hard pressed to feed, clothe, and shelter their own family, much less another family member's child.

A further factor is the disruption of the Khmer family structure. Before the war, almost everyone knew where their relatives were and if a child was suddenly orphaned, word would quickly spread to the other members of the family. In the provinces this is still the case, and explains in part the absence of easily identifiable orphans in most of the provinces to date. In Phnom Penh and among the military, however, families and relatives now quickly become disconnected and many orphans remain abandoned simply because relatives capable of raising them never learn of their plight. As before, the pagodas still informally take in children to raise, but they are already overcrowded with orphan children and are clearly unable to fill the entire need.

There is no accurate information available on the numbers of orphans and their present condition. One Cambodian official estimates that there are over 15,000 orphans or half-orphans in Phnom Penh alone. In early 1973, the Cambodian Ministry of Interior estimated that there were 250,000 orphans, although how this number was compiled remains unclear. Of all the estimates on the numbers of orphans, those of the Ministry of Social Action are considered by USAID as the most accurate, since it has the specific responsibility for registering and caring for orphans. According to the Minister for Social Action and Labor, there are approximately 3,000-4,000 orphans in the country who are not being properly or adequately cared for. Of this number, he estimates 2,000-3,000 are in Phnom Penh and the remainder in the provinces. These figures are very conservative, and fail to include all orphans in the care of families. The Ministry breaks down the orphan population as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orphans</th>
<th>100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In refugees camps</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In recognized orphanages</td>
<td>200/300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In pagodas</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living with relatives or in provinces</td>
<td>1,000-2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kompong Thom</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kampot</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battambang</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kompong Speu</td>
<td>Some</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The remainder are scattered throughout other provinces.
Faced with the increasing number of orphans, the Government of Cambodia and several national and international humanitarian organizations have instituted a number of relief programs. For the most part these programs have centered around the traditional concept of organized orphanages. At the present time there are five orphanages in Phnom Penh and three in Battambang, with more planned.

6. CONCLUDING NOTE

As the Study Mission report observed last year, Cambodia was the last nation of Indochina to fall victim to the spreading Vietnam war. Today it still seems destined to be the last to see it end. The even greater tragedy for Cambodia has been that neither the war's beginning, nor apparently its end, will be under its control.

But there are some hopeful signs. First, some greater measure of concern has now been expressed by our government over the growing humanitarian crisis overtaking the people of Cambodia. Some programs and services are now underway, and more are promised. Second, the Subcommittee Study Mission observed in the field a new determination to press for peaceful accommodation and negotiation necessary to achieve a ceasefire and a political settlement. For this new tone the new American Ambassador deserves high marks and, even more, our full support.

Only when peace is no longer the last item on our priority list, will we, in concert with the people of Cambodia and others in the international community, be able to truly contribute to the relief and rehabilitation of that sad land.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

I. SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Any pretense that the Paris Agreement for “Ending the War and Restoring Peace” has accomplished what it is entitled, is shattered by a simple look at official statistics on the continuing toll of refugees and civilian war casualties. The record shows that the official monthly average of war-related hospital admissions (3,600 each month) is the same level as last year, and down only slightly from previous years. In fact, the toll since the ceasefire is comparable to the levels of 1971 and 1972, peak years of the fighting.

New refugees continue to flee from the conflict in the countryside, reminiscent of the worst days of the past. Since the ceasefire agreement was signed, an estimated 1,413,000 refugees were displaced in South Vietnam—818,000 in 1973, and 594,000 in 1974. The cumulative total of refugees displaced since the war escalated in 1964–65, now stands at 11,683,000—well over half of the total population.

2. Based upon official reports from the field, the worst period for refugees during 1974 was not late in the year, during what the Pentagon calls a “dry-season offensive;” rather, the greatest number of new refugees moved during the months of May–August, when escalated military operations were reported from both sides in the northern and central provinces. Some 353,100 new refugees were reported displaced by the end of the summer, compared to 201,800 during the last months of 1974.

3. The “ceasefire war” raging in South Vietnam is clearly as dangerous as the old war. When the 1973 and 1974 toll of wounded and killed civilians is added to the official accounting of military casualties, it totals 339,822 Vietnamese killed or wounded in two years (compared to 56,231 American dead over an entire decade of fighting).

4. Programs for refugee resettlement and return to village have come to a halt, and 1974 was marked more by a feeling of the clock-being-turned-back than of “progress” in refugee resettlement.

5. The full extent of the war’s impact upon the land and people of Vietnam will perhaps never be known, for along with the toll in lives and lost limbs, there has also been an accompanying toll in the strength and functioning of societal institutions.

Once a predominantly rural society, today some 65% of South Vietnam’s population lives in an urbanized setting—mostly in a false urban situation, without a sustaining economic base. A critical need remains to return people to the land. However, South Vietnam remains a deficit agricultural area, with no prospect of becoming self-sufficient as long as there is conflict in the countryside.

A massive social welfare problem has emerged in the need to care for orphans, war widows, and, for the first time in Vietnamese history, institutions to care for the aged, who normally is cared for in the extended family.
Rehabilitation needs of 178,000 Vietnamese physically disabled by the war remain to be met. Although some progress has been reported in providing prosthetic devices to 80,000 amputees, the long backlog of untreated cases will still not be eliminated for 2½ years, even if the war were to be stopped tomorrow.

6. After over a year of foot-dragging, programs for inter-country adoption of Vietnamese orphans have now received necessary funds. However, a critical problem remains in other child welfare programs. Only in recent months, after fourteen months delay, have Congressionally ear-marked funds for child welfare programs reached the agencies working in the field, and a child welfare conference planned for 1973–1974 was convened a year late, on January 14, 1975.

The sums involved in child welfare remain small—some $7.5 million for 1974, and $8.2 million programmed for fiscal year 1975. Thus, there is a continuing need to provide additional support for child welfare, and to strengthen the capabilities of the Ministry of Social Welfare and other indigenous organizations to provide services to all children disadvantaged by the war.

7. Although continued progress is evident in the hospital and public health programs in South Vietnam, the burden of civilian and military casualties continues to out-pace its capacity to treat or to rehabilitate them. But while pressure on the medical system remains constant, U.S. support for it has continued to decline.

II. CAMBODIA

1. In four years of war, Cambodia has become a nation of refugees. Over half its population have become refugees, moving from the countryside into the city. A desperate situation last year has become even more precarious this year, as each new day of war adds more refugees to swollen towns and cities which offer no shelter and even less hope. Some 1,140,000 refugees are officially registered, but the cumulative total of refugees is close to 3,389,000.

2. War damage has been extensive, as the Cambodian government steadily loses control of territory—now claiming less than 15 percent under government control. Once a rice-rich nation, it now depends upon three-quarters of its rice from the United States.

3. Medical needs are critical. Without the presence of medical teams from the Indochina Operational Group of the International Red Cross, the war casualty problem in Cambodia would be catastrophic, rather than the mere crisis it is today. Nearly 50 percent of the hospital facilities have been destroyed, and there is no internal capability of administrative capacity to deal with the new medical burdens created by war—some 7,000 civilian war casualties each month. There remain critical shortages of beds, medical supplies and personnel to treat an ever-growing number of casualties, much less to provide rehabilitative services.

4. The refugees of Cambodia have long been ignored. Only this past year—after years of inexcusable neglect—have additional funds and personnel been made available for refugee programs within AID and for the programs of voluntary agencies.

5. As in South Vietnam, a serious orphan problem has emerged with the war in Cambodia. Estimates of orphans who have lost one or both parents range as high as 250,000. The U.S. Embassy estimates that
there are 3,000 to 4,000 orphans who have no family, and are in need of the care of orphanages which do not exist.

6. Nowhere in Indochina is there greater urgency to the humanitarian needs of refugees and war victims, and the highest priority must be placed upon increased international assistance and American support for the programs of the International Red Cross and other voluntary agencies. And this urgency will remain until diplomacy ends the long, entirely senseless war in Cambodia.
RECOMMENDATION

As indicated at the outset, the primary purpose of this Study Mission report was to help document the continuing humanitarian needs of millions of war victims in South Vietnam and Cambodia. Despite the ceasefire agreements, and the rhetoric of peace, the violence continues in South Vietnam, and in Cambodia the war drags on as before. Each new day of war adds to the already massive humanitarian problems that confront both nations.

Over the coming weeks and months—as it has since 1965—the Subcommittee will continue to be as tenacious in its recommendations for action as it feels the pressing humanitarian needs in Indochina warrant. However, for the purposes of this up-dated report, two concluding recommendations are offered.

First, renewed efforts are needed on the diplomatic front. For two years the American people have heard more about new military options and the need for more guns and bombs for a "ceasefire war." But the breakdown of the Paris agreement demands more than a threat of new bombing. The lingering and bloody conflict in Indochina deserves more of our diplomacy, and less of our ammunition.

In the days ahead, Congress and the American people will want to know more fully what our diplomats are doing to bring peace. We will want to know what the President has done to help accomplish the political goals of the ceasefire agreements, and securing a truce in Vietnam. Until the question of peace, rather than war, becomes the focus of our government’s effort in Indochina, we will see continuing war rather than peace.

Second, new efforts are required to meet the growing humanitarian needs of Indochina, and a key factor in accomplishing this is the internationalization of humanitarian assistance to the people throughout the area. The overwhelming conclusion of a visit to South Vietnam and Cambodia today is the simple, but tragic, fact: because of continuing violence the human toll of a decade of war escalates, and the world is confronted with a very serious regional crisis of people. The needs of new war victims, especially in Cambodia, are great and immediate. The efforts being made to meet these needs are fragmented and inadequate. And the regional character of the problem—including the flight of people over international boundaries—is producing problems which must be dealt with on an international, rather than purely bi-lateral, basis.

Today, there is both an opportunity as well as a critical need for the internationalization of humanitarian assistance to Indochina—particularly in Cambodia, but also in Laos, where a fragile government of national union is struggling to maintain the peace. Even in South Vietnam, where the ceasefire has broken down, there is a pressing need to reduce old patterns of outside bi-lateral aid, and to promote greater international participation, and to encourage a transition in America’s relationship with the government in Saigon.
Increased international participation in the humanitarian relief and rehabilitation problems of Indochina will also serve to involve all channels of assistance, thereby reducing the total amount of direct United States assistance required, yet increasing the total amount of humanitarian aid available to the peoples of Indochina.

Equally important, the opportunity is now at hand to immediately involve international humanitarian organizations in the relief effort in South Vietnam and Cambodia—and all of Indochina. This is particularly so regarding the United Nations and its specialized agencies. The Study Mission found, for the first time, not just a generalized expression of interest in participating in Indochina programs, but rather a very specific and tangible set of programs and intentions by U.N. agencies—if only the necessary funding were available.

The first priority of our government in the days ahead, in terms of humanitarian assistance in Indochina, must be to pledge our dollar support to such international relief and rehabilitation programs as those of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Health Organization, UNICEF, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the U.N. Fund for Population Activities, and international organizations as the Indochina Operational Group of the International Red Cross, the Asian Development Bank, among others.

It is the recommendation of the Study Mission that our government now fund these international humanitarian programs, and we must fund them at a level which will serve to make them operational, and which will encourage other nations to contribute their share. And this process can begin not tomorrow, nor next fiscal year, but today. To do otherwise, is not only to miss new opportunities for change and for helping the people of Indochina in need, but also to repeat the program failures and the policy frustrations of the past.

There can be a new beginning in Indochina, if only our government seeks it.
APPENDIX I.—CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SENATOR KENNEDY AND SECRETARY OF STATE, HENRY A. KISSINGER, ON U.S. POLICY IN INDOCHINA
1. TEXT OF SENATOR KENNEDY'S LETTER OF INQUIRY TO SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you know, there is continuing and, I feel, growing congressional and public concern over the course of American policy toward Indochina. Inquiry by the Subcommittee on Refugees and other committees of the Congress, an unclassified cable of March 6 from Ambassador Graham Martin in Saigon, other statements by officials in the Executive Branch, the supplemental appropriation request for the current fiscal year and the anticipated requests for fiscal year 1975, news dispatches from the field, and various private reports, raise troubling questions for many Americans over the character and objective of our policy towards Indochina and over the kinds and levels of our current involvement in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

In light of the growing concern over American policy toward Indochina and the contradictory and incomplete information currently available, I would like to request comprehensive comment and review on the following items:

(1) The general character and objectives of American policy towards Indochina as a whole and tellers each government or political authority in the area;
(2) The general content and nature of existing obligations and commitments to the governments in Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane;
(3) The kinds, categories and levels of support and assistance given or projected to the governments in Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane for fiscal year 1973 through 1975—including (a) a breakdown of the number, distribution, activities and agency/departmental association of official American personnel, as well as those associated with private business and other organizations under contract to the United States government; and (b) a breakdown from all sources of humanitarian assistance, police and public safety oriented assistance, general supporting and economic development assistance, and military assistance;
(4) The current status and problems of reported efforts to establish an international consortium for general reconstruction assistance to the area;
(5) The current status and problems of the Administrations stated intention to encourage internationalizing humanitarian assistance to the area;
(6) The current status of negotiations between Washington and Hanoi on American reconstruction assistance to North Vietnam;
(7) The Departments assessment on the implementation of the ceasefire agreements for both Vietnam and Laos;
(8) The Departments assessment of the overall situation in Cambodia and the possibility for a ceasefire agreement; and
(9) Recent diplomatic initiatives, involving the United States, aimed at a reduction of violence in Indochina and a greater measure of normalization in the area.

In addition to the above areas of inquiry, I would also appreciate very much the Department's comment on a series of recommendations contained in a recent report based on the Subcommittee's Study Mission to Indochina last year. Lengthy excerpts from this report, including some of the recommendations, were issued in late January and informally made available to officials in the Executive Branch. The recommendations focus on the relief and rehabilitation of war victims, but also include comment and suggestions on the broader aspects of United States policies and programs in the area.

In light of persisting hopes among all our citizens for peace in Indochina, and to clarify our country's commitments and continuing involvement in the area, I feel it would be extremely helpful if definitive information on our government's
policy, involvement and future planning could be made available to the Subcommittee. I am hopeful, Mr. Secretary, that the Subcommittee can anticipate a response at an early date, and that appropriate officials from the Executive Branch will also be available for consultations or hearings.

In conclusion, let me express my personal dismay over a theme in Ambassador Martin's cable of March 6. For him to suggest a tie between alleged decisions in Hanoi and the views of Members of Congress and their staffs about the course of American policy towards South Vietnam and Indochina, is the worst kind of innuendo and regrettably ignores the many legitimate questions and concerns of the Congress and the American people over our commitments to the government's of Indochina and over the continuing level of our involvement in the political and military confrontations of the area. And I would appreciate very much your comment on the Ambassador's cable.

Many thanks for your consideration and I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,

EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees.

Enclosure.

2. TEXT OF SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER’S RESPONSE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to your letter of March 13 on various aspects of United States policy toward Indochina, I am enclosing our comment on the nine specific items you have outlined. I hope this information will be useful to you. As to the recommendations of the Subcommittee’s Study Mission to Indochina last year, which were enclosed with your letter, I have asked Governor Holton to review these and to prepare our comments for submission to you as soon as possible.

Your letter also expresses concern over a March 6 cable by Ambassador Martin commenting on a recent press article on the United States role in Viet-Nam. I do not believe the Ambassador is suggesting a cause-and-effect relationship between decisions in Hanoi and the views of any individual Members of Congress or their staffs. What he is describing is a very real and sophisticated propaganda effort by North Viet-Nam to bring to bear on a wide spectrum of Americans its own special view of the situation in Indochina. The Ambassador believes, and in this he has our full confidence and support, that we must counter these distortions emanating from Hanoi and continue to provide the best answers to the concerned questions many Americans have about our Indochina policy.

Warm regards,

HENRY A. KISSINGER.

Enclosure: Comment on Indochina Policy Issues.

(1) “The general character and objectives of American policy towards Indochina as a whole and towards each government or political authority in the area;”

There are two basic themes in our policy toward Indochina. The first is our belief that a secure peace in Indochina is an important element in our efforts to achieve a worldwide structure of peace. Conversely, we believe that an evolution toward peace in other troubled areas helps bring about the stability for which we strive in Indochina. Consequently, our Indochina policy has been geared to bring about the conditions which will enable the contending parties to find a peaceful resolution of their differences.

A resolution of differences can, of course, be achieved by other than peaceful means. For example, North Viet-Nam might seek to conquer South Viet-Nam by force of arms. Such a resolution, however, would almost certainly be a temporary one and would not produce the long-term and stable peace which is essential. Therefore, a corollary to our search for peace, and the second theme of our policy, is to discourage the takeover of the various parts of Indochina by force. Forcible conquest is not only repugnant to American traditions