• Professor Le Van Hoa—a professor of sociology at the Buddhist Van Hanh University in Saigon and also nonpolitical. Professor Hoa is reportedly in a reeducation camp, perhaps because his doctorate was earned in the U.S.

Other arrests said to have occurred before the April 25, 1976, elections institutionalizing Vietnam's unification included a roundup of journalists and novelists. Reportedly detained were Nguyen Van Minh, former chief editor of Con Ong, who used the pen name Minh Vo; Hong Duong, a writer for Song Thanh, and three authors of serialized novels that were once widely read in South Vietnam's popular press; Tran Thi Thu Van, who wrote more than twenty-five novels under the pen name Nha Ca, including at least one translated into English; Nguyen Dang Quy, who wrote about forty novels using the pen name Mai Thao; and novelist Hong Hai Thuy.

Still more reportedly imprisoned people include writers Don Quoc Sy, actor Hoang Giang, Dr. Pham Ha Thanh (chief of the Cong Hoa military hospital and detained with most of his medical staff), Professors Vu Quoc Thong, Vu Quoc Thuc, and Nguyen Van Luong, Judges Tran Minh Tiet and Vu Tien Tuan, dentists Nguyen Tu Mo and Hoang Co Binh (who also engaged in anti-Thieu political activities), and others too numerous to list.

People allegedly dead from detention-related causes include poet Vu Hoang Chuong; children's storyteller Vu Mong Long, who used the pen name Duyen Anh; Judges Nguyen Ngoc Loi and Ngo Van Vu; and Dr. Pham Van Luong, who once carried a hand grenade to the front of Saigon's National Assembly and threatened to blow himself up in protest against Thieu's dictatorial rule.

One had to believe that if North Vietnam ever took over, it was not going to be any picnic, but that does not mean they should escape international pressure, or censure, if we can build an adequate case.” Representative Donald Fraser (D-Minn.) told me in an interview. A leader of the old Congressional peace forces and the current Capitol Hill human rights movement, Fraser chairs a key international affairs subcommittee that frequently publicizes human rights violations. He and Representative Millicent Fenwick (R-N.J.) sent a letter to Hanoi last year expressing humanitarian interest in some of the people in Vietnam's detention camps, co-signed by more than twenty former leaders of the antiwar movement in the House of Representatives. A number of other onetime peace activists, including the board of SANE, have expressed similar concern in letters to Vietnam's U.N. observer office.

Another human rights petition has been sent to Hanoi, signed by about ninety former peace movement leaders including Joan Baez, Roger Baldwin, Daniel Ellsberg, and Paul O'Dwyer, spearheaded by International Fellowship of Reconciliation Coordinator James H. Forest, who once served thirteen months in prison for destroying draft records during the Indochina war. Hanoi's aide-memoire response to petition signers in February rejected all expressions of inquiry and concern on human rights violations. Other former opponents of U.S. Vietnam policies strongly defend Hanoi's human rights practices, arguing that critics of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam are misinformed, are premature in publicizing their concerns, and do not understand the subtleties of the reeducation process.

A few American religious leaders, some associated with Clergy and Laity Concerned, have invited five Hanoi-approved Vietnamese religious figures to tour the U.S. They complain that the State Department has to date refused permission. The invitation did not mention the very many other Vietnamese religious and lay figures in detention and prisons who ought to be invited here too; nor necessarily to speak, but because such public invitations could help secure their future health and safety by letting Hanoi know that, as in the case of Soviet dissidents or Chilean political prisoners, there is humanitarian concern for these people in the democracies.

"Your people should consider who we are," Tran Van Tuyen once said to me. "We, the 'third segment,' represent what would be the democratic majority in your country—the people who want freedom, [the right] to vote, social justice. Where would Americans be if their country was torn by a battlefield of contesting Communists, with a massive army supported by mighty foreign powers; opposed by a corrupt, ruthless military dictatorship, also armed and supplied by a mighty outside power. What could the majority do, what could democratic leaders do, unarmed and empty-handed?"

They are us, were we Vietnamese.
APPENDIX 2

STATEMENT OF THE INDOCHINA RESOURCE CENTER (OCTOBER 1976) Entitled “HUMAN RIGHTS IN VIETNAM: A REPLY TO THEODORE JACQUENEY”

INTRODUCTION

In his article “Vietnam’s ‘Gulag Archipelago’” (New York Times, September 17, 1976), Theodore Jacqueney, formerly with the State Department’s A.I.D. program in Viet Nam, grossly misrepresents conditions in Vietnamese re-education centers as well as the character of five men whom he alleges were third force leaders and former victims of Thieu’s repressive regime.

Jacqueney portrays “his friends” as people who hold no responsibility for the policies of the Thieu government, but among these men are Father Tran Huu Thanh, a former lecturer to ARVN psychological warfare officers who is accused of involvement in an anti-government armed rebellion last February, Tran Van Tuyen, a deputy Premier in a previous Saigon government which arrested and detained the leadership of a “movement for peace,” and Tran Ngoc Chau who was formerly a director of training for a Saigon pacification program. Although these men were opposed to Thieu, the evidence indicates they supported continuation of the war with American military assistance. They merely believed Thieu had become ineffective. The only way in which these men could be considered opposition leaders is in their similarity to the infamous Col. Nguyen Cao Ky, who took part in an internal power struggle against Thieu.

A few points about re-education need to be clarified:

1. Approximately 95% of the lower-level military and civilian personnel of the Thieu regime have completed re-education and have had full civil rights restored. Considering that Thieu’s army and civilian personnel numbered 1.5 million, this is a significant reintegration of people into civilian life.

2. The system of repression instituted by the Thieu regime was one of the most sophisticated and brutal ever devised, and employed tens of thousands of police, intelligence officers and various levels of officials. It is important to distinguish between those who continue to be held in re-education centers (police, intelligence officers, high-ranking military officers, heads of reactionary political parties) from those who were incarcerated in Thieu’s prisons (namely students, journalists, artists, Buddhist monks and nuns, lawyers, opposition politicians, and innocent civilians rounded up in repressive police sweeps).

3. Western journalist Tiziano Terzani, who was critical of the concept of re-education camps in Viet Nam, describes them as “model prisons” in terms of health and welfare standards. Jacqueney admitted in a phone conversation with Indochina Resource Center that there have been no allegations of torture in the prisons and re-education centers under the present government. In contrast, Thieu’s prisons were documented to be unhealthy and torture was used indiscriminately.

4. Jacqueney speaks of deaths and privations suffered by those detained in re-education, but conditions in the centers are no different from those faced by the entire population living in the countryside. In the aftermath of 30 years of warfare, disease is indeed rampant and food is scarce. The first reported outbreak of cholera in many years was reported in the Haiphong area after reunification brought southerners to visit their families in the north.

The learners in re-education are asked to do the same as ordinary farmers and they run the same risks as farmers who are trying to return fields bombed and fallow during the war back into cultivation. Jacqueney speaks of “human

NOTE.—After the article appeared, Indochina Resource Center spoke with Mr. Jacqueney by phone to question him about his sources and for more information concerning allegations of imprisoned journalists and novelists. He would not reveal the nature of his sources nor elaborate on the allegations made.
mine-field sweeping” but fails to mention that the Vietnamese army is leading
the mine-clearing operations and often are the first to be blown up by unexploded
ordnance in the paddies.

(5) The Vietnamese government has already announced that the maximum
period of re-education will be 3 years. Many thousands have already been re­
leased and releases will continue. In contrast, many of the sentences under
former Saigon governments were indeterminant and some prisoners were held
for 10 years or more.

Returning to the men Jacqueney describes in his article, it is clear from their
own actions that they were intimately involved in promoting the Thieu govern­
ment policy which included an elaborate system of terror and repression. An­
mnesty International defines political prisoners as those “imprisoned for beliefs,
color, language, ethnic origin, or religion provided that they have not used or
advocated violence.” Having supported the American military intervention and
physical repression of revolutionaries and peace activists in Viet Nam, these
men can not be considered political prisoners.

Historical background on four of the five men, Tran Van Tuyen, Luong Trong
Tuong, Tran Ngoc Chau, and Father Tran Huu Thanh, follows. Research is not
yet completed concerning Bui Tung Huan but will be forwarded when available.

ANOTHER VIEW OF THE MEN UNDER DETENTION

TRAN VAN TUYEN

Tran Van Tuyen, a high-ranking mandarin began working for the colonial
administration in 1943, and continued during the period of greatest human
suffering in Viet Nam due to the French and Japanese occupation of the country,
1944-45. Following the establishment of Vietnam's first independent government,
he fled the country, to return as Minister of Information in the French-sponsored
Bao Dai cabinet. He remained an advocate of collaboration with the French
throughout the war, serving as Minister of Information in the Tran Van Hau
government as well (1950). He was a leader of the anti-Communist Vietnam
Nationalist Party in South Vietnam and was among the small group of anti­
Communist politicians who jockeyed for power after the overthrow of Ngo Dinh
Diem. Tuyen was named Deputy Premier in the Phan Huy Quat government
in the spring of 1965, at a time when the Saigon government was no more than
an appendage of American military power. The first U.S. Marines had already
come ashore and U.S. bombing of both North and South Vietnam had begun when
he took office. It was that government which arrested the leadership of a “move­
ment for peace” which included Ngo Ba Thanh.

LUONG TRONG TUONG

Luong Trong Tuong, a big landowner from Can Tho Province, was political
advisor to Huynh Pho So, the founder of the Hoa Hao church. Tuong was one of
the chief architects of the church's hostility to the newly-formed revolutionary
government in the north in September, 1945. Since that time, he has been a bitter
enemy of the Vietnamese revolution, and has relied on foreign military power
in his effort to crush the Communist movement. According to Bernard Fall,
Tuong was the representative of the Hoa Hao at the National Political Con­
ference of 1953, held under the auspices of the Bao Dai government. After Diem's
assumption to power, he quickly changed his allegiance to the U.S. supported
leader; when Nguyen Cao Ky became Prime Minister in 1965, he supported
him in return for government favors.

According to lawyer Dinh Thach Bich, a former military aide to Vice-President
Tho and knowledgeable source on Vietnamese politics frequently consulted by
the U.S. political section, Tuong was involved in a smuggling system with his
wife, whose brother was chief of customs in 1967-68. She had been charged with
drug smuggling, but was acquitted through the help of the Minister of Justice,
an associate of Tuong's in the Hoa Hao movement.

Under both Ky and Thieu, Tuong's Hoa Hao faction was the only official fac­
tion recognized by the government. Local level Hoa Hao, however, accused
Tuong's group of several instances of corruption: 1) selling draft deferments
meant for church dignitaries to Chinese merchants; 2) appropriating as much as
half of a fund set up by the government for buildings in Hoa Hao village; and
3) involving the Hoa Hao in politics for the first time by joining the government­
sponsored, anti-Communist “Front of Political Groups” after the Tet offensive.
Under Tuong's leadership, the Hoa Hao were opposed to any kind of peace settlement, and called for military victory over the NLF. On June 13, 1971, Tuong said publicly that the Hoa Hao would support any presidential ticket which proposed defeating the Communists by military means, deriding the peace negotiations in Paris as useless. He said the Hoa Hao "have always supported the necessity for victory over the Communists by the sole path of attacking and defeating the Communists" (Tien Tuyen, June 15, 1971).

Even after the Paris Agreement was signed and most other anti-Communist politicians saw the necessity for reconciliation, Tuong continued to advocate violent opposition to the Communists. On June 7, 1974, he was quoted as saying that the Hoa Hao "still contribute actively to the effort to destroy Communism" (Chinh Luan, June 8, 1974).

Following their victory of April 30, 1975, the revolutionary government organized Hoa Hao followers in Long Chau Tien province to hold a series of meetings to expose the "evil, anti-religious, anti-people, and counterrevolutionary nature" of Tuong's activities. His organization was ordered dissolved, along with a rival Hoa Hao organization. Tuong and another Hoa Hao leader were accused of organizing armed resistance to the Government, sabotage, robbery, and conspiracy to disrupt order and security.

TRAN NGOC CHAU

Tran Ngoc Chau was a celebrated Deputy in the National Assembly when he was accused of having liaised with his brother Tran Ngoc Hien, an NLF cadre, without informing the Thieu government. Earlier Chau had served as Program Director of Revolutionary Development, a pacification program designed to gather intelligence on the NLF infrastructure.

Through the program, RD cadres simulated the behavior of the NLF, but attempted to bribe village heads with economic incentives, engaged in propaganda and psychological warfare aimed at increasing NLF defections. Although Chau was arrested by Thieu, he was a strong Thieu supporter for many years. His own words from his trial serve to indict him as a supporter of increased U.S. military involvement in Viet Nam.

Selections from Tran Ngoc Chau's personal declaration of February 27, 1970, prepared for his trial follow:

"I did make a trip to the U.S., France, Great Britain and Italy. The trip was offered to me by the (US) State Department. This invitation was handed to me when I was director of RD, ...

"The fifth time I met Mr. Hien (his brother) was when the US was having its Presidential election campaign. At the bottom of my heart I wanted very much to see Mr. Nixon elected because I realized that Mr. Johnson had decided not to increase more troops, because I was worried that the fighting would turn disadvantageous for Viet Nam."

"(after Nixon's election) I told him that with the election victory of Nixon Mr. Thieu's position would be very strong."

FATHER TRAN HUU THANH

According to an article by Reuters correspondent Nayan Chanda, Redemptorist priest Tran Huu Thanh was arrested by the Vietnamese government involvement in an armed rebellion which took place in the Vinh Son Church February 15, 1976 (Chicago Tribune, September 15, 1976). The incident was described in newspaper accounts as a 15-hour gun battle against forces of the new South Vietnamese government. When it was over, one member of government security forces was killed, two rebels died, and 15 were arrested. The rebels left behind "counter-revolutionary" leaflets, weapons and printing equipment for making counterfeit money.

Tran Huu Thanh had often been accused by the NLF of having worked closely with the U.S. CIA. While this has not been documented, Thanh was in fact a psychological warfare specialist who trained ARVN officers at the Central School of Psychological Warfare.

Thanh did indeed become known in the final year of the war for his opposition to Thieu; however, it should be remembered that his proposal was merely to replace Thieu with another figurehead who would pursue the same policies as Thieu.
Tran Huu Thanh has been aligned with right-wing forces favoring U.S. military involvement since 1954. He was an intimate advisor of Ngo Dinh Diem. Thanh describes himself as belonging to the First Force (as Thieu) in an interview. Thanh says, "So from the beginning we thought only of replacing the leader and maintaining everything in the structure of the regime." (Dai Dan Toc, December 28–30, 1974).
APPENDIX 3

ARTICLE FROM ORBIS (AUGUST 1977) ENTITLED "UNPOPULAR SOCIALISM IN UNITED VIETNAM" BY STEPHEN YOUNG

Having achieved a monopoly of state power over the entire territory of Vietnam, the Hanoi government faces a growing crisis of legitimacy. Communist Party leader Le Duan and his Politburo have recognized the problem and feel essentially helpless to resolve it -- except to reach out to outside powers such as the United States and the USSR for support in this hour of political unrest.

Because of an inherent conflict between the western norms of the regime's ideology, buttressed by harsh opportunism in practice, and the core values of traditional Vietnamese peasant nationalism, the moral authority of the Hanoi administration is not accepted by the vast majority of Vietnamese. Such a lack of legitimacy does not imply a present inability to rule or to assert power, but it does set limitations on means employed and on the degree to which new norms can be successfully institutionalized. Many regimes survive without widespread acceptance of their moral authority on the part of those they rule. Use of force and material incentives to maintain political supremacy is a common mode of governance. But such regimes are especially vulnerable to corruption, factionalism, and upon the death of top leaders become subject to rapid decay.

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Thus the lack of legitimacy inhibiting the Hanoi regime today has important implications for the future of Vietnam.

Some governments attempt to compensate for a lack of endogenous legitimacy by eliciting support from other governments. The eagerness with which the Vietnamese government currently seeks new ties with the United States, especially in ways which convey implicit American recognition of its revolutionary legitimacy, speaks loudly about the degree of internal support for the regime. The ability of Hanoi to mobilize south Vietnam to its purposes will depend to a large extent upon the reconciliation of Hanoi with the outside world. And the Carter administration will have to consider whether the purposes of Hanoi are consistent with its intention to protect human rights around the world.

Legitimacy and the Concept of "Du Tin"

Hanoi's lack of legitimacy arises because the goals and aims of the Vietnamese communist party cannot be affirmed by the values held by almost all Vietnamese. This has always been true but has become of utmost relevance now that the country has been unified and the last imperialist lackey defeated. The banner of nationalism with its supporting front organizations can no longer be waived by the communists on a daily basis as a distraction, so to speak, from their ultimate purposes. The need to sacrifice on behalf of national liberation is no longer salient. The communists must now concentrate
on socializing Vietnam; their core policies at last stand on their own, open to judgment of the Vietnamese people.

Vietnamese award moral authority to those who possess the quality of **uy tin**. The communists do not have **uy tin** now in the eyes of the Vietnamese people. Therefore, they are illegitimate despots to be obeyed only in so far as they can exact obedience.

**Uy tin** has three components: **tai**, **duc** and **so**.

**Tai** is ability and reflects the intelligence and skill necessary to master situations in which one finds oneself.

But to give complete **uy tin**, **tai** must be used to advance and promote **duc** - virtue. And a leader of **uy tin** must possess personal **duc** as well. **Duc** is a complicated word, being used with different meanings as the central concept in Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. Originally in pre-Confucian China of the Shang and Chou dynasties, **duc** meant power, the energy of one who had mastered fate. It was the quality of the sage kings such as Shun and Yao who were given authority because they had already demonstrated competence.

Today, the Vietnamese use **uy tin** the way **duc** was once used because **duc** now means primarily moral and ethical righteousness. In Buddhism, **duc** is the quality of self-sacrifice which brings us ever closer to extinction of the ego. It determines our karma. The more **duc** we display in this life, the more felicitious our existence in the
next reincarnation. In Confucianism, duc has nothing to do with the afterlife. Duc here means propriety, self-cultivation and filial piety. It is treated as an obligation and the external sign of the gentleman. In any case, in the Vietnamese concept of uy tin, a leader gathers duc for himself by helping others around him promote their own duc; the leader with duc does not use his power exclusively to maximize his own personal notion of virtue. To do so would be selfish and a selfish person does not even have personal duc. The Communists have no duc because they have killed to gain dictatorial power and because they exploit any opportunity to gain personal influence.

Finally, tai used to promote duc will not give uy tin unless fate permits. The third part of uy tin is therefore so - destiny. An accepted leader must be blessed with a fortunate horoscope, facial features ("tuong so") or good geomancy in the location of his birthsite and his ancestors' graves. Vietnamese are very fatalistic and need to be convinced that one who seeks leadership has already received Heaven's mandate.

The concept of uy tin is one part of a wider cultural pattern of mutually supporting values and rational explanations which has brought the Vietnamese essentially unchanged through centuries of oppression, wars and other vissitudes. The core philosophic rationalization of the Vietnamese cultural pattern is the notion of phuc duc, the super ego of their ethnic experience. Phuc duc is an
amalgam of Buddhist and Confucian notions, with pre-Confucian origins, which stresses individualism and private economic incentive in the context of the family which is a collective repository of good and bad Karma. A leader who does not promote phuc duc prohibits Vietnamese from doing what they most want to do in that inner part of their being which identifies itself as "Vietnamese". Such a leader has no duc and therefore, no uy tin. Vietnamese, north and south, want to be free to rise as high as the phuc duc of their family will let them and they want to enjoy whatever material prosperity that same phuc duc brings their way. Communism does not let them do this because the dictates of the party replace the workings of fate. Thus there is a basic antagonism between the good of the communists and the values of the Vietnamese people. This antagonism sustained a long and bloody war.

The Post-War Record

After their victory in May 1975, the Communists lost whatever uy tin they had acquired. How this happened is ironically and appropriately Vietnamese. Thieu's regime collapsed and no organized opposition greeted the invading North Vietnamese army. Visitors spoke of an excited mood among the people of Saigon. Fate had taken a sudden and dramatic turn; perhaps the communists were meant to rule after all. But then the euphoria rapidly faded.
First, living conditions plummeted, exacerbated by the new rulers' campaign against what they called the lackey culture fostered by the Americans, a culture which was really based on phuc duc. The currency conversion of September 1975 was seen as confiscation by the people. Saigon and the south were stripped of goods and machinery to boost the north, which had been kept economically backward for years as resources were thrown into the war effort. The new regime was promoting its own ideas, not the general welfare. Criticism, opposition, individualism were repressed. Within three months of April 30, Thich Tri Quang, the self-appointed arbiter of the duc of Vietnamese leaders, had publicly called upon the new administration to adopt policies of genuine reconciliation. The men from Hanoi who had won turned out to be selfish and greedy for power. They sought what was good for them, not what the people wanted. They would not let the masses have the benefits of their phuc duc. The new leaders therefore could have no duc themselves, and so no uy tin.

Second, on reflection south Vietnamese concluded that Hanoi's leaders had little tai or ability either. They had fallen into victory not so much as a result of their own planning but as a result of the American withdrawal and Thieu's incompetence. Fate thrust victory upon them;
they had not really struggled or manipulated to bring off the final triumph. Success of the anti-war movement in the United States was the outcome of foreign political happenings in the eyes of most Vietnamese who did not credit Hanoi with an ability to resolve Vietnamese aspirations because of that fortuitous (for the Communists) turn of events. Furthermore, south Vietnamese knew that the NLF had been defeated and that the communist triumph was not achieved with the cooperation of the majority of south Vietnamese. The communists had not come to power through mastery of internal south Vietnamese politics. Without tai, the new rulers could have no uy tin.

But the communists did have power; that fate had bestowed upon them. Thus communist rule is a gift of destiny to the Vietnamese, something to be suffered and made the best of like war, famine, flood and other natural catastrophes. Hanoi has the benefit of so which alone is not enough to give it uy tin. The regime will therefore be obeyed as long as fate is perceived as going its way. When the regime encounters difficulties, few will be there to help it out. Previous examples of such regimes in Vietnam are the collapse of Ho Qui Ly in 1400, the collapse of the Nguyen, Trinh and Le families under Nguyen Hue's attacks in the late 1700's, the inability of the Nguyen dynasty to rally the nation against the French in the late 19th century, the collapse of French rule in March 1945, the collapse of Diem's regime in 1963 and the fall of South Vietnam in 1975.
Surprisingly, Hanoi's victory over the south in 1975 also lost it uy tin in north Vietnam. The people there discovered that their leaders had lied to them for years. Contrary to what they had been told, life was far better in the south than in the north and the south had not been held together by the Americans. The individualism and phuc duc repressed in the north for two decades had flourished in the south. Northerners had had to suffer so that the communist leaders could extend the sway of their power and ideology. Ordinary north Vietnamese now too felt abused and exploited. Hanoi's rulers were seen as selfish men without uy tin. Rule #1 in the politics of uy tin is never lie. The communists with their opportunism had violated this rule many times.

The Misperceptions of Past Rulers

The notion of phuc duc, the concept of uy tin and Hanoi's loss of legitimacy are not understood in the West. They are necessary parts of Vietnam's peasant nationalism which to date has not been analyzed in any western written materials. Upon their arrival in Vietnam, French colonialists formulated an incorrect analysis of Vietnamese society which has been taken as the basis for every succeeding western commentary. The French, looking at the mandarinate of the Nguyen Dynasty centered on the imperial court in Hue, concluded that the Vietnamese had a Chinese confucian, class-stratified society. In this
view they were encouraged by members of the Vietnamese mandarin class, most of whom happily served the French administration and continued their elite status under a new mandate. And Vietnamese nationalists had no interest in even speaking with the French, much less telling them about Vietnam. The colonial vision of autonomous villages ruled by confucian mandarins became unquestioned. Both the French left and the French right used versions of this image to justify their own wishes for Vietnam. The same vision also lies at the heart of communist historiography and Hanoi's justification for its rule. In the French and Hanoi view the communists are merely logical successors to confucian mandarins in the modern world. In fact, most communist leaders do come from mandarin families. Thus the communists are indeed the legitimate successors of French colonialism. Hanoi's final triumph is nothing more than the latest benefit of French "civilization" to the Vietnamese.

Vietnam's nineteenth century confucian elite was a relatively recent development in Vietnam's history. A scholar gentry class using the neo-confucian norms of China's classic mandarin form of state and society only began to form in north Vietnam in the mid 1600's. Le Quy Don in the mid 1700's was Vietnam's first great neo-confucian scholar. Nguyen Hue's revolt and short reign in the 1780's attempted to cripple Vietnam's emerging sinified scholar gentry elite. As late
As 1820, the high mandarin Nguyen Du wrote the great poem Kim Van Kieu using Buddhist theory and the language of phuc duc.

But Vietnam's 19th century mandarins then extensively imported neo-confucian ideology from China because they had no uy tin and phuc duc and sought a new basis for their moral authority. In 1812 Emperor Gia Long, who had founded in 1802 the dynasty which would acquiesce in the French conquest, brought in the Ching Dynasty law code from China while the villages continued to live by the terms of the Le Dynasty code of the mid 15th century. Unfortunately, neo-confucianism did not replace older and more fundamental norms. For example, confucianism revolves around paternalistic families while to this day Vietnamese families are run by women who, in many cases, barely tolerate their fathers, husbands and sons.

A gap also arose between imported chinese law and village custom generating the saying so popular with French scholars that "the Emperor's laws fall before village customs". Because nineteenth century village custom remained fifteenth century imperial law, the Vietnamese preserved in their villages (which remained mysterious worlds to the French) their national heritage.

Yet to the extent there was a gap between the villages and the elite, there was potential for alienation and political opposition. The Nguyen Dynasty mandarins
could not rally the people to oppose the French because of this. The French then foundered as well on this crevice where nationalism bred.

Vietnamese nationalism, with its roots in geomancy and spirits, resides in the villages of Vietnam. It is not a modern phenomenon but an ancient ethnic tradition. Of all the peoples in south China conquered by the Chinese, only the Vietnamese retained a sufficient sense of themselves to throw off Chinese rule after 1,000 years domination. Four subsequent Chinese invasions were also defeated.

Western commentators, and Vietnamese communist analysts, looked for nationalism as a modern product of the urban middle class and didn't find much there. They were applying western theories to a non-western fact pattern. So they selected those facts which fit the theories and ignored those that didn't. The indigenous fact pattern and the concepts giving isolated events their Vietnamese coherence were overlooked. We have been told that there was no real nationalism in Vietnam, only class rivalries but this too fell within the French colonial image of Vietnam as the smaller dragon. Consider that Ho Chi Minh had only 5,000 followers in 1945 after recruiting since 1925 whereas Huynh Phu So, who founded the Hoa Hao sect in 1939, had gathered nearly 2 million behind him in only 6 years.
Yet much has been written about the Vietnamese communists and not one thorough study in English or French has been done of the Hoa Hao. With this intellectual track record, we are still in no position to understand the Vietnamese, especially since we have built an anti-war movement in response to domestic political considerations rather than on a correct understanding of the aspirations of the Vietnamese people.

The Family Basis of Legitimacy

The Vietnamese national tradition of *uy tín* and *phúc đức* is perpetuated from generation to generation by a structure of family life and personality development which mold Vietnamese to feel comfortable with these intellectual concepts. One generation, believing in *phúc đức* and reliving as adults the patterns of their youth, raise a succeeding generation to follow the same ways. It is a testament to the aptness and brilliance of the Vietnamese cultural dynamic that it has stood the batterings of centuries essentially unchanged. Individuals may come and go, dynasties rise and fall, but Vietnameseness remains.

First, childraising in a Vietnamese family uses primarily arbitrary authority and conditional love tied to punctilious obedience of parental whims. This gives Vietnamese children a strong feeling that those with power over you cannot be trusted and that power is unaccountable and
must be placated by conformity.

Second, a child's ability to put up with pain and bear humiliation is encouraged. Suffering and self-sacrifice are rewarded. Older siblings are consistently forced to yield to younger ones. But the selfish urges, never legitimated by parental authority, still remain close to the surface, bubbling out whenever they can get away with it. This leaves many Vietnamese with an ability to tolerate suffering and enjoy personal deprivation but with an intuition that most people are only out for themselves and for that reason also are not to be trusted.

Third, parents believe their children's fate has already been decided by Heaven so that there is little for parents to do except keep the children fed and disciplined. Children are treated as independent adults who have to be restrained from the moment of birth. While this gives Vietnamese that winning alertness and sense of themselves as independent persons, they are always in fact dependent on others. Childhood needs for dependency and reliance, for limits within which one can be secure, were never met. Thus few Vietnamese develop effective autonomy and sense of mastery over their futures.

The result of this family experience is a need to depend but a conviction that no one is trustworthy because all are selfish and that one cannot even take a
chance in trusting others because, if they gain power and show their selfishness, one will not have the inner strength to protect one's position. Only a person of uy tin can be trusted and depended upon; others are to be manipulated to the extent possible.

Then, a generalized need for dependence permits Vietnamese to accept the fatalism inherent in phuc duc while the satisfaction derived from self-sacrifice enables them to carry out the injunction of phuc duc to restrain self-indulgent impulses and accumulate merit for the future. Uy tin and phuc duc also apply to relationships within the family. What we think of as family loyalty in Vietnam is more the reciprocal obligations of those who depend on others for phuc duc and those who are earning phuc duc for the family.

The Search for Uy Tin

The crisis of legitimacy puts Hanoi in something of a quandry. Since it won't as yet accede to the demands of phuc duc, it cannot acquire uy tin. It has the benefit of so. It can only impose its way through coercion and manipulation of self interest. The Vietnamese tendency towards fatalism and submission before unchallengeable power will minimize blatant opposition to such a course as long as the regime displays its resolve. Thus Hanoi can rule by doing as it pleases. But without uy tin the regime knows
that as soon as it weakens, it will be challenged and the old norms will reassert themselves. Thus it needs legitimacy to ensure that its values become permanent. It needs uy tin just as much as it opposes the moral and intellectual base on which uy tin rests. Hanoi can only seek legitimacy by manipulating existing norms or replacing old values with new ones. Thus one would expect its policy to be a mixture of (1) dictatorial imposition, (2) re-education and (3) appeals to those aspects of tradition which least intrude into the workings of a socialist state (such as Confucianism over Buddhism).

This policy then imposes limitations: the regime must rely most on coercion and selfish incentives but those techniques only encourage factions and corruption. Furthermore, those techniques make it more difficult to acquire uy tin and they attract to the regime cadres without personal uy tin. Hanoi can therefore never be sure of the quality of its support so that its leadership will always be defensive and suspicious. Without moral legitimacy, it faces progressive decay from dryrot within.

To develop tai and in that way bolster its uy tin the regime can show that it can master its present situation. Thus it must continue to monopolize state power and it must develop the economy. It must have a plan and it must realize its plan. To do this it needs Soviet and American assistance.