

III MAF had the mission within its TAOR of destroying the main force of the Viet Cong and the guerrilla forces. This combat mission was closely linked with Vietnamese revolutionary development because the indispensable factor for the beginning of RD in the Marine Corps TAORs was successful combat against the overt fighting elements of the Viet Cong. But III MAF, with remarkable candidness, rated the destruction or expulsion of Viet Cong combat units at only 15 percent of the accomplishment of RD. The Marine Corps combat effort provided the shield behind which the complex, political, economic, social, and paramilitary action could take place which formed the remaining 85 percent of revolutionary development.(46)

Marine Corps civic action meshed with revolutionary development in a broader range of the RD indicators than combat operations. For example, 25 percent of the "destruction of enemy units" involved the establishment of a local defense force. By February 1966, HQ, III MAF had established two Combined Action Companies and had conducted systematic training for large numbers of Popular Forces, thus making an important contribution to RD by means of the hard or security type of civic action. Eighty-five percent of the "Vietnamese establishment of security" comprised the training of Popular Forces, planning for defense, and the construction of defensive installations. Again, Marine Corps civic action directly supported adequate public health programs, education facilities, transportation facilities, agricultural development, and the establishment of markets. Considering the support of public health programs alone in March 1966, III MAF gave medical treatment to more than 84,000 Vietnamese citizens and was in the process of training 77 persons as medical assistants of various types. The RD indicators placed the medical effort of III MAF in a meaningful relationship with the general progress of the war. The establishment of an adequate public health program was rated at only four percent of the total accomplishment of revolutionary development.(47)

Principles of Effective Civic Action for Vietnam

By March 1966, the Marine Corps had formulated effective principles of civic action. The Marine Corps had advanced beyond its initial defensive military mission and had become part of a full-blooded effort to establish a viable South Vietnamese government. The broader outlook of the Marine Corps in its new role in revolutionary war was strongly etched in the new principles which included purposeful support for local government at the expense, if necessary, of the acknowledgement of Marine Corps assistance. The Marine Corps had faced revolutionary movements in the past in the Central American and the Caribbean areas. But the disciplined insurgent organization in Vietnam and the international complications rendered the Vietnamese situation so much more intense that it had to be

ranked as something different in Marine Corps experience.(48)

The principles of effective civic action for Vietnam comprised more than a dry-as-dust list of etiquette for relations between Marines and officials and citizens of the Republic of Vietnam. The principles represented a new form of warfare, a concept balanced between sophisticated modern combat and direct support for indigenous political, social, and economic action. Six points could be differentiated; together they formed a pronouncement of the Marine Corps response to "the struggle to rescue the people"(49) from a subtle, intellectually brilliant form of warfare.

First, Marine Corps civic action programs had to be continuous. Discontinuity and incompleteness were synonymous with failure. Civic action programs were responsible acts which were promises of benefits to a seriously demoralized population. Failure to produce the promised benefits allowed the irresponsible Viet Cong to outbid the government in power by promising superior results at an undefined future time. Ultimately, no Marine Corps civic action could be lasting unless it were part of a program requested and needed by the local Vietnamese population and allocated the resources required for completion and continuation by the national government. To provide real continuity the Marine Corps had to support Vietnamese projects rather than, with misplaced zeal, create Marine Corps projects.

Second, civic action had to function through local Vietnamese officials. Again, the tendency to produce Marine Corps programs or to work through individuals had to be strictly controlled.(50) Only Vietnamese programs could be tolerated and support of those programs had to take place through Vietnamese governing officials. However, spontaneous humanitarian acts and contacts between individual Marines and Vietnamese citizens were exceptions to functioning within the Vietnamese chain of governmental command. These acts and contacts were important adjuncts to the Vietnamese programs encompassing revolutionary development and the programs of rural health, agricultural assistance, etc.. The spontaneous Marine Corps acts served to popularize the Marine Corps and the government which it had come to support. But Marine Corps civic action was not a popularity contest between Marines and the local population. Even though the spontaneous acts and individual contacts were important, they had to fit within the framework of a disciplined, single-minded program of support for the Vietnamese government. An enemy so ruthless and well-entrenched as the Vietnamese communist of the mid-1960s could be successfully overcome only by the discipline, purpose, and control possible within a first-class military organization.(51)

Third, civic action programs had to be related to the basic needs of the rural population. The production of food was the central issue of life for most of the Vietnamese people. Concentration of effort, one of the principles of war and a



Support for education: a winsome young orphan at Trung Phu Orphanage south of Da Nang receives booklets from a Marine visitor early in 1966. By this time support for education had become a vital part of civic action. The Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action Fund which had been announced in Sep 65 concentrated initially on the buying of CARE school kits. (MCA187646)



Support for the rural school system: in a well organized program at Le Tinh village near Chu Lai, LtCol Paul X. Kelley, CO, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines presents precious school supplies to a child. Note the schoolmaster (raised hands) prompting the children, ARVN soldier (beret), loudspeaker system (upper right), and the Vietnamese flag. (USMC A369053)

sound principle of business management, ruled the field in the case of basic needs. Marine Corps civic action had neither the resources nor the time to support frivolous activities. The Viet Cong and predecessor Viet Minh had operated in parts of the South Vietnamese countryside for a quarter of a century. In the I Corps Tactical Zone, the Viet Cong had made important advances in 1964 and these were characterized by meticulous attention to honesty in dealings with farmers and fishermen. In both its earlier operations and the more recent ones, the Viet Cong had displayed a masterful grasp of what was real to the peasant and the fisherman. The Marine Corps had to reveal to the rural population the same benevolent realism. But the pressing, basic needs of the countryside could be most effectively determined by the people themselves. And even though the Marine Corps could determine by pure reason that support for food production was the basic need of the people, the precise programs for implementation were so complex as to require playing the subtle game of waiting for the request of the local peasant for assistance. (52)

Fourth, once civic action programs had begun which were requested by the people, were coordinated with Vietnamese revolutionary development, and had been assured of the resources necessary for completion and continuation, the Marine Corps had to bend every effort to enhance the prestige of the local officials who were directing the programs. The assassination of effective governing officials was one of the mainstays of Viet Cong political action. Marine Corps civic action projects had to enhance the reputation of Vietnamese officials who were able to produce concrete gains for the peasants and provide justice. Support and protection for honest officials was the foundation for Marine Corps civic action. Even the Southeast Asian form of the Marxist dialectic would find it a tortuous path to justify assassination of effective and honest men. Marine Corps civic action had to help to create those men and support their actions. Marine Corps rifles would make the Viet Cong form of public "execution" a greater challenge than the cheap exercise in deliberate terror which it had been in the past.

Fifth, in the cases where choices existed, Marines had to choose civic action projects with the shortest time of completion. The mobility of the Marine Corps and its preoccupation with combat against the main forces and the guerrillas of the Viet Cong movement emphasized the reality that long-term projects and ultimately revolutionary development were the responsibility of the people and the Government of Vietnam. Assuredly, the Marine Corps would support both individual long-term projects and revolutionary development; but Marine Corps support was forced to take the form of short-term projects within the framework of the larger, longer ones. For example, medical assistance was one of the keystones of Marine Corps civic action and was probably the essence of short-term, high-

impact civic action. But the most effective medical assistance was that which reinforced the existing Vietnamese rural health service and that carried out as part of revolutionary development. It was generally true that the words, short-term and high-impact, best described Marine Corps civic action. But the levels of service established in programs involving Marine Corps support had to be delicately curtailed in many cases to ensure the same level of service after the departure of the Marine units.

Sixth, civic action encouraged and supported projects which used Vietnamese talent and materials to the maximum practical extent. A guiding principle in civic action projects proved to be self-help on the part of the peasantry. Self-help projects meant more to the peasants than gifts; and the Viet Cong, who were barometers of the effectiveness of Marine Corps actions, normally avoided damage to projects which were the result of peasant labor. On the other hand, government or Marine Corps projects were fair game for criticism and destruction. The peasants had to have a predominating influence in projects which were, after all, aimed at beneficial change for them. Marine Corps ingenuity could never be allowed to predominate if civic action programs were going to have lasting significance for the Vietnamese people and be a source of lasting influence for their governing officials.(53)



Clothes for old women: clothes along with food and medicine were the most important commodities distributed by Marines. The essence of this view seems to be that happiness is a bundle of old clothes. The youngster looks pleased also. The distribution was made late in 1966 at Ly Son island off the coast near Chu Lai by MAG-26. (USMC A421460)

NOTES

Chapter I

1. Based on 1stLt Kenneth W. Clem, Ltr. Background Data on Killed or Captured Viet Cong, dtd 17 April 1967, presently on file in Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQ, U. S. Marine Corps.
2. Clem, Ltr., Background Data, 17Apr67.
3. Vietnamese villages often include hamlets with identical names differentiated only by a following numeral.
4. New York Times, 8 March 1965, p. A-3.
5. Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, Ltr 6/DAC/k1, 5700 16 June 1965 to Commanding General, III MAF, paras 1-4.
6. William A. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification in Vietnam: 1962-1965 (Advanced Research Projects Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense; May 1966), pp. 138-154. See also HQ (G-2), FMFPac, A Marine's Guide to the Republic of Vietnam, 11 May 1966.
7. FMFPac, III MAF Operations, December 1966 (S), pp. 30, 31.
8. 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, Command Chronology, February 1966 (S). The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines was the successor to the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines at Hue/Phu Bai and continued the CAC operations of the former unit.

Chapter II

1. U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services, Vietnam Information Notes, Number 1, February 1967, pp. 2, 3.
2. Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis, Revised Edition (New York: 1965), pp. 252-253. 336.
3. See the New York Times, 13 June 1965, for a concise summary of the political shifts in Vietnam from November 1963-June 1965.
4. Washington Post, 19 June 1965, p. 1. See also Ky's description of the critical nature of the Vietnamese situation in the Washington Post, 20 June 1965, p. 1.

5. "Charts" and "Summaries" provided by Mr. J. J. Helble, Office of South Vietnamese Affairs, Department of State, dtd 1 March 1965, 19 June 1965, 12 October 1965, 21 February 1966, 13 July 1966, 18 November 1966, and 28 January 1967 (hereinafter referred to as Helble, "Charts" and "Summaries").

6. Single Sheet entitled The Government of the Republic of Vietnam, Field Administration and Local Government, Unofficial as of January 1966, and Produced by the U. S. Agency for International Development, Public Administration Division. See also, Department of State, Agency for International Development, A Vietnamese District Chief in Action, pp. 19, 31. The term, hamlet, is used in this paper to include the traditional "thon" or small village (hamlet) and the "xa" or village of normal size. The term, village, is used to refer to the grouped village or unit of administrative convenience.

7. Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, G-3 Division, Civic Action Branch, Notes for Public Appearances (effective March 1967), p. 2. The quotation has a certain poetical meter and was quoted in its most effective form.

8. George A. Carver, Jr. "The Faceless Viet Cong," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 3, April 1966, pp. 347-372. Carver's work is a detailed analysis of the organization of the Viet Cong movement. Carver emphasizes the use of terror by the Viet Cong and notes that the main strength of the movement is in the countryside.

9. Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Civil Affairs, Plans and Policies Division, Civic Action Branch, Revolutionary Development Planning, p. 2.

10. Headquarters, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, MACJ332, dtd 23 November 1965, Establishment of the 1966 Rural Construction (Pacification) Plan, pp. 1, 2.

11. Helble, "Charts" and "Summaries".

12. Richard C. Kriegel, Jr., Revolutionary Development: Last Chance for Victory in Vietnam, pp. 1-12. This document is a pamphlet presently on file in the Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQ, U. S. Marine Corps. Kriegel was one of the U. S. advisors to General Thang at the National Training Center, Vung Tau, in 1966. General Thang carried out the training of the revolutionary development cadres at Vung Tau.

Chapter III

1. Jerome of Westphalia originated the remark that "man could do anything with bayonets but sit on them." He made the remark during a conversation with his redoubtable relative, Napoleon I.

2. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Operations, Field Manual No. 41-10, p. 88.

3. Ibid.

4. In 1965 the government's plan to secure the countryside, and hence, the state was called rural construction. The term revolutionary development appeared at the turn of 1966 and replaced the words, rural construction, as the general description of the government's plan for survival.

5. Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Civil Affairs, Civic Action Branch, Revolutionary Development Planning, pp. 1-4.

6. HQ, U. S. Marine Corps, G-3 Division, Civic Action Branch, Notes for Public Appearances, p. 5. The definition was a general one. A definition applying more directly to the situation in Vietnam was found in III MAF Order 1750.1, 7 June 1965, p. 1.

7. Ibid., p. 4. The definition was based on, Departments of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, Joint Manual for Civil Affairs, November 1966, para. 4-5.

8. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification, pp. 161-166.

9. Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Civil Affairs, Civic Action Branch, Chart: US/GVN Organization for Revolutionary Development, SVN.

10. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification, p. 287. The author emphasizes the central importance of security for any progress in revolutionary development.

11. Major Charles J. Keever, III MAF Civic Action Summary, pp. 7-13. This document is a 16-page authoritative description of Marine Corps civic action by the first Civic Action Officer of III MAF.

Chapter IV

1. HQ, U. S. Marine Corps, G-3 Division, Historical Branch, Manuscript, Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, January 1965-June 1965 (S) p. 8.
2. U. S. Department of State, White Paper, "Aggression from the North," excerpts in The Viet-Nam Reader: Articles and documents on American Foreign Policy in the Viet-Nam Crisis, ed. by Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall (New York: 1965), pp. 143-154.
3. Washington Post, 8 March 1965, p. 1. See also the Philadelphia Inquirer, 8 March 1965, p. 1 and the editorial page.
4. 9th MEB, Command Chronology, March 1965 (S), pp. 1, 2.
5. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force, Vietnam, March-September 1965 (S), pp. 1, 5, 18.
6. 9th MEB, Command Chronology, March 1965 (S). The whole chronology exudes concern over the problems of the buildup.
7. 9th MEB, Command Chronology, April 1965 (S), p. 4.
8. FMFPac, Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force, Vietnam, March-September 1965 (S), pp. 17-24.
9. Washington Post, 7 May 1965.
10. 3d MAB Command Diary, April/May 1965, p. 23.
11. LtCol David A. Clement, Taped Interview #189: Civic Action Program of the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, pp. 63-77.
12. FMFPac, III MAF Operations, March-September 1965, (S), pp. 26-31.
13. HQ, USMACV, Letter of Instruction, Da Nang Administrative Coordination, 29 May 1965, pp. 1-3.
14. Force Order 1750.1, Concepts of Civic Action in the Republic of Vietnam, 7 June 1965.
15. Ibid., p. 1. The problems were described succinctly under the heading, "Background."
16. Ibid., p. 2, para. 2.
17. Ibid., p. 2, para. 6.

18. See the Howard Margolis column in The Washington Post, 11 June 1965.
19. HQ, III MAF, Civic Action Report, 8 March-15 July 1965, dtd 18 July 1965, Enclosures (4), (5), (6), (10), (13), (14), (16).
20. Ibid., Enclosure (13).
21. 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, Command Chronology, June 1965 (S), pp. 1-3 of the Narrative.
22. FMFPac, III MAF Operations, March-September 1965, (S), pp. 27, 35. The exact figures were 8,204 (25May65) and 17,601 (15Jun65).
23. HQ, III MAF, Civic Action Report, 8 March-15 July 1965, Enclosure (13).
24. Ibid.
25. 1stLt William F. B. Francis, Taped Interview #120: Work as Civil Affairs Officer, 3d Marines, 15 April-15 July 1965, pp. 38-51.
26. Ibid., p. 49.
27. Ibid., p. 40.
28. Ibid., pp. 50, 51.
29. Capt Lionel V. Silva, Taped Interview #37: Civic Action in the Le My Area, pp. 1-18.
30. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
31. See the remarkably detailed account of the action in the Baltimore Sun, 1 July 1965, p. 1. See also, HQ, U. S. Marine Corps, Division of Information, United Press International Clips, 1600 (local time) 1 July 1965.
32. FMFPac, III MAF Operations, March-September 1965 (S) pp. 33, 34.
33. III MAF, Command Chronology, July 1965 (S), p. 6.
34. III MAF Order 5800.3, 17 June 1965, Civic Action Medical Teams, p. 3.
35. III MAF, Command Chronology, July 1965 (S), p. 6.
36. HQ, III MAF, Civic Action Reports, 8 March-15 July 1965, p. 2.

37. Ibid., Enclosure (3), p. 2.
38. CARE Fact Sheet, effective May 1967, pp. 1, 3.
39. See OPNAV Instruction 5726.3A, dtd 28 August 1964, and the information sheet, Commander J. F. Dow, Project Handclasp/Civic Action, dtd 10 November 1965.
40. 3d Engineer Battalion (Reinf) (Forward), Command Chronology, 1-31 July 1965 (S), Part II, third and fourth pages (pages not numbered).
41. The problem of payment of claims was especially important in both the Da Nang and Chu Lai TAORs because of the problems of airfield construction, maintenance, and defense.
42. Keever, III MAF Civic Action Summary, pp. 3-4.
43. HQ, 4th Marines, Regimental Order 6000.1, dtd 23 June 1965, pp. 1-2.
44. HQ, III MAF, Civic Action Report, 8 March-15 July 1965, Encl. (14).
45. In 1965 and 1966 civilian personnel of the U. S. Operations Mission were established no lower than province level. The situation was only beginning to change by April 1967. See the chart entitled, US/GVN Organization for Revolutionary Development and held by U. S. Army, Office of the Chief of Operations, Civil Affairs Division, Civic Action Branch.
46. III MAF, Combat Information Bureau, Release No. 247-65, 16 July 1965. See also Pacific Stars and Stripes, 26 July 1965.
47. CO, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, Ltr 6/DAC/klj, 5700, 16Jun65, Reconstruction of Le My (known to local people as Hoa Loc village, district of Hoa Vang, province of Quang Nam), Encl: (9).
48. 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, Command Chronology, July 1965 (S), Situation Report 104, 19 July 1965.
49. See, for example, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, Ltr 6/DAC/kl, 5700 16 June 1965, para. 3.
50. Special Operations Research Office, American University, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, 1 December 1965, pp. 182, 183. This document appeared in September 1966 as Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 550-104.
51. FMFPac, III MAF Operations, March-September 1965 (S), pp. 11-14. See also, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, Civic Action Situation Report, 2 December 1965.

Chapter V

1. Interview with Col Don P. Wyckoff, dtd 5 June 1967. Col Wyckoff was the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, 3d MarDiv in August 1965.
2. Kever, III MAF Civic Action Summary, pp. 6-8, 10.
3. See the description of the various civic action programs in HQ, III MAF, Civic Action Report, 8 March-15 July 1965, Enclosures (1), (2), (3), for a brief, general description of civic action through the middle of July.
4. HQ, III MAF, Minutes of Planning Meeting /for a Regional Working Group/, 30 August 1965.
5. HQ, III MAF, Civil Affairs Officer, Memo to Deputy Chief of Staff, 29 August 1965. This document contained a suggested mission which was accepted by the planning meeting of the I Corps JCC on 30 August 1965.
6. HQ, U. S. Marine Corps, G-3 Division, Civic Action Branch, I Corps Joint Coordinating Council, Summary of Activities During CY 1966.
7. HQ, III MAF, Minutes of the Meeting of the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council, Statement of Mission, Composition, and Functions I Corps Joint Coordinating Council.
8. HQ, III MAF, Minutes of the Meeting of the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council, 15 November 1965, para. 3.
9. LtCol Verle E. Ludwig, "Bus to Tra Khe," Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 50, no. 10, October 1966, p. 34.
10. Col Bryce F. Denno USA, "Viet Cong Defeat at Phuoc Chau," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 49, No. 3, March 1965, p. 35.
11. Recall the quotation of the village elder from, Notes for Public Appearances, Civic Action Branch, G-3 Division, HQ, U. S. Marine Corps: "...the Viet Cong never take anything, they tax...."
12. New York Times, 20 August 1965.
13. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification, pp. 177-179.
14. MSgt George Wilson, "Combined Action," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 50, No. 10, October 1966, pp. 28-31.
15. See the article in the Washington Post, 22 September 1965, entitled "Viet Militiamen are Attached to U. S. Marines," by Mr. Jack Foisie, reporter for the Los Angeles Times.

16. Captain Francis J. West, Jr., The CAC as a Catalyst, mimeographed sheet recounting the impressions of Captain West after duty with the CACs in Vietnam in late 1966.
17. HQ, U. S. Marine Corps, Division of Reserve, Mimeographed Sheets Entitled, Marine Corps Civic Action Fund for Vietnam-Summary, two pages.
18. Ronwyn M. Ingraham, Assistant Director, Washington, D. C. Office CARE, Inc., Letter addressed to Major Stevens and Captain Smith, dated 26 August 1965.
19. Marine Corps Order 5710.4, dtd 13 September 1965.
20. HQ, U. S. Marine Corps, Division of Reserve, Reserve Civic Action Fund-Summary, two pages.

Chapter VI

1. See The New York Times, 8 September 1965, p. 1, and The Washington Post, 9 September 1965, p. 12, for details about PIRANHA.
2. Washington News, 7 September 1965, p. 8.
3. FMFPac, III MAF Operations, October 1965 (S), p. 24. See also, FMFPac, III MAF Operations, December 1965 (S), p. 51.
4. FMFPac, III MAF Operations, October 1965 (S), p.23, and FMFPac, III MAF Operations, December 1965 (S), p. 50.
5. III MAF, Command Chronology, October 1965 (S), Part Three, p. 10.
6. HQ, III MAF, Press Release, 29 October 1965.
7. Interview with Capt Thomas J. McGowan, USMC, on 19 April 1967 at HQ, U. S. Marine Corps. Capt McGowan was Executive Officer, Company I, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines at the time of the action.
8. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, Command Chronology, October 1965 (S), p. 12.
9. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, Command Chronology, October 1965 (S), p. 10.
10. This rural construction effort had several names including the following: (1) Quang Nam Pacification Project, (2) Ngu Hanh Son (FIVE MOUNTAINS) Pacification Campaign.
11. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification, pp. 150-154. This account is thin on detail but does emphasize the importance of security

and the challenge of rural construction after two years of Viet Cong gains.

12. 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, Civic Action Situation Reports, Reports Nos. 1-7, Operation FIVE MOUNTAINS.
13. 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, Civic Action Situation Report, 3 January 1966, Report No. 7, Operation FIVE MOUNTAINS
14. FMFPac, III MAF Operations, November 1965 (S), p. 16.
15. FMFPac, III MAF Operations, November 1965 (S), p. 2.
16. A small unit was defined as a company or smaller organization.
17. Clem, Ltr, Background Data, 17 April 1967.
18. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification, pp. 95, 285-288, 291-292. See also, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, Civic Action Situation Report, 21 December 1965, Report No. 6, Operation FIVE MOUNTAINS.
19. 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, Civic Action Situation Report 15 December 1965. The Report shows the medical activity of the battalion on 13 December 1965 and gives a lucid picture of the effectiveness of the mobile concept. A total of 655 persons were assisted on 13 December 1965.
20. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, Command Chronology, November 1965 (S), p. 7.
21. Ibid., p. 8.
22. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, Command Chronology, November 1965 (S), Enclosure (8), After Action Report No. 8-65.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 9.
25. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, Civic Action Situation Report, 2 December 1965. The report of 2 December 1965 included part of the civic action summary for November 1965.
26. FMFPac, III MAF Operations, December 1965 (S), pp. 50-51. **FMFPac**, III MAF Operations, October 1965 (S), pp. 23-24. FMFPac, III MAF Operations, March-September 1965 (S), pp. 32,48.
27. Ibid. (The material in this paragraph is based on the data in the listing preceding it in the text).

28. See the material contained in 3d Marine Division, Civic Action Situation Reports, 1-31 December 1965. The information in this massive source supports a view that Marine Corps civic action was not yet fully coordinated with either Vietnamese local government or rural construction.
29. Compare, LtCol Clement, Taped Interview #189, pp. 67-69, with 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, Civic Action Situation Report, 1 January 1966, to see the unchanged problem of security between June 1965-December 1965.
30. See 3d Marine Division, Civic Action Situation Reports, for the months of December and January 1965/1966. They form a voluminous account largely of the soft type of civic action.
31. 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, Civic Action Situation Report /hereinafter abbreviated to SitReps/, 1 January 1966.
32. The shot in the back of Mr. Truong's head was probably fired from close range by unhurried gunmen who had downed the chief with three previous shots.
33. See the brief analysis of security in, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, Civic Action Situation Report, 21 December 1965, Report No. 6, Operation FIVE MOUNTAINS.
34. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification, pp. 161-163.
35. 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, Civic Action Sit Rep, 1-7 January 1966, Report Number 7, Operation FIVE MOUNTAINS.
36. Ibid.
37. The Republic of Vietnam, Quang Nam Province, Hoa Vang District, the Northwest Zone, Impressions of the People of Northwest Hoa Vang District, 12 June 1965. This letter was also included as Enclosure (1) to HQ, III MAF, Ltr. 1/drw 5720 29 June 1965.
38. 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, Civic Action Sit Rep, 1700, 22 December 1965. The italics were included in the report.
39. 3d Marine Division, Civic Action Sit Reps, 1-7 December 1965. For the quotation see 3d Tank Battalion, Civic Action Sit Rep, 2 December 1965.
40. 3d Tank Battalion, Civic Action Sit Rep, 25 January 1966.
41. 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, Civic Action Sit Rep, 2 January 1966.
42. 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, Civic Action Sit Rep 25 December 1965.