June 25: (cont.)

We think that the Cambodian incursions have been very successful from a military standpoint. We have captured more military supplies and equipment and food than we captured in all of South Viet-Nam last year. We think it will be very difficult for the enemy to resupply, to establish lines of communication, to organize attacks on our forces in South Viet-Nam to the extent that they might otherwise have been able to do.

It is encouraging, I think, this morning to learn about the statistics of last week. As you know, our casualties last week were the lowest in 3 or 4 months. The total casualties in South Viet-Nam were, I think, 60 last week. We would hope that the casualty rate will continue at a low rate.

One of the reasons the President, as you know, made the decision that he did was in the belief that in the long run our casualty rates would be down.

And I think it is also encouraging to notice that the casualty rate—our casualty rates in Cambodia were considerably less than we had anticipated, because total casualties to date in Cambodia have been about 320. At one point in the discussions leading up to the decision by the President, there were predictions that our casualties in Cambodia might run as high as 500 a week for a while.

So I think, overall, the Cambodian decision was a wise one and I think it will result in a lot less loss of life on the part of the American forces.

Murrey [Murrey Marder, Washington Post].

Q. Mr. Secretary, reports from the scene say that the United States is engaged in combat air support for the Cambodian troops. U.S. spokesmen say the United States is engaged in air interdiction. Is this a distinction without a difference? And secondly, how do you describe the state of U.S. guarantees in Cambodia? Is the United States engaging in a widening involvement in the Cambodian war?
June 25: (cont.)

A. Well, the President's policy on air interdiction is that at the present time and after our troops leave Cambodia, our Air Force will be used, be permitted to interdict the supply lines and communication lines in Cambodia.

And, as you know, yesterday Mr. Hanquin, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, pointed out that General Abrams [Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Viet-Nam] is following those orders.

It is obvious, of course, that there will be times when, in the process of interdicting supply lines or communication lines of the enemy, that will be of direct benefit to the present government in Cambodia. But I think the main thrust of our policy is to use our Air Force for the purpose of interdicting supply lines and communication lines to protect Americans in South Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I believe yesterday a spokesman for the Cambodian Military Command stated that American fighter bombers were flying missions in direct support of Cambodian forces. Now, was he mistaken, or do I perceive a change in our policy?

A. Well, as I have just said to Mr. Marder, I think that I can see very well why a Cambodian might think it was helpful to the government when we fly those missions.

But our purpose is to interdict communications and supply lines of the enemy. As I say, that's our purpose. That is our policy. Obviously, it may have a dual benefit; it may serve our purposes and at the same time serve the Cambodian Government.
June 29:

Secretary William P. Rogers Address before the Department of State's National Foreign Policy Conference for Editors and Broadcasters, San Francisco. DSB, v. LXIII, #1621: 79.

We support and encourage Cambodia's expressed desire to remain neutral. We have no other objective than to have its neutrality respected by all nations. We have no desire to associate it with SEATO or to seek to have it aligned with ourselves or anybody else. We maintain friendly relations with the present government of Cambodia, obviously, as we did with its predecessor.

November 25:

Statement by Secretary William P. Rogers before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. DSB, v. LXIII, #1642: 714-715.

Cambodia's involvement in war is the result of events over which that small country has had little control. The North Vietnamese, who had long occupied Cambodia along the border provinces, decided last April to compound their violations of Cambodia's territories by undertaking actions throughout much of the country. This left the Cambodian Government no choice but to defend itself. Realizing this would require a good deal of outside help, the Cambodians reacted initially by submitting to us a request for $400 million in assistance. The aid they asked for would have included many expensive and sophisticated weapons.

Sympathetic as we were to Cambodia's plight, and much as we realized that what it contemplated doing would contribute to our own goals in Viet-Nam, we did not agree to this approach. We recognized that if we complied with the Cambodian request we might have had to establish a large American presence to go along with the aid. We were concerned that we would be gradually sucked into greater and greater involvement as we had been in Vietnam and finally would be pressured into extensive use of ground forces.
Instead, we decided to use our aid in a totally different way, taking advantage of Cambodia's principal assets: its strong sense of nationalism and patriotic determination to repel the North Vietnamese invaders. Thus it was that our cross-border operations last spring were limited in time, in area, and in objective. They succeeded in depriving the North Vietnamese of free use of the border-sanctuary areas, and they greatly assisted our troop withdrawal program in Viet-Nam. They also gave the Cambodian Government an opportunity in cooperating with other neighboring nations to establish its own substantial military force.

Since last spring, our aid to Cambodia has taken the form of providing weapons and ammunition that the Cambodians are fully capable of using themselves. Through an all-out mobilization effort -- 150,000 men are now under arms -- and with the assistance of its friends, including training, Cambodia has thus far succeeded in preserving its independence and sovereignty. We have no military forces or advisers in Cambodia, nor do we intend to send any.

The Cambodians have made it clear that they want to do the job themselves. Their continued interdiction of North Vietnamese lines of communication throughout Cambodia is improving the military situation in Viet-Nam and facilitating our troop withdrawals. Thus the situation is entirely different than it was in Viet-Nam.

But despite a high degree of national unity, Cambodia still lacks the wherewithal to carry on the fight. Its traditional export earnings from rice and rubber and its income from tourism have been radically reduced. For the immediate future -- and particularly in the face of a possible enemy offensive during the coming dry season -- additional aid will be urgently needed.
November 25:  
(cont.)

December 8:

The $70 million requested for economic assistance is essential to sustain the Cambodian defense effort and is designed only in part to offset the loss of normal export earnings. Cambodia is not creating an elaborate military machine. Rather it is set on keeping in the field units that can be rapidly trained to cope with the North Vietnamese efforts to reestablish supply lines and harass the Cambodian Government wherever possible.

Over 70% of the military assistance request for Cambodia is for ammunition. The remainder will be used for small arms, trucks, a small number of propeller-driven aircraft, communications equipment, river patrol boats, and similar items.

The United States is not alone in providing help. Military or humanitarian aid has also been forthcoming from neighboring South Vietnam and Thailand and from Australia and Japan.

Statement by Secretary William P. Rogers before the Senate Committee on Appropriations. DSB, v. LXIV, ¶1646: 63-64.

There are indications that a multilateral approach for economic assistance to Cambodia may be developing, a mechanism which we would favor. Cambodia has asked for the help of International Monetary Fund experts for advice on the best way to manage domestic resources to meet the cost of the war. In announcing a second grant of $2 million humanitarian economic assistance for Cambodia on December 1, Japanese Minister Aichi said that if such an approach is developed, sentiment for augmented assistance to Cambodia will be focused on considering the type and scale of assistance to extend and Japan will consult with other countries in this regard.

The United States respects Cambodia's neutral stance. We respect Cambodia's desire to do the job as far as possible itself. We are deeply concerned about the effect of the war in Cambodia on our objectives in Vietnam. We have formulated our appropriation request with these considerations in mind.
January 29:


A. The United States is not fighting for the defense of Cambodia. The United States is fighting to protect the American forces in South Viet-Nam. Now, in that connection, we are prepared to use airpower to the fullest possible extent necessary to protect American lives. And the principal objective of the United States as far as Cambodia is concerned is to prevent the enemy from reestablishing its base areas in Cambodia which it can use against American forces.

Now, that use of airpower is not going to cause us to get bogged down in a land war in Cambodia or Laos. But we are going to continue to use that airpower, because it protects American lives. It's the least costly way to protect our men — and why we should have any restriction on the use of that airpower to protect American lives, I don't know.

...We will not provide ground combat forces. And I think that's the term that's fairly clear — that we won't send men into Cambodia to fight on the ground. Secondly, we will not have advisers for Cambodian units.

Now, "advisers," I believe — and I told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this yesterday — I believe "advisers" means that we will not send Americans with a combat unit in a combat environment to give them advice about how to conduct the combat.

Now, we do have, because we have to make military deliveries under the supplemental aid program — we will have to have military equipment delivery teams. But they will be essentially auditors that will keep track of the material, make the deliveries, keep track of the inventories, etc. Now, the law requires that.

Now, it's conceivable that there could be some argument about definition, but I don't think it's much of a problem. The fact is that, you know, if we're going to send troops in to fight in Cambodia — either to fight or to help the other — help Cambodians while they're fighting — we can't do that. We're not going to do that. That's the dividing line.
On other things, such as the use of airpower, providing transportation for logistics — or even for men — we propose to do that, because that in a sense will make the lives of our men safer. It will help us with our program, and that’s what the President has in mind.

President Nixon said during his press conference on November 12: “Cambodia is the Nixon Doctrine in purest form... because in Cambodia what we are doing is helping the Cambodians to help themselves, and we are doing that rather than to go in and do the fighting ourselves ...”

With military and economic assistance, we are aiding a government in Cambodia which seeks to preserve the sovereignty, neutrality, and territorial integrity of the Khmer Republic.

The Republic is facing a grave military threat. Throughout 1971, Cambodia continued its resistance to North Vietnamese and Viet Cong invaders and fought to preserve its independence with armed forces consisting largely of untrained and inexperienced volunteers.

The North Vietnamese invaders made no large gains in 1971 over the preceding year, but neither could they be dislodged from the areas they seized in mid-1970. Employing economy of force tactics, the invaders sought victories of high psychological yield in efforts to undermine Cambodian morale. While continuing to deny their own presence in Cambodia, the North Vietnamese have sought to recruit and organize indigenous insurgents in the country as an anti-government force behind whose facade they could march. The enemy holds the national park containing the ruins of Angkor Wat and other temples. The Cambodian Government has twice made international appeals for the demilitarization and neutralization of this sacred area and has raised the question in U.N. forums, but to no avail.

Economic and Political Development. In FY 1971, as authorized by the Congress, we obligated $185 million for military assistance to Cambodia, $70 million for economic assistance, and $8.5 million in agricultural commodities under Public Law 480. The Administration's requests for authority for assistance for Cambodia for FY 1972 were not significantly greater than in 1971. In FY 1972, we will provide basic equipment and necessary training. Our military assistance goals in Cambodia, therefore, continue to be the equipment, training, and supply of a military force designed essentially as light infantry.

In August 1971, at the behest of Cambodian Prime Minister Lon Nol, who was recovering from an illness, Acting Prime Minister Sisowath Sirik Matak came to Washington personally to thank the President and the American people for the assistance rendered to his nation, assistance without which he said, they would have been unable to survive.

Cambodia's continued survival as a nation has meant that the North Vietnamese aggressors are under pressure on their western flank. This situation, in turn, has enhanced the prospects for the success of Vietnamization, including the continued withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam. But the Cambodians are fighting for their own survival and have demonstrated that they are worthy of our support under the Nixon Doctrine.

Statement by Secretary William P. Rogers before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. DSB, v. LXVIII, #1757: 223.

In Cambodia, President Lon Nol declared a unilateral cessation of hostilities on January 28, reserving only the right of self-defense, and there has been a considerable lessening of military activity. Also
there are signs that certain elements of the Khmer insurgents are reconsidering their heretofore intransigent attitude toward the Cambodian Government, as well as signs that the North Vietnamese are less involved in combat operations. In response to its requests we continue to support the Cambodian Government with both military and economic assistance. The supply of military equipment remains at a modest scale. U.S. air support is in line with President Lon Nol's declared policy to cease offensive operations while reserving the right of self-defense.

Statement by Secretary William P. Rogers before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. DSB, v. LXVIII, #1759: 283.

The Lao settlement is yet another important step in the overall solution to the Indochina problem. It gives hope for a resolution to the Cambodian situation. However, it must be noted that President Lon Nol's declaration of a unilateral end to offensive operations on January 28 has unfortunately been met by an increase in Khmer insurgent hostilities. There were some early signs that certain elements of the insurgents were considering a positive response to the unilateral action by the Cambodian Government, but these have not been borne out. Let us hope that the progress toward peace in Vietnam and Laos may have its effect in creating a momentum toward peace in Cambodia.


But the most important thing we can do is to give full recognition and meaning to the single most important provision in the agreement relating to Laos and Cambodia. I refer to article 20 (b). The article says that foreign countries shall put an end to all military activities in Laos and Cambodia, totally withdraw from and refrain from reintroducing into these two countries troops, military advisers, and military personnel.

Why do I underscore the importance of this provision? Because if the provision is scrupulously observed then the problems that remain will be problems for indigenous populations to solve. Solutions to those problems, we are convinced, can and will be reached peacefully—and without delay.

Stated another way: The war continues in Cambodia and the cease-fire in Laos is not yet fully effective because of the presence of foreign forces in those countries.

Therefore, by endorsing the Paris agreement, we support article 20(b) calling for the removal of all foreign forces from Laos and Cambodia. When this provision is honored the cease-fire agreement in Laos will be honored and peace will come to Cambodia.

That, I believe, should be our fifth order of business.

March 2: Secretary William P. Rogers' News Conference, Paris, France. DSB. v. LXVIII, #1761: 343.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the fact that the declaration today specifically includes mention of Laos and Cambodia, will the machinery for reconvening the conference in the event of a breach of the peace also apply to the situations in Laos and Cambodia?

Secretary Rogers: I think as far as the decision about reconvening is concerned, it has to be based on the language of the act; and if peace is jeopardized and six parties to the act feel that reconvening would be helpful and would be a constructive act, then they can call for reconvening. Now, I would not want to...
March 2: (cont.) speculate as to what particular situations would require that decision to be made. But as you know we have said—and I have said in my statement—we think peace in that area of the world is indivisible and therefore we are looking at peace in Indochina, not just peace in any one country. That is one of the provisions of the Paris agreement; that was one of the purposes of this conference—to consider peace in Indochina—and therefore I think any decision about reconvening the conference will have to take into account the whole picture in Indochina.

March 11: Interview with Secretary William P. Rogers on CBS's "Face the Nation." DSB. v. LXVIII, #1762: 376.

Mr. Herman: I noticed in the wires overnight that our bombers were out over Cambodia again. When do you expect peace in Cambodia?

Secretary Rogers: It's difficult to make any prophecy about that, because the situation is particularly complex in Cambodia. One of the reasons for that is that the Government of Cambodia has difficulty in finding who to talk to. The insurgents—the opposition to the government is split up. There are those Communists who are indigenous to, apparently, to Cambodia; there are others that are supported by other nations. So there's no one group that the Lon Nol government can discuss a negotiated settlement with. We hope that that will change. We hope that there will be some opportunity, through negotiated settlement, as was done in Laos.

April: United States Foreign Policy 1972: A Report of the Secretary of State. 1/

The neutrality, independence, and territorial integrity of the Khmer Republic is a key point of U.S. policy in this area. In the face of grave military threats to the Republic from the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, we have pursued our policy of granting military and economic assistance to Phnom Penh to enable Cambodia to survive and defend itself. Following the general cease-fire in Vietnam on

January 27, 1973, the Government of the Khmer Republic (G.K.R.) announced a unilateral cease-fire for offensive operations effective 24 hours later in order to permit the Communist Vietnamese forces to depart in peace. Unfortunately, the other side did not respond to this action, and hostilities continued. The G.K.R. continues efforts to initiate contacts through various channels with insurgent elements, but the insurgents have only repeated their opposition to any compromise with the Government of President Lon Nol to end the fighting.

Throughout 1972, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces, assisted by their Khmer insurgent allies, attacked population centers and routes of communication as part of their continuing effort to destroy the government and eventually to replace it with one amenable to their ideology. Most of the fighting was for control of the vital roads and riverways that carry food and military supplies to government forces and to the capital and to protect the supply line to Vietnam.

In March 1972 the bulk of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units left from Cambodian bases to join the general invasion of South Vietnam. Also in March Soviet-made rockets killed over 100 civilians in Phnom Penh, and enemy troops subjected the capital to several serious ground attacks. Communist terrorists kept up their bombing, grenadeing, and other violence, including attempts to assassinate two successive Prime Ministers and the U.S. Chargé d'Affaires.

The United States continues to supply the Khmer Republic's light infantry force of 220,000 men. U.S. economic aid funds more than 50 percent of the country's imports. In FY-72 we obligated $180 million for military assistance and $53.6 million for economic assistance--about the same as in the previous fiscal year.

The Government of the Khmer Republic instituted a number of fiscal reforms recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), including currency devaluation, adoption of a realistic foreign exchange system.
April (cont.)

higher taxes and interest rates. The first year's experience with the Exchange Support Fund, created to shore up the country's foreign exchange requirements, has been satisfactory. Eight nations, including the G.K.R., contributed almost $35 million to the Fund in 1972. Plans are now being readied for U.S. aid for postwar recovery and refugee resettlement.

Despite the war the G.K.R. has been able to establish the new republican institutions promised in 1970. A new constitution drafted in early 1972 was accepted by a large majority. In June, Marshal Lon Nol, the incumbent Prime Minister, was elected the President of Cambodia's first Republic. Legislative elections were held in August for a 126-man National Assembly and a 40-man Senate.

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IV. Statements of the Secretaries of Defense

1971


Communist strength in Cambodia is estimated to be over 55,000 VC/NVA forces and Khmer Communists. Communist activity here has been characterized by persistent light-to-heavy military pressure against population centers, increased acts of terrorism, sabotage and interdiction of major lines of communication throughout the countryside. Current Communist strength in Laos is estimated at about 145,000 North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao.

1972


President Nixon said on November 12, 1971:

"... Cambodia is the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form. Vietnam was in violation of the Nixon Doctrine. Because in Cambodia what we are doing is helping the Cambodians to help themselves, and we are doing that rather than to go in and do the fighting ourselves, as we did in Korea and as we did in Vietnam."

During the past year, the U.S. security assistance program in Cambodia has been an excellent example of how we believe the Nixon Doctrine should be implemented. In the first place, U.S. assistance is confined to military and economic aid, and some air support, with Cambodia assuming the basic responsibility for its own self defense. The U.S. has no ground troops and no military advisers in Cambodia.

Additionally, the U.S. assistance effort is being complemented by military and economic aid from a growing number of Cambodia's friends in East Asia and the world. In January, a group of seven countries agreed to contribute to an economic stabilization fund for Cambodia. The most...
direct assistance, of course, is coming from South Vietnam. Indeed, one of the most encouraging developments of the last year was the increasing number of combined operations conducted by Cambodian and South Vietnamese forces against NVA/VC forces in Eastern Cambodia.

Most heartening of all has been Cambodia's own efforts to defend her territory and her people against the North Vietnamese invaders. Cambodia has expanded its military manpower six-fold in the past year and has been able to maintain the major populated areas under government control. Despite enemy interuption efforts, Cambodia has kept open the major highways and is now assuming responsibility for Mekong River convoys from the South Vietnamese border to Phnom Penh.

These Cambodian efforts have, of course, also placed additional strain on the NVA/VC logistical system and helped to relieve pressure on U.S. and allied forces in South Vietnam. Thus, in the military area there has been considerable progress in the past year. But much more still needs to be done, particularly in the fields of training and logistics. These are the tasks we and our friends will be assisting Cambodia with in the coming year.

The North Vietnamese threat in Southeast Asia remains formidable. As of early March, 1973, there were more than 230,000 North Vietnamese/Viet Cong personnel in the Republic of Vietnam, about 70-90,000 VC/NVA and Khmer Communist in Cambodia, and over 100,000 NVA and Pathet Lao in Laos. These forces are heavily reinforced by both artillery and tanks.
WCPD. vol. 9, #4: 49. Regarding Cambodia and Laos, Article 20:

(a) The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam shall strictly respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Cambodia and the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos, which recognized the Cambodian and the Lao peoples' fundamental national rights, i.e., the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of these countries. The parties shall respect the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos.

The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam undertake to refrain from using the territory of Cambodia and the territory of Laos to encroach on the sovereignty and security of one another and of other countries.

(b) Foreign countries shall put an end to all military activities in Cambodia and Laos, totally withdraw from and refrain from reintroducing into these two countries troops, military advisers and military personnel, armaments, munitions and war material.

(c) The internal affairs of Cambodia and Laos shall be settled by the people of each of these countries without foreign interference.

(d) The problems existing between the Indochinese countries shall be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of respect for each others' independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and non-interference in each others' internal affairs.

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Text of the Note Sent by the United States to Participants of the Paris Conference on Vietnam.1/

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam further alleges United States violation of the "independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and neutrality" of Cambodia by continuing to conduct military activities in that country. In fact, these activities are limited to air-support operations in response to the continued military operations in Cambodia by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and were requested by the Khmer Republic itself. In late January, the Government of the Khmer Republic suspended all offensive operations and the United States likewise halted offensive air operations. However, the reaction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Cambodian forces under its control was a total military offensive, despite obligations assumed by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Article 20 of the agreement and Article 8 of the Act of Paris. In order to induce compliance with those essential provisions, without which the entire Vietnam agreement would be endangered, the United States is giving air support to the Khmer forces.