your position as Deputy National Security Advisor, clearly someone very close to the President, close enough to the President that you were sent along to make sure that there was a second judgment in addition to Dr. Kissinger's in the latest round of negotiations, it's your testimony that you did not know of this letter?

A. About that letter, no, I didn't know anything about that letter in terms of the decision made to send it at that particular time, at least I don't recall it. Now, as I told you, the whole issue is a blur to me because I may have learned about that letter afterwards, because I do know about it when you asked the question. I may have read about it in the press or it may have been part of a constant evolution of issues associated with that incentive.

I think as a staff member, when that incentive was raised in front of me -- and this is my recollection; there may be somebody that remembers -- I would have been opposed to it, just as I would have been opposed to paying blackmail for hostages in Iran or any other payoff to people whose level of conduct has proven to be unacceptable.

But it doesn't mean if the difference was $1 billion of American rehabilitation versus the return of all of our prisoners, a peace settlement which would have
worked, that I would be an obstacle to that. I wouldn’t be an obstacle.

Q. You would not be an obstacle?
A. No, under those conditions.

Q. You’ve told us that at least at some earlier time you were aware that this subject was being discussed. What did you perceive to be the advantages, if there were any, of the U.S. promising to pay reconstruction aid, and the disadvantages, if there were any, to such a promise?

A. Well, the advantages would have been to elicit some higher level of cooperation and consistency with the obligations agreed to, talking about the February time frame. Advantages before that time may have been to get them into the frame of mind where they would be.

Do I endorse it? No. No. I remember being appalled by the discussions earlier, but, you know, we had a very diverse NSC, a very diverse staff, a very diverse set of inputs, and that’s healthy. That’s good. But if they had listened to me I might have started on inaugural day of 1969 to bomb Hanoi right into the stone ages.

That’s what I would have done.

And in the case of Johnson, when I worked for McNamara I made up a list, along with another Army officer, that laid out the initial involvement of the United States in Southeast Asia, and there were some 36 recommendations,
the last of which was to mobilize to put Moscow on notice
that we were going to bring the war to Hanoi, to start
moving divisions, to tell the American people you aren't
going to have guns and butter, but a period of great
sacrifice in which world peace was at stake, and we never
would have had a fight in Vietnam.

But that list was cut in half, not by a
politician but the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, and
that was the list that half that list, truncated in half,
were the initial steps -- a Marine division in DaNang,
increased air power, increased advisors, increased Special
Forces. That's how we got into that quagmire.

Now that's really the answer to your question.
You're batting gnats, from my point of view. I understand
why, and I'm not criticizing you. You have to do your job.
But I have to do my job of reminding you you are batting
gnats.

Q. You said you were present for about two or three
weeks of negotiations in late 1972.

A. Yes, a dreadful period.

Q. You recall no discussions during that period
relating to reconstruction aid?

A. May have been, may have been. Probably was.
Probably was, because at that time the whole panorama of
incentives and gives and takes went on in excruciating
Q. Winston Lord testified that in his opinion the North Vietnamese would not have signed the peace agreements absent the promise from us to deliver the aid letter a few days after the signing of the agreements. Do you think that's an accurate statement?

A. He would know better than I would, and Winston Lord is a fellow I respect immensely but don't always agree with. For example, we are at total odds on relationships with the Peoples Republic of China today. I would be at total odds with the product he just produced as to what the future should be for the United States, although I would be the first to say if I had an appointment to be made I'd look at Winston Lord very carefully for a high-level position.

I respect him immensely. I don't always agree with him, and he's not always right any more than I am.

Q. Let me ask the question again. Do you know whether or do you have an opinion as to whether his statement that I just told you about is accurate, that the North Vietnamese would not have --

A. No. It may have been in the context of the way the question was asked that his answer is very precise. From my point of view, it's not, because, as I've already told you, the only way to get them to sign an acceptable
agreement was to continue applying military pressure, which we were forbidden to do in effect.

And, therefore, anything, any subset of calculations under that, were made under duress. Of course they were flawed, because the basic point of departure was flawed.

Q. There's no question from documents we've seen that throughout the negotiations the DRV sought to link the release of U.S. prisoners with the payment by the United States of reparations or reconstruction aid, and it's also clear from all the documents we've read that the U.S. always sought to disentangle those two subjects and to make sure that there was no link between those two.

A. That's right, and that was wise.

Q. Do you think that, notwithstanding our attempts to make sure that there was no link between those two subjects, that it was likely that the North Vietnamese still viewed reconstruction aid and the release of U.S. prisoners as being linked?

A. I can't answer that question. When you start speculating about the intentions of a complex society like that, you're generally going to be wrong, as we've been with respect to the Soviet Union for so many years. So I wouldn't want to throw my weight one way or the other. I kind of doubt it.
Q. Do you know why President Nixon's letter, which was delivered on February 1, 1973, was kept secret?

A. No. I don't know why it would have been, except it was considered sensitive at the time because it might impact on a more objective judgment on the part of Hanoi. I mean, I could make that case.

Q. I don't understand what you meant by that.

A. Well, if it becomes a public matter that you're dealing in flesh -- in other words, you're taking money in order to get POWs out or to do whatever we expected of Hanoi in the process of making that offer -- then it would probably be better in secret.

For example, we would never have had relations with the Peoples Republic of China had we not made those initiatives in secret. If we brought it up to the Hill, it would have been a disaster.

Now certain members of key committees were informed at the time, but we would have had a backlash that would have made it impossible. And I could see where President Nixon would have said, hell, if I make this public, what he ultimately was faced with -- and that was the legislative prohibition anyway -- would have been forthcoming, and therefore he would have looked even weaker.

Q. Are you saying that we were paying money to get
our POWs back?

A. No, no, no. What I was saying was that the perception that that might be true would be a disaster.

Q. Why is that?

A. Why? Well, to me that's like paying ransom for hostages. That's what it is, and I would have been opposed to that had I stayed on as Secretary of State in the Reagan Administration. I would have resigned on that issue instead of giving away Lebanon, which I resigned on.

Q. Can you say with any confidence that the Nixon aid letter was something other than paying ransom for POWs?

A. Oh, sure.

Q. What was it other than that?

A. It was never devised in the context of the POW issue. It was devised in the context of giving Hanoi an incentive for a peaceful solution which would lead to the continued sovereignty of South Vietnam and a chance for those people to have self determination, which we deprived them of in the ultimate outcome.

Q. So, in other words, at least in your view, the Nixon aid letter was more the holding out of a carrot to the DRV?

A. Absolutely. It's easy to say in hindsight, but I couldn't conceive of myself ever being part of a ploy like that. I really couldn't. You know, to pay to get our POWs
out.

Q. But you've already told us you were not part of — you had nothing to do with this.

A. No. What I said was that February letter, that's right, I had nothing to do with that.

Q. My questions are more related to what the people who were responsible for the letter had in mind.

A. Well, I can't answer what they had in their mind. You are asking me to put myself in their frame of mind, with their own set of circumstances they were dealing with.

MR. KRAVITZ: Why don't we take five minutes?

[Recess.]

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. General Haig, is there anything you want to add to or change about anything you've said previously?

A. No.

MR. GOLDBERG: Very quickly, there's an impression I get, sir, that in January '73 the POWs in the national psyche was, if one reads this out of context, less significant than in 1974 when the POWs were back, certainly in your mind, having commanded a battalion there and a brigade and the like, POWs were always —

THE WITNESS: Always.

MR. GOLDBERG: -- significant?

THE WITNESS: Yes. I don't know where you got
MR. GOLDBERG: When you were asked about the issue of priorities of world peace and U.S.-Soviet relations versus POWs, POWs were not number one as the most important issue, as compared to '74.

THE WITNESS: That doesn't make sense to me the way you've articulated. I think the point I was trying to make was that until the peace settlement appeared possible the POWs was not as important an issue within the bureaucracy, but then, as the time approached and it looked like we may get a settlement, this became a very important thing because we had to have all the facts together and had to know what we were doing.

Then I made a second point, and that was that as the controversy over the war declined and the preoccupation with getting out of Vietnam, whatever it cost, then there was a certain enhancement of the attention to the POW issue because that was a residual problem, as it is today.

That's what I was trying to say. If I said it any other way, it's my fault.

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. General Haig, were you aware that, as of the fall of 1972, specifically late September 1972, that in the negotiations between Le Duc Tho and Dr. Kissinger the North Vietnamese, at least on occasion, were making statements
which seemed to link the understanding regarding the
release of U.S. prisoners of war held in Laos with the
understanding that the United States would provide
reconstruction aid to North Vietnam and the rest of
Indochina as part of a settlement?

A. I can't say that I was. I can't say that I was
not aware of it. On the other hand, I don't view it as a
major issue among the range of issues that were separating
the U.S. in the negotiations from the North Vietnamese.
That doesn't mean it wasn't true.

I do have a nagging recollection that the
decouplement of these two issues became an important issue,
and should have been.

Q. Can you tell us what you're talking about?
A. What I'm saying is that we had to avoid at all
costs the impression that we were peddling in flesh.

Q. In other words, it was very important to our
government that there not be the perception that we were
paying ransom for hostages?
A. Absolutely right.

Q. And there was a concern that the DRV was viewing
these two issues as being linked, and that's why it was
even more important for us to avoid the perception that
they were linked?
A. Well, yes. But that's a nagging thing that I
couldn't take an oath on or be categoric about. It's my impression that that was probably the case.

Q. Let me show you a series of messages that may refresh your memory, because it appears, to me anyway, from reviewing some of the messages that we have, that despite our efforts to avoid the appearance of a link between the aid promise and the understanding regarding the release of U.S. POWs held in Laos that these two understandings or promises did become inextricably linked, first when the DRV failed to turn over its list of U.S. POWs held in Laos on January 27, 1973, and then when the U.S. refused to deliver President Nixon's aid letter until the so-called Laos list was delivered to us by the DRV.

Does that sound familiar to you? Is that what perhaps is that nagging sense in your mind?

A. No, because at that point I would not have had an enlightened knowledge of what was going on.

Q. I'm going to mark as Exhibit Number 18 a message dated January 29, 1973, from Dr. Kissinger to Hayward Isham.

A. Isham?

Q. I-s-h-a-m. He was one of the senior members of the U.S. delegation to the public peace negotiations, a Foreign Service officer.

[The document referred to was
This is a back channel cable.

A. That's part of the Rogers, Bill Rogers' efforts because it shifted to the State Department and Rogers signed the Accord.

Q. This message from Dr. Kissinger reads: "You should call Vy and tell him that you will have a note ready to hand over to him tomorrow, but you cannot deliver it until you receive the Lao POW list."

Then Exhibit Number 19 is a message dated January 31, 1973, from Mr. Isham to Dr. Kissinger indicating that, pursuant to Dr. Kissinger's instructions, Mr. Isham told the DRV, his contact for the DRV, "I said my instructions were clear and that we would await word on Laos POW list from them," and he's referring to his refusal to turn over the Nixon aid letter until that time.

This next Exhibit, Number 20, is actually the one
that I'd like to go over with you in most detail, but I'll wait until you're finished with 19.

[Pause.]

Number 20 is a message from Mr. Isham to Dr. Kissinger dated February 1, 1973. Again, this is the day that the Laos list was provided to us and the day that Mr. Nixon's aid letter was delivered in exchange.

[The document referred to was marked Haig Exhibit No. 20 for identification and was retained in the custody of the National Security Council.]

Let me just read it into the record. It says:

"Having insisted for three days that there should be no linkage between delivery of economic note and furnishing of Laos POW list, Vy, at this morning's meeting, switched tactics. He offered to give me the list if I handed over the note. A new aid who was present for the first time at yesterday's session and probably had just arrived from Hanoi had placed a manila envelope on the table in front of him. Vy assured me that this was in fact the list. I expressed satisfaction and complimented him on the cooperation they had been able to secure from their Laotian friends.

"I explained we preferred to have note delivered
intent or at the outset.

It means that, as every layer of onion was peeled off -- we agreed to withdraw, we did this, we did that -- the only thing left for them to extract the money they wanted, which they wanted regardless of the POW issue, was the POW issue. That's the point I'm making.

I don't know that that's true, but I would sure make the case, were I defending the proposition that they were not linked except as a matter of expediency at this point in the process.

The thing I don't want you to be able to do is to get from me in my answering your question that I in any way believe that, despite all the denials, there was some subtle connection between these two issues from the beginning, or by intention ever.

Q. In other words, you think it's just something that happened on February 1 because it was the only way that we were going to get the list and it was the only way they were going to get the letter?

A. It was the only way they were going to get the money. That's all that was left. They had no other way to blackmail us.

Q. So your testimony is that --

A. That would be my belief as to how this issue evolved from an earlier proposition that you lay out a menu
by Colonel Guay through established channel for such
messages, and in view of their position on linkage assumed
they also would prefer that. I said I would instruct
Colonel Guay by telephone immediately upon receiving the
list. However, after several exchanges it became apparent
that their instructions today were for buffalo trading only. It was agreed that Colonel Guay would deliver note
this morning and his counterpart would hand over list at
that time.

"It seems apparent in retrospect that they had
list yesterday but were making one more try to extract note
without this quid pro quo." It goes on.

Does that refresh your memory that at least by
February 1, 1973, these two issues -- the Laos POW list and
the Nixon aid letter -- really were linked in fact,
regardless of what our government had tried to avoid, but
they really were linked in fact and really were juxtaposed
as a quid pro quo?

A. Well, you can't argue with that at this point.

On the other hand, it's important to remember that was the
only issue we had to make the point already given up on.

Q. I'm sorry. I didn't understand that.

A. The POWs were all that were left. What the hell
else would Hanoi have left for leverage to extract money?

It doesn't mean that that issue was linked in concept or
of things to try to make a negotiated settlement attractive to Hanoi, while still realizing your objectives.

Q. In your opinion, then, looking at this from the perspective of the DRV, they held back on the Laos POW list until we were willing to give them the aid note at the same time?

A. I don’t know that that actually happened. Is that the way it happened?

Q. It sounds from the cables as if it happened.

A. It says that’s what their offer was. Did they do it?

Q. Did they do what?

A. They gave them the list and we got the --

Q. There are other cables which --

A. Yes, sure.

Q. From what you could tell, did the DRV negotiators distrust the American negotiators as much as you and Dr. Kissinger and President Nixon and everyone else distrusted the DRV negotiators?

A. Probably more.

Q. Do you think, then, that in the minds of the DRV not only did they link the exchange of their Laos POW list with our giving them the letter promising aid, but that they also linked actual release of POWs from Laos with our actual payment of reconstruction aid?
A. I couldn't take that giant step as a conclusion. I couldn't discount it.

Q. It's certainly a possibility?

A. Sure.

Q. And you think it's certainly a possibility that the DRV would intentionally provide an incomplete list of U.S. POWs in Laos and wait until some of the reconstruction aid money started arriving to give us a more complete list?

A. You could, among countless other incentives for doing that that we discussed earlier. There are many possibilities.

Q. What practical effect, if any, do you think that this linkage may have had on the release of POWs from Laos? I understand your position that this was never anything intended by the United States, and I think it's fair to say that the cable traffic we've seen is absolutely consistent with your position.

But my question is I think we've agreed that, at least as of February 1, 1973, regardless of what our intentions may have been, the aid letter and the Laos POW list were linked in fact. How do you think that may have affected the POW and MIA situation, specifically in Laos but more generally throughout Indochina?

A. Well, I think it's very dangerous to speculate on that because one could make the case that they had already
begun violating the even more significant aspects of the Accords that I'm telling you about or which I mentioned earlier, and therefore, against that backdrop of violation of countless provisions, the provision of aid became increasingly ludicrous.

So I’d be very suspicious of that tightly constructed theory you just espoused against the backdrop of everything else they were doing.

Q. I’ve asked you questions previously about how many prisoners of war you might have expected to have been on the DRV list for Vietnam. I want to ask you more specifically related to Laos, did you have a sense as to how many or an expectation as to how many U.S. prisoners of war we should be expecting to get back from Laos?

A. From Laos? I forget what the figure was. It was a couple hundred.

Q. There were approximately 350 listed --

A. Out of the 2,550, roughly, 600 were Laos, yes. But I mean down to our list of what we thought.

Q. Well, let me ask you about that.

A. It seems to me it was substantially less than that.

Q. I think you’re right. I’m marking as Exhibit Number 21 a set of minutes of a WSAG meeting on January 29, 1973. The cover memo is February 1, 1973, but the minutes
are from the meeting on January 29, 1973.

[The document referred to was marked Haig Exhibit No. 21 for identification and was retained in the custody of the National Security Council.]

To put this in temporal context, that's two days after the DRV lists of U.S. prisoners in Vietnam have been released and three days before the so-called Laos list is provided on February 1.

There's a discussion as to how many prisoners we can expect to be coming out of Laos when we get the list. Dr. Kissinger is talking about the fact that we should be getting the Laos list in another day or two, and he asks were there any surprises in the list of POWs in North Vietnam. *blank* answers: "It was pretty close to what we expected. We are hoping for 40 more on the list of those in Laos."

Later on, about halfway down that same page -- I'm on page 8 -- *blank* from the Defense Department says: "We don't know what we will get from Laos. We have only six known prisoners in Laos, although we hope there may be 40 or 41. We have known very little about the caves where they keep the prisoners in Laos. We just got the first photos of those caves recently and our impression is
that they are pretty big. We think they are holding a lot more than six prisoners there."

Was your expectation similar to that of [redacted]?

A. Not necessarily.

Q. Do you know what either of [redacted] would have been basing those statements on?

A. Probably DIA advice. I think I would say DIA would have been their source.

Q. Were you aware of any contrary expectations within the highest level of the Administration?

A. On Laos, no. But that's probably because I was decoupled at that time and not focused on that, and very, very busy.
Q. We have messages -- and we'll try and locate them in a second -- which indicate that the U.S. Government recognized immediately that the list of 10 prisoners from Laos that was provided on February 1 was significantly smaller than our expectations. Were you aware of that?

A. No.

Q. You were just out of the loop at that time?

A. Out of the loop.

Q. Let me ask you a general question. We were hoping that you might be able to help us with understanding decisions that were made or were not made throughout the period January, February, March, April of 1973, decisions made relating to any reactions to North Vietnamese violations of the Paris Accords.

Is it your testimony that you would not have information on any of those subjects?

A. Well, not really, other than I’ve told you several. For example, I know Kissinger was increasingly frustrated and wanted to resume bombing. I probably knew that at the time, and I’m sure I learned it after the fact.

Q. Let me show you, because that’s one of the documents I’d like to show you, what I’m marking as Exhibit Number 22, a memorandum dated March 14, 1973, from Dr. Kissinger The subject is Response to Continued North Vietnamese Infiltration and Logistics

[The document referred to was marked Haig Exhibit No. 22 for identification and was retained in the custody of the National Security Council.]

I'll just summarize this for you, since I don't have the time to show the document to you right now. There was a WSAG meeting, at which time a set of five response levels was debated. And it was agreed at the WSAG meeting that a recommendation would be made to the President to bomb in the southern part of the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos.

A. That I would have been opposed to.

Q. On March 14, Dr. Kissinger sent this memo to the President, Exhibit Number 22, recommending -- he says on the last page: "I recommend that you approve planning now for a two to three-day series of intensive U.S. air strikes against the trail area of southern Laos, to be conducted immediately after the release of the third increment of POWs is completed on March 16. Your final decision would be given after the POW release and in light of developments between now and that date."

And there's then two lines -- approve and disapprove -- and what appears to be President Nixon's initials next to the approval line.
Were you aware -- I think you've mentioned that you were aware that Dr. Kissinger made such a recommendation.

A. Not the memo or any of the communications. I just would have --

Q. You were aware of a recommendation for bombing?

A. And I would have been opposed to that solution.

Q. Why is that?

A. Because it's more of the same.

Q. What do you mean?

A. A driblet of bombs for three days down the Ho Chi Minh trail? Dear Lord. I'd have taken Hanoi out -- I'm serious -- with military targeting. That was the only way to deal with it. That would have done nothing. Didn't we learn anything in ten years?

Q. This bombing recommended by Dr. Kissinger and apparently approved by President Nixon never occurred, did it?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Do you know how it was that the decision was made that it would --

A. It would be my judgment that -- you see, this is the same issue that George Bush faced in the Gulf. Had they bombed the trail, they would have stirred up every bit as vigorous a hornet's nest, to include a cutoff of
bombing, which happened two months later anyway, than if they had bombed Hanoi, where they would have gotten the same reaction on the Hill.

I think the President was wise enough to know that, whatever he did, it was not going to happen, and in the end he would look weaker rather than stronger, and Hanoi would be more encouraged to hold POWs and to violate the accords than they would be to meet their commitments.

That's my judgment.

Q. We're going to have to suspend the deposition on these 1972-1973 issues.

I just want to ask you a couple, in my remaining three minutes. I want to jump to 1981, when you were Secretary of State, and ask you a couple of questions.

Let me just cut to the important ones. Shortly after President Reagan became President did you or, to your knowledge, anyone else within the Reagan Administration become aware of an offer allegedly passed from the Vietnamese to exchange live American prisoners of war for a sum of money?

A. No, because it didn't happen. It didn't happen in my presence, and I doubt it happened at all.

Q. So you're not aware of such an offer?

A. No.

Q. Is it conceivable that such an offer could have
been made without your knowledge?

A. Well, yes. Anything could have happened in that White House.

Q. Were you aware of or did you attend a meeting in early 1981 at the White House which was attended by the President, the Vice President, by Mr. Allen and Mr. Casey in which this offer was discussed?

A. No. Neither was Mr. Allen.

Q. Are you aware of any back-channel cable or message outlining this offer which had been passed to the U.S. Government by the Canadians?

A. No.

Q. Are you aware of any CIA cable or any other U.S. Government cable relating to an offer to release live POWs for payment in cash?
MR. KRAVITZ: Okay. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., the taking of the
instant deposition recessed, to reconvene at 9:00 a.m.,
Tuesday, September 16, 1992.]

____________________________
Signature of the Witness

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN TO before me this ________ day of
____________________________, 19__.

____________________________
Notary Public

My Commission Expires: _______________
AUTHORITY AND RULES
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
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To establish a Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.

RESOLUTION

To establish a Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.

Resolved,

SECTION 1. (a) There is established a temporary Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the "select committee") which...
shall consist of 12 members, 6 to be appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate upon recommendations of the Majority Leader from among members of the majority party, and 6 to be appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate upon recommendations of the Minority Leader from among members of the minority party.

(b) The Majority Leader shall select the chairman of the select committee.

c) The Minority Leader shall select the vice chairman of the select committee.

d) The service of a Senator as a member or chairman on the select committee shall not count for purposes of paragraph 4 of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate.

e) A majority of the members of the select committee shall constitute a quorum thereof for the transaction of business, except that the select committee may fix a lesser number as a quorum for the purpose of taking testimony.

The select committee shall adopt rules of procedure not inconsistent with this resolution and the rules of the Senate governing standing committees of the Senate.

(f) Vacancies in the membership of the select committee shall not affect the authority of the remaining members to execute the functions of the select committee.

SEC. 2. (a) There shall be referred to the select committee, concurrently with referral to any other committee of the Senate with jurisdiction, all messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to United States personnel unaccounted for from military conflicts.

(b) Nothing in this resolution shall be construed as prohibiting or otherwise restricting the authority of any other committee of the Senate or as amending, limiting, or otherwise changing the authority of any standing committee of the Senate.

SEC. 3. The select committee may, for the purposes of accountability to the Senate, make such reports to the Senate with respect to matters within its jurisdiction as it shall deem advisable which shall be referred to the appropriate committee. In making such reports, the select committee shall proceed in a manner consistent with the requirements of national security.

SEC. 4. (a) For the purposes of this resolution, the select committee is authorized at its discretion (1) to make investigations into any matter within its jurisdiction, (2) to hold hearings, (3) to sit and act at any time or place during the sessions (subject to paragraph 5 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate), recesses, and adjourned periods of the Senate, (4) to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance of witnesses and the produc-
tion of correspondence, books, papers, and documents, (5)
to make expenditures from the contingent fund of the Sen-
ate to carry out its functions and to employ personnel,
subject to procedures of paragraph (9) of rule XXVI of
the Standing Rules of the Senate, and (6) with the prior
consent of the Government department or agency con-
cerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration,
to use on a reimbursable, or nonreimbursable basis the
services of personnel of any such department or agency.

(b) The chairman of the select committee or any
member thereof may administer oaths to witnesses.
(c) Subpoenas authorized by a majority of the select
committee shall be issued over the signature of the chair-
man and may be served by any person designated by the
chairman.

SEC. 5. (a) No employee of the select committee or
person engaged to perform services for or at the request
of such committee shall be given access to any classified
information by such committee unless such employee or
person has (1) agreed in writing and under oath to be
bound by the rules of the Senate and of such committee
as to the security of such information during and after
the period of his employment or relationship with such
committee; and (2) received an appropriate security clear-
ance as determined by such committee in consultation with
the Director of Central Intelligence. The type of security
clearance to be required in the case of any such employee
or person shall, within the determination of such commit-
tee in consultation with the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, be commensurate with the sensitivity of the classi-
ified information to which such employee or person will be
given access by such committee.

(b) The select committee shall designate a security
officer qualified to administer appropriate security proce-
dures to ensure the protection of confidential and classi-
fied information in the possession of the select committee
and shall make suitable arrangements, in consultation
with the Office of Senate Security, for the physical protec-
tion and storage of classified information in its possession.

SEC. 6. (a) The select committee shall formulate and
carry out such rules and procedures as it deems necessary
to prevent the disclosure, without the consent of the per-
son or persons concerned, of information in the possession
of such committee which unduly infringes upon the privacy
or which violates the constitutional rights of such person
or persons.

(b) Nothing in this resolution shall be construed to
prevent the select committee from publicly disclosing any
such information in any case in which such committee de-
determines the national interest in the disclosure of such in-
I Connation clearly outweighs any infringement on the pri-

vacy of any person or persons.

SEC. 7. The select committee is authorized to permit
any personal representative of the President, designated
by the President to serve as a liaison to such committee,
to attend any closed meeting of such committee.

SEC. 8. Paragraph 3(c) of rule XXV of the Standing
Rules of the Senate is amended by adding at the end
thereof the following:

"POW/MIA Affairs .......................................................... 12".

SEC. 9. The select committee shall terminate at the
end of the One Hundred Second Congress. Upon termina-
tion of the select committee, all records, files, documents,
and other materials in the possession, custody, or control
of the select committee, under appropriate conditions es-
tablished by the select committee, shall be transferred to
the Secretary of the Senate.

RESOLUTION
To provide for expenses and supplemental authority of Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.

Resolved, That (a) in carrying out its powers, duties,
and functions under Senate Resolution 82, agreed to Au-
gust 2, 1991 (102nd Congress, 1st Session), and under
this resolution, from August 2, 1991 through February
29, 1992, and from March 1, 1992 until the end of the
One Hundred Second Congress, through January 2, 1993,
the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs (referred to in this resolution as the “select committee”) is authorized in its discretion to:

(1) make expenditures from the contingent fund of the Senate; and

(2) appoint and fix compensation of personnel.

(b)(1) The expenses of the select committee for the period from August 2, 1991, through February 29, 1992, shall not exceed $540,300 of which amount not to exceed $53,000 may be expended for the procurement of the services of individual consultants, or organizations thereof, as authorized by section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 72a(i)).

(2) The expenses of the select committee for the period from March 1, 1992 through January 2, 1993, shall not exceed $1,360,200 of which amount not to exceed $160,000 may be expended for the procurement of the services of individual consultants, or organizations thereof, as authorized by section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 72a(i)).

(c) Expenditures from the contingent fund shall be paid out of the appropriations account for Expenses of Inquiries and Investigations upon vouchers approved by the chairman, except that vouchers shall not be required for:

(1) the disbursement of salaries of employees who are paid at an annual rate;

(2) the payment of expenses for telecommunications services provided by the Telecommunications Department, Sergeant at Arms, United States Senate;

(3) the payment of expenses for stationery supplies purchased through the Keeper of the Stationery, United States Senate;

(4) the payment of expenses for postage to the Postmaster, United States Senate; or

(5) the payment of metered charges on copying equipment provided by the Sergeant at Arms, United States Senate.

(d) There are authorized such sums as may be necessary for agency contributions related to the compensation of employees of the select committee to be paid from the appropriations account for Expenses of Inquiries and Investigations, in like manner as for the standing and permanent select committees of the Senate.

(e) Of the funds authorized by this resolution for the funding period ending on the last day of February 1992, any unexpended balance remaining after such last day shall be transferred to a special reserve for this committee, which reserve shall be available to this committee for the
period commencing March 1, 1992, and ending with the close of September 30, 1992, for the purpose of—

(1) meeting any unpaid obligations incurred during the funding period ending on the last day of February 1992; and

(2) meeting expenses of such committee incurred after such last day and prior to the close of September 30, 1992.

SEC. 2. (a) In addition to all powers, duties, and functions vested in the Select Committee of POW/MIA Affairs by Senate Resolution 82, agreed to August 2, 1991 (102nd Congress, 1st Session), the select committee is authorized to do the following:

(1) To delegate to the chairman the power, with the consent of the vice chairman, to authorize subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of correspondence, books, papers, documents, and other records.

(2) To (A) authorize staff to conduct depositions of witnesses under oath, including oaths administered by individuals authorized by local law to administer oaths, for the purpose of taking testimony and receiving correspondence, books, papers, documents, and other records, and (B) require, by subpoena or order, the attendance of witnesses and

the production of correspondence, books, papers, documents, and other records at such staff depositions.

(3) To make to the Senate any recommendations by report or resolution, including recommendations for criminal or civil enforcement, which the select committee may consider appropriate with respect to (A) the failure or refusal of any person to appear at a hearing or deposition or to produce records, in obedience to a subpoena or order, or (B) the failure or refusal of any person to answer questions during his or her appearance as a witness at a hearing or deposition.

(4) To procure the temporary or intermittent services of individual consultants, or organizations thereof, in the same manner and under the same conditions as a standing committee of the Senate may procure such services under section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 72a(i)).

(5) To (A) use, with the prior consent of the chairman of any other Senate committee or the chairman of any subcommittee of any committee of the Senate, the facilities of any other Senate committees or the services of any members of the staff
of them whenever the select committee or its chair-
man considers that such action is necessary or ap-
propriate to enable the select committee to carry out
its powers, duties, and functions, and (B) pay the
official travel expenses for staff members of other
committees used pursuant to this resolution.
(b) Any foreign travel by Members and employees re-
quired for the select committee shall be deemed to be on
behalf of the Senate for purposes of Senate Resolution
179, agreed to May 25, 1977 (95th Congress, 1st Ses-
sion).
(e) The Majority Leader and the Minority Leader
may each select one investigator to serve on the staff of
the select committee.
(d) The Majority Leader and the Minority Leader
shall serve as ex officio members of the select committee
but shall have no vote in the select committee and shall
not be counted for purposes of determining a quorum.
SEC. 3. The disclosure of any classified information
obtained by the select committee either directly from the
Executive branch of the United States Government,
through the Select Committee on Intelligence, or by other
means, shall be governed by the provisions of section 8
of Senate Resolution 400, agreed to May 19, 1976 (94th
Congress, 2nd Session), except that references to the Se-
RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/ MIA AFFAIRS

RULE 1. CONVENING OF MEETINGS AND HEARINGS

1.1 Definitions. As used in these rules, the term “meeting” includes a meeting to conduct a hearing. The term “hearing” is used to describe any meeting of the committee for the purpose of receiving testimony.

1.2 Calling of Meetings. The committee shall meet at the call of the chair. The members of the committee may call special meetings as provided in Senate Rule XXVI(3).

1.3 Notice of Hearings. The committee shall publicly announce the date, place, and subject matter of any hearing at least one week before its commencement. A hearing may be called on shorter notice if the chair, after consultation with the vice chair, determines that there is good cause to begin it at an earlier date.

1.4 Presiding Officer. The chair shall preside when present. If the chair is not present at any meeting, the vice chair shall preside. The chair may designate any member of the committee to preside in the absence of the chair or vice chair.

RULE 2. OPEN AND CLOSED SESSIONS AND MEDIA

2.1 Procedure. All meetings shall be open to the public unless closed. To close all or part of a meeting, or a series of meetings for a period of no more than 14 days, the committee shall vote in open session by a record vote, including proxy votes, of a majority of the members of the committee. If discussion is necessary, a motion shall be made and seconded to go into closed session to discuss whether the meeting will concern the matters enumerated in Rule 2.2. Immediately after such discussion the committee shall return to open session and the meeting may then be closed by a record vote.

2.2 Closed Session Subjects. A meeting may be closed if the matters to be discussed concern: (1) national security or the confidential conduct of foreign relations; (2) committee staff personnel or internal staff management or procedure; (3) matters tending to reflect adversely on the character or reputation, or to invade the privacy, of any individuals; (4) matters which will disclose the identity of any person or undercover law enforcement agent or will disclose any information relating to the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense which is required to be kept secret in the interests of effective law enforcement; or (5) other matters enumerated in Senate Rule XXVI(3).

2.3 Representative of the President. The presiding officer at any closed meeting or hearing may permit any personal representative of the President, designated by the President to serve as a liaison to the committee, to attend the closed meeting.

2.4 Witness Request. Any witness may submit to the chair, no later than 24 hours in advance of a hearing, a written request that he or she be examined in closed or open session. The chair shall inform the committee of the request, and the committee shall take such action pursuant to Rule 2.1 as it deems appropriate.

2.5 Media. Any meeting open to the public may be covered by television, radio, or still photography. Coverage must be conducted in an orderly and unobtrusive manner. The presiding officer, in exercising his or her responsibility for the conduct of meetings, may order that the use of cameras, microphones, and lights adhere to standards which the select committee deems appropriate, taking into account the concerns of any witness. For good cause the presiding officer may terminate coverage in whole or in part or take other action to promote orderly proceedings or for the protection of witnesses.

RULE 3. QUORUMS AND VOTING

3.1 In General. A majority of members of the committees shall constitute a quorum for reporting to the Senate and for the transaction of other business.

3.2 Testimony. One member shall constitute a quorum for taking testimony.

3.3 Proxies. Proxies shall be in writing, and shall be filed with the chief clerk by the absent member or by a member present at the meeting. Proxies shall contain sufficient reference to the pending matter to show that the absent member has been informed of it and has affirmatively requested that he or she be recorded as voting on it. Proxies shall not be counted towards a quorum.

3.4 Polling.

(a) Subjects. The committee may poll only (1) internal committee matters including the committee’s staff, records, and budget; (2) authorization for steps in any investigation within its jurisdiction, including the authorization and issuance of subpoenas, applications for immunity orders, and requests for documents; (3) other committee business, not including a vote on reporting to the Senate, that the committee at a meeting has designated for polling at a subsequent time.

(b) Procedure. At the direction of the committee or the chair, the chief clerk shall distribute a polling form to each member specifying the matter being polled and the time limit for completion of the poll. If any member so requests, the matter shall be held for consideration at a meeting. If the chair, with the approval of a majority of the members, determines that the polled matter is in one of the areas enumerated in Rule 2.2, the record of the poll shall be confidential. The chair shall keep a record of polls, and shall notify the members of the committee of the results of each poll. In order for a proposition to be approved by poll, a majority of the members of the committee must have responded to the poll and a majority of those responding must have voted in the affirmative.

RULE 4. SUBPOENAS

4.1 Authorization. Subpoenas shall be authorized either by a majority of the committee or by the chair with the consent of the vice chair, and shall be issued by the chair. Subpoenas
dividual authorized by local law to administer oaths. Questions shall be propounded orally by staff members. Objections by the witness as to the form of questions shall be noted for the record. If the witness objects to a question and refuses to testify on the basis of relevance or privilege, the committee staff may proceed with a ruling by telephone or otherwise on the objection. The ruling may be sought from the chairman of the committee or, in the absence of the chairman, from the vice chairman, or, in the absence of both the chairman and the vice chairman, from any member designated by the chairman. The member from whom the ruling is sought may rule on the objection, and order the witness to answer the question if the objection is overruled, or may refer the matter to the committee for ruling. The committee shall not initiate procedures leading to civil or criminal enforcement unless the witness refuses to testify after having been ordered to answer.

6.4 Deposition Transcripts. An accurate electronic or stenographic record shall be kept of all testimony at depositions. If a transcript is prepared, the witness shall be furnished with a copy, or access to a copy, for review. No later than five days thereafter, if a copy is provided, the witness shall return it with his or her signature, and the staff may enter or append to the transcript the changes, if any, requested by the witness in accordance with the procedures established by Rule 5.5. If the witness fails to return a signed copy the staff shall note on the transcript the date a copy was provided and the failure to return it. The individual administering the oath shall certify on the transcript that the witness was duly sworn in his or her presence, the transcriber shall certify that the transcript is a true record of the testimony, and the transcript shall then be filed with the chief clerk. Committee staff may stipulate with the witness to changes in this procedure. Objections to errors in this procedure that might be cured if promptly presented are waived unless timely objection is made.

6.5 Examination of Records. The committee or the chairman and vice chairman, acting jointly, may authorize the staff to inspect locations or systems of records on behalf of the committee.

6.6 Written Interrogatories. Written interrogatories may be authorized by the committee or the chairman and vice chairman, acting jointly, and issued by the chairman, or, in the absence of the chairman, by the vice chairman, or, in the absence of both the chairman and the vice chairman, by any member designated by the chairman, and shall specify a date for filing an answer with the chief clerk. Written interrogatories shall be answered under oath.

RULE 7. PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING OF CONFIDENTIAL OR CLASSIFIED MATERIALS

7.1 Security. Committee offices shall operate under strict security precautions. The chairman or vice chairman may request the Senate Sergeant at Arms and the Office of Senate Security to provide assistance necessary to ensure strict security.

7.2 Confidential or Classified Materials. Confidential or classified materials shall be segregated in a secure storage area under the supervision of the committee’s security officer. The committee shall adopt security regulations, in consultation with the Office of Senate Security, governing the handling of confidential or classified materials. The chairman may enter into agreements to obtain materials and information under assurances concerning confidentiality. Each member of the committee shall be notified of such agreements.

7.3 Privacy Interests. Before disclosing publicly information that could adversely affect the privacy or other legitimate interests of any person, the committee shall carefully consider that person’s interests, but the committee may disclose publicly any information for which it determines that the national interest in disclosure outweighs the privacy or other interests of persons concerned.

7.4 Access. Staff access to classified materials shall be limited to staff members with appropriate security clearances and a need to know, as determined by the chairman and vice chairman, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence. The committee shall adopt internal guidelines governing staff access to particular categories of classified materials, which shall be applied by the chairman and vice chairman. Staff access to confidential materials may be limited by the chairman and vice chairman.

7.5 Nondisclosure. No member of the committee or its staff shall disclose, in whole or in part or by way of summary, to any person outside the committee and its staff, for any purpose or in connection with any proceeding, judicial or otherwise, any testimony taken, including the names of witnesses testifying, or material presented, in closed hearings, or any confidential materials or information, including the results of the committee’s investigation and any proposed or otherwise non-public conclusions of the committee, unless authorized by the committee or the chairman.

7.6 Nondisclosure Agreement. All members of the committee staff shall agree in writing, as a condition of employment or agreement for the provision of services, to abide by the conditions of the nondisclosure agreement promulgated by the committee pursuant to section 5(a)(1) of Senate Resolution 82.

7.7 Violations. Allegations concerning unauthorized disclosure may be addressed by the committee or may be referred by a majority vote of the committee to the Select Committee on Ethics in accordance with section 8 of Senate Resolution 400 (94th Congress, 2d Session), as made applicable to this committee by Senate Resolution 185. Any member of the staff who fails to conform to the provisions of Rule 7 shall be subject to disciplinary sanction, including termination of employment or agreement for the provision of services.

7.8 Applicability of Rules. For purposes of Rule 7, committee staff include the employees of the committee, staff designated by the members, with the approval of the chairman, to work on committee business, other officers and employees of the Senate who are requested by the chairman to work on committee business, and detailers and consultants to the committee, including any person engaged to perform services for or at the request of the committee.
may be served by any person designated by the chairman. The chief clerk shall keep a log, and a file, of all subpoenas.

4.2 Return. A subpoena duces tecum or order for records may be served by any person designated by the chairman. The chief clerk shall keep a log, and a file, of all subpoenas.

When a return on such a subpoena or order is incomplete or accompanied by an objection, the chairman, after consultation with the vice chairman, may convene a meeting, including a hearing on shortened notice, to determine the adequacy of the return and to rule on the objection, or may refer the issues raised by the return for decision by the committee. At a hearing on such a return one member shall constitute a quorum.

RULE 5. HEARINGS

5.1 Notice. Witnesses shall be given at least 48 hours notice, unless the chairman, after consultation with the vice chairman, determines that extraordinary circumstances warrant shorter notice, and all witnesses shall be furnished with copies of Senate Resolution 82 (102d Congress, 1st Session), Senate Resolution 185 (102d Congress, 1st Session), and these rules.

5.2 Oath. All witnesses who testify to matters of fact shall be sworn unless the committee authorizes waiver of an oath. Any member of the committee may administer oaths to witnesses.

5.3 Statement. Any witness desiring to make an introductory statement shall file 40 copies of the statement with the chairman or chief clerk 48 hours in advance of the appearance unless the chairman determines that there is good cause to modify either of these requirements. A witness may be required to summarize a prepared statement if it exceeds ten minutes. Unless the committee determines otherwise, a witness who appears before the committee under a grant of immunity shall not be permitted to make an introductory or other statement and may be required to testify only in response to questions posed directly by committee members or committee staff.

5.4 Counsel

(a) Presence. A witness' counsel shall be permitted to be present during the witness' testimony at any open hearing, closed hearing, or deposition, or at any staff interview of the witness, to advise the witness of his or her rights; provided, however, that in the case of any witness who is an officer or employee of the government, or of a corporation or association, the chairman or the committee may rule that representation by counsel from the government, corporation, or association or by counsel representing other witnesses, creates a conflict of interest, and that the witness shall be represented by personal counsel not from the government, corporation, or association or not representing other witnesses.

(b) Inability To Obtain Counsel. A witness who is unable for indigence or other reason to obtain counsel shall inform the committee at least 48 hours prior to the witness' appearance, and the committee will endeavor to obtain volunteer counsel for the witness. Failure to obtain counsel will not excuse the witness from appearing and testifying.

(c) Conduct. Counsel shall behave in an ethical and professional manner. Failure to do so shall, upon a finding to that effect by a majority of the members present, subject counsel to disciplinary action, which may include warning, censure, or ejection.

5.5 Transcript. An accurate electronic or stenographic record shall be kept of all testimony in open and closed hearings. At a witness' request and expense, access to a copy of the transcription of a witness' testimony in open or closed session shall be provided to the witness. Upon inspecting the transcript, within a time limit set by the chief clerk, a witness may in writing request changes in the transcript to correct errors of transcription. A witness may also request that specified grammatical errors and obvious errors of fact be corrected for the purpose of any printed record of the witness' testimony. The chairman or a staff officer designated by the chairman shall rule on such requests.

5.6 Impugned Persons. Any person who believes that evidence presented, or comment made by a member or staff, at a public hearing or at a closed hearing concerning which there have been public reports, tends to impugn his or her character or adversely affect his or her reputation may:

(a) file a sworn statement of facts relevant to the evidence or comment, which shall be placed in the hearing record;

(b) request the opportunity to appear personally before the committee to testify in his or her own behalf; or

(c) request that submitted written questions be used for the cross-examination of witnesses called by the committee. The chairman shall inform the committee of requests for appearance or cross-examination. If the committee so decides, the requested questions, or paraphrased versions or portions of them, shall be put to the other witnesses by a member or by staff.

5.7 Additional Witnesses. Any four members of the committee shall be entitled, upon a timely request made to the chairman, to call additional witnesses or to require the production of documents during at least one day of hearing.

5.8 Objections. The presiding officer shall rule on any objections at a hearing, which ruling shall be the ruling of the committee unless a majority of the committee disagrees with the ruling. In the case of a tie, the vote of the chairman shall prevail.

RULE 6. DEPOSITIONS, EXAMINATION OF RECORDS, AND INTERROGATORIES

6.1 Authorization for Depositions. The chairman and the vice chairman, acting jointly, may authorize the taking of a deposition. The authorization shall specify a time and place for examination, and the name of the staff member or members who will take the deposition. Unless otherwise specified, the deposition shall be in private. The committee shall not initiate procedures leading to criminal or civil enforcement proceedings for a witness' failure to appear unless any notice of the deposition was accompanied by a subpoena authorized by the committee.

6.2 Counsel at Depositions. Witnesses may be accompanied at a deposition by counsel to advise them of their rights, subject to the provisions of Rule 5.4.

6.3 Deposition Procedures. Witnesses at depositions shall be examined upon oaths administered by a committee member or an in-
RULE 8. DETAILLEES, CONSULTANTS, AND ASSISTANCE OF OTHER COMMITTEES

8.1 Detaillees and Consultants. The chairman and vice chairman, acting jointly, shall have authority to use on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, with the prior consent of the Committee on Rules and Administration, the services of personnel of any department or agency of the United States and shall have authority to procure the temporary or intermittent services of individual consultants or organizations.

8.2 Assistance of Other Committees. The chairman and vice chairman, acting jointly, may request the chairman of any Senate committee or subcommittee for consent to utilize the facilities of any such committee or the services of any members of its staff for the purpose of enabling this committee to perform its responsibilities under Senate Resolution 82 and Senate Resolution 185.

8.3 Scope of Authority. Detaillees, consultants, and staff of other committees who provide services to the committee pursuant to Rule 8 shall be deemed to be staff of the committee for all purposes under these rules.

RULE 9. FOREIGN TRAVEL

No member of the committee or its staff shall travel abroad on committee business unless specifically authorized by the President pro tempore, Majority Leader, or Minority Leader of the Senate, in accordance with Senate Resolution 179 (95th Congress, 1st Session). All requests for authorization of such travel shall first be presented to the chairman and vice chairman for approval and shall state the extent, nature, and purpose of the proposed travel. When the foreign travel of a member of the staff not accompanying a member of the committee has been authorized, all members of the committee shall be advised, prior to the commencement of such travel, of its extent, nature, and purpose.

RULE 10. EFFECTIVENESS OF RULES AND RULE CHANGES

These rules shall become effective upon publication in the Congressional Record. These rules may be modified, amended, or repealed by the committee, provided that all members are present or provided proxies or if a notice in writing of the proposed changes has been given to each member at least 48 hours prior to the meeting at which action thereon is to be taken. The changes shall become effective immediately upon publication of the changed rule or rules in the Congressional Record.
Office Memorandum - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CERTIFICATE OF SECURITY CLEARANCE FOR ACCESS

NOTE: This certification is being issued pursuant to governing security standards and is subject to the conditions and limitations expressed in applicable statutory or executive authority (also, see annexes on the reverse of this form). Inquiries regarding security clearances should be referred to the Chief, Division of Evaluations, Bureau of Diplomatic Security.

TO: DS/PM/IM - Ms. Andrea Wraalstad  DATE: August 23, 1990

FROM: DS/PIN - Gary H. Govea

SUBJECT: Starwood D.

☐ Contractor ☐ Applicant ☐ Employee ☐ Detail ☐ Other

DUTIES:

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security has reviewed subject's investigative file with respect to the proposed action for contractual hire with the Department in

TH/IS/TEC. 53 requested on 02/22/90.

☐ 1. Contingent upon employment in duties with a valid need-to-know for such information, subject is cleared for access through TOP SECRET thru 08/31/92.

☐ 2. DS incorporates no objection to the above described affiliation/relationship. This does not constitute a security clearance.

☐ 3. DS has reviewed available information, pursuant to reported relationship between above named persons, including results of investigation under 3 FAM 629. DS finds:

☐ a. No basis for restricting continued security clearance eligibility, or worldwide availability.

☐ b. Security or suitability concerns that preclude unrestricted worldwide availability (see attached memo). Further DS review is required prior to approval of any domestic or overseas U.S. Foreign Service employment of the foreign national spouse of subject.

☐ e. Security concerns that preclude continued or unrestricted security clearance (see attached memo).

☐ 4. Investigation consisted of

5. Remarks: This clearance can be upgraded at SW 0801 upon request, without further processing. 08/31/92

ATTACHMENTS: 08/31/92

UNCLASSIFIED
Mr. Michael P. Di Silvestro
Director of Senate Security
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Di Silvestro:

This letter is intended to permanently certify (PERM CERT) to your office the clearances of the following individual for the period 24 August to 1 October 1992:

NAME: HAIG, Alexander M.
SSN: 195-12-3625
CLEARANCE: Top Secret

If circumstances require, the Department of State has authorized either your office or the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to brief Mr. Haig into the SCI compartments SI, G, and TK in order to review documents to refresh his recollection in preparation for his deposition to the Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs. The Department requests that Mr. Haig be debriefed of the SCI accesses no later than 1 October 1992.

If you have any questions regarding the above, please contact me or Robyn Barbaris at your convenience on extension (703) 482-4515.

Sincerely,

Paul F. Morris
Chief, Security Staff
Office of Congressional Affairs
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Congress of the United States

Notice of
Senate Deposition

To ____________________________

General Alexander Haig

Worldwide Assoc., Inc.: Suite 800

1155 15th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006

Please take notice that at 10:00 o'clock a.m., on August 24, 1992, at S-407 the Capitol, Wash., DC, of the staff of the Select committee on POW/MIA Affairs of the Senate of the United States, will take your deposition on oral examination concerning what you may know relative to the subject matters under consideration by said Select committee. The deposition will be taken before a notary public, or before some other officer authorized by local law to administer oaths; it will, be taken pursuant to the committee's rules, a copy of which are attached.

Please provide the Committee with a current resume of your educational and professional experience in advance of your deposition.

Given under my hand, by authority vested in me by the Select committee, on August 18, 1992.

John F. Kerry, Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
As Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs ("the Committee"), pursuant to Rule 4 and Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee, we hereby agree and consent to the deposition of General Alexander Haig, as described in the attached notice of deposition. This deposition shall be taken by Frances A. Zwenig, Staff Director for the Committee; J. William Codinha, Chief Counsel to the Committee; Neal Kravitz, Investigative Attorney to the Committee; and/or any Member of the Committee.

John F. Kerry
Chairman

Bob Smith
Vice Chairman