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IDEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS WITHIN
THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMED FORCES
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IDEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS WITHIN
THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMED FORCES

INTRODUCTION

On 27, 28, 29 and 30 April 1971, Liberation Radio in Vietnamese broadcast what appeared to have been the full text of an article by Cưu Long, entitled: "Some Problems On the Ideological Task in the South Viet-Nam People's Liberation Armed Forces." According to Cưu Long, all cadres and combatants within the ranks of the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) at one time or another have been afflicted with "rightist phenomena," which apparently manifests itself in a number of forms: "rightist, passive thinking," a tendency to "fear difficulties and hardships;" "counterrevolutionary, negative, and nonprogressive thoughts and acts;" "individualistic phenomena," are some. All pose the ultimate danger: causing cadres and combatants "to fail to resolutely fulfill our tasks..."

That these problems stem directly from poor political indoctrination and ideological education is the principal thrust of Cưu Long's five-part article.

Ideological problems have been chronic within both the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the PLAF. Cưu Long's warnings of the dangers of "rightist ideology... an ideology that is influenced by remnants of the bourgeois and feudal ideology that have remained in our persons," echoes remarks

1. Cưu Long, the Vietnamese word for the Mekong River, is the pen name of Trần Bồ, a Major General in the North Vietnamese Army, an alternate member of the North Vietnamese Workers' Party Central Committee, third-ranking member of the COSVN Military Affairs Committee, and Assistant Political Officer of the People's Liberation Armed Forces.
made by the late General Nguyễn Chí Thanh\(^2\) to an audience of senior NVA officers in early 1963. Thanh warned at that time that "the influence of adverse thoughts--such as feudal thoughts, bourgeois thoughts, petty bourgeois thoughts, and so forth--still remain among the people and even in the Army." (The text of those remarks was published by Quân Đội Nhân Dân (People's Army) on 25 May 1963.)

Thanh's warnings do not appear to have had a significant effect upon the problem. On 6 February 1965, Quân Đội Nhân Dân published a summary of an address delivered by Lê Đức Thọ, a member of the Lao Dong Party Politburo and Chief of the Party Central Committee's Organization Department, to the Fourth All-Army Conference on Organizational Matters. Thọ was highly critical of the "influence of bourgeois ideology" in the Army and warned that the consequent "individualism, peaceseeking, thoughts of enjoyment and so forth," would cause a fear of difficulties and hardships. Thọ also criticized "bureaucracy and commandism," stating, as Cụ Long was to state six years later, that "strict discipline, which is very necessary, must go along with broad democracy." Rightism, in the form of reluctance on the part of military leaders to subordinate themselves and their commands to the Party, was also the subject of Thọ's criticism. He stated that "officers of all ranks, whether they be Party members or not, must submit absolutely to Party leadership. Any tendency to disregard regional Party committee leadership, to extol individual power, or to rely on collective leadership to dodge individual responsibility is erroneous."

On 17 April 1965, Quân Đội Nhân Dân published an article by then Major General (now Lieutenant General) Song Hao, a member of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee and Director of the NVA's General Political Directorate. Hao warned that "it is necessary to combat all negative rightist tendencies and exaggerated desires for peace, which will result

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2. Nguyen Chi Thanh, a member of the North Vietnamese Workers' Party Politburo and a General in the North Vietnamese Army, was director of the COSVN apparatus in South Viet-Nam from approximately late 1964 until his death in mid-1967.
in a reduction of combativity." Hao also stressed the importance of the ideological task in "eliminating subjectivism; the tendencies to underestimate the enemy and to be afraid of suffering and difficulties; simplism; and formalism, during preparations for combat and during combat."

The ideological shortcomings addressed by Cuu Long are chronic and have troubled Vietnamese Communist military leaders for a number of years. The problem is probably best defined by, and its extent best determined through, criticisms and self-assessments intended for internal and limited distribution within COSVN and PLAF channels. The amount of such evidence is large.

A "Report On Political and Ideological Situation" in elements of the 3rd NVA Division during the latter half of 1967, while it was operating in the Central portion of South Viet-Nam, indicates that numerous manifestations of rightism, including lack of conviction, fear of hardships and death, and malingering, were prevalent within divisional elements. The reasons given were that the "ideological indoctrination task has been carried out mechanically" and "the role of Party leadership has not been vigorously developed in each Party member." (The full text of this report may be found in Documents and Research Notes No. 19, "Self-Criticism: Report from a North Vietnamese Division," February 1968.)

That the PLAF was suffering from the same lack of adequate and effective political education and ideological indoctrination was indicated in an undated document "On Political and Ideological Indoctrination Against Desertion and Surrender," circulated within a PLAF regiment and captured by U.S. Forces in September 1968. (The full text of this document may be found in Documents and Research Notes No. 46, "On Political and Ideological Indoctrination Against Desertion and Surrender," October 1968.)

In October 1969, U.S. Forces captured a document believed to have been produced by and circulated within a North Vietnamese division. The document, bearing the Communist classification SECRET, indicated the existence of "many serious deficiencies" in the "political and ideological situation" during the first three months of 1969. The document stated that "rightist, pessimistic and individualistic
thinking still widely prevails in varying degrees among various echelons or individuals," and that this think had been manifested through "lack of an absolute and firm fighting stand; fear of difficulties and hardships, fear of [war] fierceness and sacrifices; fear of prolonged [war]; illusions for a quick and easy victory; peace illusions; pessimism and lack of confidence in [our] capability to win a decisive victory within a relatively short period of time as in the case of the people who see that their subjective expectations did not materialize (this is presently the main trend); over-estimation of the enemy [strength] and underestimation of our own [strength]; seeing the stubbornness of the enemy but failing to see that the enemy is stubborn in a position of defeat and that we have the capability to force him to abandon his stubbornness no matter how stubborn he is; (at times, these people entertain illusions about the nature of the enemy, and expectations about the objective changes in the internal situation of the enemy and in the U.S.A.; worse still, they fail to see the enemy's stubborn nature in his deceitful, coaxing schemes)\(^3\).

The causes of these ideological problems are also best defined by the Communists themselves. Cụu Long stated that within the PLAF, "many units have to fight in extremely difficult conditions with a shortage of everything," with the result that "in a number of regions, self-reliance in food and medicine and the using of the enemy's weapons to fight the enemy have become a routine way of life for our cadres and combatants."

The seriousness of these logistical problems, their ideological effects and the measures taken to counter those effects are indicated in a large number of enemy internal

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3. The full text of this document may be found in Documents and Research Notes No. 73, "Ideological Deficiencies and Lowered Combat Effectiveness," February 1970. Additional documents, indicating serious ideological problems, may be founded in Documents and Research Notes No. 92, "The Decline of VC Capabilities in Sub-Region 5, COSVN, in 1969-1970," April 1971, and in COSVN Resolution Nine.
documents captured subsequent to the March 1970 overthrow of Cambodian Chief of State Norodom Sihanouk and the loss by the PLAF and North Vietnamese forces of their sanctuaries in Cambodia. Some examples of such documents are included as appendices to this issue of Document and Research Notes.

On 6 June 1970, a Viet Cong Provincial Party headquarters issued a document which included an extract from Directive 13/CT-70, issued by the Standing Committee of COSVN. (Appendix No. 1) The purpose of the document was "to establish a budget in accordance with the new situation" brought about by "the poisonous scheme" of the U.S. in Cambodia, which had "temporarily caused a number of difficulties to friendly [Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces] forces in financial and rear service activities." In view of this situation, the leadership directed its forces to fully understand the importance of self-sufficiency. Tax collection and food purchase plans were to be developed at each echelon based on local capabilities. They were told that they "should not rely on support from COSVN. If conditions permit, some reinforcements will come, but they will only assist local areas in improving their self-sufficiency."

Another document, written by the Viet Cong Military Region 3 Standing Committee on 16 May 1970 (Appendix No. 2), indicated that not only would little support be forthcoming from COSVN, but that "local areas must collect a larger amount of money to deliver to C112 [COSVN]." The Military Region directive outlined measures to be taken as a result of the "critical situation." These included: 1) the establishment of "a light and compact organization," including "a decrease in support strength;" 2) readjustment of allowances; 3) adjustment of the ratio between the "operating fund allowance and the subsistence allowance;" and 4) adjustment (up) of the prices of some items. Food allowances were decreased by one-fourth to one-third, depending upon individual position, rice allowances were cut and monthly allowances to cadres were cut by 33 to 70 percent.

These "rear services" difficulties continued throughout 1970 in most areas and were aggravated by allied operations and pacification. The seriousness of the problem is indicated in a letter written on 27 December 1970 by a rear service cadre in Viet Cong Military Region 7. (Appendix No. 3)
He wrote to "brother Hiêu and all comrades" that the amount of rice collected was "very limited" as a result of allied activities, the small number of Communist personnel, and their "fear of hardships and sacrifices." The letter indicated that rear service elements had not collected enough money to cope with immediate needs, let alone provide for the future.

It is evident that these hardships and difficulties have had a significant effect upon Communist capabilities and morale. The solutions presented in captured documents, in COSVN Resolution Nine, and in the Cuu Long article stress the strengthening of political education and ideological leadership. Resolution Nine noted that of the efforts to be made "to ensure the achievement of the great responsibility of securing a decisive victory in the coming period, to foil every scheme, every evil trick of the enemy in the process of his de-escalation and the shift to political struggle ... strengthening ideological leadership is most important." Cuu Long echoed this when he stated that "extreme importance" must be attached to the "ideological task" in order to "develop the positive factors of our Army's revolutionary nature, tradition, and heroism" and to "limit and eliminate negative phenomena," and that "political education and ideological leadership are the most important, permanent tasks in our armed forces."

Political reorientation material designed for platoon cadres and soldiers was captured on 30 November 1970 in Viet Cong Sub-Region 5. (Appendix No. 4) The reorientation summarized allied "failures and main efforts" and detailed "new great friendly victories." Communist personnel were told that "to stop the aid from North Viet-Nam is an impossibility," that the allied plan "to search for and destroy friendly agencies and storage facilities" in Cambodia had failed and that "in Laos, two more southern provinces, Attopeu and Saravane, have been liberated. The enemy plan to secure the Xieng Khoang area has been smashed."

As further inspiration for Communist forces to make continued and greater efforts for a final victory, in spite of increasing hardships and sacrifices, the document discusses the "enemy political and diplomatic" situation. These included 1) "the opposition of the U.S. people to their government," 2) "the opposition of the U.S. Congress to the U.S. government," 3) the opposition of "a number of leaders and groups
in the [Republican] party to the Nixon policy," 4) "the opposition of the people of the world to the U.S.," 5) the open opposition of other "imperialistic countries" to the U.S., and 6) the opposition of U.S. "satellite countries" to the U.S. plan to form the Indo-China Military Alliance (sic).

Turning to the diplomatic front, the document hailed Madame Nguyên Thị Bình's "eight-point" peace solution but cautioned Communist personnel: "In the present victorious conditions, our objective remains unchanged on the basis of the eight-point [peace solution] which constitutes a new tactic. The decisive victory is still the one on the battlefield."

Further indication of the efforts to be made in the ideological field are to be found in the fifth and last part of the Cuu Long article, which is subtitled: "To Defeat the Enemy's Psywar." He warns that "the enemy has always tried to take advantage of our troops' ideological shortcomings in order to conduct his psychological warfare. Rightist and passive thinking and especially individualism is a main point of the enemy psychological warfare poison enabling him to exert his destructive influence." To counter this, Cuu Long states that "it is necessary to be constantly offensive on the ideological front." By Cuu Long's own definition, this ideological offensive amounts to a reindoctrination of the PLAF. "It is necessary," he says, "to analyze and compare the two natures in order to clearly see that we are winning and the enemy has been defeated, that our cause is just and the enemy's cause unjust, and that we are noble and heroic and the enemy is depraved and corrupt." The "broad reindoctrination study phase in the whole Party, the whole army, and the whole people" ordered by Resolution Nine apparently was unsuccessful.

Whether the public nature of Cuu Long's recent complaints is, in fact, an indication of significant increase in the various manifestations of "rightism," or whether it is an indication of increased emphasis on a long-standing problem in response to "the new situation and task," as Cuu Long claims, cannot be judged with certainty.

It appears by Cuu Long's own admission and by information contained in captured documents that the 1970 allied efforts to eliminate communist sanctuaries in Cambodia had
a significant effect upon ideological discipline and morale within PLAF ranks. The timing of Ců Long's article may be indicative of further inroads made upon morale by the allied operations in northeastern Cambodia, the U Minh Forest and Southern Laos. What is most apparent is the continued existence of serious ideological problems within Communist ranks.
"SOME PROBLEMS ON THE IDEOLOGICAL TASK IN THE SOUTH VIET-NAM PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMED FORCES"
(Article by Cùu Long)

[Editor's note: The article was broadcast by Liberation Radio, clandestine, in Vietnamese to South Viet-Nam in four installments on 27, 28, 29 and 30 April 1971]

This article is divided into five parts. The first part deals with further strengthening political education and ideological leadership. The second deals with improving the quality of the ideological task. The third deals with the fact that the contents of the ideological task must be comprehensive. And the fifth deals with defeating the enemy's psywar. Following are the foreword and first part of the article dealing with improving the quality of the ideological task.

In the present anti-U.S. national salvation resistance, the South Viet-Nam PLAF have won continuous, glorious victories and have stepped up their continuous attacks, thus being worthy of being the heroic army of the heroic Vietnamese people. Our cadres and combatants have constantly developed their determination to fight and win, their offensive revolutionary spirit and their unequalled valiant and resourceful acts. Our nation's stalwart and indomitable tradition has been strongly developed in the liberation armed forces. The decisive factor of this development is that led by the NFLSV, the PLAF have successfully carried out political education and ideological leadership. In recent years, the political education and ideological task among the PLAF have scored beautiful success and have gained many varied and creative experiences. The revolutionary ideology of our cadres and combatants has always developed vigorously. Our armed forces have brilliantly implemented every task and defeated every enemy.

The combat of our armed forces and people has now become increasingly critical, difficult, and fierce. The demands of the resistance have become increasingly numerous. More than ever, we must fully develop the strength of the ideological
education and leadership in order that our armed forces can always satisfy every demand of the new situation and task in order to advance forward to completely defeat the U.S. aggressors.

1--Further Strengthen Political Education and Ideological Leadership

Political education and ideological leadership are the most important, permanent tasks in our armed forces. A satisfactory ideological leadership will develop the positive factors of our army's revolutionary nature, tradition, and heroism and limit and eliminate negative phenomena.

Particularly in our present combat, which has become increasingly critical, fierce, and complex and in which ideology has developed rapidly and in a complex manner, it is necessary to attach extreme importance to the ideological task. In the past, thanks to the great success of the ideological task in the armed forces, the ideological situation in our armed forces has developed rather steadfastly and has clearly reflected satisfactory and positive leadership. The South Viet-

Nam PLAF have always been boundlessly loyal to the revolutionary drive of the people and nation. Thanks to this loyalty, our cadres and combatants through years of very fierce combat have had a wonderfully valiant combat spirit. Our armed forces have continuously attacked and annihilated the enemy. They have courageously conducted offensives or stayed in their positions. One man with one gun, under fierce bombs and shells, pushed back tens of the enemy's counterattacks during 1 day. Many wounded comrades who were asked to engage in combat, although unable to move forward to assault, stayed in their bunkers to fight the enemy. They were determined not to leave the battleground.

Many units have fought very bravely and have been determined to win a victory in every battle. Some comrades have known in advance that they would be sacrificed, but they have shown themselves to be very calm in trying by every means possible to rush forward to exterminate the enemy, thus choosing a glorious way to sacrifice themselves. Some comrades who were unluckily captured by the enemy have firmly maintained their revolutionary heroism and have tried by every means possible to attack the enemy. Our armed forces are devoted to
their tasks and are resolved to endure and overcome all violence and hardships. We can say that they have a wonderful spirit of endurance.

Many units, despite their small size, have overcome great difficulties and hardships and achieved outstanding exploits in the attacks against the key positions of the enemy. Many units have to fight in extremely difficult conditions with a shortage of everything and yet they have firmly held to their positions and fought bravely. Many surgical units, although they do not have a fixed area of operation, have, however, succeeded in taking care of the sick and wounded combatants along with fighting and trying to find food for these combatants.

In a number of regions, self-reliance in food and medicine and the using of the enemy's weapons to fight the enemy have become a routine way of life for our cadres and combatants. The revolutionary heroism, the spirit of devotion to their tasks, and the spirit of enduring hardships and overcoming difficulties of our armed forces have been reflected in all categories of troops and armed branches, on all battlefronts, on the fronts as well as in the rear bases, and among cadres as well as combatants. This is undeniable proof of the boundless loyalty of the South Viet-Nam PLAF to the revolution. They also prove that our armed forces are very reliable instruments of the front, the revolutionary administration, and the people.

Being guided and educated by the front, our armed forces feel more confident in the success of the revolutionary line and the people, and are ever more strengthened when faced with violence and hardships and the frenzied counterattacks of the enemy. Through difficult tests, through violent combat, through the study of the lines and policies of the front, and through the criticism and self-criticism movements, our cadres and combatants have become ever more united, and have firmly believed in and strictly carried out all lines and policies of the front.

The cadres have always maintained their exemplary vanguard roles, raised high their sense of responsibility, and firmly led the masses to overcome all difficulties and to dash forward and fulfill all tasks.
The combatants have always strictly carried out all orders and instructions from higher echelons, have absolute confidence in the front, the revolution and the people, and have firmly struggled for the people. In their struggle against the enemy, the PLAF have clearly shown their revolutionary virtue, their readiness to fulfill all tasks, and their high sense of responsibility toward the revolution. Despite great difficulties and hardships, our armed forces have always been ready to accept all tasks entrusted them by the front, have always shown an indomitable spirit and a spirit of unremittingly and vigorously harassing the enemy. They have repeatedly won victories.

Our armed forces' beautiful revolutionary qualities have been also reflected in their increasingly firm internal solidarity and army-people solidarity. Affection and solidarity between cadres and combatants and between upper and lower echelons in the armed forces have become increasingly strong. Democracy has been vigorously developed within the armed forces. Cadres have cared for combatants, who have respected and loved their cadres. In difficult situations, many cadres have upheld their spirit of responsibility by taking the lead in their units, by sharing hardships with their combatants, by discussing and overcoming the difficulties with them, and by showing confidence in each other to fulfill every task. Many cadres have always set brilliant examples in implementing policies toward wounded combatants and dead heroes. Also, the solidarity and coordination between armed branches and organs, between the front and rear areas, and between combat units and units that serve combat demands have been close.

Also, the army-people solidarity has been increasingly firm. Our armed forces have set many good behavioral examples in dealing with the people, in protecting the property and lives of the people, and in assisting them, especially in difficult and dangerous situations. These examples of serving the people have deeply impressed the people, especially in cities and areas temporarily under the enemy's control. Conversely, the people have wholeheartedly protected, fed, and helped the cadres, cared for wounded combatants, transported the wounded and ammunition, and participated in the fighting together with the armed forces. This is really a source of great encouragement and strength for our armed forces to fulfill every task.
Thanks to having noble revolutionary qualities, our armed forces have also been very versatile and resourceful in combat and work. Fighting against an extremely cruel and perfidious enemy, the armed forces have demonstrated satisfactory combativeness and have creatively applied the front's lines and instructions in uniting with the people in defeating every operation and tactic of the enemy, thus defeating all of his perfidious and crafty maneuvers. Our armed forces have always made new and creative progress in applying combat thoughts, directions, and formulas and the combat methods of the people's war.

In the present, fierce life-or-death fighting against the enemy, together with developing these very positive and fundamental factors, our armed forces have actively struggled against rightist phenomena that have at times appeared in different forms in every unit, locality, and individual. The rightist ideology is the ideology of the small bourgeois, an ideology that is influenced by remnants of the bourgeois and feudal ideology that have remained in our persons.

It can easily cause us to lose our spirit of self-reliance and spirit of self-strengthening, to evaluate the enemy incorrectly, to erroneously believe in an easy success at some times, to fear length and hardships at other times, and to fail to resolutely fulfill our tasks at still other times. Therefore, more than ever, it is presently necessary to further strengthen political education and ideological leadership in a constantly critical and active manner and on a widespread basis, in order to constantly develop the positive factors and to hamper negative factors in time. The present problem is that all leading echelons must understand the role and position of political education and ideological leadership thoroughly and in a comprehensive manner.

After a certain period of time, leading echelons must re-study and re-evaluate the ideological situation and discuss and adopt comprehensive resolutions on the contents of the political and ideological task. They must neither base themselves on personal and preconceived opinion in giving directions for ideological leadership over each task nor carelessly discuss the ideological task and completely entrust the ideological task to political commissars, political cadres, and political task organs. It is necessary to thoroughly understand the ideological task in leading the performance of the military, political, rear service,
and professional tasks of the units and to point out and firmly adhere to the guiding thoughts for every task. In order to thoroughly lead and educate the units to satisfactorily fulfill every task, it is necessary to avoid the simplification which lessens the importance of ideological leadership over various tasks, and, thereby, limits the results of the tasks or even causes the tasks to fail.

2 -- Heighten the Quality of the Ideological Task.

In order to heighten the quality of the ideological task, it is necessary to vigorously develop the positive, revolutionary factors among the armed forces while striving to repel and overcome rightist, passive thinking; to improve our combativity, the masses' character, and our comprehensiveness, and regularity in understanding the ideological task; and to closely combine the ideological and organizational tasks.

Because we are beings in an objective world, the development of human thinking is also governed by definite laws. Nevertheless, the coming into being and development of human thinking are not entirely identical to the coming into being and development of beings in the inanimate world. This has its own conditions. The ideological development of our army always undergoes a struggle between two opposing factors: positiveness and passiveness. The positive aspect is that of development. It is like young sprouts that develop, blossom, and yield fruit. The passive, backward aspect is decadent and is repelled and overcome. In our cadre's and combatants' thinking, the positively revolutionary spirit—the aspect of progress through educational activities and training in revolutionary realities—is always a basic, main aspect that is constantly developed.

In its process of development, the revolutionary thinking must fiercely struggle against the passive, backward aspect. The passive, backward aspect always slows down and hampers the development and progress of the positively revolutionary aspect.
In our army, revolutionary heroism is developing vigorously and widely. On the battlefield, the absolute majority of our cadres and combatants have fought bravely and marvelously, enthusiastically surged forward, and scored glorious feats of arms. In the rear, many comrades have devotedly and enthusiastically fulfilled their tasks and have scored great achievements.

But, apart from these positively revolutionary acts, these brave combat activities, and these sacrifices for the revolution, a number of people in various places and at various times have carried out acts that are not truly revolutionary. They still fear difficulties and hardships and are afraid of making sacrifices. A leading cadre must be able to grasp this ideological law and to correctly and thoroughly assess the positive and passive ideological aspects. We cannot be subjective or simple. We cannot look only at one direction, at one aspect. It is necessary to consider the "positive" aspect of thinking as being the main aspect.

It is necessary to be vigilant so as to detect the phenomena of the passive aspect--no matter how small they may be—in order to seek ways to overcome them. We happen to see more concrete phenomena of the passive aspect in certain places than others. It is necessary to firmly grasp the revolutionary thinking. The positive, progressive aspect is a basic, main aspect that is being constantly developed.

We can only, on this basis, develop the positive aspect and overcome the passive phenomena, no matter how small they may be. The struggle between the positive thinking and the passive thinking is a protracted and fierce struggle between revolutionary heroism and individualism, between progress and backwardness, between the good and the bad, between the right and the wrong.

Human ideology is developing under definite conditions. It is necessary to grasp and analyze these conditions in order to grasp the trend of the ideological development. The thinking of our cadres and combatants has usually been formed on the basis of the following factors: First, the social base acting as the origin of the human class; second, the realities of the revolutionary struggle within society; third, the education and training of the communities and organization; and fourth, the self-development of each individual in the revolutionary struggle.
Socially speaking, the absolute majority of our cadres and combatants were born in the ranks of the laborers and revolutionary classes in our society and have grown up in our great national revolutionary struggle. This is an excellent condition for our cadres' and combatants' ideological development. But, the deep vestiges of the old regime and the old society and the reactionary, bad thinking of the U.S. imperialists and the rotten social regime in the south are still influencing our people. As a result, noteworthy passive points still exist in our cadres' and combatants' consciousness and thinking.

Regarding the realities of the revolutionary struggle in society, the Vietnamese revolution has been developing vigorously and has won one victory after another. Under the front's proper and creative leadership and with their heroic, unsubmitive traditions, the Vietnamese people scored great victories in the resistance against French imperialism and are now conducting the great anti-U.S. national salvation struggle.

The revolutionary struggle is like an oven in which the cadres and combatants of our armed forces can be forged to become dynamic men who, with the noble thoughts and deeds, will glorify the Vietnamese country and nation. In this oven, they have been trained to endure hardships and have made steady progress. Revolutionary thoughts and heroic acts have increasingly developed. However, in this protracted, difficult but glorious struggle, counterrevolutionary, negative, and non-progressive thoughts and acts have been revealed in several places.

Regarding the training and education by the collective and organization, our cadres and combatants have been trained and educated by the front permanently and closely during the whole prospect of our people's great revolutionary struggle. The revolution has transformed them into dynamic people who possess a good nature, proletarian thoughts, and a revolutionary philosophy of life.

The revolution can guide us in the struggle to weed out negative thoughts, vices, and bad habits. Because our cadres and combatants have been led, educated, and trained by the
front, they have made progress. This is the fundamental factor for the emergence and development of revolutionary and progressive thoughts among our troops.

Regarding self-improvement and self-training, because our cadres and combatants have been educated by the revolution and have improved and trained themselves within the realities of a hard struggle, they have succeeded in overcoming untold hardships in this war.

If we do not make subjective efforts and improve ourselves, we cannot accept education by the revolution, and although we belong to a good class and are in a position favorable for our self-training, we cannot make progress and may become disorganized. Otherwise, if we make great subjective efforts and fully accept this education, we will be able to become loyal revolutionary cadres and combatants and score glorious achievements and victories in this protracted, fierce, and difficult struggle.

However, revolutionary thoughts do not always develop easily and favorably. There must be a struggle against negative thoughts and their development depends on the influence of the above factors in any situation. If political education and ideological leadership are loose and self-improvement and self-training are neglected in the face of trials and complicated problems, negative events will have an opportunity to develop and progress.

The present fierce and hard fight is also a great trial with regard to the conflict between positive and negative thoughts. In a normal situation, thoughts can be manifested clearly or can develop favorably. But, during a fierce war, the struggles between life and death and between happiness and suffering will take place every day and every hour.

Under these circumstances, wherever the educational leadership is good, the cadres' and combatants' abilities are remarkable [words indistinct]. Let us heighten the quality of the ideological task, improve our combative ability, the masses' character, and our regularity and comprehensiveness in
understanding the ideological task, and closely combine the ideological and organizational task! Let us heighten our combativity, activeness, and revolutionary offensive spirit in carrying out the ideological task and strive to develop our good points, while seriously criticizing and combating our erroneous points!

In all (? circumstances), it is necessary to thoroughly imbue ourselves with a high combat spirit [words indistinct] and constantly criticize our passive, backward points that are inconsistent with our army's revolutionary nature. The ideological task must constantly take the initiative in developing positive points and must resolutely combat and overcome in time the passive phenomena that preclude our educational activities. In our studies, along with heightening our consciousness, we must pay attention to liberating ourselves ideologically. In our activities, we must combine criticism and self-criticism, while strictly complying with disciplinary rules. While caring for and paying attention to the education of our internal ranks, we must vigorously attack the enemy on the ideological front. It is necessary to heighten the masses' awareness in the ideological task [words indistinct]. It is necessary to pay attention to stirring the masses ideologically in all activities, studies, and works and to combating the situation in which higher echelons only concern themselves with [words indistinct] to lower echelons and belittle discussions and the masses' ideological motivation. [words indistinct] only by seriously developing this factor can we create a strong impetus and a healthy atmosphere in our units and can we develop the masses' activeness in understanding the ideological task, as well as in combat and other activities.

It is necessary to fully exercise political democracy, military democracy, and economic democracy, to highly value and attentively listen to the masses' views, to judiciously reflect the masses' thoughts, and to perseveringly and wholeheartedly stir, persuade, and educate the masses.

In particular, when the situation is tense and urgent, it is all the more necessary to make the masses thoroughly understand all tasks. It is necessary to heighten our comprehensiveness in fulfilling the ideological task in its contents, aspects, measures, and objectives. While paying attention to

1. The form (?----) indicates that the word in parentheses is probably accurate but that reception was such that complete assurance that the word is as broadcast is not possible.
satisfactorily understanding the situation and our tasks, we must concern ourselves with studying the basic problems, while perseveringly striving to truly understand the policies that were set forth. It is necessary to know how to develop and combine all forms of political education and ideological leadership, such as ideological reform, permanent education [words indistinct], the drives to build our organization and to combine the (? ideological) task with the care for the material life [words indistinct].

It is necessary to pay adequate attention to the welfare of the three troop categories on the frontline, as well as in the rear. It is necessary to pay adequate attention to the welfare of the cadres and agencies, in combat and construction, in all places, at all times, and during the periods of difficulties or favorable opportunities. It is necessary to heighten the fulfilling of the ideological task, to constantly cling to the common situation and the concrete situations in units and localities, and to tightly hold to resolutions and instructions so as to regularly map out plans to carry out the tasks of political education and ideological leadership. It is necessary to have concrete plans for each period of time, to achieve close coordination among echelons and components concerned, and to properly improve the methods for carrying out the ideological task.

It is necessary to systematize the permanent propaganda and emulation task for the benefit of units at basic levels. It is necessary to avoid the situation in which tasks are incompletely fulfilled or in which all set tasks are not assigned to units at basic levels. For our cadres and combatants, to heighten consciousness, to effect an ideological change, and to guide activities constitute three necessary links in the unified chain of the task of political education and ideological leadership. Therefore, in order to turn thoughts into acts and material forces, it is necessary to closely combine the ideological and organizational tasks.

In particular, it is necessary to study the ideological situation and ideological task in order to implement the organizational task. It is necessary to study the organizational situation and organizational task in order to implement the (?) ideological task. Ideological education must go along with developing the organization. It is necessary to closely link the educational task with the training inside an organization, inside the masses' struggle movement, and in combat.
It is necessary to closely link the political, military, and logistic tasks, the task of various branches, and the various links of each task in order to create favorable conditions in order to strengthen and develop the ideological strength [words indistinct] and overcome difficulties, thus enabling our cadres and combatants to progress constantly.

3 -- The Content of the Ideological Task Must Be Comprehensive

The ideological task in our armed forces is the task of forming new men and elite combatants with a fine revolutionary nature, a heroic bearing, and an ability to struggle to successfully achieve every revolutionary task. The basic content of the ideological task in our armed forces is to unceasingly heighten revolutionary enlightenment by using revolutionary tasks, revolutionary ethics, and revolutionary traditions as substance for basic education.

In view of the content and trend of the ideological task and the present, common state of ideological thinking of our troops, the political education and ideological leadership must consist mainly of explaining to them the situation and their tasks, improving their revolutionary nature and the armed forces' tradition, bringing into full play their revolutionary heroism, their ardent patriotism, their hatred for the enemy, and their determination to fight to liberate the South, defend the North, and proceed toward the reunification of the fatherland and to stand shoulder to shoulder with the Cambodian and Lao people to expel the U.S. imperialists from the Indochinese Peninsula.

At the same time, it must consist of trying to help them overcome rightist and negative ideology and all individualistic phenomena. It is necessary to improve the troops revolutionary point of view, position, and ideology through the explanation
of the situation and their tasks. In education, it is necessary to make the cadres and troops clearly realize the nature of the two regimes: the people's proletarian regime and the neocolonialist regime; of the two administrations: the revolutionary administration and the country-selling administration; of the two armies: the revolutionary army and the U.S. lackey, reactionary army; and of the two lines: the revolutionary line and the counter-revolutionary line.

It is necessary to develop a thorough revolutionary spirit among the troops and to strengthen their combat stand and determination to completely defeat the U.S. aggressors. It is necessary to strengthen the leadership over the education of the troops in making them thoroughly understand combat guidelines and methods and tactical views. This is also a big problem of the political education and ideological leadership which, in the recent past, a number of localities have satisfactorily solved.

At present, our combat guidelines and methods are very inspiring and inventive. There are general guidelines reflecting the strategic line and determination of the front, concrete guidelines for each area and each category of troop, and concrete combat methods. Therefore, in order to firmly grasp and satisfactorily lead the education to make the troops thoroughly understand combat guidelines and methods and tactical methods, it is necessary to firmly grasp general guidelines and at the same time to firmly grasp the situation of the area in which one is operating and the situation of his enemy and of his side in a battle or an operation. It is necessary to bring into play the subjective activity of a leading cadre to study in depth and apply combat guidelines and methods and tactical views.

On the other hand, it is necessary to develop military democracy and motivate the masses to learn, thoroughly understand, and apply the combat guidelines and methods which have been set forth. The education in combat guidelines and methods must be repeatedly performed in order to achieve good results. After each battle or each operation, it is necessary to review it in order to draw experiences and to correct deviations in time, especially from tactical views. It is also necessary to regularly make analyses through reasoning and realities to educate the troops, thus making all of them fully confident of the effort and determination to satisfactorily carry out combat guidelines and methods.
4. The Objectives of the Ideological Task in Our Army
Are the Cadres and Combatants of the Armed Forces

In order to properly carry out the ideological leadership task according to a concrete plan, it is necessary to hold fast to, appraise, and analyze the objectives and to encourage and develop their thoughts on the matter. In general, the thoughts of our cadres and combatants must be encouraged and developed this way. However, the encouragement and development of thoughts vary according to each person's situation. These factors are: the social bases, the class spirit, the ability to assimilate revolutionary education, the ability to improve oneself, and the (? activities) of each person. Since the influence of these factors varies according to each person's situation, the evolution of each person's thoughts varies too. In fact, many comrades who possess a firm revolutionary nature, a good ability to assimilate education, and a strong ability to improve themselves can have good thoughts, make constant progress, and become brilliant examples under any circumstances. Meanwhile, many other comrades, though being in a favorable situation, cannot make progress and their thoughts have proven to be backward because they have had a (? poor) education and have not properly improved themselves. However, many other comrades can become good cadres and combatants of the revolution although they do not belong to the working class, because they have had a good education, made subjective efforts, and improved themselves under all circumstances.

Therefore in the ideological task, it is necessary to apply a concrete method of educating and leading each type of task. The more concrete the methods, the greater the results and it is possible to avoid a general, uniform education that fails to penetrate each type of objective and allows those that can make progress to become backward and disorganized.

To effectively carry out the educational task and to help cadres and combatants accept education in an advantageous fashion, it is necessary to seek to understand their ability to assimilate education in order to apply proper educational measures. It is necessary to avoid applying [words indistinct] which lacks
vividness or emphasizes only a certain method instead of coordinating all methods so as to create a combined strength that can help change the thoughts of each objective under all circumstances.

For this reason, our cadres and combatants must be educated in such a way that they can assimilate what they have learned and that they can accept the revolutionary line, viewpoint, stand, thoughts, and tasks.

Regarding the problem of holding fast to the concrete objectives of the ideological task, it is necessary to satisfactorily solve the problem concerning the relations between the educational and political links and concerning the ideological leadership regarding the cadres and units at the basic level, the units on the forefront and in the rear, and the regular, regional, militia, and guerrilla forces. No objective can be disregarded.

The problem of political education and ideological leadership must be posed correctly on the basis of the position and importance of each objective. The education of and leadership over cadres must be considered as a central task. At the same time, it is necessary to solicitously welcome [words indistinct] to the basic units.

In the face of the new situation and tasks, the regional troops, militiamen, and guerrillas are very important forces for persistently advancing the resistance toward complete victory. Thus, adequate attention must be paid to the leadership task.

At present, it is necessary to build and consolidate systems concerning education, study, and internal activities and to enable the regional troops, especially militiamen and guerrillas, to fight persistently and tenaciously. All echelons and political organs must step up the collection of documents on the role and tasks of militiamen and guerrillas and on the nature and traditions of the people's armed forces. It is necessary to build a permanent study and a concrete study program for regional troops and to hold classes regularly and to not fear difficulties.
Along with armed attacks on the battlefield, ideological warfare is being waged fiercely between our forces and the enemy. The U.S. imperialists have invaded our country, hoping to turn the southern part into a new U.S.-type colony and to force our people to serve as their slaves in order to serve their political, military and neocolonialist schemes.

They have tried to deceive and poison our people in the cultural and ideological fields in order to cause our people to fear them, admire them, and accept their way of living. They have tried by all means to choke the nationalism and patriotism of our people. They have used bombs and ammunition to destroy our country, our villages, our rice paddies, our gardens, and our homes. They have massacred our people, have destroyed or robbed them of their property, and have gone as far as to wipe out all of the sacred vestiges left by our forefathers. They have also resorted to political tricks, have tried to woo and buy people through material gain, and have disseminated a depraved culture and way of living in order to turn people into their lackeys and make the majority of our people admire them, fear them, and live under their control.

Our enemy is crafty and insidious. He knows that material destruction is terrible, that moral and ideological destruction is even more destructive, and that the consequences of his depraved and reactionary ideology and culture will have a more lasting effect on society than material destruction. Therefore, he has spared no effort and wealth to serve this insidious scheme. His immediate objective is to direct his attacks on the confidence and unity of the revolutionary ranks. He has tried to deter our troops' efforts to aid our ideology and our people in order to weaken our fighting spirit, to steady the morale of his struggling troops, and to deceive the people in the United States and in the world.
To carry out his military, political, and cultural activities, he has spared no tricks, not even the most brazen and vilest ones, provided that they can serve his ends. He has coordinated psychological warfare with espionage warfare in order to undermine our morals and organizations. He has [words indistinct].

The present ideological struggle between us and the enemy is actually a struggle between two ideologies: our revolutionary ideology and the counter-revolutionary ideology of the imperialists and their lackeys. Our people's revolutionary ideology, in its highest manifestation, is a determination to sacrifice for the anti-U.S. national salvation struggle in accordance with the "nothing is more valuable than independence and freedom" spirit. The ideology of the imperialists and their lackeys at its highest manifestation is an attack against the revolution and the people. The enemy has never ceased slandering and distorting communism and the revolution in the vilest and dirtiest manner in order to keep our people away from the revolutionaries so that the enemy can easily rule and enslave our people and turn our country into a neocolony.

We should be determined to attack the enemy on the political and ideological fields and to defeat his psychological warfare in order to prevent its vicious influence among our ranks. The enemy has always tried to take advantage of our troops' ideological shortcomings in order to conduct his psychological warfare.

Rightist and passive thinking and especially individualism is a main point of the enemy psychological warfare poison enabling him to exert his destructive influence. Therefore, to defeat the enemy's psychological warfare we should consolidate our revolutionary ideology, vigorously develop revolutionary heroism among our ranks, and strive to consolidate and improve our organization in order to make (? the people) healthy, firm, strong, and well-disciplined.

The more our entire people improve revolutionary heroism the more they can combat individualism and the more they defeat the enemy psychological warfare. It is necessary to improve
the combat ideals of our cadres and combatants and make them conscious of [words indistinct] community, progress, and revolutionary philosophy of life in order to serve as a basis for their acts of revolutionary heroism.

In the present anti-U.S. national salvation struggle our armed forces have many heroic units and individuals. These individuals constitute the most typical manifestation of revolutionary heroism. These bright examples are being disseminated everywhere, are exerting great influences, and are vigorously encouraging our armed forces to contribute toward defeating the enemy psychological warfare. It is necessary to motivate the masses to constantly expose the plots, content, and tricks of the enemy's psywar. The more serious his defeats on the battlefields, the more active his psywar activities. However, no matter how crafty and perfidious his schemes and tricks may be, never can he hide his cruel and unjust aggressive and country-selling nature. We are fully able to defeat his psywar because we have our brilliantly just cause, our absolute political and spiritual superiority, and many experiences in smashing his schemes and tricks.

In order to defeat the enemy's psywar, it is necessary to be constantly offensive on the ideological front. To be offensive on this front, it is necessary, first of all, to be highly vigilant in order to be clearly aware of his tricks. No matter how crafty his tricks may be, it is necessary to be thoroughly aware of his vile nature. Political education and ideological leadership must always expose the reactionary nature of the U.S. aggressors and their country-selling henchmen in order to motivate everyone to disdain and forsake them. It is necessary to thoroughly analyze and compare the totally different natures of the two governments, regimes, armies, and lines and, hence, to consolidate our confidence and internal solidarity and unanimity. It is necessary to analyze and compare the two natures in order to clearly see that we are winning and the enemy has been defeated, that our cause is just and the enemy's cause is unjust, and that we are noble and heroic and the enemy is depraved and corrupt. It is necessary to expose the true nature of the enemy's beautiful but deceitful words on democracy and independence, on nationalism, on the just cause, on humanity, and on the enemy's legitimacy and constitutionality.
Regarding the enemy's very sophisticated tricks, it is necessary to base oneself on realities to analyze them and to analyze and expose the true nature of his words and acts, not allowing him to cover up his evils and deceive our troops with his brazenly deceitful and bribing words. It is necessary to persevere in carrying out educational and propaganda activities within the army as well as among the people against the enemy's propaganda. It is necessary that every one of our press and radio activities and educational, informational, and propaganda documents and every political and ideological activity of our units aim at opposing the enemy's psywar. All these activities must be carried out continually on the basis of building a steadfast revolutionary ideological battleground for the units.

Our people's great, just war against the Americans for national salvation, having very appropriate policies and lines, has scored extremely great success and is vigorously advancing toward total victory. Our armed forces and people, filled with confidence, enthusiasm, and optimism, are heightening more than ever before their revolutionary offensive spirit and heroism in advancing in the wave of success to score greater successes. Our people's armed forces, tempered in the protracted resistance, have grown by leaps and bounds, have strongly developed their beautiful revolutionary qualities and tradition of determination to fight and win, and have stepped up the emulation movement to annihilate the aggressors and achieve exploits throughout the battlefield. We also have much experience in building our army politically and ideologically.

These are very fundamental advantages for us to continue to further strengthen the ideological education and leadership, to develop positive factors, and to overcome negative phenomena in order to cause our army to have a steadfast revolutionary stand, to firmly maintain its combat spirit, and to persist in and step up the resistance to total victory under all circumstances no matter how protracted and hard the fighting may be.
Appendix No. 1
Bàu Bàng Province Party
Headquarters

TO: ALL K'S [DISTRICTS] AND BRANCHES [AT THE
PROVINCIAL HEADQUARTERS]

(EXTRACT FROM DIRECTIVE 13/CT-70 ISSUED BY
THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF COSVN)

STRENGTHENING LEADERSHIP TO ESTABLISH A BUDGET
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NEW SITUATION

[Because] the U.S. imperialists are continuously being
defeated in the war in Viet-Nam and Laos, they overthrew
the Cambodian government in order to save themselves.
However the situation did not develop favorably as they had
expected. On the contrary, the U.S. imperialists and their
henchmen have suffered a serious failure at the hands of the
peoples of Laos and K [Cambodia]. Their policy of aggres-
sion and expansion of the war in Indochina was denounced by
world opinion. They could not salvage their defeat. More-
over, the peoples of Viet-Nam, Khmer [Cambodia] and Laos
have united to form a broader and stronger anti-American
front. This created new advantages and capabilities for the
people in Indochina to strengthen the revolutionary spirit and
provide conditions for attaining new and greater victories.
However, the poisonous scheme of the U.S. temporarily
caused a number of difficulties to friendly [VC/NVA] forces
in financial and rear service activities. All combat support
requirements increased, especially requirements for new
spontaneous tasks and food provisions in order to maintain
the initiative in facing all situations and to make possible
the reception and use of aid in the near future.

In the face of such a situation, and in order to defeat
the poisonous U.S. scheme and to turn present temporary
difficulties into great advantages, the whole Party, army,
and people must urgently and positively take the initiative
in performing the following missions:
1. First, we should make the party committee, party members, cadre soldiers, personnel, and workers of all echelons in the army as well as in all branches fully realize our victories and the development of the revolution in Laos and Cambodia. We should also make them realize the new situation in order to generate new capabilities during the resistance against the U.S. for national salvation, and at the same time, heighten their determination to overcome difficulties created by the enemy's poisonous scheme in order to achieve new victories.

We should deeply develop the viewpoint of economic and financial self-sufficiency in order to strive to increase agricultural production to insure improvement of the people's living conditions, to increase support to the front line, and the collection of additional resources. The purpose of this is to gain the initiative in coping with the situation under any circumstances, to insure satisfactory accomplishment of combat missions, strengthening of our forces, and task performance.

The rear services of all echelons, in each area, province, and district etc. should estimate by themselves the capability of the local areas to work out their own plans for tax collection and the purchase of food, and should not rely on support from COSVN. If conditions permit, some reinforcements will come, but they will only assist local areas in improving their self-sufficiency.

But in the present situation, local areas must be fully conscious of [the importance of] formulating their own budget in accordance with the spirit of self-sufficiency, and building of local rear services in order to be able to operate on their own initiative.

If we fully understand the above problems, and if the Party committees exercise proper leadership, take specific measures organize implementation, and know how to rely on the people, we will surely succeed in overcoming all difficulties in the financial, economic, and rear service fields, in the faithful discharge of our economic and financial duty, in [balancing] receipts and expenditures and will be able to contribute our part to the revolutionary work in the new situation.
2. Specific missions:

Endeavor to develop areas of collection of resources and resource collection.

We must strive by all means to develop agricultural production by the people [as well as] self-sufficiency by the army and agencies in order to increase agricultural production (according to the directive of COSVN and SVNLa Military Affairs Party Committee); and to develop purchase-requisition areas and resource collection. We must strive to collect taxes in accordance with the criteria prescribed by COSVN. We should discuss the problem with local areas and try to avoid bad collections that have occurred in the past. Taxes are the main resource which contributes to combat achievements. If we cannot increase agricultural production, or fail to collect taxes to build up our local rear service, we will not be able to attain achievements, to overcome difficulties etc. and, will on the other hand create more local problems.

All agencies, branches and army units should, in accordance with their capabilities, collect production taxes and other resources, including war booty.

Emphasis should be placed on attacks on the enemy's storage sites to seize his equipment, to replace [the losses of] our forces. This is a big problem and all branch levels and units must strictly observe discipline [regarding] war booty.

In the new situation, the collection of taxes is not only an important economic measure, to overcome economic difficulties but also a political one to smash the enemy's cunning schemes and intently turn the situation in our favor.

b. To have a strong grasp of the present requirements and criteria of expenditures and allocations, first we must rely on our capability to collect taxes and resources, then work out monthly and quarterly plans for receipts and expenditures. We must practice thriftiness by eliminating unnecessary expenditures and saving money to purchase rice, salt, medicine and food for our combat forces. Units which have sufficient food must save it to support those which need it, and those which are having serious [food] problems.
Expenditures: Priority should be given to the purchase of the most necessary items such as: Rice, salt, and medicine. Commodities should be issued following strict requirements. It is not necessary to make uniform, standard allocations. Additional allowances for health recuperation and holidays should be cancelled.

Subsistence allowance: We must strictly practice thrift. We should spend money only within the limits of our collection capabilities. We should make the best use of available materiel and repair and redistribute equipment which is still serviceable. Make an inventory of available property for the purpose of ensuring a uniform distribution of property by taking surplus from one area to supplement the shortage of another. Stop all purchases which can be postponed.

c. To strengthen the administration of financial receipts and expenditures, to strengthen the administration of production for self-sufficiency which includes the launching of the thrift movement.

We should control all receipts and expenditures, increase production and initiate a movement of thrift. In the face of the skyrocketing prices caused by inflation, the devaluation of [SVN] currency, and the reduction of subsistence allowances (which is a necessary measure to cope with the present situation), the living conditions of cadre, soldiers, and personnel are partly affected. For that reason, commanders of agencies and units and Party Chapter members must encourage their personnel to overcome difficulties and make them understand the situation and their missions in helping to solve common problems so that they will positively participate in administering the budget and will practice thrift.

Efforts should be made to better our financial administration, practice thrift, and maintain and properly use the property and equipment of agencies and units. It is necessary to initiate a movement for increasing production, practicing thriftiness and eliminating corruption and waste. Only when we increase [farm] production, practice thrift, heighten the sense of responsibility, protect property, and improve the financial administration in agencies and units, can we minimize difficulties and improve the living conditions of the personnel of all agencies and units.
Appendix No. 2

DIRECTIVE

TO: All provinces, Cần Thơ City, and agencies at T [Region] level.

The financial collection this year is beset with great difficulties because local areas must collect a larger amount of money to deliver to CII2 [COSVN]. Due to the critical situation, we should increase the collection of money and practice economy. (The related directives have been forwarded to all U's [provinces Party Committees]).

Under the guidance of the CII2 Standing Committee and Finance-Economy Section, after reviewing all expenditures of T, the Standing Committee realizes that various types of expenditures should be reviewed more carefully.

The combat strength in general is low as compared with the assigned strength which is still high.

Regulations concerning allowances are improperly executed.

According to the instructions of CII2, the ratio between the operating fund allowance and the subsistence allowance is too high.

Therefore, in order to practice economy in expenditures more effectively, based on the instructions of higher echelons and the specific situation of local areas, the Standing Committee of Ti [VC Region 3], determines the following specific points:

1. Establishment of a light and compact organization; increase of combat and command strength; and a decrease of support strength.

The Standing Committee of Ti specifically prescribes the authorized strength for each branch and each province. Instructions on this have already been sent to the various provinces and Military Region [3] Party Committee. The
other branches will be informed of the matter later.

2. Rectification of the regulations concerning allowances:

The 1970 regulations issued by the Ti Standing Committee on 25 Dec 69 are still in effect. However, according to the instructions of higher echelons, some items are readjusted as follows:

Item 1: Subsistence allowances.

Article 1: [Daily] food allowances

a. The daily food allowance will be 4$ [SVN piasters] instead of 6$ for each cadre, soldier, and member of Party military and political agencies, military units, and finance-economy agencies.

b. It will be 6$ instead of 8$ for each member of assault youth groups in the front line, postal-transportation and communication sections, ordnance production sections, district local forces, etc.

Article 2: [Monthly] husked rice allowances.

The monthly husked rice allowance is 27 liters instead of 30 liters for each individual receiving 6$ or 10$ as a daily food allowance. (27 liters of husked rice is equivalent to one gia or 26 liters of unhusked rice [sic]).

Article 3: Clothing equipment.

a. Everyone who receives the [daily] 4$ food allowance will be issued one towel instead of two.

Article 4: [Monthly] pocket money allowances

All three categories of individuals [receiving 4$, 6$, and 10$ as a daily food allowance] will be issued a monthly pocket money allowance of 150$ instead of 100$.

Item 2: Subsistence allowances

Article 1: Monthly cadre allowances
It will be 30$ instead of 100$ for each low-level cadre; 50$ instead of 150$ for each intermediate cadre; and 100$ instead of 150$ for each high-level cadre.

Item 3: Social [welfare] allowances

Article 1: The social [welfare] allowance (incidental allowance) for cadre, soldiers, and workers is not included in the expenditure estimate.

The above readjusted items will take effect as of 1 Jun 70.

3. Determination of the ratio between the operating fund allowance and the subsistence allowance for every branch at all levels.

(According to the instructions of higher echelons), the ratio between the operating fund allowance and the subsistence allowance is determined as follows:

Agencies at T level: The operating fund allowance of Party military, civilian, and political agencies will be equal to 40 percent of their subsistence allowance. This is the per capita ratio for all agencies at T level. The Ti Standing Committee will later prescribe a specific ratio for each branch at T level. For military agencies that ratio will be 35 percent.

At province and district level: For Party civilian and political agencies, the ratio will be 35 percent; for military agencies, the ratio will be 30 percent. (Ul Standing Committee will prescribe a specific ratio for each branch in the province).

After establishing their own expenditure estimates, all agencies and units must deduct five percent from their operating fund allowance for the savings fund.

4. Adjustment of the prices of some items:

One meter of cloth: 150$ instead of 120$.

One meter of "Khaki" material: 210$ instead of 180$. 
One meter of rubber [sic]: 50$ instead of 45$.

One towel: 60$ instead of 50$.

One mosquito net: 360$ instead of 300$. (The price of other goods is not changed).

One rice belt: 40$

One flour belt: 40$.

One mat: 150$

Thread and buttons for a suit of clothes: 40$

One gia of husked rice: 500$ instead of 300$.

Based on the recently adjusted prices of goods and regulations for allowances, the annual per capita subsistence allowances are as follows:

Main force: 21,420$

Local force: 20,562$

Party military and political agencies, military agencies and finance-economy sections: 16,232$.

All agencies and units may base the above subsistence allowances on a census [of their personnel strength] while establishing their expenditure estimates.

Based on these regulations, all branches in provinces and cities should establish their 1970 receipt and expenditure estimates. Then they should assign cadre to work directly with the T Finance-Economy Section prior to submitting their budget estimates to the Ti Standing Committee for consideration.

To expedite the approval of the 1970 receipt and expenditure estimates, all branches at all levels must settle their 1969 expenditure accounts and make a report on the financial situation, cash funds on hand, and property in stock at the
end of 1969, and carry them forward on the 1970 budget. (It is also necessary to report on the rice loss at the end of 1969, if any, and the cause of that loss, in order to make a request for cancellation of its value from the budget.) In addition, any decrease in the collection of farm products must also be reported to be recorded in the budget.

The 1970 receipt and expenditure estimates must be completed by all branches at T level no later than 10 Jun 70, and by all agencies in provinces and Cần Thơ City no later than 20 Jun 70, to submit to the Ti Standing Committee for consideration.

16 May 70

For the Ti Standing Committee

/S/ TU-BT ZH
Appendix No. 3

To: Brother Hiệu and all comrades

First of all, I wish you good health. I have just returned "home" at 1700 hours on 20 December 1970 after an unhusked rice purchasing task. Upon arrival I received your letter addressed to me and the current affairs committees. From the letter, I understand that you and our comrades are in good health and that 20 metric tons of goods have been unloaded. I will make a preliminary report [on the requisition and purchase] of unhusked rice to you. This year [1970], we have faced many difficulties in the purchase of unhusked rice.

Enemy situation: One enemy company was located at Đồn Kho Hamlet where you ate jack fruits. This company was composed of one US platoon, one RVNAF platoon, and one Popular Force platoon. It conducted artillery fire along the route leading from Tánh Linh to the Tà Bao Bridge. Enemy armored vehicles also conducted patrols along this route. One enemy company was stationed between Đa Chồng and Cây Gạo Quỹ areas. This year, the land under cultivation in Đồng Me was only half of last year's. We have only collected 300 thúng [one thúng equals approximately 36 liters] of unhusked rice.
The total of personnel in our unit and [Unit] 88 was 35. The personnel of the rear service section numbered eight men; unit [sic], five; and the civilian party, 16. In fact, there was a maximum of 22 men participating in the collection of unhusked rice, including the personnel in charge of guard duties and patrols. Therefore, the amount of unhusked rice collected was very limited. Another reason was that the enemy strove to collect unhusked rice [from the people] and our personnel were very few in number. In addition, our personnel displayed a fear of hardships and sacrifices. You should make efforts to overcome all difficulties in the attainment of the criteria for the collection of unhusked rice. I fear that only a few personnel in the command committee dared to go to Đồng Me [to control] the collection of unhusked rice of X16. Concerning the collection of unhusked rice in [two words illegible], Brother Trong could only collect a small quantity because he reached [two words illegible] too late on 12 December [1970]. This made me very sad.
Concerning foodstuffs, you were reasonable to complain that I placed more emphasis upon immediate tasks than future tasks. In fact, we always strive to prepare for our future tasks. Of course, we cannot achieve anything beyond our capabilities and we have not enough money to buy rice for a reserve, because our financial sources were based mainly on the money collected from the sale of lumber. The money we collected was not enough for the expenditures in September, October, November, and December [1970]. The sum of money collected from selling wood was only enough to buy food. Furthermore, our province consumed 6,000 liters of rice each month while the amount of rice to be purchased and reserved for five months should be 30 metric tons. Consequently, we did not have enough personnel to buy this amount of rice immediately. It is very dangerous for us if we do not prepare for the transportation of rice. If we do not, the enemy will easily detect and capture our rice. In addition, having little money, we could not buy much flour at the price of 120$ [SVN piasters] per kilogram. According to your letter, it is very favorable for us to buy 20 metric tons of flour on credit for immediate use. We faced many difficulties in the transportation of 13 metric tons of rice for distribution to various organizations. X13 has not yet received 1,000 large earthenware jars [of rice]. We had to use a great number of personnel for the transportation of rice. At "home," except the rice transportation units, other personnel have sometimes suffered from hunger because of the difficulties in the transportation of rice and rice flour. Consequently, each person was issued only one can of rice [each day].

Brothers Thu, Sang, and Ly have not returned after nearly a month of transporting flour. At "home" we had no personnel for regulating our tasks. As for me, after returning from one rice transportation task, I had to leave for another because it is very important for us to provide enough rice to our units. I think that you can understand me. Since the departure of Brother Sang, the 1971 budget estimate has not been settled. The recapitulation of the settlement of accounts for 1970 was also left unfinished. Though we had many personnel in charge of the transportation and delivery [of rice], they were not eager to carry out their tasks. It was very difficult for us because Brother Thu was unable to improve this shortcoming even though he had investigated the situation in advance. Tài did not satisfactorily carry out the 1971 farm
production task. In addition, the task of clearing land for cultivation and preparing plans for boosting farm production in 1971 were not discussed. The current affairs committee has not yet held a conference [three words illegible] to recapitulate our activities in January 1971. I am very anxious about this. I am unable to assume every task. I cannot assume the unhusked rice requisition and purchase task while settling other tasks at our base.

It is suggested that you study my following answers to your questions and give me some opinions:

1. Our unit has already transported and concealed the foodstuffs reserved for the province. Goods for Tết for higher echelons were ordered at XI3. You had better urge XI3 to prepare the goods which we have already ordered at XI3 for our organizations. We had to order goods at XI3 at a rather high price because we have no personnel to come and wait to buy goods at a lower price. Your proposal was very good but we could not use it because we did not have that option. I for one, think it is more favorable for us to order goods from XI3 than from another place.

2. We can also have our tax collection units take charge of our rice transportation tasks if they have completed their primary tasks. It is unreasonable for them to have no work while we have so much work to do.

3. Brothers Thu and Sang and Miss Ly had better return to fulfill their specialized tasks. If they all stay in our location to take charge of [the requisition and purchase] of rice flour, their specialized tasks will be left unfinished. However, Brother Thu may stay to assume the task of providing flour for our organization. I will assign some more personnel to help him accomplish this task. The reserve flour will be managed by the transportation unit.

4. For 1971 Tết, each friendly individual will be granted 100$. For example, each 200 personnel organization will be granted 20,000$. In addition to this amount, the organization may be issued an amount of sugar, milk, fish, meat, salad oil, cigarettes, tea, jam, and sweets equaling 20,000$. If it wants to be issued more goods, it must pay us in cash. If
we do not collect in cash, we will face many difficulties because of the tightness of our budget. The administrative organization will be issued anything available as a Têt allowance. However, it must be issued with the amount of goods equal to 20,000$ which has already been submitted to us. Each individual of the civil health and corridor transportation sections will be granted only 100$ as a Têt allowance. Goods, if any, will be provided by the friendly organizations themselves. We will issue no goods except for the 100$ worth of goods prescribed for each individual.

According to your letter, we must reserve more goods to use in emergencies.

It is suggested that 20 bags of sugar and 50 cans of milk be issued to the office organization, 25 bags of sugar to the rear service section, 80 cans of milk to the war invalids, five bags of sugar and 20 cans of milk to the finance-economy section, and 30 cans of milk to the transportation unit.

Goods for the [1971] Têt allowances for various organizations should be counted on the basis of 100$ per person. At present, various organizations have repaid 70 [percent] of their debts. Consequently, some organizations are still in debt to the finance-economy section and some organizations have not even paid anything to the rear service section. The only organization which is not in debt is the rear service section.

5. Concerning the supply of batteries for the radio communication unit, I will propose the prompt purchase of 25 to 35 dozen batteries each month and paper to print newspapers. If we cannot buy large paper, we will buy at least 10,000 sheets of colored paper to print leaflets for use during Têt. You may have XI3 or the flour transportation unit buy this type of paper for you.

6. I do not know why some personnel changed their position from XI5 to XI3. It is requested that you tell them to return to their former positions to continue their tasks.

7. Concerning assignment of personnel to 77 for settlement of financial affairs, we repaid 450,000$ of the 1,900,000$ borrowed from C10, 84 and [two words illegible]. D7 [possibly
7th Battalion] received 15 tons of foodstuffs from our province. Recently, D7 also received rice and salt from our province at [two words illegible]. Therefore Cl0, 84 and D7 are in debt to us. While D7 is bivouacking here, we can only help it with foodstuffs. Consequently, D7 as well as Cl0, 84 and 77 [possibly units] must pay us to buy food for them. We can only provide personnel and prepare good loading sites for them. It is requested that you discuss this with Brother Sau Thinh because we can only assign our personnel to help them unload and transport foodstuffs. They must assign personnel to transport and conceal flour and maintain guard duties because we do not have enough personnel to spare for these jobs.

If we have money we can buy three to five tons [of rice] for a reserve. Of course, if we do not have enough money and personnel, we will achieve nothing. Therefore, I think we had better strive to collect the taxes on lumber trucks. We should discuss this with Brother Sau Thinh and Cl0, 84. As for the comrades operating near X13, we can only encourage them to heighten vigilance in order to operate safely. If possible, they can continue to operate there. However, they had better receive instructions from the Binh Tuy Province Standing Committee. We are afraid that they will be easily detected and attacked by the enemy because of their presence there, thus causing problems for themselves and us. Of course, we do not think that they will interfere with our tasks.

Concerning the loading of flour, we had better use loading Site 25 or V5. The reason is that we must eliminate the use of the current loading site to keep it from being detected by the enemy and save it for use in the future. However, it will be used occasionally for loading [goods] for the province.

8. A quantity of medicine, as determined by the standing committee, will not be given to T7 [Region 7], but to the province civil health section for our own use, because we fear that we may not be able to buy more medicine due to our lack of funds. This will be discussed by the province standing committee and the civil health section.

9. Spiced flour will be bought for our personnel at the rate of 1,000$ per kilogram. The spiced flour can be issued to any requesting unit.
10. Concerning seasoning, as you told me, it cost 700$ per kilogram. I request that you have our personnel buy 50 kilograms of seasoning to reserve for our organization. Those organizations which want to have seasoning must pay us because we will no longer provide them with goods on credit.

11. Concerning the request for weapons, we only have CKC carbines left. I realize that our units have enough weapons except for Comrades Chi, Hue, and Bu who have no weapons. Therefore, I will send three CKC carbines to these three comrades. You may tell either Comrade Châu or Chi that if he wants, he may receive a 12mm pistol for temporary use. As for AK assault rifles and R-15 [sic] automatic rifles, we have none.

12. As planned, 40 tons of goods will be reserved during the first quarter of 1971 for the province, including 20 tons to be bought with the money collected from selling wood, and 20 tons to be bought gradually. Ten more tons of goods should be collected in January 1971. As a result, the province will be able to reserve some goods.

13. Goods for [VC armed forces] will be transported in civilian lumber trucks. The quantity of goods has already been determined.

I lay down my pen. I wish you good health.

27 December 1970
/S/Hùng
Appendix No. 4

POLITICAL REORIENTATION OUTLINES

TRAINING DOCUMENT FOR B [PLATOON] CADRE AND SOLDIERS

CONTENTS:

I. Friendly victories in every field, and enemy failures and efforts.
   1. Summary of enemy failures and main efforts.
   2. New friendly victories and new enemy failures and deadlocks.

II. Projected development of the situation, capabilities and immediate missions.
   1. Comparison of friendly and enemy forces.
   2. Enemy schemes and capabilities.
   3. [Friendly] advantages and difficulties.
   4. Immediate missions.

PART ONE

I. FRIENDLY VICTORIES IN EVERY FIELD, AND ENEMY FAILURES AND EFFORTS:

   1. Summary of enemy failures and main efforts:

   Having been defeated in the special war, the US imperialists feared that SVN might be lost to the Revolution and that all Indochina and Southeast Asia would be influenced by the SVN Revolution and would rise up vigorously to oppose US neocolonialism. In order to save the situation, the US has changed its strategy by transforming the special war into a limited one.
It increased its troop strength in SVN from 200,000 to 450,000 men; it persuaded a number of satellite countries to send troops to SVN bringing the total troop strength to over half a million soldiers (in addition to the half million SVN troops); and introduced modern war materiel, including B-52 strategic bombers, etc... It attacked North Viet-Nam by air and by sea, using a high number of air sorties and expending a volume [of ordnance] which it qualified as terrible.

These enemy efforts were aimed at counter-attacking our forces to gain the initiative on the battlefield. The enemy launched his first large-scale, all out counter-offensive phase during the dry season of 1966. This first US-Puppet counter-offensive was defeated. During 1967, even though the enemy increased his troop strength and [war] facilities, he could not launch another all out counter-offensive phase, but only large-scale attacks in limited areas. He continued to suffer heavy defeats in this new attempt. Figuring that the enemy could not launch his third counter-attack phase, and taking advantage of our victories during the Spring of 1968, we brought our entire army and people into a General Offensive and Uprising. The enemy was heavily defeated, and over a million US, Puppet, and satellite troops were driven into a deadlock. The enemy was forced to change his strategy from an offensive to a defensive position, from "search and destroy" operations to a selective defensive system, a system of defense in depth, defense with reserve forces. The enemy has yielded to three of our requests:

To halt the bombing of NVN unconditionally.

To negotiate at the conference table.

To withdraw troops.

Because of these failures, the enemy had to change his plan from trying to attain a military victory, to gaining a strong position for a political solution through the Vietnamization plan.

This is an unprecedented victory for us.

This is not only an historical turning point, but also a great leap forward for the Revolution in SVN.
From early 1969 to early 1970, although the enemy made great efforts to execute his Vietnamization program, principally his pacification plan, he still met with failures.

The enemy pacification plan has failed in its initial step. Therefore, he had to correct it many times. He admitted that the plan has been stalled, that it moved too slowly.

His manpower and war facilities have been destroyed in greater quantities.

During 1968, we killed 630,000 enemy soldiers, including 230,000 US soldiers; destroyed 6,000 aircraft, 13,000 armored vehicles, and 1,100 artillery pieces.

During 1969, we killed 645,000 enemy soldiers, including 235,000 US soldiers; and destroyed 6,400 aircraft, 19,000 armored vehicles, and 2,500 artillery pieces.

2. New great friendly victories, and new enemy deadlocks and failures:

Because the pacification plan failed in its first step, the Vietnamization program was unsuccessful. The US had to de-escalate the war and reduce its forces. These are the obstacles and difficulties that US troops cannot overcome to save the situation. To expand the war throughout the country of Vietnam would not insure a victory. To stop the aid from NVN is an impossibility. The situation of defeat forced the US imperialists to take adventurous actions through new efforts:

Colluding with the reactionary Lo-Non [Lon-Nol] clique, they staged the coup in Cambodia with the intention to drive our forces from the Cambodian border. This, they believed, would destroy the support of the Revolution in SVN, create troubles and materiel difficulties for our forces, destroy the Revolution in Cambodia and save the Vietnamization program. However, this plan has failed.

The revolutionary movement is developing in Cambodia and is coordinating with our forces on the battlefield to attack the Lo Non [Lon Noi] clique from all sides. His government is vacillating and is highly isolated.