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THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY
OF SOUTH VIET-NAM

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Foreword

The National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam -- the NLF -- was formed on December 20, 1960, it is claimed. It therefore appears to predate by a year the People's Revolutionary Party organized "in the last days of December 1961." Actually the PRP is much the older organization. A Radio Hanoi broadcast reprinted here, welcoming its emergence, acknowledged that it was a successor to the Indochinese Communist Party which had been established in Hong Kong by Hồ Chí Minh in 1930 under the terms of a Comintern instruction (1).

For tactical reasons, the Indochinese Communist Party was dissolved in 1946 with its core membership joining an Association for Marxist Studies. Actually the Party continued to operate in both North and South Viet-Nam. Then in February 1951 the ICP's predominantly Vietnamese membership was reorganized into the Đảng Lao Động -- the Việt-Nam Workers' Party -- which became the ruling Party in the North, the Democratic Republic of Việt-Nam, in 1954. In the South it was declared illegal by the Government of the Republic of Việt-Nam, but continued to operate clandestinely under the direction of the Central Committee in Hanoi, exercised through two regional committees. When the interlocking State-Party leadership in Hanoi "accepted" the division of Việt-Nam into two zones at the 1954 Geneva Conference, it did not agree to a division of the Party.

Until January 1959, the Party's activity in the South was primarily agitational, although terrorist acts were sanctioned. In that month the Central Committee made the first of a series of decisions transforming the "political struggle" in the South into an "armed political struggle" and

(1) The Comintern instruction is reprinted as an appendix to Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes No. 100, "The Hồ Chí Minh Image", Part II.
finally into a full scale war with North Vietnamese Army units fighting alongside the Southern Viet Cong. (2) The decision to inaugurate the NLF was announced at the Party's Third Congress in Hanoi, in September 1960, in the "Political Report" of First Secretary Lê Duẩn who pointedly outlined the revolutionary responsibilities of VWP members in the South as well as in the North.

COSVN -- the Central Office of South Viet-Nam -- an agency of the Central Committee which had directed the Southern section of the Viet Minh's 1945-1954 fight against the French, had been disbanded in 1954. It was reactivated prior to October 1961, before the formation of the PRP. The latter, which brought the Nam BỘ and Trung BỘ regional organizations of the VWP into a single structure, was, from its inception, under COSVN direction, as documents reprinted in this research note demonstrate. The PRP was formally represented at the first regular Congress of the NLF in February 1962.

The PRP, therefore, has from its inception been subject to two types of control from the VWP Central Committee in Hanoi: its original members were the cadres of the Nam BỘ and Trung BỘ regional organizations of the ICP and the VWP who voluntarily accepted "Central's" leadership; operationally it was directed by the Hanoi-appointed political and military officials of COSVN (3).

The Hanoi broadcast welcoming the PRP declared that the Party "warmly supports the declaration and program of the National Liberation Front" and limited its "immediate tasks" to those of the "national democratic revolution" and

(2) This process was intimated by the Central Committee itself in its 1963 "Resolution Concerning the South". See Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes No. 96, p. 3. An analysis of the sequence of Hanoi decisions is provided in the introduction to Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes N. 98.

(3) See Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes No. 40, "The Central Office of South Viet-Nam."

As late as 1963, at least a year after the "founding" of the PRP a set of "Training Materials for Party Chapter Committee Members" on the "Nature of the Viet-Nam Revolution in the South," published by "Training and Learning, Saigon-Gia Dinh" referred to the Party as "The Workers Party."
the setting up of a "broad democratic coalition government" which would "achieve national reunification by peaceful means." Nonetheless, the announcement proclaimed it a "Marxist-Leninist" Party, which, as documents reproduced here demonstrate, would press on to the "socialist revolution" once the "immediate tasks" were accomplished. (4)

The first part of this research note reprints a 1966 memorandum to the Saigon Regional Committee of the PRP from a ranking leader of the VWP, outlining both strategy and tactics for the Party, and two Party training manuals. That its objective is the establishment of a Communist state in South Viet-Nam was stated in them. They predate the 1968 Tet Offensive. The memorandum and one of the pamphlets were concerned with the attainment of an urban revolution in South Viet-Nam, particularly in Saigon.

A subsequent section of this research note collects a number of captured documents which illustrate some of the procedures and problems of the Party since the failure of the 1968 attempt at a "General Offensive and Uprising."

(4) The distinction Vietnamese Communists make between the two revolutions, and their determination to move rapidly from the first to the second, are illustrated by several documents reprinted in Parts I and III of Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes No. 101 "The PRGRSV", and the PRP representative's speech to the PRG's founding conference in Part II.
Formation of Marxist-Leninist Party in Republic of Viet-Nam


Viet-Nam is indivisible. The Vietnamese people form one bloc. Since ancient times, the Vietnamese people from North to South have worked together to build Viet-Nam and have united to combat foreign aggression and protect national independence and territorial integrity. After 100 years of unity and indomitable struggle against colonialism, in 1945 compatriots throughout the country -- under the leadership of the Indochinese Communist Party -- rose to overthrow the French-Japanese rule, carry out the August Revolution successfully, set up the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and participate in the Resistance War till the signing of the 1954 Geneva Accords recognizing the sovereignty, independence unity, and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam.

But disregarding their pledges at the Geneva Conference, the U.S. imperialists have intervened more deeply and widely in South Viet-Nam. They have collaborated with the most reactionary feudal bourgeois comprador administration -- now represented by Ngô Đình Diệm -- savagely to terrorize, massacre, oppress and exploit the southern compatriots, sabotage the Geneva Accords, carry out the plot to partition our country forever, turn South Viet-Nam into a colony and military base, and prepare for war.

Thus far, our national reunification has not been achieved, Viet-Nam is still divided into two regions having different social regimes. Thus, the Vietnamese people have two different revolutionary tasks. Under the cruel rule of the imperialists and feudalists and under the U.S.-Diemist rule of oppression, exploitation, terrorization, and bloody massacres, all people's strata in South Viet-Nam find themselves in an extremely dark situation. They are being threatened by banditry
and poverty. To protect themselves and the right to live and to recover independence and human freedom, the southern people have no other path than to unite to struggle to overthrow the savage rule of the U.S.-Diemists and to liberate South Viet-Nam. This is an urgent duty for all compatriots in South Viet-Nam.

To fulfill their historic and glorious duty in the present phase, workers, peasants, and laborers in South Viet-Nam need a vanguard group serving as a thoroughly revolutionary party. Held during the last days of December 1961, the conference of Marxist-Leninists in South Viet-Nam decided to set up the Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party. They approved a platform and statute.

The Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party is the party of the working class and the laboring people in South Viet-Nam. It is also the party of all patriots in South Viet-Nam. The immediate tasks of the Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party are: to unite and lead the working class, the peasantry, the laboring people, and all compatriots in South Viet-Nam in struggling to overthrow the rule of the imperialists and feudalists who are the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, the Ngô Đình Diệm clique, to liberate South Viet-Nam; and to set up a broad democratic coalition government which will achieve national independence and democratic freedoms, improve the people's living conditions, give land to the tillers, develop industry, trade, culture, and education, bring a comfortable life to all the people, achieve national reunification by peaceful means, and contribute to protecting world peace.

The Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party warmly supports the Declaration and Program of Action of the National Liberation Front and volunteers to join the Front's ranks. It pledges to participate in the Front's activities and to unite and cooperate closely with all democratic parties, religions, and patriotic people's organizations in the National Liberation Front in order to struggle for the realization of the Front's program.
To achieve national unity, the Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party advocates respect of the legitimate interests of all classes, parties, and patriots and all-out assistance to ethnic minorities on the basis of complete equality in the fields of duties and rights.

Concerning foreign relations, the Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party advocates unity and friendship with all nations and countries -- especially neighboring countries -- positive support to national liberation movements, and positive contributions to the struggle against colonialism, imperialism, and feudalism and to the protection of world peace.

Dear Compatriots and Party Members, the Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party will carry on the glorious and historic work of our revolutionary predecessor parties. It is determined to overcome all difficulties and struggle to the end to bring peace, independence, freedom, and happiness to southern compatriots. It appeals to the working class, the peasantry, and the laboring people in South Viet-Nam to unite more closely within the Party. It appeals to all southern compatriots and overseas compatriots to tighten their ranks under the banner of the Party and that of the liberation front, rise and overthrow the rule of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys -- the Ngô Đình Diệm clique.

It appeals to soldiers, officers, and public servants in South Viet-Nam -- for the sake of national independence and freedom to side with the people and contribute to overthrowing the cruel rule of the U.S.-Diemists. It appeals to northern compatriots to do their best to build North Viet-Nam into an increasingly rich and powerful region and turn North Viet-Nam into a firm base for the struggle for national unification and to continue to support southern compatriots in carrying out their present revolutionary work.

It appeals to socialist countries, independent nationalist countries, working classes, and peace lovers the world over to support the Vietnamese people in their struggle to achieve national independence and reunification by peaceful means.
It appeals to all its members to devote all their revolutionary enthusiasm to serving the people and the Fatherland, to struggle hard to carry out the Party's platform and the Front's Program of Action, to do their best to overcome all difficulties without regard for hardships, and to heroically rise under the glorious, invincible, and vanguard banner of the Party.

With the iron will of all Party members, with the gallant struggle of the working class, the peasantry, and the laboring people, with the unity and indomitable struggle of southern compatriots, with the support of all compatriots inside and outside the country, and with the positive support of the forces of peace and democracy the world over, the Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party is determined to struggle to successfully fulfill its glorious and historic tasks - overthrowing the U.S.-Diemist rule, bringing independence, democracy, and peace to southern compatriots, and contributing to peacefully achieving national reunification and protecting peace in Southeast Asia and in the world.
I. NORTH VIETNAMESE BACKGROUND: COMRADE "BA" WRITES TO THE SAIGON REGIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY.

INTRODUCTION

While the main force of the Communist revolution in Viet-Nam has been drawn from the country's most numerous class -- the peasants -- Communist leaders have persistently referred to it as a "proletarian" revolution. They have endeavored, without success, to promote revolutionary activity in Saigon and other cities of Viet-Nam -- notably during the "Tet offensive" in early 1968 -- and in 1972 were still trying to provoke civil disorders and a revolutionary atmosphere in the cities.

Besides believing that urban revolutionary action, involving students, women, intellectuals and small entrepreneurs as well as wage workers, is necessary for military-political victory in South Viet-Nam, the Communists have thought that urban proletarian participation in the revolution would be necessary to consolidate the victory they have hoped for, and to place their revolution in the Leninist tradition.

Lê Duẩn, First Secretary of the Viet-Nam Workers' Party, the ruling party in North Viet-Nam, outlined the roles of the peasantry and the proletariat in the Vietnamese revolution at a "meeting to brief propaganda and educational cadres on the political remoulding drive convened on March 10, 1961 by the Secretariat of the Viet-Nam Workers' Party Central Committee." (1) Six months earlier, at the VWP's Third Congress, he had been confirmed as Party First Secretary, and in his "Political Report" declared that the Party would increase its support and guidance of the insurgency in South Viet-Nam.

"Việt-Nam does not go through capitalist development and advances straight to socialism, owing to the fact that the proletariat has led the national democratic revolution and the peasantry has followed it, and that we benefit by the help of the socialist camp," he said. "In this revolution the peasantry accepted the leadership of the proletariat not only out of its hatred for imperialism and feudalism, but also because it supported the abolition of the landlords' land ownership advocated by the proletariat. It followed the proletariat, not the bourgeoisie for it realized that the former was the most patriotic class. Moreover, it recognized the leadership of the proletariat with its political meaning and also with its economic content."

Moreover, continued Lê Duan: "Our peasantry was aware that thanks to the Communist [Bolshevik] Party Russian peasants had land to till. Our proletariat has led it to overthrow imperialism and feudalism and seize power. Though this power is based on class alliance it is in essence held by the proletariat." In this context "proletariat" can only be read as meaning the Communist Party.

Lê Duan candidly defined "power". "To speak of power is fundamentally to speak of violence. Who uses violence? The proletariat -- which does not share power with any other class. With the possibility of using violence it detains [sic] what is essential in power. And as power is held by the proletariat we can shift to the proletarian revolution after the triumph of the national democratic revolution. Power means violence, without which our Party, no matter what it wields, has no authority and strength. We can thus clearly see that the problem of being masters of the society is first of all that of leadership of the proletariat. To speak of proletarian dictatorship and of the sense of being masters is first of all to speak of the leading class."

But, Lê Duan recognized, that in Việt-Nam, both North and South, it was peasants who manned the revolutionary armies. How, then, could the revolution be called "proletarian"? This was his answer:
"By leadership we do not only mean the elaboration of line and policies but, first and foremost, the wielding of real force, the force we actually keep in hand, without which there can be no effective leadership. Where do we find this force? Mainly in the peasantry, which is the biggest and the principal revolutionary force in our country. Our line and policies come from the Party of the proletariat, but our real force originates from the peasantry. In our nine-year Resistance War our army was recruited from the peasantry. Therefore, the proletarian dictatorship means leadership of the proletariat which must be based on the worker-peasant alliance. Of course our line and policies must come from the proletariat, our ideology must be the ideology of the proletariat, the proletariat must take the leadership. However, unless there exists a close worker-peasant alliance, the proletariat cannot be master of the society ... "

Of the revolution in North Viet-Nam Le Duan said: "Our proletarian power was set up by the workers and peasants after the August Revolution and the nine-year Resistance War. Without grasping this characteristic we cannot understand the nature of our power. Under the leadership of the proletariat we seized power in the countryside first, then relying upon the peasantry we strengthened and brought it to towns. It was acquired through the struggle waged by both the workers and the peasants, the latter being the main force. In the Soviet Union, when the proletariat had seized power the workers were more largely represented in the State machine, whereas in Viet-Nam the peasants prevailed over the workers in this regard. This does not mean that in our country political power loses its proletarian character. In our social system this proletarian character does not disappear, it is consolidated instead." (2)

(2) Ibid, pp. 69-72. Underlining is as in the original.
In September, 1960 the Third Congress of the Viet-Nam Workers' Party had adopted a resolution promising support to the Southern insurgents, characterizing theirs as "national people's democratic revolution" and a struggle for "national reunification." (3) This revolution, Le Duan pointed out in his March, 1961 speech, "we can shift to the proletarian revolution." "To ensure the complete success of the revolutionary struggle in South Viet-Nam," said the 1960 VWP resolution, "our people there must strive to establish a united bloc of workers, peasants and soldiers, and to bring into being a broad National United Front directed against the U.S. and Diem and based on the worker-peasant alliance." In short, the VWP envisioned the revolution in the South ultimately producing the same pattern of power that prevailed in the North.

Very little of a theoretical nature has appeared to show how the VWP and its affiliated People's Revolutionary Party in South Viet-Nam have viewed the prospects, strategy and tactics of urban revolution. One analysis has, however, been found by Free World forces in South Viet-Nam and is reproduced in this research note. It is a long letter to the "Saigon Regional Party Committee and Comrade Tu' Anh" from "Ba". It has not been possible to determine "Ba's" identity. From the text, however, one can deduce that he was a veteran of the Indochinese Communist Party, an important figure in the VWP in North Viet-Nam, steeped in Leninist literature. The tone of the letter suggested that he had been active in the Communist movement in South Viet-Nam, either a native Southerner or one of the senior North Vietnamese Communists who have been sent South from time to time to oversee Party activity there. While there are frequent references to Russian experience no lessons were overtly drawn from the Chinese revolution. Perhaps the author was Le Duan himself. Several of "Ba's" quotations from Lenin and his reference to "the contradictions between Kornilov and the provisional government of Kerensky" (page 31) have appeared in Le Duan's speeches.

(3) For the full text of the VWP Third Congress Resolution see Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes No. 90, "The 19th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Viet-Nam Workers Party and Its Reference Documents," pages 31 ff. See also Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes Nos. 96 and 98 for the background and implementation of the Resolution.
The letter is not dated, but its reference to the "March to May 1966" uprising in Đà Nẵng demonstrates that it was written after that date, but prior to the September, 1966 election in South Việt-Nam to choose the National Assembly which wrote the Republic of Việt-Nam's constitution. Slogans for that election are suggested in the text.

Apparently the People's Revolutionary Party in Sài Gòn-Cholon had held a conference on its tasks at which "Comrade Tu Anh" (a pseudonym) had spoken. The Regional Party Committee sent a copy of his speech to "Ba", who took the opportunity to "contribute" his analysis of the situation in the South and to stress the importance of revolutionary activity in the cities, and particularly in the capital.

"The critical and practical situation of the Vietnamese Revolution permits us to affirm that this is the era of a rising proletarian revolution which will decide the victory of either socialism or capitalism in the world ... In order to develop the democratic and national Revolution, we must confirm the role of the working class as leader of the Revolution and consider it the main force of the Revolution," "Ba" declared. "Therefore, we should not only strengthen the rural areas and use them to encircle the cities, but also strengthen the revolutionary forces and intensify the revolutionary struggles in both rural and city areas. Our August Revolution showed us that we could not carry out a General Uprising and attain victory unless we strengthen both areas."

He emphasized: "In the present situation where the class struggle is waged decisively over the world, any revolutionary struggle which is meant to liberate the people and the working class must be carried out by violence and must endure a hard and protracted struggle. Violence does not simply mean armed struggle; it may be either armed violence or political violence carried out by the people."

After outlining the reversed order of importance of urban and rural revolts in industrialized and underdeveloped countries, "Ba" declared: "At a certain time, the political and military attacks against the enemy forces will become a General Offensive and Uprising to defeat the enemy forces and seize power in
all areas including the cities ... Along with the political and military struggles in the rural areas, there must be a political struggle movement coordinated with military violence at a definitive level in the cities to prepare for the General Offensive and Uprising movement which is the decisive step of the South Viet-Nam Revolution." (4)

"Comrade Tu Anh" had analyzed the "political tendencies of various social classes, parties, factions and religious groups in Saigon and Cholon". So, "Ba" said that he would limit himself to "some additional points", identifying "youths and female laborers" as "cruelly oppressed and exploited" and ripe for revolutionary propaganda. Youths, subject to mobilization by the GVN, should be recruited instead for "secret self-defense, secret guerrilla and special action units which are operating in cities."

One feature of the "South Viet-Nam Revolution which has never been found in other countries," said "Ba", is its "long-haired army" of rural women. He urged that women in the cities be recruited in a "women political army." Next "Ba" briefly expounded the Communist concepts of "the workers-peasants alliance," the slogan, "Workers, Peasants and Soldiers Alliance," and "the front of workers-peasants-intellectuals." "In South Viet-Nam," he said, "the school and university students, the writers, artists, the intellectuals and scientists, all enjoy a social prestige vis-a-vis the people of other strata in the cities."

"We must try by all means to infiltrate the enemy's trade unions," he continued, implying that the Party had neglected this task, and "get hold of the Buddhist masses," while striving to "neutralize the Catholics in the cities."

The Party should continue to strengthen the National Liberation Front, "Ba" declared, but "it is necessary to set up many other forms of fronts as you comrades have done." This is the only explicit reference to the NLF in the letter. It was to the Party, not the NLF, that "Ba" looked for action.

(4) For the Vietnamese Communist concept of the General Offensive and Uprising see also Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes No. 45,"The Processes of Revolution and the General Uprising."
In the third section of his letter "Ba" explained at some length the importance of slogans in organizing an urban revolution, pointing out that while the goal is to overthrow the government organization, that can best be achieved by gearing protest actions to "the immediate demands of the masses."

Commenting on the pending elections for the Constitutional Assembly, "Ba" said that while urging the people to boycott the elections to "prevent the masses from having any illusion whatsoever on the constitution, parliament and election forces of the enemy... we would be wrong also if we do not put forth slogans demanding establishment of a civilian government... and creating more contradictions among the enemy."

Organizing at the place of work as well as in neighborhoods, a standard Communist technique, is mentioned, but "Ba" insisted "we must use all means and methods to motivate and rally the youths and women because they represent the principal forces in the military and political struggles in the cities." Harking back to the pre-World War II experience of the Indochinese Communist Party, "Ba" declared: "Particularly in the period of the Democratic Front, along with the secret organizations which included the base organizations of the Party, we made use of the organizations operating under legal status, the disguised organizations or we took advantage of reactionary organizations in order to pursue our activities."

"Even a minor incident such as a police raid in the market, a military vehicle running over a pedestrian or an American soldier refusing to pay his cyclo fare etc., has the capability of provoking a struggle," said "Ba". Then in one of his few harsh remarks to the Saigon comrades he declared: "To be on the offensive does not mean to grope about as you comrades usually do but rather to tie organizations with struggle, that is after putting forth appropriate slogans, we must daringly take advantage of all opportunities to rally the masses overtly, legally or through semi-covert and semi-legal means and this must be done at the same time as we develop secret loyal organizations, liberation organizations and the Party."
While in "Ba's" opinion the building of "legal" organizations and of the secret Party were of equal importance, "in the present situation of the cities in South Viet-Nam, if we advocate building up secret organizations prior to agitating the masses for the struggle, we will abandon the masses, restrict the development of the masses' struggle movement, by so doing we will also restrict the development of the Party and the loyal organizations and, more importantly, we will miss the opportunity to rally and develop the force of the masses when it comes to us."

Turning to "the exploitation of enemy internal contradictions," after a review of Marxist-Leninist formulations of the "contradictions" concept, "Ba" remarked: "Recapitulating the experiences of the revolution in Viet-Nam the third congress of our Party came to the conclusion that exploiting the enemy's internal contradictions was a revolutionary principle of a strategic nature, not merely a question of tactics." He asserted that there were two "contradictions" working in the Party's favor, those between the GVN and the interests of the "laboring people" and "the division within the U.S. political circles."

The March-May 1966 "uprising of the Da Nang people" was not initiated by the Communists, "Ba" declared, "but we took advantage of the internal disputes of the enemy, aggravated his contradictions, rallied the people, seized leadership of the movement, agitated the people to struggle and to rise up in order to seize control of the city. You comrades [the reference is probably to the Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party of South Viet-Nam, not to the Saigon Regional Party Committee] had done this work despite the fact that the Party's base organizations in the city were weak. However, on the other hand, because we did not fully use the leadership force, we missed an opportunity to win a bigger victory." He was critical of the "comrades in Da Nang" for not "building foundations for an administration at base level" and urged the Saigon Committee to learn from their errors.

The last section of the "Ba" letter was on "the question of opportunity." The Party was planning to "couple the general uprising with a general offensive," an intimation of the Tet 1968 campaign. The general uprising, he explained, "is a process
of simultaneous or successive uprisings... aimed at seizing power for the people... mainly in the larger cities which are the important rear of the enemy, the places where the enemy's nerve center and command organs are located."

It could not succeed "if the ruling class is in control of a strong military force." But it "can succeed with the condition that we win a basic military victory by inflicting heavy losses to the American troops, shaking their aggressive will to its roots and by destroying an important part of the puppet army, thereby driving it to an inevitable collapse.

"A second point is that in the process of uprisings in the cities we do not use only our political force but we must combine both political and military forces ..." (5) But, "Ba" continued, this does not mean that "the general uprising must wait until the general offensive is completed." Popular uprisings can "give a boost" to military offensives, he thought. But "for a general uprising to take place there must be a general offensive."

"Ba" recognized that uprisings in Saigon, Hue and Da Nang in the then recent past could not turn into "uprisings for seizing power," but he was of the view that "in the coming period, if while our repeated military successes are driving the enemy into a dangerous and confused situation, in a given city, including Saigon-Cholon, the masses seething with revolutionary zeal, want to rise up to overthrow the puppet administration, then I think that this uprising can take place without waiting for the military offensive to win a basic victory."

"Ba" cited Russian revolutionary experience in 1917 and that of the Viet Minh in 1945. "In Saigon the Party's force was very small," he said, but the masses were determined "to engage in a life and death struggle with the enemy," so the Communists were obliged to lead them. He maintained that the American troops in 1966 were "suffering repeated and heavy

(5) The VWP's 1963 decision to lend "main force" military support to the PRP in the South is recounted in Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes Nos. 96 and 98.
defeats on the battlefields of South Viet-Nam... and the puppet troops in South Viet-Nam are on the verge of collapse." In contrast "our troops in South Viet-Nam are the victors in an offensive position."

"These are great advantages; if the situation in the cities is ripe, uprisings can break out... We have put forth a policy of general offensive and uprising, this policy reflects our highest determination, it is also a decisive method of revolutionary struggle," "Ba" maintained.

This, then, was the Vietnamese Communists' dream of victory to be won by a great national uprising, in which some urban areas would play a vital role, coordinated with a military offensive against GVN and United States troops. Execution of the plan revealed that the whole of the Communist leadership in 1967-1968, like Ba in 1966, underestimated GVN and United States military strength. At the same time they exaggerated the support they could muster for the revolution among residents of Saigon and other cities in South Viet-Nam.

Perhaps the people sensed what "Ba" and his colleagues had in mind for them. He stated it in the final pages of his letter:

"... During and after the uprising, concurrently with establishing control on the masses and the administrative organs at the base level, we must materialize a form of front for a broad coalition government at the top, a national, democratic, peaceful and neutral coalition government. These are the transitional forms designed to divide the enemy, drive him into a passive position, defeat the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, and realize the immediate objectives of the revolution in South Viet-Nam."
TO: SAIGON REGIONAL PARTY COMMITTEE
AND COMRADE TU ANH

I have just read Comrade Tu Anh's speech concerning a number of problems related to our tasks in the Saigon-Cholon area. I am much encouraged by the progress of the Revolutionary movement in Saigon and the valuable observations made by Comrade Tu Anh.

Comrade Tu Anh's opinion, I think, is the same as that of all comrades in charge of city tasks.

On this occasion, I would like to contribute my opinion, but since I do not have the opportunity to contact you to discuss the matter more specifically, I will only give some ideas concerning general matters.

I. ROLE OF THE CITIES IN THE SOUTH VIET-NAM REVOLUTION:

The cities are one of three strategic areas in the South Viet-Nam Revolution. When referring to city tasks, we must place them in the strategy concerning the three areas which we have set forth.

The policy for the three strategic areas is different from that set forth for the three tactical areas which are: (1) The guerrilla base area, (2) the guerrilla area, and (3) the area under [enemy] temporary control. The policy for the three strategic areas is the culmination of experiences gathered by the Vietnamese Revolution. The question of dividing [the war theater] into strategic areas and setting forth different policies for the three strategic areas was based not only on the balance of forces between us and the enemy in each area but also on the objectives, motives and methods of our revolution.

The theoretical and practical situation of the Vietnamese Revolution permits us to affirm that this is the era of a rising proletarian revolution which will decide the victory of either
socialism or capitalism in the world. At present, the world's revolution is constantly on the offensive against the imperialists. This offensive is aimed at repelling the imperialists step by step, destroying them part by part and eventually defeating completely imperialism in order to realize the transition from capitalism to socialism on a worldwide scope.

In such situation of the world we cannot place our national democratic revolution within the movement for national independence as generally conceived by the petty bourgeois, rather we must place it within the world proletarian revolution. The reason is that any national democratic revolutionary movement is subject to interference by forces of the imperialist camp, especially by the international policeman, the U.S. imperialists. By one means or another the imperialists intervene not only to repress the movement of national liberation but also to prevent the revolution from advancing toward socialism.

To win a complete victory and gain genuine independence, the National Democratic Revolution must be developed without the capitalistic system. It must not only solve the contradictions between national independence and imperialism but also the contradictions between capitalism and socialism. This is the contradiction between the tendency of liberating the laborers and advancing toward socialism, advocated by the workers-peasants and the plot of the imperialists, their henchmen and the bourgeoisie in each country to hamper the development of the revolution and steer it toward capitalism. This is the contradiction between the socialist bloc and the imperialist bloc. In order to develop the democratic and national Revolution, we must confirm the role of the working class as leader of the Revolution and consider it the main force of the Revolution. We are mistaken if we employ only the peasants as the main force. Therefore, we should not only strengthen the rural areas and use them to encircle the cities as a step toward liberating the cities, but also strengthen the revolutionary forces and intensify the revolutionary struggles in both rural and city areas. Our August Revolution showed us that we could not carry out a General Uprising and attain victory, unless we strengthen both areas.

In the present situation, where the class struggle is waged decisively over the world, any revolutionary struggle which is meant to liberate the people and the working class must be carried out by violence and must endure a hard and protracted struggle.
Violence does not simply mean armed struggle; it may be either armed violence or political violence carried out by the people. We must stand on the side of the people before we can understand revolutionary violence. Only by understanding revolutionary violence with its political and military struggling methods can we see the offensive stance of the Revolution.

If we think of violence as only armed struggle and if we only take into consideration the comparison of military forces between us and the enemy we will erroneously estimate the balance of power between the revolutionary and anti-revolutionary forces. As a result, we will be hesitant in motivating the people to rise up, and once the people has risen up, we lack the courage to push the revolution forward, or once the armed struggle is initiated, we will not escape going into the defensive.

We all know that in South Viet-Nam, while the enemy was carrying out a most savage fascist policy, we assessed that he was basically defeated in the political field, and no matter how cruel and brutal was the enemy, the revolution was able to burst out. The reason is that the enemy's brutality on one hand harasses the revolution but on the other hand causes the revolution to break out provided that the leaders of the revolution accurately assess the situation, have confidence in the masses and know how to direct the revolution in accordance with its rule of development.

Concerning the ability of a Revolution to break out Lenin said: "In the imperialist system, wherever the enemy is weak, the Revolution will erupt easily and once it breaks out it will generate a new force capable of coping with the anti-revolutionary violence and defeating the enemy." Lenin's statements concerned not only the whole world, but each country as well.

We have followed the concept of Lenin by pushing forward partial uprisings in South Viet-Nam rural areas. In countries where capitalism is developed, the cities are considered the center of authority governing the rural areas. They are also the place where the workers, who are the most progressive and numerous force, play the key role in the struggle against the bourgeoisie. Those who succeed in controlling the city areas are masters of the rural areas.
For this reason, the uprisings that are aimed at overthrowing the yoke of the bourgeois class must break out in the cities.

In South Viet-Nam and underdeveloped countries, the situation is different. The rural areas are immense and have a natural [sic] economy which does not entirely depend on the cities. The majority of the people are peasants. Their lives are mainly based on an agricultural economy. Moreover, through the nine years of resistance, the peasants in South Viet-Nam have been masters of the rural areas and masters of a self-supporting economy which has the characteristics of a people's democratic economy. For these reasons, though the enemy could control the cities he could not control the rural areas easily. On the contrary, the rural areas are the place where the enemy was the weakest.

After years of brutal and violent attacks, the enemy has not succeeded in dominating the people in the rural areas. As for the people they realized that only by engaging in a life-and-death struggle against the enemy could they survive and maintain the basic rights and privileges provided by the Revolution. As a result, localized uprisings first broke out in the rural areas. The masses used principally political violence coordinated with armed violence at a definite level to rise up and seize power on a large scale. Then we simultaneously stepped up the military and political struggles to maintain the offensive position of the Revolution. At the same time, we unceasingly strengthened and developed forces in all fields in order to continue to struggle and frustrate the enemy's political and military schemes. At a certain time, the political and military attacks against the enemy will become a General Offensive and Uprising to defeat the enemy forces and seize power in all areas including the cities.

Considering the above revolutionary method, we can understand the strategic importance and decisive position of the cities.

Along with the political and military struggles in the rural areas, there must be a political struggle movement coordinated with military violence at a definite level in the cities to prepare for the General Offensive and Uprising movement which is the decisive step of the South Viet-Nam Revolution. In this People's
War conducted against the enemy's neo-colonialist war (because both the special war and the limited war are a means used by the imperialists to achieve neo-colonialism) the cities have a very important position.

A large part of the rural areas are controlled by the revolutionary forces but the cities remain an important base of the enemy. From a military viewpoint, if we cannot attack this base, we can no longer maintain our offensive position on the overall battlefield.

On the other hand, though the U.S. imperialists are obstinate and blatant, they cannot pretend to ignore the aspirations of the people in the country which they have invaded and enslaved. Therefore, they must gain the support of the feudalist and capitalist classes before they can achieve their goals of neo-colonialism.

Therefore, in the people's war against the neo-colonialist war, the military struggle designed to destroy an important part of the American aggressors' forces, destroy the major part of, and basically disintegrate, the puppet army is of decisive importance in breaking the enemy's aggressive will; however the political struggle designed to smash the reactionary political force and destroy the central administrative machinery of the puppet government has also a decisive bearing on the final victory in the last phase of our revolution. To intensify the political and military struggle in the cities is to strike at one of the most fundamental props of the aggressors. In the last phase of the revolution, the decisive attacks against the cities are decisive blows inflicted upon the U.S. neo-colonialist policy in South Viet-Nam.

Recently, every time the large cities are embroiled in violent popular struggles which drive the enemy into confusion and sometimes almost paralyze him, his military activities on the battlefields were weakened, stalled or heavily upset. This proves the importance of the revolutionary movement in cities, the last den of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, when waged in close coordination with the military general offensive on all battlefields.
In brief, because of the objective, motive, and method of the Revolution, we have adopted the three-area strategy. Only by placing the cities in the three-area strategy can we fully realize the strategic position of the cities and therefore can we see that the immediate city tasks are to urgently build up and accumulate forces in order to prepare for the opportunity to launch the general offensive and uprising.

In order to carry out this strategy, we must clearly realize the close relationship that exists between the cities and adjacent rural areas, and improve our unified leadership in these two areas.

The process of the South Viet-Nam Revolution has shown us the close relationship between rural areas and cities; so, we have stepped up the revolutionary movement in both urban and suburban areas and used simultaneous military and political struggles to seize control of the areas surrounding the cities, to exert our control step by step right inside the cities, to control especially the workers' quarters, thus creating conditions for seizing power. It is obvious that our method of military and political struggle going parallel to the strategy leading to the general offensive and uprising requires a close coordination between the cities and the adjacent rural areas. The unified leadership in these two areas also creates favorable conditions for the revolutionary tasks and movements in the cities. The great progress and achievements of the revolutionary movement in Saigon and Gia Dinh have proved that the Revolution has set forth the correct and necessary policy.

II. REVOLUTIONARY FORCES IN THE CITIES:

In his speech, Comrade Tu Anh has carefully analyzed the political tendencies of various social classes, parties, factions and religious groups in Saigon and Cholon. Here, I only stress on some additional points.

During time of war, the various laboring classes are cruelly oppressed and exploited, especially youths and female laborers. They suffer the most disastrous consequences of the war.
The cities in South Viet-Nam are the enemy's rear areas. Youths, especially youths of the laboring class, become the prey of the enemy and are forced to be cannon fodder of the U.S. aggressors. Beside being oppressed materially and morally, the youths face constant danger to their lives. Except for a few who are intoxicated [ideologically], turned into devious and dissolute elements, the majority of the people display a deep hatred for the U.S. pirates and their henchmen, because their personal interests and their class interests are being violated and the survival of their country is being endangered.

Therefore, the youths are the most fervent elements ready to die to counter the aggressors and traitors.

On the other hand, to increase the political and military struggles in the urban and city fringe areas, we should motivate youths to participate in the political and armed units, including secret self-defense, secret guerrilla, and special action units, which are operating in cities.

The youths represent a major force, having the capability to take part as a core element in all activities to step up the political and military struggles. Moreover, we must attach proper importance to the task of motivating the youths, considering the task of winning over the youths as a means to destroy the manpower reserve of the enemy, and give good preparations to the troop proselyting task aimed at realizing the alliance of workers-peasants and soldiers.

A typical feature of the South Viet-Nam Revolution which has never been found in other countries is that the Revolution in South Viet-Nam produced a powerful revolutionary force which is its "long-haired army". This army was born from the concept of our revolutionary struggle and is the crystallization of the indomitable traditions of our people and the marvelous courage of the Vietnamese women. The above fact proves that the revolutionary capabilities of the women are unlimited.

In South Viet-Nam cities, women, especially female laborers, are living a precarious and miserable life because of the high cost of living, the danger of house eviction and market eviction;
prostitution debases the woman's dignity, in addition, their husbands and sons are threatened by unemployment, prison, conscription. These reasons cause a deeper hatred toward the enemy and a determination to join the Revolution.

Like the women in the rural areas, women in cities can be an assault force of the political army. They are an important force in the troop proselyting tasks.

We must recruit a number of reliable and loyal agents among the women and use them in propaganda activities. We must send them to the various markets and workers' quarters where to gather the women for waging struggles and through the struggle to form a women political army. Since we succeeded in organizing a political army in the rural areas, in which women are the main force, we should be able to and we must activate such an army in the cities. At present, generally speaking, the women's movement in the cities is not as strong as that in the rural areas.

Such a situation may have many causes. However, in the analysis of various popular forces in the cities, I feel that we have failed to estimate the women's force at its true value. For this reason I suggest that you pay more attention to the role of the women and to the motivation of women in the cities.

In order to defeat the enemy in the fierce struggle between his force and ours in the cities, we should muster the force of the workers and other people of the laboring class because the workers are the leaders of the Revolution. On this point, I completely agree with Comrade Tu Anh's correct assessment of the revolutionary capacity and role of the workers and the poor laboring class in the cities; I would like to add some ideas on the "Workers and Peasants Alliance."

As we know, the workers and peasants alliance is the basis of the national united front, and it is the fundamental principle for the national democratic revolution. There are no peasants in the cities, but as I mentioned above, due to the method of our revolution it is necessary to have a unified leadership for the cities and adjacent rural areas.
For this reason, the workers-peasants alliance must be materialized by the mutual support between the revolutionary movements in two areas in the political struggle in the cities, especially in the large-scale and protracted struggles. We must coordinate the movements in the two areas skillfully, while preparing for the future uprisings when the opportunities arise.

We also set forth the three-pronged attack concept in order to realize the slogan "Workers, Peasants and Soldiers Alliance." This slogan is drawn from experiences of world revolutionary movements as well as from revolutionary movements in Viet-Nam from the past to the present time.

The history of uprisings or revolutionary wars in the Soviet Union, China, Viet-Nam proves that the soldiers in the enemy ranks, under a definite condition and in a definite phase, have the capability to mutinize in order to join the uprisings. The alliance of workers-peasants and soldiers was one of the factors ensuring the victory of the October Revolution of Russia. In the neo-colonialist war waged by the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, we must realize at all costs the alliance of workers-peasants and soldiers and be able to realize it when we launch the general offensive and uprising. The uprising of the people of Da Nang from March to May 1966 proved that we have this capability.

For this reason, in the city tasks, we must take into consideration the force represented by [enemy] soldiers. We must consider the troops proselyting task as closely related to that of motivating the workers, peasants and youths, we must make the troops proselyting task a responsibility which the Party chapters inside and outside the cities must take upon themselves and give it their close leadership.

In South Viet-Nam, the school and university students, the writers, artists, the intellectuals and scientists, all enjoy a social prestige vis-a-vis the people of other strata in the cities. They have a considerable influence over the personnel of the puppet administrative machinery. These people although partly bound to the upper class by interests are nevertheless victims of the aggressive and enslaving policy of the Americans and the dictatorial regime of the ruling clique, their material and moral
interests are being seriously violated. In the face of the American imperialists' brazen and cruel aggression, their national spirit has awakened. Once the war has become fierce and the survival of the nation is at stake, then among these intellectuals there could be some elements that will daringly join the workers, and peasants to rush forward to a life-and-death struggle against the enemy, this is particularly true of the school and university students. We must pay utmost attention to motivating the students and getting a firm hold on this force. We must use them in the national salvation movement, at the same time, we must strive to win over to our cause the other classes of intellectuals, using for this aim, many different forms of organizations and many flexible motivating methods. The goal is to materialize a front of workers-peasants and intellectuals designed to accelerate the national democratic struggle movement in the cities.

Like the front of workers-peasants-soldiers, the front of workers-peasants-intellectuals has also a decisive bearing on the revolutionary movement in the cities. Once the workers and various strata of the laboring class succeed in drawing the intellectuals into a broad front, the revolutionary movement will have the capability of shaking the puppet administration at its roots and accelerating the collapse of its ruling machinery. For this reason, we must pay proper attention to the intellectuals and the task of motivating the intellectuals.

While building the revolutionary force, attracting the masses of people at the base level in the cities, we must try all means to infiltrate the enemy's trade unions in order to get hold of the masses at the lower level while dividing the leaders at the top.

This, you comrades have done, now you must be more active and more skillful in this work.

Concerning the religious organizations in general, we must do the same, especially we must get hold of the Buddhist masses by all means. As for the Catholics in the cities, we must strive to neutralize them (where we can win them over, so much the better).
In the process of our struggle against the imperialists and their henchmen, concurrently with the strengthening of the National Liberation Front, it is necessary to set up many other forms of fronts as you comrades have done. We should pay attention to infiltrating our men into the political organizations, the factions and religious organizations which are more or less opposed to the ruling clique. The purpose is to create leftist wings in such organizations if necessary, and to rally these leftist wings. These fronts may exist as such or may not be formed yet and they only join together for a definite action, in a definite time for the purpose of meeting a definite specific requirement.

In sum, in this part, I repeat the analysis and assessment pertaining to the various social classes and I only stress on the role of various circles of people. In his speech, comrade Tu Anh has certainly alluded to the circles in the social classes of the cities. However, I think that the youths, women, soldiers, intellectuals play an important role in the building of the revolutionary force and in the national democratic struggle movement in the cities. The motivation of these circles requires imaginative and flexible modes of action. If we don't take up this problem separately from the problem of social classes in the cities, we will fail to fully develop the revolutionary capability of these people. Therefore, in the task of motivating the masses, we must pay more attention to the forces mentioned above.

III. CONCERNING THE SLOGANS, ORGANIZATION AND STRUGGLE.

The struggle of our people against more than one million of U.S. troops, satellite troops and puppet troops is reaching a high point. The great and repeated successes of our army and people, the heavy defeats of the U.S.-Puppets and their critical situation are exerting a profound and all-encompassing influence on the political, economic and social situation in the cities of South Viet-Nam. Those in charge of the city task should first of all grasp the situation of the enemy and ours, accurately assess the evolutions within the enemy's ranks, at the same time, they must analyze the aspirations, wishes, sentiments and attitude of the masses, then put forth the slogans used for propaganda and the slogans calling for actions. These slogans should be sharp,
timely and flexible, they should have the capability of rallying the masses and driving them into the struggle. If we are able to do this, we have found the weapon with which to fight the enemy. If we only repeat over and over again the slogans with a general propaganda theme, we will fail to "scratch where it itches," and therefore the masses will not be aroused for the struggle.

The objective of the revolutionary movement in the cities is to seize power to overthrow the ruling yoke of the Vietnamese traitors, lackeys of the American aggressors, to win power for the people. If we fail to propagandize widely among the laboring people in the cities our goal of smashing the puppet machinery and seizing power for the people, we will obviously fail to see the favorable trend of the revolution in South Viet-Nam.

In order to attain this political objective, right now, we should, beside the slogans calling for specific actions, widely use the slogan "the power for the people." However, at this time the slogan "the power for the people" is still a propaganda slogan, it is not yet an action slogan.

In order to motivate the masses, drive them into the struggles and through the struggles develop the revolutionary ranks of the masses in width and in depth, the use of propaganda slogans alone is not enough, we must also use slogans calling for specific actions. Among the slogans demanding welfare and democracy for the people there are those which suit the immediate demands of the masses and are appropriate for the motivation of the masses in the uprising to seize power, for instance the slogans demanding freedom, food-and-clothing, peace, land. Of course, in the daily struggle of the masses, it is not appropriate to use the slogans demanding freedom and democracy in a general manner, rather, it is necessary to use slogans demanding specific freedom and democratic rights such as: opposition to arrestation and repression, opposition to house eviction and land grabbing, demand for freedom of press, etc., or concerning the people's welfare, the slogans demanding a solution to the high cost of living, opposing the devaluation of the piaster, etc.

We should not conceive mechanically that the slogans on economic matters are reformist and that only the political slogans are revolutionary. There can be political slogans which are
reformist in nature and economic slogans which are revolutionary. The reformist or revolutionary nature of a slogan depends on the time it is being used and on the objective which a class of people or a political organization is pursuing while using that slogan for its struggle.

The slogan demanding "food and clothing" is aimed at the highest and most practical interests of the masses, it is a slogan with the highest political significance used to motivate the masses to rise up to seize power when the opportunity is at hand. We all know that the three slogans which the Bolshevik Party used to motivate the masses to seize power were "Peace, Bread, Land." Two of these slogans were of an economic nature, they were not aimed at a reformist objective but were aimed at motivating the large masses to struggle for their most pressing interests, at the same time, they were aimed at the final political goal which is the overthrow of the Tsar and the seizure of power for the people.

During the period of preparation for the August uprising in our country, the slogan for concentrated propaganda was "Overthrow the Japanese fascists, seize power for the people." At that moment North Viet-Nam and northern Central Viet-Nam were suffering a devastating famine. The Party put forth a struggle slogan calling for "Breaking up the rice storages to cope with the famine." This action slogan fully suited the vital interest of the masses and was warmly supported by the masses who actively carried it out. The Party also considered that slogan as a central slogan for motivating millions of people to take to the streets and training them for the general uprising.

After the success of the August Revolution, in preparation for the resistance against the French colonialists, President Ho put forth three slogans: "Fight against famine, fight against illiteracy, fight against foreign aggressors." Those were three revolutionary slogans with deep significance which suited the practical interests of the laboring people who had just stood up as the master of their own country, at the same time, those slogans were consistent with the interests and the fate of our people at that time.
In the revolution against the U.S. imperialists' neocolonialism, the slogan "national independence" does not mean only that the aim of the revolution is to defeat the U.S. aggressors but the defeat of the U.S. aggressors should be tied to the overthrow of their lackey reactionary government. This puppet government is being used by the American imperialists in a false position of independence for the purpose of serving their aggressive and colonialist objectives.

The slogans demanding democracy serve principally the purpose of demanding land for the tillers, on the other hand, they also demand the building of a national democratic economy. Generally speaking, in the cities, slogans demanding democracy serve the purpose of demanding welfare and democratic rights for the classes of laboring people. For the latter, demanding welfare and democratic rights is as important as demanding land for the tillers. This is a basic revolutionary slogan aimed at realizing the genuine democratic rights of the workers and the laboring people in the cities while we are establishing a broad national democratic coalition government at the top.

At present in the cities of South Viet-Nam, demanding the rights to freedom and democracy and improvement of the living conditions is a most pressing problem of the masses, at the same time it is a pressing problem of the revolution. Lenin had said: "If there were no freedom and democratic rights won by the February Revolution (Feb. 1917), it would have been difficult to muster a sweeping struggle movement of the masses which brought the October Revolution to victory." The freedom and democratic rights, under a given form, won for a definite period of time, be it 5, 10 days or a few months, are necessary for the revolution because in the revolutionary movement, one day may sometimes have the value of one year, the political enlightenment and the revolutionary creativeness of the masses are capable of unpredictable leaps forward.

In summary, at the present time and right at the moment when we are about to launch the uprising, we must put forth action slogans aimed at the most pressing needs of the masses - welfare and democracy - which are apt to attract the large majority of the masses to the struggle, and through the struggle, we will
realistically educate the masses politically, build up the revolutionary force and train the masses in the struggle in order to prepare them for the uprising.

At the present time in South Viet-Nam, the issues for uprisings to break out in the cities have appeared. The immediate future is an important transitional period. The development of the revolutionary movement in this period has an important bearing on the success of the revolution. If our leadership is sharp, timely and flexible, we will be able to lead the revolution to victory quickly; reversely if our leadership is rigid, slow-moving, conservative, hesitant, we will miss the opportunity to defeat the enemy.

In this transitional period, the situation evolves in a quick manner. The situation of the basic masses, especially of the laboring people, will undergo quick and sudden developments which will draw along the intermediate classes of people who will also evolve rapidly to adapt themselves to the quick development of the situation, then we must put forth action slogans which are realistic, sharp and devise forms of struggle which are timely, and at the same time, we must also put forth transitional slogans and transitional organizations aimed at motivating and rallying the masses in a most appropriate way.

For instance, concerning the elections organized by the puppets in South Viet-Nam, we would be mistaken if we do not put forth the action slogans boycotting the forms of lackey government set up by the Americans. We must absolutely make the masses understand thoroughly that only by smashing the puppet administrative machinery can they find the solution to their most basic and pressing interests. We must absolutely prevent the masses from having any illusion whatsoever on the constitution, parliament and election farces of the enemy. However, on the other hand we would be wrong also if we do not put forth slogans demanding the guarantee of genuine democratic rights. Along with the slogans demanding genuine democratic rights, we must put forth the slogan demanding the establishment of a civilian government. This is only a transitional slogan aimed at propagandizing and motivating the masses to oppose the dictatorial military government, and creating more internal contradictions among the enemy.
But how will this civilian government be established, to whom it will belong and by whom it will be led? We do not discuss these matters specifically because this is not yet an actual action slogan.

Devising suitable slogans is a difficult job but it is not enough to put forth slogans. It is important to rally the masses and motivate the masses to act in accordance with the slogans.

Let us consider the relation of forces between us and the enemy in the cities where with the tight control of the enemy's administrative machinery, police, spies, it is very difficult to gather up the people. But if we do not motivate and rally the masses, we will not be able to tip the balance of forces between us and the enemy in the cities to the advantage of the revolution. For this reason, in the transitional development phase of the movement, we must skillfully exploit all opportunities to set up and develop the revolutionary ranks by using all appropriate measures and organizations.

Concerning the rallying of workers and laboring people, by experience so far, we have been proceeding by organizing units at each enterprise. In Saigon at the present time, this is a necessary method. We must build our bases in the important enterprises such as the electric and water plants, the transport and communication enterprises, the factories producing for the war. But on the other hand, we must realize the importance of the local organizations of the laboring people.

Here, we must clearly understand the dialectic viewpoint in organizational matter. Previously, the Marxist members rejected the reformist viewpoint of the Second International members who advocated using the localities as the bases for their organization because they only advocated parliamentary struggle, using their local organizations to win votes in the elections. On the contrary, we attach importance to local organizations because these suit our method of struggle by simultaneous military and political means, our protracted struggle aimed at gaining control part by part as a step toward gaining control of the entire country, our method of initiating uprisings step by step and eventually advancing toward the general uprising to seize total power by force.
Moreover, considering the relation of forces between us and the enemy, in the local areas we are in a stronger position. There, it is easier for us to gather and organize the masses. Part of the activities of the laboring people in the cities is related to the living quarters of the laboring people and the rural areas adjacent to the cities. For this reason, if we use the local areas as bases for organizing our force, we will have advantageous conditions to build our force in the rural areas adjacent to the cities, in the city suburbs, in the living quarters of laboring people and from there to establish contacts with the enterprises.

Beside the organizations of the workers and laboring people in the enterprises and in the localities, we must use all means and methods to motivate and rally the youths and women because they represent the principal forces in the military and political struggle in the cities.

In order to rally and organize a large mass of people, we must develop a great number of transitional organizations operating overtly or semi-overtly under many disguised forms. There are designed to induce the masses to respond to our struggle slogans in an easy way and at the same time to cover our core elements which will be able to operate successfully.

There are many forms to these disguised organizations. We must not be rigid about their forms of organization, their names, their regulations and leadership, provided that they are able to rally the masses and that we are able to transform them step by step according to the direction of the revolution, maintain and develop the ranks of the masses, uphold the revolutionary spirit of the masses through various forms of struggle from low to higher levels. The important thing is to place within the core of these organizations elements that are Party members or loyal and reliable youths and women. Previously, our Party has many experiences in building and developing revolutionary organizations of the masses. Particularly in the period of the democratic front, along with the secret organizations which include the base organizations of the Party, we made use of the organizations operating under legal status, the disguised organizations or we took advantage of the reactionary organizations in order to pursue our activities. We must study these experiences in order to develop widely and vigorously the popular organizations of the masses.
In the cities of South Viet-Nam, especially in Saigon-Cholon, waves after waves, the masses successively stood up against the American country-grabbers and the puppet government. The masses are in an increasingly confused situation as far as political awareness and revolutionary determination are concerned. For this reason, more than ever, we have many opportunities to rally and organize the masses. Even a minor incident such as a police raid in the market, a military vehicle running over a pedestrian or an American soldier refusing to pay his cyclo fare etc., has the capability of provoking a struggle. We must take advantage of all opportunities occurring daily in the cities to draw the masses into struggles from low to higher forms; through these struggles our sympathizers establish contact with the masses, educate them and rally them under various forms.

We must seek all means to attack the enemy, using even the minor incidents, the minor opportunities to attack the enemy and drive him into confusion, at the same time, we will take advantage of these offensive actions to build up our force. If we do not timely grasp the daily ideological evolutions in the cities and fail to see all the favorable factors in the new situation, if we keep on advancing gradually by developing our base organizations one by one, we will not only miss the opportunity to rally the masses but we will also, as a consequence, be driven into the defensive, a situation which does not suit the strategy of the revolution in the South; this strategy requires that once we stand up to oppose the enemy we must seek all means to attack him.

Of course, to thoroughly grasp the offensive concept in the organizational task does not mean to act in an adventurous way which might lead to the exposure and loss of our force. To be on the offensive does not mean to grope about as you comrades usually do but rather to tie organization with struggle, that is, after putting forth appropriate slogans, we must daringly take advantage of all opportunities to rally the masses overtly, legally or through semi-covert and semi-legal means and this must be done at the same time as we develop secret loyal organizations, liberation organizations and the Party.
In the cities of South Viet-Nam, the political struggle movement has attained a high state of development and achieved great successes. Recently, we have had a number of good organizations and methods of operations such as associations, groups, [activity] weeks, etc. However, the form of disguised organizations has not yet been widely used. We must quickly review our accumulated experiences and act more vigorously in motivating and rallying the largest mass of people.

We must not think that the form of legal activities is reformist and dismiss it as unnecessary. On the contrary, we may set up overt organizations operating legally or infiltrate the overt, legal organizations of the enemy such as the trade unions. The basic problem is that we must know how to use those organizations to educate, rally the masses and steer the struggle activities of those organizations toward the final goal which is to overthrow the puppet administration and seize power for the people.

A struggle gives birth to another one, once the masses is engaged in the struggles, they become enlightened more quickly and gain more personal experiences which help them see the truth and the road to follow. Of course, the Revolution will not succeed without the leadership of the Party, however, we must realize the strength and revolutionary capability of the masses. Once they have the courage to rush forward into a life-and-death struggle against the enemy, the slogans put forth by the Party will become their slogans and, provided that the Party gets a firm hold on the policy and the organization of the struggles, there will emerge right among the masses tens of thousands of cadres of the Party.

While stressing on the question of rallying the masses under versatile forms and developing the overt and semi-overt organizations, we do not take lightly the task of developing the Party and the secret loyal organizations. On the contrary, we must associate the development of overt and semi-overt organizations with the building of secret military and political organizations. We must be skillful in covering up our core force, correctly carry out the principles pertaining to secret organizations and operations, pay utmost attention to countering [enemy] spies and guarding against the [false] surrenderers who infiltrate the Party and the loyal organizations of the masses with destructive purposes.
However, in the present situation of the cities in South Viet-Nam, if we advocate building up secret organizations prior to agitating the masses for the struggle, we will abandon the masses, restrict the development of the masses' struggle movement; by so doing we will also restrict the development of the Party and the loyal organizations, and more importantly, we will miss the opportunity to rally and develop the force of the masses when it comes to us.

IV. CONCERNING THE EXPLOITATION OF ENEMY INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS.

In any revolution the basic question of success or failure is that concerning the balance of forces between the opposing parties. The balance of forces results from the comparison of the combined material and moral forces, including military, political and economic forces, of both sides. This is not an abstract concept, it is an established fact, the result of a process of evolutive development of the quantity and quality of the material and moral factors of the opposing forces.

Concerning the revolutionary force, first of all, this force is represented by our own subjective forces which include the leadership, the revolutionary masses, the armed and political forces viewed quantitatively and qualitatively. To speak of the revolutionary force is not only to refer to our own existing force but also to consider the weakness of the enemy which results in added strength for our force. For this reason, in our revolutionary strategy it is necessary to build up our force while at the same time exploit and fully take advantage of the enemy's weakness and internal contradictions.

We all know that when applying the principles of Marxism in the era of imperialism for the purpose of devising a policy for the revolution of world proletariat, Lenin put forth three themes: (1) the contradiction between the proletarians and the capitalists; (2) the contradiction between the oppressed peoples and the imperialists; (3) the contradiction among the imperialists.

The first theme deals with the principal force opposing the capitalist class step by step and on a worldwide basis. The second theme deals with the principal ally of the workers in the struggle against imperialism. The third theme deals with the exploitation of the enemy's internal contradictions. From a general point
of view, the combined development of the three aspects mentioned above creates the balance of forces between the revolutionary forces and the anti-revolutionary forces.

Therefore the exploitation of enemy internal contradictions is one of the basic strategic principles of the proletarian revolution. According to Marxism, the capitalist system will certainly be obliterated in favor of socialism as a result of the proletarian class' revolution to overthrow it, and on the other hand, as a result of contradictions inherent to the capitalistic system of production and contradictions existing among the ruling class itself, these are the factors which cause the capitalistic system to destroy itself. This is not a pure theory but a fact which has been proved by the reality of many revolutions from the past to the present time. Lenin's argument on the winning capability of the revolution in a country based on the unequal development of capitalism and the exploitation of an imperialist war by turning it into an internal revolutionary war proved the strategic importance of this revolutionary principle.

In the history of the Russian October Revolution, we have seen an important experience, this was the fact that the Bolshevik Party took advantage of the contradiction between Kornilov and the provisional government of Kerensky to arm the city Soviets and the masses kept these arms with which they seized power by force.

Recapitulating the experiences of the revolution in Viet-Nam, the third congress of our Party came to the conclusion that exploiting the enemy's internal contradictions was a revolutionary principle of a strategic nature, not merely a question of tactic.

Right in South Viet-Nam, the fall of Ngo Dinh Diem had created a very favorable opportunity for the masses to stand up and basically destroy all the strategic hamlets of the enemy, especially in the low land of T.5. The collapse of Diem was the result of the vigorous struggle movement of the masses and at the same time the result of the acute contradictions between the imperialists and their lackeys.

At present, the contradictions between the ruling clique and the various factions in South Viet-Nam are developing in an acute way with characteristic features which we must carefully study.
in order to work out plans and measures to exploit and use to the
maximum so as to weaken the enemy and drive him into confusion,
add strength to the revolutionary force and push forward the struggle
movement more vigorously.

In the ruling class of South Viet-Nam, the most reactionary
elements are the mandarins and militarists associated with the
enemy's administrative machinery, they include both civilian and
military personnel. The real nature of the class struggle now
unfolding in a decisive way is that opposing the laboring people to
the American imperialists and the Vietnamese traitors serving as
their lackeys.

Beside the bayonets and American dollars this ruling clique
has no economic, social, political foundations to support them or
to serve as a base for unifying their forces.

In addition, the division within the U.S. political circles
and the policies of the imperialists on the use of lackeys has caused
the contradictions among the Vietnamese traitors in South Viet-Nam
to become more acute and their internal disputes to become irre-
concilable. Besides, the bourgeoisie which is loosing ground
politically and being discriminated economically is trying all means
to oppose the ruling clique and struggle for their interests and
positions. The political organizations and various factions in
South Viet-Nam are also opposed to the ruling clique and this
opposition sometimes materialized under the form of fierce
struggles.

All the contradictions mentioned above are dividing the
ruling clique and causing it to become impotent in the face of the
struggle movement of the masses in the cities.

If we know how to take advantage of those contradictions in
order to step up our propaganda activities, stage the struggles and
rally the masses, we will be able to cause the collapse of the puppet
army and administration, create conditions for alliance between the
revolutionary force and the intermediate class, the progressive
elements of the [political] factions and religious groups, the
dissidents within the enemy's ranks, or neutralize a definite portion
of the puppet army and administration and make it easier for the
masses to arise at the moment of the general uprising.
Experiences of the mass uprisings showed that there was the case such as that of the August Revolution where right from the start we were holding the leadership of the movement, there was also the case where, parallel to the leadership of the Party and the workers, the bourgeois shared in the leadership and controlled a portion of the masses or influenced a number of the masses' revolutionary organizations. For instance in the case of the February 1917 revolution in Russia, the bourgeois controlled the government and led the Soviets of the workers, thus creating a situation where two governments coexisted side by side for a certain period.

The uprising of the Da Nang people against Thieu-Ky from March to May 1966, though not ending in success, nevertheless gave us a useful lesson on the exploitation of the enemy's internal contradictions. We did not initiate the uprising of the Da Nang people but we took advantage of the internal disputes of the enemy, aggravated his contradictions, rallied the people, seized leadership of the movement, agitated the people to struggle and to rise up in order to seize control of the city. You comrades had done this work despite the fact that the Party's force was small and the Party's base organizations in the city were weak. However, on the other hand, because we did not fully use the leadership force, we missed an opportunity to win a bigger victory.

Another important point was that our comrades in Da Nang did not take advantage of that favorable opportunity to develop our revolutionary forces. Especially they did not build foundations for an administration at the base-level and solve a number of economic problems for the laboring masses. For this reason, we failed to create a new impetus for the masses' movement and keep up this impetus for future activities.

The lesson of the Da Nang people's uprising is many-sided. Here, I only discuss the problem concerning the exploitation of enemy internal contradictions.

We entertain no illusion or expectation on the accidental results of the contradictions within the enemy's ranks. But to exploit the enemy's contradictions is a positive attitude which is fully in accordance with the strategic principles of the revolution. Of course, in order to exploit the enemy's contradictions,
we need to use many tactics, even those tactics which are only necessary for a short period of time. However, it is necessary to clearly see that, viewed in the general context of the revolution, the question of exploiting enemy internal contradictions is a question of strategy, and the specific actions designed to divide the enemy's ranks are the tactics serving that strategy.

Let's not let our subjective shortcomings in the exploitation of enemy internal contradictions lead us to conclude that it is not advisable to overestimate the value of enemy internal contradictions and that the exploitation of these contradictions is only a common tactic. I suggest that you study these contradictions more carefully and work out practical policies for the exploitation of these contradictions and consider this as an important strategic mission which you must not take lightly.

V. THE QUESTION OF OPPORTUNITY.

The general strategy we put forth was aimed at the general offensive, general uprising designed to win complete victory. Why must we couple the general uprising with the general offensive? The general uprising which we are talking about is a process of simultaneous or successive uprisings staged by the revolutionary masses aimed at seizing power for the people in all the areas still under the control of the puppets, mainly in the large cities which are the important rear of the enemy, the places where the enemy's nerve center and command organs are concentrated.

By studying the experiences of uprisings in our country as well as in other countries, we realize that an uprising can burst out and succeed only when the enemy is no longer able to govern the people, when the masses are determined to rise up to free themselves from enemy's rule, when the tools of violence in the hands of the rulers, principally the armed forces, are paralyzed or disintegrated due to a conflict with a foreign imperialist country or due to an internal war. This fact proves that if the ruling class is in control of a strong military force, the uprising cannot succeed.

The revolutionary war in South Viet-Nam at the present time has both the characteristics of a war against aggression and an internal revolutionary war. In this situation, a general uprising
including uprisings in the cities, can succeed with the condition that we win a basic military victory by inflicting heavy losses to the American troops, shaking their aggressive will to its roots, and by destroying an important part of the puppet army, thereby driving it to an inevitable collapse.

A second point is that in the process of uprisings in the cities we do not use only our political force but we must combine both political and military forces.

Thus, viewed in the general context of the war and the development of the revolutionary movement, a general military offensive must win victory a step ahead. However, this does not mean that the general uprising must wait until the general offensive is completed. This simply means that in order for a general uprising to take place, there must be a general offensive.

On the other hand, we should clearly realize that during the course of the general offensive (which may be prolonged) the uprisings, including uprisings in the cities, may break out which reverberate on the general offensive and give it a boost.

We all noticed that the masses' uprisings in Hue and Da Nang in March 1966 had paralyzed two puppet divisions in this area. This fact proves that the popular uprisings create favorable conditions for military offensive actions which in turn facilitate the uprising of the masses.

In the situation of the war between us and the enemy, can uprisings break out in the cities? The political struggle movement and the actions bearing the character of revolutionary violence of the masses during the past years in Saigon, Hue, Da Nang supply a major answer to this question.

It was obvious that the revolutionary wave of the masses in the cities during 1963 added a blow to the repeated defeats of the enemy on the battlefields and over large rural areas. This has collapsed the dictatorial regime of the Diem-Nhu brothers and shook the puppet administration to its roots at a moment when the special war was entering a decisive phase.
From that time on, the political crisis of the Saigon puppet administration has found no end. A situation of direct revolution has emerged: the puppet administration has become incapable of ruling the people, and the laboring people have seen the country-grabbing face of the American aggressors, the country-selling face of their lackeys and refused to live under their ruling yoke.

While the enemy's ranks are increasingly divided and beset with acute contradictions, the various strata of basic masses in the cities are showing increasing revolutionary determination and the intermediate classes are showing increasing sympathy for the revolution. Thus the preconditions for popular uprisings aimed at seizing power have become available.

Because the subjective and objective conditions were missing, the uprisings of the people in Saigon, Hue, Da Nang in the recent past could not turn into uprisings for seizing power.

In the coming period, if while our repeated military successes are driving the enemy into a dangerous and confused situation, in a given city, including Saigon-Cholon, the masses, seething with revolutionary zeal, want to rise up to overthrow the puppet administration, then I think that this uprising can take place without waiting for the military offensive to win a basic victory.

Uprisings in the cities can be a series of consecutive uprisings similar to those of the February and October revolutions in Russia, one uprising paving the way for the next one.

At present, the masses in the cities are entertaining the idea of seizing power, more than that, they have acted in that direction.

However, our subjective capability is insufficient for leading the masses. For this reason, in the coming period, our major efforts must be concentrated on overcoming this weak point.

The revolutionary situation in the cities of South Viet-Nam is undergoing big changes. In the seething revolutionary tide of the masses, the situation will not evolve in a normal way; there will certainly be sudden changes and leaps forward. For this reason, it is most important that those in charge of leadership must grasp the situation and seize the opportunity in time to steer the movement in an appropriate way.
Here Lenin's lessons on leadership in uprisings in the October Revolution are invaluable. In April 1917 Lenin put forth the slogan: "All power to the Soviets" and remarked that there was the possibility at that moment of transferring the power to the Soviets by peaceful means. However, in July, when the Kerensky provisional government brutally repressed the masses' demonstrations, the situation of two governments' coexistence came to an end, the socialist revolutionaries and the Menshevik clique overtly stood on the anti-revolutionary side, the Soviets under their control fell into the hands of the bourgeois, Lenin then advocated the temporary withdrawal of that slogan and the preparation for armed uprising. After the workers and soldiers smashed the rebellion of Kornilov, in September of that year, Lenin resumed the slogan "All power to the Soviets," but at that time it was the slogan for armed uprising.

We have seen that during that short period of time the situation evolved rapidly and Lenin's strategic and tactical guidance also evolved skillfully, flexibly and timely.

Our August uprising from North to South, especially in Hanoi, Hue, Saigon, was an outstanding creation of our Party and the laboring masses of our country. We must draw from it the valuable lessons and the living experiences which are useful for the leadership of the uprisings in the cities of South Viet-Nam.

In Hanoi at that time, while our Party was actively preparing for the uprising, the pro-Japanese national assembly planned to hold on August 17, 1945 a popular demonstration in support of the puppet government. Prodded by the Viet-Minh [Front], the people violently protested against this demonstration which then was turned into a demonstration supporting the Viet-Minh. From that moment on, the revolutionary atmosphere was seething. Strikes broke out in the enterprises, markets and government offices. These quickly developed into a general political strike. And two days later, on August 19, 1945 more than 100,000 people of Hanoi took to the streets in an impressive demonstration which quickly turned into an uprising to seize power in the capital.
In Saigon, the Party's force was small at the time of the uprising. But among the masses there were tens of thousands of people with ardor and determination to engage in a life-and-death struggle against the enemy; these people had the ability to rally the masses and lead them to take to the streets. If at the time, the communists just sat down, discussed, calculated without realizing the pressing aspirations of the masses, if they failed to get hold of the positive elements among the masses and consequently, did not dare to rush forward to lead the uprising, then we would have lost the opportunity.

Of course the objective situation at the present time in South Viet-Nam is different from that at the time of the uprising in August 1945. The American army which is fighting our people in South Viet-Nam is not one which has suffered defeats on the world while the Japanese at the time of the August uprising had already surrendered to the Allies. However, on the one hand, we must realize that the Japanese troops at that time were not in a state of disintegration while our military force was very small. On the contrary, the American troops are suffering repeated and heavy defeats on the battlefields of South Viet-Nam, the puppet's morale is seriously declining and the puppet troops are on the verge of collapse. Meanwhile, our troops in South Viet-Nam are the victor in an offensive position and are holding strategic initiative on the whole war theater.

These are great advantages, if the situation in the cities is ripe, uprisings can break out. We are aware of our own strength, at the same time, we must correctly assess the enemy's reaction and obduracy in order to act with determination, fitness and timeliness.

We have put forth the policy of general offensive and uprising, this policy reflects our highest determination, it is also a decisive method of revolutionary struggle.

On the other hand, during and after the uprising, concurrently with establishing control on the masses and the administrative organs at the base level, we must materialize a form of front for a broad coalition government at the top, a national, democratic,
peaceful and neutral coalition government. These are the transitional forms designed to divide the enemy, drive him into a passive position, defeat the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, and realize the immediate objectives of the revolution in South Viet-Nam.

In the course of the revolution in general and of the uprising in particular, the leaders cannot foresee all the practical conditions as well as all the eventual developments. There are conditions and factors on which we have a firm control but there are also those which we are not able to envision completely or which still remain unknown. The basic problem is that we must firmly grasp the general evolution of the situation, the strategic direction of the revolution, the guiding principles of the uprising and strive to create favorable and complete conditions at a definite level. But most important of all, we must have the determination to act, in the course of actions, things will permit us to accomplish more.

My above presentation is designed to contribute ideas to comrade Tu Anh's speech, at the same time it serves as a lead for you to research, think and apply to your leadership in city tasks. Here, I only discuss a number of principles. The reality of the political struggle in Saigon and other cities of South Viet-Nam is certainly richer in living experiences. You must strive to recapitulate the revolutionary movements in the cities and draw from them new experiences and lessons. This is the best method to improve the operational level of the cadres, it is also a method to step up the movement in the cities with a view to making better preparations which enable us to correctly grasp the situation and timely seize the opportunity to lead the masses to the uprising.

I wish all of you good health and hope that the revolutionary movement in Saigon-Cholon as well as in other cities of South Viet-Nam will mature more outstandingly.

Please let me know your opinions on this letter.

With my cordial and determined-to-win salutations.

Signed: BA