of a Senate committee saying, well, it really was an accident, wasn’t it.

So when the Soviet Union was an Evil Empire, it was an evil thing. When they were no longer an Evil Empire and we had done essentially the same thing, then it was OK. You get the drift, Senator?

Senator Reid. KAL-007 was shot down by the Soviet Union. That’s what you said, right?

Mr. Mooney. That’s what’s publicly known, yes sir.

Senator Reid. Was there anything else privately known?

Mr. Mooney. There was speculation. I don’t have anything to comment on that.

Senator Reid. You also ask the question, “are some U.S. MIA’s still alive in Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese U.N. Ambassador literally admits that MIA’s are still alive on 5 November 1991 outside this hearing room. His statement confirms the Vietnam, quote, ace in the hole solution is still alive and well. Just ask me.” I’m asking.

Mr. Mooney. I’m glad you asked, Senator. The solution to this issue, as I testified to back in 1986, is pardon and parole.

Senator Reid. Is what?

Mr. Mooney. Pardon and parole.

Senator Reid. Tell me what you mean by that.

Mr. Mooney. Simple. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, at least the second one, did not happen. Point No. 1. Point No. 2. The legal right for these men to go to war was based on the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed by Congress that gave them the authority to go to war. Point No. 2. Since point No. 1 is invalid, point No. 2 is invalid. Point No. 3. All throughout the communications text, hundreds, hundreds, and hundreds of thousands of times, and even in encoded messages, at the political level, at the tactical level, how did they refer to our men? War criminals.

Senator Reid. But answer the question. Are there still MIA’s alive in Southeast Asia? And how did the Vietnam ambassador admit to that?

Mr. Mooney. His statement, when he first said it, it hit me right behind the eye and right between the eyes, that pardon and parole still exists. And then, referring to the sighting reports, which still reflect inner-outer prison systems, our men in a penal system. It fits, Senator. And that is my analysis and opinion.

Senator Reid. Mr. Mooney, with all due respect, I don’t know what you’re talking about.

Mr. Mooney. With all due respect, Senator, I don’t know what you’re talking about.

Senator Reid. Politicians, the NSC.

Mr. Mooney. Yes sir.

Senator Reid. Is that the term as I understand it?

Mr. Mooney. Yes sir.
Senator Reid. And the CIA is the godfather?
Mr. Mooney. Yes sir.
Senator Reid. And the NSA is the virgin?
Mr. Mooney. Yes sir.
Senator Reid. Any particular reason that you refer to them in that manner?
Mr. Mooney. It's discussions that flow back and forth. The term bastard for DIA is referred to as the last one on the block. Nobody really likes DIA too much, and if there's a problem, everybody tries to push it on DIA. If there's a mistake, everybody tries to push it on DIA. And DIA is good. Don't kid yourself. They've got some of the best analysts of the whole bunch.

Now what's the next one? NSC? That's the impossible dream. If you intelligence out and you see it many times, you issue a report, and then you see some type of public announcement coming out of the White House that isn't what you say, it's manipulated. Frankly manipulated. They are political.

Senator Reid. Mr. Mooney, I have reviewed your personnel reports.
Mr. Mooney. Yes sir.
Senator Reid. They are very good.
Mr. Mooney. Yes sir.
Senator Reid. Each one of them, the commanding officer who is responsible for the review says nice things about you. Now, in 1977, did you have the same feeling about your country as you do now?
Mr. Mooney. I love my country, sir.
Senator Reid. You refer to the United States as an Evil Empire?
Mr. Mooney. I asked a question, is it? That's what I'm concerned about. Is it an Evil Empire? Is Washington, DC, the last Evil Empire? I don't know. But I'm concerned about it and I want it changed. If we are going to abandon men who are willing to fight and die for this country, if we're going to let them rot in the hells of Southeast Asia, then that question is very appropriate.

Senator Reid. Let me follow-up by asking this question. Why would anyone want to do that? Why would anyone in a responsible position in this government, military or civilian, want to leave prisoners of war in Southeast Asia?
Mr. Mooney. That's what you're formed to investigate, sir. I only know that it occurred. What the policy and political decisions at levels beyond mine were, I do not have the foggiest idea. I have told your staff where to look for additional information which will get into those areas. And hopefully, you can answer that question.

Is there a serious problem here? Do we walk the dark side of democracy? Was the abandonment of men planned or was it accidental, as I believe? That has been my purpose. Somebody had to throw out the first rock from the inside. Nobody else was doing it.

Senator Reid. And that is you that threw out the first rock?
Mr. Mooney. Essentially, because I came from the inside.
Senator Reid. And, Mr. Mooney, last question. Do you really believe all this stuff that you have written, that people have been following you around and trying to kill you?
Mr. Mooney. Absolutely, Senator. If you want to talk to my 8-year-old grandson, who they had to take to a psychologist because he was threatened, I'll be glad to put him in touch with you.
Senator Reid. I have nothing further. Thanks.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Reid.

Mr. Mooney, I do not know how much of a second round we will have here, but I want to follow-up on Senator Reid’s questions because I am a little bit puzzled. I’ve talked to a lot of folks who have feelings about conspiracies and problems. I just want to say up front that we have seen, regrettably, our own government lie. Nobody should sit here and somehow be surprised that some citizen might find it difficult to get an honest answer or to get a hearing, because there are, sadly, many examples of duplicity and purposeful deception. Most recently, we have had Alan Fiers and Clair George, Elliot Abrams, all of whom sat right in front of this Senator and told a bald-faced lie for which they either have pleaded guilty or are currently under indictment.

So I do not sit here totally incredulous about the potential for deception or for motives to have existed here at all that one may have wanted to avoid negligence, oversight, or perhaps made some purposeful, willful decisions that were embarrassing or whatever.

The committee certainly approaches this issue with that in mind. I read your service record and, year after year, your service record says things like,

"Performed his staff duties in a clearly outstanding, at the highest level, technical and professional confidence. Established and implemented new criteria for taking airborne operations in support of additional information needs. Provided outstanding assistance in formulating a concept of operations involving a foreign mobile program. Conducted comprehensive evaluations of airborne effectiveness. Strengths, outstanding initiative, leadership and superior technical ability, together with his other qualities, characterized Sergeant Mooney as a professional-level NCO.""

Then the concurring reporting official, "Sergeant Mooney is one of the most confident noncommissioned officers in all areas with whom I’ve had the pleasure of working. His performance has been consistently outstanding." This is 1975, 1974.

Going on through page after page of your service jacket, there are similar comments from people who have rated you outstanding: "Initiative: Sergeant Mooney’s strengths lie in dedication to duty, compassion for subordinates, diligence, initiative, unending drive. Sergeant Mooney has demonstrated exceptional ability, both in the technical field and as the NCOIC of this division. His performance has been outstanding, not only in his duty assignment, but also in the skillful manner in which he has executed the numerous additional duties assigned him. One of the most outstanding NCO’s I’ve had the pleasure of supervising."


So you have had a distinguished career that was well represented by the reports. But then, candidly, I have the same kind of reaction that Senator Reid has had and perhaps Senator McCain a little bit. I read an affidavit which is full of the sort of military lingo that talks about a security perimeter heating up. This is in September 1990.

Mr. MOONEY. The affidavit in Michigan?
The CHAIRMAN. The Michigan one.

Mr. MOONEY. Sir, that's what happened. Was I supposed to——

The CHAIRMAN. No, no, no. I want to give you a chance to explain it, because I just want to say to you, I find it a little unsettling. It kind of has a tone to it and it has a kind of sense of persecution or paranoia that the committee has got to sort of try to make a judgment about. You understand that.

Mr. MOONEY. I understand, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I just want to give you a chance to air that with us and tell us. I mean, does the committee have to investigate whether the CIA was blowing up lawn mowers?

Mr. MOONEY. No, I have never accused anybody in the government, said that there was a planned operation against me or anybody else. I have concerns that none of these things ever occurred in my life until I got involved in this issue. Nobody was calling me up and threatening me before I got involved in this issue. Nobody was breaking into my home and stealing records before I was involved in this issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I also want to just say that you are not the only person, I might add, who has made this kind of allegation or had this kind of experience.

Mr. MOONEY. I understand that, Senator. Absolutely, sir. But these things do occur and they do happen and I have logged them down, I've kept track of some of them, because they do occur.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us get to the gravamen of your testimony, because I want to understand. Your testimony is that a number of prisoners of war were known to be held after the Paris peace accords.

Mr. MOONEY. My testimony, sir, is that I had a list of Americans who were captured alive in enemy hands with our knowledge of the specific units of those enemies down to battalion, division or regiment or up to division or higher than division and that the last information was that they were alive and well in enemy hands.

The CHAIRMAN. And your next statement beyond that is that those people did not come home. They were not accounted for. The ones that you knew were alive did not come home in Operation Homecoming.

Mr. MOONEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what is the total of people that you believe you could show this committee were alive that did not come home?

Mr. MOONEY. I believe in the briefing strip, there's about 178 names out of a total that would have been about 290 some. They are in the very front part of the briefing strip.

The CHAIRMAN. So it is your testimony to the committee that 178 people were known to be alive, but they did not come home with Operation Homecoming?

Mr. MOONEY. No, sir, I didn't say that. What I said is there were approximately 305 on the list. At Homecoming I, about 5 percent of those were returned. That brought the list down to about 293, 294. Now, what I have recovered of the names that were on that original list is approximately 140 or maybe 120 names and they're listed on the briefing strip.

The CHAIRMAN. And they, you say, did not return.
Mr. MOONEY. Well, there have been some remains returned. In the case of Van Ranselaar, his remains have been returned, and that's kind of unusual because I wrote an affidavit that he was captured alive. The government said he wasn't. His remains returned and that's confirmed by Dr. Charney.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, does your total number apply to both Laos and Vietnam?

Mr. MOONEY. Absolutely not, sir, because the majority of the units that I was responsible for operated in North Vietnam. During the dry season, they occasionally went across the border and I would pick up some information on Americans shot down in Laos or captured in Laos from those specific units.

The CHAIRMAN. But, other than that, you do not have information with respect to Laos?

Mr. MOONEY. Not to Pathet Lao or with regard to the North Vietnamese logistics and NVA forces in that area. But I've told your investigative committee where to look in that area.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any evidence whatsoever as to any of those 140 today?

Mr. MOONEY. That they may be alive today? No, sir. The CHAIRMAN. None whatsoever?

Mr. MOONEY. No, sir, I don't have access any more.

The CHAIRMAN. And the last time you had contact with your list was in what year?

Mr. MOONEY. The last time I saw it was late 1973, before I was reassigned to Nakhom Phanom, Thailand, 6908th security squadron.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you aware of any information regarding any cross-border operations for rescue?

Mr. MOONEY. I've only heard rumors, sir. I've never seen anything in text or any documents that would support that. There was only one thing in the intelligence that we saw, and that's when the North Vietnamese system would light up when they went on alert for raiders. Who these raiders were, I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me try to clarify that. Post-1973, were you aware of any rescue missions?

Mr. MOONEY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. None whatsoever?

Mr. MOONEY. Just rumor. I saw nothing as a report or an order or a result, just rumors.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mooney, are you willing to work closely with the cooperative effort, not just to this committee but of the NSA as well as DIA, so that this committee doesn't leave America kind of hanging there at the end? We really want to try to pin down name for name, incident for incident and reformulate these lists.

Mr. MOONEY. Absolutely, sir. I would have one request. That they come see me.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it you are addressing the expense issue or--

Mr. MOONEY. Expense issue, and I have a family to take care of. I can't keep running back and forth between Washington and Wolf Point and losing salary and all that other.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that. Let me ask you this. Are other members of your family aware of these incidents?
Mr. Mooney. No, sir. I have a wife, two daughters and five grandchildren, and they know that I've been involved in this issue, but I've kept them away from it.

The CHAIRMAN. So none of these incidents occurred in their view?

Mr. Mooney. Oh, which incidents are you talking about?

The CHAIRMAN. Any of them, the lawn mower.

Mr. Mooney. Oh, I thought you were talking about lost POW's. No, my grandson has been threatened. He has received two phone calls.

The CHAIRMAN. And you say he has, in fact, had to visit a psychologist.

Mr. Mooney. Yes, my daughter, when she was in Vegas, took him because he's scared to death his grandpa's going to be killed. He's very nervous right now. He doesn't want me out here. He's afraid.

But as far as being—the lawn mower incident, of course, my wife knows about that, because things were destroyed. And of course the Coast-to-Coast store knows about it, because I hauled them down there and I had to buy a new lawn mower on three different occasions.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions? Senator Smith?

Senator Smith. Mr. Mooney, I am just trying to reconstruct what has been mentioned here. The so-called salt-and-pepper incident with the black individual and the white individual, the Baron 52, 140 men on the list, roughly 140 men on the list. Those three areas are areas where you specifically indicated direct knowledge of American service personnel that were not returned that maybe should have been.

Do you have any other, are there any other incidents that you have direct knowledge of?

Mr. Mooney. All my information comes from special intelligence. I will not get into the sighting reports, because you can argue those all day long. My information comes from the horse's mouth.

Senator Smith. But following up on what Senator Kerry just asked you, if, in fact, that logistics can be worked out, you would be willing to sit down with representatives of the committee, representatives of NSA, anybody else who may have been involved in those particular three incidents, and try to at least come to some conclusion as to what happened, whether somebody was lied to or somebody was screwed up or whatever, you would be willing to try to resolve it.

Mr. Mooney. Absolutely.

Senator Smith. I have just one further question. I will not take the full time. Help me to understand what happened in 1973 when the accords are being worked on. There are prisoners, of course. The Paris peace accords are being worked out, the details at the policy level. You now are in the field collecting intelligence data, movements, troop movements in the field, prisoners in the field, this is before the accords now.

What type of system, give me some indication of how Kissinger and the policy makers communicated with you, the intelligence in the field, so that when we, in fact, negotiated the accords, there
was some continuity there, that we knew where everybody was at the time the accords were signed.

For example, if we submitted a list of missing prisoners on Day One and at the same time we are submitting a list, 14 people were lost in an incident, then they are not on the list.

Help me to understand how that was worked out between the policy level and the data collectors, you guys in the field at the time. What specifically did they do or did you do to draw that together so that there was a conclusion drawn, or at least a common base of information, when we went to Paris?

Mr. MOONEY. I understand what you're after, Senator. The word came down from, at least branch level, that, this was in late 1972, you know, that latter part of 1972 when things looked like the thing was going to come to a head eventually and be finished, that we better be prepared, have our data ready. Anybody that has any information, listings, names, whatever the case may be or any input in anticipation of a request from higher levels.

This data was assimilated. It was in the POW listings, execution lists and so on down the line. This data was essentially complete by early 1973, January time frame. Of course names are being added like Harley Hall and, you know, a few others.

The request never came down to my level. That is not to say that the policy makers had not made a request to NSA or CIA or other places. But there was no request for this type of data that came down to my desk level or to my division level. It wasn't until the salt-and-pepper incident of 1974 that that first request came in, which had to come from a higher level I believe.

Senator SMITH. So if anyone was lost, either after the last wave of POW's came home or during the negotiations, if anybody was lost in that period for whatever reason, either in Laos, Cambodia or Vietnam, you are saying that it is probable that those names of the missing would not have been on the table in Paris.

Mr. MOONEY. If they had been reported in the product system, let's say that 2 days before the Paris peace accords there was a shoot-down of a helicopter and that was reported. That would have reached the State Department. That would have reached DIA. And they would have had the opportunity to put those on a list.

Senator SMITH. What about after that? What about after the agreements were signed, after all the other dates were set for the return of the three groups of prisoners or four groups, whatever it was? What was the mechanism there for, as you know, we were still fighting in Laos, we were still——

Mr. MOONEY. There was no change in the mechanisms, sir. The reporting requirements stayed the same. If a loss occurred, and I believe it was called SONGBIRD at that time, it would have been reported. In other words, just because there was going to be a Paris peace accords or a signing or a cease-fire, the reporting requirements did not change.

If it was reflected, it would have been reported, would have been. If we would have seen it in our intelligence.

Senator SMITH. I want to wrap up here and turn it over to Senator McCain. To the best of your knowledge, did we ever ask the Vietnamese about, or the Lao, about the Baron 52 and crew?
Mr. MOONEY. Not that I know of, sir, no.
Senator SMITH. Does it not seem logical we should have?
Mr. MOONEY. Absolutely, sir. It was a hot case. Absolutely.
Senator SMITH. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCain?
Senator McCain. Thank you for your patience, Mr. Mooney. You
have been here for quite a while and we are very appreciative.
Mr. Mooney, in an L.A. Times article, you were reported as
saying you had a list of about 1,000 names.
Mr. MOONEY. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Were you misquoted in light of your testimony?
Mr. MOONEY. No, sir, no, sir. The 1,000 name list is called the
who to ask list. In other words, it lists MIA's and behind it, the
specific North Vietnamese unit that would have information on
those MIA's.
For example, I can give you one if you want, Senator.
Senator McCain. No, thank you. That is sufficient, thank you.
You were not misquoted by the Los Angeles Times.
In response to a question by Senator Kerry, you said that you
had no information that the Government was involved in any of
these incredibly serious assaults on your rights as a U.S. citizen.
And I will get into that in a minute. Is that what you told Senator
Kerry?
Mr. MOONEY. I have no direct knowledge of any agency, but
there has been one incident which tells me it has to be pretty so­
plicated.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Mooney. What incident are you
referring to?
Mr. MOONEY. It's over my telephone line, the use of Morse code.
Senator McCain. I see.
Mr. MOONEY. Cutting off my phone line and the call to Mrs. Van
Ranselaar and Morse code was sent. Then there was one other inci­
dent in a phone call with Dovey Huffman. During our conversa­
tion, we could hear background conversation talking about our con­
versation.
Senator McCain. I see. Mr. Mooney, in one of your affidavits,
you say:
"In late January 1986, I traveled to Washington, DC, to testify before the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee, concerning the MIA-POW issue. Prior to my departure to Washington, I received threats not to go. The night prior to my testifying, I received threats to get out of Washington."
More importantly, you go on to say;
"The morning of the day I was testifying, I was confronted by officials of the Justice Department and security officers of the Government. Essentially, I was told I was being bad and from now on, not to discuss my knowledge of this issue with anyone unless I had their permission first."
Mr. MOONEY. That is correct.
Senator McCain. Is that not some Government involvement in a
violation of your rights?
Mr. MOONEY. I never thought of it that way, Senator. I thought
that when I was confronted by the Justice Department in front of
Mr. Waple and a Capitol Hill policeman, that they were exercising
their rights to ensure that I was obeying the security oath that I
had taken. I had never thought of it in the context that you put it. That’s something I hadn’t even considered.

Senator McCain. Well, frankly, Mr. Mooney, if a government official from the Justice Department came to me and told me I should not provide information to a U.S. Senate committee on this vital issue, I would be very——

Mr. Mooney. No, wait a minute, sir.

In that conversation, maybe that’s incomplete. What they had told me is that I could go ahead and testify. Maybe I should have made it—clarified it better in the affidavit, that I could go ahead and testify, but from here on out, that I would have to have their permission first, or notify them first. But at that precise moment, they were not—I’m sorry that that’s misleading, Senator—but they were not trying to block me from testifying before the Veterans’ Affairs Committee.

Senator McCain. Mr. Mooney, even if they told you not to discuss this issue with anyone, to me it would be a violation of your rights and I think you should correct that affidavit. I do not want to kick a dead horse here, but when you say:

“I was confronted by officials of the Justice Department and security officers of the Government. Essentially, I was told I was being bad, and from now on, not to discuss my knowledge of this issue with anyone, unless I had their permission first.”

Let me move on, if I could, back to a question that Senator Reid was asking you.

On page 14 of one of your statements, you say:

“If you wish, we can stop these hearings right now and go forth under its guidelines and resolve this issue.”

Let me read the whole sentence.

“The original 1973 solution to the POW issue is still valid today that has been detailed to others and referred to in my affidavits. If you wish, we can stop these hearings right now, and go forth under its guidelines and resolve the issue.”

Mr. Mooney. That’s pardon and parole, sir.

Senator McCain. Frankly, I wish you would repeat what pardon and parole means to you, and how we could end this, resolve this issue today.

Mr. Mooney. From the communications text that we saw, our pilots that were being captured were continually referred to as bandit pilots and/or war criminals. This is not one-time references, it’s not two-time references. If you get hold of this data, you’ll find it was in the thousands.

Now, you couple that with the fact that the Vietnamese do not regard our presence in that area as lawful, because they know the Gulf of Tonkin incident didn’t occur. They knew our right to be there was in the Gulf of Tonkin resolution by Congress.

Senator McCain. I am with you so far.

Mr. Mooney. Our concern was if they are going to use this as a leverage point at a later date, they would have to have some trail, correct? They just couldn’t come up to you and say, Senator McCain, give me pardon and parole without any evidence. You would be into an argument with them, right?

However, if you check the sighting reports, and this is where the sighting reports do have some value, you will notice that many of them, Nhommapharath, Vung Tu, and others have sightings of Ameri-
cans in mixed camps. At Vung Tu, you will see that there's 22 Americans reported in an inner camp. At Nhommaraath you'll see——

Senator McCain. What does that have to do with pardon and parole?

Mr. Mooney. It shows, sir, that if they are going to pursue this, and if our anticipation that they are going to use pardon and parole, they would have a criminal track record through their own penal system. They would not pull these guys out of a locked cage out in the boondocks. They would have them mixed in where they would have a legal record.

Senator McCain. OK, but does this mean that the Vietnamese would pardon and parole these people?

Mr. Mooney. Absolutely, sir.

Senator McCain. Well, how can we, it says “if you wish we can stop these hearings right now and go forth under its guidelines?”

Mr. Mooney. Discuss it in the same tone we’re discussing it here.

Senator McCain. With the Vietnamese?

Mr. Mooney. With the Vietnamese.

Senator McCain. By saying what?

Mr. Mooney. By saying that we recognize, we may not appreciate, we may not totally agree with, but we recognize that our right to be there was not totally legal, and we understand your anger. Now we can resolve this issue benevolently, if we approach it in this lane, with an idea of pardon and parole.

Now, you’re not going to get them all back, but you may open the door.

Senator McCain. Then the issue would not be resolved then, Mr. Mooney, because you say we can stop these hearings and go forth under these guidelines and resolve the issue. I do not see how we can resolve the issue.

Mr. Mooney. Resolve the issue to the extent that now we would have some live bodies, Senator.

Senator McCain. I see. Thank you.

"On the 27th of September, 1990, at approximately 12:30 p.m., my representative called a major media representative. The proposal was this. They would come to Wolf Point to do an audio interview and then return to New York to check out and investigate what I had to say. This was for their protection. If, after their investigation, they felt they had a story, they would return to Wolf Point for a televised interview.

Halfway through the proposal, my representative was told to cease and desist, told they could not trust me and that they had received Government pressure."

Mr. Mooney. Yes, sir.

Senator McCain. Can you tell me who that media representative was?

Mr. Mooney. Holly Peterson of ABC. I believe it’s ABC. My representative is my daughter; Laurie Peterson, who also is a notary public and was notarizing my affidavits.

Senator McCain. Thank you. In reference to the AC-130, the shoot-down you saw a report of in 1985, do you remember if any other AC-130’s were shot down that year?

Mr. Mooney. Would you repeat that, sir?


Mr. Mooney. On CNN, sir.
Senator McCain. Were there any other AC-130's shot down that year?

Mr. Mooney. I'm sure there was, sir, but the reason this one is so clear in my mind is that after the particular shoot-down, I had no data from North Vietnamese air defense forces. I had occasion to coordinate a message down in B614, I believe it was, and while I was coordinating that message I was shown a decrypted message which referred to this incident and referred to five captured. And I recollect strongly that Thomas Hart's name was mentioned.

I asked the analyst if that data was going to be reported, and he said no. It was processed late. I said, have you informed at least DIA? He says, DIA does not have to know anything, and he threw the data away.

Senator McCain. One of the reasons why you say you accepted an invitation to speak in Michigan was, "I was assured a meeting with a Senate investigator."

Mr. Mooney. Yes, sir.

Senator McCain. "This meeting was absolutely critical to explain a mistake made by me in 1976, and now has placed our present forces in Operation Desert Shield in an unnecessary harm's way." What was that mistake?

Mr. Mooney. When we did the intelligence fix-up, we addressed everything except the reporting style. In other words, we did not address the reporting style wherein the tactical commanders could believe the information. I had grave concerns that if that reporting style had not been changed, that it would reflect in Desert Storm. Apparently, according to General Schwarzkopf, there were some problems with intelligence.

Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Mooney. Finally, I would just like to say that I do not think any American citizen should be subjected to "verbal phone threats, timing threats, shot at, hit by pellets, tacks in my carpets, mail tampering, destruction of property," et cetera, et cetera.

Mr. Chairman, there must be an investigation of this. No American citizen should be subjected to this harassment. I do not think any American should be subjected to that and I strongly urge this committee to demand a full and complete investigation of what Mr. Mooney alleges has been done to him.

I think we would be remiss in our responsibilities as United States Senators to allow such a thing as this to have taken place and not be thoroughly investigated.

So I look forward to working with you and Senator Smith in attempting to investigate what Mr. Mooney alleges, and I have no reason to disbelieve him, has been done to him and his family, including subjecting his 8-year-old grandson to psychiatric stress.

I very strongly urge this committee to begin a full and complete investigation, using whatever resources are necessary to get to the bottom of these problems that Mr. Mooney has been experiencing.

Mr. Mooney. I would appreciate that, Senator.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Mooney.

The Chairman. I think it is appropriate and I think it also will be helpful in helping us to document and make some of the judgments that we need to make here.

Mr. Mooney. The last 6 years have not been fun, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. We will be happy to have that appropriately looked at, and I think it ought to be as part of the investigative effort, and I will rely on my friend, Senator McCain, to convince Senator Dole and others to help us get the resources for it.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, may I just interject a point there? I ask this, I am not suggesting it. But if, in fact, if this investigation were to be, if we were to ask the Justice Department to look into it, and I am not saying we should, do you have a problem with that based on the conversation you had?

Mr. MOONEY. No, sir. I would be perfectly willing to talk to the Justice Department. I have numerous log books around my house detailing these incidents by date.

Senator SMITH. I am not trying to duck the responsibility of the committee here, I am just asking if that were an option.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that precisely what I had in mind is using a detail.

Mr. MOONEY. I have requested an investigation before, Senator, following the threats at the Quality Inn over on Capitol Hill, before my testimony before the Murkowski hearings. I was asked by the Capitol Hill policeman and the Arlington police if I would like to make a complaint. I made a complaint. I'm sure that is on the Arlington police records.

A Capitol Hill policeman said, you want to make another complaint to our forces, or to our department, or whatever it was? I said, yes, I would like to file a complaint, because at that time, I had direct corroboration from the telephone operator at the hotel who heard the last threat over the phone.

I assumed somebody was going to visit me, but nobody ever did, so I never did file a report, but there should be one with the Arlington police department.

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Mooney, let me just assure you. I will do everything I can to see that a complete and thorough investigation is done. Your rights as a citizen, at least in your view, are being totally violated. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Grassley?

Senator GRASSLEY. I have one question, but before I ask that question, I want to thank you for, in your words, being the first to throw a rock.

Mr. Mooney, you mention that there are other people out there in the intelligence community who will not come forward as you have, because they do not think they can win and that word win is your word.

Mr. MOONEY. Yes, sir.

Senator GRASSLEY. Is it true, to your knowledge, that some do not come forward because they have signed an oath of secrecy under penalty of law, and if this is the case, what would it take for them to come forward in your opinion?

Mr. MOONEY. Yes, sir. A lot of them that I have talked to have expressed that opinion.

Senator GRASSLEY. Because they have signed an oath?

Mr. MOONEY. Yes, sir. They're going to have to find somebody like I found. I found a Roman Catholic priest called Father Jim
Reynolds. I went to him and said, I've got big problems, Father. I signed these oaths. How can I even speak up on this?

He sat me down and he said, well, tell me what oaths you signed. I said, well, I had a copy of an old re-indoctrination oath, which I have provided to the committee, which sounds like a Gestapo oath, to be honest with you. He said, what is the highest law in this land made by man, and I said the U.S. Constitution.

He said, did you take an oath to the U.S. Constitution? I said, yes, sir, every time I re-enlisted. He said, is your oath to the U.S. Constitution higher than your security oath? I said, well, yes, sir. It's the highest law, yes, Father. He said, well then, obey it. And that's what put me over the top, sir.

Senator Grassley. Well, OK, but are you suggesting that any of these other people in the intelligence community who you are saying are willing to come out will have to go talk to a minister or a priest?

Mr. Mooney. No, sir. You can persuade them to come out. I am convinced that you can persuade them to come out.

Senator Grassley. How? How?

Mr. Mooney. If this committee, and my statement I hope at the beginning will help, because if I'm here and I trust you folks and I think you're going to get your job done, and I know that you're going to leave no stone unturned, if I say that publicly, it should bring them closer to the edge.

What you can do is, if you treat this issue with professionalism, of course, with scrutiny of course, and with doubt, define the truth, of course, but always with dignity and respect, I think they'll come forward. If they know you're for real, if they know you're for real not because I say it, but if they start feeling it, I think they'll come forward, and that's going to require some PR on your part.

The Chairman. Well, I think Senator McCain's suggestion regarding an investigation is a clear indication that we are not going to stand here and let anything, as we said, go without scrutiny.

Senator Grassley. I am sorry. I think beyond, Mr. Chairman—what you said is appropriate, I think maybe what he is suggesting even beyond your seeing that people's rights are protected, is that it would take some enticing on the part of this committee to bring these people out. I think maybe since this issue has been enunciated by Congress through the appointment of this committee, by the various Presidents saying that getting to the bottom of this is our highest national priority, plus the security and safety that this committee can give through our constitutional responsibility of oversight, it seems to me like maybe enticing on your part, or this committee's part, that these folks coming forth, that saying this responsibility supersedes that oath. It might entice them to come out.

The Chairman. The law, as a congressional committee duly constituted as we are—we believe our interpretation—we have had Senate counsel look at this—is that there is no restraint on any of those individuals answering questions of this committee. If the committee deems that there is a security issue, it can ask those questions in private session and treat it as a normal classified matter. They are not permitted to deny information to this committee on the basis of that oath, and so we will, in fact, be contact-
Among the interrogatories and requests for documents that we have submitted to various agencies are names of all individuals who had contact with this issue, including those people whom Mr. Mooney worked with. We intend to put them under oath and depose them, and we will subpoena them if necessary. So in terms of enticement, they are invited today to come forward with an understanding that if they do not come forward on their own, the greater likelihood is that the committee is going to find an opportunity for them to have to appear.

Senator Grassley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Mooney, let me just try to again—for the record, I want to be absolutely clear.
Mr. Mooney. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. You were keeping these lists.
Mr. Mooney. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Were other people keeping these lists too?
Mr. Mooney. On different areas, yes, sir. Like, down in Laos, what's called the general directorate of rear services analysis.
The Chairman. Did you know any names of people who were in that chain of command that you can recall that would have had access to these lists and seen them?
Mr. Mooney. I don't recall any names, but I described in the deposition one of the key people. He has a physical characteristic that you can't miss, and they should be able to locate him.
The Chairman. What about in your shop?
Mr. Mooney. Yes. I have provided your staff with names.
The Chairman. So all of the names of the people from your shop that you know saw this?
Mr. Mooney. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Do other people have copies of this list?
Mr. Mooney. I think that my branch chief had a copy of what we call the Kissinger list. I think the deputy branch chief had a copy of that too.
The Chairman. What happened to this list at the time of Operation Homecoming?
Mr. Mooney. We were waiting for a request to forward the data forward.
The Chairman. Did that request ever come?
Mr. Mooney. Not to my desk sir. It could have come to the agency and they ignored our section.
The Chairman. Was there any reason you did not volunteer it then and say hey, wait a minute, you know, I have a list of people here and you folks are not—
Mr. Mooney. I discussed that with the branch chief. Your committee has his name, that this period of 1965 to 1970 that I talked about, where information was suppressed or misused, or ignored, that these were unique names, and I also made a phone call to the counterpart analyst at DIA, that I did have unique names and passed at least the Francisco and Morrison names to DIA.
The Chairman. What did you do in 1973, when you saw Operation Homecoming? At that time you knew that there was a discrepancy between those coming home and those who most readily, in your memory, were on the list.
Mr. Mooney. Yes, sir. I was not really concerned, because we still had the highest requirements on the book, and we did not expect many of these people to come home.

The Chairman. So in other words, in 1973, when some came home but others did not, you, in your mind and in the minds of your colleagues, that was expected. It was what you understood, what happened. You were going to get some back, but there would still be a bargaining and there still would be an effort to bring home the remainder?

Mr. Mooney. That was our understanding. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. And, in fact, the standing orders remained?

Mr. Mooney. Absolutely, sir.

The Chairman. A scrutiny that gave credence to that theory. Is that correct? In other words, you were still collecting information on POW/MIA’s?

Mr. Mooney. I last saw that standing order, which is described as the highest national priority, in late 1976, or early 1977. It did not disappear, sir.

The Chairman. When did that standing order first get promulgated?

Mr. Mooney. To the best of my knowledge, it would have been in probably the mid-1960’s, probably 1965-66.

The Chairman. Once Homecoming I took place, was there some reiteration of the order to continue to collect information, or was this just something that happened naturally, because everybody knew there were still some unaccounted for?

Mr. Mooney. It was not changed, sir. The tasking was not changed. No, sir. It just stayed. There was no attention given to it.

The Chairman. Did it stay because there was no need to change it, since people legitimately believed everybody had come home, and so it was just an order that stayed on the books because there was no need to change it?

Mr. Mooney. I can tell you how I felt. I don’t know the reason that it was not moved, or was allowed to stay, because that would be a higher level than mine. But I felt it was just business as usual after Homecoming I.

The Chairman. Was there any discussion about it, were there ever any meetings of the staff?

Mr. Mooney. Not that I recall. It was just business as usual.

Senator Smith. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, I apologize. What about contact with the various commissions, the Woodcock Commission, the Montgomery Commission? I know they were a little bit beyond when you left, but to your knowledge, was there any contact made by those commissions, between the intelligence people on the ground?

Mr. Mooney. Not that I know of, sir. The one thing that I can say that I have some guilt over, looking back on it at this time, was that we should have known better, and maybe if we would have pushed a little harder when we had the power and authority, we might have been able to do something. But in 1973, we should have at least insisted on getting that original list of 15 or 16 names up in print, which we had flagged kiddingly as the Kissinger list. We should have pushed that.
Senator Smith. I have one more final question. I just want to be certain that you feel that you have had the opportunity to provide to the committee, either through the deposition process which you spoke of, or now, the open hearing, do you feel that you have provided all of the information to the committee that you have?

Mr. Mooney. Yes, sir.

Senator Smith. I know you have expressed some concerns and difficulties. We want to make certain, short of your willingness to come forward again, but other than that, you feel that you have provided us names and all the things that you feel we need to proceed from here.

Mr. Mooney. The people who took my deposition wanted the briefing strip because of the names that are listed in there. I authorized its return from Nigel Cawthorne. It is here. It is addressed to the U.S. Congress, it is yours. It is not mine. You can do with it, you can investigate it, you can list the names on it, you can examine it, you can do whatever and I'll be glad to respond to any questions you may have about the list. I intend to fully cooperate with the committee.

The Chairman. Mr. Mooney, is it possible that with respect to some of these people on your list interpreted as being captured, that they could have been interpreted differently by another analyst and that there is just a fair difference of analytical view here by one analyst versus another, based on intelligence information?

Mr. Mooney. I'm sure that if you went through all the data, you could find certain cases where if another analyst came to me with more provocative, or more substantial information, that I would change my mind, yes.

The Chairman. As to some?

Mr. Mooney. As to some. But it would be a very small minority, because on these lists it was very difficult to get on these lists, for one reason. These were not for product reporting purposes, because they'd already been reported via SONGBIRD reports.

My boss at that time was a Mr. M.C., and from the records you'll be able to translate that, when he wanted us to get something together and keep track of this data, he told me to my face, probably in 19-early 1971, or late 1970, that if you're going to put it on a list, we want to be able to sign it, and we want to be able for the policymakers to be able to do something with it.

So keep it tight. So, in other words, if I hadn't kept it tight, per his instruction, my list could probably have been another 60 to 70 names. Do you see what I mean? My boss told me, keep it tight.

The Chairman. So, in other words, the names that you put on the list were, in your view, clearly determined to be one of two, alive, captured, or one captured or both or whatever.

Mr. Mooney. We erred on the short side, yes, sir.

The Chairman. And that information was gleaned—give us a sense of how you got that directly from North Vietnamese units reporting that you intercepted.

Mr. Mooney. Yes, sir. The system intercepted.

The Chairman. The system intercepted. Did you hear any of those conversations yourself?
Mr. MOONEY. In 1974, I used to go out and sit in the van and listen, yes. But I didn’t do any of the transcribing. That’s a different career field.

The CHAIRMAN. So you took it off the transcribed reports that came to you?

Mr. MOONEY. Not quite correct, Senator. Once it’s transcribed, it’s on 6-ply paper and then that paper is taken and it’s punched into machine format and then it’s sent on to the agency. Then it’s automatically processed. If the crypt system is known, it’s automatically decrypted.

The CHAIRMAN. But the point I make is that when you put a name on your list with respect to someone who was alive and captured, it came directly from audio interception, from voice conversation of North Vietnamese units. Is that accurate?

Mr. MOONEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the confirmation process for that?

Mr. MOONEY. Well, we would read out the information. It would be assigned a validity. For example, in the Francisco-Morrison case, it was Category A because they had passed the names.

The CHAIRMAN. Would more than one person be required?

Mr. MOONEY. Yes, the database people. In other words, if I had a shoot-down, the text would say, shot down on the spot, so and so, so and so, and we’d have call signs or we’d have frequency, we’d even have the crypt system. I would turn over to the tech sergeant who was a database specialist. He would identify the link. He would give me the users of the crypt system, you know, so I could isolate it to the area.

Then all of this sort of came together and if I needed any more information about the personality, was it a political officer or a tactical officer, a logistics officer—

The CHAIRMAN. You would make a judgment based on that.

Mr. MOONEY. I could ask the database specialist to provide me that information.

The CHAIRMAN. Again, just to repeat clearly, from that process of accrual, you believe there were approximately 140 individuals that you believe were alive, who were not returned or otherwise accounted for.

Mr. MOONEY. That’s what I’ve been able to recover and put in the strip. The original number was up in the 290 area, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. I remember that, but that is the number that you are asserting, which could be larger depending on the process of correlation that we now go through. Is that accurate?

Mr. MOONEY. Sir, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What records are not available?

Mr. MOONEY. Yes, sir. Don’t be afraid to challenge any of these records because, like I say, I worked in the tactical area. Now what I saw, we could have seen somebody captured at the tactical level and passed to, let’s say, the division. Other sections may have the higher level stuff from division to air defense headquarters.

There could be a reference that they could have tried to escape in that material and been shot, they could have died en route and I wouldn’t have had access to that material. But I told your investi-
gators in my deposition, if that data exists, exactly where it would be and what it would look like and what the technical details are.

The CHAIRMAN. With respect to any of these people who have telephoned you and suggested to you that they wish they could come forward and so forth, but they do not think it will be a winner, do you know any of those people?

Mr. MOONEY. The ones that I know, I've given the names to your—

The CHAIRMAN. You have identified some of them.

Mr. MOONEY. I feel most of them will identify themselves and say, hey, do you remember the telephone number on your desk was 7620? Oh, OK. Do you remember that you worked in 7A119? Oh, OK. So they have used different methods and means and I'm sure some of them are snowflake, if you know what I mean, they are lying. But a lot of them seem legitimate, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, with respect to this theory of yours, what you call parole and pardon, or pardon and parole, it is possible to imagine that for a period of time, if indeed somebody were alive, that might have been a view of the Vietnamese of a way in which to get over the hurdle of how you return them.

I suppose if the United States is not dealing with you for that period of 1975 to 1979, it is very hard to have any conversation about it or begin to get over that hurdle. So then you get to the early 1980's or 1980 to 1981 and you have a different kind of problem.

The POW-MIA issue is raised to a high level of visibility in America and there is a different relationship in terms of the Communist world and certainly dealing with Vietnam than at the end of the Carter Administration.

Suddenly "pardon and parole" becomes less feasible, I would imagine. As you go through the 1980's, bringing us now to 1992, I suppose the critical question is, how do you get over any of those hurdles today. What if you were to believe somebody had been held under those circumstances then and it is yet for the evidence to determine that in any finality—the question is why would Vietnam hold them today? What possible belief could they have at this point in time that "parole and pardon" could work?

I ask you to address that in terms of the present.

Mr. MOONEY. Why wouldn't it work? If it has a legitimate base, if, in fact, as they said over and over again that they were capturing war criminals and if those sighting reports are valid with the inner, outer or mixed-prison systems that we've seen quite a few of, it would still apply today.

What would stop the Vietnamese from today walking up to the Swiss Embassy with five Caucasians and saying, here is his trial record, here is where he's been jailed and the benevolent SRV is pardoning and paroling these individuals?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think the fear would be, quite clearly, the reality is that in the current circumstances, if that were to happen cold as you have suggested, there would be an outrage expressed in the United States and that therefore they would view the possibilities of normalization and the possibilities of a friendly relationship going down the tubes.
Mr. Mooney. I'm not so sure, Senator. Because if I understand it and it opened the door to bring these people back, there must be other people who might be understanding and willing to accept it, don't you think?

The Chairman. I do not think we need to get overly philosophical at this late part of the hearing.

Mr. Mooney. Sorry, sir.

The Chairman. I think it is a fair question and I am not trying to belittle it in any sense, I just mean I think we could go on and on spinning out hypotheses here. My sense is that it really depends on a larger dialogue between ourselves and the Vietnamese.

Mr. Mooney. That's why the various lists were kept, sir. That's why, if you wanted to approach a Vietnamese, you could walk up to them and say, where is this POW? We know that in your disposition of forces, this battalion, this regiment, this company, this squad, this division has detailed records. In addition, we know that your 291st radar regiment tracked them.

I mean, this is why we kept this who-to-ask list. If it was going to be kept at the high policy negotiation level, our negotiators would have the best detail possible so that when dealing with the Vietnamese, the Vietnamese would know they're for real.

The Chairman. Let me ask you a question, yet another, and I apologize to my colleagues. If, and I am not advocating this—obviously the position of every Senator here has been that we need to understand the accounting process before you normalize—but if there were suddenly an open relationship and all of a sudden people were pouring into Vietnam and people were talking and so forth, I would presume that within short order people being as they move around the country, are going to hear from other people in Vietnam, hey, you know, there were people being held here for 15 years or there were people being held here.

But that the longer we wait, the longer before that begins to flow. If the country is suddenly accessible and people are moving all over it, you have a better chance of finding out whether somebody's still being held than not.

Mr. Mooney. I have a problem with that, Senator.

The Chairman. Then tell me about that.

Mr. Mooney. Why should we let tourists or business people resolve a problem that the government created?

The Chairman. Well, how will the Government resolve it if you get caught in this vicious circle? Just help me understand it. I just want to hear your conversation on it. How do you get out of the vicious cycle of their looking at us and saying, we want to normalize. If we admit somebody is here, you will not do that.

We are sitting there sort of caught unwillingly in this lack of communication, so you go around the cycle and, meanwhile, the years go by. If somebody were in fact there, they become the double victims in a way, of the inability of anybody to get over that hurdle.

Mr. Mooney. Well, Senator, you're taking me into an area where I'm not an expert, OK? But I can make an observation if you don't mind. Most of the negotiations on this issue have been by policy makers. They go there with a specific opinion and they're not going to breach from that.
For the first time, you're going to have Senators going there. You guys know how to wheel and deal. You know how to compromise. Maybe this is the proper approach.

The CHAIRMAN. We never compromise, we just wheel and deal.

Mr. MOONEY. Mr. Chairman, I know better than that. Maybe if you would go there with this attitude of specific knowledge, and talk to these people and show them respect and gain respect from them, it might open doors.

See, a lot of people have made a serious mistake. They think that the Vietnamese are nothing more than a bunch of brown-skinned munchkins running around in black and brown pajamas. You hear this argument, well, they're not very smart. They don't have a war college and they don't have an academy.

No, their war college was Dien Bien Phu and their academy was 10,000 days of war. They came up the hard way. So they're not dumb. If you treat them with respect and I think, and you have good knowledge, which you should have with this investigation that's going on, maybe that necessary rapport will come and you can talk about it honestly as politicians and policy makers.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith? Senator McCain?

Let me make two comments. First of all, thank you for coming. Particularly given the problems that you have cited, we are appreciative of your doing this.

On behalf of the committee, I would like to ask you that if there is any kind of subsequent intimidation or threat or incident, I hope you will immediately contact the committee and let us know right away about that.

Mr. MOONEY. Yes, sir, I will.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. And we look forward to the cooperation which you have promised, Mr. Mooney. There is a lot of work obviously to be done and we appreciate very much your being here.

The committee will recess until the hour of 3:15 p.m., when we will hear Mr. Minarcin.

[Whereupon, at 2:10 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 3:15 p.m. the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. Minarcin, I would like to ask you to rise.

Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MINARCIN. I do.

STATEMENT OF TERRELL ALAN MINARCIN

The CHAIRMAN. Would you state your full name for the record, please?

Mr. MINARCIN. Terrell Alan Minarcin.

The CHAIRMAN. Where are you currently employed, Mr. Minarcin?
Mr. Minarcin. I'm currently employed with the Baron 52 project, which is a nonprofit organization in the State of Washington providing services to veterans.

The Chairman. Do you have an opening statement you wish to make for the committee?

Mr. Minarcin. Yes, sir. Good afternoon, Senators. I'm Terrell Alan Minarcin. I was an asset of the National Security Agency/Central Security Services from September 14, 1967 until July 9, 1984. During this time, I saw, not as a result of directed search, but as a matter of routine, material that stated emphatically Americans were held by both the Vietnamese and Soviet military forces in Southeast Asia and that some of these Americans were sent to the Soviet Union. I offer the following affidavit, not as proof, but as a gist of what was available to the intelligence community as a whole, during my tenure in the community. I ask that the rest of this statement be placed into the record.

The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Minarcin follows:]
Good morning, Senators.

I am Terrell Alan Minarcin.

I was an asset of the National Security Agency/Central Security Services from September 14, 1967 until July 9, 1984. During this time, I saw, not as a result of directed search, but as a matter of routine, material that stated emphatically Americans were held by both the Vietnamese and Soviet military forces in Southeast Asia and that some of these Americans were sent to the Soviet Union. I offer the following affidavit, not as proof, but as a gist of what was available to the intelligence community as a whole, during my tenure in the community.
To Whom It May Concern; December 9, 1991

The following statement is offered of my own free will. It is, to the best of my recollection, a true accounting of some of the knowledge I possess concerning the Prisoner of War issue. While I might have further knowledge of this issue, I feel that the following gives the best representation of what I know.

I give this statement without reservation. I tender it to proper authorities under penalty of law, in particular, RCW 98.72, Perjury and Interference to Official Inquiries. I do so knowing the penalties of this statute and also Title 18 USC Section 798, Section 799 notwithstanding.

TERRELL A. MINARCIN

STATE OF WASHINGTON )
COUNTY OF PIERCE ) SS

I, Donald H. Thompson, a Superior Court Judge of the State of Washington in and for Pierce County, do hereby certify that, on this day, Terrell A. Minarcin personally appeared before me, and acknowledged the due execution of the foregoing instrument. DATED this 9th day of December, 1991. Donald H. Thompson
I am Terrell A. "Terry" Minarick. I spent from September 14, 1967, until July 9, 1984, as an asset of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service. During this time, I performed duties as a Vietnamese linguist, serving as a cryptolinguist, a ground based voice intercept operator and processing specialist, a technical reporter, an analyst, an intelligence reporter, an airborne voice intercept operator and an airborne instructor. At various times during the above dates, I provided direct SIGINT support to "special operations," which, at times, included rescue attempts. Some of my peripheral duties included flight training NCO, Shift Supervisor/Flight Commander, unit historian, primary member of the Emergency Response Team (Team #5) (Southeast Asia Desk) of NSOC, NCOIC of operational Plans and Programs, and NCOIC of OC3CM/DC3CM at the 6990 ESG.

During the times I served in the above categories, I was privy to various forms of information regarding American POWs. This information covered the gamut from those held in the Hanoi area, those held in "special" camp areas, those held in what became known as the "New Economic Areas," those sent to the Soviet Union, and those captured after the cease fire in 1973. Through analysis, I also saw references to the fate of others. Because I was charged with providing SIGINT support to special operations, I was also privy to some rescue attempts after the cease fire.

I, along with many others, constantly ask myself why I am stepping forward to discuss my knowledge of this controversial matter. I am not a glory hound. I do not do this for monetary gain. I do this, not out of some perverse joy of blabbing secrets, but rather to appease my conscience. I do this because I know, without a single shred of doubt, that American POWs were left behind in Southeast Asia, after America disengaged from either the war itself or from supporting South Vietnam. I do this, not to exonerate myself or my colleagues, not to place blame on some, but to correct a terrible wrong perpetrated by all against the most helpless - the POWs themselves.
By stepping forward, I have lost the friendship and respect of many individuals I had the honor and privilege to work with. I gave my word never to discuss what I did while I worked as an asset of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service. I also was charged with making every attempt humanly possible with ensuring no American was ever abandoned to the wiles of any hostile government. That was the crux of the problem I faced. Maintain my pledge to remain silent, but by maintaining my silence, I would condemn my fellow service members to death. Instead, I chose to break my word.

While what I say, taken in conjunction with the allegations and attestations of others, can point to a conspiracy (and, perhaps, rightly so), I feel that this forum should not, at this time, lay the blame with any individual or agency for this mass abandonment. Rather, we should all work together, at this time, to bring about the release of all POWs, regardless of nationality. If, indeed, there is or was a conspiracy to abandon the allied POWs, then I am part of that conspiracy.
Almost from the very beginning of my time exploiting Vietnamese military communications, I noticed that American POWs were separated into, at least, three categories. These categories were: political/economic exploitation; military exploitation; and general knowledge exploitation. It is extremely difficult to explain the determination utilized by which the POWs were separated into these categories.

The Vietnamese were not stupid. They knew, as with any war, that sooner or later, there would be POW exchanges. One always tries to exchange the lesser number of POWs for the greater. Failing that, one always tries to exchange POWs for concessions, particularly at the end of the conflict. Some of the concessions one would hope to obtain would be political recognition, economic aid for reconstruction, or something similar. The majority of POWs taken by the North Vietnamese during the Vietnam War fell into this category. The second category of POWs were those held back for military exploitation. While this usually is considered as immediately exploiting a POW for military knowledge for immediate exploitation, it is also indicative of learning all that can be learned of particular weapon systems, communications systems and/or procedures, infiltration/exfiltration methodologies, employment of peripheral assets, etc. This becomes especially important if the two belligerents remain hostile after cessation of the war.

The third type of exploitation of POWs is that of peripheral knowledge. A good example of this would be a pilot who is trained as an electrical engineer with expertise in advanced research in a government sponsored project which would not necessarily be military related. An example of this will be presented later. See Appendix A for maps showing the approximate locations of these camps associated with these POW categories.

Beginning in December of 1967, I was assigned to provide SIGINT support to Special Operations (SPECOPS). At first, this was done through cryptanalysis. Later in my career, I provided this support through the total aspects of my job. Normally, this entailed going through all available traffic searching for possible mission compromise, mission failures and degree of mission successes. Normally, an analyst was tasked with providing support for one to five (rarely six) different operations. Others in the office would be tasked
to support additional SPECCOPS. One of the SPECCOPS I became involved with in January of 1968 was LIMA SITE 85. LIMA SITE 85 was bombed by the North Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) on January 17, 1968. This was the prelude to both Tet of 1968 and to the ground attack on the site which resulted in the capture of LIMA SITE 85 and several of its personnel. See Appendix B.

While plaintext messages contained the bulk of named Americans captured alive, encoded texts normally carried information relating to locations of POW camps, logistical support of those camps, and, through analysis and correlation with collateral sources, unusual events at the camps. (PLEASE NOTE: All of the code/crypt systems and/or radio networks cited herein have been superseded. Some of the systems were exploited on a real time basis while others were exploited at a later date, some up to five years after the fact.)

One crypt system that I successfully exploited during the summer and autumn of 1968 was utilized by North Vietnam's State Security Forces. Some of the information gleaned from this system dealt with the location of offices, camps, providing security for BAN (the Vietnamese euphemism for the Soviets), duties, etc. Among some of the information recovered from this system was the location of interrogation centers run by the Vietnamese (other than Hanoi), Soviet run interrogation centers, and "special" camps. About eighteen months after this crypt system was "broken," I began analytical work on a radio network serving the Nghe An Province. The information contained in this network was similar in nature to the crypt system. The locations passed in this network, while only serving the Nghe An Province, coincided with information previously learned through the crypt system. Another code, first used in 1963 and seen by me in the fall of 1968 was identified as serving the North Vietnamese Military Training Command. This system also had references to "special" POW camps, particularly in northwestern Vietnam, to interrogation centers run by either or both the Soviets and the Vietnamese, and to unusual incidents at POW centers. See Appendix C.

Rarely did I work on systems, prior to the cease fire on 1973.
that were found to serve any units located entirely in South Vietnam. Over 90% of the systems that I worked on served Vietnamese units serving in Laos and North Vietnam. One of the systems that I worked with that did deal with South Vietnam dealt primarily with logistical support for the North Vietnamese support to the war effort in the South. This dealt primarily with the "Ho Chi Minh Trail," the North Vietnamese system of Communal Liaison Stations known as Binh Tram.

Occasionally, I saw references to American POWs being transported back to North Vietnam. Other systems were utilized by North Vietnamese Air Defense units charged with protecting the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Some of these units played pivotal roles in both the Brown (see Appendix D) and the BARON 52 (see Appendix E) cases.

There were many instances prior to the cease fire of references to American POWs. After the cease fire, though, the references that I saw dealt mainly with the areas where American POWs were held. Although I read many collateral reports and could correlate inferences contained in raw traffic to those reports, I saw less than ten incidents, where I had most or complete knowledge of the incident, in SIGINT that mentioned or directly dealt with American POWs. These were the BARON 52 incident (Appendix E), the capture of an American advisory team in March of 1975 (Appendix F), the transshipment of American POWs to the USSR (Appendix G), the flight itinerary of March 3, 1978 (Appendix H), mycotoxins usage in central Laos (Appendix I), the transshipment of American POWs from Saigon to the North (Appendix J), new economic areas (Appendix K), the transshipment of former ARVN and American POWs to the USSR (Appendix L), and the grumblings of guards and the logistical reports for known "special" camps (Appendix M). While I am sure there are many other instances of indicators of American POWs in SIGINT, these are the only instances where I have first hand knowledge, a working knowledge, if you will.

During the war, I saw several instances of rescue attempts, some successful, some not (see Appendix B). After the cease fire, I was tasked to provide SIGINT support to several rescue attempts. The only two that I knew the overall plan and the results occurred in 1978 (Appendix N) and in 1981 (Appendix O).
The last incident I was involved with is the location contained in the "message" found in the photograph purporting to show Colonels Lundy and Robertson and Commander Stevens. While the location could be viewed as highly speculative, when taken in concert with the six eyewitnesses reports (as already presented by the Robertson family), the location is probably valid. See Appendix P.

This, Senators, is my statement. Not much, I'm afraid. As I work with other individuals who also have knowledge of American POWs left behind, I remember more and more. The majority of what I am beginning to remember is a piece here or a bit there that I can not, at this time, recount the entire story or even pin down to a specific incident or area or individual. The rest of what I can remember now that can be related in full is presented here. Thank you for your time and consideration of what I have had to say. I hope and pray that this statement can be of some use in bringing home my comrades.
Appendix A

The following maps show the locations of the five "special" camps, some of the new economic areas, some of the general holding areas for POWs other than the "special" POWs, and some of the Soviet interrogation centers.

The names I have assigned to the "special" camp areas (from south to north and then west) are: the Quan Lang Corridor; the Muong Sen Corridor; the Bai Thuong Corridor (more a triangle); the Black River Valley (which includes Ba Vi); and the Dien Bien Phu Valley (actually the valley just to the west of the real Dien Bien Phu Valley).

The Sam Neua Corridor is also shown. At one time, this was a viable "special" camp in addition to being a Soviet interrogation center. American POWs were handed over to the Soviets here, both prior to and after the cease fire. After 1975, some American POWs who were turned over to the Soviets in this area met an ominous fate. See Appendix I for further details.

The new economic areas were formed after 1975. Individuals sent to these areas included prostitutes, street urchins, former South Vietnamese Government officials who had been re-educated and were then considered trust worthy but not completely rehabilitated into the new Communist way of life, and nguy and tu binh who had also been re-educated and who were not considered recalcitrants. The term nguy referred primarily to ARVN but also to other Asian POWs such as Thai, ROKs, Chinese (both CHINATs and CHICOMs), Filipinos, etc. The term tu binh referred primarily to American POWs but could also refer to French, English, West Germans, Luxemburgians, Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, etc.

While the interrogation centers were manned primarily by Soviets, the presence of Chinese (CHICOMs) can not be discounted out of hand. Personally, I do not believe that there were Chinese present at these centers after 1967.
One additional item about the "special" camps. The Quan Lang, Muong Sen, and Bai Thuong camps contained only American POWs. The other two contained a mixture of Americans and other occidentals. This was learned from various cryptsystems serving all five areas. The POWs contained in the three southern camps were always referred to as tu binh my which means exactly American Prisoners of War. The other two camps had just tu binh. Tu binh only means Prisoners of War. Sometimes, but not always, if an American POW came out of those two camps, he would be referenced as a tu binh my.

This same distinction would not normally be seen when the term nguy was used. Rarely was the country given after the Asian POWs were incarcerated. Occasionally upon capture would we see the term nguy Thai-lan, etc.
Appendix B

One of the primary taskings for any unit involving SIGINT operations is to provide SIGINT support for other Special Operations (SPECOPS). This ran from rescue attempts to "raider" activity to special projects (such as LIMA SITE 85) to special research and development in various fields such as weapons, weapon systems to guidance devices to locator devices, etc. While other appendices deal with specific cases that could rightfully fall into this appendix, I will deal with two specific cases which illustrate SPECOPS.

The first SPECOPS is LIMA SITE 85. As you are well aware, LIMA SITE 85 was essentially a strategic bombing radar guidance system. I was never given a specific briefing of the site. However, from what I have ascertained over the years, LIMA SITE 85 was actually a series of camps. At the pinnacle of the karst was the radar site. Lower down were several support camps and an abbreviated airfield. At the radar site was a helipad. Again, I must stress that I was never formally given a briefing on the site.

On January 17, 1968, LIMA SITE 85 was bombed by three AN-2/COLT aircraft. The munitions dropped were actually 50MM mortar shells. According to the initial reports that I remember, only the upper camps were struck. The airfield was not hit but the helipad was. There casualties among the indigenous personnel. The radar site was not hit. (Please note: I DO NOT REMEMBER THE EXACT DATES FOR THE FOLLOWING. I was engaged with providing SIGINT support in the counteroffensive during Tet of 1968 and with providing SIGINT support for other operations during this critical time. I do remember that the actual ground battle which culminated in the fall of LIMA SITE 85 took place over several weeks.) I believe that the actual battle began around the 10th of March of 1968 and ended some six weeks later with the capture of the radar site. The infighting between the Air Force and the CIA has been well documented in various reports dealing with the site. The initial Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) report re the AN-2 raid listed all site personnel be category.
I am pretty sure that there were about 200 indigenous personnel with their families, about 100 Special Forces personnel and Air America personnel and about 18-24 Air Force personnel (including radar and communications specialists). One of the other cryptanalysts in the office was responsible for providing SIGINT support to LIMA SITE 85. As I was the only Vietnamese linguist assigned to this office, I was allowed to read the ongoing operational reports dealing with the progress of the battle for LIMA SITE 85. The Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao had committed 19 battalions to the fray.

Where the decision was made to keep LIMA SITE 85 operational during the ground attacks is beyond my knowledge. However, it was deemed that, although there was plenty of time to evacuate the site, it was to remain open to facilitate increased bombing of the North during Tet. I must stress at this time there was ample time to evacuate the site had the attack come at any other time. I draw your attention to some of the documents and depositions held by Mrs. Ann Holland, the wife of an Air Force communications specialist who was stationed there. Of particular note are two documents – one in her possession and the other referenced. The first is that of an Air Force Forward Air Controller (FAC). The FAC tells his story to fit the official version of the fall of the site; that it took some 12 hours. Yet his actions are indicative of a prolonged stay at his location, some several weeks rather than mere hours. The other report that is referenced contains the entire after action report including who was captured. The majority of those captured were the indigenous personnel. About 20 Special Forces and Air America personnel and about 12 to 15 Air Force personnel were also captured. The after action report that is cited in Mrs. Holland’s papers is of paramount importance to the determination of what happened at LIMA SITE 85.

The second example of SPECOPS that deals with a rescue attempt gone awry was seen by me around November of 1970 in raw traffic in the Nghe An Province radio network associated with the State Security Police. Located in remote areas throughout the North were SAFE HAVEN sites. One was located in western Nghe An Province.
It was isolated by a contingent of State Security Police forces which were augmented by Provincial Militia. After several attempts to overrun the site, more militia were brought in. Inclement weather hampered military operations against the site. According to the Vietnamese after action report, the site was isolated and then attacked several times, but the attacks were beaten off. It was felt that there were two Americans and 12 nguy at the site. While the Vietnamese were awaiting reinforcements, the site was supposedly also reinforced by some 16 Americans. After several further attempts were made to overrun the site, the on-site Vietnamese commander reported that the site had received air support to beat off the last two attacks. The Vietnamese reported that the site was resupplied by air drop at that time. About 24 hours after the air drop, the Vietnamese attacked again. This time, they met no opposition and entered the site. There, they found the bodies of 18 Americans and 12 nguy. According to the Vietnamese, all enemy personnel had been poisoned, supposedly by their rations which had just been air dropped to them. Several of the Americans were identified as escaped tu binh from the Muong Sen area.

Some of the SPECOPS I supported had specific missions that ended in disaster but we could not find the results in Vietnamese communiques.
Two of the cryptsystems I dealt with had references to "special" camps where American POWs were held.

The first system I isolated and "broke" was used by the State Security Police located in Ha Tinh, Nghe An, and Thanh Hoa Provinces. There were two areas of "special" camps under the command of the State Security Police in this area. One was located north and northwest of Quan Lang. The other was located in the Bai Thuong area. Several other camps where the State Security Police were stationed, but not in command, were in the area of Vinh, Muong Sen, Thai Binh, and Thanh Hoa. While State Security Police were located at these camps, the camps were under the command of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). One of these camps, located to the west of Vinh on the edge of a swamp, reported on the crash and subsequent efforts to reach the site of an FB-111 crash in the spring of 1968.

The camp was about 12 to 15 kilometers east of the crash site. The State Security Police contingent was directed to head up the recovery operations as this was a high interest incident - the downing of an FB-111 aircraft. No NVA forces were involved in this operation, only Provincial Militia and State Security Police forces. The militia had initially secured the area of the crash, but only the State Security Police were allowed to inspect the wreckage. During the course of the operation, a plaintext message was sent over this radio network giving an update and progress report. It was reported that the State Security Police forces were returning with all recoverable items, including the identity cards of the aircrew. Given the scope of the operation and that there was no mention of capturing the aircrew, it was felt by myself and others that the aircrew either died in the crash or were shot while attempting to evade hostile forces.

This was the only time this system referenced an operation designed to capture American personnel. Most of the time, the messages dealt
with transporting tu binh to interrogation centers in Vinh, Thai Binh, Thanh Hoa, and, in a few cases, Ninh Binh. Other messages dealt with escorting Ban to camp sites, crash sites, areas of SPECOPS, and through the infiltration/exfiltration routes. Just before this system was superseded, several messages were intercepted which dealt with escorting the Ban to the Muong Sen area. As none of the Ban were noted returning to Vinh or other Soviet interrogation centers, it was felt that Muong Sen was being upgraded from being a general POW camp to that of a "special" camp holding captured SPECOPS personnel.

The second system was determined to be primarily used by the NVA's Military Training Command. While the vast majority of messages detailed training, there were a significant number of messages detailing NVA units being sent to the Ba Vi area to augment existing camp guards. Other locations where NVA forces were sent to guard tu binh were in the northeastern area of North Vietnam, particularly along the Sino-Viet border. Other messages were seen where the Ban, which were identified as military specialists and technicians, were requesting tu binh to be exploited. These requests were sent from Ninh Binh to various such as Vinh, Bai Thuong, Son Tay and the Black River Valley areas. While it can not be correlated to any interrogation center, several messages dealt with escorting Ban to the Thai Nguyen-Vinh Phu area. This probably was a legitimate attempt by the Ban to restore the power plant in the area.

Both systems were superseded long before the cease fire.
Appendix D

Several of the cryptsystems I worked with were used by independent air defense units charged with protecting strategic points. One of these areas was known as the Vinh Linh Special Air Defense Zone. This zone covered the area from the DMZ north to the Ban Karai Pass east to the Gulf and then back down to the DMZ.

On November 7, 1972, an FB-111, crewed by Colonels Brown and Morrissey, was shot down just north of the DMZ. While some have said the aircraft was downed in a "flak trap," the actual cause for downing was probably an airburst that caused a vacuum which in turn caused a flameout. Regardless, the aircraft crashed almost intact. In other words, the aircraft did not break up on impact but was salvageable. The air crew were captured alive. The hulk of the aircraft was salvaged and was sent to the Soviet Union within 100 hours of the incident. The air crew was also sent to the Soviet Union at that time.

The original transshipment of the aircraft hulk was initially reported in a cryptsystem used by the Vinh Linh Special Air Defense Zone units. The aircraft was shipped from the crash site to Vinh then up the Muong Sen Valley to Sam Neua where the Soviets took control of the aircraft. At that time, a Soviet IL-14 flew the hulk out to the Soviet Union. Several passengers were manifested on that flight. It was believed that at least Brown and Morrissey were among the passengers.

Once in the Soviet Union, the hulk of the FB-111 would be stripped bare and completely analyzed. The Soviets would have the added bonus of exploiting the aircrew to compliment the analysis of the FB-111 and vice versa.

It is my opinion that to properly exploit a weapon system such as the FB-111, one needs both the aircraft and the aircrew. Not only did the Soviets have both the aircraft and the aircrew, they
also had, in their possession or had access to, other crewmembers of other FB-111 shootdowns.

As an additional bonus for the Soviets, Col. Brown was an electrical engineer who worked on the Gemini space program's electrical circuitry for command loops and for life support. Prior to Col. Brown's capture, the Soviet space program was a laughing stock. After Col. Brown's capture, the Soviet space program began to be upgraded to the level of Gemini. I am not an expert in the technologies required for a viable space program. I do believe that the editors and writers of Aviation Week and Space Technology are. I draw your attention to the issues of that magazine dated March 11, 1974, and July 15, 1974. The first issue states that the Soviet Soyuz/Salyut programs were now at the Gemini level and the other issue attributed the upgrade to enhanced circuitry design in the command loops and in life support, both areas of Col. Brown's expertise.
Soviet Union Pushes to Restore Manned Space Effort Momentum

Soviet put 132 payloads into space during 1972, averaging two launches per week. It was a year dedicated to regaining some of the momentum lost in their manned space program, preparing for next year's Apollo-Soyuz flight and exploiting military, research and applications satellites developed earlier.

Except for the first Maks spacecraft launched last summer, little new technology was put aloft by the Russians last year. The bulk of their effort was taken up in the launch of 82 secret Cosmos satellites. These included tests of elements related to the manned space flight program and a biological satellite, Cosmos 606, which was launched Oct. 24 and recovered three weeks later.

But the majority of the Cosmos launches were military reconnaissance satellites, with emphasis last fall put on observation of the Middle East fighting.

The end of a 12-month lull in manned space flight was signaled by the Soyuz flight of Soyuz 12 in September, followed two months later by the eight-day mission of Soyuz 13. Both flights were below the Mercury-Gemina level of complexity on the U.S. scale of space accomplishments, but were nevertheless highly important as a need to establish space-worthiness for its Soviet spacecraft in preparation for the 1975 joint venture with the U.S.

Apollo-Soyuz, meanwhile, has emerged as the chief occupation of Soviet central space officials, who view the program as a major concept for assimilation of advanced U.S. thinking on the technology of manned space flight. Large-scale construction at Plesetsk, Gornyak, the "space town" near Moskow, is aimed at accommodating visiting scientists from the U.S. and the program has top priority within the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

A major setback for the Soviet manned space effort was the breakup of Soyuz 2, launched last April 24 and May 7, 1972. Soviet officials repeatedly
been worn during launch and were taken off after orbital insertion. After the three-part docking exercise—soft dock, hard dock and pressure verification—the spacesuits were again removed. During pressure verification, it was found the Soyuz pressure was slightly lower than that of Salyut, and the former was raised slightly.

Formal permission was then given from ground control to open the port and enter Salyut. Art'yukhin was the first to enter. He turned on the lights and made a cursory inspection, then returned to Soyuz. Popovich then entered Salyut, activated the radio and announced the boarding to the ground station. This occurred at about 1:30 a.m. GMT July 5. Voice transmission from the cosmonauts through rendezvous and docking was made on a typical Soyuz frequency of 121.75 mc, but after they entered Salyut that frequency was abandoned. The Salyut has been transmitting on one biomedical channel and 15 spacecraft hardware parameter channels at 19.946 mc. (Avast July 8, p. 13). A relatively limited mission for the Soyuz-Salyut fight was then announced by Soviet officials, indicating the primary purpose of the flight is testing new systems and procedures. The mission was described as:

• Study of geological-morphological objects on the earth's surface and atmospheric effects on them, with the aim of application to the economy.
• Study of physical characteristics of space.
• Medical-biological studies dealing with the effect of space flight on the human organism and the development of "rational" regimes of work for crewmembers.
• Testing of improved structure and systems of equipment involved in operating the spacecraft itself.

The Soviets made no mention of what they have called their Salyut "solar telescope," but which western analysts indicate is a large, high-resolution ground-viewing camera with reconnaissance potential.

Orbital alignment sensors on the Salyut's exterior are positioned to orient the spacecraft with the 33-ft. focal length optical unit viewing the ground.

Two Soviet space researchers in a replica Salyut spacecraft on the ground have been duplicating every move of the cosmonauts in space to aid ground controllers in visualizing the physical actions of the orbiting crew.

On the morning after the docking, Popovich's pulse was reported at 50 and that of Art'yukhin at 56. Both cosmonauts had blood pressure of 115 over 75. Electrocardiograms were taken of each cosmonaut at that time.

In addition to solar array changes on the exterior of the spacecraft, extensive interior configuration changes have been made. A corridor has been designed along the entire left length of the spacecraft from front to back, connecting the entry tunnel, living compartment, control center and working section that have been created from the original single-chamber interior. All compartments are served by the same life support system, and there are no pressure bulkheads between them.

In the working and living sections a color scheme involving a light-colored ceiling and dark-colored floors has been adopted to give an appearance of an earth structure, with Velcro-like material on the floor, to permit near-normal walking. Soviets emphasized the psychological effect of the earth-like color schemes on basic orientation factors.

The control compartment is located just aft of the living compartment, which occupies the forward portion of Salyut. The control section was described by the Soviets as the "ship's quarterdeck.

The living compartment is for sleeping, eating and taking some medical and biological data for which a special sofa is provided. There is a fixed-position bed and one that swings out of the bulkhead as a space-saver. There is a table for eating, with hot and cold water sources.

The living compartment has storage space for clothes, linen, and entertainment gear, which in the case of Salyut-3 included a tape recorder and chess set, as well as a small library.

Medical equipment is also stored in the living compartment. A modified standard vacuum cleaner is used to clear the air.

A portion of the laboratory section has been set aside for what officials called a "small sports arena" for physical exercises. Equipment includes a treadmill and simulated weights for lifting.

Early medical studies made by the cosmonauts included the vestibular system and the delivery of blood to the brain cells. Soviet doctors said the data would be particularly useful because of problems that have been noted earlier in the initial hours of space travel.

During the exercise sessions special clothing was worn, but it appeared the equipment had no resemblance to the "penguin" suits worn by the cosmonauts on the ill-fated Soyuz-11/Salyut-1 mission two years ago.
**Major Redesign Marks Salyut-3**

New mission oriented toward Soviet national space program after last manned flight aimed at joint project with the U.S.

Major systems and interior configuration refinements on the Salyut spacecraft, aimed at eventual prolonged Soviet manned space flights, were being tested last week by Cosmonaut Pavel R. Popovich and Yuri P. Gavrilov, in earth orbit on board Salyut-3.

The changes ranged from miniaturized circuitry in the control loops and more efficient power supply and life support systems to a general redesign of the Salyut spacecraft interior which permits additional scientific research equipment and increased amenities for the crew members.

Major, Gen. Vladimir A. Shatalov, head of Soviet cosmonaut training, indicated the Salyut-14/Salyut-3 flight would last about 15 days.

The flight of Salyut-3 was planned primarily in conjunction with the Soviet national space program. This is in contrast to the Soyuz-13 flight of last December, which was aimed largely at proving systems that would be used on the joint U.S.-Soviet Apollo-Soyuz Test Project mission scheduled for next summer (ASTP Jan. 14, p. 20).

**More Missions**

However, Soviet officials gave clear indication during the recent Nixon-Kissinger summit visit to Moscow that they wish to follow ASTP with more comprehensive joint missions, and it is likely these would include use of Salyut by U.S. astronauts in the latter half of the decade.

Refinements employed in the current Soyuz-14/Salyut-3 mission include:

* Articulated solar panels rotate 180 deg. and turn toward the sun during daylight portions of flight without changing the basic orientation of the spacecraft (ASTP Feb. 25, p. 36). Solar arrays have been increased in size but reduced from four to three in total. In the case of Salyut-1, the entire spacecraft had to be turned with the solar panels, greatly reducing the spacecraft's potential for earth observation and causing excess expenditure of solar fuel in maneuvering.

* A new, compact system for active thermal control described by the Soviets as more sensitive to temperature changes than those used previously.

* Major interior changes in which the single large 13-ft.-dia. working compartment of Salyut (ASTP June 14, 1971, p. 27) has been subdivided into control, working and living sections with basic decoration changes aimed at simulating an earth-like environment for crew members.

The Soviets declared the changes have greatly increased workload capacity of Salyut by improving its instrument-carrying capability. Scientists gave indications they are attempting to achieve missions of about a month's duration with a single crew of two or three men. Manned of the station by consecutive crews to it by Soyuz spacecraft is also included in the Salyut mission planning. The spacecraft appears to have an orbital life capability of at least six to eight months.

Soyuz-14 was launched in darkness from Tyuratam July 3 at 6:51 p.m. GMT into an orbit of 171.7 x 158.1 mi. with an inclination of 51.6 deg. and a period of 99.7 min. Popovich, the commander, is a Soviet air force colonel who first flew in space aboard Vostok-4 in 1962. For the Soyuz-14 mission he revised his original code name, Berkut, or Golden Eagle.

Flight Engineer Attyukhin, making his first flight, is an air force lieutenant colonel who worked several years in the laboratories of the Zhukovsky Aviation Academy in Moscow after graduating from that institution. Both he and Popovich are 44 years old.

**Circular Orbit**

Launch of Soyuz-14 came more than a week after the June 25 launch of Salyut-3 (ASTP July 1, p. 21). Original Salyut orbital altitude, 167.4 x 137.8 mi., had been boosted several times by postflight firings and was roughly circular at 171.1 x 164.3 mi. two days after the Soyuz-14 launch.

Soyuz rendezvous with a Salyut at that altitude was the highest ever made between the two Soviet spacecraft. Soyuz 10 and 11 rendezvoused with Salyut-1 at 130 x 130 mi. and 151 x 151 mi. orbits, respectively.

The Soviets have indicated that Soyuz can be flown on internal battery power alone, thus allowing removal of the spacecraft's solar panels. A Soyuz configured in that manner would be lighter and have more maneuvering capability. Both rendezvous and reentry could be accomplished on internal battery power alone on a Salyut space station mission.

Soyuz 12 (ASTP Oct. 8, 1973, p. 18) achieved a Soyuz altitude record of 213 mi. with considerable maneuvering on only a two-day flight during which spacecraft rendezvous and reentry modifications probably were tested.

Soviet scientists said they chose the launch time of Soyuz-14 so the spacecraft would be approximately 1,800 mi. from Salyut-3 at the time of orbital insertion. The purpose was to test new control circuitry in the Salyut spacecraft, which plays the active role in docking with the Salyut.

In the ASTP experiment, Soyuz will play the passive role, with the U.S. Apollo spacecraft performing all approach and docking maneuvers.

During the rendezvous period, four separate orbital corrections were made on the Soyuz spacecraft by the automatic docking system. The first two were major orbital shifts, performed after the tenth orbit, and reduced the distance between Soyuz and Salyut by 400 mi. each time. The final two orbital corrections were relatively small, and by the evening of July 4 the manned spacecraft had drifted to within less than 10 mi. of Salyut-3.

Soviet scientists said Soyuz was equipped with a control system that could have achieved an automatic docking. However, the program called for the final approach to be made by the spacecraft commander. Manual control was turned on when Soyuz-14 had drifted to within about 300 ft. of Salyut.

New manual control consists of two handles resembling an automobile gear shift, but in miniature and able to be moved with three fingers. Left stick moves the spacecraft up, down, left, right, forward and back while the right-hand control turns it on its center of mass.

**Rendezvous Observation**

Special periscope permits both the commander and second crewman to observe the rendezvous approach visually. It is located below the control panel directly between the two crew members. There is also a television image of the approach on a screen in the control panel. An indicator shows relative speed of the two spacecraft during the entire hand approach.

Speed at a distance of 400 ft. was approximately 3 fps. At a distance of 120 ft., Popovich slowed the Soyuz again to a speed of about 1.5 fps. Contact was made at exactly 9 p.m. GMT July 4, during the 160th orbit of Salyut. The Soviets used a probe/drogue docking system as they have in previous linkups with Salyut vehicles on Soyuz 10 and the ill-fated Soyuz 11 mission (ASTP July 5, 1973, p. 12).

Both cosmonauts had put on their pressurized space suits prior to the final approach maneuvers. The spacesuits had
Appendix E

One of the most discussed incidents to come out of Southeast Asia, especially since it happened after the cease fire, was the BARON 52 incident. While I will not rehash all the details that have already been reported in various forms, I will just state the following information with some conjectures.

When the GUARD monitor came into the analysis shop (where I worked) to report that BARON 52 just went down, we asked how many were on board. We were immediately informed that there were ten individuals aboard, not the eight on the manifest. When queried again about the total, the answer remained the same. I believe we were told that the extra two were "dead-heading" back to Ubon. However, due to the mission of the aircraft and the special tasking, the other two might have been Vietnamese linguists. My section immediately began searching through the traffic for any communications that might reflect information on the shoot down. As our aircraft were flying too far north, it was not surprising that we had no immediate communications reporting on the incident.

The aircraft we had up were diverted further south in order to try to pick up after action reports. The only report that we came across was a request we saw two days later for more SA-7s. Another report we saw came on February 17, 1973. I am the analyst who issued this report. The unit that we had intercepted was requesting transportation for three "giaclai my," the Vietnamese phrase for any American captured in flight suits. It means bandit American pilot. Couple this with the four who had been captured on February 5, and you have seven crew members who had been captured.

It is my opinion that BARON 52 was downed by at least one and probably two SA-7 missiles. The SA-7 would hit the heat source. In this case it would be the engines. The detonation pattern would also, in all probability, have severed the radio transmission lines thus rendering the plane mute. It also would have allowed most,
if not all, the crew to bailout. I further believe that the aircraft was hit while it was heading south and that the first "stick" of four crew members bailed out almost at once. The remainder of the crew would be tasked with trying to destroy the equipment. They did not completely do so. The second "stick" of crew members went out around the immediate area where BARON 52 went in. I believe the make up of the first stick would be Bollinger, Matejov, and the two extras. I believe that Berhardt was killed by shrapnel of the SA-7. The rest of the crew that jumped would be Spitz, Primm, Melton, Brandenberg and Cressman. The two members of the crew that went back to probably sanitize either the aircraft or Berhardt would be Primm and Melton. Both were found shot to death at the site. (This comes from another witness to this committee.) We knew that the three referenced on February 17th did not have a linguist among them, but that the three were SIGINT specialists. All seven would be taken first to Tchepone then to Khe Sanh then to Vinh. At Vinh, we knew that the SIGINT specialists would then be taken either to Muong Sen or Bai Thuong. I believe that they were sent to Bai Thuong.

I know that the aircraft was not downed by AAA fire. I have seen a photograph, now in possession of the Cressman family, which shows the body of the aircraft intact. It also shows two helicopters, probably American JOLLY GREEN JOLLY types, flying directly to the crash sight. All subsequent photographs show massive damage to BARON 52.

One further note on this incident. In January of 1978, I saw a request from Hanoi going out to all "special" camps asking if all the tu binh thong tin ky thuat (SIGINT specialists POWs) had been sent to Hanoi. The replies were all the same - all SIGINT specialists had been sent to Hanoi. This was during the period when the special flights were occurring. See Appendix G. If the crew were still alive, and there was no evidence indicating otherwise, then all SIGINT specialists from BARON 52 were sent to the Soviet Union by the end of January of 1978.
During the Final Offensive in 1975, I was stationed at Shu Lin Kou Air Station, Republic of China, as a Vietnamese linguist. I was the flight reporter for both technical and intelligence reporting purposes for "E" Flight.

Beginning in the early morning hours of March 21, 1975, we began many messages, both in plaintext and in various cryptsystems and codes, stating that when the Command Post of the 23rd ARVN Infantry Division was overrun and captured, 12 Americans had been captured alive. Of those 12, nine were identified as missionaries. Of the other three, one was identified as a "trung ta co van my," one was identified as a "tieu ta co van my," and the third was never identified. Trung ta co van my means an American Lt Col military advisor. Tieu ta co van my means an American Major military advisor. The last person was never identified. However, from what I know of the American advisory teams, two field grade officers would be accompanied by a senior NCO. We literally saw hundreds of messages, again both in the clear and encrypted, that stated that all units attacking major ARVN units were to emulate the NVA group that had captured "1 trung ta co van my, 1 tieu ta co van my."

When we tried to report this information, we were directed to cancel our intelligence reports and not reissue it. The reason given was that, because the report was sent to some units/addressees that had a history of compromising previous rescue attempts, any report sent at that time would jeopardize an ongoing rescue attempt trying to recover this American advisory team. I learned in 1976 that the rescue attempt launched on March 23, 1975, and which continued for several weeks thereafter, had, of course, failed. I had talked to Mr. Ralph Adams, one of the directors of this rescue attempt, that the reason it failed was due to the fact that his team had no up to date information on that particular team.
Appendix G

Beginning in the middle of December of 1977, I began seeing flight itineraries for military aircraft departing the "special" camp areas for either Hanoi Gia Lam Airfield, the international airfield serving Vietnam. While other flights could and did go into Saigon, the majority of international flights into and out of Vietnam came through Hanoi Gia Lam. Other military flights went into Hanoi Bach Mai. The significance was determined later. Other flights were noted going into Thanh Hoa, Thai Binh, and Ninh Binh. These cities had been found to contain interrogation centers manned by the Soviets.

These flight information messages were found in a format listing all scheduled aircraft flight activity for a given day. Some of the flights had prefixes which were found to indicate the nature of the flight. A flight without any prefixes served as a regularly scheduled flight serving two or more cities, similar to a local flight from Seattle to Chicago or even an express service (non-stop) between those two cities. Flights with a letter prefix might also have the same itinerary but the letter indicated that the passengers fit into a specific category that made that particular flight a high priority. An example of one of these flights would have Truong Chinh flying from Hanoi Gia Lam to Saigon. He would not be manifested on that flight itinerary but the flight would be starred indicating that a VIP was on board. In this case, the flight would be listed as an "A" flight. For Vo Nguyen Giap, the flight would be starred as a "B" flight. Any in-country flight carrying individuals such as Roger Shields, would be listed as a "C" flight. The other letter prefix that was seen was the letter "D." These flights originated in the five "special" camp areas, the new economic areas and other known POW camp areas (see Appendix A). The flight itinerary included the number of passengers and crew and guards. The flights would only go into interrogation centers or into Hanoi Bach Mai or into Hanoi Gia Lam. When the flights went into Gia Lam, a Soviet IL-62 aircraft would depart within 6-12 hours. The initial aircraft would then depart Gia Lam and return to its base of origin without
carrying passengers. From collateral sources, the passengers that had been manifested on the first aircraft would be transshipped on the IL-62 that would then fly to the Soviet Union.

The flight itinerary normally looked like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Flight</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Passengers</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thu 1</td>
<td>IL-14</td>
<td>Bai Thuong</td>
<td>Thai Binh</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4/8 000KG</td>
<td>0700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thu 2</td>
<td>IL-14</td>
<td>Vinh</td>
<td>Thanh Hoa Gia Lam Na San</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14 1750KG</td>
<td>0700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thu 3</td>
<td>MI-8</td>
<td>Dien Bien Phu</td>
<td>Gia Lam</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2/4 000KG</td>
<td>0715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thu 4</td>
<td>LI-2</td>
<td>Muong Sen</td>
<td>Gia Lam</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4/6 000KG</td>
<td>0715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thu 5</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>Gia Lam</td>
<td>Sai Gon</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18/6 750KG</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thu 6</td>
<td>LI-2</td>
<td>Cao Bang</td>
<td>Bach Mai</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8 000KG</td>
<td>0800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thu 7</td>
<td>IL-62</td>
<td>Gia Lam</td>
<td>In-Do Moskova</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6/12 1500KG</td>
<td>1330</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first flight carried four American POWs from Bai Thuong to the interrogation center in Thai Binh. The second flight would be a "normal" passenger flight serving Vinh and Na San with intermediate stops as listed. The third flight carried two POWs from Dien Bien Phu into Gia Lam. The fourth flight carried four American POWs from Muong Sen to Gia Lam. Flights five and six carried Vietnamese civilian and military dignitaries respectively. The last flight carried the six POWs from Gia Lam to the Soviet Union. This was a simplified compilation of what I saw. Over the six week period that I worked this particular problem, I saw 28 POWs transported from various camps into Gia Lam with the subsequent corresponding IL-62 flight going to the Soviet Union. 22 of these POWs came from all American POW camps while the other six came from those camps known to house a variety of occidental POWs.