wise accounted for by the Korean People's Army and the Chinese.\textsuperscript{579}

Yet according to Dr. Cole, casualty status data maintained by the U.S. government contradicts these figures. In fact, he says, the list of 389 contains the names of 197 MIA's, 180 Americans who may or may not have ever been prisoners, and one case which has in fact been resolved. According to Dr. Cole, "prisoner status means that the individual was lost under circumstances that were consistent with a probability of live capture. There is no evidence in many cases that those listed as POWs were ever seen alive in a POW camp." Dr. Cole notes, for example, that the majority of the 188 Army names on the list belonged to individuals who were lost during the first eight months of the Korean War. Given the brutality of the Koreans in this period, and the conditions of imprisonment for U.S. POWs at this time, according to Dr. Cole, "the likelihood of survival for this group was very low."

RAND also reviewed information concerning the alleged transportation of U.S. POWs to the USSR from Korea. It is well documented that there was a significant Soviet presence on the ground in North Korea during the war. In addition, some returning U.S. POWs and Army personnel reported having been questioned by Russian officers in North Korea or China. A 1974 Air Force assessment of the Korean War POW experience, quoted by Dr. Cole, described Soviet interrogations of U.S. POWs in Korea as follows:

Interrogators of three nationalities, Chinese, North Korean, and Caucasian (presumably Russian) questioned USAF personnel during the Korean conflict. The predominance of interrogators were Chinese who, after their entry into the conflict in late October of 1950, took over the responsibility for POWs from the Koreans. Evidence indicates that the Koreans reluctantly gave up this responsibility, and that often tense feelings rose concerning who was to have custody of a new POW. Not infrequently, POWs reported that they were captured by North Koreans and turned over to the Chinese only after much heated discussion and sometimes near violence between the two groups. In some cases, a POW remained in North Korean custody for prolonged periods of time.\textsuperscript{580}

The most detailed discussion of the interrogations now available is contained in the recent interview by Dr. Cole or Victor Alexandrovich Bushuyev, Deputy Chief of Intelligence for the 64th Soviet Air Corps. On September 16, 1992, Mr. Bushuyev made the following statement:

We had contacts with the American POWs, mainly the pilots. We weren't interested in anybody else. I was responsible for organizing the interrogations and for processing all of the information received during the interrogations.

How were the interrogations organized? All arrangements, the structure of the interrogation, its content etc., were completely in the hands of the Chinese. We prepared questions in advance. Then we gave the questions to the Chinese. They asked the questions while interrogating the American POWs. When I was there, I believe all American POWs were completely in Chinese hands on the territory of North Korea.

All American pilots, with no exception, would be interrogated in the town of Sinjido. It was the very northernmost point in Korea, near the Yalu river across from An'Dung where we were stationed. There was a special building there—the interrogation point. Americans would be brought there. We could see it from An'Dung. We would go there about twice a week to accommodate the prisoners. Sometimes there were just a few of them so we didn't need to go.

I was responsible for the interrogations of the POWs, but neither I nor the translators ever saw any of the POWs with our own eyes. Contact on our level was completely prohibited. We only had to get questions ready and then receive the answers.

We would enter the building from a different side before the POWs were brought there. We would go into our room and would sit there very quietly. Only then would they bring in the POWs. We had no visual contact. We would sit behind the wall, a thin wooden wall, and the translators would sit with us. We hear everything. The interrogations were in English, of course.

We were prohibited from seeing the Americans... The Main Intelligence Directorate in Moscow would give us questionnaires: ask this, ask that, whatever we thought was interesting. I don't want to offend the American pilots, mainly we would deal with the pilots, but they were of no value. They didn't know anything. They were average pilots, and good athletes.

I was there for more than one year, the most tense period. Practically all the POWs went through may hands, not in person but their files and interrogation materials. Several hundred of them. But, again I want to say that none of them was any serious value to us. We knew twice as much as they could tell us... Practically all of the American POWs belonged to the Chinese. The war was conducted not by the Koreans but by the Chinese and Soviets. The Koreans were under pressure and had no rights. They would just load and unload stuff, build roads, that sort of thing.

There was no need to bring Americans to Russia. Military personnel, location of bases and all that were already known. We had no questions of this sort. We had the planes as well, all their parts, so it didn't make any sense to take pilots to Russia. If someone had asked for political asylum we would have, but I haven't heard of any such cases. As far as I know, our counterintelligence people

\textsuperscript{579} Submitted for the record of the Select Committee hearing, 11/10/92.

\textsuperscript{580} Analysis of the Korean War Prisoner of War Experience HQ USAF SEAsia PW Analysis Program Report A10-2, March 1974, Appendix One, 25.
Regarding the issue of post-capture deaths of American MIA-POWs in the Soviet Union, Dr. Cole has stated the following:

I have interviewed two Soviet military advisers in Korea who had contact with two American POWs who were not repatriated. The first, tentatively identified as First Lieutenant Niemann, was definitely seen and perhaps interrogated by Soviet military advisors. Niemann, who is on the RAND and TFR lists, is listed in several records as deceased.

Another Soviet military adviser recalled having contact with "Lt. Colonel V. Black" in order to arrange an interview with Pravda. Colonel Vance E. Black of California, who has not been accounted for since he was shot down in May 1951, was seen alive by an American POW in Pyongyang in March 1952. Lt. Colonel Vance E. Black may be the "V. Black," who was identified in the Pravda article and seen by a Soviet military adviser.

According to a retired KGB Major General, Soviet intelligence wanted to recruit agents. George Blake's decision to work for the KGB, whether it was the result of recruitment or simply a walk-in, gave the KGB additional incentive to find other potential agents among the UN prisoner-of-war population. Army G-2 analyses of repatriated American POWs turned up an alarming number of cases that fit this pattern. In June 1954, the U.S. advised the Air Force that "evidence had been uncovered which concerned the assignment of Sabotage and Espionage missions to repatriated American prisoners of war during "Big and Little Switch," and that quite recently new cases of this type have been discovered." No evidence has yet been obtained that points toward a similar North Korean or Chinese interest in recruiting agents. There have been reports over the years that American POWs were used as guinea pigs in Sino-Soviet biological experiments. None of this has been documented thus far.

Intelligence reports located in the U.S. archives are nearly silent on the issue of whether American MIA-POWS were transferred to the territory of the USSR. If this activity took place, it was not discussed in Eighth Army G-2 daily reports or annual summaries. If this activity took place it was not widely known to repatriated POWs. Thus far only one repatriated POW affidavit has been located that mentions this activity.

In this affidavit, repatriated POW John T. Cain said that he had been told by a Nationalist Chinese officer that a U.S. helicopter pilot with the rank of Second Lieutenant had been taken to Russia in March, 1952. The Captain did not know the branch of service, and had communicated this information to POW Cain through "sign language, in broken English, and by pictures drawn on the ground then erased."

In the early and mid-1950s, according to Dr. Cole, the U.S. Government took the position that Americans may well have been transported from Korea or China to the territory of the USSR. For example, according to press reports, in May 1954, the U.S. Department of State delivered a note to the Soviet Foreign Ministry accusing the Soviets of having transferred American prisoners to the territory of the Soviet Union from Korea. The Soviet Government's rejection of the U.S. note was the first public notice that the U.S. had made such a protest. As Dr. Cole stated, "reports were apparently collected through U.S. intelligence and diplomatic channels that U.S. POWs during the Korean War were seen in Soviet camps."

Yet, the following year, the coordinated inter-agency position of the United States took precisely the opposite position, concluding:

With regard to the question of United States personnel captured in Korea, the Department of Defense has informed us that all American servicemen, missing or unaccounted for in that conflict, have been presumed dead. In close cooperation with the Department of Defense, however, we intend to continue to seek information from the Communists about their fate. Further, we have no evidence that any United States personnel captured in Korea were ever taken to the Soviet Union.

As Dr. Cole stated:

There has been no official explanation that squares these two contradictory positions. The possibility that American POWs were moved from Korea or China to the territory of the USSR cannot be ruled out. Thus far, no documentary evidence has been found to support such a position. Circumstantial evidence (viz., missing POWs, Sino-Soviet intelligence cooperation, Russian presence in Korean POW camps) and eyewitness testimony (former prisoners, Soviet military sources) point to the possibility that some American POWs may have been taken to the USSR. The motives for this activity have been established.

Testimony of Gen. Volkogonov on Korea

In response to questions from the Committee, Gen. Volkogonov said that he had found no evidence to indicate that large numbers of U.S. POWs had been held in the Soviet Union during the Korean War. As he testified:

I have examined an enormous number of documents, including the documents of Stalin, Beria, and all the special services, and these are documents which would have con-
tained evidence of American prisoners being taken through Soviet territory.

I want to bring your attention to one document emphasizing that the leaders of these secret agencies, the KGB, the NKVD, did not lie to one another. They told the truth to one another in the totalitarian system because it was extremely dangerous for them not to do so. They may have deceived America or the Soviet public, but among themselves they were forced to tell the truth.

And here is a document giving evidence to the following. This is a document of February 4, 1954 of Interior Minister Sergei Kruglov, written to him, indicating that in special prisons on the territory of the Soviet Union there are six American citizens being held in special prisons and camps of the ministry of internal affairs. This document was never intended to be made public. It was top secret, and it contains the names of these persons, but again, was purely for the internal use of the Interior Ministry.

And this was immediately after the war in Korea. Despite all of our work—and we have many archivists working, dozens of experts searching, on their own time on a volunteer basis, a great many archives. Despite this, we have found no confirmation of the presence of other American citizens located on the territory of the Soviet Union.585

Gen. Volkogonov testified that apart from the February 4, 1954 document, the Russians have found only one other document concerning Korean-era U.S. POWs. This document concerned two U.S. airmen from a helicopter forced to land in North Korea, in behalf of whom the U.S. Embassy in Moscow requested Soviet assistance. According to Gen. Volkogonov, the Soviet government decided not to respond to the note. The Russians have no information on the fate of these two men.

With respect to the location of interrogations of U.S. prisoners during the Korean war, Gen. Volkogonov has told the Committee:

Based on testimony by G.I. Korotkov, who participated in interrogations of American POWs from the Korean War period, interrogations were conducted in an especially equipped site at a junction of the Korean, Chinese and Soviet borders. So far we have been unable to determine the exact location of this site. The Soviet side was not engaged in transporting American POWs to this site. Probably they were brought by Korean servicemen, who then took them away after interrogations.586

Testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Phillip Corso, USA, Ret.

On November 10, 1992, the Committee heard the testimony of Lt. Col. Phillip Corso, USA, Ret., a member of the National Security Council staff during the Eisenhower Administration. Lt. Col. Corso was head of the special projects division of the Far East Command during the Korean War, in the G-2 section, with responsibility for keeping track of North Korean POW camps. During the closing days of the war, Lt. Col. Corso participated in discussions on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war (the "Little Switch" operation), and the full exchange of prisoners ("Big Switch").

Lt. Col. Corso testified that at the end of the exchange of sick and wounded in the Little Switch Operation, he prepared a document showing that all U.S. sick and wounded were not returned, and that about 500 prisoners who were not returned would be in danger of dying if they did not receive treatment. Lt. Col. Corso testified that U.S. officials brought this to the attention of the existing Chinese general who responded simply by snapping a pencil in two and doing nothing. According to Lt. Col. Corso, the U.S. concluded that approximately 8,000 prisoners who should have come home during Operation Big Switch did not. Lt. Col. Corso drafted statements to be given to the United Nations by Dr. Charles Mayo and Henry Cabot Lodge. As Col. Corso testified:

Dr. Charles Mayo gave the statement on bacteriological warfare, and Ambassador Lodge on the United Nations prisoners of war. And we found out that at the time the Chinese, under Russian tutelage, had a detailed, scientific process of Pavlovian type experiments which they were conducting on our prisoners.

We knew about this information, but were hindered from sending agents to the North to find out more about this because this was handled mostly by OPC, which was a unit of the CIA.

Now, during my tour in Korea, I compiled the evidence, I was receiving this daily, that prisoners had not been returned from North Korea and had been sent, in fact, to the Soviet Union. The war was still going on at the time. The information that I had was compiled, and I was amazed to hear that there was no evidence in the archives on this. There were actually hundreds of reports. The reports came from prisoner of war interrogation reports of North Koreans, prisoners of war, Chinese prisoners of war, and defectors, and some photographs that we took, our reconnaissance planes took.

These reports were compiled and kept in files, and I'd say offhand there must have been 300 or 400 of these reports easily in my file of knowledge from prisoners of war and so forth that our prisoners had been sent up through Manchuria to Man-chou-li (by train). There they were transported or changed. There they were changed because of the gauge and sent to the Soviet Union. I had very definite information on two train loads . . . from Chinese prisoners of war, North Korean prisoners of war, civilian defectors, and photographs. We had some photographs of the camps.587

Lt. Col. Corso estimated that each of the two train loads of U.S. POWs contained about 450 prisoners, for a total of 900 POWs.

585 Select Committee hearing, 11/11/92.
587 Select Committee hearing, 11/10/92.
transported to the Soviet Union. He stated that he had some inconclusive information as to the possibility of a third, similar train load. In all, Lt. Col. Corso said he had 200 to 300 reports about these 900 POWs or related information. Eventually, he was asked to brief President Eisenhower personally on the situation, in a five-minute meeting which took place in mid-1953, or possibly as late as 1954. This meeting took place while Lt. Col. Corso was serving on the staff of the National Security Council. As Lt. Col. Corso testified:

I had a call from my principal, C. D. Jackson, one day, who was special assistant to the President. He said, get over, we have to see the President. Bring your prison report. My prison of war report that I handed him was one page. I walked in the office. The President was in the Oval Office, the three of us, and I saw him, and he said, I understand you have a report on prisoners of war going to the Soviet Union? I told him, yes, that's what I'm here for.

I compiled this report not only here but from information in Korea, which I said before, that up to 1,200 we suspect, but about 900 certainly did go there. Our information is solid, as solid as intelligence information can be, because that's the nature of intelligence.

I handed [President Eisenhower] the report, and he read it. And he had a very serious look on his face. . . . This was not a pleasant meeting. It did not last long. . . . He said, Colonel, he said, do you have any recommendations, because in the military, generally the writer of the report has to make a recommendation to his superior who then decides on what to do with it.

I said, yes. The nature of this report—these men will never come back alive because they will get in the hands of the KGB who will use them for their purposes. Espionage, play-backs, or whatever. This is not uncommon in the intelligence business. Once they fall in their hands, there's little hope of them coming back.

And I told him, Mr. President, you are aware of the system of the KGB, how they use prisoners of war and defectors? And he said, yes, I am. He said, is your recommendation not to make it public? I said, my recommendation is not to make public the part—the KGB operation. It's difficult to understand at its best. It hasn't been revealed. The part on prisoners, that I don't know.

So, the President said, well, I accept your recommendation . . . he said, well, I agree, we cannot give it to the families. Then I said, Mr. President, though, may I send a copy of this report to the Department of Defense? He said, yes.588

According to Lt. Col. Corso, the effort to locate and retrieve U.S. POWs held by the Communists during the Korean War were impeded by the U.S. policy of not making strident and confrontational statements directed at the Soviet Union, North Korea and China. Lt. Col. Corso testified that "The big policy was the policy of fear. Fear of general war. That was the policy that was stopping us." Lt. Col. Corso added that the families were not told because:

[You'd have to tell the families that these boys were going to be tried, used, exploited for NKVD operations which were espionage, sabotage, and take their identities. And that we felt would have been damaging to the families, but it's hard to explain, sir . . . . They were going to be exploited in a very sinister way. As far as telling them they were alive, sir, I put in a speech at the United Nations that 1,800 prisoners of war had gone to the Soviet Union, had been transferred to the Soviet Union. Now, there was no mention that they were dead or not dead, but that was put in the statement and released, and he gave me permission to put that in.589]

According to Lt. Col. Corso, he is the only person alive who participated in the decision not to tell the families the information concerning U.S. POWs in the Soviet Union. The Committee has not been able to find any documentary corroboration of his information.

**Testimony of Col. Delk Simpson**

The testimony of Col. Delk Simpson (USAF-Ret.), a former U.S. military attache in Hong Kong, also supported the possibility that large numbers of U.S. prisoners were transferred to Soviet territory during the Korean war period. Col. Simpson testified that he had received and passed on to U.S. Air Force Intelligence headquarters in 1954 an eyewitness account concerning the transportation of approximately 700 American prisoners from Man-chou-li, China into Siberia. According to Col. Simpson's source, a number of the prisoners were black soldiers.

Col. Simpson testified that he has worked since his retirement in 1961 to bring this issue to the attention of the government, including visits to offices in both the executive and legislative branch. Col. Simpson said that he had learned that DIA considered him to be "senile" and that the prisoners he had reported were French from the French-Indochinese War, being taken to Siberia for return to France.

As Col. Simpson testified:

It was not until six months ago that I came to understand the possibility of why I received such official inaction. At that time, I met Colonel Corso, and Colonel Corso told me that in 1953, he was the author of a policy while on the White House staff to abandon all prisoners being held by the Russians. He said the policy was approved by President Eisenhower. Senator, it is incomprehensible to me that anybody would make such a decision to send our boys to a sure death.590
Col. Simpson testified that his original source was a Polish man trying to get to Australia, who was afraid the U.S. was going to try to stop him. Col. Simpson promised to keep his name and destination secret. He sent the information as a classified report to the Pentagon, and never received a response.

Testimony of Sgt. Steve E. Kiba

The case of Sgt. Steve E. Kiba demonstrates conclusively that, whether or not prisoners were transferred from North Korea to the former Soviet Union, at least some were transferred to the People's Republic of China (PRC). Sgt. Kiba was interred in China for 32 months as a POW during the Korean War. An Air Force pilot, Sgt. Kiba was transported to Red China about three days after his capture on January 12, 1953, and remained there until his release on August 4, 1955. Throughout his time as a POW in China, he experienced degrading and harsh conditions. As Sgt. Kiba testified:

They were sadistic and barbaric . . . threatened me with all kinds of horrendous tortures, and they even did some of them . . . They told me I would never go home unless I cooperated. And they threatened to keep me for life. And they kept some of my friends for life. They're still there. 591

Sgt. Kiba testified that American POWs were abandoned after the 1958 cease-fire, and that he was one of them, but that others, unlike him, never returned. He stated that either he or others in his crew saw ten to fifteen caucasians whose fates remain undetermined. As he testified:

It is a known fact that we abandoned American servicemen after [World War II, Korea, and Vietnam] and let their families down. I know we abandoned some because I saw some of them.

President Harry Truman was the first President to leave Americans behind. Then President Eisenhower abandoned American POWs after the Korean War in North Korea, Red China and the Soviet Union. In a press conference on April 29, 1959, President Eisenhower acknowledged that not all American POWs were repatriated after the Korean War cease-fire. 592

According to Sgt. Kiba, The Communists he met while he was in captivity demonstrated to him that they were sadistic and needed no reason to keep Americans, because "a Communist is different." As he testified, "for almost 40 years, I've been trying to inform the American people and the news media of the heinous crime of enslaving the bodies and minds of our courageous fighting men by the godless communists." Mr. Kiba said that in the final analysis, he could understand why he was so badly treated by the Communists, but he could not understand why his own government had asked him to remain silent after his return about the others he had seen in China while he was a POW.

Select Committee hearing, 11/10/92.

Testimony of Robert Dumas

On November 11, 1992, the Committee received testimony from Mr. Robert Dumas, whose brother, PFC Roger A. Dumas of Company C, 19th Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, was captured northeast of Anju, North Korea on or about November 4, 1950. Mr. Dumas testified to his belief that a large number of POWs were retained by the Koreans and are still there, working on collective farms.

Furthermore, Mr. Dumas, who had personal contact with senior North Korean officials at the United Nations for several years, including the Ambassadors, said that only a comprehensive approach, involving all outstanding issues, could bring results on the POW issue with the North Koreans.

Mr. Dumas testified that he met with the North Korean Ambassador in New York in July 1992 and the Ambassador said:

Bob, all you want is your brother home. That's all. And he said talk to the man in the White House, get somebody to sit down with us, and let's go over the whole thing, the whole category. Let's go over everything, the whole category.

Mr. Dumas then related for the Committee a meeting he attended in New York on December 9, 1987, with the Reverend Jesse Jackson and Ambassador Pak Del Yan of the DPRK. He said that Reverend Jackson opened the discussion with:

Mr. Ambassador, if you have live prisoners in North Korea right now, I will come to North Korea on Christmas Eve and bring some home alive. And in the springtime, if you have any remains, we will go back in the spring and exhume those with an organization of human rights people from our side and your side.

Mr. Dumas continued, "And the first thing the Ambassador said, yes, Reverend, that would be good for both our countries."

Mr. Dumas interpreted this discussion to be an admission by the North Korean Ambassador that his country continues to hold U.S. POWs. The Committee staff has requested an opportunity to discuss this meeting with Rev. Jackson, but such a discussion has not taken place.

Testimony of Serban Oprica, former Rumanian engineer

Mr. Dumas' belief that American POWs are laboring in North Korean collective farms was consistent with the testimony of Serban Oprica, a former Rumanian engineer now living in Hartford, Connecticut. Mr. Oprica worked for the Romanian government in North Korea during 1979 and 1980, assisting in the construction of a television production factory in Pyongyang. Mr.

Oprica testified that, in late October or early November, 1979, he saw a group of Caucasians whom he believed to be American POWs. The sighting occurred during a bus ride in the countryside.

We see a land like a camp where vegetables, and my attention was to—because I saw a person with a European face, with blue eyes very close the bus. And I was very shocked. And everybody on the bus was shocked. And I was looking behind him (and) I saw 7 or 10 peoples with Caucasian face. And behind them, I saw more people working the camp... They were dressed with North Korean dress, like Chinese, but they worked in camp and was dark color.

According to Mr. Oprica, the men were not guarded. In his deposition, he specified that he saw no less than five and as many as fifteen other Caucasians in the immediate vicinity of the bus and as many as 50 others in the distance. All wore the same gray drab clothes and were working in a farm field, without restraints.

Mr. Oprica testified that at another place in North Korea, at a museum, he and his wife saw parts of American soldiers in alcohol, which were used as a means of frightening people. These body parts included limbs, hands, and heads, and were displayed in the vicinity of American armament items, including uniforms and flags.

Mr. Oprica also remembered witnessing an altercation between a Rumanian and a North Korean while he was on an outing to the west coast port city of Nampo. Mr. Oprica remembers hearing the Rumanian angrily accuse the Koreans of holding American POWs from the Korean War. Mr. Oprica said that the Rumanians had spent a longer time in Korea than he had been certain that American POWs were still being held by the North Koreans.

Mr. Oprica was debriefed by U.S. Army intelligence in 1988 in behalf of the DIA, and by the FBI, but he believes that little or nothing was done with the information he provided.

U.S. POWs from World War II

RAND Project/Cole

The RAND research on World War II, conducted by Dr. Paul Cole, focused on the European theater of operations, looking into the question of how many Americans, "liberated" from German POW camps by the Soviets, were not repatriated.

RAND found that 76,854 Americans were estimated to be in German POW camps as of March 15, 1945, but that the total number of American POWs recovered from German POW camps was 91,252, nearly 14,000 more than expected. Moreover, Soviet forces liberated a substantial number of these POWs—28,662 according to U.S. records; but only 22,554 according to Soviet records, a difference which Dr. Cole attributed to poor Soviet recordkeeping.

In the years that followed, several dozen, and possibly as many as several hundred, inquiries were made by the United States gov-

593 Select Committee hearing, 11/11/92.

594 Select Committee hearing, 11/11/92.

595 Select Committee hearing, 11/11/92.
ernment on behalf of U.S. MIAs, usually based on requests from family members. The Soviets responded by creating an American Missing Persons File at its National Archives, which included some of this correspondence, as well as files derived from Missing Air Crew reports and Enemy Evasion Aid reports, some of which covered crewmen who had been repatriated to the United States. As Dr. Cole found:

There is no question that many bomber crews survived after parachuting or crash landing on territory controlled by Soviet forces. Many of these crewmen were repatriated. U.S. and Soviet records suggest, however, that an undetermined number were not. The U.S. Embassy at Moscow's efforts to obtain information about American citizens held on the territory of the USSR were severely limited by the Soviet position that some American citizens were considered by Soviet authorities to be Rumanians, Hungarians, other eastern Europeans, or even citizens of the USSR. In these cases, the Soviet government always refused to give the U.S. Embassy even the slightest bit of information in response to inquiries concerning people the Soviet authorities considered to be non-U.S. citizens.597

Dr. Cole found no evidence to support charges that thousands of American POWs liberated from Nazi German POW camps were never repatriated. Moreover, his research raises questions even about the relatively few individuals identified by the Russians as U.S. POWs who were never repatriated by the USSR. As Dr. Cole testified:

Some explanations of what happened to unrepatriated American POWs do not hold up well under scrutiny. In December 1991, the Senate Select committee on MIA-POW Affairs visited Moscow. During this visit, Gen. Dimitri Volkogonov gave the U.S. delegation a list containing the names of fourteen Americans who died who were alleged to have died in Soviet custody during World War II. There is no information concerning the sources used to compile this list. The list does not correspond to unaccounted-for POW records of the Adjutant General. There is no correlation between this list and the mandate of the Joint U.S.-Russian Commission on MIA-POWs either.598

Dr. Cole then reviewed the efforts in the late 1940's and early 1950s, which by 1956 had resulted in the release from Soviet block captivity of nineteen American citizens. There was little subsequent activity in this area until December 5, 1991, when the U.S. submitted data to the Russian government "concerning certain individuals who could have been detained in the Soviet Union in the 1950's." Russian President Yeltsin later advised that "two of the people the U.S. side inquired about... were returned to U.S. authorities nearly 36 years ago." Another individual about whom the U.S. requested information had his remains recovered, identified, and buried at his family's request in the United States in 1957. There was no record with respect to the other individuals identified by the U.S.

On July 30, 1992, Gen. Dimitri Volkogonov, chairman of the Russian Delegation to the U.S.-Russian Commission on MIA-POWs, published an article in Izvestia listing the names of 39 American citizens who had been illegally detained by the Soviet government. According to Dr. Cole, however, none of the 39 was an American POW.

In summary, the initial phase of the Rand review, while incomplete and inconclusive, tends to discredit the idea that a substantial number of U.S. POWs were held by the Soviet Union following World War II and not repatriated.

In this regard, Dr. Cole took issue with the authors of Soldiers of Misfortune and Moscow Bound concerning the number of POWs the Red Army "liberated" from German POW camps and failed to repatriate. His conclusions:

The number of American POWs who were not repatriated from German POW camps in World War II appears to be less than 200. Assertions that tens of thousands of American POWs were abandoned are "inconsistent with the historical record."

U.S. and Soviet Archives suggest that fewer than 100 American POWs, perhaps 50 or fewer, were held on the territory of the U.S.S.R. after World War II. An undetermined number of American air crews—not POWs—were detained by the U.S.S.R. after making forced landings on territory it controlled. Most, if not all, of these crews were repatriated from the U.S.S.R. Some others may not have been repatriated from Soviet-occupied territory, but answering this question requires further research.

The U.S. government located the graves of hundreds of American servicemen on Soviet-controlled territory. These were not POWs; most were on the territory of Soviet-occupied Germany. Records show few of these remains were recovered from the territory of the U.S.S.R.599

Sanders, Sauter, and Brown

John M.G. Brown and James D. Sanders, assisted by Mark A. Sauter, have conducted years of research in U.S. archives, searching for information relating to U.S. and allied POWs who fell into the hands of the Soviet Army as it pursued the rapidly retreating Wehrmacht across Eastern Europe in 1945. Thousands of soldiers were moved by rail, truck and foot eastward, not westward, and most ended their cross-country journey at the port of Odessa, on the Black sea, there to await transport by sea to their homelands. This much is not in dispute. What is in question is how many of these soldiers were not allowed to board ship, but were destined for the vast Gulag of the Russian-Siberian interior. Mr. Sanders and Mr. Brown estimate that between 20,000 and 23,500 were POWs of the Germans and became prisoners of the Soviets.

597 Select Committee hearing, 11/10/92.
598 Select Committee hearing 11/10/92.
It is Mr. Brown's theory that Communist mistreatment of POWs—that is, retaining them as hostages for political purposes—can be traced to the behavior of the Bolsheviks. According to Mr. Brown, the Bolsheviks kept at least 60 American soldiers they captured during the Allied intervention of 1918-1919 at Archangel, and a few from the Siberian front. In his view, this was a prelude to the retention by the Soviets of thousands of soldiers taken from the German POW camps after World War II.

Mr. Sanders furnished the Committee with a critique of Dr. Cole's research in a letter on November 15. Pertinent excerpts follow:

Let me start by stating that the World War II portion of Dr. Cole's report is hopelessly incompetent. Any investigator/historian/historian researching a possible Government cover-up of historic proportions, would begin by testing the official Government history against the available data. Dr. Cole, however, failed to do this.

Instead, he relied exclusively on the RAMP Report (Recovered Allied Military Personnel) to formulate his working hypothesis. Since the RAMP report, completed in 1946, is the official Government version of the recovery of POWs, a competent historian would first demonstrate that the official history is correct. It is incorrect in virtually all critical areas.

Cole quotes the RAMPs disinformation line that only "76,854 were estimated to be in German POW camps." Here are the correct confirmed American POWs held by the Germans:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theater</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Theater</td>
<td>76,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Theater</td>
<td>20,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North African Theater</td>
<td>1,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>98,312</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mr. Sanders went on to say that his archival research turned up "Battle Casualties of the Army," which support his figures. He also asserts that his research shows that the U.S. actually expected 106-107,000 POWs to be returned, which included between 8,000 and 9,000 men carried as MIA but not definitely known to be in captivity. On May 19, 1945, a document found by Mr. Sanders—signed by Gen. Eisenhower—shows that 105,000 returnees were expected.

How many returned? Dr. Cole, using the RAMP report, says 91,252. Mr. Sanders says that his research shows that the number did not exceed 85,000.

Mr. Sanders letter continued with its summary of his findings:

Between February and April 1945, 5,159 Americans should have been evacuated through Odessa. . . . Only 2,858 were recovered, however. At least 2,301 Americans disappeared. A June 1945, State Department study in the MIS-X files confirms this, stating that 5,200 Americans should have come out through Odessa.

---

600 Letter to Select Committee from James D. Sanders, 11/15/92.
601 Sanders letter.
602 Select Committee hearing, 11/10/92.
Defense Department view

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Al Ptak testified that U.S. investigative efforts have focused on 10 incidents between 1950 and 1965 in which shootdowns took place, involving 90 crew members who remain unaccounted for.

Despite the lack of conclusive evidence, we do not rule out the possibility that members of these crews may have survived the loss incident long enough to be rescued by Soviet units. U.S. debriefs from the 1950s provide second-hand evidence that individuals matching the descriptions of members of a few of these crews were sighted in Soviet prisons; however, we lack conclusive evidence of such prisoners.

The U.S. has provided the Russians with highly specific data, including the names of the service members involved, the dates of their flights, their last known locations, and their aircraft types, for each of the ten incidents. To date, little information has been received from the Russians in response, despite continuing commitments of cooperation. Beginning in September, 1992, representatives of the Russian Border Guards were included in discussions with the U.S. members of the Commission, and the Commission is continuing to seek information from the archives maintained by them.

Joint Commission visit to Ukraine

In December, 1992, the Joint Commission visited Kiev, Ukraine. During a meeting with Ukrainian officials, the U.S. side turned over lists of all known citizens of the former Soviet Union captured in Afghanistan and of all known former Soviet citizens who had been resettled in the United States. Ambassador Toon also held a press conference asking Ukrainians to come forward with information concerning U.S. POWs and MIAs. Ukrainian officials stated their willingness to investigate their records and archives and to share any information they find with the United States.

During the visit, an official of the DIA pressed the Ukrainians concerning ten incidents in the Cold War in which Americans were lost and did not return. One of the incidents occurred in 1965, at a location that would be within the Ukrainian national territory. Ukrainian officials uniformly stated that all records had been taken to Moscow on the orders of Soviet officials of the central government. Nevertheless, they promised to research whatever files and archives remained in the Ukraine and to pass on the results.

RAND project/Cole testimony

Dr. Cole had this to say about Cold War losses:

During the early period of the Cold War, the U.S. Government in the 1950's systematically collected live sighting reports of American citizens, military and civilian, in Soviet bloc control. This information provided the basis for dozens of U.S. requests for information and protests to the Soviet Government. Between 1945 and 1959, U.S. government protests resulted in the repatriation of at least nine American citizens held in the Soviet Union.

Between 1945 and 1969, at least 23 U.S. military aircraft were shot down by Soviet forces. On at least three occasions, live crew members were repatriated. During the 1950s, the U.S. government believed that some crew members were imprisoned by the Soviet Union and made many protests to the Soviets on their behalf.

Other protests were made on the behalf of American civilians not permitted to leave the Soviet bloc.

The U.S. also kept detailed records on the whereabouts of American defectors in the Soviet bloc, the majority of whom lived in East Germany or Czechoslovakia. Few lived in the Soviet Union, and some U.S. defectors were imprisoned by the Soviets as suspected spies.

Family members and Task Force Russia

TFR and some members of families who have lost servicemen in Cold War situations take a more positive view on the possibility of survivors. One of the most intriguing and convincing cases that can be made showing Soviet duplicity in retaining members of U.S. aircrews shot down by Soviet fighters during the Cold War involves the USAF RB-50, tail number 47-145A, which was attacked by two MIG-15s on July 29, 1953, over the Sea of Japan. The sons of one of the crew, 1st Lt. Warren Sanderson, have made an intensive search for the truth regarding possible survivors. One of the sons, Bruce W. Sanderson, of Fargo, North Dakota, testified before the Committee.

Bruce Sanderson has enjoyed the full support of and considerable assistance from TFR, including personal attention from Gen. Loeffke and Col. Harrington in his research and visit to Russia, where he participated in interviews with Russian sources and was given access to Russian archives. He has been partially successful in obtaining U.S. Government records involving the case, but the search for relevant documents is incomplete.

Facts that make this case particularly important are:
- The Soviets admitted that they shot the aircraft down.
- Survivors, beyond the sole individual who was rescued by a USN ship, were seen in the water by search and rescue aircraft.
- North Korean patrol boats were seen in the area, moving to and away from the crash-site.
- The co-pilot was rescued 22 hours after the crash, 17 miles from the coast.

Mr. Bruce Sanderson provided the Committee with a possible insight into what might have happened to his father and to other American servicemen who flew missions to collect intelligence along the Soviet frontiers during the Cold War. He told the Committee that he located a Russian citizen who was personally in-

---

Select Committee hearing, 11/10/92.
involved in the interrogation of American servicemen in the U.S.S.R. from 1950 to 1954. According to Mr. Sanderson, this is what he was told:

He also reaffirmed the information from the first meeting that all U.S. personnel under Soviet control were photographed, fingerprinted, and given Russian names, that these men were then moved frequently from camp to camp. It was common practice to create a false death certificate or record when a prisoner was moved.  

Jane Reynolds Howard presented testimony concerning her search for the facts concerning her husband’s loss over the Baltic Sea. Robert D. Reynolds (USN Class of '45; graduated in June 1944 because of the war) was in a Navy PB4Y2 “Privateer” shot down by four Soviet MIGs on April 8, 1950. U.S. searches found no survivors and all 10 of the crew were presumed dead.

Mrs. Howard testified that she had originally accepted the Navy’s account of her husband’s death. But 16 months ago, she finally learned, through an article in the Los Angeles Times, that her husband’s true mission was not “training,” as the Navy had told her at the time. This led her to consider the possibility that Robert Reynolds had been captured and to begin a search for answers.

She traveled to Russia where she was assisted by the TFR during a 10-week visit. There, she conducted an intensive search, including the use of media and photos of her husband as he would appear at age 70. She does not know if her husband survives, but she is absolutely convinced that he was captured by the Soviets.

A third family member, Mr. Gregg Škavinski of Virginia, testified about the case of his uncle, MSgt William R. Homer, who was aboard a USAF RB-29 when it disappeared over the Sea of Japan on June 13, 1952. The Air Force recorded the loss as an “accident, a non-battle casualty.” But Mr. Škavinski testified to information that two radar blips were seen approaching the plane just before it disappeared; that a Russian radio transmission discussed the rescue of a member of the crew; that an empty six-man life raft, that might have been from the RB-29, was sighted; and that Soviets reportedly interrogated an American aviator in Manchuria about Major Sam Bush, the commander of the RB-29. What was the Soviet interest in Major Bush, Mr. Škavinski speculated, if he was at the bottom of the Sea of Japan?

In summary, the book is not closed on the missing from the Cold War. There can be little doubt that much more information lies in the archives and in the recollections of the ex-Soviets who participated in these events. TFR faces a formidable challenge in ferreting out the truth.

THE VIETNAM WAR

The Committee examined reports and allegations that U.S. prisoners were interrogated by Soviet military and intelligence officials during the war in Vietnam and also that some U.S. POWs may have been transferred to the Soviet Union during that conflict.

Defense Department testimony

Assistant Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Al Ptak testified concerning efforts by the Commission to determine whether there is evidence that U.S. prisoners were transferred to the Soviet Union during the Vietnam war:

Despite having vigorously examined every lead, to date we have no conclusive evidence supporting claims that U.S. POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union. It is also important to note that some of these key individuals, including the former Soviet Ambassador to Laos, have refused to be interviewed by the Commission.

To date, the Commission has found no documents indicating that any U.S. POWs from the Vietnam War were interned in the Soviet Union, or that Soviet personnel participated in interrogations of U.S. POWs during the Vietnam War.

Assessment of committee investigator

Committee investigator Al Graham testified that:

As with the Korean War, the Russians are very sensitive to their possible role in the Vietnamese War. Although they claim that they did not take [part] in any interrogations in Vietnam and that no U.S. POWs were transferred from Vietnam to the Soviet Union, there is at least some circumstantial evidence that such interrogations did take place and that at least a few U.S. POWs may have been transferred from Vietnam to the Soviet Union.

If so, there is a good chance that some of them could still be alive. Again, there are possibly several former U.S. POWs who might have cooperated with the Soviets and who might not wish to be found. In such cases, it would probably be worthwhile for representations to be made to the Russian government at the highest level that such individuals would not be persecuted by the U.S. and that on humanitarian grounds, it would be quite useful to be able to resolve these cases.

Testimony of Bui Tin

During its first set of hearings, in November, 1991, the Committee received testimony from Bui Tin, former Senior Colonel in the Vietnamese People’s Army. During the latter part of the Vietnam War, Col. Bui Tin had been the official spokesman for the North Vietnamese Army. According to the Colonel:

At that time, I had the right to read all the documents and the secret telegrams from the politburo on this (POW) issue. In addition, I had special authorization from the General Vo Nguyen Giap, then defense minister to go to
many camps, to meet with any officers, and to interview any
POWs and read their files.\footnote{Select Committee hearings, 11/7/91, pp. 466.}

Col. Bui Tin testified that he believed some U.S. prisoners were
interrogated in Vietnam by Soviet and Cuban military intelligence
officers and that the purpose of this questioning was to obtain in-
formation about their knowledge of advanced aircraft technology.
He said he never heard that any U.S. POWs were transferred
to the Soviet Union.

Other reports

A number of those who have written books about POW/MIA-re-
lated issues, including John M.G. Brown, Thomas Ashworth, Mark
Sauter, James Sanders, and Monika Jensen-Stevenson have assert-
et or speculated that some Americans captured during the Viet-
nam War were transferred to the Soviet Union. For many, the
principal source for this allegation has been Mr. Jerry Mooney, a
retired USAF Maj. who served a long career in communications in-
telligence.

In addition to the testimony of Mr. Mooney, the Committee
received several reports that Americans were transferred to the
Soviet Union during this period:

Trung Hieu, a North Vietnamese who has sought political
asylum in the United States, was interviewed by Committee
staff in June 1992. In an interview, Hieu said that the entire
crew of a downed B-52 was turned over to the Soviet Union in
1972; but he backed away from his assertions during his sworn
deposition. (Mr. Hieu, by virtue of his occupation as a photog-
rapher for the Ministry of Culture, may have had access to re-
ports of this kind, but it is doubtful that he would have had
personal knowledge.)

Terrell "Terry" A. Minarcin was also in communications in-
telligence in the Air Force. Mr. Minarcin told the Committee
that he tracked "special flights" of Soviet aircraft in 1977 that
carried American POWs to the Soviet Union.

Jan Senja, a retired Maj. Gen. in the Czechoslovakian Army,
has testified in a deposition and stated in interviews that American
POWs were transported to the Soviet Union, transiting Prague. He said he had personal knowledge of the transfer of
up to 90 such POWs through Prague. Gen. Senja defected
from a high-level position in the Ministry of Defense—where he
would have had access to such information—in 1968, and is
now an employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The Committee found no information to corroborate the reports
of Trung Hieu or Mr. Minarcin.

In December, 1992, during a visit by the Joint Commission to
Prague, Ambassador Toon asked Czech officials whether they had
heard of the allegations made by Jan Senja. None of the officials
denounced or discredited Senja. All promised to research their ar-
chives, but referred the U.S. delegation to the Ministry of Interior
for answers. The Federal Minister of the Interior, Mr. Petr Cermak
said that the allegations must be taken seriously, that the commu-
nists were capable of anything, and that his Ministry would turn
over to the U.S. Government everything it found concerning
Czechoslovakia's involvement in the Korean and Vietnam Wars.\footnote{Select Committee hearing, 1/22/92.}

Mooney testimony

Considering the fact that Jerry Mooney was the principal source
cited by those who assert that American POWs were "Moscow
Bound," his testimony was remarkably equivocal on the subject. He
testified and presented the Committee with a volume of affidavits
on January 22, 1992. The most definitive part of his testimony, as
it relates specifically to American POWs going to the USSR, was
elicited through questioning by Sen. McCain:

Senator McC Affin... Mr. Mooney, I believe you said on
a television program that there were several movements of
American POWs to the Soviet Union, is that correct?

Mr. Mooney. I have never said that sir. What I have
said is that there was a tentacle Mosow-bound. The men
were collected. There was a connection by the "friends." We
knew where they were transported within North Viet-
nam. I have no knowledge of Laos, and we knew where
they went. We knew where the "friends" primary prison
camp was and we knew how they were transported from
North Vietnam over to Sam Neua, Laos, which we design-
nated as Tentacle MB. I never saw an American prisoner
being transported out of Southeast Asia and I have never
said that...

Senator McC Affin. My question is, do you have informa-
d or do you believe that American POWs were taken to
the Soviet Union?

Mr. Mooney. I have no direct information, but consider-
ing the Tentacle Moscow-bound nature of Sam Neua, I
would consider it a probability and, as I have said many
times, they would go only if they were broken.

Senator McCain. So you believe that some Americans
were taken to the Soviet Union?

Mr. Mooney. Under those conditions, sir.

Senator McC Affin. I am not sure I understand your
answer.

Mr. Mooney. Well, sir, let me—

Senator McC Affin. You either believe that some were
taken to the Soviet Union or you do not believe some were
taken to the Soviet Union, Mr. Mooney. I think it's a pretty
straightforward question.\footnote{Select Committee hearing, 1/22/92.}

Mr. Mooney then explained why he believed that flights of IL-
14s carried American POWs from a prison camp northwest of Vinh
to Sam Neua. He said the Soviets had no need for POW labor, but
"were after minds." The flights to Sam Neua were unusual in the
secretly with which they were conducted; there was no air-to-ground communications. "But," Mr. Mooney said, "we did not know if they went on beyond Sam Neua. We did not know. I have no knowledge of that."

Further discussion of Mr. Mooney’s testimony and the Committee’s investigation concerning it may be found in the “Intelligence” chapter of this report.

**ACTIVITIES IN MOSCOW**

**Joint U.S.-Russia Commission**

**U.S. delegation to the Commission**

Malcolm Toon, the Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1976 to 1979, is chairman of the U.S. delegations. The other members of the American delegation are: Kerry, John (Senator, D-Mass); Smith, Robert (Senator, D-N.H.); Miller, John (Congressman, R-Wash); Peterson, Pete (Congressman, D-Fl.); Kauzarich, Richard (Department of State); Quinn, Kenneth (Department of State); Ptak, Al (Department of Defense); Clift, Dennis (Department of Defense); Peterson, Trudy (National Archives; Ad Hoc mbr.); Ross, Edward (Department of Defense, Exec. Sec.).

**Russian delegation to the Commission**

Col. General Dmitri Volkogonov, is chairman of the Russian delegation. Dr. Vladimir Kozlov, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Archives, has served as the Deputy Chairman. Other members of the Russian delegation are: Ambartsoum, Yevgeniy (Act. Chm. Int’l Affairs Comm, SS); Arzhannikov, Nikolay Mikhaylovich (DC, Human Rights, SS); Venkov, Igor Nikolayevich (Col. Dir. Hist. & Mem. Ctr. GS); Kalinin, Yuriy Ivanovich (Col. Min. of Internal Affairs); Kovalov, Sergey Adamovich (Chm. Human Rights Comm, SS); Krayskikh, Anatoliy Afanasyevich (BG, Min. of Security); Lezhikov, Gennadiy Lukyanovich (Col. Dir. MVD Info. Ctr.); Mazarov, Vyacheslav Petrovich (Col. Foreign Intel Serv); Mironov, Vladimir Fedorovich (Consultant, Min. of Jus.); Podrazhants, Iosif Nikolayevich (Acting Chief, No. Amer Dir MFA).

**Plenary meetings**

The Joint Commission’s inaugural meeting was held in Moscow from March 26–28. This was followed by a “Working Group” delegation led by Mr. Ed Ross which met in Moscow from May 27th to 29th. At this session, Gen. Volkogonov gave the American side free rein to contact and interview as they saw fit. This resulted in about a dozen interviews with former colonels and generals who had served in Vietnam. At this time, Gen. Volkogonov provided the American side with 21 documents which primarily dealt with World War II and the Cold War periods.

A full Joint Committee meeting was held between September 21–24 with Ambassador Toon and Gen. Volkogonov in attendance. At that time, Gen. Volkogonov explained President Yeltsin’s statement before the U.S. Congress on the possibility of live Americans in Russia as being based on the revelation of Mr. Hamilton in a Soviet psychiatric hospital. Gen. Volkogonov later admitted that the David Markin story also played a role. During this Joint meeting, ten archival directors gave their reports. They all claimed not to have found any information indicating U.S. soldiers were sent to the USSR from Korea or Vietnam or that Soviets took part in interrogating American POWs from these wars. When it was pointed out that oral interviews were not consistent with President Yeltsin’s statements, Gen. Volkogonov pledged to continue the interviews of former Soviet military personnel with Vietnam and Korean experience. Gen. Volkogonov also admitted at this time that he had not been through the GRU or KGB archives.

**December 1992 meeting**

During the Joint Commission’s Plenary session in December, Gen. Volkogonov stated three Russian positions:

- No Americans are detained against their will in Russia and that is believed to be the case throughout the former Soviet Union;
- The Russian side has established the fate of over 23,000 U.S. personnel held after World War II and considers this issue now closed;
- The Russian side considers the remaining work of the Commission to be the resolution of questions concerning the Cold War era.

The Russian side of the Commission provided a number of documents to the U.S. side, including a list of cases of persons who had been in Russia but were later returned; a document listing four POW camps in Korea during the war and the number of persons held in each; a list of 109 Americans who did not return from the Korean War but who Russian research indicated were not in Russia; and a document containing data on the Cold War incidents. Gen. Volkogonov stated categorically that there has never been a KGB General named Gregoriyev. Thus, any report attributed to this man is false. Volkogonov reviewed the many files that had been researched in response to U.S. requests, including more than 40,000 files of the Ministry of Public Health. None of these investigations has produced information that U.S. persons were held in Russia.

Ambassador Toon agreed that the World War II issue could be considered finished, although not all U.S. members of the Commission agreed. For example, the Commissioner from the National Archives raised several outstanding issues from World War II, which the Russians have not satisfactorily addressed.

After a U.S. Commissioner referred to “strong evidence” that American POWs had been taken to the Soviet Union during the Korean War, the Russian side said they found no evidence in their archival research that this had taken place.

In working group interviews, two retired Russian Colonels, veterans of the Korean War, indicated that it was plausible that a limited number of American specialists had been taken from Korea to Russia in connection with efforts to defeat radars used by U.S. F-86 Sabre Jets during the war. They did not, however, state categorically that U.S. personnel had been taken to Russia. One retired
Colonel indicated that Russia archives still hold all the answers to U.S. questions.

Gen. Volkogonov told the U.S. Commissioners that answers to POW issues connected with the Korean War would be found in the War Museum in Korea, which he had visited six years earlier, and in China. He also stated that political turbulence in Russia was overtaking the work of the Commission and that there continued to be opposition within the Russian Government to its work. He restated President Yeltsin’s support for the Committee, however, and proposed another meeting in the spring of 1993. The two agenda items he raised are the Cold War incidents and investigation of remains recently found on Sakhalin Island. He proposed that the Joint Commission publish a booklet on its work and its findings, with supporting documentation.

**Task Force Russia**

Task Force Russia (TFR) was formed on June 29, 1992. Its basic mission has been to field a Task Force capable of collecting, analyzing and using information provided from Russian archives and citizens to achieve the fullest possible accounting of American POW/MIA personnel. The Task Force has a complement of 40 people based in Moscow and Washington, D.C.

**Personnel**

Col. Ed Pusey was named the first chief of TFR’s Moscow office on September 1, 1992. He presently supervises a staff of 8-10 people including a Deputy, an historian, an archivist, three field interviewers, an interpreter, and administrative NCO, an administrative clerk and a secretary. The Senate Select Committee representative also works out of the TFR Moscow Office which is presently located on the 5th floor of the Old Embassy Building.

**Mission**

The principal mission of the TFR Moscow Office staff is to achieve the fullest possible accounting of American POW/MIA personnel in Russia through the collection and analysis of information provided by and obtained from Russian archives and citizens.

**Objectives**

Organize an effective research, interview and analytical team in Moscow;

- Develop a prioritized research-interview plan supporting TFR’s requirements and priorities;
- Conduct archival research and personal interviews in full cooperation with the Russian side of the Joint U.S.-Russian Commission on POW/MIA;
- Satisfy Russian concerns, particularly those of the military and security services pertaining to the mission and personnel makeup of TFR;
- Assist Russian counterparts, whenever possible, in overcoming shortages in personnel, funding, equipment, and information (when lacking) related to mission accomplishments;

Reduce perceived barriers between General Volkogonov’s commission and the MOD, General Staff, GRU, KGB, and other governmental entities pursuant to TFR’s mission;

- Obtain Russian agency acquiescence in TFR’s mission;
- Maintain and improve upon the positive development of the U.S.-Russian relationship in POW/MIA affairs as well as for the long term with emphasis on the Russian military;
- Satisfy the priorities up and down both U.S. and Russian “chain of command;”
- Develop and maintain cooperative work relationship with AmEmb and DAO Moscow;
- Provide respectable work environment and personal care for TFR’s Moscow Office personnel.

**Russian joint office**

The United States requested that a physical joint office be established for the purpose of conducting interviews. The proposal was formally raised at the Joint Commission meeting on May 28th. On June 8th, Gen. Volkogonov announced that the POW/MIA Team consisting of Al Graham, Col. William Saxe, and Mr. James Connell, would be permitted to conduct interviews at the Joint Office which was to be located at Ilyinka, 12, near Staraya Ploschad [Old Square] the former headquarters of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

**Joint interview program in Russia**

**Background**

Committee investigator Al Graham was posted to Moscow in May, 1992 to represent the Senate Select Committee and work under the aegis of the Joint Commission on POW/MIA affairs. One of his principal tasks while in Russia was, in conjunction with TFR-Moscow team members, to arrange for and conduct interviews with Russian officials, Russian citizens and retired officers who may have served in Southeast Asia during the Korean and Vietnam Wars and therefore might be knowledgeable about possible U.S. POW/MIs. Often, as a consequence of these interviews, other leads were developed.

The majority of interviews have been conducted at Ilyinka 12, the former headquarters of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Committee investigator found that some interviewees were intimidated by this location and somewhat reluctant to reveal all they knew, and many believed the room and telephone to be under surveillance by Russian authorities. Since mid-to-late October 1992, some interviews were held elsewhere to respond to these problems.

Initial interviews were scheduled in early June. Interviewees, at that time, were drawn from the Soviet Vietnamese Veterans Association and a few parliamentarians. Others later learned of and responded to the inquiry as a result of media appeals on Kiev and Moscow TV, and Ambassador Toon and Gen. Volkogonov’s TV broadcast on June 28, 1992. Advertisements were also placed in a number of newspapers. Other interviewees were developed from...
citizens writing, calling or walking in either the American Embassy or the Joint Office at Ilyinka 12.

The interview program has been the major source of forward progress. Russian authorities have provided the Committee with a substantial number of archival documents, mostly concerning World War II. However, this archival effort has yielded very little to date that is verifiable on American POWs during World War II and virtually nothing new about Korea, Vietnam and the Cold War.

By the interview, the results moved the Russians to admit that they were involved in interrogating American POWs in Korea and Vietnam. Moreover, although the Committee has no direct evidence to prove it, there appears to be a strong possibility that at least a handful of U.S. POWs, possibly more, were transferred to Soviet territory during the Korean War.

Based on the Committee's experiences with the Russians to date, the investigators believe the Russian side will likely stick to its current line until the body of evidence gathered through a vigorous interview program forces the government and security services to reevaluate their position.

**Interviews with Russian officials**

These included interviews with Russian active-duty servicemen, GULAG officials, Security service personnel, doctors, archivists, historians, linguists, and parliamentarians.

**Interviews with Russian citizens**

These consist primarily of interviews with retired military officers, foreign service officers and correspondents who served in Southeast Asia as well as with former prisoners who served in the GULAG and ordinary citizens who had knowledge of possible Americans on Russian territory.

Retired Military Officers: The first interviews were conducted by Committee staff investigator Bob Taylor during his trip to Moscow on February 17th, 1992 with Senators Kerry and Smith and his subsequent visit on March 26-27, 1992 during the Joint Commission meetings. On those occasions, he succeeded in interviewing mostly retired senior Soviet officers who had served in Vietnam. The story that emerges from these interviews was that Soviet soldiers were forbidden to have any contact with American POWs, were not armed and did not take part in interrogations of American prisoners. However, this testimony was contradicted by an officer who said that the non-contact rule was not strictly practiced and who admitted that they knew of a Soviet officer sitting behind a screen during an interrogation of an American. These sources added that questions to ask POWs were passed to the Vietnamese from higher Soviet commands. The Committee was also told that there was a Soviet Analytical Team in Hanoi which exploited the information learned from the interrogations.

Col. Gen. Vladimir Abramov, former Commander of the Soviet forces in Vietnam, told the Committee in March that the Vietnamese provided him with a report on every American pilot captured. He said however, that his office kept no files or records on the individual POWs. This information, however, may have been forwarded to Moscow, he thought.

During a second interview with Gen. Abramov on June 1, 1992, the General denied having told investigators during the earlier meeting that he had received a report on every American pilot captured in Vietnam. He also denied saying that a high-placed Vietnamese friend told him at a May 1975 reception in Vietnam that there were still American servicemen being held in Vietnam at that time.

Perhaps the clearest case in which Russian testimony changed during the course of the investigation came during a re-interview with Col. (ret) Gavriil Korotkov, who was stationed in Khabarovsk from 1950-54 and reported directly to the Commander of the Far East Military District. During the first interview with him, conducted on August 19th, 1992, he told five Joint Commission representatives that Soviet military specialists had been given approval to interrogate American servicemen in Korea and that some of the senior, more experienced Americans as well as those with specific specialties were selected for transfer to the USSR for further interrogation. He asserted that the Soviet Naval Base at Posyet served as the transit point for the movement of Americans North [by rail or plane] to Khabarovsk. Col. Korotkov further maintained that the number of Americans processed through Khabarovsk was in the hundreds and that they were kept under KGB control during and after the interrogations.

He claimed not to know their fate after the interrogations. Col. Korotkov said he personally interrogated two American POWs on Russian soil. One was a Lt. Col. Black. Efforts were made, according to Col. Korotkov, to recruit and gain cooperation of Americans. He stated that interrogation reports were sent to the Far East Military District Headquarters, the 7th Directorate of the Main Political Directorate and the GRU. He further maintained that Col. Gen. Shtykov, the Soviet Ambassador to North Korea at the time, prepared reports for Stalin's eyes only.

In a follow-up interview on September 29th, 1992, Col. Korotkov modified his previous statements. He now denied that American POWs during the Korean War were ever interrogated by Soviets in Khabarovsk. He categorically denied ever interrogating an American POW named Black but did admit to interrogating two American POWs in North Korea. He also asserted that there were between 10 and 25 Soviet interrogators involved in this process, indicating that a large number of American POWs may have been interrogated during the Korean War. Although not completely ruling out the fact that these interrogations may have taken place on Russian soil, he now maintained that the interrogation center existed for at least 18 months and was located at a non-demarcated juncture along the North Korean, Chinese and Soviet borders. He also declared that a 150 question questionnaire used to interrogate American POWs during Vietnam was prepared in Khabarovsk. Col. Korotkov added that similar type questionnaires were used to interrogate American POWs during Vietnam. A possible explanation for the modifications in Col. Korotkov's statements is that he received a call the night before the interview from an official of the Foreign Intelligence Service (formerly the KGB).
On December 16, 1992, Col. Korotkov testified at a meeting of the Joint Commission that approximately 100 U.S. POWs were interrogated by Soviets during the Korean war era and that possibly "tens" of these were taken by the special forces to the Soviet Union. Col. Korotkov said that the Soviets tried "to get first-hand information from them and then to turn them." According to Col. Korotkov, the Soviets employed fear, pressure and appeals to material interests in their effort to 'turn' prisoners. He also said that it was common for the American prisoners to change their names and that it is likely some died in the Soviet Union under names different than their own.

Col. Korotkov characterized the Korean-era U.S. POWs with whom he came in contact as 'great patriots' and said:

They were assured, cocky, convinced that someone would come and get them. Among the (Soviet) specialists, we discussed how difficult it was to work with the Americans. The tone of our conversation was that Americans were self-assured, they never gave up hope.

Additional testimony on these subjects was received from a number of other retired Soviet officers:

Col. Aleksandr Semyonovich Orlov (Ret.), who was brought forward on the initiative of the Russian side of the Joint Commission. Col. Orlov said he had no knowledge of American POWs having been taken to the USSR. He did say, however, that he had received special MVD[KGB] permission to interview a certain LTC Black in Pyongyang in July, 1951 primarily for propaganda purposes. Col. Orlov acknowledged that questionnaires were routinely used in obtaining information from American POWs in Korea but that the interrogations were principally carried out by the North Koreans.

Col. (ret.) Viktor Aleksandrovich Bushuyev, former intelligence analyst in North Korea with the 64th Air Defense Corps, told investigators that the Soviets had access to the interrogations of hundreds of American pilots. He claimed not to know if the Soviet officials had taken part in the actual interrogations.

Col. (ret.) Georgiy Kuzmich Plotnikov, assistant Soviet military advisor to North Korea for 7 years, testified that a high-ranking North Korean officer told him in 1953 that some American POWs were sent to the Soviet Union. Moreover, he asserts that he personally interrogated a captured American captain from the 24th Infantry Regiment at a small POW camp on the Yalu River in 1952. Col. Plotnikov said that he conducted the interrogation while dressed in a North Korean major's uniform.

Col. (ret.) Valeriy Ivanovich Ukолов, said in an interview that he witnessed an American pilot being captured in the Russian town of Port Arthur in the summer of 1952.

Col. (ret.) Leonid Ivanovich Ambrosov, Chief of Staff of an anti-aircraft battalion in Vietnam from September 1965 to August 1966, stated that he had no knowledge of Russian participation in the questioning of American prisoners. He did say that the Russians may have provided some questions to the North Vietnamese to be asked of captured Americans. He does not know what happened to the resulting interrogation reports.

Walk-ins: A number of individuals have come voluntarily to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Information provided by these individuals have included an account of an alleged American POW, David Markoff, whose case is discussed later in this report. Other information has been provided by naturalized American citizens and two Russian citizens who had previously spent time in the GULAG. In addition, three Vietnamese nationals living in Moscow handed over dog tags, ID cards, photographs, bone fragments and body parts of alleged Americans. Two of the three did this out of humanitarian concern, while the third claimed to know where the remains of at least 20 Americans were located in Vietnam and asked $75,000 for each set of remains. All of this material was turned over to American experts for verification and analysis.

Write-ins: Since June, 1992, approximately two dozen letters or telegrams have been received from citizens of the former Soviet Union. Many of the writers claim to have knowledge about Americans in Soviet prison camps or psychiatric hospitals. Others claim to have information about grave sites where Americans are allegedly buried. The writers are being contacted by members of the Commission for the purpose of obtaining additional data. Several have asked for guarantees or assurances from the highest authorities against retributions before they speak with the Committee.

Recently, the flow of letters to the Commission has slowed to a trickle. This may be because publicity on the POW/MIA issue has died down or that all letters sent to the Joint Commission on American POW/MIA are now initially screened by the Office of the President for Letters and Appointments.

Call-ins: Most of the call-ins received so far resulted from television programs on which Ambassador Toon, Gen. Volkogonov, and Committee representatives appeared. After the Toon-Volkogonov appearance on June 28, 1992, six people called the Ilyinka-12 "Hot Line." Likewise, several people called this number after Ambassador Toon's press conference in Khabarovsk on September 25, 1992. Committee representative Graham, TFR Moscow officer director Pusey and other POW/MIA team members have frequently appeared on TV on Moscow and other cities throughout the former Soviet Union asking those with information to call Ilyinka 12 or the Embassy. Newspaper advertisements have also resulted in calls with information.

Summary of requests to the Russians

Correspondence files

Correspondence has been sent to the Russian side of the Joint Commission since early September 1992. These letters serve two general purposes. The first is to provide the Russian side with specific data from the U.S. side on individual servicemen or the circumstances surrounding Cold War incidents. The second is to request meetings, interviews with particular people or types of people, and access to archives. To date, requests for interviews with specific individuals have met with little or no success.
Documents requested

Among the kinds of documents that the U.S. has requested are:

**World War II**

Lists of Americans liberated from German POW camps and transported into Soviet territory, especially records that indicate medical treatment or death and burial, and records that indicate sentences for crimes, charges and conviction, and transportation to camps on Soviet territory.

**Cold War**

Reports of aircraft shootdown incidents, including rescue and retrieval operations, reports of sightings, interrogations, and treatment of air crews, recordings and films of shootdowns, log books plus any reports that may be discovered in files of political and diplomatic reaction to such incidents.

For the entire Cold War period, the U.S. has also sought, so far without success, access to records of psychiatric hospitals (or any hospitals under control of the KGB, MVD and predecessors) and those of prison and labor camps. In addition, there is a project under way to compare fingerprints from the FBI collection with those in the collection of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. With respect to the fingerprint files, high hopes have been reduced by the perception that in both collections such files are regularly purged of older records on actuarial terms. The U.S. seeks to have access to the records of the Border Guards for the entire Cold War period because such units may have played a significant role in shootdown incidents during the Cold War period.

**Korean War**

Any documents that indicate the role of Soviet civilian or military officials in the control, interrogation, or transportation of U.S. POWs wherever located, or in the shootdowns of U.S. aircraft during that conflict, or any documents in Russian files that contain information about control, interrogation, or transportation of U.S. POWs in North Korea or China.

**Vietnam War**

Any documents that indicate the role of Soviet military or civilian officials in the control, interrogation, or transportation of U.S. POWs wherever located, or in the shootdown of American aircraft during that conflict, or any documents in Russian files that contain information about control, interrogation, or transportation of U.S. POWs in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia or China.

Documents received

Russian researchers have discovered relevant materials on the POW/MIA issue which they have released to the American side. Early in the process, Gen. Volkogonov and his aides released batches of materials during Joint Commission meetings. More recently, the flow of documents has increased and become more regular.
Documents received thus far from the Russians are too numerous and varied to be summarized effectively in this report. They are listed, analyzed and described in the series of reports printed bi-weekly by the U.S. Army's Task Force Russia, copies of which may be obtained by Members of Congress from the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs. In very general terms, the documents have concerned Americans of other than military origin who were caught up in the throes of World War II or who deserted or otherwise sought political refuge in the Soviet Union, as well as some lists of U.S. military men and some diplomatic exchanges concerning repatriation efforts or shoot-downs. Little of this information has been new to the U.S. side.

Some documents, however, have provided new and useful information. For example, interrogation reports on American POWs which the Russians professed to have received from the Koreans revealed that at least ten men who were heretofore entirely unaccounted for lived long enough to be interrogated. Unfortunately, their fates have still not been determined.

**Assessment of archival research**

The following preliminary judgments can be made based on the Committee's review, thus far, of Russian archival documents:

- Soviet archivists did an excellent job of record-keeping, and current research efforts have barely scratched the surface of what is potentially available throughout the vast archival system of the former Soviet Union. Even the strategic "fires" and other destructions that have taken place do not seriously detract from completeness;
- The traditional archival community is ready and willing to respond to American inquiries, especially in return for fair compensation;
- Officials of the Security and Defense Ministries are currently more resistant to U.S. inquiries, but this may change if the political situation becomes more stable;
- The time schedule for gradual disclosure of information about American POW/MIA may be determined as much by the internal political requirements of the Russian regime as by the needs of Americans for that information;
- It could take many years to carry out a comprehensive program of research within the centralized and regional archives of the former Soviet Union, even if the political atmosphere is hospitable to such an effort;
- The Russian archival material passed to the American side of the Joint Commission appears thus far to constitute a carefully-controlled release of information by the Russian government to convince the U.S. side that the Soviet Union did not capture, detain, interrogate, move or eliminate U.S. POW/MIA.

**POW/MIA family members efforts in Russia**

Committee and TFR representatives in Moscow have met with the relatives of several American POW/MIA who might possibly have been on Russian territory at one time. The Committees/TFR staff also made arrangements for the family members to meet with Robert Strauss, U.S. Ambassador to Russia, and with Gen. Volkogonov and other Russian officials. The family members asked the Russian authorities to help find information on the fate of their loved one. TFR members also passed on correspondence from about two dozen individual family members requesting any additional documentation that the Russians may be able to find concerning their missing relatives.

**Repatriation of U.S. citizens buried in Russia**

The Committee notes that a report on the ABC television program "20/20" that four Americans are still buried in Odessa is not accurate. The remains of at least three, and possibly all four, of the individuals have been repatriated.

TFR is looking into the alleged existence of graves of American servicemen from World War II on Iturup Island in the Kuriles. Accordingly, correspondence has been sent to the Russian side requesting a check of the archives of the Far East Military District, the Pacific Fleet, the Central Army, the Foreign Intelligence Service and the Ministry of Interior [MVD] for any information on the location of U.S. graves.

**Mutual cooperation**

The effort to find POW/MIA is a two-way street. The United States Government may be able to overcome some of the reluctance of the Russian Security Services by addressing similar Russian POW/MIA issues where possible. The U.S. should strive to provide the Russians with more information from our records on Soviet MIAs from World War II, Cold War incidents and Afghanistan. Genuine reciprocity may lead to greater progress.

**Russian inquiries on Afghanistan Veterans**

The Russian side has asked the American side for information concerning 19 former Soviet soldiers who served in Afghanistan and are currently living in the west, and for information on servicemen presently held captive in Afghanistan. In September, Ambassador Toon provided a document to the Russian side listing Soviet POWs from the Afghan War who resettled in the West.

**Soviet submarine incident**

The Russian side has also requested information on the fate of Soviet submarine 574 which sank in the Pacific Ocean in March of 1968. On September 21, 1992, Ambassador Toon handed over a document to the Russians listing three crew members from this submarine. Moreover, the CIA has provided the Russians with copies of a film made during the "Glomar Challenger's" raising of sections of this submarine in August of 1974.

**The Case of "David Markin"**

An individual named Vikto Pugantsev claimed to have spent 1982-1986 in labor camp PL-350/5 near Pechora (some 900 miles northeast of Moscow) with an alleged downed U.S. pilot from the Korean War called David Markin (Marken).

According to Mr. Pugantsev, Mr. Markin told him that he had been shot down about 40 years ago in North Korea, after which he
and 50 other U.S. POWs were flown to the Soviet Union. According to the story, Mr. Markin spent the next three decades in one prison or psychiatric ward after another, ending up in PL350/5 in 1982. He was apparently sent to Soviet psychiatric hospitals when he told people he was in America. While there, he claimed to have been put in a straitjacket, given drugs such as aminazin and an unknown drug which caused his hands to "twist inward."

Mr. Pugantsev described the American as a tall, frail, polite, soft-spoken, psychologically-broken and stooped 60 year old, who had a shaven head, scars on his left shoulder and left forearm and a name tag on his prison uniform identifying him as "Markin, D."

Although, Mr. Pugantsev kept a low profile in camp, Mr. Pugantsev said he was treated worse than other prisoners and was harassed by guards for minor infractions like wearing his cap askew. Three such reprimands earned him a stay in the "solitary-confinement box" where, according to Mr. Pugantsev he spent a good deal of time Mr. Pugantsev maintained that Mr. Markin was still alive at the same camp in 1989.

The Committee and TFR personnel launched an intensive investigation into this matter despite the fact that no David Markin (or any close approximation) appeared on U.S. Government lists of unaccounted for from Korea. Commission investigators flew to Pechora on June 18, 1992. No person or record found there confirmed Mr. Pugantsev's claims. After the disappointing trip to Pechora, Mr. Pugantsev identified another inmate, Vladimir Bageyev, who might be able to confirm his story. Committee investigator Graham flew with a Russian foreign service officer to the city of Elista to interview Mr. Bageyev. Mr. Bageyev confirmed that there was an individual by the name of Markin in Pechora and that this individual matched the description given by Mr. Pugantsev.

In response to this news, Gen. Volkogonov arranged to bring the Director of Operations for the Pechora camp to Moscow to meet face to face with Mr. Pugantsev to determine the truth. Although the meeting took place, the differences in the respective stories could not be resolved. During the course of the discussion, however, not be resolved. During the course of the discussion, additional names of other inmates and camp officials who might be able to provide more information on this matter were disclosed. Seventeen individuals were identified, including 8 officers, 7 inmates and 2 doctors. Five of the eight camp officials provided virtually identical written statements to the effect that there were no Americans at PL350/5 during their tour there. U.S. investigators asked to see the camp hospital records because Mr. Pugantsev, Mr. Bageyev and Mr. Markin were reportedly in the hospital at the same time. The official reply to this request was that the records were destroyed in a fire that took place between August 30 and September 1, 1989.

At the Committee hearings in November, Gen. Volkogonov discounted Mr. Pugantsev's story and suggested that he was motivated by a desire to emigrate to America. Mr. Pugantsev, on the other hand, has told investigators that he has been harassed and threatened as a result of his testimony. He claims that he was summoned to appear at the Security Service [former KGB] office in his native town of Chernovtsy in the Ukraine and queried about his contact

with the Moscow POW/MIA team members. According to Mr. Pugantsev, he was told "not to stick his nose where it did not belong."

The Committee has continued concerns over reports pertaining to "David Markin."

FUTURE ACTIONS

Levels of cooperation

The interview program pursued by the American side of the Joint Commission has been extremely pro-active while the Russian side's response has been reactionary at best. The U.S. side has received little response to correspondence requesting that specific individuals be made available for interviews. Part of this problem may be due to the fact that Gen. Volkogonov has only two assistants. It might expedite things greatly if the number of staff people on the Russian side were increased.

The level of cooperation from the Russian side has not met the standard of official statements. For example, a long-standing request to interview 20 intelligence and security service [former KGB] officials who served during the Korean and Vietnamese War eras was made in early June. The request was kicked back and forth between Col. Kobaladze, the Bureau Chief for Public Affairs of the Russian Intelligence Service and Col. Mazurov, the Foreign Intelligence Service representative on the Joint Commission. Finally, after several months, Col. Kobaladze replied by expressing surprise that his superiors wished to answer a type of request that the CIA would not have. He then informed Committee investigators that of the 20 people we requested to interview four were dead, four were unlocate-able, six had no knowledge of American POWs, two worked for other agencies [MFA & MOD], another never worked for them, one was in England during the entire war effort, one could not be identified and one refused to be interviewed due to illness.

There are a number of other examples of a failure to provide basic information about individuals despite the fact that the information must be readily available to the Russian side. For months, the Russians said they were unable to provide information concerning one individual who, when finally located through U.S. efforts, was found to live scarcely a kilometer from the hotel where the TFR team is housed.

Media appeals for people with information on American POW/MIAs to come forward have also met with limited success. Due to doubts about long term political stability in the country, some citizens may feel reluctant to speak out. Several potential interview candidates have requested assurances and guarantees from the highest authorities before they would talk to investigators. Others may be afraid to become involved with foreigners, either because of the sensitive nature of their employment or because of a general apprehension based on what has happened in the past to Russians who had contacts with foreigners.
Trips and visits

The Russian side has agreed to a 48-hour notice policy for on-site inspections of any camp or archive. Future plans are to visit those camps where Americans were reportedly held.

Planned interviews

The interview program is critical to developing the body of evidence necessary to open the doors to the official records. Interviews, especially of retired officers, have provided the most lucrative source of new or significant information to date. One key to such an effort is publicity. Therefore, the United States needs to publicize widely the efforts of investigators and the desire to obtain additional information.

Follow-up action leads

These include finding and interviewing several former KGB generals, military officers and pilots who are alleged to have been involved in or to have known about the possible transfer of American POWs during the Korean War and the war in Vietnam. It also may be worthwhile exploring if any of the ex-Republic archives, especially those dealing with KGB documents, might have been cased.

Investigation of individual leads

With the break-up of the former USSR, many of the individuals who need to be interviewed and many of the archives of importance are now beyond Moscow’s control. More time and effort should be placed on developing parallel programs in some of the other Republics. Moreover, since much of the information developed to date points to the KGB as the institution most likely to have been involved in arranging transfers and escorting Americans onto Soviet soil, the United States may want to look into which former Republic archives containing KGB records were cased after the coup and whether we can gain access to these records.

CONCLUSIONS

Gen. Volkogonov’s assessment

Gen. Volkogonov contends, to his knowledge, no Americans are currently being held against their will within the borders of the former Soviet Union. Although the Committee has found evidence that some U.S. POWs were held in the former Soviet Union after WWII, the Korean War and Cold War incidents, we have found no proof that would contradict Gen. Volkogonov’s contention with respect to the present. However, the Committee cannot, based on its investigation to date, rule out the possibility that one or more U.S. POWs from past wars or incidents are still being held somewhere within the borders of the former Soviet Union.

Cold war

There is evidence, some of which has been confirmed to the Committee by President Yeltsin, that some U.S. personnel still unaccounted for from the Cold War, were taken captive and held within the former Soviet Union. This information involves several incidents stretching across the former Soviet Union from the Baltic Sea to the Sea of Japan.

The Committee is pleased to report that Task Force Russia has been actively investigating these cases and is keeping surviving family members fully apprised of its progress to date. The Committee notes, however, that progress is, in large part, dependent on cooperation from Russian authorities. In the Committee’s November, 1992 hearings, our investigator in Moscow testified that the U.S. was “intentionally being stonewalled” by the Russians on the subject of Cold War incidents, despite pledges of cooperation from President Yeltsin and Gen. Volkogonov. The Committee, therefore, urges the Joint Commission to place special attention and focus on obtaining further information on the fate of those U.S. personnel who are believed to have been taken captive during the Cold War.

Korean conflict

There is strong evidence, both from archived U.S. intelligence reports and from recent interviews in Russia, that Soviet military and intelligence officials were involved in the interrogation of American POWs during the Korean War. The Committee notes that Task Force Russia concurs in our assessment concerning the transfers. We are pleased that this subject was raised by the U.S. side in December, 1992 at the plenary session of the Joint Commission in Moscow.
The Committee further believes it is possible that one or more POWs from the Korean Conflict could still be alive on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The most notable case in this regard concerns a USAF pilot named David "Markham," or "Markin," who was reportedly shot down during the Korean Conflict. According to several sources, this pilot was reportedly alive in detention facilities in Russia as late as 1991. Although Task Force Russia has thus far been unable to confirm these reports, we note that the investigation is continuing.

Vietnam war

The Committee is aware of several reports that U.S. POWs may have been transferred to the Soviet Union during the Vietnam War. Information about this possibility was provided by a former employee of the National Security Agency (NSA), Mr. Jerry Mooney, who was thoroughly investigated and could not be substantiated. The Committee notes that Mr. Mooney testified that he personally believed prisoners were transferred to the Soviet Union but that he had "no direct information" that this took place. Other reports concerning the possibility that U.S. POWs were transferred from Vietnam to the former Soviet Union deserve further investigation and followup.

With respect to interrogations, the Committee has confirmed that one KGB officer participated directly in the questioning of an American POW during the Vietnam Conflict. More generally, Soviet military officers have told the Committee that they received intelligence from North Vietnamese interrogations of American POWs and that the Soviets "participated" in interrogations through the preparation of questions and through their presence during some of the interrogations. It is possible that American POWs would not have been aware of the presence of Soviet officers during these interrogations. The Committee has also received information that Soviet personnel operated certain SAM sites in Vietnam which shot down American aircraft during the war.

The Committee notes that the cooperation received to date from Russian on POW/MIA matters has been due largely to the leadership of President Boris Yeltsin. During a visit to Washington last summer, President Yeltsin declared that "each and every document in each and every archive will be examined to investigate the fate of every American unaccounted for." Although there is still much work to be done, Russian officials deserve credit for providing access to archival material, for cooperating in efforts to solicit testimony from Russian veterans and other citizens and for their willingness to disclose certain previously undisclosed aspects of the historical record. The ultimate success of the Joint Commission will be judged, however, on whether the U.S. side is able to obtain full support for its interview program and archival research from all levels of power and authority throughout the former Soviet Union.

President Yeltsin has made a heroic effort to demonstrate his own commitment to full cooperation and Gen. Volkogonov has done a great deal, with limited resources, to meet this standard.

Unfortunately, the level of cooperation from within the Russian military and intelligence bureaucracy has been less extensive and has, at times, seemed intentionally obstructive. This may well be due to the uncertainty of the current political situation in Russia. It is vital, therefore, that U.S. officials, both in Congress and the Executive branch, continue to demonstrate to Russian authorities that America attaches a high priority to cooperation on this issue and to ensure that any problems that might develop are raised with the Russians promptly and at a senior level.

The Committee also recommends strongly that the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission be continued and that efforts be made to gain full cooperation, as needed and appropriate, of the other Republics of the former Soviet Union.

Information from North Korea and China

As part of the Committee's investigation into the fate of those Americans still missing from the Korean Conflict, the Committee Vice-Chairman traveled to Pyongyang, North Korea from December 19-21, 1992. This trip was especially significant in that it was the first time a United States Senator had traveled to the North Korean capital. Also, for the first time, a State Department official traveled with Senator Smith to Pyongyang, in addition to two staff members working with the Committee. The trip itself was a followon to an earlier trip made by Senator Smith to Korea in June, 1991.

The timing of the trip was important in that just a few weeks earlier, the Committee had held the first in-depth Congressional hearings on American POW/MIAIs from the Korean Conflict in more than 35 years. In view of the fact that the North Korean Government has provided virtually no information on 8,177 unaccounted for Americans in the last 40 years, the goal of the trip was to establish a dialogue which would encourage North Korea to move the accounting process forward on a humanitarian basis. A second goal of the fact-finding trip was to gain information from North Korea on reports which had surfaced during the Committee's November hearings on the fate of some American POWs.

The committee is pleased to report that Senator Smith was successful in achieving both of these goals during the trip.

Meetings were held with Supreme Assembly Speaker Yang Hyong Sop, Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju, and a staff of ministry officials who appeared knowledgeable on POW/MIA issues. The atmosphere was cooperative and it was the sense of Senator Smith and his delegation that North Korea is prepared and willing to move forward on this humanitarian issue without any preconditions. As a sign of good faith, the North Koreans allowed Senator Smith and his delegation to visit their war museum in Pyongyang, although the request had been made only hours earlier. This was the first time any American official had visited the museum. At the museum, Senator Smith was able to view photographs of POWs, documents, letters, personal effects and captured weaponry from U.S. servicemen. Senator Smith's delegation was

---

612 The Committee notes, however, that over the past two and one-half years, North Korea has repatriated the remains of 41 American servicemen.
also permitted to photograph and take notes concerning many of the items in the museum. Important new information was also learned from North Korean officials concerning China’s involvement with American POWs.

The principal Committee findings and recommendations concerning this trip are:

Although the North Korean officials with whom Senator Smith met denied that any American POWs had survived to the present day in North Korea, the Committee cannot exclude the possibility in view of intelligence information which has been received by the United States in recent years. Specifically, the Committee shares Senator Smith’s frustration during his trip at not being able to investigate unconfirmed reports that a small number of American POWs may be teaching English at a military language school on the outskirts of Pyongyang. The Committee, therefore, urges the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to cooperate fully in the investigation of these recent reports, in addition to other live-sighting reports which have been received by the United States during the last few decades.

It is likely that a large number of possible MIA remains can be repatriated and several records and documents on unaccounted for POWs and MIAs can be provided from North Korea once a joint working level commission is set up under the leadership of the United States. Accordingly, the Committee strongly urges the Departments of State and Defense to take immediate steps to form this commission through the United Nations Command at Panmunjom, Korea. The Committee also encourages President-elect Clinton, upon taking office, to appoint a high level representative to sit on the commission. The Committee further believes that the proposed joint commission should have a strictly humanitarian mission and should not be tied to political developments on the Korean peninsula.

Comments made by North Korean officials during the trip substantiated indications that many American POWs had been held in China during the Korean Conflict and that foreign POW camps in both China and North Korea were run by Chinese officials. In addition, North Korean officials confirmed that propaganda photos showing POW camps with large numbers of U.S. personnel had, in fact, been taken in China, not in North Korea as purported by the propaganda publications. The Committee notes that other information from both high level Russian intelligence sources and from several U.S. intelligence reports corroborate the comments made by the North Koreans.

Given the fact that only 26 Army and 15 Air Force personnel returned from China following the war, the Committee can now firmly conclude that the People’s Republic of China surely has information on the fate of other unaccounted for American POWs. The Committee, therefore, strongly urges the Departments of State and Defense to form a POW/MIA task force on China similar to Task Force Russia. The Committee also strongly urges the Department of State to raise this matter at the highest levels in Beijing. In this regard, we are pleased that the first round of talks was held in January, 1993. We believe that a proposed POW Task Force on China will need to have several additional rounds of talks with the Chinese in order to search for and receive POW information in China over the coming months.

For the surviving families of those Americans still missing from the Korean Conflict, the perception has been that determining the fate of their loved ones is a task that has not been vigorously pursued by their government. We note that this perception has been fueled by past intransigence and lack of information from North Korea and China. In addition, accounting for POWs and MIAs from the Vietnam Conflict has received far greater media attention in America. The Committee can therefore understand why the Korean Conflict has often been labeled the “ Forgotten War” by veterans and POW/MIA family members.

However, in view of the Vice-Chairman’s recent trip to North Korea, the Committee believes that a dramatic breakthrough has been achieved in terms of establishing a dialogue and gaining access to new information on POWs and MIAs. Consequently, there is now a window of opportunity which the Committee believes should be fully exploited by the United States on behalf of the families of those Americans still missing from the Korean Conflict.

CHAPTER 10: RETROSPECTIVE

CONCLUSIONS AND A LOOK AHEAD

The U.S. Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs has accomplished most of the goals and tasks that were assigned to it by the U.S. Senate at its creation. However, as with any assignment to review matters occurring over a 20-year period and involving thousands of individuals, there remain areas of inquiry that still must be completed. These areas fall into the following broad categories:

Russia

The Committee recommends that the U.S./Russia Commission continue to pursue those leads which involve the countries of the former Soviet Union, including, but not limited to:

Interview Vladimir Churkov, head of the KGB 6th Division (Southeast Asia) during the mid- to late-1970s. It was General Kalugin’s testimony that Gen. Churkov would be the most knowledgeable individual as to whether U.S. POWs were held in Vietnam after 1973. The Senate Select Committee has not been able to obtain an interview with Gen. Churkov.

Re-evaluate the testimony of General Kalugin versus the testimony of Oleg Nepochirenko. Gen. Kalugin testified at his deposition that U.S. POWs in Vietnam were interviewed by KGB agents (Nepochirenko) after 1973 and possibly as late as 1976. Oleg Nepochirenko told Senators Kerry and Smith in Moscow that he interviewed a POW in 1973. He also said he prepared a questionnaire for use by the Vietnamese. Both the CIA and the Vietnamese confirmed the KGB interrogation of the CIA agent.

Interview the Soviet Ambassador to Laos (1973). Gen. Kalugin testified that this Soviet Ambassador was very knowledgeable about this matter. He stated that if such POWs were kept,
the Soviet Ambassador would almost certainly have known. The Senate Select Committee has been unable to schedule an interview with the Ambassador.

Continued pursuit of the KGB, GRU and Soviet Military Archival records. The records of these organizations, if made available to the U.S., will assist in finally determining whether any Vietnam-era POWs were taken to the former USSR.

Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia

The Committee recognizes that many answers to the questions it posed this year lay in Southeast Asia and recommends that the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the Joint Task Force for Full Accounting (JTF-FA) continue to work with the governments of these countries to find answers. These matters should include:

The continued pursuit and evaluation of information from the Vietnamese archives;

The continued pursuit and evaluation of information from and about Lao official records.

Interviews of former Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphanouvong and former Pathet Lao spokesman Soth Petrasay concerning their war-time statements that they (Pathet Lao) were holding U.S. POWs in Laos. The Senate Select Committee was unable to obtain permission from Prince Souphanouvong or from Mr. Petrasay for an interview. Neither individual felt able at this time to add to the statements they had already made.

Access to and evaluation of the information available on Lima Site 85. The Senate Select Committee was unable to obtain Lao permission for JTF-FA to examine the site of this incident. The Lao military commanders who are knowledgeable about the fate of the Americans who were present when the intelligence site was overrun should be interviewed.

China and North Korea

The Committee recognizes that the Governments of China and North Korea continue to hold information concerning the fates of U.S. servicemen. The Committee recommends the following:

Continued pursuit of information from museums, archives and government officials in North Korea that was begun by the Committee;

The formation of a commission similar to the U.S./Russia Commission to work with the Government of China;

The formation of a commission similar to the U.S./Russia Commission to work with the Government of North Korea.

The Department of Defense

The Committee recognizes the accomplishments of the Department of Defense but also recommends the following areas of continued pursuit:

Continuation of the JTF-FA approach to information gathering in Southeast Asia;

Declassification and release to the public (in cooperation with Garwood’s attorneys) of all records that relate to PFC Robert Garwood;

Full analysis of the Operation Homecoming debriefs. The debriefs should be reexamined to answer finally and with absolute certainty that no POWs remain unaccounted for who were in the prison system. The Senate Select Committee was not allowed to do an independent examination of the debriefs because of promises made to returning POWs by DoD at Homecoming.

Interview of former South Vietnamese President Thieu. President Thieu should be interviewed to determine how much information the South Vietnamese military intelligence had concerning American POWs in both North Vietnam and Laos.

Continued analysis and evaluation of the 4500(+) photos received from the Government of Vietnam;

Continued analysis and evaluation of all material received from the Vietnamese archives;

Continued support of the Vessey initiatives.

Inter-Agency group

The Committee believes that an inter-agency coordinating body for POW/MIA policies is needed and that the IAG for POW/MIA Affairs ably fulfills this role. However, the Committee is disturbed by the lack of formality in IAG record-keeping and believes that, at a minimum, that the minutes of discussions at such meetings should be maintained.

In addition, although the IAG should consult regularly with the League and other POW/MIA family organizations, the Committee believes that the role of the IAG and issues of membership on it should be reviewed by the new Administration.

Department of Justice

The Department of Justice was very supportive of the Committee and was able to accommodate almost all of its requests. There are areas, however, which will require continued independent investigation, such as:

Evaluation of previous referrals from the Committee to the Department of Justice to assess the appropriateness for prosecutions of fraud cases;

Review of the materials to be provided to the Department of Justice from the December Oversight hearing;

Evaluation of any new referrals coming at the end of the Committee life.

Watergate tapes

The Committee was denied access to the Watergate tapes and strongly believes it is in the public interest that Congress pursue that information.

Progress on declassification

All records used by the Committee in the Office of Senate Security (U.S.-407) have been declassified, except for National Security
Agency records, these are to be declassified soon, according to the N.U.S.A.\textsuperscript{614}

Approximately one-sixth of the 1.5 million pages of material ordered declassified by the 1991 McCain Amendment to the DoD Authorization had been declassified by publication date. That law gave DoD until November 1994 to establish libraries of POW/MIA information correlated to unaccounted-for servicemen for their families, and a library of uncorrelated information for all concerned citizens.

**Information about the committee**

Copies of the Committee Report and hearing transcripts will be available from the Government Printing Office beginning in February 1993. They also are available through the U.S. Government Depository Libraries located at most colleges and listed in the attached directory.\textsuperscript{615}

Non-published Committee records will be available to the public through the National Archives beginning in early February 1993. These include staff materials, memos of conversation, notes and other documents that may include incorrect data, discredited theories, incomplete pieces of information, or staff opinion, however; the Committee’s judgments, after consideration of all evidence available to United States Senators, is reflected in this Report.

Other information and judgments should not be accorded credibility simply because of its presence in the Committee’s working files; the staff was structured to provide the Committee’s Members with the strongest arguments on all sides of each issue, and their comments must be taken in totality. All Committee documents are available through the National Archives; please contact its Center for Legislative Archives, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 20408, telephone 202/501-5350.

**ANNEX: MEMBERS’ FLOOR STATEMENTS**

Some of the statements Committee members made on the Senate floor are appended. For statements made after publication date, please check the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

**STATEMENT OF JOHN KERRY, CHAIRMAN, JANUARY 25, 1993**

On January 13, after more than a year’s work and investigation, the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs released its final report.

That report did not resolve fully the POW/MIA issue, nor was it intended to. But I believe that it, and the body of the Committee’s work, have done much to heal the wounds of distrust and division that have characterized this controversy for 20 years.

The Members of the POW/MIA Committee are of differing backgrounds, temperaments and ideologies. Some Members had devoted years of effort to studying POW/MIA matters; others had only a general familiarity with the issue. Some came to the issue with emotions forged in the personal experience of service in Vietnam; one was a former POW.

If anyone had predicted at the outset that these eleven men and one woman would come together at the end of fourteen months to add their names to a single document on this most emotional and controversial of issues, that person would not have believed it. And, in fact, our investigation was characterized, at times, by sharp disagreement about fact, focus and process. Up until the very end, there was a possibility that we would not agree on the final report. And that report does cite a lack of unanimity on a few significant issues.

But I am convinced that the final product of this Committee’s work reflects the combined strengths of its Members, and that we were able to transform our differences of perspective into a tool for digging out the truth.

There is not a single significant finding or recommendation in the report that was not subject, at some point, to challenge or questioning from within the Committee. Key sections were the subjects of lengthy debate. Any thesis that could not stand up in the face of evidence gathered by the Committee was excluded; and only those findings that could be supported, after consideration of all available information, were left in.

The result is a report that I believe is as close to the full truth as we could hope to come. Because we were so demanding, and because the POW/MIA family members and activist groups were so demanding about declassification, this report reflects the sum total of what the US Government knows about the POW/MIA issue, particularly as it relates to the Vietnam era. No longer can anyone fairly claim that knowledge on this issue has been locked away; or that there exists a conspiracy of silence; or that the basic parameters of truth are in doubt.

We know, as a result of our investigation, that there were not 2,264 Americans whose fates were truly unknown following the Vietnam War. This is the number of Americans who went to Southeast Asia and who have not returned either alive or dead. But we know that the vast majority of those Americans died during the war—pilots who crashed over water, soldiers injured beyond recognition in combat, servicemen buried in graves that were subsequently destroyed by allied bombing, airmen killed in the remote jungles of Laos or Cambodia. For most of these 2,264, although there is not proof positive in the form of a body that they are dead, there is also absolutely no evidence that they survived or were taken captive.

For a small number of these 2,264 American perhaps around 100, the story is somewhat different. In some cases, individuals were known to have been taken captive. Others were known to have survived crashes and to be alive on the ground. Others disappeared in circumstances where the possibility of survival and capture was very real. Even here, however, the number of Americans known for certain to have been taken captive is quite small and—in some of these cases—there are indications that the individual may have died or been killed at the time of their incidents.

Although the Committee, unlike previous investigations, uncovered evidence that a small number of Americans may have sur-


\textsuperscript{616} NSA letter to Committee, Dec. —, 1992.

\textsuperscript{617} Directory of U.S. Government Depository Libraries.
vived in captivity after Operation Homecoming, there is, in my view, no reason to believe that any Americans remain alive today. Yes, the possibility exists that a prisoner or prisoners could be held deep within a jungle or behind a locked door under conditions of greatest security. But there is no evidence of that, and it is hard to conceive of a reason for it. Moreover, the nations of Vietnam and Laos are becoming more and more open. Foreign businessmen, diplomats, tourists and aid workers have poured into both countries, especially Vietnam. But neither these foreigners, nor any of the thousands of individuals who have worked in the Laotian or Vietnamese prison systems, have come forward with a confirmed report that an American is being held alive. Moreover, the Select Committee conducted an exhaustive review of files, records, photographs and other materials without developing a single, solid lead indicating that an American is currently being held in captivity. We are operating, and we should continue to operate, on the presumption that one or more Americans may still be held alive; but we cannot say that we have found evidence in the form of live-sighting reports, signals or imagery intelligence or other sources that make us optimistic about that possibility today.

Although we have reached some important conclusions based on our own analysis of the evidence, the Select Committee was not intended to serve as final judge and jury of the POW/MIA issue. Our principal task was to get the facts on the table so the American people could decide for themselves. That's why we put such an emphasis on declassification, it's why we insisted on open, public hearings; and it's why we have included such a wealth of information in our report. It is inevitable that different people will view the data differently. The important thing, however, is that the information is now available; and that a process for following up effectively on this and possible future revelations is in place.

It is ironic—and revealing—that more Americans are now officially working on the POW/MIA issue than at any time since the end of the war. According to figures received by the Committee, the Defense Department is now spending $100 million annually on the problem. Teams of investigators are based in Hanoi and Bangkok and are increasingly being granted access to Laos, as well.

The fact is that we can do more now because we are being allowed to do more now. Particularly over the past 12 months, there have been dramatic improvements in the level of cooperation from Vietnam. I personally find little mystery in Vietnam's motive for this cooperation, for it is clearly in their best interests to establish economic and political ties to the west now that their allies and trading partners within the old Soviet bloc have disappeared. Obviously, current cooperation does not erase the memory of 20 years of broken promises, noncooperation and outright lies. But we remove the incentive for the Vietnamese to change if we refuse to recognize change when it occurs. And the evidence that there has been real change in the area of POW/MIA cooperation is abundant. Within the past year, Vietnam has given:

- Permission for U.S. investigators to carry out short-notice investigations of many live-sighting reports;
- Permission for U.S. investigators to use U.S.-owned, maintained and operated helicopters in the course of investigations within Vietnam;
- Grants of access to certain highly-secure prison and defense ministry buildings for the purpose of investigating live-sighting reports;
- Guarantees of full access for U.S. investigators to political and military archives containing POW/MIA related information;
- Access to certain key archival documents and personnel that had been long-requested, and long-denied by Vietnam;
- Access to photographs of American wartime casualties;
- Access to Vietnam's military museum, including hundreds of material objects once owned by American servicemen that might contain clues about the fate of missing Americans;
- Amnesty for any Vietnamese citizens illegally holding American remains who come forward with them;
- A commitment to cooperate in the conduct of an "oral history" program that would seek to record information from Vietnamese military officials, soldiers and civilians who might have information about the fate of missing Americans;
- Promises of full cooperation from Vietnam in working with Laos and Cambodia to investigate discrepancy cases involving servicemen lost in parts of those countries controlled by North Vietnamese forces during the war; and
- Permission for POW/MIA families, if they so desire, to come to Vietnam and evaluate the investigation process.

Although some have dismissed the significance of these recent developments, the fact is that there is little left for us to ask of Vietnam that we have not already been granted or promised. Obviously, we cannot, given the history, simply take Vietnam at its word. We must insist that the promises that have been made will be kept. But I personally believe that—if those promises are kept, and if we maintain our own commitment to the issues—we are now on track with a process of accountability, investigation and cooperation that will resolve the POW/MIA issue to the best of our ability to do so.

In this connection, I think it is particularly helpful when representatives of veterans groups and the POW/MIA families are able to visit Southeast Asia and talk directly to the leaders of the governments involved. The Vietnamese have made it clear that they welcome such visits and that they believe it is useful for those directly affected to be in a position to understand and evaluate the investigatory efforts now being made.

Because of certain controversies that arose while our Committee was drafting its report, one additional point needs to be made. The POW/MIA issue should be above partisanship. The Americans who are missing did not risk their lives for a political party, but for a country. The process of investigating their fate becomes invalid if we allow it to be colored by concerns of party affiliation or historical reputation. Moreover, the two major political parties contributed amply and in roughly equal measure to the decisions, deceptions and divisions of the wartime period.

For years ago, in his Inaugural Address, former President Bush said that:
Our great political parties have too often been far apart and untrustworthy of each other. It's been this way since Vietnam. That war leaves us still. But, friends, that war began in earnest a quarter of a century ago; and, surely, the Statute of Limitations has been reached. This is a fact: the final lesson of Vietnam is that no great nation can afford to be sullied by a memory.

The recent campaign demonstrated how hard it is—even for the former President—to live up to those sentiments, but also how important it is that we do so. Our nation faces a multitude of challenges today at home and abroad. How well and how aggressively we respond to these challenges has nothing to do with the divisions of generation and outlook that characterized our nation a quarter century ago; and everything to do with our ability now to pull together in a single direction.

The Select Committee's unanimous report is an indication of what is possible when diverse Americans focus on what is agreed rather than what divides; and on future recommendations, rather than past rationalizations.

As Chairman of the Select Committee, I am proud of the Committee's work and proud of its staff and Members. The POW/MIA issue has not been resolved, but the ball has been advanced far down the field. The families of those missing, not only from Vietnam, but from previous conflicts, have reason to believe that their government is now doing what it should to find out what it can.

I am personally grateful to all those who served on the Committee, Vice-Chairman Bob Smith, and Senators Hank Brown, Tom Daschle, Chuck Grassley, Jesse Helms, Nancy Kassebaum, Bob Kerrey, Herb Kohl, John McCain, Harry Reid and Chuck Robb. I do not know of a Committee that has worked harder or with greater commitment than this one. The conclusion of the Committee does not mean that we will cease working together to see that remaining POW/MIA work is done—either by the Executive branch or through appropriate Congressional oversight. Our commitment continues even if the Committee does not.

Finally, I must close with a tribute to the POW/MIA families. They are, at bottom, what this investigation has been all about. Their persistence through years of partial neglect and inexcusable secrecy, has been validated by the work of the Select Committee. They said there was more to the story than had previously been told and they were right. Even more important, their dedication to finding the truth about their loved ones reflects something very deep and very good about the human character. Let no one ever be blamed for believing in his or her heart that the conventional wisdom is wrong. It is, after all, the questioners, not the complacent, who advance our state of knowledge; and those who remember, even when the memories are painful, who keep honor and loyalty before us all our lives.

**Statement of Senator Bob Smith**

Let me begin by thanking the staff, who—in the closing days of this investigation have really been tough people staying up all night until the wee hours of the morning trying to get documents typed and accommodating the views of Senators.

There have been some difficult times throughout the course of this investigation, and I want to single out two members of the opposition party, who in extremely difficult times, did seek me out and talk to me. One is Harry Reid and the other is Tom Daschle who sat next to me through the hearings. I appreciate their advice during the more challenging and trying moments in our investigation.

And of course, to the chairman—John Kerry and I were thrown together by the discretion of our leaders. We did not know each other, and we took the time to try to get to know each other. And the interesting thing is when things got very difficult, and many times they did, we turned to each other, not against each other. Have we had differences, yes, we have. The American people have had differences.

But when it came down to getting a report written, nobody threatened to walk out. We extended our hands to each other and we shook hands and we were able to do it. And Senator Kerry deserves a tremendous amount of credit for the fact that we were able to come to this agreement that we have today.

Is every single thing in the report what I would have written myself? Of course not. But where there were differences, I had the opportunity to express those differences in the report. You cannot be any fairer than that. And I commend the chairman for his strong leadership in getting us to this point.

This investigation was bipartisan, indeed non-partisan, throughout the last year. Members did not sit at one side or another at the hearings depending on their party affiliation. There was absolutely not one word uttered of partisanship throughout all the hearings, public and private. The private conversations, informal procedures, I never heard a word of partisan debate on the central issues in our investigation.

Our work represents the most comprehensive investigation that was ever done in the history of this issue, and hopefully that will be our legacy. In fact, we started by reviewing other investigations that have been done in the past, and we built upon those.

Our goal was to know what our own government knew, and to get that out to the American people. We did not and could not expect to get all of the answers from the Vietnamese or the Lao or any other government. But we could expect to get information from our government, and I believe, we've done that to the greatest extent possible during the last year.

Hearing records, depositions, government documents, extensive declassification—that is our legacy. The President of the United States, George Bush, and especially Brent Scowcroft, Dick Cheney, and Robert Gates were extremely cooperative. They went out of their way to make documents available to us that had never before been seen by Members of Congress.

Did we see everything? Was it complete? We certainly believe the review of materials was extensive, although there will always be doubt on whether we saw everything that was truly pertinent to resolving our questions.
Americans can take pride in the fact that this issue has now been opened to scrutiny, more so than at any time in the last 40 years. We did not close the books. We opened the books.

This committee was formed because there is distrust. We tried to allay that distrust by getting the books opened. The issue has been an emotional and contentious one for the past 20 years in Vietnam, and longer than that in Korea and the Cold War. It has been contentious and emotional for veterans and families, and it was contentious and emotional for the committee members as well.

I would like to briefly lay out some observations on key areas in our report:

1. Paris peace accords.

We are here today because Vietnam and Laos did not fully comply with the Paris Accords and the Laos Cease-Fire Agreement in 1973. That is the primary reason we are here. If they had complied fully, I think the issue would have been resolved, and we would not be here 20 years later. We are also here today because in 1973, Americans had become weary with the war, there were anti-war protests, Congress voted to cut off funds and it did not support legislation such as the Dole Amendment. We are also here today because by March, 1973, Watergate was consuming the attention of the President. In this framework, I am convinced Dr. Kissinger tried his best to negotiate an agreement and implement accords with an intrasignificant enemy who exploited the American political situation. And they did it well.

So, in this environment, did we get a full accounting? The answer is no. But there is no doubt that everyone is united today in demanding the fullest possible accounting from Vietnam and Laos.

2. State of the evidence on POWs in Southeast Asia

This was the most contentious area of the investigation. We knew it would be contentious, so we tried to conduct the most thorough examination of the intelligence ever done to see if consensus could be reached on the question of evidence of live POWs after 1973. Staff investigators worked thousands of man hours investigating every single available lead that we could find. For the most part, we were successful in pursuing the majority of leads. The exceptions are noted in the report.

Based on our review of all available intelligence information, the Committee unanimously agreed that there is evidence that indicates the possibility of survival (of American POWs) after Operation Homecoming. As of today, we also agree that there is evidence that some POWs may have survived to the present... and some information still remains to be investigated. However, at this time, there is no compelling evidence that proves Americans are still alive.

In the Final Report, readers will note that there is a majority and minority view on the state of some of the evidence which the Committee explored—mainly the live-sighting reports analyzed by our investigators using basic techniques such as plotting relevant sightings on a map to look for patterns and clusters. These reports and the analysis by Committee staff will be available for the public at the National Archives.

The essence of the minority view on this portion of the investigation is that the Committee staff analysis indicates to me and to Senator Grassley a strong possibility that some American POWs could still be alive. I would also stress that my conclusion on the intelligence is based on all-source information, to include signals intelligence, imagery, and the live-sighting/hearsay reports. I also agreed with Senator Grassley that in the case of one possible symbol which corresponds to a known MIA's authenticator number, the benefit of doubt should go in favor of the individual. This case is especially disturbing in view of the fact that the possible symbol is located only 400 feet from a secure detention facility in northern Vietnam.

Finally, concerning intelligence reports which have not yet been fully investigated in Vietnam or Laos, the question we were faced with is Members is "What do you believe?" It is my judgment that many of the live-sighting reports of Americans in captivity are compelling and appear credible. The sheer volume of this evidence cannot be summarily dismissed when one considers the fact that in Laos alone, we have not visited any detention facilities.

I also find the live-sightings from Robert Garwood who returned from Vietnam in 1979 to be very credible. Even the Vietnamese have confirmed many of the details concerning Garwood's movement and prison visits in northern Vietnam, including his work in 1977 to repair a generator at a prison complex in Thach Ba Lake on the outskirts of Hanoi. In typical fashion, I believe DIA used pending convictions against Garwood upon his return to the U.S. as a basis for discrediting his reports about other American POWs. They have also consistently stated, as recently as June, 1992, that no such prison as Garwood described at Thach Ba Lake ever existed, even though the Vietnamese have confirmed Garwood's description of the facility. These actions by DIA have often been referred to as the "mindset to debunk" possible information on live American POWs.

3. Defense Intelligence Agency

As noted in the Executive Summary, several Members of the Committee, including the Chairman and myself, have formally expressed our concern that some individuals involved with DIA's POW/MIA activities have, on occasion, been evasive, unresponsive, and disturbingly cavalier. I hope that this situation will be reviewed by the new Administration to ensure that we have dedicated personnel who are objectively committed to finding the truth about our POWs and MIAs.

4. Past wars

The public should realize that the findings of the Committee concerning evidence of Korean War POWs who did not return contradict statements by U.S. Government officials in recent years that there was no evidence to suggest POWs from these wars did not come home. The Committee found strong evidence that some American POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union during the Korean War. The Committee has also firmly concluded that China
surely has information on the fate of unaccounted for POWs from the Korean War.

Finally, based on its investigation and review of intelligence information, the Committee cannot rule out the possibility that one or more POWs could still be held against their will in North Korea and on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Concerning the Cold War, it is important to note that the evidence is convincing that some unaccounted for American servicemen lost during the Cold War were actually captured and held in the Soviet Union. Their fates are unknown. We are hopeful that a continuation of the U.S./Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA matters along with the very recent increased level of cooperation from North Korea and China will result in answers to these questions.

5. Vietnam and Laos

The Executive Summary describes in detail the overall judgment of the Committee concerning the level of cooperation on POW/MIA matters from Vietnam and Laos. We are pleased with recent cooperative efforts by Vietnam, although disappointed that it took 20 years to get to this point. In Laos, we are disappointed by what we believe is a general lack of access to allow investigation of live-sighting reports and discrepancy cases. We strongly encourage Lao leaders to match the new level of cooperation our investigators are now experiencing in Vietnam.

6. Families

Certainly the families of unaccounted for POWs and MIAs have had the most to lose following past military conflicts. They have literally been on a rollercoaster ride perpetrated by a historical lack of cooperation from Communist governments and difficulty in securing information from our own government. It these families that have consistently motivated us during the last 8 years to help them in their search for answers. “Not Knowing” and uncertainty can be even more difficult than knowing that death of a loved one has occurred. We rightly pay tribute to these families in our Final Report. Moreover, we have urged our government to centralize and declassify POW/MIA records to ensure families and the public have access to what our Government knows.

The Committee has worked tirelessly during the past year to open this issue to the American public so together we can all try to seek the truth on our POWs and MIAs. We owe no less to those who make the ultimate sacrifices on behalf of their nation’s freedom, as well as to their families and their comrades who fought with them.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR NANCY LANDON KASEBALA, JANUARY 21, 1993

Mr. President, the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs has culminated its work with the release of its report, which provides a very extensive review of the issue.

I would like to join my colleagues in commending the chairman, Senator John Kerry (D-Mass) for his leadership on this committee. Senator Kerry, despite the committee’s differences on various aspects of this issue, kept the committee non-partisan and kept our eye on the central fact that we were all working for the families.

In this same regard, Senator Bob Smith (R-NH), our vice chairman also deserves our commendation.

The members of this committee started with a wide range of views on this issue, but every member shared the determination to find answers and provide recommendations on how our government could better serve the families whose sons and daughters had made the greatest sacrifice for our nation. It was this shared spirit that the chairman and the vice chairman tapped and were successfully able to mold into a productive force.

As someone who had not had an extensive knowledge of this issue when this process began, I have come to know firsthand the pain this tragedy has caused for countless families. This experience has only served to reinforce my own commitment to ensuring that our government is responsive to its citizenry, particularly in areas as important as this one.

In my view, the most important accomplishment for the committee has been the release of an unprecedented amount of information that will help ultimately resolve the questions about U.S. servicemen still unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. While the committee was not able to resolve all of the questions surrounding this issue, its main success was to put in place a process in which questions can be answered about missing Americans and that over time this process will provide additional answers.

This process includes the most rapid and extensive declassification of public files and documents on a single issue in American history. The release of these documents, combined with our hearing record and with this report will now provide an unprecedented amount of resources which can help resolve this issue.

The report is a unanimous report supported by all 12 members of the committee. It is a very honest and direct report. Where there are differences among the members, these differences are noted. While it provides a review of the background of this issue, including an analysis of the Paris peace accord, it would be beyond the scope of this report to give a complete history of the more than twenty years covered. What we tried to do was highlight those areas and factors over the years which had an important impact on this issue. I believe the result of this effort is the most comprehensive review of the POW/MIA issue that has even been provided.

The committee’s main conclusion was that there is no compelling evidence that any American POWs are alive today in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, the Committee also determined that despite official statements to the contrary, our government expected over 100 more Americans home at Operation Homecoming. While we do not believe that American officials had certain knowledge that any specific prisoner or prisoners were left behind after Operation Homecoming, the fact that these individuals were not accounted for began the twenty year agony on this issue.

Ultimately we are still dependent on the Southeast Asian countries, particularly Vietnam and Laos, for cooperation on this issue. But, a more effective and responsive policy on the part of our government can help heal the wounds and answer remaining questions.
It is in this regard, that I would strongly recommend the implementation of the committee's recommendations for the executive branch on how to improve its handling of the POW/MIA issue.

By far the greatest obstacle to a successful accounting effort over the years has been the refusal of the foreign governments involved, until recently, to allow the U.S. access to key files or to carry-out in-country, on-site investigations. But, I would like to underscore the committee's conclusion that the U.S. government's process for accounting for Americans missing in Southeast Asia has been flawed by a lack of resources, organizational clarity, coordination and consistency. These problems had their roots during the war and worsened after the war as frustration about the ability to gain access and answers from Southeast Asian government increased.

The committee's recommendations include encouraging the Executive branch to establish a process of livesighting response, investigation and evaluation that is more extensive and professional than ever before. They also include:

Accounting for missing Americans from the war in Southeast Asia should continue to be treated as a "matter of highest national priority" by our diplomats, by those participating in the accounting process, by all elements of our intelligence community and by the nation, as a whole.

Continued, best efforts should be made to investigate the remaining unresolved discrepancy cases in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

The United States should make a continuing effort, at a high level, to arrange regular tri-partite meetings with the Governments of Laos and Vietnam to seek information on the possible control and movement of unaccounted for U.S. personnel by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces in Laos during the Southeast Asian war.

The President and Secretary of Defense should order regular, independent reviews of the efficiency and professionalism of the DOD's POW/MIA accounting process for Americans still listed as missing from the war in Southeast Asia.

A clear hierarchy of responsibility for handling POW/MIA related issues that may regrettably arise as a result of future conflicts must be established. This requires full and rapid coordination between and among the intelligence agencies involved and the military services. It requires the integration of missing civilians and suspected deserters into the overall accounting process. It requires a clear liaison between those responsible for the accounting (and related intelligence) and those responsible for negotiating with our adversaries about the terms for peace. It requires procedures for the full, honest and prompt disclosure of information to next of kin, at the time of incident and as other information becomes available. And it requires, above all, the designation within the Executive branch of an individual who is clearly responsible and fully accountable for making certain that the process works as it should.

In the future, clear categories should be established and consistently maintained in accounting for Americans missing during time of war. At one end of the listings should be Americans known with certainty to have been taken prisoner; at the other should be Americans known dead with bodies not recovered. The categories should be carefully separated in official summaries and discussions of the accounting process and should be applied consistently and uniformly.

Present law needs to be reviewed to minimize distortions in the status determination process that may result from the financial considerations of the families involved.

Wartime search and rescue (SAR) missions have an urgent operational value, but they are also crucial for the purposes of accounting for POW/MIA. The records concerning many Vietnam era SAR missions have been lost or destroyed. In the future, all information obtained during any unsuccessful or partially successful military search and rescue mission should be shared with the agency responsible for accounting for POW/MIA from that conflict and should be retained by that agency.

If these reforms are implemented, we will be even further along in answering the outstanding questions. It is important to emphasize that the release of this report is not the end of our concern here in the Senate or in the government. One of the committee's most significant conclusions is that we must keep the door open on this issue until it is ultimately resolved.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR J. ROBERT KERREY, JANUARY 21, 1983

The work of the Senate Select Committee on America's prisoners and missing from the War in Vietnam is finished. In the beginning I was deeply skeptical of the value of this effort; in the end I was convinced—thanks in particular to the work of Senator John Kerry—the Committee had measurably advanced the cause of knowing more about the tragedy of this war's ending.

In the end we reached a conclusion which is supported by exhausterive investigation: There is no compelling evidence to reach a judgement of proof that American prisoners are being held against their will in Vietnam or any other foreign locations.

There is compelling evidence that our Federal Government did not do all it should have done to make certain we did not leave our men behind. We expect and are not disappointed when Vietnam's government lies to us, but we cannot excuse and should not be surprised when the lies of our government anger those who have the greatest right to know—the families of the missing. For there is compelling evidence that our government withheld information from family members which had the perversive effect of increasing their pain and suffering.

Further, there is compelling evidence that much more needs to be done before we are through with this issue. This report makes it clear that the failure to obtain evidence sufficient to stand the tests and burdens of proof does not mean we have eliminated all doubt and ambiguity. This report makes clear our belief that much more work must be done by the American and the Vietnamese government before we have removed this stain from our consciences.

In the beginning, I was concerned about the work of this committee because I have grown weary with the self-indulgent moaning which often accompany Vietnam post-mortems. In spite of having wounds which provide a daily reminder of how the war changed me; in spite of the uncontrollable sadness and longing which builds inside when I stand at the Vietnam Memorial and consider what
might have been; in spite of the anger I feel towards policy makers who were too blind or too frightened to see and tell the truth; in spite of the heart-breaking passion I feel for those veterans whose spirits were shattered in the war; in spite of all of the negatives, I still feel I was lucky to have had the experience.

Money could not buy the lesson I learned in service to my country. In short, the debt is still on my side. That I consider it important to make this declaration reinforces the unique nature of the Vietnam War in American history. Having served on this committee, and having faced the angry accusations of my fellow citizens, I am reminded again how terribly divisive and destructive this war was. Thus, I know it is unlikely this report will "heal the wounds of Vietnam."

However, the fate of missing Americans and the larger questions arising from America's participation in the war dictate that we risk the emotional fire arising from legitimate differences of opinion. As I have listened to testimony and reviewed documents over the past year, my feelings about the war and about our efforts to account for POW/MIA's have shifted between anger and sadness. Despite the disagreements that have sometimes arisen, I believe, in the end, the committee has always managed to retain its focus on the most important objective: obtaining the fullest possible accounting for missing Americans.

Over the past year, the committee has examined information from every available source, from refugee live-sighting reports to satellite imagery, in the hope that some Americans might still be found alive. In addition, the committee has been able to draw on substantial resources on the ground in Vietnam, Laos, and the republics of the former Soviet Union to investigate reports and gather information.

Our conclusion does not change our commitment to achieving the fullest possible accounting for missing Americans. The United States has expanded its presence on the ground in Vietnam and as a result of the recent cooperation by the Vietnamese government has considerable opportunity to pursue information relating to missing Americans. Coordination between the federal agencies that are responsible for accounting for POW/MIAs has improved and more resources have been devoted to intelligence analysis. Finally, with the ongoing declassification process, all the information that the committee has reviewed will be available to the American people to decide the quality of the evidence for themselves. After too many years, the U.S. government finally seems to be pursuing the POW/MIA issues as a matter of the "highest national priority."

The movement towards resolving this issue will affect the present direction of United States policy towards Vietnam. Some in the United States seem to believe that we can achieve the goal of obtaining a full accounting in isolation of the goals of political and economic freedom for the people of Vietnam. I believe the issue of accounting for missing Americans is inseparable from the larger context of American objectives in the war and relations with Vietnam today.

At its best, the Vietnam War was a struggle against communism for the principles of self-determination and political freedom for the people of Vietnam. At worst, the war was a misguided exercise in balance of power politics. For myself and many other Americans who went to Vietnam, and who believed that we were fighting for democracy and for freedom, the reality of the war and its outcome were profoundly disillusioning experiences.

I believe that sometime during the war we lost our resolve. Reading the too-heavily classified documents of the negotiations over the Paris Peace Accords and Operation Homecoming, this loss of resolve to fight for the principles that were at the heart of its most noble aspirations for the people of Vietnam is painfully clear. Vietnam had become a political liability to be shed like an old set of clothes. We, as a nation, wasted out of a continuing war that was threatening our society and our economy, and we were willing to accept what was expedient to accomplish that purpose. Rather than self-determination for the people of Vietnam or even "peace with honor," we got a decent interval between our withdrawal and the fall of Saigon. Rather than pursue every means that we might have to resolve POW/MIA questions, we settled for less.

The record of the negotiation and implementation of the Paris Peace Accords makes it clear that the principles of self-determination for the South Vietnamese and obtaining a full accounting for missing Americans were subordinated to the dominant American concern: to end U.S. involvement in the war. The compromises in the Paris Peace Accords set the stage for the failure of the United States to secure either freedom for the South Vietnamese or a full accounting for missing Americans.

We are all familiar with the outcome. Two years after the Paris Peace Accords the North Vietnamese made a mockery of the agreement by invading South Vietnam and imposing a totalitarian communist government. The North Vietnamese were not cooperative in returning US prisoners and after twenty years there has still not been a satisfactory accounting for missing Americans. Americans lost sight of the principles that were the basis for our involvement in Vietnam and we were willing to make compromises for what was expedient at the time. We must not make the same mistake again.

For twenty years the United States has maintained a trade embargo and refused to establish diplomatic relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. This policy is consistent with the US Treatment of other hardline communist states, notably North Korea and Cuba. Current US policy towards Vietnam is based on two considerations: cooperation in accounting for missing Americans; and the removal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. The United States has established a "road map" that matches progress by the Vietnamese in these areas with improved trade and diplomatic relations with the United States.

The most noticeable aspect of the current road map is the conspicuous absence of mention of human rights or political freedom for the people of Vietnam. For North Korea, progress in human rights is one of the central conditions for improving relations. It must also be for Vietnam. The United States was willing to fight for political freedom and human rights for the people of Vietnam; 58,183 Americans died there, countless billions were spent, and since that time the US has refused to establish relations in part because of the repressive nature of the Vietnamese regime.
It is ironic that after twenty years we appear willing to sacrifice these principles for the people of Vietnam just as democracy is triumphing around the world, and perhaps once again subjugate, this time probably forever, the question of a full accounting for those missing in Vietnam. One of the key factors in the democratic revolution in the former Soviet Union and throughout.

Eastern Europe was the hard line that the United States took against the repressive communist regimes that dominated those societies. Today the leaders of those nations thank us for our tough stand, even though that stand meant economic hardship and isolation for their people.

What is missing in our discussions today is a vision of 70 million Vietnamese with the freedom for which we fought and for which our nation stands—freedom of religion, speech, travel, due process under the law, and the right to protest the policies of their government. God help us if we come back to Vietnam just to make a little money.

A free Vietnam is the best way to honor the sacrifice of Americans and to help the Vietnamese people. We do not need to go to war to win this battle, nor do we need to stop moving towards normal relations. We need to believe it is desirable and we need to believe it is possible. We need at least to say the words.

The United States should be willing to take a stand for the people of Southeast Asia. Obtaining a full accounting for our missing soldiers will never happen as long as Vietnam remains a closed society. Before opening the door to Vietnam, the United States should demonstrate its support for democracy and human rights by raising these issues with the Vietnamese government.

**Statement of Senator Herb Kohl**

Mr. President, one of the central problems which faced the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, and one of the central problems which faces this country, is how to overcome the cynicism which surrounds almost any statement made by government.

When I was growing up, in an earlier and perhaps more innocent age, people took comfort from government: the fireside chats gave us hope; the Truman walks gave us confidence; the Eisenhower smile gave us a peaceful feeling.

But those feelings have faded. The credibility gap created in the Johnson administration became a chasm under Nixon; the malaise of Carter surrendered briefly to the charm of Reagan but reappeared as deficits mounted, arms and money were diverted, and divided government flourished; and while the Bush administration strengthened our standing in the world, last year's campaign enshrined "running against Washington" as a major part of our political liturgy.

It is in that more cynical environment which this Committee operated. And in that environment, conspiracy theories—even if they are based on minimal and marginal evidence—flourish. From the Space Aliens which the government is keeping in deep storage somewhere out west to the CIA's role in killing Elvis—if you have a conspiracy theory which involves the government, someone will believe it.

But this Committee, Mr. President, did not operate in a realm of speculation and fantasy. In this case, conspiracy theories—while dubious and incomplete—at least have some substance to them.

As I evaluated the testimony presented to us and looked at the records made available to us, I concluded that when our government said that all American POWs had returned, it had reason to believe that was not the case. That is not to say that our government "lied," it is to say that it did not tell us the whole truth. I am making more than a semantic distinction here: "lying" implies some intention to deceive; "not telling the whole truth" suggests that a statement does not fully describe a complex reality.

Whatever the difference in actual meaning, it is clear that our government did not reveal everything that was known and was less than truthful when it talked publicly about POWs and MIAs at the end of the Vietnam war. As a result, when people charge that there was "a government conspiracy to hide the truth from the American people," there is at least some factual basis for their belief.

The problem that creates is obvious. This Committee, as a part of the government, is asking people to believe that we are telling the truth. But it is the very government which the Committee represents which did not give it's citizens all the facts in the beginning. Based on the overall credibility of government, why should people believe we are telling the truth now about how we mislead people in the past?

There are, in my judgement, several reasons. But, Mr. President, the most important is simply this: we are making virtually all the information upon which we relied available to the American people. They do not have to believe us: they can read the same records we did, evaluate the same testimony we heard, go through the same investigation and evaluation that we engaged in—and they can reach their own conclusions. We are not asking anyone to take anything on faith; we are giving everything we received to everyone and allowing them to draw their own conclusions.

But the issue here, Mr. President, is broader than the credibility of the Committee's work. In truth, I feel no need to defend the Committee and no sympathy for those who doubt the sincerity of our efforts. Personally, I believe that Chairman Kerry and Vice-Chairman Smith, along with the other members of the Committee and the superb staff they assembled, have done a magnificent job. They have been fair. They have been thorough. And they have been able to disagree about what conclusions the evidence supports without in any way demeaning each other's intelligence or patriotism or dedication to finding out everything that we can.

The issue is not the credibility of the Committee. But an issue of credibility is at the heart of the POW issue. Indeed, it is at the very heart of a government's moral right to ask men and women to risk their lives for our country.

Our military might is based on our ability to persuade young men and women to risk their lives for this country. That willingness to face death is based on many factors: love of country, courage, comradeship. But perhaps most importantly, service is based on a belief in, and trust of, their government: that it will train