Subject: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 525th Military Intelligence Group, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

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1. (U) Attached is the Operational Report—Lessons Learned of the 525th Military Intelligence Group for the period ending 30 April 1971.

2. (U) Copies of this report have been forwarded to Department of the Army through USARV for evaluation and comment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

S. C. CZEULISI
CPT, AGC
Adjutant

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CO, 2d MI Bn (Prov) - 1
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companies were inserted into the area supported by artillery and air
strikes. As a result of this action, 24 enemy were killed and seven
AK-47's and one B-40 round were captured.

(3) This Unit provided information on the location and configuration
of a Prisoner of War Camp containing 43 Vietnamese POW's in the vicinity
of Rach Dua Hamlet, Dai Phuoc (V), Cang Long (D), Vinh Binh Province. On
19 November 1970, one Regional Force Company and the Intelligence and
Security Platoon of Vinh Binh Sector reacted with a ground operation re­
sulting in the recovery of nine Vietnamese POW's. Concomitant with the
recovery, the associated ground assault resulted in nine VC KIA and three
 sampans destroyed.

(4) An IIR, dated 11 November 1970, provided information on an in­
stallation used by the VC Tu Ngia District Committee. A reconnois­
ance unit of the 6th ARVN Regiment was inserted and 18 VC were killed.

(5) An element of this Unit furnished information concerning the
location of three base camp areas in Gia Dinh Province. The 1/5 Mech­
anized Infantry Battalion, 2/25 Infantry Division, conducted a ground
operation which realized the following results: 31 enemy KIA and two
two enemy CIA. In addition, one AK-47, two K-54 pistols, one PRC 9 radio,
several sampans, and various medical supplies were captured.

(6) This Unit reported the 78th Rocket Battalion with a strength
of 200 personnel located at Tien Phuoc. Their mission was to attack Chu
Lai Airport and a 2d ARVN Division base camp located west of Chu Lai.
On the basis of this report, 1st Bn, 46th Infantry and RF Companies were
credited with 26 enemy KIA.

(7) An IIR, dated 20 November 1970, was prepared by Team 23, 2d MI
Bn, as a summary of all IIR's produced by the team. This IIR was used
to aid in the briefings and evaluations for ARVN Operation Nguyen Hue II
to Base Area 701 in Cambodia. Team 23's IIR's were a major briefing
factor in the planning of the operation. It was Team 23 which first re­
ported the VC intentions to rebuild the Chu Dang Base Camp Area. Team
23 also traced its progress as it once again became a major supply and
staging area. Operation Nguyen Hue II struck directly into the Chu Dang
with excellent results. Team 23 was credited with the following results
for its IIR's: 82 enemy KIA, 500 rounds of 105 ammunition captured,
254 tons of T-34 tank ammunition captured, 200 55-gallon drums of MOGAS
captured, 28 tons of rice captured or destroyed, six houses destroyed,
one hectare of crops destroyed, 36 assorted weapons and 100 pounds of
TNT captured.

(8) Based on information provided in an IIR, dated 25 November 1970,
Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) Forces conducted operation Chuong Duong 55/70 from 2 December 1970 until 4 December 1970. RSSZ Forces were inserted into the reported area with the following results: 167 VC/NVA KIA, 16 base camps discovered and destroyed, 100 sleeping platforms destroyed, 5,000 kgs of rice and foodstuffs captured, and assorted weapons and supplies captured.

(9) An IIR produced by the 3d MI Bn pointed out the location of an unidentified company located in some stone caves on Nui Ba Den Mountain, Tay Ninh Province. An operation was launched with the following results: nine VC KIA, one 60mm mortar, one AK-47, one RPG rifle, 250 rounds of M-16 ammunition, eight 82mm rounds, 20 rounds B-40, 30 rounds 60mm ammunition, six Chicom hand grenades, 50 kgs of rice and two blankets CIA.

(10) An IIR was submitted on a small VC unit in Tan Tru District, Long An Province which had a mission to assassinate RF soldiers in the area. Tan Tru sub-sector conducted three ground operations within one kilometer of the reported area which resulted in 20 enemy KIA and 14 AK-47 assault rifles and two carbines being captured. After the third ground operation, Tan Tru sub-sector recovered one German machinegun and two Browning automatic rifles near the area.

(11) Based on information provided by an IIR, dated 25 November 1970, Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) Forces conducted operation Chuong Duong 54/70 from 25 November 1970 until 26 November 1970. During the operation, RSSZ Forces made contact with the following enemy units: Nhon Trach District Armed Force, C-240 Nhon Trach Mobile Force, C-212 Convalescence Units, and H-5 Hospital of D.12/SR-4. The results of this operation were 51 VC/NVA KIA, two VC/NVA CIA, 16 base camps discovered, 40 bunkers and fortifications destroyed, 5,000 kgs of rice and foodstuffs captured, and assorted weapons and other equipment captured.

(12) IIR's, dated 10, 12 and 19 December 1970, furnished information concerning VC/NVA resupply activity taking place south of QL#1, 45 kilometers northeast of Saigon in Long Thanh District, Bien Hoa Province. As a result of these IIR's, an extended interdiction operation was launched by elements of the 1/11 ACR, RTAVF, 2/25th US Infantry Division and RF and PF elements. This operation had the following results: 30 enemy KIA and two enemy CIA, 15 individual weapons captured, eight pounds of documents captured, and large quantities of supplies and equipment captured.

(13) An element of this Unit reported the C.09 Sapper Company located in the vicinity of Que Son City, Quang Nam Province. Elements of the 1st Marine Regiment launched a ground operation on the basis of this report. The operation resulted in nine enemy KIA (confirmed), 22 enemy KIA (probable) and the discovery of supplies and equipment.
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(14) An IIR, dated 16 December 1970, reported the location and intentions of the 338th VC Sapper Company. This unit was reported to be undergoing training in the area of Xeo Tre Canal, My Phuc Hamlet, My Thien Village, Cai Be District, Dinh Tuong Province. On 18 December 1970, Dinh Tuong Sector Forces reacted to the report, killed 10 VC/NVA and captured an unspecified amount of documents, supplies and mines.

(15) On 23 December 1970, this Unit provided information on the location and intentions of a VC company to attack villages west of Pleiku. As a result of this information the villages in the area were prepared for the attacks which did in fact occur. This report was credited with 30 enemy KIA.

(16) An IIR, dated 24 December 1970, on the VC Shadow Supply activity along Q1#1 in Bien Hoa and Long Khar8 Provinces, was credited with the following results: 36 enemy KIA, one crew served weapon, 15 individual weapons and 700 pounds of rice captured in action.

(17) An IIR, dated 18 January 1971, reported an enemy battalion-size unit in Phu Nhơn (D), Pleiku (P). The report described the camp location and the weapons of the unit. In response, the 17th AYN Regiment mounted a ground operation which resulted in contact with the enemy unit after it had attacked Plei Poui (V). Captured documents identified the unit as the C3/K39th Battalion. Fifty-one enemy were killed as a result of this ground action.

(18) On 26 January 1971, this Unit provided information on the possibility of rocket attacks on DaNang Air Base. Indications of imminent terrorist activities in DaNang City in support of these attacks were also reported by agents working for this Unit. The projected activities were further pinpointed as commencing on 20 February 1971. DaNang AFB was subjected to a rocket attack on the night of 20 February 1971. In addition, terrorist activities did in fact occur in DaNang City on the same day. Based on this report, the 1st Marine Air Wing at DaNang moved their aircraft and thereby prevented some very costly damage to the aircraft.

(19) An IIR, dated 1 February 1971, revealed a plan to assassinate the President of the Republic of Vietnam during his visit to the Tao Ph'an Cao Dai Temple in Tay Ninh Province. This report delineated the method of assassination and the names of the assassins. This IIR was substantiated by information provided by other intelligence agencies in Tay Ninh Province. Although no incident occurred during the President's visit, the information provided by this IIR enabled the agencies responsible for the President's safety to establish adequate safeguards.

(20) An IIR, dated 5 February 1971, located a company of the D11h
Main Force Battalion. As a result of this report, this Unit was intercepted by a mixed force of ARVN regulars and RF/PF's. The results were 16 enemy KIA, and five AK-47 rifles, one B-40 round and one light machine-gun captured.

(21) An IIR, dated 20 March 1971, concerned the Phuoc Long Group which was located in Poem Cheang Rubber Plantation in Cambodia. The intention of this unit was to lure an ARVN force into a trap in the vicinity of Suong, Cambodia. By virtue of the early warning provided by this report, and the immediate reaction which was afforded by prior knowledge of the enemy's intentions, the ARVN units were able to thwart the enemy's plan of attack. On 27 - 28 March they found the enemy unit at the location stated in the IIR. In the subsequent battle, 350 enemy were killed and seven captured.

(22) On 29 March 1971, this unit reported a 30 man VC/NVA unit of the Ben Tranh District Mobile Force located in the vicinity of Tuyen "Hon District, Kien Tuong Province. A RF Company and a Province Reconnaissance Unit were supported by artillery gunships and inserted into the area. The results of this operation were 7 VC/NVA KIA and 6 AK-47's CIA.

(23) During April, this unit produced a report on the clandestine importation of contraband material into Saigon from Hong Kong. The information contained in this report was turned over to the US advisors to the Vietnamese Customs Service. This action resulted in the confiscation of contraband valued at 50,000,000$VN.

(24) On 5 April 1971, an element of this organization reported that a 350 man VC/NVA/NVA Battalion was planning to attack the Plei Me CIDG Camp. As a result of this report a ground operation, supported by artillery strikes, was credited with 57 enemy KIA, the destruction of enemy fortifications, and the capture of an unknown number of weapons.

(25) An IIR dated 8 April 1971, furnished information concerning the intentions of a company-sized unit to move from Cambodia into Phuoc Long Province, approximately 16 kilometers north of Song Be. On 121400 April, an element of the Phuoc Long PRUs made contact with an estimated company size force in a base camp. The PRUs received artillery and helicopter support from US units and were reinforced by a RF company. The contact resulted in 30 VC KIA and two tactical radios, one 120mm mortar, 26 120mm mortar rounds, 20 82mm mortar rounds, 130 B-40/B1 rounds, 150 B-10/B1 charges and 30 grenades captured. Forty military structures were destroyed.

b. General Intelligence Support

(1) During November 1970, three BRIGHTLIGHT IIR's were produced:
One IIR, dated 23 November 1970, provided information about three Caucasian and one Negro US POW that were travelling with a 90-man NVA unit in the vicinity of a canyon in Binh Kha (D), Binh Dinh Province. These captives were wearing unit patches on the left shoulder and a sword in the middle. One of the individuals was carrying a CHICOM 130 radio. Another IIR, dated 26 November 1970, reported that the VC were holding captive three Caucasian and one Negro US POW in the vicinity of Hoai An City, Hoai An District, Binh Dinh Province. All the US were wearing jungle fatigues except the Negro who was dressed in a khaki shirt and fatigue pants. They carried a CHICOM 130 radio and a PRC-10. The farmer from whom the information was obtained stated that one of the American captives was a sergeant from Ft. Du. The commander of the VC unit, NGO, stated that the Americans were not prisoners. The source for this information was different from the source for the first IIR mentioned. A third IIR, dated 28 November 1970, reported that a 250-man battalion, identified as the K-8, was seen with four Caucasians who spoke English and who were armed with M-16 rifles. The source of this information was a penetration agent who was accompanied from the sources of the other two reports. No confirmed information was obtained as to whether the four men were American prisoners or defectors. However, the three reports, based on location, time frame, and number of (possible) Americans make it probable that four non-oriental personnel are in the area. G2, IFFV, sent a message to Joint Personnel Research Center with all of the above information and similar reports from other agencies.

(2) An IIR, dated 23 November 1970, contained a list of the Mo Duc District VCI. The report contained a list of 60 VCI, Local Force and Main Force cadre. Although this report did not generate a combat response, 16 of the VCI names were confirmed by the Phung Hoang "Summary of Political Warfare." The VCI Section, Americal Division, stated that this report was extremely valuable to their newly formed section.

(3) On 19 January 1971, this Unit furnished information concerning a VC meeting at a house in Tan Uyen District. During this meeting, plans were discussed concerning the placement of VC within GVN organizations at village and higher level, the number of individuals who were presently involved in GVN organizations, and the reorganization of the local VCI which is to be completed prior to 31 May 1971. Although this report had no tactical response, a meeting with the Phung Hoang Coordinator at Bien Hoa Province confirmed the names and positions of these VCI of Tan Uyen District. The Tan Uyen DIOCC was able to confirm the names and positions of several village VCI and stated that there was no reason to believe that the rest of the information was not true.

(4) US Operations in the Republic of Vietnam and Vietnamese operations in Cambodia continue to produce much raw information to be analyzed, evaluated, processed and disseminated by the MACV Combined Intelligence
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Centers. Approximately 90 percent of the nearly 900 US personnel assigned to the Centers are members of the 525th MI Group's 519th MI Battalion (Field Army). Following is a synopsis of support rendered by Intelligence Center personnel during the reporting period.

(a) Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC): During the six months reporting period, CDEC received 1,100,000 pages of captured documents for translation and exploitation. Of those, 124,000 were of intelligence use and were published as summaries and disseminated to supported units. The captured documents contained information which was generated into 1,250 IIR's. In addition, 239 pages of information were disseminated to the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) for possible use. In December CDEC translated LFG Vinh Loc's, CG, National War College, article on the release of POW's for NAM. In March CDEC translated a captured notebook that was being maintained by a member of the Thai Communist Party and contained notes concerning military and political training. The translation was requested by the US Army attaché in Vientiane, Laos.

(b) Combined Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC): CMEC examined and analyzed 5,700 pounds of miscellaneous equipment, 96,000 pounds of ammunition, 750 pounds of captured medical equipment and 420 individual weapons. The Center processed 2,365 mine and booby trap reports and shipped 265,000 pounds of equipment back to the United States for further examination and exploitation.

(c) Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC): CMIC personnel completed 7,420 interrogations during the period: 3,560 at the Center, 610 at the National Chieu Hoi Center and 150 by Mobile Interrogation Teams. These interrogations resulted in the publication and distribution of 870 reports to major intelligence users.

(d) Strategic Research and Analysis Division (SRA): Division personnel published 11 major studies during the period.

1 SRAAS 0171 - Kep, Cambodia
2 SRAAS 0470 - Neah Luong, Cambodia
3 SRAAS 0570 - Kompong Chom, Cambodia
4 SRAAS 0670 - Kampot, Cambodia
5 SRAP 0171 - Estimate of VC Activities Jan - Jun 1971
6 SRAP 0271 - Laos Terminology Study
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1. SRAP 1970 - Foreign Aid to North Vietnam, 65 - 70
2. SRAP 2070 - VC Treatment of United States Prisoners of War
3. VCI Summary 11-70 (Oct)
4. VCI Summary 15-70 (Nov)
5. VCI Summary 16-70 (Dec)

(e) Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV): During the reporting period CICV completed the following projects: a trafficability study of the area south of the Lon Nol Line and east of the Mekong River in southeastern Cambodia; a navigability study of the Mekong River in Cambodia and Laos; a study of the interdiction points in Cambodia; a terrain analysis of the area near the Laos - Cambodian border; studies of enemy base areas 112, 128, and 129; a study on "Areas of Major Logistical Significance in Cambodia and Laos;" a study of where defoliants would be used if the present ban on defoliants was to be lifted; a terrain and lines of communication analysis of Route QL-1 from Tan Ky to Dong Hoa; a terrain analysis of a selected area in Cambodia to determine if ARVN battalions could be employed in the area.

(f) The following personnel changes occurred in command positions during the reporting period:

(a) Commanding Officer: Colonel David A. Owens vice Colonel Ransom E. Barber, 20 Jan 71.
(b) Deputy Commanding Officer: LTC Oliver A. Ray vice Colonel David A. Owens, 20 Jan 71.
(c) Commanding Officer, 1st MI Bn (Prov): LTC Robert W. Wells vice LTC Donald G. Bennett, 20 Apr 71.
(d) Commanding Officer, 2d MI Bn (Prov): LTC Techie Aoyagi vice MAJ Milford P. Hubbard, 13 Nov 70.
(e) Commanding Officer, 3d MI Bn (Prov): LTC James W. Wensyel vice LTC Eric H. Vieler, 18 Dec 70.
(f) Commanding Officer, 4th MI Bn (Prov): MAJ J. Barrie Williams vice LTC Ernest DuFresne, 18 Jan 71.
(g) Commanding Officer, 5th MI Bn (Prov): MAJ Cary W. Bowles vice LTC Robert McCue, 3 Jan 71.
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(h) Commanding Officer, 519th MI En (FA): MAJ Neil Hock vice LTC Dallas Brown, 1 Feb 71.

2. (C-NOFORN) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel—Civilian Interpreter/Translators

(1) Observation: The mission of this Group has been impeded by problems with interpreter/translators (I/T's).

(2) Evaluation:

(a) Civilian I/T's consider an assignment to the provinces, and especially one to the highlands, as little better than a prison sentence. Since civilian I/T's do not receive a cost of living allowance, and because the ARVN frequently refuses to help board or feed them, a provincial assignment means a loss of income for an I/T.

(b) Civilian I/T's have proven to be tardy, undependable, and prone to prolonged and unexplained absences. Minor illnesses are exaggerated into major catastrophes. I/T's who distrust local physicians have been known to make for the capital at the sign of a runny nose.

(3) Recommendations:

(a) Team chiefs and case officers must exert maximum control or face the loss of these assets.

(b) Battalion commanders must conduct liaison with ARVN Unit 101 Detachment Commanders in order to provide the necessary facilities for I/T's.

(c) When local help becomes undependable or totally nonexistent, US intelligence personnel trained in Vietnamese can be tasked to translate contact reports and vouchers. Although the battalion has found that initial translations are of marginal value, experience rapidly improves the quality of their work.

(4) Command Action: Every effort is made to provide civilian employees with satisfactory working conditions.

b. Intelligence

(1) HUMINT Photography:
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(a) Observation: Reconnaissance agents operating in the A Shau Valley, Thua Thien (P), western Quang Tri (P) and in the border areas of Laos and the DMZ frequently report sighting tracked vehicles, heavy equipment, artillery and tanks. Despite training in equipment recognition, agent sketching and reporting techniques, the quality and accuracy of information supplied by agents of relatively low levels of intelligence has failed to convince intelligence analysts of the existence of tanks and similar types of equipment. Nevertheless, enemy reaction to Lam Son 719 confirmed the presence of tanks in areas where agents had previously reported tanks.

(b) Evaluation: In those instances when an agent observes tanks, artillery pieces or major items of heavy equipment, his ability to photograph the items observed would immeasurably aid in convincing commanders that such equipment is located where the agent has reported it. Such evidence would more accurately portray enemy capabilities.

(c) Recommendations: Further efforts are required in special training, control and use of agents equipped with cameras. In addition to developing proper concealment devices, training and control techniques must be studied in order to train and control reconnaissance agents equipped with cameras. Such training should continue to include area sketching as an aid to locating the agent's position on the ground.

(d) Command Action: Special attention will be given to the development of concealment devices and the training of agent personnel wherever possible.

(2) Daily Summary of Intelligence Information Reports:

(a) Observations: A major problem area in any tactical operation concerns the senior intelligence officer's ability to achieve effective, yet efficient management of all reported intelligence information. The volume of detailed information reported to a corps, division brigade headquarters precludes the G-2 from personally seeing all reports. Consequently, he must depend upon his analysts for producing completed intelligence. In order to assist the G-2, XXIV Corps, and the G-2's and G-2 Advisors of divisional units, as well as to establish a quantity control device within this unit, a daily summary of intelligence information reports (IIR) was devised by the 1st MI Bn. This summary contains only the basic elements of unit identity, location, date and intentions, as well as the evaluation code, of the more detailed information contained in the IIR itself. An example of this summary is contained in the following extract: "1BLB/C020/71: Evaluation F6. Unit: 2 Co's K3 Bn. Date of information: 27 - 28 Mar 71. Location: ZC 173960. Strength: 180. Armament: 2x82mm mortars, 2xHMGs, 3xBH0's, 2xBH1's,"
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many indiv wpns, mines, and explosives. Summary: Intentions were to cut off Highway 1 between the Phuoc Tuong Pass and Nuoc Ngot." During the conduct of Lam Son 719, this summary of IIR's gained in importance as an intelligence tool and means of dissemination. Major changes in a unit's mission and its disposition required broadening the existing intelligence resources. At this time, intelligence personnel of forward TOC's, reserve units and units maintaining dual responsibilities, e.g., normal operations and reserve commitments in separated areas of operational responsibility, found the daily summary to be increasingly useful. The Corps G-2 Fwd, the G-2, 23d Inf Div and G-2 Advisor, 2d ARVN Division were able to quickly review information reported from HUMINT sources throughout the Corps AO by using this summary. In this manner, significant human intelligence came directly to the G-2's attention.

(b) Evaluation: The daily summary of IIR's is particularly useful as an intelligence dissemination tool for human intelligence in a rapidly moving situation when intelligence production resources are committed to their maximum extent. It provides the G-2 a means for quickly checking his analysts' use of all sources of information. Moreover, the summary provides the G-2 intelligence information from beyond his normal area of interest, yet one into which his unit may be committed as a reserve force.

(c) Recommendation: That daily summaries be included in the current HUMINT reporting doctrine for use as tactical intelligence tools at Corps, Division and Brigade. This is not to imply substituting the summary for detailed reports but for use at the intelligence management level.

(d) Command Action: The lst MI BN is continuing to test the usefulness of the Daily Summary of Intelligence Information Reports in MRL.

(3) Alternate Principal Agent:

(a) Observations: During the reporting period, this Group has lost several nets due to the incarceration of the principal agent. In each case, the loss of a net would not have resulted if the case officer and team chief involved had previously developed an alternate principal agent.

(b) Evaluation: Too many agent nets have no alternate principal agent. Furthermore, many case officers and team chiefs have not developed an effective alternate or emergency channel of communication between the case officer and the principal agent. This compounds the problem and makes the destruction of nets possible by the blocking or eliminating of one channel of communication or by the eliminating of one individual.

(c) Recommendations:
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1. That each net have at least one alternate principal agent. Further, that communication be tested between the case officer and the alternate principal agent at least once a month.

2. That each principal agent have both an alternate and an emergency means of recontact. Case officers and team chiefs should remember that these means must be totally divorced from one another. A personal meeting can not be used as both the primary and alternate means of communication.

(d) Command Action: These recommendations have been incorporated into the training courses that this Group runs for its case officers and other operational personnel.

c. Operations

(1) Helicopter Insertion:

(a) Observation: The results of an agent team insertion by helicopter in operation TEXAS ROUNDUP has provided a number of lessons learned for use in future operations of this type. TEXAS ROUNDUP differed considerably from the initial helicopter insertion of June 1970 in that the operation covered a much larger area including route reconnaissance and three area reconnaissance target boxes in western Quang Tri (P) and eastern Laos. The following comments are observations from TEXAS ROUNDUP.

1. The length of the operational period, 16 December 1970 to 6 January 1971, precluded the reporting of both positive and negative intelligence in a timely manner. Observations on 19 and 26 December could not be reported until after 6 January, a delay of 17 and 12 days respectively.

2. To expect agents, who are required to memorize all details, to accurately report information collected over a 22 day period is unrealistic for the type of information desired.

3. The amount of traveling accomplished by these agents reduced the control factor established by inserting the agents at a known point in the operational area.

4. The principal agent failed to thoroughly debrief the agents. He also failed to obtain memory sketches from the sources on installations they had seen.

5. There was a difference of opinion as to the proper mission for this type of operation.

a. Unit 101 approached this operation as a means of obtaining rapid
technical reaction to targets reported by these sources while on station.
The Unit 101 concept is to equip reconnaissance agents with concealed
radios in order to report information for immediate tactical response.

In contrast to this point of view, reconnaissance teams used to
satisfy badly needed intelligence requirements in NVA controlled areas
where camouflage and use of telephone land lines preclude complete in-
telligence exploitation by other collection means. Determining locations,
the nature of activity, unit identity and NVA unit missions contributes
significantly to the intelligence situation used at Corps and higher
command levels in arriving at command decisions.

During TEXAS ROUNDUP, the collection team demonstrated their abili-
ty to elicit information of value from individuals in the target area.

Intelligence reports from this operation covered the following
subjects: movement of enemy supplies and location of C6 Local Force
Company near the Vietnam/Laotian border; location and intentions of the
81st NVA Artillery Battalion to include a description of the unit's base
area; identified NVA battalion of which one element was engaged in road
repair; tracked vehicles reported as tanks moving northwest from Huong
Hoa (D), Quang Tri Province.

Negative intelligence during period 20 - 26 December, 28 - 30 De-
cember and 1 - 5 January 1971 was not reported.

Intelligence reports did not reference TEXAS ROUNDUP.

(b) Evaluation:

TEXAS ROUNDUP was too long. Control of agents and retention of
information collected was degraded by the length of the operation.

Agents must be thoroughly debriefed and sketches obtained from all
target areas during debriefing.

Operations using a helicopter insert for access to cross border
areas should not add additional compromising factors by including radios
with the agent. Rather, shorter missions, more thorough debriefing and
obtaining target sketches can significantly improve the intelligence value
of such missions.

(c) Recommendations:

That reconnaissance agents used on heliborne insert operations not
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2. Future planned operations will be limited to single target boxes, with Unit 101 concurrence, unless XXIV Corps or I Corps requests route reconnaissance. Initial targeting must be obtained from G2, XXIV Corps.

3. Principal agents and case officers/agent handlers be further trained in debriefing based on anticipated future missions.

4. In disseminating reports from future operations, the code name should be referenced in the IIAR synopsis.

(d) Command Action: These observations and recommendations are to be used as guidelines for any future helicopter insertions that this Group conducts.

2 Intelligence Reports for Regional Forces:

(a) Observations: The stand down of US tactical units places much responsibility on Regional Forces for tactical responses.

(b) Evaluation: Regional Forces do not have the organic mobility of other FWMAF. They are neither equipped nor designed for extensive field maneuvers. Their normal operations are characterized by relatively small maneuver elements, operating in a specific area for a relatively short duration. Intelligence reports which provide random coverage of large geographic areas are of relatively little value to the Regional Forces because they are unable to utilize them. Carefully directed intelligence operations in specific areas of interest, with efforts toward the development of trends and patterns, produces intelligence which these forces can exploit. Such operations are not possible unless US/ARVN case officers and team chiefs work very closely on a day to day basis with DIOCC's and PIOCC's to develop a knowledge of enemy OB, areas of DIOCC and PIOCC interest, and information needed to complete the intelligence picture on the enemy situation. Once-weekly-trips to these organizations of a few minutes duration are totally inadequate for this purpose. Instances where team chiefs and case officers have worked closely with the DIOCC's and PIOCC's have had great success in targeting agent resources to fit the needs of the Regional Forces.

(c) Recommendations: That more emphasis be placed on the day-to-day working relationship between case officers, team chiefs, and DIOCC and PIOCC personnel to develop better targeting.

(d) Command Action: All units have been directed to work more closely
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with the DIOCC's and PIOCC's.

(3) Bilateral Team Operations

(a) Observation: The 1st MI Battalion (Prov) currently has one 525/101 bilateral collection team (BLB) located in Hue City, Thua Thien (P), MR I, which is responsible for intelligence collection in that province. This team's overall effectiveness and efficiency are outstanding in every respect.

(b) Evaluation: A careful study of this team's operation has been made to determine the facts which contribute to its outstanding performance. Analysis reveals the following factors:

1. An ambitious, capable, intelligent ARVN Team Chief.

2. Excellent rapport established between US and ARVN team chiefs.

3. A one-for-one counterparting between US and ARVN team chiefs, case officers and agent handlers.

4. Sufficient interpreter/translator support for US contingent. This includes two US case officers who have received Vietnamese language training.

5. Implementation of command policy which requires case officers to be fully knowledgeable of both friendly and enemy order of battle.

6. Bi-weekly meetings between US case officers and ARVN agent handlers for purpose of resolving problem areas, establishing tasking, briefing, debriefing and training. Contact reports are required from US case officers.

7. US case officers knowledge of all routes used by action agents improves case officer's ability to task agents.

8. Collocated team offices.

Of these factors, 3 and 4 are considered to be the most important factors. Factor 3 allows each US individual to learn in detail the duties and problems of his counterpart. He is therefore in a position to understand the counterpart better and offer advice in a manner that is more acceptable from an operational viewpoint. Factor 4 assists greatly in the establishment of rapport and understanding. It allows the translation of information without any fabricated errors due to an independent translator capability and permits translation at a rate and at times desired by US personnel. Collocated working office, 8, insures effective and rapid communication
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 525th Military Intelligence Group, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

concerning all facets of the combined team's operation.

(c) Recommendations: Based on the factors discussed above, the following recommendations are made:

1. All efforts should be made to insure a one to one ratio between US case officers and ARVN agent handlers and between team chiefs.

2. Each team should have at least two interpreter/translators, and one or two of the US personnel (preferably case officers) assigned to the team should be language qualified.

3. Scheduled bi-weekly meetings should be held between US case officers and ARVN agent handlers to discuss problems, tasking, specific goals and training. A record must be maintained of each meeting.

4. US case officers should be required to be fully knowledgeable of both friendly and enemy order of battle in the AO.

5. Collocated working offices in all teams.

6. US case officers be thoroughly knowledgeable of each agent's capabilities, routes of travel, means of acquiring information and areas where agents cannot go.

(d) Command Actions: These observations and recommendations have been disseminated to all field elements of this Group.

(4) Bilateral Operations

(a) Observation: During the past year, 525th Military Intelligence Group's relationships with ARVN Unit 101 have been frustrated by problems of protocol, training and military priorities.

(b) Evaluation:

1. The rank-conscious attitude of the ARVN has required that a number of US officers be documented in higher ranks. One particular incident illustrates the problem of protocol. One battalion commander was scheduled to go on an inspection trip with his counterpart. When the US CO was prevented from going by local tactical problems and sought to send his Executive Officer, the ARVN commander begged off.

2. ARVN Unit 101 still has not realized the necessity of completing paper work on time. They would prefer that we provide the money, share the
collection results, and forget about the paperwork. Bartering surplus supplies from the Property Book Officer for Contact Reports and Vouchers has been quite successful, but quite often this Unit has been forced to harass ARVN counterparts to the point where tempers fray before the required reports are achieved.

3 Unit 101 has not realized the effect of the American standdown. There is still very much of a manana attitude towards operations. Recruitment and training is still frightfully simplistic by our own standards, though conscientious ARVN and US officers have worked to improve the quality of operations.

4 There is almost no liaison within the Vietnamese intelligence community. S2s of ARVN units often do not receive collection reports. In addition, ARVN S2s often refuse to brief collection agencies on their respective priorities. Although US counterparts have tried to facilitate liaison, the results are still frighteningly primitive.

(c) Recommendations:

1 The education effort will naturally decrease as the standdown of the US Army continues. Further, if five years of intense liaison has achieved so little, the pessimist might well wonder what fewer men with less "clout" will be able to accomplish. Nevertheless, each case officer must strive to inculcate their counterparts with some degree of professionalism.

2 To insure that paperwork is completed promptly and correctly, it is necessary to monitor all vouchers and contact reports from the team level to the battalion level. If this is not done conscientiously, operational control will be lost and the battalion will be swamped with paperwork. Command emphasis is absolutely necessary. Battalion commanders and the Group Commander must use their prestige to force their counterparts to exert effective control over team chiefs and agent handlers.

2 ARVN Detachment Commanders need many items that only we can provide. These items can be used to encourage our counterparts to a greater effort. Although this technique is not recommended as the sole factor in motivating counterparts, it may be used as a last resort.

(d) Command Action: The problems delineated in this paragraph are being addressed on a day-to-day basis by detailing more personnel to work with Unit 101, increasing joint inspections and staff visits, developing combined operating procedures, and sponsoring more and more training activities for Unit 101. On 1 December 1970, a Combined SOF was published.
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by Unit 101 and this Group. This SOP is designed to address all aspects of combined operations with Unit 101.

(5) Use of Montagnard Agents

(a) Observations: During the past three years, US personnel have had a hard time trying to motivate, train and target Montagnard sources.

(b) Evaluation:

1 Motivation: The Montagnard’s sense of priorities is vastly different from our own. He identifies in descending order with his family, religion, hamlet and clan. This is where his loyalty rests. He feels little if any loyalty to the government of Vietnam or to such abstract ideas as "freedom" or "democracy." He is really not interested in money. In fact, almost every effort to utilize money as a motivational factor has failed. He does place great faith in friendship and personal trust. If he believes a case officer is a dependable and loyal friend, there is little that he will not do for him.

2 Relations with the Vietnamese: For centuries, the Vietnamese have exploited the people of the mountains. The common Vietnamese word for Montagnard was mois, which can literally be translated as "savage." Although the present government has made an effort to eliminate this racist attitude, the feeling remains that the Montagnards are untermenisch, and among the Montagnards that the Vietnamese are less than human.

3 Training: The vast majority of the Montagnards live in a primitive tribal culture. Most of them have never seen a map, held a pencil, or utilized a compass. Further, some of the tribes do not have a word for a number higher than five. Consequently, accounts of enemy troop concentrations should be reviewed very carefully before they are passed on to the user.

4 Language: The Montagnards are divided into seven main tribal groups which are in turn subdivided into a number of tribes or clans. Twenty separate languages have been identified among the Montagnard population. Language differences are enough to prevent effective communication between two men who belong to different tribal groups that live only a few kilometers apart.

(c) Recommendations:

1 Motivation: A deep personal rapport must be developed between US case officer and a Montagnard principal agent. Case officers should be
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left in place as long as possible so that trust between them and their principal agents can mature. Any case officer dispatched to a Montagnard district should be thoroughly briefed on the various aspects of Montagnard life. Money should definitely not be used as a "handle" for it is not held to be of value by people who to this day still utilize a barter economy.

2 Relationship with the Vietnamese: Obviously, Vietnamese principal agents should be avoided when working with the Montagnards. Of course it is sometimes impossible to follow this proscription. When a mixed net is used, the Vietnamese must be briefed to respect their Montagnard sub-sources.

3 Training: Patience is of paramount importance when training Montagnard sources. The rudimentary act of sketching can be developed by elementary training and the careful targeting of sources. Success in this aspect has been achieved when the Montagnards were required to sketch their routes to and from the target.

4 Language: As much as possible, Montagnards should be targeted within their own tribal area. A Stienf in a Miong area is as incongruous as a Caucasian in Harlem on a Saturday night.

4 Command Action: These recommendations are to be incorporated into the training classes that this Group conducts for its case officers and other operational personnel.

6 Intelligence Reports on Prisoner's of War

(a) Observation: A 19 February 1971 BRIGHTLIGHT IIR reported four US prisoners of war, one black and three whites. The BRIGHTLIGHT was hand carried to Can Tho and immediately disseminated to G3, Delta Military Assistance Command for reaction. Initially, G3 MAC alerted the 7/1 Air Cavalry, Vinh Long, to support a recovery operation. G3, MAC later stated, however, that he had no troops who were trained in this type of operation. Consequently, he felt the utilization of an untrained recovery force was too great a risk. In lieu of a recovery attempt, G3 MAC did activate a first light aerial reconnaissance which detected movement in the exact area reported in the BRIGHTLIGHT IIR.

(b) Evaluation: Even though the BRIGHTLIGHT IIR received special handling, G3 MAC was unable to provide troops trained in this type of operation. Air support was available, and on alert, yet due to the lack of trained troops, no operation was mounted.

(c) Recommendation: It is imperative that all BRIGHTLIGHT reports are disseminated as rapidly as possible, especially to organizations with prior
training in recovery type operations, such as US Navy Seals. At this writing, three US Navy addressers have been added to the distribution of all BRIGHTLIGHT reports to facilitate coordination of Seal operations in the future. If necessary, IIR’s should be hand carried to consumers utilizing the unit’s organic aviation support. Rapid dissemination and a trained recovery force may add up to a successful POW recovery.

(d) Command Action: All units have been instructed to disseminate BRIGHTLIGHT reports as quickly as possible in order to exploit all possible opportunities to recover POW’s.

(7) Communications Reception Capability

(a) Observation: The component of the AN/GRC-106 radio which is most likely to break down is the amplifier, AN-3349/GRC. It is this amplifier which provides the power to enable the radio to transmit. Under normal operating conditions, the antenna is connected to the amplifier and both transmitted and received messages pass through it. The AN/GRC-122 teletypewriter rig, however, has a second duplex receiver-transmitter (RT-662/GRC) and can be set up to receive on a second frequency without recourse to the amplifier. Although the training manual does not give specific instructions on using the radio for reception only, when the amplifier is missing, it is fairly simple to derive the method from the manner in which the duplex receiver-transmitter is connected.

(b) Evaluation: After removing the amplifier for repair, the rig is placed in the duplex mode of operation. If the duplex receiver-transmitter has been previously removed, the remaining RT-662 must be moved to the position above the modem, MD-522A/GRC, to facilitate connections. The RT is connected to the modem, with a cable, CG-3366/U, between the microphone jack on the RT and the auxiliary receiver/audio jack on the modem. The antenna lead is then connected to the receiver-transmitter. The TT-98, page printer, must be moved to its auxiliary position, and the KW-7 must be moved to the IN/REC PONY position above its ordinary position. The modem is placed in loop 2 operation and the switch box is placed in the TT-98 duplex receive position.

(c) Recommendation: Although this procedure produces excellent results, it is of little value to the field sites where the primary requirement is the ability of the rig to provide rapid transmission of messages. With the four rigs that are satellited on the CommCenter in Saigon, however, the situation is somewhat different. The Saigon rigs act mainly as receiving stations, sending only a relatively small amount of traffic out to the field. Here this technique can be used to relieve a backlog of messages.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 525th Military Intelligence Group, Period Ending 30 April 1971, AGS CGFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(d) Command Action: This technique is used whenever there is a requirement to increase a SIG's reception capability.

d. Organization: None.

e. Training: In-Country Training Requirements:

(1) Observation: Required in-country training requirements present field battalions with scheduling and logistics problems due to the scattered location of subordinate elements.

(2) Evaluation: In order to accomplish their mission, field battalions have many of their subordinate collection elements operating at great distances from their respective headquarters. While this arrangement facilitates mission accomplishment, it creates difficulties in accomplishing required training. Training which can be accomplished through reading and study lends itself readily to the training packet vehicle and can be accomplished by the distribution of training packets to the field elements. Training which requires the employment of practical exercises and special facilities, such as weapons firing, CBR, etc., presents a more difficult problem as they are beyond the capabilities of the small field elements. In most instances the battalions themselves do not have special facilities to conduct this training or ready access to them. In an effort to solve this problem, tactical and support units who receive intelligence from this Group have been contacted for assistance. The 1st Air Cavalry Division (AM) offered to incorporate incoming 3d MI Battalion personnel into their three day Replacement Training School. The school, which provides training in weapons, CBR, Code of Conduct, Geneva Convention, drug abuse, VC/NVA tactics and other related subjects, also includes intelligence collection training. 3d MI Battalion in return for the 1st Air Cavalry Division's assistance will assist them in the presentation of the intelligence subjects. It is a mutually supporting project which enables the 3d MI Bn to have all of its incoming personnel accomplish their initial required training. The Replacement Training Center will also support the battalion's semi-annual firing and CBR training.

(3) Recommendation: That the facilities of tactical combat support and logistical units be utilized to accomplish required training whenever possible.

(4) Command Action: Unit commanders are encouraged to make maximum use of all available training facilities in an effort to accomplish required training.

3. (c) Special Highlight. The item discussed in this paragraph was received
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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 25th Military Intelligence Group, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGSPOR-65 (R3) (U)

after this unit's ORLL had already been prepared. In view of its overall significance, however, it is being inserted into the ORLL at this point so as to insure that it is brought to the attention of all interested parties.

a. On 5 December 1970, the 2d MI Bn (Prov) reported that the Headquarters of the Communist H.16 District Committee had issued a directive to collect information on HQ, 42nd Regiment, 22nd ARVN Infantry Division, which was located in the vicinity of Dak To. Specific essential elements of information (EEI) of this directive were: to sketch the 42nd Regiment's defenses with special emphasis on weak areas; to determine when the guards changed; and to infiltrate the ranks of the Regiment personnel in an attempt to have them drink and/or smoke opium and thereby release information to the enemy. These EEI were to be satisfied by 30 December 1970 so that the attack could take place in early January 1971.

b. Development of the attack plan was reported in three subsequent IIIs:

(1) An III, dated 26 December 1970, reported that the H.16 Intelligence and Security Section had completed its reconnaissance and study of the barracks and defense system of the 42nd Regiment base. A chart of the base and a detailed plan of attack were provided.

(2) On 3 January 1971 this unit reported that a PVT Thu had been detained by security authorities of the 42nd Regiment. The Communists had elicited information concerning the target from PVT Thu by causing him to become intoxicated at a local establishment. This attempt was in line with the EEI of HQ, H.16 to infiltrate the ranks of the 42nd Regiment in order to elicit information.

(3) An III, dated 24 March reported preparations and coordination between the Communist 66th Regiment and the 28th and 40th Communist Artillery Regiments for their attack upon Dak To and the 42nd Regiment.

c. On 6 April 1971, Headquarters, 42nd ARVN Infantry Regiment was attacked but the attack was repulsed by ARVN forces on the same night with the following initial combat results: 56 members of the 406th Sapper Battalion KIA, four others CIA, 1 B-41, 6 B-40, and 15 AK-47s captured. ARVN forces suffered three wounded.

d. The subsequent operation in that area involving 16 ARVN combat battalions is known as Operation Quang Trung 22-1. Results of this operation as of 210700 April 1971 were 3,286 enemy KIA, 6 CIA, 361 small arms and 116 crew-served weapons captured. These figures cover the period from 31 March 1971 to the above listed date. In addition, there were numerous secondary explosions as a result of air strikes, and numerous bunkers, caves and other fortifications were destroyed.
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 525th Military Intelligence Group, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

The results listed in the previous paragraph are official ARVN figures at MR II Headquarters. The great majority of KIA have been reported by ARVN units to US advisory elements and are attributed mostly to air strikes. These results are not included in the Operational Production Status report.

2 Inc.
1. Operational Production
   Status Report
2. List of Units

D.A. OWENS
Colonel MI
Commanding
AVHDO-DO (15 May 1971) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 525th Military Intelligence Group, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington D.C. 20310

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 525th Military Intelligence Group and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furb:
525th MI Gp
GPOP-FD (15 May 71) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters
525th Military Intelligence Group, Period Ending
30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 8 JUL 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L.M. O'Leary
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
Operational Production Status Report

1 November 1970 - 30 April 1971

1. (C) Total number of raw Intelligence Information Reports produced: 11,632.
   a. Unilateral: 4680
   b. Bilateral 525/101: 6140
   c. Bilateral 525/MSS: 812

2. (C) Tactical Unit Responses to IIR's:
   a. Artillery strikes:
      (1) Unilateral: 358
      (2) Bilateral 525/101: 445
      (3) Bilateral 525/MSS: 13
   b. Air Reconnaissance Missions:
      (1) Unilateral: 610
      (2) Bilateral 525/101: 578
      (3) Bilateral 525/MSS: 53
   c. Air Strikes:
      (1) Unilateral: 90
      (2) Bilateral 525/101: 114
      (3) Bilateral 525/MSS: 19
   d. Ground Operations:
      (1) Unilateral: 302
      (2) Bilateral 525/101: 445
      (3) Bilateral 525/MSS: 29

Inclocure 1
e. Naval Missions:
   (1) Unilateral: 14
   (2) Bilateral 525/101: 66
   (3) Bilateral 525/MSS: 13
f. Command Alerts:
   (1) Unilateral: 136
   (2) Bilateral 525/101: 416
   (3) Bilateral 525/MSS: 40
3. (C) Results of Tactical Responses:
   a. VC/NVA killed in action:
      (1) Unilateral: 443
      (2) Bilateral 525/101: 725
      (3) Bilateral 525/MSS: 53
   b. VC/NVA captured in action:
      (1) Unilateral: 29
      (2) Bilateral 525/101: 69
      (3) Bilateral 525/MSS: 28
4. (C) Total number of IIR evaluations received from supported units: 44,186.
5. (C) Validity of IIR's based upon evaluations submitted by supported units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unilateral</th>
<th>525/101</th>
<th>525/MSS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Confirmed</td>
<td>188 (4.50%)</td>
<td>249 (2.70%)</td>
<td>39 (4.50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Probably True</td>
<td>906 (22.00%)</td>
<td>1747 (19.60%)</td>
<td>200 (23.40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Possibly True</td>
<td>2316 (56.30%)</td>
<td>4684 (52.60%)</td>
<td>427 (50.00%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Doubtful</td>
<td>191 (4.60%)</td>
<td>383 (4.30%)</td>
<td>51 (5.90%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Improbable</td>
<td>45 (1.00%)</td>
<td>84 (0.90%)</td>
<td>5 (0.50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Cannot Judge</td>
<td>467 (11.30%)</td>
<td>1747 (19.60%)</td>
<td>132 (15.40%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals 4091 8922 854
6. (C) Usability of IIR's based upon evaluations submitted by supported units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unilateral</th>
<th>525/101</th>
<th>585/458</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Great</td>
<td>538 (13.10%)</td>
<td>871 (9.70%)</td>
<td>84 (9.80%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Moderate</td>
<td>2453 (59.90%)</td>
<td>5647 (63.20%)</td>
<td>497 (58.10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Slight</td>
<td>1004 (24.50%)</td>
<td>2223 (24.90%)</td>
<td>252 (29.50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. None</td>
<td>87 (2.10%)</td>
<td>172 (1.90%)</td>
<td>20 (2.30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Do not need</td>
<td>9 (0.20%)</td>
<td>9 (0.10%)</td>
<td>1 (0.10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>4091</td>
<td>8922</td>
<td>854</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NOTE: Totals are less than total evaluations received, paragraph 4, due to some inevitable duplicate, unusable, partial and invalid evaluations.
List of Units Assigned to the 525th MI Group*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 525th MI Group</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st MI Bn (Prov)</td>
<td>DaNang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d MI Bn (Prov)</td>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d MI Bn (Prov)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th MI Bn (Prov)</td>
<td>Can Tho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th MI Bn (Prov)</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>519th MI Bn (FA)</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>504th Signal Detachment</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>358th Aviation Detachment</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*List provided in accordance with USARV Supplement 1 to AR 525-11, dated 8 February 1971.
Operation Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 525th Military Intelligence Group

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 70 to 30 Apr 71.

CO, 525th Military Intelligence Group