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COMMUNIST "REPRESSION" IN SOUTH VIET-NAM

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Among the more difficult aspects of Communist literature is the obscure and oblique meanings its authors assign to perfectly ordinary words. Nonetheless, to understand their writings this special semantic code must be broken. Their use of special terms is particularly prevalent in their policy and directive documents covering the activities of their security services. This issue of Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes deals specifically with their policy of assassination and selective terror and, as such, is particularly full of these seemingly innocuous words that really mean something else. Like most ideological writings the authors find it convenient and expedient not to call the devil by his true name.

Knowing this pitfall, however, it does not then become a simple task to be entirely sure of the Communist directive writers' meaning in every case. The VC have no legal code as we understand it, but they do make laws -- binding on their acolytes and adherents -- in the form of statements and re-statements of their continuously shifting policies toward specific situations, general situations, specific individuals. It may be clear in a given document that to "repress" means to execute, but since there are so many of these documents, continuously being revised and superseded, one can never be sure that the document in hand is the final word on the subject and it may be that a subsequent document will use the word "repress" to mean imprison. In the following paragraphs we are only trying to suggest the range of meaning that a specific term may have without attempting to define it exactly every time it is used.

For example: When a VC document states that a "puppet reactionary should be re-educated," trained VC security cadre know that the subject is to be sent to prison to reform his "reactionary" thinking.
A frequent sentence imposed on VC victims by "people's courts" or merely by administrative fiat is expressed by the Vietnamese word diệt, a term which literally means to "end the existence of." However, since this is a little startling to the reader not familiar with the grey world of security operations, the VC writers frequently substitute the term Trần áp in cases where they feel the need for such delicacy. Trần áp actually means "to repress," but as used "repress" can mean anything from "warning," either written or oral, to "house arrest," wherein the victim is isolated from the community for an indefinite period, to "imprisonment" or "summary execution." The security cadre in charge has to decide which of these degrees of "repression" is indicated in each individual case.

The targets of this "repression" are usually officials of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam (GVN) at the hamlet or village level. The VC designate these individuals as ác ôn, an untranslatable term which implies that these individuals are "cruel" or "brutal" elements who use their "power" to harm "the people." This term is usually translated "cruel tyrants" and is used to betoken anyone from a messenger in a village administration to a major general commanding a division -- in other words someone who works for the GVN and not for the Communists.

The flexibility of decision accorded to security cadre, noted above, is another factor making it difficult to assign consistent exact meanings to Communist terms. For example, the Vietnamese term xã ly means (approximately) "to solve a problem." This can and has been interpreted by zealous cadre as "execute." However, it can also mean "detention" or "re-education." It is all up to the cadre.

The term xã ly tài cho means literally "to solve a problem on the spot." This order authorizes the cadre specifically to execute the victim without further administrative action.

GVN forces are almost always "puppet troops" but they can be "tyrant troops." The Americans are almost always "imperialist aggressors," and other free world forces "foreign puppets" or "satellite troops."

Some of the idiomatic language is very colorful. "Cancel" means kill when used by security cadre. "Sleep with
the worms," "go diving for shrimp," "let him go," "punish severely," "punish with a fully extended arm," "feed him copper candy," all mean to security cadre that the victim is to be killed immediately. Some of the above terms are used only in oral communication, some in written. The Vietnamese Communists are particularly careful not to use written terms which by ordinary definition can mean "kill" or "execute"; thus the continuous use of "repress" "oppress," "purge" "weed out" and the like.

The above does not presume to represent a definitive listing of the security cadres' special terms. They are merely illustrative and, hopefully, will aid the reader in wending his way through some of the more arcane prose that follows.
COMMUNIST "REPRESSION" IN SOUTH VIET-NAM

INTRODUCTION

"The fundamental objective of the Revolution is political power. In order to oust the puppet government and seize power for ourselves, we should resort to revolutionary violence (political and military violence) to oppose the enemy's anti-revolutionary violence. The Armed Security Force in particular, and the People's Security Agency in general, are an absolutist tool of the Party and the Revolution. They fully demonstrate the high combat quality through armed and professional activities aimed at aggressively attacking the enemy in order to positively protect ourselves." This basic policy was reaffirmed by the Security Agency of R [COSVN headquarters] (1) in a directive concerning security units prepared on September 30, 1968. (2)

This issue of Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes examines one of the means of "revolutionary violence", which is an integral part of Vietnamese Communist strategy "repression." Several hundreds of captured VC documents which concentrate on "security" problems have been examined. The documents reproduced here, which range from a directive from the Ministry of Public Security in North Viet-Nam to an individual death warrant were selected on the basis of showing the continuity of VC policy and its widespread application. Footnotes in the introduction citing documents by number, refer to the documents as listed in the table of contents of this research note unless otherwise specified.

THE RATIONALE

The rationale for the Communists' use of severe "repression," including assassination, is to "demoralize the enemy, sow dissension and confusion among them, limit their cruel activities, and create enthusiasm among the revolutionary people." The milder forms of "repression," such as "warnings," are used to "sow confusion and anxiety among the personnel of the puppet government, police and secret agencies, etc., so as to cause them to work only perfunctorily for the enemy and to do no harm to the revolution." The goal is to "try to reduce the effectiveness of the puppets as a step toward paralyzing whole units of the puppet government, National Police, and Secret Service." (3)

Plans for long term resort to "repression" are justified, according to the Communists, by alleged plans of the Government of Viet-Nam (GVN) and the United States to use spies and reactionaries, even after all of South Viet-Nam is "liberated," to destroy the revolutionary government through subversion and espionage. Communist security forces must protect the revolutionary government. The Security Agency of COSVN wrote, "We must counter the aggressive war not only in the present but also in the future even when our fatherland is completely liberated. The class struggle will continue to take place, fierce and complicated, especially the struggle against spies, reactionaries, henchmen of the U.S. imperialists, reactionary elements in religious communities and ethnic minority groups. The Armed Security Forces will still have to display high combat quality through armed and professional activities in their mission of providing security for the revolutionary government and territory, repressing the counter-revolutionaries and destroying overt and covert enemies." (4)

(3) See Document No. 1, pp. 1-4 through 1-5
(4) See Document No. 2, pp. 2-2 through 2-3
Finally, the security branch is important in maintaining stability within the Communist ranks. An unspecified province agency in Viet-Cong Military Region 7, in a memorandum based on Directive 08 CT.NT of the Standing Committee of COSVN, stated that the Party must keep abreast of the political situation and inspect Communist internal organizations in order to "purify our internal organizations, promote our members' sense of solidarity, strengthen our ideology, tighten our organization and enable us to accomplish all missions." To implement this mission, members were to "properly assess the internal ideological situation to discover any manifestations of lack of vigilance, violation of policies, internal dissensions, suspected enemy activities within our internal organizations, and activities of backward elements." Particular attention was to be paid to "persons suspected of having relations with the enemy and those whose biographical data are unclear." Every person was to be watched. "Cell leaders," the memorandum directed, "should keep an eye on every member's daily behavior and report any developments, whether good or bad, to the operations committee member in charge of security maintenance."

Similarly, the Security Section, Quế Sơn District in VC Military Region 5, in a circular discussing the "Security Mission During the First Six Months of 1969," directed members to "purify the ranks of the people in liberated areas." "As soon as we liberate an area," the circular continued, "we must destroy the enemy oppressive machinery there and establish our security system so as to meet the requirements in repressing and purging [undesirable elements] and preserving power."

(5) See Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes No. 93, "Viet-Cong Political Geography of South Viet-Nam" for a discussion of VC political units appearing throughout this Research Note.
(6) See Document No. 4, pp. 4-8 through 4-9
(7) Ibid., p. 4-11
(8) See Document No. 10, p. 10-1
ORIGINS OF THE SECURITY BRANCH

Terror and assassination of GVN personnel was employed from the beginning of the Southern Communists' revolt against the Diệm government in the late 1950's. When North Viet-Nam decided in 1963 to increase its support to the Southern insurgency it recommended continued use of terror, advising the VC to "properly punish a number of reactionaries and tyrants who owe blood debts to the people" and recommended a "policy of repression combined with clemency and punishment with reeducation."(9)

The Security Agency of COSVN is controlled by the Ministry of Public Security in North Viet-Nam. Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes No. 90, "Communist Security Forces in Viet-Nam," discussed the origins of the security forces and their organization and functions in North Viet-Nam. An August 1970 speech by Trần Quốc Hoàn, Minister of Public Security, an alternate member of the Viet-Nam Workers' Party Politburo, mentioned that in August-September, 1945, security forces of his Ministry's precursor in the North operated in Thuận Thiên Province and Saigon-Cholon in South Viet-Nam. They won praise from Hồ Chí Minh "for their exploits in annihilating collaborators and spies."(10)

Hoàn went on to say: "After the Diên Biên Phủ victory, peace was restored, North Viet-Nam was completely liberated and switched to the socialist revolutionary stage, and our people's democratic state performed its historic task of [sic] proletarian dictatorship task. Closely led by the Party, the People's Security Forces developed its fine nature and tradition and endeavored to build itself into a firm, strong force in order to cope with the new situation and tasks. As a result the great,

(9) See Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes No. 96, "The Viet-Nam Workers' Party's 1963 Decision to Escalate the War in the South," p.27.

(10) See Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes No. 90, p.12
wicked, and cunning plots of sabotage against the northern part of our country by the imperialists' spies and the reactionaries in the country failed tragically."(11)

Hoàn greeted "the heroic South Viet-Nam liberation security fighters" as a brother force in his August speech, as did an "emulation congress" of his men in June 1970.(12)

Experiences gained in the North are applied to Viet-Cong security operations in the South. A November 1967 Directive from Nhà, the Ministry of Public Security in Hanoi, stressed the value of the VC's "learning from experiences of security activities in North Viet-Nam."(13)

THE COSVN SECURITY AGENCY APPARATUS

The VC Security Agency has its headquarters at COSVN. There are subordinate Security Sections at region, province, district, and village levels. Each Section reports to the next higher echelon in the chain, and is also responsible to the Standing Committee of the Party at its own level, where approval of most security actions must be granted. The November 1967 directive from Nhà stated that the killing or capture of "cruel and dangerous elements" serving the GVN "must be approved by the competent Party Committee authorities."(14) A June 1970 directive of a province in VC Military Region 5, reiterating Party policy, stated, "It is necessary to control security agencies and intensify the Party leadership over security tasks to repress anti-revolutionaries in order to gain and maintain the revolutionary power at present and in the future."(15) This included the submission of "files of local puppet administrative personnel, spies, and tyrants" to "Party Committee authorities for approval before taking appropriate action toward each of those individuals."(16)

(11) Ibid., p. 13
(12) Ibid., pp. 43-44
(13) See Document No. 1, p. 1-2
(14) See Document No. 1, p. 1-4
(15) See Document No. 7, p. 7-4
(16) See Document No. 7, p. 7-7
Likewise, a Province Party Committee Security Section "Resolution Concerning Security Tasks to Be Performed From October 1970 to June 1971" stated that the people's movement to preserve secrecy and repress reactionaries and spies must be in accordance with the guideline: "Party Chapters provide leadership, key organizations mobilize the people to participate in the movement, and security personnel provide technical guidance." (17)

These documents, along with COSVN Directive 17 "Pertaining to the Development of Armed Security Forces," June 9, 1968, and a training document based on it written a year later, establish that the security forces operate directly under the control of the Party, not the National Liberation Front or the Provisional Revolutionary Government. Hence no undertakings by either of those bodies would necessarily be binding upon the security apparatus should the National Liberation Front - Provisional Revolutionary Government (NLF-PRG) be included in a coalition government in South Viet-Nam. The security forces are "an absolutist tool of the Party." (18)

The organization of the security sections varies from area to area depending on the number of reliable personnel available, the degree of control of the area by the Communists, and the local situation. Each section has a number of subsections, which may include an espionage force, area security force, armed reconnaissance force, armed security force, education, propaganda and training subsection, mass proselyting subsection, and others.

The 1967 directive from the Ministry of Public Security in North Viet-Nam explains the role of three of the critical elements: The espionage force, the area security force, and the armed reconnaissance force. The mission of the espionage force is "to plant agents in the

(17) See Document No. 5, p. 5-6
(18) See Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes No. 90, pp. 50, 56, & 61
enemy's military, political, intelligence, police, secret services, and psywar agencies and in religious organizations and reactionary parties." These agents are to "penetrate deeply into enemy organizations, and to attain high positions of influence in order to collect important information and documents concerning the enemy's strategies, tactics and schemes." (19) Targets include counter-espionage agencies of the GVN and the U.S.; the U.S. Embassy, various consulates, the National Armed Forces Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, GVN Province Chiefs, mayors, and other leaders of key GVN agencies; the "Vietnamese Nationalist Party, Đại Việt Party, the Labor and Personalist Party; (20) "reactionary elements of religious groups (Catholics, Protestants, Caodais, and Hòa Hảo Buddhists);" "reactionary cliques among the ethnic minority people (Fulro, Khmer, Krom);" and "reactionary elements in the popular organizations established by the enemy, such as the Confederation of Labor headed by Trần Quốc Buội, Vietnamese Youths' and Students' Association, etc."

(19) See Document No. 1, p. 1-8
(20) The Viet-Nam Kuomintăng, or Nationalist Party (Việt-Nam Quốc Dân Đảng-VNQDD) was organized in 1925 in Canton, China and two years later it was established secretly in Hanoi. The Party was severely repressed in 1930 by the French and nearly destroyed. It returned to Viet-Nam after World War II and briefly joined the Communists in a coalition to oppose the French, being represented in Hồ Chí Minh's first cabinet and in the 1946 National Assembly in North Viet-Nam. Subsequently, those of its cadres who maintained an independent position were killed or driven out of public life. In 1954 it reemerged in the South, split into several factions. The party was severely suppressed during the Diệm regime. After 1963 it became a major organization in parts of the Republic of Viet-Nam (with several factions) standing for anti-Communism, anti-neutralism, national reconstruction and democratic socialism.
The area security force operates in areas such as "city streets, markets, bus terminals, ports, enterprises, schools, etc. It has the mission to investigate and discover enemy secret agents, informers, Military Intelligence Collection Teams, dangerous elements in reactionary parties, reactionary elements of the Buddhist and Catholic groups and enemy lackeys who operate in agencies, enterprises, schools, markets, and popular organizations established by the enemy." (22)

In addition to these two forces, the Security Agency established armed security forces, including the armed reconnaissance forces. Their responsibility is to "provide security for the Party Committee authorities and the bases and to attack the enemy at the same time," according to Directive 167/AN of the Security Agency of COSVN, issued on September 30, 1968. (23)

The Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (ĐCĐVN) or Communist Party of Vietnam, was established in Hanoi in 1930 by a group of nationalists. It was outlawed by the Communist Hanoi regime in 1946 and shifted its base of operations to the South. The Party has been firmly committed to anti-Communism and national independence.

The Đảng Lao Động Việt Nam (ĐLĐVN) or Communist Party of Vietnam, was an "elite group" of intellectuals and civil servants under Nguyễn Đình Diệm. The Party supported the political ideas of Diệm and Nhu, labeled Personalism (Nhân Vi), through which Diệm sought a middle ground between capitalist individualism and Communist collectivism, both of which, he said, "have inflicted great damage on man."

(21) See Document No. 1, p. 1-7

(22) See Document No. 1, p. 1-9

(23) See Document No. 2, p. 2-3
The composition of the armed security forces was described by COSVN in Directive 17 as consisting of "concentrated armed security units, security guard and bodyguard units, and armed reconnaissance units." (24)

Directive 167 defined the protection and combat missions of the concentrated armed security force. The people must be motivated and agent networks established, "in order to successfully provide security for the Party Committee authorities, for the bases and the detention camps." This force, because its "own strength is limited," must coordinate closely with village and hamlet security and guerrilla forces. (25)

"The missions of the security guard and bodyguard units," according to the training document concerning Directive 17, "are to provide close protection for individuals as prescribed by the Party and to protect sensitive points." (26)

According to Nhà's 1967 directive, the mission of the armed reconnaissance force is "to eliminate the dishonest elements, puppet [i.e. GVN] administrative personnel, the tyrants and betrayers who undermine our movements and terrorize the people; to protect our revolutionary organizations; and to heighten the prestige of the revolution and lower the prestige of the enemy." (27) This force "has political characteristics and is different, as far as its missions and operations are concerned, from other armed forces of the Party and the Armed Security Force," the directive continued, and it "must be placed under close leadership of the higher echelon and must operate according to the political situation in a local area to meet the policies and stratagem of the Party." (28)

(24) See Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes No. 90, p. 53.
(25) See Document No. 2, p. 2-10
(26) See Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes No. 90, p. 67.
(27) See Document No. 1, p. 1-11
(28) Ibid., p. 1-12
THE TARGETS FOR REPRESSION

Any person whose viewpoint is not in consonance with the Party, and therefore is a source, or potential source, of opposition, is a possible target for repression and elimination. Labeled "cruel tyrants," "reactionaries," "betrayers," and "spies," they include elected village and hamlet administrative personnel, pacification personnel, teachers, leaders in the GVN, Psywar and Chiêu Hồi personnel, intelligence personnel, police, People's Self-Defense Force members and leaders of religious, political and minority groups. (29)

Target groups are classified into categories which vary locally, but the lists are designed to include all persons who presently or may potentially oppose the Party. They may be people actively countering the Communists, such as "those who have served as puppet government officials from Chief of Inter-families to higher levels," "leading and key members of popular organizations, set up by the enemy," and "those who are the key and leading members of reactionary parties and organizations disguised under a national religious mask, puppet armed forces servicemen from corporal to higher level, and enemy government officials from village level up." Others may be currently passive, with no direct connection with the GVN, but whose "crime" is that their "relatives are participating in espionage, security, cruel special force, and psywar organizations," and "those whose relatives were condemned to death, imprisoned by the Revolution or who had been victims of mistakes committed during the land reform campaign and who still bear a grudge against the Revolution despite the rectification campaign, (30) or those who were jailed by the Revolution." (31)


(31) See Document No. 14, pp. 14-1, and 14-2
A "specific mission" of VC security forces, according to a Province Party Committee Security Section "Resolution Concerning Security Tasks To Be Performed From October 1970 to June 1971," is "to get full information on every enemy organization and individual target [of repression], especially the cruel ringleaders and the enemy secret [espionage] networks. We must classify these people into specific categories with information on their political background." (32) This critical mission receives priority from Communist security forces throughout South Viet-Nam. Units which fail to meet set goals in compiling records on suspects are severely criticized by their superiors.

In a preliminary report to the Security Section of COSVN, the Đô Sơn Security Section stated, "The investigation of overt enemy administrative personnel, secret agents, and informers was not intensive in our controlled areas and disputed areas. In 500 hamlets of five provinces, there are approximately 3,800 overt administrative personnel. Only 2,331 (three-fifths) have been recorded. Most of these records contain names but not personal histories and activity records. They have not yet been classified; in some areas they have been classified, but classification was inaccurate. Records of tyrants and information on them were poor and incomplete. We failed to get complete information on their movements and activities. As a result, we could not make specific plans for capturing or annihilating them." (33)

There are two steps in developing files on suspects, according to the Đô Sơn report. First, security agencies must "thoroughly understand the political and social situation, study and discover suspicious cases." Second, they must "determine, prove, and confirm the suspects." (34)

In the first step Party chapters, Party members, secret agents, and "cooperative people" collect information on the political and social situation of villages and

(32) See Document No. 5, p. 5-10
(33) See Document No. 3, p. 3-6
(34) Ibid., p. 3-16
hamlets. Village security sections study this information to identify persons "who have bad political backgrounds." These people become "targets" for fuller Communist investigation.

The "targets" listed for investigation in step one are classified in step two as "highly suspected" or "slightly suspected." An individual should not be declared suspect on the basis of insufficient evidence. A reconnaissance agent must follow him and, if he finds specific evidence that the target is friendly to the "enemy," the target is then considered a "suspect."

Once that determination is made, that the "target" is a "suspect," "agents," "secret supporters," or "cooperative people" must closely observe the "suspect" to develop proof that he is an "enemy." If this is proved, "prompt and specific measures" are taken by "arresting, detaining, or eliminating" him in order to safeguard the Revolution. (35)

FORMS OF REPRESSION

According to the provincial agency in VC Military Region 7, in its memorandum based on COSVN's Directive 08 CT.NT, the Communists "must wipe out all hamlet and village puppet administrative personnel, spies, tyrants and reactionaries who operate openly or secretly against the revolution." (36) If their acts did not yet warrant arrest, they were to be put under surveillance or "reformed." The objective was to deprive the GVN of the personnel it needed to contain the Communists and extend its protection throughout the country.

To realize this policy, graduated forms of repression were developed. Although the designations of these forms may vary locally, there are generally five that can

(35) See Document No. 3, p. 3-16 through 3-18
(36) See Document No. 4, p. 4-5
be identified: (1) private warning, (2) public warning, (3) "house arrest," (4) thought reform camps, and (5) execution. (37)

A VC Cà Mậu Province plan for August through October 1970 stressed the application of the five forms of repression. In GVN pacified rural areas, the document said, "the Political Security [Section] should coordinate with the forces that destroy enemy control to wipe out and repress 100% [of the targets] through the use of the five methods." In "liberated" rural areas every effort was to be made "to break up the enemy spy network, capture enemy ring-leaders and subordinates and use the five methods to ensure security for the areas of emphasis." "Norms" (quotas) were specified. The province Security Section was to "destroy four intelligence networks and repress 250 of the enemy by the five methods." Each district section was "required to destroy one to two intelligence networks, and repress from 100 to 150 enemy spies and reactionaries by using the five methods." (38)

**WARNINGS**

The mildest form of repression is a warning. This may be verbal or it may be written and delivered by a courier or sent through the mail. The target is notified that the Party knows of his activities and "crimes" and is following his movements. He is warned that if he does not abandon these activities, and the GVN, he will be "severely punished," however, if he "repents," he may return to the Revolution.

Document No. 15, dated December 12, 1969, illustrates the appeal and the threat of the warning. "An old

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(37) These five forms of "repression" were identified by former VC Lt. Col. Huỳnh Cử, who served with the Vietnamese Communists from 1945 until March 24, 1967 when he rallied to the GVN. His last position was Chief of the Training Section, VC Military Region 5.

(38) See Document No. 6, pp. 6-5 through 6-6
friend" wrote to Nguyễn Văn Lý, a GVN hamlet chief, to encourage him to return to the "Revolution" or become the victim of severe punishment, probably assassination.

The author recalls Lý's service to the resistance against the French as a member of the Việt Minh, highlighted by his participation "in the glorious Diên Biên Phú Battle." After 1954, the warning recounts, Lý returned to his native South Viet-Nam where he fearlessly continued to serve the "Revolution," and behaved "as a good citizen." The author expressed his pleasure over Lý's continued "good attitude" toward the "Revolution" when he first became a GVN hamlet chief. "But," the writer notes, "now your attitude has completely changed. Why?" he asked.

Warning of the failures of the U.S. and GVN in the "Vietnamization" program Lý's "friend," gave the opinion that "the puppet troops will be completely wiped out within 24 hours after the withdrawal of all American troops from South Viet-Nam." More importantly, Lý was warned that he "must give careful consideration to the above fact to avoid future dangers."

As hamlet chief, Lý permitted the capture of a Communist cadre and was "responsible for many other crimes." Now he had to "atone for [his] crimes before the people" in order to "enjoy clemency" and so that his "wife and children will also find a life of happiness." The warning concluded: "If you do not mend your ways, bad things will befall you, and don't resent us." A post-script, reiterating that "the Revolution will severely punish those who intentionally persist in working for the enemy," directed the victim to contact the author immediately to discuss more details in the correction of Lý's "erroneous thoughts."

A "warning" dated September 10, 1970 was sent to Mr. Lực Hoàng and "the entire staff of the Tần Văn newspaper," a Chinese language daily published in Cholon. It accused Hoàng and his staff of acting as the "propaganda mouthpiece for the puppet Chiang Kai-chek clique," carry-
ing "arguments that are against the people's common hope" for the declaration of a U.S. troop withdrawal, and writing "propaganda beneficial for the people-betraying and nation-endangering policy of the reactionary and hound-dog Thiệu-Kỳ-Khiêm clique."

The warning declared that the U.S. defeats "are very clear" and "the puppet clique will also be beaten." "When even the world's strongest imperialist leader suffers defeats inflicted by the heroic people of Viet-Nam," the warning continued, "can there be any question whether your strength could possibly resist the revolutionary waves of the people?"

Mr. Hoàng and his staff were directed to stop their "running-dog acts of betraying the people" and especially to stop obeying the orders of the "Chiang Kai-chek special mission clique" and cease putting out "news beneficial to the enemy." "If your staff fails to observe this warning," the letter concluded, "your lives and properties will not be secure. The punishments of previous reactionary papers and of the running-dog Khoảng Trọng Vinh will serve as the best examples." Saigon and Cholon papers of September 11, 1970 reported that Vinh, a well-known figure in business and political circles in Saigon and Cholon and one-time member of the Nguyễn Văn Huyên ticket in the Senate election who was rejected for his alleged former connections with the Communists, had been assassinated in Cholon after, the papers said, he had received three warning letters from the VC. A copy of his "death sentence" was attached to the letter warning Hoàng. (39)

Warnings similar to the one sent to Hoàng and the Tấn Văn staff were sent to all Chinese language papers. Since the assassination of Vinh and the following warnings, the offices of the Chinese papers have been guarded by armed guards and protective doors installed.

A "warning" may not be addressed to a specific individual. The 1967 directive from Nhà states that "warning

(39) See Document No. 15, pp. 15-1 through 15-2
the obstinate elements" may be given "in order to set an example to the uncommitted elements." (40) A more effective measure may be to "kill one [enemy] personnel in order to shake the entire clique." (41) A Directive written on January 16, 1970 in Quảng Đà Special Zone, VC Military Region 5 stated that this type of "political motivation" should include "attaching the verdict to the body of any tyrant after killing him. Send verdicts to 2/3 of other tyrants." (42)

"HOUSE ARREST"

According to the Province Party Committee Security Section "Resolution Concerning Security Tasks to Be Performed From October 1970 to June 1971" mentioned earlier, in "liberated or disputed areas where we are strong" it is "necessary to closely watch the individuals with doubtful political background and investigate them to detect enemy elements and apply appropriate repressive measures against them." (43) Under "Points to stress in the elimination of tyrants and traitors" in "liberated areas," the document stated, "the various forms of on-the-spot repression must be put into full use. Village Committees together with village security sections must consider and decide the forms of on-the-spot repression (consisting of warning, thought reform, and house arrest), then report their actions to districts." (44)

"On-the-spot" thought reform consists of indoctrination sessions conducted in the subject's hamlet, which may last two to ten days during which criticism and self criticism are stressed. Following these courses the individual may be released to the custody of his family and kept under surveillance.

(40) See Document No. 1, p. 1-5
(41) See Document No. 7, p. 7-6
(42) See Document No. 8, pp. 8-4 and 8-5
(43) See Document No. 5, p. 5-8
(44) See Document No. 5, pp. 5-11 and 5-12
The Quê Sơn District circular concerning the "Security Mission During the First Six Months of 1969" stated: "In motivation, we should ask the assistance of popular organizations to conduct regular political courses in the area for those who are politically backward or have been deceived or intimidated by the enemy. We should conduct two courses lasting from two to three days. The local administration and security section should conduct [thought] reform courses in the area. Enemy informers who do not deserve to be arrested must be kept under close surveillance after their period of thought reform." (45)

THOUGHT REFORM CAMPS

Communist policy, as defined in Document No. 4, the November 1970 memorandum based upon COSVN Standing Committee Directive 08-CT.NT, calls for repression "tempered with clemency, and punishment coupled with indoctrination and [thought] reform. These will disintegrate the enemy ranks and create favorable conditions for the people to seize power and the control of villages and hamlets. They will also weed out undesirable elements in hamlets and heighten the political awareness [of the people]. Therefore the requirements of our policy are: Severely punish the obstinate tyrants who oppose the Revolution; give clemency to those who have been bribed, oppressed or misled by the enemy, and who sincerely mend their ways; reduce or void the sentences against those who have achieved merits [vis a vis the Revolution]; and commend and reward those who have achieved great merits." The objective is "to transform an undesirable person into a good one." (46)

Accordingly, the Đô Sơn Security Section of VC Military Region 6, discussing the building of secret political security sections in February 1970, stated, "After thought reforms, we should select the ones who are the least criminal and are least hated by the people, who belong

(45) See Document No. 10, p. 10-5
(46) See Document No. 4, p. 4-6
to the working class and are willing to reform and allow them to return to their native villages. They should be kept under surveillance and have missions assigned to them step by step." (47)

However, problems have arisen in carrying out the policy. In the resolution concerning tasks for October 1970 to June 1971, the Security Section noted among its weaknesses, "In repressing the enemy, we put too much emphasis on detention and neglected other forms of action to be carried out on the spot. As a result, our detention camps are overloaded and trials are not expeditious enough." (48) To correct the problem, the resolution directed security personnel in "enemy controlled areas" to "limit detention [of tyrants and traitors]. If they are worthy of being condemned to death, we must kill them without delay. We may exploit information from them, but this must be done quickly." (49)

**EXECUTION**

"Obstinate tyrants" who continued to work for the enemy after they had been warned and did not correct their thoughts and demonstrate a sincere desire to return to the "Revolution" must be "severely punished." COSVN policy gave cadre the responsibility to "motivate the people to eliminate spies and reactionaries." (50) "The masses should be indoctrinated to fully understand the wicked and crafty schemes of enemy spies and reactionaries," the November 1970 memorandum stated. "On this basis, we must deepen the people's hatred for those who betrayed the Revolution. This will help them understand their responsibility to participate in the counter-espionage tasks in order to protect revolutionary forces and their lives and property." (51) Thus, the Party, by developing hatred, attempts to motivate the people to involve themselves in and thereby legitimize the ultimate form of repression, execution.

(47) See Document No. 3, p. 3-12
(48) See Document No. 5, p. 5-3 through 5-4
(49) Ibid., p. 5-11
(50) See Document No. 4, p. 4-5
(51) Ibid.
The June 1970 "plan for intensifying the repression of counter-revolutionaries" in a province of VC Military Region 5, emphasized the role of the people: "The motivation of the people to kill puppet administrative personnel and spies was poor," the plan said. "The people in many areas are vague about the enemy or did not heighten their hatred of the enemy." The cause of this weakness, it continued, was that the "Party Committee authorities failed to make the whole Party body, army, people, and members of the security branch understand the role and impact of the people's security activities in this emergency phase when the people must contribute in destroying tyrants and breaking up the enemy's oppressive control in order to successfully fulfill the Party's political mission and policy concerning the repression of anti-revolutionaries." (52)

Whenever possible the victims' "crimes" were to be publicly revealed "to the people in order to obtain popular support for destroying" them, according to the 1970 Quảng Đa Special Zone directive. (53) One method of heightening the people's hatred and motivating them to contribute to the destruction of "tyrants" is trying of victims in "people's courts." Trials are frequently held at night when the people have no excuse, such as working in the fields, not to attend. Sentences are determined before the court session begins and justifications written, (see p. ). The purpose of the trial is to gain the support of the people for the destruction of the "culprits" who owe a "blood debt" to the people and to heighten "revolutionary pride."

The Quế Sơn District Security Section circular, discussing actions to be taken against members of "reactionary parties," stated that they should "be arrested and tried before a court. Each area of activity should establish a record of reactionaries who should be arrested. Specific

(52) See Document No. 7, p. 7-3
(53) See Document No. 8, pp. 8-5 through 8-6
cases must be submitted to courts for trial. Death penalties will be given by the court to heighten the pride of the revolutionary movement." (54)

A Province Party Committee "Resolution Concerning Security Tasks to Be Performed From October 1970 to June 1971" directed that "care should be taken" to have "enemy psywar and open arms (Chiêu Hí) agents, pacification personnel, anti-revolutionaries, reactionaries who disturb public order, and surrenderers and traitors" who are to be resolutely punished "judged by the people." (55) This resolution stated that, on the basis of "full information" on the enemy, the Communists "must have specific plans to effectively arrest and kill each individual. There must be a verdict for each case and there must be indoctrination and motivation of the people" to participate. (56) Regarding prisoners in detention camps, the resolution directed that "appropriate forms and methods of trial must be applied according to the situation of each area, but there must be participation by the people." (57)

Participation by the people is often formalized in the verdict. Document No. 16 is the death sentence of a deputy village chief of security handed down by the Command Committee of the People's Armed Forces of Bình Long Province "at the request of the people of Thanh Bình village" on February 26, 1971.

An account of a court trial, provided by Bùi Công Tường, a VC rallier, illustrates the execution of this policy. Mr. Tường was a member of the Province Party Committee of Bình Châu Province prior to rallying to the GVN in September 1970. He was Chief of Propaganda, Culture, Education, and Training for that province for ten of his twenty three years with the Communists.

(54) See Document No. 10, pp. 10-5 through 10-6
(55) See Document No. 5, p. 5-8
(56) Ibid., p. 5-10
(57) Ibid., p. 5-13
Of "more than twenty sessions" of "people's courts" attended by Mr. Tường, one was "really frightening" to him. It took place in 1962 or 1963. The Communists had decided to launch a "purge movement" in areas controlled by the National Liberation Front, Mr. Tường recalled. The purpose was "to get rid of all the spies." The names of all the "spies" arrested were made public, but "actually," Mr. Tường continued, "people who were arrested were only those who opposed them [the Communists], those who opposed the Party's policies. Not all of them were spies."

More than one thousand people were arrested by the Communists in Bến Tre Province, said Mr. Tường. At that time he worked in Tân Hao village in Giong Tiong District where a "people's court" was set up to try some spies. The night the 25 death sentences were decreed there were more than 30 defendants tried. Mr. Tường wrote the death sentences. "I had to write down different motives for each of these 25 death sentences. The death sentences had already been decided by the Province Party Committee, and Mrs. Nguyễn Thị Bình [the Deputy Commander of the People's Liberation Armed Forces] had countersigned them as approved." Mr. Tường continued, "The condemnations had to be read to the people, and I had to write them in such manner that they would be approved by the people. The condemnations, or the accusations, and public denunciations had to stir people so that they would shout, asking for the death sentence. Once the people had shouted for the death sentence, the People's Court would then pronounce it." The condemned, according to Mr. Tường, were put to death right after their pronouncements. "They shot them and they buried them in a mass grave." The victims' families were not allowed to bury their dead.

Twenty-five death sentences at one court session was unusual. "There was never a session of the people's courts without a death sentence," Mr. Tường said, but "there were may be three death sentences, or four death sentences, or at most five death sentences in one session of the people's courts. That did not surprise me, that did not frighten me. But when there were 25 death sentences in one night's ses-
sion, then ..." Mr. Tường did not show his concern at the time, for "if I spoke out," he said, "they could condemn me as having sympathy for the spies and say I was trying to defend and protect them and I could be condemned to die also."

The victims are not always present at a people's court session. Document No. 11 is the announcement of the "People's Court of Phú Cát District," Bình Định Province of the death sentence of five "culprits who have owed blood debts to the people." Although they "had time and again been educated by the Front," they "did not repent or mend their ways." Those assigned to carry out the verdict were, "under all circumstances," to "stand ready to sacrifice their lives for the achievement of the execution missions."

The Party's policies and missions, the June 1970 provincial plan stated, were to "intensify our activities to kill tyrants, punish local puppet administrative personnel, wipe out spies and oppressive forces in order to win over the people, counter the enemy accelerated pacification plans, and rebuild and develop our forces."

To satisfy the requirements of this mission, "efforts to destroy tyrants, punish puppet administrative personnel and wipe out spies must be carried out constantly, destruction must be carried out on the spot, and pursuit must be carried as far as the enemy's den. Not one enemy element must be overlooked, not one person must be hit by mistake... make sure that not a single enemy is left unpunished." In areas "under mixed control and under loose enemy control" cells and small units are to be organized "to kill ringleaders and tyrants, or destroy whole groups of local puppet administrative personnel, working days and nights to fulfill their missions."(58)

The caution "not one person must be hit by mistake" indicates the difficulty the Communists have had controlling assassinations. Although their stated policy is one of leniency, their preoccupation with destruction of all enemies of

(58) See Document No. 7, pp. 7-6 through 7-7
the Party inevitably has resulted in excesses, often severe. The 1970 plan acknowledged that "Party policy has not been carefully studied and strictly observed... For instance, in some areas, we killed entire families, teenagers, and even friendly personnel. We have put more emphasis on killing than on the indoctrination of [culprits]. Consequently, this has badly affected the prestige of the Party." Nonetheless, the next sentence complains that "the motivation of the people to kill puppet administrative personnel and spies was poor." (59)

A leaflet prepared by the Security force of Vinh Xuong District, Khánh Hòa Province in April 1971 demonstrates how excesses may develop in local areas. The leaflet urges "compatriots of the entire country" to "rise up" and destroy the Americans and their "puppets and lackeys." Specifically, "Honda [riders] are to be intercepted and destroyed" for "if they are not civil servants then they must be servicemen." This leaflet and its translation are reproduced as Document No. 20.

The excesses of Tet 1968 provide further illustration. Document No. 17 is a reproduction and a translation of an incomplete death sentence, one of several hundred blank forms found bundled together when they were captured in Saigon's Fourth Precinct during the Tet offensive. Each of the death sentences were "by order of the People's Revolutionary Committee of Saigon-Gia Dinh Fourth Precinct" for the "crime" of being "a collaborator of the country-grabbing pirates and U.S. Thiệu-Ký-Hương country-selling lackeys, who has arrested, killed, or harmed our compatriots, and opposed the revolutionary undertaking of our entire people." Only a few blanks had to be filled in: the dates of the judgement and resolutions of the Fourth Precinct People's Revolutionary Council and the Saigon-Gia Dinh People's Armed Forces Field Court, the victims' name and address, and finally an additional "crime" to personalize the sentence. The bundles of blank sentences were pre-stamped with the seal of the Fourth Precinct.

(59) Ibid., pp. 7-2 through 7-3
The emphasis on killing was brought out in the province resolution concerning tasks for October 1970 to June 1971 which stated that "the main mission is to arrest and kill enemy and overt and covert personnel at the grass-roots level." (60) Furthermore, because of the need to eliminate not only current, but potential opposition, the resolution criticized the "ideological viewpoints" of weak personnel. "They only see those presently serving in the puppet administration but failed to see the revanchists, landlords, the wicked tyrants, henchmen, and reactionaries in various religious and ethnic minority groups." The resolution continued: "They worried more about their families than about their duties. They were inclined to overlook mistakes of relatives and friends because of personal feelings and they showed a lack of determination in repressing them." (61)

One group that has long been the target of severe repression is the "reactionary [Vietnamese] Kuomintang Party." A 1968 directive "On the Strong Repression of the Kuomintang Party Members" stated that all efforts should be concentrated on "the liquidation of Kuomintang Party ring-leaders and the destruction of their various organizations from low to high level." (62) Since the Communists could not "eliminate all Kuomintang Party members in a short time," the task was to be carried out gradually and "all means" were to be used to "kill them or capture them alive, if possible, for exploitation." The goal was that "in June 1968, all district and village Kuomintang Committees will be frightened, shirking their duties. Therefore in July 1968 the province Kuomintang Committees will be unable to motivate their members and the Party will become stagnant." (63)

A major contributing factor to the excesses in assassination campaigns is the setting of death quotas, or "norms" to be achieved by various agencies. Agencies that do not fulfill their "norms" are severely criticized, with the result

(60) See Document No. 5, p. 5-7
(61) Ibid., pp. 5-4 through 5-5
(62) See Document No. 9, p. 9-2
(63) Ibid., p. 9-3
that quotas are normally met one way or another.

For example, an agency in Quảng Đà Special Zone, VC Military Region 5 on January 16, 1970 stated that "to ensure successful elimination of enemy personnel in quality and quantity it is necessary to set a general specific norm and a separate one for our Security forces..." "As the set norm for districts and regions to annihilate [GVN] administrative personnel and tyrants," the agency directed: "Our forces should kill 60 personnel in Điển Bân [district], 30 personnel in Duy Xuyên [District], 20 personnel in Đại Lộc [District], 10 personnel in Region I, 30 personnel in Region II, and 30 personnel in Region III..."

"The province armed reconnaissance elements should conduct two attacks and kill 30 enemy personnel then opening two attacks on enemy targets, coordinating Hoi An inner-city elements for 5 battles to reach the total elimination of 60 enemy personnel.

"The 2nd and 3rd Precinct Units should conduct three to five battles and kill 10 enemy personnel in the 2nd Precinct, 15 personnel in the 3rd Precinct." (64)

Similarly, the Quế Sơn District statement of the "Security Mission During the First Six Months of 1969" said that "the agents" should be employed to "kill tyrants." "Specific norms" were established for each of 25 villages. These ranged up to 40 persons for a single village; the average death quota was just over 21. (65)

The plan for the 1970 autumn campaign in Sa Đéc City directed the use of the "five forms of repression to repress 300 enemy personnel, 40 of whom should be killed." Specific quotas were set for each sub-ward which ranged from two to seven to be killed and 20 to 50 to be warned. Numbered city inner-areas were given death quotas of two to five with 10 to 30 warnings to be issued. (66)

(64) See Document No. 8, p. 8-3
(65) See Document No. 10, p. 10-4
(66) See Document No. 13, p. 13-6
Communist broadcasts have claimed great successes for the "repression" movements. For example, Radio Hanoi at 0100 GMT on November 26, 1970 alleged that "during the past two months, more than 30,000 spies and cruel administrative officials were punished by the guerrillas and liberation security agents." Primary emphasis was placed on elimination of the "cruel agents in the basic echelon administration to eradicate the most important elements in the enemy oppressive system..." the broadcast continued. The several forms of "repression" (warnings, thought reform, execution) were praised. "In areas adjacent to cities, the guerrillas and liberation security forces have sent warning letters to and educated many cruel agents..." The result, Radio Hanoi claimed, was that "thousands" deserted and "joined the revolutionary cause." Many allegedly "promised to stop committing crimes and advised their colleagues to do the same."

In other areas, "after many cruel agents were tried by the revolutionary tribunals or were appropriately punished, many administrative officials have stopped showing their arrogance" or promised "from now on to work honestly to earn their living."

The broadcast concluded that because the GVN was stepping up pacification "the punishment of cruel agents is necessary." The Communists allegedly learned from the "recent movement" that, although leniency must be shown towards those who repent and atone for their crimes, "it is necessary to destroy the most stubborn cruel agents at any cost." (67)

"Liberation Radio" on July 11, 1971 praised the raid on the "puppet office in Bình Tạo C hamlet in the third district to punish wicked tyrant Tôn who was the hamlet chief and chief of the civil self-defense group." Tôn, the broadcast continued, was a "diehard villain" who has now "paid for his crimes." (68)

(67) See Document No. 18, pp. 18-1 through 18-2
(68) See Document No. 19, p. 19-1
At the same time "Liberation Radio" reported that in mid-June 1971 two villages in Củ Chi District in Gia Định Province "held court sessions to give warnings to and punish 12 puppet spies," while in another village in Trảng Bàng District, "76 civil guardsmen, militiamen, and puppet spies" were "educated and enlightened." "On the night of 15 May," the broadcast concluded, "compatriots" in another Củ Chi District village "arrested and gave warnings to 10 U.S. - puppet spies. Faced with the compatriots' impetus, a spy confessed his crimes to the revolutionary administration and enjoyed leniency." (69)

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Although the "immediate objective," according to the 1967 directive from Nhạ, is "to protect the liberated areas and the revolutionary forces in the cities," the "long range objective" is to "serve the uprising to liberate municipalities and cities and struggle against the counter-revolutionary elements after the liberation." In order to successfully perform this task, the directive stated that security agents must understand GVN organization and composition and keep a "personnel list" of target organizations in order to "effectively serve the security tasks during the uprising and later on the administrative tasks after the uprising has achieved success." The directive continued, "for the purpose of serving our immediate and long-range 'liquidation' program, investigate all cruel and dangerous elements who surrender to us." (70)

The directive concerning the "repression" of Kuomintang Party members, in looking to the future, stated that "in the newly liberated areas after the General Attack and General Uprising" the agency was to "try to locate, pursue and capture, at any cost, all the Kuomintang Party members at Chapter Party level and higher and surrender them to the District or Province for exploitation." The directive continued, "Efforts should be made to discover and destroy

(69) Ibid.
all Kuomintang Party organizations to insure that they will not harm us later."(71)

The training document explaining COSVN's Directive 17 pointed out in June 1969 that "The history of the past years prove that the offensive strategy is a unique and sound strategy of our Party; it strengthens our belief in the final victory which ensures complete success to our people's Revolution."(72)

"The People's Security Branch, in general, and the armed security forces, in particular, must also concentrate all-out efforts on accomplishing their missions to contribute to the achievement of the decisive victory, that is to smash the aggressive will of the U.S. imperialists, defeat the puppet troops, destroy the puppet government, seize power for the people, liberate the South, protect the North and reunify the fatherland."(73)

After briefly discussing intelligence and psychological warfare operations of the GVN and its allies, the training document declared: "These efforts are designed to achieve their immediate military objectives and prepare themselves to cope with us when a political solution is achieved. When we have seized total governmental power, they will continue to undermine our revolutionary achievements in the economic, political, and social fields; and cause national dissension, disturbances, revolts and disorders in order to overthrow our government... The above situation requires us to promptly and actively develop the armed security forces, which is the absolutist tool of the Party and the Revolution, and make it a spearhead element to destroy the enemy, protect the Party, the revolutionary government, the people, the revolutionary achievements, and satisfactorily perform all missions assigned by the Party under all circumstances, at present as well as in the future when the Revolution is [fully] developed."(74)

(71) See Document No. 9, pp. 9-3 through 9-4
(72) See Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes No. 90, p. 60.
(73) Ibid., p. 61, and Document No. 2 in this research note.
(74) Ibid., p.63.
The installation of a provisional coalition government in Saigon, or even of a Communist-controlled regime would not terminate the activities of the Party's armed security forces. The 1969 "training document" explained. "The exploiting class never voluntarily gives up its schemes of aggression and domination. Only through political and armed struggle can we smash it. However, when we successfully seize power for the Revolution, the enemy still would not give up his design of undermining our revolutionary achievements and will certainly continue to try all dark schemes to overthrow the revolutionary government.

"Therefore, when the Revolution successfully seizes power, the class struggle will still go on in a hard, complicated and decisive way, and this will require us to have a strong armed and political force to completely destroy the enemy in order to protect the revolutionary government and to build a prosperous and happy life for the people.

"In order to protect the Party, the revolutionary government, and the Revolution's achievements we need an absolute tool, that is the protection force, and the absolute tool of the Party and the Revolution is the army and the security force... The army and the security force are the two main forces of the Party and the Revolution. Therefore, they are not to associate with anyone or any Party but are placed under the direct absolute and overall leadership of our Party, the Party of the working class." (75)

"When the fatherland is completely liberated, the missions of the armed security forces are to destroy anti-revolutionary organizations, eliminate intelligence agents, spies, Special Forces troops, scouts, spies of the U.S. and of other capitalist and imperialist countries who infiltrate our country, the reactionaries, imperialist henchmen, and reactionary factions who conceal themselves within the religious organizations or ethnic minority groups to sow disturbances, instigate revolts, counter the Revolution, and undermine the revolutionary government. In addition, armed security forces must also protect the Party, the revolutionary government, the people and revolutionary achievements, and finally defend the country's borders and territorial waters." (76)

(75) Ibid., pp. 64 through 65, and Document No. 7 in this research note.
(76) Ibid., p. 66
DOCUMENT No. 1

Communication from North Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security to a Region Party Committee in South Viet-Nam, November 3, 1967
Lam Sơn Security Section

RESPECTFULLY TO THE STANDING COMMITTEE
OF LAM SÓN

Recently the Ministry out there [North Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security] cabled a directive to the Security [Section] of T.10 concerning "the situation and missions of security in the cities, towns, municipalities still under enemy temporary occupation."

We have sent official memoranda to all local areas with instructions for studying and applying [the Ministry's directive] to the practical reality of each area.

We are sending you copy of this directive for your information.

29 December 1967

The Security Section of T0 [sic]
[signed] Công
After studying a number of reports and directives sent from the Security Branch, and after learning from experiences of security activities in North Viet-Nam, Nhà realizes that the Security Branch in South Viet-Nam has carried out a few operations in some towns temporarily controlled by the enemy. However, due to a lack of a full comprehension [of the task], the specific missions as well as organization of security in those towns still fail to be well planned. Therefore, there exists a lack of coordination.

In order to serve the present requirements and avoid being passive in the face of the evaluation of the situation, Nhà makes the following suggestions for comrades to study and thus, when necessary, improve various aspects of organization and activities in accordance with the local situation.

I. SECURITY TASK IN CITIES AND PROVINCE CAPITALS TEMPORARILY CONTROLLED BY THE ENEMY.

Based on the fundamental tasks of the Security Branch, all security agents operating in cities and municipalities temporarily controlled by the enemy should:

1. Firmly grasp all aspects of the enemy situation in order, as an immediate objective, to protect the liberated areas and the revolutionary forces in the cities, and as a long range objective, to serve the uprising to liberate municipalities and cities and struggle against the counter revolutionary elements after the liberation.
2/ Eliminate all cruel and dangerous elements serving in the enemy's ranks.

3/ Conduct political attacks to widen the contradictions among enemy soldiers and disintegrate their ranks.

4/ Strengthen our force to carry out the immediate activities of the local area and prepare for the uprising to liberate cities and municipalities and for the administrative tasks after the liberation.

In order to successfully perform the tasks mentioned above, all security agents should carry out the following activities:

1/ Investigating and studying the situation:

a) Find out the schemes as well as military and political policies of the puppet government, the U.S. imperialists, and different factions and religious groups and submit them to the Party committee authorities for study.

b) Study enemy documents and his military activities. Try to grasp a number of enemy intelligence and psywar activities against the liberated areas in order to serve our tasks in the liberated area.

c) Investigate and prove various cases of enemy agents infiltrating our revolutionary agencies and movement in the cities and municipalities in order to protect our movement and agencies in the urban area.

d) Clearly understand their organizational system and composition as well as keeping a personnel list of enemy Intelligence Service, National Police, Public Security, psywar and disguised agencies in the cities and towns. This will effectively serve the security tasks during the uprising and later on the administrative tasks after the uprising has achieved success.
e) For the purpose of serving our immediate and long-range "liquidation" program, investigate all cruel and dangerous elements who surrender to us.

h) [Sic] Study the military, political, economic, social and cultural aspects of the general situation in the cities in order to serve the liberation task and the administration task in the future.

The six tasks mentioned above are common missions of various forces in the cities. The first four [of these six missions] are assigned to the espionage force which belongs to the security branch of the various intelligence agencies responsible for collecting news, important documents on politics, military, intelligence and counter espionage of the enemy, etc. The last two missions are assigned to the area security branch. This is the force permanently present as covert agents among the populace and in the agencies and enterprises to provide information concerning the counter-espionage activities of the enemy in order to protect the Party and organizations of the masses; its immediate task is to furnish food and housing for our cadre, support the elimination of traitors, serve the maintenance of order and security and serve the administration.

2/ Elimination of cruel and dangerous elements serving in the enemy's ranks:

Depending on the requirements of our struggle and the task of protecting the [revolutionary] movement, and according to the directive of the Party Committee authorities we must kill or capture a number of cruel and dangerous elements serving in the enemy's ranks. This must be done in a careful manner so as to demoralize the enemy, sow dissension and confusion among them, limit their cruel activities, and create enthusiasm among the revolutionary people. In addition, any action of this type must be approved by the competent Party Committee authorities.

3/ Political attacks:

With a view to disintegrating the enemy's ranks, we have to use political attacks to sow confusion and anxiety among
the personnel of the puppet government, police and secret agencies, etc., so as to cause them to work only perfunctorily for the enemy and to do no harm to the revolution. We should try to reduce the effectiveness of the puppets as a step toward paralyzing whole units of the puppet government, National Police, and Secret Service.

The substance of political attacks may consist of:

- Motivating enemy personnel not to cause damage to the revolution and appealing to those who still have a clear conscience to return to the revolutionary movement.

- Warning the obstinate elements in order to set an example to the uncommitted elements.

- Creating dissensions between the higher and lower echelons of the enemy and between different elements in his internal organizations.

Political attacks can be conducted according to the following methods:

- Publish a circular appealing to enemy personnel [to support the revolution] (through the radio or by dropping leaflets) and send separate letters to them through their families.

- Stir up public opinion by spreading news on the elimination of tyrants.

The conduct of political attacks must become a mission of the entire Party body and the masses' organizations. Each area security [branch] must directly carry out all activities within its competence, study the attitude of every tyrant in order to submit its opinions of these individuals to higher authorities.

4/ Building a secret force inside the city:

This secret force consists of security cadre and secret agents who can live and operate in the cities or municipalities. The building of a secret force in the cities is aimed at serving our immediate activities and our forthcoming security activities during the uprising or after the liberation of cities and
municipalities. It must be based on the mission in the operational area and the activities of every force.

In order to successfully set up a network of a secret force which can successfully cover the operational activities of the local areas, our leadership should be cautious and secretive. Our secret agents include those who belong to the basic social class, those whom we can trust, and those whom we can only trust to a lesser degree, etc. The responsibilities of recruiting secret agents are divided between the area security [force] and espionage [force]. Any secret agent who can furnish us with a wide range of important information and documents concerning the enemy's political, military, intelligence and counter espionage activities must be subordinated to the espionage [force]. Any secret agent who can only furnish us with limited information should be placed under the leadership of the area security [force].

[One paragraph in O.T. unintelligible]

II. ORGANIZATIONS

In order to successfully carry out the above missions, the security units in the cities and municipalities which are temporarily controlled by the enemy, must organize and employ their forces in an appropriate manner.

The espionage, area security and armed reconnaissance forces have their own missions, and separate area of activities; therefore, employment must depend on the specific characteristics of each type of forces.

1/ Espionage force

a) The mission of the espionage force is to plant agents in the enemy's military, political, intelligence, police, secret services, and psywar agencies and in religious organizations and reactionary parties. It requires the espionage force to particularly be concerned with the enemy's secret elements which are in control of the most secret documents in South Viet-Nam and abroad. They also must collect information concerning enemy political and military activities, and to study the strategies, schemes and operating procedures of the enemy's
Espionage, intelligence and secret agents. In doing so, the espionage force can submit counter plans to the Party, and aid in the discovery of enemy spies and secret agents, in order to protect the revolutionary forces in South Viet-Nam (including the liberated area, the base areas and the areas temporarily controlled by the enemy) during the uprising and after the liberation, contribute to the protection of North Viet-Nam, and serve the immediate as well as future mission.

b) Espionage force has the three following types of targets:

Type 1: Composed of the intelligence and counter espionage agencies of the U.S. and its henchmen, such as CIA, DIA, CID, Monitor Posts, Military Intelligence Collection Detachment, Liaison Office, Public Security Unit, Police Unit, Rural Pacification Unit, Interior Ministry, Chief of Special Service, etc. and covert organizations which are agencies where important secret documents are stored.

Type 2: Composed of U.S. Embassy, various consulates, an element of the National Armed Forces Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as leaders of puppet key agencies, such as the province chief, mayor, etc. in large cities such as Saigon, Đà Nẵng, Huế, etc.

Type 3: Composed of Vietnamese Nationalist Party [Vietnamese Kuomingtang--Ed], Dai Viet Party, the Labor and Personalist Party [Party of the late Ngô Đình Diệm --Ed].

- Reactionary elements of religious groups (Catholics, Protestants, Caodais and Hôa Hảo Buddhists).

- Reactionary cliques among the ethnic minority people (Fulro, Khmer Krom).

- Reactionary elements in the popular organizations established by the enemy, such as, the Confederation of Labor headed by Trần Quốc Bửu, Vietnamese Youths' and Students' Association, etc.

The enemy's organizations are often changed. Members of these organizations always oppose one another because of conflicts of interests. Therefore, determination of specific
targets must be made by the Party according to the political situation in each area, and should be directed to the requirement of the mission in each phase.

c) The espionage force has always operated according to two following methods: "To drive in and to take out" [Planting agents in enemy organizations and persuading enemy personnel to serve us].

- The task of planting agents in enemy organizations can gain valuable results, due to the fact that we have well trained personnel, whose ideology we can be assured of, but it takes too much time, etc. [sic]

- The task of persuading enemy personnel to work for us in greatly limited because the enemy personnel have been more or less indoctrinated by the enemy, so we cannot control them easily; however, in the face of the present situation of South Viet-Nam, and the demoralization of the enemy, we have many favorable conditions to attract enemy personnel. Therefore the "take out" method is most convenient. However, we must prepare our force to "drive in" when the enemy concentrates his forces or when he suffers failures.

The mission of the espionage agent is to penetrate deeply into enemy organizations, and to attain high positions of influence in order to collect important information and documents concerning the enemy's strategies, tactics and schemes. Therefore, it is not advisable for us to force them to carry out other activities, such as fund drives or purchasing of facilities, etc., which would enable the enemy to uncover the identity of the agent. Any secret agent who cannot carry out his espionage mission must be transferred to another branch, which is suitable for his capability. Conversely, an agent of another security force who possesses the adeptness for espionage activities must be assigned to the espionage force. Due to the specific situation and the popular characteristics of the espionage activities, the city Security [branch] suggests the Party Committee authorities order the lower Party Committee echelons and popular organizations in local areas to recruit persons fit for espionage tasks and assign them to the city and municipality Security Units.
When the cities and municipalities are liberated, a number of espionage agents will be sent abroad to various countries such as the U.S., England, Thailand, Japan, etc., according to the condition of the situation and the capability of each agent. The remainder will become counter-espionage and special intelligence agents.

The espionage force is very important. It infiltrates enemy organizations and tries to attain important positions in order to be able to study enemy secrets and therefore to aid the Party Committee authorities in the drafting of plans for attacking the enemy and protecting our forces.

Due to their missions, the espionage agents must live in the disputed areas and always maintain contact with the enemy. Therefore, the leadership of espionage agents must place great emphasis on their indoctrination, on improving their ideological stand and stimulating their pride as well as heightening their vigilance, reminding them to maintain absolute secrecy, and enhancing their sense of organization and discipline. The guidance must be applied in a meticulous and skillful manner in order to help espionage agents successfully accomplish their mission, and to help them avoid being uncovered by the enemy. We realize that espionage agents must seize the initiative and act aggressively, however they must be alert and cautious, that is why we should work out plans to supervise them.

2/ Area Security:

a) The Area Security Force is a force of the security branch operating in areas such as city streets, markets, bus terminals, ports, enterprises, schools, etc. It has the mission to investigate and discover enemy secret agents, informers, Military Intelligence Collection Teams, dangerous elements in reactionary parties, reactionary elements of the Buddhist and Catholic groups and enemy lackeys who operate in agencies, enterprises, schools, markets, and popular organizations established by the enemy. For instance, Cổng Đoàn Vàng [Literally: Yellow Trade Union], Vietnamese Youth and Students' Association...

In addition, the Area Security Force must detect the overt and covert messing and billeting facilities of the above
elements, as well as observe their movements in order to protect our cadre, the people's organizations, and the people's struggles led by us. This force also must be alert to enemy provocative and sabotage activities, and look for enemy penetration agents who operate among our masses' organizations and Party agencies in the cities.

Simultaneously, they also have the responsibility to collect documents as well as information on the situation of the above enemy agents, so that the working unit can successfully perform its mission. The Area Security Force is also an integral part of the Security Branch which has many favorable conditions for conducting political attacks and police proselyting in order to break up the enemy's police, induce his personnel to return to the Revolution or at least reduce their brutality in repressing the revolutionary movement.

In the future, when the General Offensive and Uprising takes place or when a political settlement is reached, the Area Security Force will effectively serve our struggle against the anti-revolutionary elements, especially in the discovery, capture, and killing of dangerous enemy elements operating covertly. One element of the Area Security Force may operate openly to maintain security in each liberated district, or continue to operate secretly. The other elements of the Area Security Force will contribute effectively to reconnaissance and counter-espionage activities in the future.

b) In the cities temporarily controlled by the enemy, the Area Security Force is a strategic and important force of our branch. It has a wide scope of activities among the masses and has good conditions to well understand the enemy espionage, informer network, and the anti-revolutionary elements, who usually operate in the area temporarily controlled by the enemy.

In addition, the Area Security Force can provide us with information to help in the maintenance of order such as information on the activities of night clubs, hoodlum gangs, etc.

c) Cadre in charge of establishing the Area Security Force must recruit secret agents to carry out the above missions. Secret agents of the Area Security Force must belong to the basic social class, such as laborers, cooks and drivers
working in our targets' houses, or factory workers, shopkeepers, clerks in government and private agencies.

The recruitment of secret agents must be done carefully, according to the prescribed plan and specific requirements. We should meticulously study the city, streets, enterprises, stores, schools, markets and bus terminals, where secret agents will be planted.

The task of recruiting secret agents is divided between the Espionage Force and Area Security Force. While the Espionage Force recruits secret agents for the purpose of following the targets of our investigations, the Area Security Force recruits secret agents according to the area of activities in the hamlet, which is under the scope of its responsibility.

The Area Security Force and Espionage Force can exchange their secret agents when it is deemed appropriate.

If the Espionage Force has agents in lower levels, such as a journalist, traffic policeman, a low civil servant working in an enemy agency, or school teacher, and finds them unnecessary for use as liaison agents, messengers or suppliers of boarding and lodging for espionage cadre, it must report them to the higher echelons for the purpose of transferring the people concerned to the Area Security Force. In order to deploy or utilize the agents of high levels, or agents of low levels but working in enemy sensitive agencies such as clerks and typists, the Area Security Force must report to the higher authorities for the purpose of transferring the people concerned to the Espionage Force.

3/ Armed Reconnaissance Force:

a) Besides the two forces stated above, it is necessary to establish the Armed Reconnaissance Force with the mission to eliminate the dishonest elements, puppet administrative personnel, the tyrants and betrayers who undermine our movements and terrorize the people; to protect our revolutionary organizations; and to heighten the prestige of the revolution and lower the prestige of the enemy. In addition, it must create conditions favorable to the recruitment of