capture of enemy personnel who can provide us with information concerning the enemy and it must steal the documents of enemy ring-leaders to help us understand the situation of the enemy.

This is an armed force of the Security Branch. It has political characteristics and is different, as far as its missions and operations are concerned, from other armed forces of the Party and the Armed Security Force which operates in areas temporarily controlled by the enemy, especially in the cities. It does not lay ambushes like the guerrillas do nor does it conduct sabotage activities in the fashion of the Special Actions Force. The Armed Reconnaissance Force must be placed under close leadership of the higher echelon and must operate according to the political situation in a local area to meet the policies and stratagem of the Party. If the political situation and enemy internal organization change, the Armed Reconnaissance Force must also adjust to the situation and change their targets. Also, if a plan has been approved, but has not yet been executed before the political situation is changed, the Armed Reconnaissance Force must change that plan so that it is in agreement with our stratagem during that particular period of time.

The Armed Reconnaissance Force consists of elements living in the cities and elements living outside the cities which go into the cities when required by their missions.

b) Concerning the establishment of Armed Reconnaissance Force attention should be paid to the following:

Besides the problems of technical facilities, we should establish one or many armed reconnaissance teams according to the size of the local area. Each armed reconnaissance team consists only of five or seven persons. The largest team consists of nine or ten persons. We should pay more attention to the quality than the size of the teams. We must choose the armed reconnaissance agents among the poor laborers and students who have a firm political viewpoint; an absolute loyalty to the country, the revolution, and the people; who are honest to the organization; who have a sense of organization and discipline and, especially, who know the local area.
On the one hand, we must pay particular attention to the political and ideological tasks, indoctrinate our personnel on the class viewpoint, revolutionary spirit and pride, and also criticize individual heroism, adventurism, the thirst for honors, indisciplined conduct, etc.

On the other hand, we should not disregard the training in the use of weapons and other combat facilities, the learning of experiences on the conduct of secret activities in cities, and measures to counter the enemy espionage activities.

The armed reconnaissance activities require us to fully and accurately understand the situation in all fields and to operate according to the prescribed plan. Sometimes, we have to practice an operation before carrying it out. In combat, we are not authorized to operate at our convenience, but we should adhere to the regulations concerning the submitting of reports and the requesting of advice from our superiors before carrying out a specific project. And after implementing a plan, the leadership must learn from experiences and play up our victories.

The activities of the Security Branch in areas temporarily controlled by the enemy and in cities are not changed, but the security leadership must clearly distinguish them, because their missions, nature and methods of operation are different from one another. Also, the security leadership must appropriately assign each type of activities to each type of force and avoid confounding the Espionage Force with the Area Security Force. In addition, close leadership must be provided to each type of force in order to ensure the accomplishment of assigned missions.

Above are a number of ideas which we suggest the comrades apply in your areas of operation in connection with your practical experiences. If you have any new ideas please let us know so we may disseminate them to the other areas.

3 November 1967

S/Quốc
DOCUMENT No. 2

DIRECTIVE NO. 167/AN

Concerning characteristics, responsibility, capability, mission, organization, equipment, recruitment, training and combat activities of armed security units that provide security for Party Committee authorities, our bases, and our detention camps.

After the Security sections have thoroughly understood the contents of Directive No. 171 CT/NT, they should, basing themselves on the situation, mission, combat activities, protection activities in each local area, make a specific plan and submit it to the Party Committee authorities in order to receive their clear-sighted guidance for its implementation.

In order to execute this Directive (No. 171 CT/NT), the Party Committee authorities in charge of people's security services should thoroughly understand the following matters when performing their mission of building and providing operational guidance for concentrated armed security units.

I. Characteristics, responsibility, capability, and mission:

A. Characteristics:

1. According to Directive 171/CT/NT from the Standing Committee, COSVN, so as to be able to conduct continuous attacks against the enemy to protect us, the armed security forces

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1. See Documents and Research Notes No. 93, "Viet Cong Political Geography of South Viet-Nam."
must show high determination in the performance of their armed and professional activities. Considering the strategic mission of the Party in South Viet-Nam during the General Offensive and Uprising phase; considering the enemy's defeat and his obstinacy; considering the wicked schemes of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen; considering the mission of the people's security branch which has been recognized by the Party as an "absolutist tool" of the [working] class, the security branch, as a combat force, must always have armed strength in order to protect the Party and serve as a spearhead to destroy the enemy targets which the Party assigns to the security and armed security branches.

2. The fundamental objective of the Revolution is political power. In order to oust the puppet government and seize power for ourselves, we should resort to revolutionary violence (political and military violence) to oppose the enemy's anti-revolutionary violence. The Armed Security Force in particular, and the People's Security Agency in general, are an absolutist tool of the Party and the Revolution. They fully demonstrate the high combat quality through armed and professional activities [aimed at aggressively attacking the enemy in order to positively protect ourselves.]

3. In SVN, we have been conducting our liberation war to defeat the U.S. imperialistic aggressors and their henchmen who are extremely cruel, savage and wicked.

The war situation will be fiercer with the enemy side (consisting of U.S., puppet, and satellite troops, the leaders of reactionary parties, security and police network, spies, overt and covert informants) and the friendly side applying the comb-tooth tactic. We must especially counter the enemy scheme of "policizing" the enemy control machinery at all levels. Besides we must counter the enemy armed forces, spies, secret agents, informers, wicked tyrants, and administrative personnel.

We must counter the aggressive war not only in the present but also in the future even when our fatherland is completely liberated. The class struggle will continue to take place, fierce and complicated, especially the struggle against spies, reactionaries, henchmen of the U.S. imperialists,
reactionary elements in religious communities and ethnic minority groups. The Armed Security Forces will still have to display high combat quality through armed and professional activities in their mission of providing security for the revolutionary government and territory, repressing the counter-revolutionaries and destroying overt and covert enemies. Armed security units are the force of the Party and the Revolution. They are also the combat force of the People's Security Branch, an absolutist tool, a spearhead element to attack the enemy, repress the counter-revolutionaries, provide security for the Party, and revolutionary administration. In order to accomplish this mission, the Armed Security Forces must continuously improve the military and professional skills of their cadre and soldiers and strengthen their ideological and political standpoints.

B. Responsibility, capability, and mission:
Responsibility, capability, and mission of providing security for Party Committee authorities and base areas:

a. The responsibility of the Armed Security Force is to provide security for the Party Committee authorities and the bases and to attack the enemy at the same time. To aggressively attack the enemy and positively protect ourselves are two facets of a problem which are closely related to each other. Neither of them can be neglected.

b. Missions assigned must be clear. Guards must be posted. The security guard element must take charge of the inner perimeter whereas the patrol element, in addition to patrol duty, must occupy key positions in the main objective area to provide around-the-clock security for the outer perimeter. The elements taking charge of inner and outer perimeters must work in close coordination with each other to provide maximum security for the Party Committee authorities under any circumstance.

The armed units having the mission of protecting the outer perimeter must coordinate with the agency, hamlet, and village guerrillas to set up a guerrilla, counter-espionage, and security maintenance network operating within the agencies and among the people. In addition a specific plan should be
made to team up with the hamlet and village security forces to make efforts to uncover and destroy the network of enemy spies and informers.

In order to simultaneously attack the enemy and protect us, a specific plan should be made in coordination with village and hamlet guerrilla forces and local forces to set up a guerrilla belt to encircle the enemy's posts (located within the base areas), to annihilate the enemy and to expand the revolutionary base area. In short, this is aimed at providing security for the base area and the transportation corridors of the base.


   a. Responsibility and capability.

Cooperate with the supervisors of detention camps to guard and reform the prisoners and at the same time, work out a combat plan to counter enemy raids, sweep operations, and attacks on detention camps to liberate the prisoners.

   b. Mission.

Effectively guard and manage the prisoners' camps. Closely coordinate with supervisors of the detention camps to administer the prisoners. Properly comply with regulations of the Party Committee authorities concerning the management of detention camps. Indoctrinate and reform the prisoners through hard labor to let them understand their crimes and then help them to mend their ways. Work out a defense plan to counter air attacks and artillery fire and coordinate with the village and hamlet guerrillas to establish a security belt to counter enemy raids, enemy Special Forces activities, and to provide security for detention camps.

II. Concentrated Armed Security Units.

   1. Organization.

   a. They are organized like the infantry units of
the Liberation Army (triangular organization) with the following differences:

- Each squad must have ten persons (including the squad leader and assistant squad leader).

- If two platoons are activated, a company command must also be activated to prepare for their further development.

- If two companies are activated, a battalion command should also be activated for their further development.

- The armed security platoon must have a political officer, because the ideological and political indoctrination of the troops is of primary importance for the armed security force.

- The command committee must have four or five persons to take turns in attending training courses.

- A battalion sized unit must have a heavy weapons detachment to secure good results in combat, if the enemy posts are present in our base areas and if we have to cope with his Special Forces.

b. Concentrated Armed Security Forces in charge of providing security for District Party Committee authorities may have one or two platoons.

- Concentrated Armed Security Units in charge of providing security for Party Committee authorities and base areas of the Province and Sub-Region may have one or two companies. One third of the troop strength must provide security for the Party Committee authorities echelons (in the inner perimeter) and two thirds of the troop strength must provide security for the base (the outer perimeter). If two companies are activated, a Battalion Party Committee and a Battalion Command should also be activated to prepare for their further development.

- The Armed Security Units in charge of guarding the detention camps of Districts, Provinces, Sub-Regions, must, depending on the number of prisoners in each place, organize their composition either in platoon strength or in
company strength.

2. Equipment.

Each squad will be equipped with eight AK Assault Rifles, one RPD Light Machine gun, (squad automatic rifle), and one B40 (B41) Rocket Launcher. If AK Assault Rifles are not available use CKC carbines instead.

Based on the equipment of the squad, we will equip the platoon, company, and battalion. Besides the problem of equipment, care must be taken to provide enough cadre for platoon, company, and battalion command and headquarters.

Basic ammunition loads [possibly for each squad] are determined as follows: 150 rounds for Assault Rifles, 500 rounds for RPD Light Machine gun, 1,000 rounds for heavy machine gun and machine gun, six B40 rockets, 50 shells of 61mm and 82mm mortar (according to the situation, the equipment may be heavy or light.)

According to Directive No. 171/CT/NT, weapons and ammunition used to equip the units are supplied through the Region Party Committee, Province Party Committee, and Sub-Region Party Committee, and supplemented by those captured from the enemy. Equipment must be properly maintained and weapons and ammunition must be used sparingly in order to meet the requirements for strong fire power which would ensure good combat efficiency.

III. Building and training.

1. Concentrated forces.

The following criteria must be met:

The personnel must belong to the basic social class [proletariat]. They must have a spotless personal history, good revolutionary spirit, especially high determination to attack the enemy, faithfulness to the Revolution and Party, experience in actual combat, and bravery to protect the Party and the people.
2. To fulfill the requirements of the situation in local areas, prompt action should be taken to build up the force from low to high levels, from primitive to perfect conditions. In addition, the building of forces should be in parallel with their training to meet combat requirements.

In the building of forces, we should pay much attention to the quality factor. The "quantity" should depend on the specific requirements of the security tasks and the combat situation in each area. Care should be taken to insure present needs and future needs dictated by the development of the Revolution.

3. In order to build a good concentrated Armed Security Unit, we should thoroughly understand our basic requirements. Political indoctrination must be a fundamental task; ideological leadership and accomplishment of the mission must be of primary importance and, at the same time, efforts must be made unceasingly to improve military and professional skills.

In order to successfully progress in this direction, we should improve the leadership of the Party Chapter and train our personnel in political, military, professional, and educational skills to strengthen their units of combat missions.

a. Political indoctrination.

- Intensify indoctrination on the security guidelines and policies of the Party, the standpoint of the working class and the concept of revolutionary violence, promote hatred of the enemy, and heighten the personnel's gallantry, unsubmitteness and willingness to make sacrifices in order to protect the Party. Ceaselessly improve the ethics and virtues of the armed combatants of the Party in the Security Branch.

- Heighten the cadres' and combatants' sense of organization, discipline, and vigilance, and encourage them to strictly execute the policies, orders, and regulations of the Party and the Revolution.

- Educate the cadres and combatants on the masses' viewpoint, and the civilian proselyting task, and make them...
realize the dependence on the people for the success of their protection and combat task. Heighten their revolutionary ethics and virtues, encourage them to respect aged people, love children, behave correctly with women and lead the youth well.

- Heighten their sense of revolutionary vigilance, encourage them to execute all directives concerning the task of protecting the people and the Party. Prepare them to be ready for combat, teach them how to motivate the people, review the implementation system in order to protect the people and the Revolution.

- Promote the principle of collective democracy, implement the principle of centralized democracy and the "three great democracies" of political democracy, military democracy and economic democracy.

- Promote the spirit of internal solidarity based on love for the masses, love for one's comrades-in-arm, love of the cadres for the combatants, respect of the combatants for the cadres.

- Encourage troops to wholeheartedly serve the people, respect the people's property, and observe prescribed disciplinary rules.

b. Military training:

Make cadres and combatants thoroughly understand the people's war.

- Give tactical training.

- Ceaselessly improve their level of efficiency in administering the troops well and organizing the command structure; train three-man cells, squads, and sections in guerrilla tactics. Train small sections in coordinated operations: raid, ambush, counter-raids, counter-sweep operations, and capture of enemy spies and informers.

- Give good training in individual, cell, squad, and platoon combat tactics. Combat cells and squads will
be considered as key elements in coordinated platoon and company size operations.

- Technical training:

Train personnel to use their organic weapons and a few types of enemy and friendly mines and explosives. Train them to assemble and disassemble weapons, and to conduct armed reconnaissance, to secretly approach the enemy, to detect the enemy, stay close to the enemy, and to hit the enemy by surprise attack to capture and destroy the enemy.

General subjects of training:

Close combat with bare hands - Use of bayonet - Methods of finding directions in the jungle by using compasses and by looking at the moon and stars. In addition, the personnel must be familiar with different types of terrain and have in hand the people's and enemy situation in the vicinities of their responsible areas.

- Training for improvement of professional skills:

Make cadres and combatants know how to carry out the five steps of basic revolutionary work to motivate the masses to engage in revolutionary work. First of all to rely on the workers and the laboring people. Investigate, study to know the ideological enlightenment of the masses, learn to know how to organize, train, educate and guide the people in combat activities. On this basis, rely on the masses to protect the bases and areas of responsibility. The local people will help us in destroying the enemy, breaking his espionage network, and destroying his Special Forces operating in the base-areas and areas of responsibility.

Units in charge of protecting Party Committee authorities must activate Armed [Security] Forces to directly protect the District Party Committee authorities and train their personnel to go on security missions, mount guard and man warning posts.

The Armed Security Units in charge of guarding the detention camps must know how to watch and escort the prisoners.
All security plans should be rehearsed such as: Counter-raids, counter-Special Forces, counter-sweep operations and plans for encircling, killing, capturing the wicked tyrants, Special Force troops, spies, informers who penetrate our bases, our areas of responsibility, and plans to prevent attempts at evasion or the recapture of escaped prisoners.

IV. PROTECTION AND COMBAT MISSIONS OF THE CONCENTRATED ARMED SECURITY FORCE:

1. In order to successfully provide security for the Party Committee authorities, for the bases and the detention camps, we must rely on the people by applying the five steps of basic revolutionary work to motivate the people to engage in revolutionary activities; we must select cooperative people to establish an agent network which serves as our eyes and ears, and set up a network of agents to protect our secrets, detect and prevent enemy espionage activities.

2. We must coordinate with the troop proselyting force, administrative personnel, other organizations, and the village and hamlet security forces, to standardize our security maintenance regulations, prescribe measures to comply with them, and check their application in our areas of responsibility.

3. We must cooperate with village and hamlet security forces and village military commands to establish combat villages and guerrilla belts around enemy posts near our bases or our areas of responsibility to detect the enemy and stop him, destroy or wear him down from a distance and ensure security for our Party Committee authorities, bases, and detention camps. Specially, the district Armed Security Forces must coordinate with the village and hamlet security and guerrilla forces more closely because their own strength is limited.

4. Work out security protection plans to cope with all situations (see paragraph: Training for improvement of professional skills): Conduct periodical exercises to help the cadres and combatants properly handle all situations. Draw experiences from these exercises. Coordinate with the village and hamlet guerrillas and district local force to
encircle enemy posts near friendly bases or areas of responsibility (if any), and to follow up the enemy situation. Use snipers to harass the enemy to wear down his strength and hinder his activity. If 61mm and 82mm mortars are available, we may use them to shell the enemy; or we may use small forces to pursue, ambush, intercept, or capture enemy scout or reconnaissance elements that patrol around their posts or stations. Efforts must be made to destroy enemy forces especially Special Forces, to provide security for the Party Committee authorities, the bases, and the detention camps.

5. Constantly perform guard and patrol duty to provide security for the Party Committee authorities in the inner perimeter and for the bases in the outer perimeter to detect enemy presence and prevent enemy surprise attacks and subversive activities. On the other hand, we should provide security for our underground quarters, communication corridors in the base areas of Party Committee authorities and work out a plan to overcome difficulties and promptly restore normal conditions after an enemy attack. When attacked, there must be an element to directly protect the Party Committee authorities and secret documents and a combat element which must stop and kill the enemy and fight to the last man to protect the Party Committee authorities.

6. Particularly, the Armed Security Unit having charge of providing security for the detention camps must step up patrol activities outside the camp and in their areas of responsibility to guard the prisoners and prevent their escape. If any prisoners escape, it should closely coordinate with the military reform center, supervisors of the detention camps, hamlet and village guerrillas (if any) to pursue and recapture them. We should also work out a plan to counter air raids and artillery attacks, destroy the enemy's oppressive control, attack the Special Force troops who attempt to free the prisoners. In case the enemy attacks the detention camps, we should tightly control the prisoners and closely coordinate with the military reform center, supervisors of the detention camps, and the combat element to counter the enemy and prevent him from freeing the prisoners.

In addition, we must do engineer work such as digging trenches and building obstacles around detention camps to better guard the prisoners and prevent enemy surprise attacks.
The Security Sections of the Region, Sub-Region, and District must depend on the specific situation of their local areas to expedite the activation of their Armed Security Forces.

Building process:

The Armed Security Force will conduct short term courses to improve the security cadres on organization, training, operations and combat.

For Section in charge of Armed $^2[sic]$ of COSVN

/S/ 3 [Ba] Nam
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON FAST POLITICAL SECURITY ACTIVITIES AND A PLAN FOR FUTURE POLITICAL SECURITY ACTIVITIES OF THE ĐÔ SƠN SECURITY SECTION

I. REVIEW OF MISSIONS.

1. Execution of Directive No. 39 of the Security Section of R [COSVN]

Before Directive No. 39 of R was issued, Region 6 had not yet organized a political security branch, but had had to fulfill the requirements of attacking the enemy to support the political missions of the Party. Therefore, the Region and its provinces carried out its missions based on the enemy situation in local areas. Missions included motivating people to increase vigilance in the preservation of secrecy and precaution against spies, and investigating to collect full information on enemy objectives and discover enemy secret agents networks. We have killed tyrants, broken the oppressive enemy control of local inhabitants, liberated the people, and suppressed enemy henchmen who operated in areas under our control in liberated areas and base areas. We also established hamlet and village security sections and developed our secret security network.

Since Directive No. 39 of R was issued, Region 6 and its provinces have executed it in accordance with the requirements of the political security mission.

The Region disseminated to local agencies copies of this directive, followed by a number of instructions containing specific guidance (Nos. 22 VP, 134 VP, 102 B2, and 92 B2).

1. VC Military Region 6 (Southern Trung Bộ) controls the VC provinces of Tuyên Đức, Ninh Thuận, Lâm Đồng, Bình Thuận, and Bình Tuy. See Documents and Research Notes No. 59 "Việt Cộng Political Geography of South Viet-Nam."
To follow the implementation [of Directive No. 39], the comrades leaders as well as cadres of the Region had gone to local areas to review political security activities and correct deficiencies. In 1969, the Region sent two cadres to two areas to coordinate with the responsible personnel to carry out a number of specific missions to gain experience.

One cadre was sent to Thuận Điểm Village (Ninh Thuận), a disputed area, to observe and report on the political activities of the village. He also investigated to confirm suspects and recruited secret agents.

Another cadre was assigned to a Montagnard area, southern base (Lâm Đồng), to coordinate with the local agency, to collect information on the local situation, to initiate a security maintenance campaign and strengthen the Village Security Section, and to make a preliminary report on the classification of the villages.

By studying Directive No. 39 under the guidance of the Region, local units realized that so far they have not been properly organized for fighting the enemy. They failed to accomplish their missions or to meet the requirements of the political security missions. As a result, all provinces requested that the Party Committee echelons assign specialized cadre to guide them in carrying out political security tasks in a proper manner. Some districts, including Thuận Nam (Ninh Thuận), Tuy Phong, Phan Lý (Bình Thuận), and the southern and northern base areas, K4 (Lâm Đồng), have made progress in carrying out this mission.

In city-fringe areas, in [our] controlled areas, and in disputed areas, the Province Security Section guided District and Village Security Sections and action units in collecting information on the enemy situation and investigating enemy personnel (Administrative personnel and pacification cadre) and administrative personnel who have fled the local areas. As a result, they detected enemy secret agents, made better files of the cruel tyrants, developed A2 [sic], and collected more reliable information.

In liberated areas, a number of local agencies formulated plans, made preliminary reports on security maintenance activities, and corrected deficiencies. They continuously
collected information on the enemy situation and prepared a list of suspects to be investigated. They formulated internal regulations and rules for [Montagnard] villages appropriate to ethnic minority customs in Bác Ai, Anh Đồng (Ninh Thuận) Lạc Động (Tuyên Đức) Di Linh (Bình Thuận), and the northern and southern base areas (Lâm Đồng).

However, these were only the initial achievements. The implementation of the political security mission was not homogeneous.

Many districts had no cadre in charge of political security tasks. The responsibility, capabilities, and measures needed to perform political security missions were not clearly understood by security echelons and specialized cadres.

The Region seldom provided specific guidance. It seldom disseminated information on the enemy situation to help local agencies overcome difficulties. At experimental sites, the Region gained experience (in recording political activities of villages, security maintenance, discovering suspects, and recruiting secret agents). However, this experience has not been passed on to provinces and districts.

Cadres in provinces argued that the enemy temporarily controls many areas in Region 6, and because of this they cannot carry out political security tasks, or that political security is a technical mission which can be performed by experienced cadres only.

2. The implementation of political security tasks in the three areas:

A number of cadre in some areas believe that the political security tasks should be implemented only in liberated areas, and that in areas temporarily controlled by the enemy, these tasks should be carried out by espionage agents. In city areas, it is particularly difficult to perform these tasks because of the shortage of well-trained cadre. At present, no locality has carried [the political security activities] into district seats and province capitals but have only coordinated with espionage agents to collect information on the enemy situation. The fourth meeting of the security
(sections) of the Region (held in October 1969) formulated solutions to problems concerning the basic understanding [of the political security mission] and initially defined the scope of political security activities in each area.

3. Getting information on our targets, investigating, proving and determining suspects.

In order to perform the Party's political missions which are to attack the enemy and maintain security, our localities have concentrated efforts on collecting information on the enemy situation. They have discovered and investigated the puppet administrative personnel and pacification cadres in areas temporarily controlled by the enemy as well as a number of enemy public security personnel, policemen, G-2 personnel, and puppet authorities at province and district levels. Thus they were contributing effectively to destroying the enemy's leading elements, the tyrants and breaking the enemy's oppressive control.

After two recent enemy sweep operations and relocation of the people in Lam Dong base, local areas motivated the people to maintain security. They investigated and discovered two enemy espionage groups (12 personnel), individuals who spread adverse propaganda about the Party's policy, and three suspects. (They started prosecution against these 12 espionage agents.)

In the disputed areas north of Lâm Đồng, we were informed by our agents of the activities of Catholic reactionaries and the People's Alliance Party in Phú Lâm Ward.

Ninh Thuận planned investigations. Relying upon the Party Chapter and underground agents, it utilized documents and information provided by higher echelons to carry out investigations. As a result, it found seven suspects that the Special Investigation Unit had traced for them.

After recording political activities of the villages (in areas temporarily controlled by the enemy) in coordination with the Party Chapter, secret agents, and with close guidance from the District Party Committee echelons, Thuận Diên Village (Thuận Nam District, Ninh Thuận) discovered six attacks by the enemy which we suspected were conducted with the assistance of informers.
After investigation, we discovered two cases of fifth columnists. One case was put on trial (69), and five suspects are under investigation. We have seven A2's, four secret supporters recruited by the village, and two secret agents recruited by the District Security Section. We have agents transferred from the prison [to the district] when they were released from the prison.

Through information supplied by our secret agents in Ca Long, Phan Lý (Bình Thuận) we discovered enemy agents planted by the Phan Lý sub-sector in our village organizations.

The results in these areas prove that any area which daringly implements political security missions will be successful. In the present situation it is obvious that the political security mission can be implemented even in areas temporarily controlled by the enemy.

We still have the following weaknesses and deficiencies in collecting information on the enemy situation:

a. We did not provide specific guidance to help the districts, villages, and security units grasp the situation before the enemy's attacks which forced them to react passively.

Enemy informers provided the enemy with information necessary to relocate the people in the Lâm Đồng Base Area, La Bạ in Bình Thuận, Phước Lâm (Ninh Thuận) etc. The enemy planted his men in our areas to establish contact between the two areas. Some elements conducted Чи́êu Hồi activities, threatened the people, and spread slanderous propaganda against Party policies. These enemy personnel had operated for a long time, but district and village Security [Sections] had failed to discover or check their activities.

b. Since an order was given to drop 13 targets of investigations, some of our personnel have been confused in making judgments and using appropriate measures during investigations. They did not rely on our agents or take into consideration the broad political and social situation to proceed with the investigations and determination of suspects. Some areas were able to confirm the suspects, but they did not try to maintain close surveillance to gain adequate information.
to prove suspicions and use secret agents to conclude the cases [sic]. Some areas have not properly implemented prescribed policies; and even worse, they sent some suspects to undergo thought reform. Province and district security [sections] failed to provide specific guidance for village security [sections] and security units on methods of collecting information on the situation so that the latter could perform reconnaissance missions (investigation of the suspects).

c. The investigation of overt enemy administrative personnel, secret agents, and informers was not intensive in our controlled areas and disputed areas. In 500 hamlets of five provinces, there are approximately 3,800 overt administrative personnel. Only 2,331 (three fifths) have been recorded. Most of these records contain names but not personal histories and activity records. They have not yet been classified; in some areas they have been classified, but classification was inaccurate. Records of tyrants and information on them were poor and incomplete. We failed to get complete information on their movements and activities. As a result, we could not make specific plans for capturing or annihilating them. The remaining critical weakness is that only a few results have been achieved in discovering enemy secret systems. Many local areas have not made records of [RVN administrative] personnel and their activities. We have not achieved many results in investigation missions, because we have not improved our technical skills.

d. We have failed to collect current information on the activities and plans of suspects. We have not coordinated with specialized sections (political security, espionage, and judicial).

Documents were scattered in many places and were not consolidated to increase the efficiency of investigations to aid us in attacking the enemy.


In liberated areas, we have closely coordinated political reorientation with Party motivation and indoctrination on security maintenance. We have initially succeeded in discovering suspects, purifying the people's internal organizations, and strengthening the security organizations in villages and buon [tribal villages].
From January 1969 to August 1969 we have briefed 18,472 people in liberated base areas on security maintenance. In the Anh Dung Base Area (Ninh Thuận), we initiated a movement designated "Good Political Background and Stable Security"; and in Northern Lâm Đồng Base Area, we have made a recapitulative review of district security maintenance, and were able to cite two villages as models in security maintenance.

During motivation concerning security maintenance, Lâm Đồng discovered four espionage agents and another individual who disturbed our security and order. Ninh Thuận [discovered] five [espionage agents]; and two local areas, Bình Tân and Ninh Thuận, completed investigation of 54 suspects.

In rural areas controlled by the enemy, in coordination with armed propaganda units, we held discussions with 8,355 people. We seldom held big meetings, but often talked to small groups of people, families, or individuals. As a result, we successfully improved the people's alertness in security maintenance. A number of them showed willingness in protecting our cadres and helped those who got lost (as in Tuyên Đức). One area discovered five cases of espionage agents infiltrating liberated areas (Lâm Đồng, Ninh Thuận). Nine people were forced to join enemy organizations, but they reported their cases to us (in Ninh Thuận). We investigated 30 administrative personnel and tyrants (Bình Tuyễn) and the cases of three of our personnel who surrendered to the enemy (Bình Thuận and Ninh Thuận).

In district seats and province capitals, we usually motivated the people individually. Generally speaking, the movement has developed in width not in depth. In Montagnard areas, the movement stalled after it was launched.

Village and buôn (Montagnard village) security [sections] failed to perform their security missions.

Consequently, cadres have been assigned to do the job for them.

In some areas (ethnic minority areas), we have not indoctrinated the people on security maintenance to meet the requirements dictated by the enemy and friendly situation.
We have not explained the purpose of the enemy schemes to the people.

Some areas have not equipped the people with professional knowledge [on security maintenance]. Particularly in area under enemy temporary control the movement is weak and sporadic. The mission is performed if conditions are favorable and abandoned if conditions are difficult.

5. Recruiting personnel for secret forces to perform political security missions.

As of August 1969, we had recruited 476 A2's (in five provinces), 358 of them are effective in varying degrees, 8 secret agents (in three provinces), and 406 secret supporters (in Bình Thuận, Ninh Thuận).

The majority of the A2's met the political standards. A number of them successfully collected information on activities of puppet administrative personnel and detected tyrants operating in exile to effectively help us break the oppressive enemy control (in all five provinces).

A2 forces have been developed in a number of villages, hamlets, wards, sections of cities, and difficult areas where there are many objectives and targets. Some hamlets have from one to three A2's (Tuyễn Đức, Bình Thuận, Ninh Thuận); however, the number [of A2's] is too small considering the requirements. At present, many hamlets, wards, [railway] stations, schools, and bus terminals have not yet recruited A2's. There are many A2's in our controlled areas, but few are available in areas bordering cities and enemy controlled areas.

In Lâm Đồng, only 18 of 94 hamlets have A2's. In areas surrounding Bảo District seat, five of 18 hamlets have A2's. In Ninh Thuận, 18 of 110 hamlets have A2's. In the entire Region, only two of five cities have A2's but in small number. Ten quarters and 43 wards in Đà Lạt City have only 19 A2's. Bình Thuận has 12 A2's.

Up to now, no A2 is able to multiply. The security [branch] cannot administer the A2's recruited by Party Chapters and various organizations. Therefore, quantity is low and quality is poor.
Many A2's do not understand their missions and are not qualified to collect information on the situation. They report haphazardly, concentrating on gathering information on Popular and Regional Force activities. A number of members of action units are concerned only with carrying out trade activities and seldom pay attention to the targets in their areas of operation. Only about one-fifth of the total A2's are effective in varying degrees.

Guidance on security maintenance has not been provided. When contacting one another our agents often failed to ensure the secrecy of their missions causing numerous exposures [of secret personnel]. In the first eight months, we lost 118 agents in five provinces.

Indoctrination to improve the cadre's political background and their professional capabilities was very poor; therefore, when they were terrorized by the enemy, the A2's became confused and cut off contact with us. Some followed the people and moved into enemy areas, some were captured, but even worse, some surrendered to the enemy and betrayed us.

Secret agents:

In the three provinces: Lâm Đồng, Ninh Thuận, and Bình Thuận, only eight secret agents were recruited by three villages. These agents were recruited among puppet village and hamlet administrative personnel, who have received thought reform. Some were released from our detention camp.

In recruiting, we applied the necessary principles and have turned out a number of good agents. In K4, Lâm Đồng, we discovered members of the People's Alliance Party. In Phan Lý (Bình Thuận), we detected one case of espionage involving our internal organization. In Thuận Nam (Bình Thuận), we found two cases of espionage and are now trying one.

Secret supporters:

According to a report, there are 406 [secret supporters] in Bình Thuận and Ninh Thuận whose qualifications are not yet known.

Generally speaking, the strength of political security
forces is poor. The main reason was that we failed to master the technical skills of reconnaissance and political security tasks. We failed to realize the value of secret agents in maintaining the security of our movements in all areas. The majority of cadre do not have practical experience, therefore they continue to balk at hardships and perform their duties reluctantly.

Region and province echelons have not properly guided [the ideology] and activities of lower levels to effectively settle their problems.

6. The organization of political security machinery.

The Region has two cadres in charge, Lâm Đồng has four cadres in charge, Binh Tuy has three, Tuyên Đức has one, and Bình Thuận has four. There are eleven additional members provided as reinforcements and four recently recruited cadre (including one Montagnard). Out of the 11 reinforcement members only five have been trained on reconnaissance and political security, and one trained on reconnaissance and criminal affairs.

In reality, the region and province each have one cadre in charge of political security. The remaining comrades are responsible for carrying out other missions. Therefore, political security missions in the region and province have met with many difficulties and are limited.

7. The principle of requesting instructions and submitting reports:

Reports on political security missions are usually included in the general report of the section. No local area makes a separate report [on political security missions] except Lâm Đồng, which recently made a preliminary report (Nov. 69). Particularly, the Region still does not execute the principle of reporting to the Security Section of [COSVN].

General remarks.

Since the issuance of Directive No. 39 of [COSVN], the Security Section of Tố has provided guidance for local areas in understanding the responsibility and missions concerning
political security. Some provinces have performed these missions and have gained definite results. However, up to now, in performing these missions, province, district, and village security [sections] have not fully understood their missions.

Professional security cadre of various levels have not realized that the political security task is a sharp prong in attacking the enemy and in protecting our movement and revolutionary forces in the three areas. By carrying out these missions, we continuously attack the enemy and will simultaneously master the situation in preparation for launching attacks to preserve the achievements of the Revolution and the Revolutionary Government.

Organization-wise, we are still at the initial step, at the district level we don't have full-time cadres.

The number of cadres in the region and province is small, their political background and professional capabilities are weak, and they have not been trained or improved. Understanding of political security tasks was not widespread. The measures and plans for performing political security in each area, as well as working procedures, have not been properly implemented, thus creating difficulties and limiting the results achieved.

The main cause is that we did not thoroughly understand the political security task and realize its importance in our struggle against enemy secret agents. This is due to the lack of determination to overcome every difficulty to perform [the political security mission]. Objectively, there are also difficulties which could not be overcome which affected our tasks. For instance, most of the war theaters are areas temporarily controlled by the enemy and liberated areas where most of the population are Montagnards, and the capabilities of the security personnel in villages and buon [Montagnard village] were limited.

There were few village and hamlet security cadres in city fringe areas and other weak areas. The requirements for security missions were great, while only a few cadres trained in political security were available. In addition, these cadre had to take charge of other missions.
As a result, they had no time to improve their technical skills. Replacements in local areas were limited.

II. FORTHCOMING POLITICAL SECURITY MISSION:

In accordance with Resolution 9, the resolution of the Fourth Security Conference of Đờ Sơn, set forth the following missions:

On the basis of the success of the recent political reorientation, we must strive to bring our achievements into full play, correct all weak points and deficiencies, improve the ideology of the working class and our determination to fight and to win, fully understand the political mission and the strategic determination of the Party, and accurately assess the immediate and future schemes of the enemy. We must take the initiative, and increase favorable conditions to correctly implement the policy, guidelines, and principle of the [Security] Branch to conform with the practical situation of the battlefield in order to be determined to intensify the security maintenance movement in all three areas, both in our international organizations and among the people. Motivate the entire Party, Army, and people to fight under the unified leadership of the Party to defeat enemy espionage, pacification and psy-war schemes to protect the Party, the government and all revolutionary organizations, and to secure the corridors of transportation, food depots, and bases. Maintain security for the people, and support the combat activities of the troops and the struggles and uprising of the people. Use the two-step, three-pronged attack tactics in carrying out [the political security missions of] the branch. We must arm the people and motivate them to carry out puppet troop and police proselyting. At the same time, closely coordinate overt control and secret reconnaissance to intensify the destruction of cruel tyrants, conduct continuous political attacks in the three areas, deal heavy blows against such key objectives as: Enemy intelligence, security and police agents; Phụng Hoàng[Phoenix] members; pacification cadre; and anti-revolutionary forces (including reactionary parties and reactionary elements of various religions). We must smash the puppet administrative system. Especially, we must disorganize the oppressive machinery in villages and hamlets (including local enemy administrative personnel and People’s Self-Defense Force organizations) to contribute to our efforts in the motivation of the people. We must
strengthen the People's Revolutionary Government, eliminate bad elements in our organizations and among the people, and counter the activities of enemy penetration agents. We must also urgently develop and strengthen in-place forces (including underground agents, A1's, A2's and A3's); improve leadership; and consolidate organizations, especially those at district and village levels, and all specialized branches (political security, espionage, and armed reconnaissance branches). We should prepare all forces to take the initiative in frustrating enemy intelligence and espionage schemes in the forthcoming phases.

The resolution of the Fourth Conference of the Security Branch of Đạo Són pointed out the specific tasks of political security and other specialized branches. Therefore, we should rely on this resolution to aid us in carrying out our mission, and also study it to fully understand Directive No. 39 and all directives from the Region to properly perform political security tasks in the entire branch, especially in agencies at village and district levels.

Based on Resolution 4 of the Region's Security [Branch], political security sections should pay attention to the following specific tasks:

1. Increase the efficiency of reconnaissance and political security activities for coordination with espionage and other specialized sections in order to fully grasp all schemes and plans of activity of intelligence agents, spies, and reactionary agents. Emphasis should be placed on collecting information to determine the objectives and areas of operations of enemy secret activities. In this way, we will effectively support immediate as well as forthcoming attacks against the enemy.

2. Together with other branches and forces we must strive to eliminate tyrants, disrupt the enemy's oppressive control over the population, wipe out enemy agents in areas surrounding cities and enemy-controlled areas, and detect and destroy all enemy intelligence and espionage networks which support enemy attacks against our liberated areas.

3. Block and promptly suppress intelligence and espionage activities of reactionary elements in our liberated areas to ensure the stability of our rear bases.
4. Urgently recruit personnel for the secret forces of the Political Security Section (A2, secret supporters, and secret agents).

5. Consolidate the organization of Political Security Sections at all levels. Attention should be paid to the activation of main reconnaissance units in districts and provinces.

In order to properly implement the above tasks, the Region provided the following additional guidance on the political security mission:

1. Responsibilities and competence of the political security force: It is necessary to make the entire branch, especially at district and village levels, fully realize that the political security force is a spearhead element which initiates attacks against the enemy by conducting [political security] activities to detect secret enemy agents (such as intelligence agents, spies, and reactionaries). Through this realization we must improve the quality of reconnaissance activities for the political security section and other specialized branches, including [agencies] of villages and districts. We should collect information on the situation and not rely only on general facts without conducting investigations or studies. It is necessary to have more information on the enemy to effectively exploit and increase the results of our attacks against the enemy.

The political security force is composed of three combat forces:

a. The key force is the political security reconnaissance force of all levels, which is composed of cadres in charge of studying the enemy situation, main reconnaissance units, and networks of secret agents, secret supporters, and A2's.

b. Village security forces and other specialized sections of the branch.

c. Positive elements in popular revolutionary organizations which have been indoctrinated on reconnaissance missions, (the collection of information on the situation, discovery of suspects, and follow-up actions).
Since the political security force comes from the three forces mentioned above, it is necessary to make the entire branch, especially village security agencies, fully comprehend the responsibilities, competence, and methods of struggle of political security forces in order to successfully motivate the entire branch and population to fight enemy secret agents. Practical experience in a number of local areas, such as Thuận Điểm (Ninh Thuận Province), Phương Phú Lâm (Lâm Đồng), and Phan Lý (Bình Thuận Province), showed that although these areas had no full-time cadres, they were nevertheless able to carry out the political security mission and achieve some good results once they have mastered a number of basic problems concerning the political security reconnaissance task.

Concerning the positive elements of the masses we should continuously improve their specialized knowledge in order to utilize them in conjunction with the security agencies to fight the enemy secret agents. On this basis, we can develop reconnaissance forces.

Secrecy maintenance is a principle. But, we must know what should be kept secret and who should be kept away from our secrets. We should avoid being mechanical in this respect. We must not disclose the plan and purpose of reconnaissance missions to irresponsible persons. As for the people, especially the cooperative people in popular organizations, we must inform them of the enemy's scheme, methods of investigation and verification, and the measures to be taken against the enemy. The security maintenance members of revolutionary groups should be improved so that they can instruct the people on the purpose of security maintenance with the guidance of village Party Committee authorities and village security personnel. Village security personnel should be encouraged to assist Party Committee authorities in improving the knowledge of the security maintenance members [of revolutionary groups], to constantly stay close to the people, to organize and guide them to perform [political security] missions, and to gather the people's creativeness for use in attacking the enemy.

2. Specific methods for carrying out the political security and reconnaissance task: (Get a thorough understanding of the situation, investigate, determine, prove
and confirm suspects).

This is a very important task which the district
and village, especially village security agencies, should
fully understand.

There are two steps [in the implementation of the
above tasks].

The first step is to: Thoroughly understand the
political and social situation, study and discover suspicious
cases.

The second step is to: Determine, prove and confirm
the suspects.

Step one: We must thoroughly understand the poli­
tical and social situation so that we can discover the indi­
viduals whose records need to be investigated, i.e. the
targets of our investigation. From the investigation we will
discover the targets of our reconnaissance mission (i.e.
the suspects).

Investigation is an important task which cannot be
omitted. Presently, because of the situation of the battle­
field in SVN, we cannot yet predetermine the targets to be
investigated for the entire area of South Viet-Nam. (Thirteen
old targets were dropped.¹) We should consider the practical
situation, and rely on village security sections and security
action units under the guidance of district security sections
and political security reconnaissance [sections]; on coopera­
tive people who have already been indoctrinated on security
maintenance, Party Chapters, Party members, and secret
agents to collect information on the political and social
situation of villages and hamlets. (The guidance on collect­
ing information on the situation provided by the village
security section should be studied). After having the
situation well in hand, village security sections will study

¹. The original number of target categories, which apparently
varies from area to area in South Viet-Nam, is not known for
VC Military Region 6.
collected information in order to discover those who have bad political backgrounds and who can be used by the enemy. This way we can discover the targets of our investigation.

There are instances in which only suspicious facts and phenomena are observed such as the arrest of one of our agents or an ambush laid by the enemy with the suspected assistance of informers but no specific suspects are identified. We must nevertheless study these cases and if there is strong suspicion that enemy spies and informers are involved, we must try to find proof so as to confirm the targets of our reconnaissance mission.

**Step two: Determine, prove and confirm suspects.**

a. **Determining the suspects:** When the list of people to be investigated is made, we should classify them as either highly suspected or slightly suspected, or classify them according to ABC order, A being the highly suspected. Based on this classification system we will find out highly suspected people whose background is unclear and who are likely enemy agents. These individuals are called "suspects." It is necessary to assign reconnaissance agents to follow the subjects in order to determine whether they are friends or enemies. We should not declare an individual suspect by using groundless facts. We should find specific evidence before making conclusions. For example, according to our information, Miss X was seen making trading trips between two areas [liberated and enemy-controlled areas]. In addition she was reported to have made frequent stops at a police station. Furthermore, she moved from one area to another more easily than most people. According to these facts, Miss X should be investigated. If, through our investigation, we find that every time she stops at the police station X meets the Chief of Police personally and delivers something to him, then we can determine that Miss "X" is a suspect.

b. **Proving and confirming the suspects:** Proving a suspect requires concrete evidences which prove whether the person under investigation is a friend or an enemy. This is an important aspect of our reconnaissance mission. Therefore, we should work out a specific plan in order to reach a prompt conclusion. Proving must be concentrated on the principal object of our suspicion, avoid diversion.
To prove somebody is a suspect, we should perform the following actions:

Rely on agents and secret supporters to closely observe the subject. In providing guidance for our secret agents, we should work out a plan to increase the confidence of the subject toward our secret agents so that the agents can determine what the subject is concealing.

Cooperative people who know the subject should be found and worked on individually [to get information on the subject].

Assign secret supporters or cooperative people to approach the subject and induce him to talk. In this way, the subject may unintentionally disclose information that we are seeking.

Use the information on the daily activities of the subject and the results of the investigations mentioned above to analyze his case and make conclusions as to whether or not he works for the enemy. If he is not enemy personnel, discontinue the surveillance process. If he is proven to be enemy personnel, we should take prompt and specific measures in order to prevent him from doing harm to the Revolution. In liberated areas, if we are capable of neutralizing his harmful activities, we should continue to conduct reconnaissance activities, and prosecute him in order to destroy the enemy at his roots. In areas temporarily controlled by the enemy, we should take prompt action by arresting, detaining, or eliminating [those suspected of being enemy personnel].

In case there are many suspects in one village, we should investigate one or two most important suspects. The rest must be kept under normal surveillance.

Most of the liberated areas in Region 6 are inhabited by the Montagnards. The security comrades working in these local [Montagnard] villages and hamlets have only a limited knowledge of security procedures. Therefore, they need to be provided with close and careful guidance in order to gradually improve their ability. We must use realistic examples of people and facts to provide guidance to them. Unnecessary theoretical discussions should be avoided.
The district security or the political security reconnaissance section should, based on the practical situation, use a village as an experimental center in order to draw experience in leadership.

In large areas under the enemy's temporary control, where Party Chapters and village security sections are not yet established, guidance for action units should be provided according to the specific local conditions. District security, political security, reconnaissance sections should operate directly in important locations in order to cause widespread repercussions when we attack the enemy.

3. Political security tasks in three areas:

The spirit of the directive issued from higher echelons follows:

The security branch should mobilize all specialized branches to support the Party's immediate political mission in the three areas.

The areas under the enemy's temporary control are places where enemy intelligence and espionage activities have been concentrated to collect information about us in order to conduct sabotage activities against our rear base areas. Political security activities must be carried out in the areas under enemy temporary control to collect information on his situation in order to impede and counter his attacks and protect our rear base.

Liberated rural areas will definitely be enlarged, therefore political security activities should be conducted at this time in areas surrounding cities and disputed areas so that we will not be confused in performing political security activities when [the liberated rural areas] are enlarged.

Although we are encountering many difficulties on the battlefield and the quality of our cadres is low, we should nevertheless strive to overcome difficulties in conducting political security activities in cities and areas surrounding cities. In the local areas where conditions do not permit the performance of this task, we should coordinate
political security activities with espionage activities. Political security activities can be conducted in city fringe areas, weak areas, and especially liberated areas. Political security activities must be coordinated with espionage activities in cities and district seats to collect information on the situation and the suspects. There must be separation of responsibilities between political security and espionage sections] as far as objectives and targets are concerned. The political security [section] will concentrate on pacification cadres, members of political factions, members of religious sects, and puppet authorities at every level, especially at village and hamlet levels. The espionage section will concentrate on enemy intelligence agents, counter-espionage agents, J2 personnel, security agents, "Phuong Hoang" (Phoenix) cadres, CIA, and members of the Special Unit for intelligence collection. In city fringe areas and areas under enemy temporary control, the immediate mission of the political security section is to concentrate its efforts on coping with such enemy personnel as pacification cadres, hamlet and village local administrative personnel, key personnel of the People's Self Defense Force organizations, members of reactionary parties and religions. Attention should be given to various types of secret agent networks in order to support the annihilation of cruel "tyrants" and break the enemy's oppressive control to seize power [for the people].

4. Building secret forces of political security [sections]:

The main purpose of the security branch, in general, and of the political security section in particular, is to fight the enemy secretly. There are many methods to fight the enemy secretly (such as using civilians, administrative personnel, or reconnaissance agents). In the method of using reconnaissance agents, the recruitment of secret agents is a key factor, because it is very difficult to accomplish the political security mission without having a network of secret agents. This fact must be realized when providing guidance for the entire branch so that we can concentrate our efforts on developing and strengthening the secret forces of the branch.

The specialized documents concerning secret agents, Directive 92/B2, '(dated June 1969), and Resolution 4 of the
Region, (dated Oct. 1969), pointed out the responsibility and competence of the secret forces and the methods of recruiting and employing them. It is necessary that local areas continue to study these documents. Following are a number of experiences about recruiting secret agents in areas under enemy temporary control which some local areas have successfully carried out:

Through the Party Chapters operating in enemy areas, we will recruit persons who have access to the targets of our investigation or who are able to collect information on the situation in complicated areas of activities.

Recruit persons who are sympathetic to the Revolution and who intend to leave their families to join the Revolution. Indoctrinate and persuade them to work for us while maintaining their legal status in the enemy area.

Among the people who have been taken out and educated to become replenishment troops, there are some who ask to return to their native villages because of the economic status of their families. We should carefully consider their cases and let them return to their native villages if it is not detrimental to our general policy.

After thought reforms, we should select the ones who are the least criminal and are least hated by the people, who belong to the working class and are willing to reform and allow them to return to their native villages. They should be kept under surveillance and have missions assigned to them step by step.

Select among the convicts released from prisons those who have undergone thought reform or take the agents in prisons who have completed their prison terms or whose usefulness in prison has ended and send them to their native areas to serve as secret agents.

Check the people who have participated in the movements initiated by Party Committee authorities and popular groups, select those having the opportunity to contact the people subjected to our investigations and to collect information on our areas of operation, and recommend them for employment by the security section.
All these above methods should be done aggressively, but in a careful and clever manner, and plans for activities must be carefully prepared. The assignment of missions should be made gradually from easy to difficult missions. The performance of the assigned missions must be closely supervised. Our plans for and information on the people subjected to our investigations should not be disclosed. Reasonable and logical responses should be prepared for our secret agents in advance so that the agents will know how to deal with the enemy if they are arrested and interrogated. The recruitment of agents must be based on our needs and must be performed flexibly and resourcefully. Some agents were not familiar with the missions of closely observing the people subjected to our investigations and collecting information on areas of operations. If we provide them with close and resourceful leadership, we can improve their capabilities when conditions permit.

5. **Organization of political security machinery:**

We must continue to consolidate the political security machinery according to the spirit of Directive 92/B2 of the Region. We must strive to establish [political security sections in provinces and districts]. In local areas where the conditions do not permit, we must assign two or three specialized cadres to aggressively recruit personnel for a reconnaissance and political security unit.

It is suggested to Party Committee echelons that the male and female youths who meet the prescribed criteria be selected to reinforce the branch. The region and provinces will organize basic and advanced training courses for these personnel.

6. **Reporting system of the political security branch:**

The region and provinces will overcome previous shortcomings and maintain the system of submitting regular reports on each task performed in order to keep higher echelons well informed of the specific situation so that they can provide the local agencies with more effective guidance.
Addresses:

Security Section of Nam Trương [COSVN]
Standing Committee of Đỗ Sơn
Province Security Sections
File at B2

Đỗ Sơn, (blank) Feb. 70
For the Security Section of Đỗ Sơn
[crossed out in O.T.]

Trần Lạc Mỹ [crossed out in O.T.]
Memorandum, dated November 15, 1970, from an unspecified province agency with excerpts from Directive 08-CT-NT of the Standing Committee of COSVN
SUBJECT: DIRECTIVE 08 CT.NT OF TV. NT¹ AND DIRECTIVE No. 3 OF TV. AJ2 DATED 20 JAN 70 CONCERNING THE RESPONSIBILITY OF [SPECIALIZED] BRANCHES ON THE SECURITY TASK:

This document may be distributed to district and village security sections and the executive committees of various branches at district level.

Responsibilities and duties of [specialized] branches in the security task:

For over 20 years and under the Party's leadership our people have stood up to carry out the Revolution and successfully defeated the French colonialists after nine years of struggle. They are now defeating the U.S. imperialists and making glorious achievements which are lauded by friends all over the world.

These achievements clearly prove that the Vietnamese people are heroic and that the masses' strength is unlimited. Moreover, this strength becomes an invincible force thanks to the leadership of the Party which is a vanguard organization of the working class. It is a force which can defeat any enemy scheme. This has been proven by our nine years of Resistance against the French colonialists and our present fight against the U.S. imperialists. In our people's struggle against the U.S. imperialists for national salvation, the security task is one aspect of Resistance activities. It attacks the enemy secretly and eliminates the tyrants who oppress the people in order to liberate wards, hamlets and villages, and protect our administration and the people's lives and property.

In reality, the security task is not newly created by the Party, it existed ever since the Party and the people's revolutionary movement existed. In the clandestine period of our Revolution, our cadres were protected, concealed and supported by the masses, that is why they have survived and developed. The security mission is to secretly attack the enemy. Therefore, it requires professional elements. However, the key and decisive role is played by the masses, especially when the masses are well organized and have the strength and capability as well as rich experiences in the task of countering spies and reactionaries. Therefore, success

¹ TV. NT is the Standing Committee of Năm Trương (COSVN)
in motivating the people to engage in the security task not only indicates that we know how to take advantage of our superiority but also displays our proper class viewpoint and correct compliance with the Party's policy towards the people.

The U.S. imperialists and the clique of country-selling traitors are obviously defeated. However, they are stubborn and never give up their aggressive intention. They always strive to intensify and implement their insane schemes to counter the Revolution and use savage tricks to attack us at the present time while preparing for long-range activities against us. In the future, they will give espionage and reactionary activities a strategic importance in the destruction of the Revolution.

In order to develop the great strength and capability of the people in the security task, to prove that we have taken the offensive to positively protect ourselves, TV. NT [the Standing Committee, COSVN] prescribed the following responsibilities and missions for various [specialized] branches and organizations with regard to the security task.

I. THE TASK OF CONTINUOUSLY AND WIDELY MOTIVATING THE PEOPLE.

In past years, all [specialized] branches have successfully motivated the people to engage in the security task. Their revolutionary vigilance has been heightened. The people succeeded in keeping track of the enemy and discovering his secret espionage activities. However, they still failed to cope with enemy activities and meet requirements of the movement. They also failed to take the initiative by continuously attacking the enemy. In the future, the enemy will intensify espionage activities in hamlets and villages, and try to penetrate popular organizations with the aim to carry out long range attacks against us. Therefore, the missions of the Party troops, and people are to motivate the people to participate in the security task and attack the enemy, especially his special pacification plan, in local areas. The following are main points that [specialized] branches must clearly understand:
a. **Fully understand the characteristics and missions of the security maintenance movements:**

To successfully counter enemy espionage activities, all [specialized] cadre must rely on the organized masses to initiate a security maintenance movement in depth, then broaden the movement in order to heighten the peoples' revolutionary vigilance. Cadres in various [specialized] branches who are assigned to protect these branches must improve the skill of the command committees and operations committees and personnel in their branches on this task. In conducting the security maintenance movement, the people not only preserve our secrets and observe internal regulations, but also closely watch the enemy, and discover his secret activities. At the same time, the people take part in destroying tyrants, breaking the enemy oppressive control, liberating hamlets and villages, and seizing and preserving political power.

b. **Clearly understand the purpose, requirements and methods of maintaining and developing the security movement.**

1. **Clearly understand the purpose and requirements of the people's struggle against espionage agents and reactionaries.**

The following are the security maintenance requirements:

We must make the people realize the schemes and activities of reactionaries and espionage agents, uncreasingly heighten their revolutionary vigilance, and ensure that they keep track of and discover the enemy. At the same time, the people should be instructed to keep the secrecy of revolutionary activities, to protect revolutionary agents and cadres and to maintain order and security for the people.

We must insure that the people distinguish the enemy from friends and reject the enemy's distorted propaganda, psywar tricks and appeals to surrender.

To attain these three requirements, cadre of various branches should properly carry out the following methods:
Motivation methods for security maintenance.

a. Initially, the executive committees should thoroughly understand the requirements of the security maintenance movement. At the same time, they must see through the enemy espionage and reactionary schemes in order to heighten the people's vigilance and provide leadership for lower echelons on how to counter the enemy.

b. The masses should be indoctrinated to fully understand the wicked and crafty schemes of enemy spies and reactionaries. On this basis, we must deepen the people's hatred for those who betrayed the Revolution. This will help them understand their responsibility to participate in the counter-espionage tasks in order to protect revolutionary forces and their lives and property.

c. Cadres assigned security tasks to protect their respective branches, must discover good elements with a high sense of security maintenance and train the latter to become core elements in the security maintenance movement especially at cell level.

d. The security maintenance task should be carried out in conjunction with Front policies. On a daily basis we should assess and review this task through cell meetings or meetings of the command committees and operation committees of various branches. Cadres in charge of protecting branches should closely coordinate with security personnel of all levels. This will help them improve their professional skills, collect information on enemy intelligence and reactionary activities in the hamlets and villages and settle the difficulties concerning professional business.

In short, all branches are responsible for indoctrinating the masses and closely coordinating with village security sections to promote the security maintenance task in the people's organizations. The security maintenance task should be constantly conducted.

II. TASK OF REPRESSING ANTI-REVOLUTIONARIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR REQUIREMENTS AND POLICIES.

In recent period the task of repressing anti-revolutionaries, thanks to the leadership of Chapter Party Committees
and village Party Chapters, and the coordination between the branches and the village security sections, has scored a number of successes. However, it failed to meet the Party's political requirements, which are to wipe out the enemy administrative machinery, to purge the villages and hamlets [of undesirable elements], and protect and consolidate our liberated areas. As for the task of repressing anti-revolutionaries, the cadre of all branches have the responsibility to motivate the people to eliminate spies and reactionaries, therefore, our cadre in charge of protecting branches should fully understand the following problems:

a. **Characteristics, requirements, and policies of repressing anti-revolutionaries.**

1. **Characteristics and requirements.**

   The repression of enemy spies and reactionaries is a part of the long and decisive class struggle which is taking place between the enemy and ourselves. The enemy always seeks every means to counter our revolutionary activities in villages and hamlets. If we lack vigilance and fail to repress the enemy, he will fiercely counter us in order to restore his domination. Therefore, we should rely on the people to counter his schemes.

   We must wipe out all hamlet and village puppet administrative personnel, spies, tyrants and reactionaries who operate openly or secretly against the revolution. We must arrest enemy personnel who work in the areas surrounding cities and in liberated areas, and reform or put under surveillance those whose arrest is not yet warranted. The purpose is to deprive the enemy of the support he needs to counter-attack us, encroach upon our territory or exercise his oppressive control over the population.

   We must frustrate the enemy accelerated pacification scheme, plant our agents in enemy ranks, smash the enemy's anti-revolutionary will, heighten the pride and revolutionary spirit of the people, gain effective control of hamlets, and build up and maintain newly gained power.

2. **Policies of repressing anti-revolutionaries.**
To insure the above requirements, we should thoroughly understand the following policies of repressing reactionaries: Use repression tempered with clemency, and punishment coupled with indoctrination and [thought] reform. These will disintegrate the enemy ranks and create favorable conditions for the people to seize power and the control of villages and hamlets. They will also weed out undesirable elements in hamlets and heighten the political awareness [of the people]. Therefore the requirements of our policy are: Severely punish the obstinate tyrants who oppose the Revolution; give clemency to those who have been bribed, oppressed or misled by the enemy, and who sincerely mend their ways; reduce or void the sentences against those who have achieved merits [vis a vis the Revolution]; and commend and reward those who have achieved great merits.

As for the task of repressing anti-revolutionaries, the main mission of the branches is to closely coordinate with village security sections to motivate the people to kill tyrants, break the enemy oppressive control, participate in the indoctrination and thought reform of those who need to be reformed and put under surveillance those who need to be watched.

Concerning the targets, form and method of re-education and surveillance, the village security section is responsible for providing specific guidance. It is necessary to understand the following re-education tasks:

The executive committees and the operation committees should regularly indoctrinate the people and Group members to heighten their political awareness in order to fully understand the thought reform task. The requirements of this task are:

- To transform an undesirable person into a good one.
- To define the responsibility of each association and Group member so that he will positively participate in the thought reform task in the local area.
- To determine the targets for thought reform in the hamlets.
During periodical meetings, various branches in villages and hamlets should review the execution by association and Group members of the indoctrination task as well as the good or bad evolution of the individuals undergoing thought reform. They should encourage association and Group members who have successfully carried out their tasks and criticize their poor performance. At the same time, various branches should work out a plan for association members to continuously carry out the thought reform task.

III. TASK OF PROTECTING THE POPULAR ASSOCIATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS IN VILLAGES AND HAMLETS.

We have made progress in the protection of our internal organizations in the past, but we still have many relatively serious shortcomings, especially in admitting new members into various organizations and branches. We did not pay much attention to preventing enemy infiltration of our organizations, and we failed to counter his psywar and Open-Arms activities. Therefore, in the future, cadre in charge of protecting internal organizations in various branches should pay attention to the following tasks:

a. Understand enemy schemes concerning our internal organizations, especially those in villages.

All the enemy schemes are stated above; however, we should fully understand that the enemy is always seeking ways to plant his secret agents in our internal organizations, create conditions for his agents to get into high positions from where they can collect information concerning our activities. This information will enable him to use air and artillery strikes and sweep operations to destroy our immediate and long-range revolutionary activities.

b. Fully understand the purpose and requirements of the protection of internal organizations and branches at village level.

The purpose and requirements of the protection of village revolutionary forces are aimed at detecting and preventing enemy spies and reactionaries from infiltrating our internal organizations. Specifically they aim at:
1. Protecting Party members and cadre, especially key cadre of the Party and branches in villages.

2. Preserving the secrecy of all documents and plans of the Party and branches, and preventing the enemy from capturing them and collecting intelligence on our activities.

3. Protecting the people's organizations and our revolutionary base-level organizations, at the same time, insuring that no enemy agent can infiltrate our internal organizations.

To meet the above requirements, we should successfully carry out the following tasks:

c. Contents and implementation measures of the internal security task.

1. Initiate a security maintenance movement among internal organizations.

We must initiate a security maintenance movement among our internal organizations to make cadres of branches and members of associations clearly realize the enemy's determination to destroy our internal organizations. We must promote their political awareness, sense of class struggle and deep hatred of the enemy. This will heighten their revolutionary vigilance and their determination to counter enemy spies and reactionaries, and protect their branches and associations.

2. Regularly observe the political situation and inspect the internal political situation:

Keeping abreast of the political situation and inspecting our internal organizations are the very important and regular missions which help us purify our internal organizations, promote our members' sense of solidarity, strengthen our ideology, tighten our organization and enable us to accomplish all missions assigned by higher authorities. Observation of the internal political situation should be implemented as follows:

Properly assess the internal ideological situation to discover any manifestations of lack of vigilance, violation of
policies, internal dissensions, suspected enemy activities within our internal organizations, and activities of backward elements.

In the inspection of internal organizations, pay particular attention to persons suspected of having relations with the enemy and those whose biographical data are unclear. The content of the investigation should be aimed at the two following kinds of personnel:

Personnel who have unclear biographical data.

Personnel suspected of having relations with the enemy.

Methods of investigation consist of studying the biographical data [of the personnel concerned] and at the same time, coordinating with security agencies of all levels to verify all unclear points.

After the investigation, personnel are usually classified into three categories as follows:

1) Personnel who have clear and clean personal records: these will be considered as key personnel in our organizations.

2) Personnel who have clear personal records but present some problem: these must be judged on their ideology, attitude, and work performances; and, depending on Party policies applied to the local areas concerned, must be treated in an appropriate way in order to help them become enlightened politically and encourage them to make progress in discharging their duties. However, do not assign important tasks to them.

3) Personnel whose biographical data is under suspicion: these should be reported to village Party Committee. The security agencies at all echelons should quickly examine all suspected points. On the other hand, they should be discretely, urgently and carefully expelled from our organizations; never assign them important missions.

3. Investigation of the biographical data of individuals to be recruited into branches:
Perform careful investigations on the biographical data and political background of individuals to be assigned to command committees, or operations committees of various branches and people's organizations, especially individuals who were former puppet administrative personnel, spies, reactionaries, etc., and those who are inhabitants of other areas. Never assign those whose families have a deep hatred for the revolution to command committees, and operations committees, or popular organizations having a class nature.

To successfully carry out the above tasks, it is necessary to fully understand the Party's policy lines concerning the protection of branches. The Party provides leadership for the people and always relies on the people; security activities should be closely coordinated with the people's intensive struggle movements. Properly implementing the Party's policy lines concerning the protection of branches and associations means properly complying with the principle: Actively attack and destroy the enemy and positively protect ourselves.

In order to meet the requirements of present and future situations, popular organizations should build up secret security forces responsible for keeping track of targets, enemy secret security agents, spies and reactionaries. The secret security forces will provide effective assistance for [our personnel] to destroy tyrants, break up the enemy oppressive control, protect our base-level organizations, and accomplish their assigned missions under all circumstances.

Organization of branches:

In compliance with the directive of the Standing Committee, NT [COSVN] and the directive of the Standing Committee, AJ2, the protection of popular organizations of all levels down to cell level is organized as follows:

The executive committee of each branch at province or district level should assign one of its members to take charge of protecting popular organizations.

The executive committee of each branch at village level should assign one of its members to take charge of protecting popular organizations.