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COMMUNIST "REPRESSION" IN SOUTH VIET-NAM

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"Resolution Concerning Security Tasks to be Performed from October 1970 to June 1971,"
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RESOLUTION CONCERNING SECURITY
TASKS TO BE PERFORMED FROM
OCTOBER 1970 TO JUNE 1971

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SITUATION:

To implement the Vietnamization program, the Americans and puppets have recently intensified the activities of their security, intelligence, and reactionary forces. They have devoted all their efforts to serve their pacification plan, using Ca Mau Province as an area of emphasis and testing site for the Phoenix [Phương Hoàng] which is designed to smash our infrastructure.

They used 50% of their security and intelligence forces from higher echelons to reinforce districts, villages, hamlets, sub-hamlets, and wards to exercise close control over the population. They recruited and trained reactionary landowners, their children, former intelligence agents and administrative personnel, ralliers and traitors, etc. as cadre to expand their intelligence network and establish a ruling system at village, hamlet, sub-hamlet, and ward levels.

While devoting their main efforts to pacification activities, they stepped up the development of intelligence and reactionary forces among religious sects, ethnic minority groups, political factions, and important areas (such as coastal areas, sea ports, densely populated and prosperous areas, etc.) to prepare a long-range operation against us.

They strongly developed their forces among the people to frustrate our activities and plant their personnel in our organizations. They followed a well-prepared overall plan. They collected information [on our activities] to sabotage our organizations. They chose main and secondary objectives and controlled each individual person.

They were very cruel and cunning. They terrorized, oppressed, bribed, and deceived everyone.
They intensified psywar and Chíeu Hủi activities in order to demoralize our cadre, troops, and the people.

**Enemy weaknesses:**

Reactionaries and intelligence agents are facing failure, whereas the Revolution is victorious. They work for money and positions so they fear that the people will unmask their criminal actions. They work without conviction. They are confused and wavering; this is a factor which limits the damages caused by their actions to the country and people. They are easy to break up and are ready to surrender when attacked by the masses' [revolutionary] movement.

In the past, many key enemy agents were killed. New agents lacked experience and displayed poor professional skills and unstable morale. Their organizations were run by a small number of agents who were disillusioned in the face of the people's revolutionary struggle movement. Therefore, though enemy organizations were numerous, they were composed of poor agents who worked for the enemy only because they were forced to. They had negative attitudes, displayed unstable morale, and were easily influenced to surrender to the Revolution.

Reactionaries and intelligence agents secretly serve the enemy's immediate and long-range goals. Because of his great requirements for disrupting our revolutionary structure, the enemy had to urgently develop his [intelligence and espionage] organizations on a wide scale in order to operate strongly.

Low-level personnel were forced to carry out tasks ordered by higher echelons while burdened with anxiety and the fear of death. As a result, the enemy's organizations were in a state of confusion, and activities were conducted in a perfunctory manner. Contradictions between his present and future requirements, between high and low levels, and between the people and himself increasingly developed. Ca Mau Province is a "base" province where the Revolution's position and power are strong, and the enemy is now being encircled. These are the basic enemy
weaknesses which can never be overcome and which grow with each passing day.

In fighting enemy spies and reactionaries, our cadre, soldiers, and people have learned many lessons. We are gaining great victories against the enemy while defending and strengthening our forces.

In compliance with Resolution 9, the security branch held its fifth [possibly provincial] security conference to reassess the friendly and enemy situations and set forth tasks for the branch to fulfill the political requirements laid down by the Party and to frustrate the enemy pacification plan.

At the conference, the security branch properly assessed friendly victories and enemy failures and studied enemy strengths and weaknesses as well as our deficiencies and their causes. In addition, the security branch made everyone aware of enemy tricks and schemes, especially his espionage and reactionary activities. Upon completion of the above conference, the ideological standpoints and class concepts of [the personnel] of the security branch were improved.

As a result, during the last year, we have made considerable progress in our attacks against the enemy, in eliminating tyrants and spies, as well as protecting and strengthening our forces both in quantity and quality. We progressed especially in strengthening our armed reconnaissance force, political protection reconnaissance force, base-level security force, etc.

However, we still have a number of weaknesses as follows:

In the past, we succeeded in hitting the enemy tactical and overt elements and elements of secondary importance. But, we failed to destroy the covert elements, the organizers, especially the cruel ringleaders in order to create a great political impact. Our activities were irregular, and we did not promptly react against enemy sabotage activities. In repressing the enemy, we put too much emphasis on detention and neglected other forms of action to be carried out on the
spot. As a result, our detention camps are overloaded and trials are not expeditious enough.

In elimination of spies and reactionaries, various branches and associations did not closely coordinate with one another; as a result, they could not motivate the people to participate enthusiastically in security activities.

Our internal security operating methods remained unchanged despite the changing situation. The security of base areas and Party Committee authorities has been given greater consideration, but the motivation of the people to participate in the movement to preserve secrets and maintain security in agencies and units left much to be desired.

The strengthening of basic security forces, especially base-level security forces and secret forces, was poor both in quality and quantity. Our guidelines and policies were not suitable to the current situation. Training of key cadre for the branch was insufficient.

In brief, as compared with enemy sabotage activities and requirements prescribed by higher echelons, the recent progress we made was inadequate and could not ensure successful performance of present and future tasks.

**Reasons for deficiencies:**

1. The ideological viewpoints of our personnel were not firm. They only see those presently serving in the puppet administration but failed to see the revanchist landlords, the wicked tyrants, henchmen, and reactionaries in various religious and ethnic minority groups. They failed to see the obdurate nature and wily schemes of the enemy. They overestimated the enemy while underestimating our forces and displayed rightist and shirking attitudes.

   They hesitated to suppress local tyrants lest the latter take revenge on them. They were worried that their families living in or having to go in and out of enemy controlled areas would meet difficulties.

   They worried more about their families than about their duties. They were inclined to overlook mistakes of
relatives and friends because of personal feelings and they showed a lack of determination in repressing them. They did not dare to capture enemy spies. A number of our cadre did not discriminate between friends and foes. There were also a number of cadre and Party members who were resentful of enemy atrocities. However, they did not fully understand the requirements of the security task, lacked patience, or did not know how to motivate the people and coordinate with local revolutionary authorities to repress the enemy. They thought only of capturing or killing the enemy. If they were unsuccessful in doing so, they became confused, passive, and inactive.

2. They failed to master their political task which is a principal part of the security mission. Security activities are closely related to Party policies and the daily activities of friendly agencies and branches. They did not thoroughly understand the following three major tasks:

Closely coordinate with other branches and organizations.

Employ combined forces to fight the enemy.

Motivate the people to participate in attacking the enemy.

These three major tasks cannot be neglected. Recently, the leadership for these three major tasks was ineffective. Especially poor were the employment of combined forces and the conduct of the people's movement. This has reduced the strength of the front against enemy spies and reactionaries.

3. They failed to fully comprehend policies and guidelines concerning the repression of counter-revolutionaries. The application of repression measures was not suitable to each target and each area of operation. Our cadre did not take the initiative in repression activities. As a result, they failed to disrupt the enemy ranks.

4. Security machinery and forces were weak both in quantity and quality. Especially weak were base-level security agencies and secret forces. Troop skills were inadequately improved. Operational procedures of each type of force have not been understood.
5. Leadership of security authorities of various levels: This leadership was inadequate in political and professional matters. They failed to accurately assess the friendly and enemy situation, to work closely with the villages and hamlets and as a result, were unable to timely cope with the situation.

Leadership was poor. For this reason, [cadre] could not gain much experience. They did not make recapitulative or preliminary reports, thus failing in their functions and duties entrusted by Party Committee authorities.

6. Party Committee leadership of the security task was not close and did not follow a set pattern.

These deficiencies were the main causes directly affecting the performance and development of Party security missions in the past.

II. PURPOSES OF SECURITY MISSIONS:

To serve the primary mission of countering pacification activities and making preparations for struggles against the enemy in the future, FT [sic] prescribed a number of future missions to expedite the development of the security task in accordance with Resolution 9.

A. Motivation for initiating a people's movement to preserve secrecy and repress reactionaries and spies in accordance with the guideline: "Party Chapters provide leadership, key organizations mobilize the people to participate in the movement, and security [personnel] provide technical guidance".

1. Requirements:

Conduct indoctrination to increase the revolutionary awareness in the Party, revolutionary organizations, armed forces, and among the people in order to:

Expose the wicked schemes of reactionaries and spies; foster hatred of the enemy so that everybody will understand missions, guidelines and policies for repressing reactionaries and see the targets of repression for the
present time and for the future. Mobilize all branches, organizations and armed forces to activate a movement to preserve secrecy, maintain security, and suppress spies and reactionaries, among the people at large in order to cope with and frustrate all enemy schemes and subversive activities, especially his psywar activities, divisive tricks, his schemes to relocate local inhabitants, and eliminate puppet and US depraved culture, etc. Gradually consolidate [the security system of] each hamlet and village and purge our old base areas [of undesirable elements].

2. To meet the above requirements, the following missions must be accomplished:

Each area may organize and plan for a short phase of intensive propaganda and indoctrination to heighten revolutionary awareness or coordinate its program with other motivation campaigns conducted by the Party.

The Security [sections] must coordinate with all branches and organizations to indoctrinate backward people and individuals having a doubtful background to prevent them from being taken advantage of by the enemy.

All branches and organizations must consider the indoctrination task as part of their regular village and hamlet activities. Proceed with the formation of hamlet and village "security maintenance councils" to ensure close coordination between branches and organizations in countering enemy spies and reactionaries in hamlets and villages (directive providing specific guidance thereon is available).

Security [sections] are responsible for providing guidance for cadre in charge of protecting organizations to perform their assigned security missions.

Make preliminary and recapitulative reports after each phase of motivation.

Step up the destruction of tyrants and wicked officials and the repression of spies and reactionaries in three areas.

The main mission is to arrest and kill enemy and overt and covert personnel at the grass-roots level who are
oppressing the people in order to actively support the people to rise up to counter enemy pacification activities.

1. Liberated and disputed areas where we are strong:

Properly adopt the principle of "taking the initiative to attack the enemy aggressively in order to protect ourselves."

We must immediately clean up our liberated areas and villages and hamlets in base areas by wiping out all enemy secret [espionage] networks.

Each hamlet must kill from one to two key enemy cadre secretly operating in the area.

We must hold thought reform sessions for individuals who have doubtful political background because they may support the enemy and give him favorable conditions to recruit and plant his spies in various hamlets.

Specific missions to be fulfilled:

To motivate the people, we must clearly understand enemy activities. Security agents at all levels must penetrate deep into [friendly and disputed areas] to detect and repress enemy cadre and local covert agents and expose his espionage networks. We must also resolutely punish enemy psywar and open arms agents, pacification personnel, anti-revolutionaries, reactionaries who disturb public order, and surrenderers and traitors, etc. Care should be taken to have these elements judged by the people.

It is necessary to closely watch the individuals with doubtful political background and investigate them to detect enemy elements and apply appropriate repressive measures against them. In addition, specific measures must also be taken to indoctrinate and reform the thoughts of reactionaries to destroy the enemy's foothold. We must have high determination to eliminate any shortcomings which the enemy can exploit.

Notice: We must closely coordinate with various [popular] organizations, branches and forces to get enemy
information. We must carefully indoctrinate suspects and follow up their [ideological evolution] in order to take prompt precautionary measures against their activities.

We must organize [our security forces] and cooperate with assault forces to arrest and destroy the enemy's agents operating in hamlets under his oppressive control and expose his [espionage] networks in areas bordering cities and liberated areas. These activities are to be carried out with the purpose of stopping enemy espionage activities.

Step up the implantation of covert agents in strategic areas for the purpose of detecting the targets [of repression] and taking repressive measures in time.

Notice:

While applying repressive measures, take into consideration the situation of each local area and the individual case of each target to implement the Party's policies in a concrete way with a view to serve our political requirements which are to frustrate the enemy pacification plan, step up the people's uprising movement, attack the enemy fiercely, and break his oppressive control to win the peoples' support.

2. Enemy-controlled rural areas and disputed areas where we are weak:

In compliance with the principle of "actively attacking the enemy to positively protect ourselves" we must actively arrest and destroy enemy ring-leaders and tyrants and dis-organize his oppressive machinery which includes such elements as village and hamlet administrative personnel, leaders of the People's Self-Defense Force, reactionary landlords, reactionaries in various religions and political parties and ethnic minority people, surrenderers, traitors and pacification personnel, etc. We must expose from two to five enemy secret espionage networks and kill or arrest from one to three ring-leaders in the hamlets in order to help the people rise up to break the enemy's oppressive control.
Specific missions to be performed

We must organize [our security forces] and work out specific plans to get full information on every enemy organization, individual target [of repression], especially the cruel ring-leaders and the enemy secret [espionage] networks. We must classify these people into specific categories with information on their political background.

On the basis of getting full information on the enemy, we must have specific plans to effectively arrest and kill each individual. There must be a verdict for each case and there must be indoctrination and motivation of the people [to participate in the action].

Employ security forces in coordination with specialized agencies to arrest and kill enemy ring-leaders and tyrants, and disorganize their subordinate personnel with special attention paid to secret agents.

Due attention must be paid to the build-up and development of security and secret agent forces in each hamlet or village so that they will be able to kill tyrants and traitors.

Make preliminary and recapitulative reports on activities to learn lessons, enabling our [movement] to become stronger with each passing day.

3. Province capitals and district towns:

Requirements concerning the continuous annihilation of the enemy's low-level tyrants and attacks against his high-level personnel to cause confusion in his organizations.

Each city ward or housing area must kill two to five low-ranking tyrants and one to two upper level ring-leaders who have been targeted [for suppression] and expose one to three espionage networks. It must also conduct one to three attacks to terrorize the enemy's upper level personnel, confuse his oppressive machinery, and favor the people's uprising to seize control of their local areas.

We must be determined to accomplish the following:

Security sections and other forces must urgently
investigate targeted individuals and cells, especially ring-leaders and secret agent networks oppressing the people in villages and hamlets. Draft a plan for them to arrest, kill, or force enemy agents out of action one by one.

It is necessary to review past activities to learn lessons and find out strengths and weaknesses and, on this basis, make plans for villages, hamlets, and city wards to follow-up each objective, and direct cadre in charge to resolutely hold firm to enemy areas. In-place agents must coordinate with the "outside" forces [forces operating outside GVN-controlled areas] to have the situation well in hand. They must be prepared to be able to act promptly when good opportunities arise. As an immediate requirement, concentrate efforts on tyrants, traitors, and key personnel, and be determined to stay close to them to kill them. Tyrant killing activities must be wide and constant, but great attention must be paid to areas of emphasis.

When killing tyrants, there must be a plan for politically attacking the enemy's ranks to disrupt his organization. The armed reconnaissance force responsible for eliminating tyrants and traitors must also assume the mission of motivating the people and developing agent network.

Points to stress in the elimination of tyrants and traitors:

**Enemy-controlled areas:**

Limit the detention [of tyrants and traitors]. If they are worthy of being condemned to death, we must kill them without delay. We may exploit information from them, but this must be done quickly. As for those who do not deserve to be killed, apply on-the-spot repressive measures. Village Party Committees and security sections are in charge of determining those who deserve to be killed.

**Province capitals and district towns:**

Party Chapters have the right to consider, arrest, and kill overt ring-leaders and tyrants, and give warnings
to their subordinates. They must ask the city Party Committee and EU [sic] for instructions concerning the arrest or killing of enemy secret agents.

**Liberated areas:**

The various forms of on-the-spot repression must be put into full use. Village Committees together with village security sections must consider and decide the forms of on-the-spot repression (consisting of warning, thought reform, and house arrest), then report their actions to districts. Concerning the imprisonment and execution, these are to be carried out as prescribed before. In case an arrest cannot be delayed (because the subject would cause us great damages or would leave for enemy areas), Village Committees and security sections must immediately arrest the subject and send him [to higher echelons] according to the usual procedures.

Repression must be absolute but repression policies must be thoroughly understood and properly applied to each target and each area.

While repressing the enemy, close coordination with various forces must be maintained in order to create strength with which to destroy the enemy.

Intensify political attacks to disrupt the enemy in conjunction with the killing of tyrants and traitors. Urgently recruit and develop security forces, especially secret agents to kill tyrants and eliminate traitors.

After each phase of activity, recapitulative reports should be made to gain experiences to improve the capabilities of [security] members.

**Detention camps:**

Promptly solve all [prisoner] problems and properly carry out the policy towards prisoners. According to the present situation, each district and province detention camp is authorized to detain 20 to 30 prisoners, but these detention camps must be carefully guarded to prevent the prisoners from escaping and the enemy from rescuing them.
Following are missions to be carried out:

We should concentrate security forces to urgently take care of all cases in the camps where there are a large number of culprits. These should be promptly brought to trial.

In the coming days, arrests and exploitation of information must also be expedited in order to successfully support the Party political task.

Appropriate forms and methods of trial must be applied according to the situation of each area, but there must be participation by the people.

Assign enough qualified interrogators and administration and indoctrination cadre.

C. Increase of internal security activities:

Make every effort to increase political indoctrination, provide ideological guidance, promptly correct erroneous thoughts and consolidate our organizations.

Conduct an indoctrination phase to increase the revolutionary vigilance of every member in agencies and units. A plan should be drafted to initiate a security maintenance movement. Intensify struggles against enemy psywar activities conducted in an attempt to make our troops defect to his side and create dissension among our ranks. Prevent the US enslaving culture from infiltrating our ranks and gradually consolidate our agencies and units.

Properly observe established regulations when admitting the following personnel into our internal organizations:

Soldiers and [administrative] personnel.

Newly assigned cadre and Party members; Party members and cadre released from enemy captivity.

Personnel who have relatives working for the enemy or living in enemy-controlled areas.
Cadre and soldiers who have lost contact [with their own agencies].

Plans should be made to protect our cadre and avoid unnecessary losses.

Provide ideological guidance and promptly correct erroneous thoughts in internal organizations.

Units and agencies must observe security maintenance regulations in billeting and messing areas. Agencies must construct good trenches and fox holes. They must promptly uncover spies and reactionaries and suppress them. They must always be ready for combat to maintain security.

They must strengthen, train, and provide efficient leadership for the security unit to improve its personnel's political knowledge, ideology and technical skills.

They must observe movement and bivouacking regulations.

They must closely coordinate with local authorities to foster a guerrilla warfare movement, maintain security, and repress spies and reactionaries operating around the areas where friendly agencies are located.

They must adhere to the principles and regulations concerning the maintenance and safekeeping of documents and Party policies to prevent them from being captured by the enemy or lost.

They must strengthen the Security Guard Section of agencies and units, and ensure an adequate number of qualified cadre for the various people's organizations who can perform their mission in a satisfactory manner.

Security cadre at all levels must provide technical guidance for agency security guards and cadre in charge of protecting the people's organizations. They must also exchange information on the activities of agents with friendly agencies and make preliminary and recapitulation reports to gain and disseminate experience to improve the skills of their personnel.
D. Urgently improve and develop the basic security forces:

We must develop all types of security forces so as to be able to successfully fulfill our immediate task. We must also energetically prepare for the struggle against the enemy in the future. Therefore, the main mission to be fulfilled by the security branch at present consists of developing the security forces at village, hamlet, sub-hamlet, and [city] ward level. We must also plant our agents in our areas of operations and in strategic targets [sic] such as coastal and populated areas, in religious sects, ethnic minority groups, and political parties.

Development procedures:

We must act expeditiously and firmly. In the present situation, we must consider both quality and quantity but put emphasis on the quality.

Requirements for future development:

1. In liberated areas and disputed areas where we are strong:

   We must recruit an adequate number of village and hamlet security agents and establish a secret security network comprising 10 to 15 agents in each hamlet. Plant agents in sensitive areas of operations and among dubious political target groups.

2. In enemy-controlled rural areas and in disputed areas where we are weak:

   In these areas, each hamlet should recruit one to three hamlet security members, one to two non-overt [sic] security members and five to seven secret agents. Two-thirds of the security force should consist of sub-hamlet security agents.

3. In provincial capitals and district towns:

   Each city ward must recruit one to two secret security members, one armed reconnaissance cell, and three to five secret agents.
In short, all three areas should have enough secret agents to effectively keep watch on all targets, especially [targets] in strategic areas of operation. We must provide effective guidance for secret agents and gradually improve them so that they can struggle against the enemy immediately and in the future.

The armed reconnaissance force must urgently build up its strength. One or two armed reconnaissance platoons must be activated at province level; one or two squads at district level; and one squad at village level. In addition, each district must recruit at least 10 members for the reconnaissance force in charge of political security.

The above forces must work out a good plan for political and professional training. The armed reconnaissance force, in particular, must be well-trained in special actions tactics and in the techniques of holding on to the area of operation, keeping watch on the targets [of repression].

Strengthen all echelons of security sections qualitatively and quantitatively in order to enable them to carry out their present and future missions.

Firmly expel unqualified cadre and personnel from the security branch, promote those who are capable and admit good persons to the branch.

All security branch cadre and personnel must have a stable status and be turned into specialists.

**Training:**

Conduct immediate training for all available forces to improve their political knowledge and professional skills, especially village, hamlet, sub-hamlet, city ward [security forces] and forces having immediate combat missions (such as armed reconnaissance force, reconnaissance agents in charge of political security, and espionage and secret agents). The requirement is that within six months, all the available secret agents and security forces in the three areas must be improved.
Contents:

Resolution 26 Cll2 and the Resolutions of T1 [Region] and FT [sic] advocate concentrating efforts on the destruction of enemy pacification efforts and on assessing the situation to settle ideological problems and strengthen the [proletarian] concept for the working class, rendering them determined to fight and to defeat the enemy.

[Security cadre and personnel] must fully comprehend their missions and responsibilities in the present situation to be determined to accomplish their tasks.

They must master our policy and guidelines concerning the repression of counter-revolutionaries.

Each force must conduct training for its personnel to improve their technical skills (the armed reconnaissance force must be well-trained in special actions techniques).

Training methods:

The province conducts training for key district personnel and coordinates with the district to train village security elements while the village must do so for the hamlet and sub-hamlet [security elements]. According to the situation, the training subjects can be taught in one, two or three sessions.

In addition, during the training, the leadership echelons must impart the experiences they have learned from the realistic situation to their trainees.

D. Increase the Party's leadership.

[Security cadre and personnel] must properly assess the situation and realize that the enemy is now building and using a force of spies and reactionaries as a forward element on his pacification and Vietnamization plans. He also employs this force as a main element to confront us on a long-range basis. For that reason, the security task is a very important task in the immediate missions of frustrating the enemy pacification program and in the countering of enemy activities in the future. Thus, Party Committee authorities must provide close leadership for the security branch.
Our leadership must fully understand all the important aspects of the security task. For example, we must underline the task of motivating the people to participate in security maintenance activities and in the repression of counter-revolutionaries. The question is to resolutely repress all counter-revolutionaries but we must also pay attention to the various forms of on-the-spot repression. We must constantly develop our security forces, especially village, hamlet, and city ward elements and secret agents.

These forces must be well-trained politically and professionally.

We should make our comrades fully understand the guideline and policy of repressing anti-revolutionaries. In the repression of anti-revolutionaries, we must have specific plans for each target and each area of operation. We must resolutely destroy the cruel ring-leaders and break up the ranks of their henchmen to serve the Party's political purposes. We should closely follow the activities and know the situation of our security forces and secret agents in hamlets, sub-hamlets, and city wards. Only by doing so can we train and strengthen them to make them capable of performing their immediate and future tasks. Furthermore, we must strive to give political and professional training to security forces and secret agents, especially those operating in villages, hamlets, sub-hamlets, and city wards.

Every month, the security section [chief] must go to authorities of the Party Standing Committee and report on security activities (according to the priority ordered by the Party Committee authorities), and request instructions and guidances from the Party Committee authorities.

The Party Committee members in charge of security tasks must have a stable status to be able to perform both their immediate and future tasks. The Party Committee authorities, therefore, must make proper assignments of missions after careful study and avoid changes [in the assignment of personnel] except in case of necessity or when so requested by the Party.

Any assignment or transfer of the cadre belonging to the security branch (including the comrades Party Committee
members in charge of security) must be made in accordance with the regulations prescribed by COSVN and Ti [Region].

Security leadership must improve and strengthen the political background, ideological concept, and class viewpoint of security personnel. We must strengthen the Party organization within the security branch.

The security [branch] must have its own leadership, learn past lessons and comply with the regulations on submission of reports and requesting instructions.

[Document captured in V.C. Sóc Trăng Province, V.C. Military Region 3]
PLAN

of the Political Protection Sub-section
of the People's Security Agency in Cà Mão
Province for the Fall-Winter Campaign du­
rine three months - August, September,
and October 1970

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SITUATION:

Through the study and recapitulation of the Spring
Campaign set up by the Standing Committee for PT and the
province Security Section, our Army and people have scored
remarkable achievements in carrying out their principal mis­
sions. The security branch has won great victories in foiling
the [GVN] accelerated pacification plan, stifling the enemy
forces through attrition and destroying the enemy vitality and
war means.

Referring to the province Security Section in general:
in performing the investigation-and-study task to ascertain the
enemy situation, the attacks on and repression of spies and
reactionaries during the Spring Campaign, the province Secu­
rit.y Section has achieved the following:

1/- With effort, determination and subjective spirit in
carrying out the investigation-and-study task throughout the
three areas, the province Security Section has investigated
3,495 people, identified 463 for further investigation, confirmed
217 as suspects, repressed 290, placed 65 under house arrest,
sent 510 for reform, and warned 211. At the same time, it
has ascertained the schemes, organizations, and stratagems of
the enemy espionage war and reactionaries' activities serving
the [GVN] pacification and reported all these actions to the
Party Committees and the [security] branch for appropriate
solution.

2/- The province Security Section's clearing-and-­
protecting task has safeguarded the bases of the Party Committees
and agencies and, despite the intensive attacks of the enemy, it has also effectively protected the quarters of the Party Committees and agencies as well as contributing to securing our internal organization.

3/- Referring to the strengthening of our forces in general: the province Security Section has coordinated the improvement of political and ideological thoughts along with organizing attacks and building our forces in accordance with our guidelines: be firm in politics, strong in organizations, skillful in technique, perfect in leading the people's activities.

4/- In leadership, the province Security Section has made a progressive step by checking and correcting the Reconnaissance [Force's] activities, submitting preliminary reports, exchanging suggestions for solving necessary problems at every moment.

Along with the above good points, shortcomings still remain uncorrected in the past 3 months, such as:

1/- Generally speaking, the investigation-and-study task is our main concern in the repression of spies and reactionaries, discovering enemy support and his opportunities for exploiting targets. However, this task has not been carried out thoroughly, therefore the enemy still has support and opportunities to organize his espionage network against the Revolution and the people's movements. In general, the repression task has not been performed thoroughly in our offensive.

2/- In the field of protection: the task of protecting the communication lines has been disregarded and not effective.

3/- In the field of strengthening our machine: the task of strengthening our basic [security] forces still does not meet our requirements.

4/- In the field of leadership: the political protection force has not yet profoundly perceived our guidelines: apply 3-pronged attack coordinated with 2 forces, 2 methods to destroy 1 objective.
Above are a number of specific progressive points and shortcomings of the Spring Campaign.

So, in order to successfully carry out our mission in the coming Fall-Winter Campaign of the Party, and:

- based on the overall results in the Spring Campaign obtained by the province Security Section in general and by the Political Protection Sub-Section in particular,

- based on the plans for the Fall-Winter Campaign and the purpose and significance of the Campaign,

- based on the purpose, requirements, and mission of the Ca Mau Province People's Security Agency for the Fall-Winter Campaign,

- based on the role, position, responsibility and capability of the Political Protection Sub-Section,

- the province B2 [sic] sees that: "The Political Protection Sub-Section's mission is to conduct the investigation-and-study task to ascertain the number of persons in each category and pay attention to the 3 areas, to get information on the people who support the enemy or whom the enemy may take advantage of, as well as the spies' and reactionaries' schemes, organizations, and stratagems, so that timely repression of the enemy can be accomplished. The task of strengthening our forces must be improved to meet our requirements for the present and future attacks on the enemy. Along this line, our village and hamlet Security forces must be guided in their organization of our secret installations and in their performance of B2 tasks in villages and hamlets. The village and hamlet Security forces must show their determination to safeguard our region, specifically the Party Committees and agencies and concentrate their efforts in attacking and destroying the [GVN] pacification."

In order to fulfill the above mission, the province Political Protection Sub-Section [of Ca Mau Province] sets forth the following requirements and measures for the task of political protection during the Campaign:
II. REQUIREMENTS AND MEASURES

A. REQUIREMENT FOR THOROUGH KNOWLEDGE:

1/- The Party's purpose, significance, requirements, direction, guidelines and methods set forth in the Fall-Winter Campaign must be realized and perceived thoroughly. Cadre, reconnaissance and political protection personnel must be led to evaluate all achievements of the Revolution and the Indo-Chinese war situation entirely, specifically the situation in South Viet-Nam, in the province, and in every local area as well as realizing completely the enemy's great setback in the past, mainly in the Spring Campaign, and his heavy defeat in the accelerated pacification plan. They also should be able to seize present and future opportunities.

2/- Based on the above realization, they should review completely the past shortcomings to do their best to overcome shirking attitudes, rightism, passivism, fear of hardship and sacrifice, so that they can strive to annihilate spies and reactionaries, dealing a heavy blow into the new [GVN] effort called the special pacification plan to win greater victories.

3/- We must understand thoroughly the guidelines: "attack and build at the same time" and create a "leap forward" to strengthen our organizations and basic secret installations, concentrating all capabilities and wit in dealing a direct blow to the enemy special pacification schemes to transform the situation and shift the balance for the accomplishment of our mission in 1970 in accordance with the spirit and content of the Party Central Headquarters' Resolution 9.

4/- We must realize and understand thoroughly the role, position, responsibility and capability, and mission of the Political Protection Sub-Section to carry out widely and profoundly the investigation-and-study task in obtaining information on all people we should pay attention to and all the people who support the enemy or the enemy can exploit, based on the 4 unclear[points]; to make an investigation and determine suspects, repress the enemy, and build basic level forces. At the same time we must accurately evaluate the schemes, tricks and organizations of the enemy spies and reactionaries. We must perceive the stubborn nature and dangerous, wicked schemes of the enemy.
MEASURES TO BE CARRIED OUT:

- Select suitable areas to organize the study of the Party Committee's documents. In the study we must review the activities of the political protection task and those of our individual reconnaissance agents to identify good points and shortcomings.

- Take advantage of our studies to help reconnaissance agents improve their ability, correct their weaknesses and shortcomings; a plan must be set up and specific assignments of operating areas arranged.

- In leadership we must follow up, correct, make preliminary reports and solve mistakes and deviations in time; do not let them accumulate or remain unsolved. Draw experiences from every problem, every case and set them as a good example for immediate congratulation.

B. SPECIFIC TASK REQUIREMENTS:

1/- Investigation and study of the situation.

To effectively support the Fall-Winter Campaign, the Political Protection [Sub-Sections] at all levels should display a high determination and urgently strive to collect information on the [enemy's] situation and his intelligence plans concerning their special pacification program. Specifically, they should:

Broadly carry out the investigation-and-study task, closely follow the various targets while taking care to distinguish between those who are supporting the enemy and those who are exploited by the enemy, and classify them according to the instructions of the Security Section. While operating throughout the three areas, they should get thorough information on the enemy overt personnel (including chiefs of sub-hamlets, inter-families in the hamlets, wards and sub-wards) and enemy covert personnel, and make a list of them as well as a summarized report of the activities of each category and each individual.
Get information on the targets of investigation and the suspects and classify them into intelligence agents, security agents, land owners, former spies and puppet administrative personnel, etc. (as prescribed in the guidelines). Attention should be given to important areas to be protected or to be destroyed, including our protection corridors, populated and wealthy areas, ethnic minority areas and areas occupied by various religious sects. Investigations must be made urgently but carefully to obtain accurate information on all targets.

Investigate plans, activities, and organizations of intelligence agents and reactionaries throughout the three areas, and the activities of other enemy personnel. Closely watch people who are bribed, threatened, or forced to work for the enemy. Investigate the enemy's immediate and long-range plans.

Keep abreast of the schemes, plans, organizations, and activities of enemy intelligence agents and reactionaries in political parties, religious sects and ethnic minority groups. Find out their present and future activity plans. Investigate enemy intelligence activities along strategic communication lines, at entry and exit points, in lowland and mountainous areas, etc... [sic].

Implementation methods.

The Political Protection [Sub-Section] and village Security Section should make great efforts and display a high determination to investigate the [enemy] situation. At the same time, they should strengthen their spirit to continuously attack the enemy and to promote enthusiasm among the masses to rise up.

They should train reconnaissance forces on the methods of evaluating suspects, of recruiting agents and of investigating the schemes, plans, organizations, and activities of enemy intelligence agents and reactionaries.

They should maintain close coordination with the forces within their own branches and with other branches and should rely on the people to collect information. In investigating the
situation, they should rely on the popular movements, branches, organizations, secret agents, and specialists of the profession.

They should intensify the recruitment of secret agents and security agents in villages, hamlets and sub-hamlets and use them as main elements to collect information to support our attacks.

**Norms:**

In municipalities, district towns, and sub-sectors, we must be relatively informed on the enemy.

In rural areas under enemy control and liberated rural areas, the Political Protection [Sub-Section] must collect essential information on the enemy.

In areas of emphasis where Party Committee authorities are to be protected and in corridor areas, we must be 100% informed of the situation.

2/- Repression and offensive activities.

The repression of enemy spies, reactionaries, secret security agents, intelligence agents, underground administrative personnel, ringleaders, and their subordinates is the primary task that must be extensively carried out by the Political Protection [Sub-Section] throughout the three areas to support the X2 TD [possibly the second climaxing phase of the Fall-Winter Campaign] and to protect ourselves during the present as well as in the future.

Targets for repression activities throughout the three areas:

a. Municipalities and district towns:

Investigate the schemes, organizations, and activities of [enemy] intelligence agents and reactionaries and movement patterns of each tyrant to provide information for our armed forces and agents to kill them.
Investigate the defense systems in cities and towns and the spying organizations in reactionary political parties, religious sects, and ethnic minority groups.

**Norms**

The norms are determined by the plans and the capability of the Political Protection [Sub-Section] of the province capital and the districts.

The province Political Protection [Sub-Section] is required to fight two battles and kill at least two enemy ring-leaders and disband 30 [enemy personnel].

**b. Pacified rural areas.**

The repression of tyrants and traitors must be intensified in accordance with the requirements of the Fall-Winter Campaign to support the local uprising movement of the people. Following are the requirements:

**Areas of emphasis** : Large chunks of enemy controlled areas should be destroyed and 20 hamlets should be liberated (in accordance with the criteria of the Party Committee).

The Political Protection [Sub-Section] should coordinate with the forces that destroy enemy control to wipe out and repress 100% [of the targets] through the use of the five methods.

Concerning the 30 hamlets which are on the way to fall under our control, the repressive activities through the five methods are aimed at basically disorganize the enemy at the lower level.

In hamlets that have been recently brought under our control, repressive activities are to be carried out according to our capability, but each hamlet is required to help friendly armed forces to arrest or kill one or two of the enemy every month.
c. Liberated rural areas.

In areas of emphasis where Party Committee authorities are to be protected and in corridor areas, we must provide complete security. In order to accomplish this, we should be determined to make every effort to break up the enemy spy network, capture enemy ringleaders and subordinates and use the five methods to ensure security for the areas of emphasis.

In liberated rural areas, in general we should restrict the enemy's possibility to find support or exploit the people, we should violently and continuously suppress the enemy's spies. This will insure safety for the lives and property of the people and our cadre and troops.

Norms for the three-month [activity phase]

The province Political Protection [Sub-Section] is required to destroy four intelligence networks and repress 250 of the enemy by the five methods.

The Political Protection [Sub-Section] of each district is required to destroy one to two intelligence networks, and repress from 100 to 150 enemy spies and reactionaries by using the five methods.

Implementation methods.

The Political Security [Sections] should strengthen their viewpoint, improve themselves ideologically and promote aggressiveness in suppressing enemy spies and adversaries. They should focus their security efforts in areas of Party Committees and corridor areas and should urgently and determinedly break the enemy's control. They should intensify their activities, firmly hold their areas of operation and stick to the guideline on "two forces, two methods, one objective." They should know the objective well and should use their reconnaissance force in a specific way to obtain specific results in repressive activities.
They should urgently increase the number of agents and help village and hamlet security sections in political security tasks and the improvement of their professional skills so that they can effectively cope with the enemy at present as well as in the future.

They should know how to make best use of the absolute power of the masses in repressive activities and political attacks, and in attacking enemy spies and reactionaries by the five methods.

The methods used to repress enemy spies and reactionaries should be reviewed after each step of implementation so that we can learn from experience and improve the professional skills of village and hamlet reconnaissance agents and security agents.

3. THE PROTECTION TASK

The task of protecting the Party Committees, agencies, units, storage caches, the people's life and properties, the Party's policy and guidelines, the communication lines and the Revolutionary installations is very important at the present time and in the future. The political protection responsibility is not only to annihilate spies and reactionaries, but there are also other specific responsibilities, such as:

- Help specifically our reconnaissance force to perceive thoroughly the important significance of the protection task which the Political Protection Sub-Section has to accomplish immediately, that is: protecting the Party Committee's area of emphasis, operating corridors, agencies, units and storage caches with 100% guarantee of security.

- Motivate the "counterspy-and-secret-protection movement" in all the above localities with the assistance of the masses to safeguard the Party Committee, agencies, storage caches, units, and communication lines.

- The Political Protection Sub-Section should assign reconnaissance agents to closely guard the Party Committee's areas and corridors at the present time and in the future,
MEASURES TO BE CARRIED OUT:

- Help the Political Protection reconnaissance force understand thoroughly the task of safeguarding the Party Committee's operating areas and corridors.

- Province and district Political Protection Sub-Sections and village Security Sections should arrange and assign specific activities for our cadres and reconnaissance agents and have a specific protection plan.

- Clear the Party Committee's operating areas and corridors and concentrate on annihilating spies and reactionaries in these areas with the spirit of guaranteeing 100% security.

4. THE TASK OF STRENGTHENING OUR FORCES

The task of strengthening our forces must be strong enough so we can find the enemy at the present time and in the future. The strengthening of our forces must follow our guidelines: "be stable in ideology, firm in politics, skillful in technique, and good in leading the people's activities." Specifically:

a. - Reconnaissance force:

In general, with the requirement of the present situation, the district Reconnaissance force should develop adequately in accordance with the district Party Committee's development plan, however, based on the realistic situation in annihilating the enemy to protect our organization, the district Reconnaissance force must be developed well in quality and quantity.

- The present Reconnaissance force must be trained intensively to thoroughly understand its position, responsibility and capability, and mission. At the same time, members must be improved, educated, led in ideology in order to have adequate strength to accomplish the mission of the Reconnaissance force.

- Along with the above, a plan must be set up to lead the village and hamlet Reconnaissance forces in performing the task of political protection, mainly the task of investigation-and-study to ascertain the situation, determine the suspect
categories and the number of persons exploited and depended on by the enemy. Moreover, village and hamlet Reconnaissance forces should know how to accumulate and manage records concerning the position of their villages and hamlets.

- In leadership, the Political Protection Reconnaissance force must pay adequate attention to political and ideological indoctrination because it usually operates independently, and members individually, therefore they can easily fall victim of distortion and be influenced by the enemy. So, our Reconnaissance force must have a high organizational spirit of discipline against all signs of individualism.

b. - The strengthening of our secret agents:

- Efforts should be highly concentrated in strengthening our secret agents in proper places, they must be adequate in quality and quantity to satisfy the requirement of each area, so there will be enough of them to repress the enemy, Great attention must be paid to strengthening our secret agents in cities, towns, enemy-controlled-areas, religious groups and among various ethnic minorities.

- In the improvement and leadership, we must set up concrete plans to improve our secret agents, checking our old agents to see whether they are still effective or not in order to transfer them to local authorities or reassign them with specific, fitting responsibility. At the same time we must set up a plan to improve their political views (in accordance with Resolution V).

Norm for building agents:

- Each member of the province political protection reconnaissance force should recruit 2 to 4 agents in accordance with his assignment during the Fall-Winter Campaign.

- The responsibility of the district political protection reconnaissance force depends on requirements of the district political protection branch. However, the province Political Protection Committee suggests each district reconnaissance agent should recruit 2 to 3 agents in this Fall-Winter Campaign.
- The village Security Section should recruit 1 to 2 secret agents in every hamlet in enemy controlled area to serve the Fall-Winter Campaign.

MEASURES TO BE CARRIED OUT:

- The most important measure is to coordinate the ideological and political task with the organization and development of our reconnaissance force and secret agents.

- To heighten our cadres' operational quality, we must draw experiences from training, study, preliminary reports and recapitulation of our cadres' activities.

c. Assignment of our Reconnaissance force:

In order to define and properly assign the role, position, responsibility and capability and mission of the Political Protection Sub-Section and the Sub-Section's direction, the assignment of our Reconnaissance force to operating areas must be carried out as following:

1/- Reconnaissance force's operational areas based on specific protection tasks:

The province Political Protection Sub-Section must have its own reconnaissance unit suitable to its protection capacity. The strength of the district Political Protection force should be based on the number of people available but the district must have at least 2 to 4 agents (because these agents have to protect the Party Committee's operating areas and agencies).

2/- Mobile area of operation:

- The province must have its own mobile reconnaissance unit.

- The district should organize 1 to 2 mobile reconnaissance agents.
3/- Strategic area of operation:

- Entries and exits.
- Areas inhabited by various religious and ethnic minority groups.
- Corridors and unified communication lines.
- Corridors used to protect Party Committee authorities.
- Areas of splitting attack [military attack for political purpose to break up GVN controlled areas].

In every operational area mentioned above, the province Political Protection Sub-Section must assign one reconnaissance unit for duty. The assignment of the district Political Protection Sub-Section should be based on the number of its Reconnaissance agents. However necessarily the district should assign Reconnaissance agents to protect our unified communication lines, the Party Committee's areas of protection and to operate in religious groups, various ethnic minority groups and in areas of splitting attacks.

4. Operational areas in cities and regional sections:
   (in accordance with the strategic objective)

   - The province should organize a reconnaissance unit.
   - The district should have 1 to 2 reconnaissance agents operating in these areas.

III. SOME PROBLEMS IN LEADERSHIP THAT REQUIRE ATTENTION

1/- We should thoroughly perceive the general situation and opportunities, the purpose, significance, and requirements of the Fall-Winter Campaign and rely on this realization to intensively exercise great efforts to achieve the role, position, and responsibility and capability as well as the mission of political protection in the Fall-Winter Campaign. At the same
we must heighten our revolutionary viewpoints in order to strongly launch attacks and to repress spies and reactionaries in order to effectively protect and serve the general uprising throughout the three areas.

2/- In leadership, we must thoroughly understand the responsibility, capability, and mission of political protection and correctly follow the Party's policy concerning the masses, attack and protection activities, and building and developing forces.

3/- We must urgently build our secret agent forces throughout all areas of operation, assigning our reconnaissance agents to stand fast in their areas of operation according to the responsibility of political protection. At the same time we must continue fierce attacks and repression of the enemy and direct our village and hamlet security forces to perform the task of political protection.

4/- In leadership, we must set up a specific plan for every area of operation, reconnaissance force, controlling and correcting our mistakes. But the important point is to launch attacks early to head off (GVN) Special Pacification teams activities.

This is the province Political Protection Sub-Section's plan to serve the Party's Fall-Winter Campaign (during August, September, October 1970).

September 6, 1970
The Province Political Protection Sub-Section [Că Mâu Province]

TO:
- TVPT [Standing Committee for PT]
- ANT [Province Security Section]
- 7 districts, cities.
- B2

Total: 13 copies, Typing: (T-A)
Directive No. 19-CT of a province in Viet Cong Military Region 5, dated June 23, 1970
DIRECTIVE

PLAN FOR INTENSIFYING THE REPRESSION OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES, DISRUPTING THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION PROGRAM, GAINING CONTROL OF THE POPULATION, AND EXPANDING THE LIBERATED AREAS

I. RECENT SITUATION

1. Good points:

Since the end of [Campaign] K7, the task of repressing counter-revolutionaries has scored remarkable achievements.

In conjunction with three-pronged attacks and the people's uprising movement, we have succeeded in killing a number of dangerous tyrants. In some areas, we have destroyed entire groups of puppet administrative personnel (for instance in Hoài Nhơn, Phú Mỹ, and Tuy Phước). In addition, we have adopted technical measures to wipe out the enemy covert spies and administrative personnel to purify the people's ranks and ensure order and security for the local areas.

To create confusion among enemy ranks and induce his soldiers to desert, we have conducted fierce attacks to destroy and threaten enemy forces. The oppressive puppet administrative machinery in many villages and hamlets have been weakened. Reactionary activities of tyrants have been reduced. These advantages have supported the people's uprising to break the oppressive enemy control and seize the control of hamlets.

Many local areas have strongly intensified activities to annihilate the enemy and consolidate the hamlet and village security force, strengthen the armed reconnaissance force, and recruit more secret security agents to keep watch on enemy covert activities.
In conjunction with the cited activities, we indoctrinated the people on revolutionary policy and heightened their awareness to participate in security activities in hamlets and villages.

All the above actions have contributed to frustrating the enemy accelerated pacification program. The above achievements were due to the fact that Party members and the people at large have understood that security tasks were designed to serve the [Party's] political mission. On the other hand, the Party's policy concerning the repression of anti-revolutionaries has been supported by the masses and successfully implemented in many areas.

Party Committee authorities have paid particular attention to strengthening the security branch in local areas. Therefore, much progress has been made.

Weaknesses and shortcomings:

The destruction of enemy tyrants and ringleaders, especially at village level and above, and the destruction of enemy covert agents was still inadequate.

We failed to kill tyrants right in their dens and did not destroy entire groups of puppet administrative personnel in order to sow confusion in the enemy's ranks.

The killing of spies did not match the killing of tyrants and puppet administrative personnel. The number of spies killed by our forces was insignificant. We did not understand the dangerous nature of spies, therefore we were not determined to kill them. In some areas we failed to realize the enemy's wicked schemes to plant his spies into our ranks and organizations, therefore the enemy has caused us many difficulties and losses.

Party policy has not been carefully studied and strictly observed, resulting in serious shortcomings. For instance, in some areas, we killed entire families, teenagers, and even friendly personnel. We have put more emphasis on killing than on the indoctrination of [culprits]. Consequently, this has badly affected the prestige of the Party.
The motivation of the people to kill puppet administrative personnel and spies was poor. The people in many areas are vague about the enemy or did not heighten their hatred of the enemy. Therefore, they have displayed a wavering attitude in struggles against the enemy and feared hardships and revenge by the enemy.

The consolidation of our branch was carried out slowly. We have not established a close coordination between attacks and development of forces. In addition, some Party Committee authorities in local areas have not paid much attention to providing effective leadership for the branch and to staffing the branch with able cadre so as to enable it to perform the great mission assigned by the Party.

In short, the destruction of enemy tyrants and oppressive personnel in local areas during the recent days did not match successes recently achieved in other fields. At present, we are achieving great victories while the enemy is defeated and put in a state of utter confusion.

Causes of weaknesses:

The Party Committee authorities failed to make the whole Party body, army, people, and members of the security branch understand the role and impact of the people's security activities in this emergency phase when the people must contribute in destroying tyrants and breaking up the enemy's oppressive control in order to successfully fulfill the Party's political mission and policy concerning the repression of anti-revolutionaries.

Guidance was not proper. The security branch in some areas is poor both in quantity and quality. Working procedures were clumsy and ineffective in coping with urgent requirements.

We have not succeeded in motivating the masses to participate in security activities.

II. ANTICIPATION OF ENEMY SCHEMES IN THE COMING DAYS:

Study the enemy situation and schemes prescribed in Resolution 3 of RT3.
Pay attention to enemy schemes pertaining to the security branch.

The enemy will try to rebuild the local administrative, espionage and secret service machinery, and intensify spy, psywar, and Chieu Hoi activities in order to attack and destroy our agencies after suffering heavy losses in K8 [sic].

There may be nothing new in the enemy schemes, but the methods of attack will be more crafty and dangerous. We should pay more attention to detecting enemy spies in our internal organization.

The enemy may coordinate with various reactionary parties and factions operating under the banner of religions to take advantage of people's superstition as well as our respect for religions in order to attack us. He established the Inter-religion anti-communist front with the aim to hit us more viciously at present and in the future.

III. POLICIES, REQUIREMENTS, MISSIONS, AND PROBLEMS TO BE UNDERSTOOD:

Realization:

To bring into full play the recent successes and to gain greater successes in the future, all Party Committee authorities must understand that:

The security [branch] is one of the main instruments for class struggle to reinforce the dictatorship of the proletariat, protect the Party, Government and the people, ensure the implementation of all Party policies and political tasks in local areas.

Therefore, all Party Committee authorities must provide absolute, direct and all-encompassing leadership over ideological and organizational tasks. It is necessary to control security agencies and intensify the Party leadership over security tasks to repress anti-revolutionaries in order to gain and maintain the revolutionary power at present and in the future.
[The Party's] policies and missions:

We should intensify our activities to kill tyrants, punish local puppet administrative personnel, wipe out spies and oppressive forces in order to win over the people, counter the enemy accelerated pacification plans, and rebuild and develop our forces. Make preparations to cope with the enemy counter-attacks. We should rapidly expand our control of the people in local areas to defeat the "de-Americanization", "Vietnamization" plan and any new schemes of the enemy in order to contribute to the overall victory of South Viet-Nam.

The requirements and methods for each local area:

(Including friendly areas where there are key enemy positions.)

The requirements:

1. Motivate the people to wipe out local puppet administrative personnel and spies planted by the enemy.

   Organize legal or illegal forces to keep track of enemy tyrants and puppet administrative personnel who had fled their native places and who are now trying to threaten and oppress the people in other areas. Resolutely repress the tyrants, puppet officials and reactionaries who re-emerge in the local areas.

2. Try to indoctrinate those who work for the enemy and the social welfare agencies in order to cut off potential support of the enemy.

3. Regularly indoctrinate the people to maintain secrecy and counter the enemy's psywar and open-arms activities, appeals to surrender, intimidation and relocation of the people.

4. Consolidate the village and hamlet security machinery (including overt and covert security personnel) and strive to recruit secret security agents in order to assess the situation, schemes, and organizations of the enemy; keep track of our repression targets and hold on to areas of operation.
Measures:

1. Promote the people's hatred of enemy tyrants, puppet authorities, local administrative personnel, and the accelerated pacification scheme of the US-Thieu-Ky clique. The people must increase their vigilance, detect and denounce the enemy's activities, and cooperate with the revolutionary cadre and security members to punish and wipe out all the enemy's covert local administrative personnel and spies.

2. Collect information and classify [the enemy] into 20 target categories and take appropriate measures against each of them. Assess the situation to work out technical plans for attacking the enemy at present and in the future.

3. Efforts to destroy tyrants, punish puppet administrative personnel and wipe out spies must be carried out constantly, destruction must be carried out on the spot, and pursuit must be carried as far as the enemy's den. Not one enemy element must be overlooked, not one person must be hit by mistake. Use the motivation of the people coupled with the application of technical measures to make sure that not a single enemy is left unpunished.

   Kill one [enemy] personnel in order to shake the entire clique. Conduct political attacks continuously to cause dissension among enemy ranks and isolate enemy ringleaders in order to disrupt the morale and organizations of the enemy.

   Work out plans for conducting indoctrination for those who are not worth punishing.

4. Indoctrinate cadre and the people on the enemy's open-arms program and appeals to surrender, so that they will heighten their vigilance, and will not be caught in the enemy's trap.

5. We should urgently strengthen the security machinery at all echelons and especially that of villages and hamlets by selecting personnel from associations or groups who have gone through difficulties in their activities against the enemy, endured hardships, and displayed a stable stand to reinforce the hamlet and village security agencies and various base-level organs. We should indoctrinate them to improve their ideology and
professional skills in order to help them accomplish political missions assigned by the Party.

Areas under mixed control and under loose enemy control.

Requirement:

1. Continuously intensify the destruction of tyrants, punishment of puppet administrative personnel, spies, and other enemy oppressive control personnel according to our policy. In addition, we should also destroy whole groups of local puppet administrative personnel and tyrants, to confuse them and disrupt the enemy organization in hamlets and villages.

2. We must destroy local puppet administrative personnel, punish spies to support the people's uprising while making efforts to strengthen our security system (particularly, legal security force) in all areas in order to support the [revolutionary] movement.

Measures:

1. We should establish files of local puppet administrative personnel, spies, and tyrants; submit these files to Party Committee authorities for approval before taking appropriate action toward each of those individuals. Once the approval is given, we must assign agents and forces to keep watch on the movements and activities of our targets in order to destroy them.

2. We should thoroughly comprehend our tasks of eliminating all tyrants, local puppet administrative personnel, and spies, and other oppressive forces in order to provide guidance for various branches, revolutionary organizations, armed forces, semi-armed forces and legal and illegal forces (secret guerrilla) to successfully carry out the above task. They should organize cells and small units in legal or illegal forms to penetrate enemy areas, to kill ringleaders and tyrants, or destroy whole groups of local puppet administrative personnel, working days and nights to fulfill their missions.

3. We should cause the people to deeply hate the enemy's oppressive control personnel, particularly tyrants and spies,
so that they denounce the latter's crimes. This is designed to heighten the people's alertness and induce them to take part in the destruction of tyrants and spies under all circumstances.

4. We should examine the people's practical activities to discover the good individuals. Recruit them for our local security forces in order to serve our immediate mission and prepare our future security machinery in the villages and hamlets.

**Base areas, corridors, and entry and exit points.**

**Requirement:**

Pay attention to spies and Special Forces.

**Measures:**

1. The people should be always motivated to heighten vigilance to maintain secrecy. At the same time, forces should be organized to successfully destroy Special Forces operating in our base areas.

2. Cadre and personnel of various agencies and units should be indoctrinated to properly implement the "three subjects and six principles" to maintain security for agencies and units.

3. We must apply covert and overt surveillance measures in coordination with technical measures to detect and prevent the enemy from operating in the area and reduce our casualties.

**Some matters which the leadership must master:**

The Party Committee authorities, particularly the security branch at all levels, should make the entire Party, people and army realize the importance of the security task in order to motivate everyone to participate. Leadership should be provided; plans should be worked out carefully with detailed instructions. We should conduct regular inspections and constant surveillance to promptly correct erroneous thoughts in order to implement tasks of the branch.

We should pay particular attention to making the security