III

THE DECISION TO NEGOTIATE FOR PEACE

In the past two years the northern invasion has continued at a record pace. Fourteen additional regiments were confirmed by intelligence as infiltrating south during 1966. In late December 1965 and January 1966, four regiments were drawn from various line units and sent south: (The 101st-built around-cadre-elements-of-the-325th-Division) the 141st Regiment of the 31st Division; the 34th Regiment of the 304th Division, and the 33rd Regiment of the 308th Division. (60, 61) (59)

Between February and late May 1966, Hanoi dispatched five more regular army units through Laos: the 3rd, 32nd, 165th, 8th Artillery and 52nd Regiments, (60, 61, 77) (The 259th was disbanded on arrival to provide 2,000 replacements.)

In June, Hanoi began moving units directly across the Demilitarized Zone into the northern section of Quang Tri province. Three regiments with 4,500 men of the 324th Division—the 812th, the 99th and the 803rd—were in place south of the Zone by July. (63) Subsequently, battalions of the 341st Division also crossed the Zone Southward. Although the units which came across suffered heavy casualties in encounters with allied forces from July through October, large elements of these divisions are again operating in Quang Tri province after regrouping across the Zone in North Viet-Nam.
Another 4,000 men were infiltrated between August and October in two unnumbered regiments which were disbanded on arrival to serve as a replacement-pool. (2)

In addition to the regiments listed above, the infiltration in 1966 of 57 other groups of infiltrators totaling 28,000 men was confirmed, and there is evidence that another 112 groups containing over 40,000 men came south during the same period. Many of these were sent to Viet Cong main-force units as replacements.

Last year alone, in sum, North Vietnam sent at least 44,000 of its troops into South Vietnam, and the total may well have been nearly twice that number.

In 1967 this movement has continued. In the first six months of the year, six additional regiments moved from their northern garrison areas: the 174th, 5th (a new regiment formed in the South from 1,800 North Vietnamese replacements), the 95th, 102nd, 29th and 368th. (5)

Explaining the Northern Presence

The presence of North Vietnamese in large numbers had apparently become so well known among the rural populace in the South by 1966 that the Viet Cong found it necessary to provide an official explanation. In a captured document containing propaganda instructions for "questions raised by the public," Communist cadre are told to admit that "we are
backed by a large war area which is the heroic socialist North Viet-Nam. It constitutes a major factor for success... North Viet-Nam is a large and stable rear area for South Viet-Nam and is providing us everything we need, including soldiers." (64)

The insurgent command also issued instructions for the correct treatment of ethnic North Vietnamese personnel sent south to fill up Viet Cong units. "Recruits from North Viet-Nam" have been "assigned to South Viet-Nam to liberate this part of the country," the order reads. Some are "not yet well indoctrinated" and are "confused, and sometime desert." Units must "absolutely avoid friction, authoritative attitude, disrespect, arrogance, and division between South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese... and prevent desertion." (65)

Dependence on Northern Manpower

As a result of the massive infiltration, the ratio of North Vietnamese regular army to Viet Cong battalions in the south rose considerably during 1966 and 1967. At the end of 1965 there were 91 Viet Cong battalions and 33 North Vietnamese battalions operating in the south. The northern units then comprised about 25 percent of the main force Communist strength. By the end of 1966, the number of regular North Vietnamese battalions in the South had nearly doubled, to 63 battalions. The Viet Cong forces with heavy reinforcements from the North had expanded to 83 battalions during the war. The North
Vietnamese regular units had thus increased to approximately 43 percent of the Communist force, a fact which testifies to the increasing dependence of the Viet Cong on Hanoi for their front-line manpower. By mid-1967 this proportion had increased to 45 percent, with 69 North Vietnamese Army battalions and 83 Viet Cong battalions operating in South Vietnam.

While the Viet Cong continue to rely in part on recruitment within South Vietnam, much recent intelligence testifies to their increasing difficulties in maintaining an adequate supply of new manpower from the local population. (66) Conscription by force has not solved the problem, despite the inclusion of youths less than 16 years old. The confirmed North Vietnamese infiltration last year, it may be noted, was appreciably greater than the estimated increase in total Communist forces, including guerrilla forces (see Tables I and II). By the most conservative standard, in other words, the intelligence suggests that Viet Cong strength without the North Vietnamese reinforcements would have measurably declined.

Dependence on Northern Supply

The growth of the northern army in the South has greatly increased the dependence of the Communist battle order on North Vietnamese logistic support. From aerial photography and pilot sightings, it is estimated that more than 300 trucks are operating on the infiltration routes in Laos alone,
delivering 20 or more tons of supplies each day of the dry season to the border area of South Viet-Nam.

Food and medical supplies figure significantly in this traffic, and still more important, weapons and ammunition. Since 1964, the Viet Cong have been extensively re-equipped with the latest Communist Chinese and Soviet automatic weapons. By the end of that year, the new family of 7.62 mm short-round firearms had appeared in South Viet-Nam in large numbers. They included the Soviet AK-47 assault rifle, SKS carbine and RPD light machine-gun, of both Chinese and Soviet manufacture.

In addition to small arms, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army units are now supplied with Soviet and Chinese heavy machine-guns, mortars and rocket launchers. The Soviet 7.62mm and 12.7mm heavy machine-guns, again of both Chinese and Soviet manufacture, are in wide use. Chinese-made 40mm grenade launchers and 60mm, 82mm and 120mm mortars are now in the hands of both North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong units. The 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles, made in China, have also become common, and in recent months the Soviet 140mm rocket launcher has appeared.

Modern Communist firearms have even been supplied to some local guerrillas, always the poorest-equipped elements of the Communist forces. French, American and homemade weapons still make up the bulk of guerrilla arsenals, but the French arms are leftovers from the Indochinese War and are going out of use, owing to losses, lack of spare parts and deterioration.
The smooth-bore, homemade weapons are not efficient, and the Viet Cong cannot count on capturing U.S. weapons and ammunition in the quantities needed for the present level of combat. Future equipment for these local guerrilla forces as well as the regular units will increasingly depend on the newer weapons supplied from North Viet-Nam.

As significant as the weapons themselves is the ammunition requirement they impose. Battle demands for rifle, machine-gun, and mortar ammunition are counted in tons. Captured or stolen U.S. ammunition is not interchangeable with the new standard communist round. The Viet Cong troops are already heavily dependent on North Viet-Nam for their ammunition supply, and this dependence can only grow as the war continues.

The Central Office for South Viet-Nam

As might be expected, the apparatus which directs this large and diverse military and political effort is not simple. But from many confirmed prisoner statements and authenticated documents, the organizational machinery by which North Viet-Nam controls the insurgent movement can be reconstructed. It includes both a party control channel and direct military control over certain units, in each case from Hanoi (see diagram on p. ___).

The primary control link, and the one to which all others are ultimately subordinate, runs from the policy-making Central Committee and Politburo of the Lao Dong Party at Hanoi to its
top echelon in the South -- the Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party. According to a former staff member who defected in 1966, the PRP's Central Committee is made up of 30 to 40 high-ranking Communists. The size and the composition of the committee, which may include representatives from lower echelons, varies from time to time as members rotate to and from the North and between regions of South Viet-Nam. Within this committee, the real decision-making power resides in a select group of its highest ranking members, a standing committee known like its forerunner of the 1950's as the Trung Hong Cuc Minh Ham, the Central Office for South Viet-Nam (COSVN). (87)

According to a Party agent arrested this year, this new "central office" for the South was first formed in Hanoi after the Lao Dong Party Congress of 1960. (87B) At that time, several Southern and Central Vietnamese were chosen to organize the Party's new regional command post and were elevated to membership on the Lao Dong Party Central Committee. One of them, known as "Muoi Ut" - a pseudonym for Nguyen Van Muoi, a Communist leader during the Indochina War -- subsequently became chairman of the PRP Central Committee as well as Secretary of COSVN - in effect, head of the Party in the South. From early 1965 until sometime early this year, Muoi Ut reportedly shared this responsibility with North Vietnamese Senior General Nguyen Chi Thanh, a Lao Dong Politburo member and commander of the "Liberation Army," whose death last July was announced in
Hanoi. (88) The party agent cited above stated that Maoi Ut was promoted to membership in the Lao Dong Party Politburo last February, following a trip to Peking with Party Secretary Le Duan to discuss the 1967 Resolution – policy statement – of the Lao Dong Party with Chinese leaders.

As the overall military and political command body, COSVN has two major arms – a Military Affairs Committee and a (political) Current Affairs Committee. The Military Affairs Committee in turn directs the Communist military effort through two subordinate organizations – a Chief of the General Staff and a Political Department of the Army. Since 1965 and perhaps earlier, COSVN and its military committee have been heavily weighted with prominent North Vietnamese general officers.

Although the COSVN Military Affairs Committee supervises both Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army military activity, the North Vietnamese Army command in Hanoi has increasingly assumed direct control over military operations in the northernmost provinces of South Viet-Nam. Between mid-1965 and 1966, after the introduction of a number of integral North Vietnamese regiments, the Hanoi high command detached two northern sub-regions from the COSVN area of responsibility and placed them under its own immediate direction – an arrangement reminiscent of the party reorganization after 1954. (89) The existence of direct North Vietnamese command channels in this area has now been reported by a number of North Vietnamese prisoners.
The second major COSVN component, the Current Affairs Committee, directs the political and administrative machinery of the insurgency. (90) Its leaders have never been positively identified, since they are referred to only by pseudonyms and code names. The committee functions through a number of divisions dealing with economic support, security, recruiting, communications and propaganda. Qualified defectors describe the "civilian proselytizing" department of the Current Affairs Committee as the main control channel to the National Liberation Front. The head of this department until last year was reportedly Vo Chi Cong, who is the senior PRP member to have been publicly identified. As noted above, he also served as a vice chairman of the Central Committee of the Liberation Front, and overtly at least was the party agent chiefly responsible for directing the Front's activity.

A senior party cadre arrested in the South in May of this year has provided revealing glimpses of the command relationship between the Lao Dong Party Politburo in Hanoi and COSVN, its southern arm. He reported there is close consultation between the Hanoi headquarters and the field office before policy is decided, and the recommendations of the latter - the advice of "the man on the spot" - are influential. COSVN also has much leeway in applying the policy thus decided. But all basic matters are firmly reserved for direct decision by the Lao Dong Politburo - specifically including the nature and
continuation of the war, the diplomatic program of the Liberation
Front and the peace terms in the
Front program.

Regional and Local Party Organization

Under the Central Office for South Viet-Nam, the party
is organized into zonal or regional, interprovincial, provincial,
district, and village committees. (91) There are special
zonal-level committees for Saigon and possibly other cities.
These lower-echelon committees follow the COSVN structure and
operate similarly, through military and political sections.
In effect, they are the bridges between COSVN and the villages.
While this party structure is reported to be well-staffed at
the higher levels, neither village nor district committees
exist universally, especially in government-controlled or
disputed areas.

One of the most important functions of the regional
committees is to build up and oversee the communist military
units in their areas. Although the number and types of units
under their control vary considerably, regional and provincial
committees usually supervise battalions, and districts supervise
independent companies. A COSVN directive captured in 1966
explicitly sets the lines of control over the military by
lower-level party committees. (92) It is interesting to
note that the political and military directives for the conduct
of the war which have been captured by allied forces in
substantial number have consistently issued from Party and military organs and not from the Liberation Front.

Control by Northern Personnel

As sections of this paper have already suggested, North Vietnamese direction of the war in the South rests on more than the formal chain of command from Hanoi, solidly organized as that is. The Northern control becomes still more comprehensive through the presence of so many North Vietnamese officers in the posts of command at all levels.

At the summit of the party structure in the South, in COSVN, the directing presence of two of the most important North Vietnamese generals, Nguyen Chi Thanh (before his recent death) and Tran Van Tra, has been noted above. Another senior North Vietnamese commander currently assigned to the Central Office for South Viet-Nam is Lieut. Gen. Tran Do, an alternate member of the Lao Dong Central Committee and now a top political commissar for the Viet Cong forces. (93)

In northern South Viet-Nam, regional commands are reportedly held by Lieut. Gen. Hoang Van Thai, a deputy chief of staff of the North Vietnamese army who has not appeared in Hanoi since March 1966, and by Maj. Gen. Chu Huy Man, both full members of the Party Central Committee. (94) Gen. Nguyen Don, an alternate member of the Central Committee, is reported to be Hoang Van Thai's deputy commander.

At lower levels the northern presence is equally conspicuous. A captured record gives personal histories of
47 Viet Cong officers and noncommissioned officers who attended a regional party meeting in January 1966. The officers listed ranged from the regional chief of staff through the heads, deputies, and assistant heads of such departments as artillery, personnel, and communications. Of the 47 men, 30 had infiltrated from North Viet-Nam. A 1966 strength report of the Region One operations and training section indicates that all the battalion and company commanders and executive officers in the section were North Vietnamese Army infiltrators and party members. (96) From statements by defectors and prisoners, it appears that a majority of the officers in many "native" Viet Cong regiments have infiltrated from North Viet-Nam.

Defining the Strategy

Documents captured during the past year have provided fresh evidence to show that the Central Committee and the Politiburo in Hanoi are setting the pace and direction of the war. Among the most revealing of these documents is a 17-page letter signed by the First Secretary of the Lao Dong Party, Le Duan, then transmitted to the southern command and reproduced in early 1966 for lower echelons. (97)

As the party's chief executive under Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan was explaining to the field commanders the newest strategic decisions for the conduct of the war. These have just been taken in secret at the Twelfth Conference of the Third Central Committee, in December 1965, and expressed in an
"At present there are three viewpoints with regard to war and peace.

"The Americans find it necessary to negotiate, but negotiate from a strong position...they want us to make concessions to them.

"A number of countries want us to enter into negotiations... Some other countries wonder whether we can defeat the Americans...A number of East European socialist countries hold the view that conditions for negotiations do prevail, and are ripe for achieving success. (The Americans would withdraw their troops, and we will continue the struggle to achieve total success.)...

"China holds the view that conditions for negotiations are not yet ripe, not until a few years from now, and even worse, seven years from now. In the meantime, we should continue fighting...

"The future situation may lead to negotiations... while negotiating, we will continue fighting the enemy more vigorously. (It is possible that the North conducts negotiations while the South continues fighting, and that the South also participates in the negotiations while continuing to fight...) ... We must fight to win great victories with which to compel the enemy to accept our conditions...we will take advantage of the opportunity offered by the negotiations..."
important "Resolution 12." Other papers show that Resolution 12 was widely disseminated by the party and army in both North and South Viet-Nam, and provided the basis for new orders to all the communist forces in the South. (93)

As Le Duan's letter notes, before the introduction of U.S. combat units in South Viet-Nam "we were winning" and were "about to defeat the enemy." But by the time of the Twelfth Conference, American troops had begun to inflict heavy losses on the communist forces. Some party voices were questioning whether the Viet Cong could successfully carry on large-unit warfare against the Americans -- whether it would not be better to avoid major confrontations and to wear down the enemy through expanded guerrilla warfare. (99)

With Resolution 12, Hanoi gave the party's reply. The Central Committee had decided against a change of tactics: "We are on the offensive and not on the defensive" - the stage of "protracted war", not of "sporadic guerrilla warfare". At this stage, "victory on the battlefield is a decisive factor... For this reason, we must urge the whole army and people to be more determined in the conduct of the war..." The build-up of all types of forces was to be accelerated and the pace of battle increased. The view that the American strength changed the strategic outlook was "erroneous"; the influx of U.S. troops actually "boosts rather than lowers the possibility" of success, since "the people will be seething with hatred..." (100)
Explaining these high-level orders to its districts, a Viet Cong regional headquarters summarized: "1966 sees a more and more violent and hard struggle" ahead. (101)

The Decision to Negotiate

The Central Committee had also fixed the Party position on another topic of importance -- "the problem of war and negotiation," as Le Duan's letter puts it. Le Duan describes the Committee decision: "There are those who hold the view that the political struggle is of major importance, but such a view is different from ours as to degree and time to use this strategy. At present the U.S. imperialists...are trying to force us to the negotiation table for some concessions... but our strategy on negotiation must serve in a practical manner our concrete political aims. For this reason, the Party Central Committee has unanimously entrusted the Politburo with the task of carrying out the above strategy in conformity with the policy of our Party and on the basis of the situation between us and the enemy whenever necessary."

Other documents give more details. One is a record of a briefing on Resolution 12 by "Comrade Vinh," undoubtedly Lieut. Gen. Nguyen Van Vinh, a deputy chief of staff of the army and chief of the Central Committee's National Reunification Commission. The Central Committee judged, according to this source, that "the situation is not yet ripe for negotiations... as long as we have not yet acquired adequate strength a situation where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneously does not exist..."
to step up further our military attacks, political struggle and military proselyting."

Whatever the future, "the Party Central Committee entrusts the Politburo with the task of deciding on the time for negotiations." (102)

Perhaps there could be no clearer statement of North Vietnamese responsibility for the war in South Viet-Nam than this — that it is the Lao Dong Party Politburo in Hanoi which will decide when to negotiate for peace in South Viet-Nam.
### TABLE I

**INFORMATION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL INTO SOUTH VIETNAM**

1959 - 1966*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CONFIRMED (1)</th>
<th>PROBABLE (2)</th>
<th>POSSIBLE (3)</th>
<th>TOTAL (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>4,556</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>4,118</td>
<td>2,177</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>5,362</td>
<td>7,495</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>4,726</td>
<td>3,180</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>9,316</td>
<td>3,108</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>23,770</td>
<td>1,910</td>
<td>8,050</td>
<td>33,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>44,300</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>84,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL 1959-66** 96,148 28,396 38,050 162,594

(1) A confirmed unit/group is one which is determined to exist on the basis of accepted direct information from a minimum of two prisoners, returnees or captured documents (any combination), in addition to indirect evidence.

(2) A probable infiltration unit/group is one believed to exist on the basis of accepted direct information from one captive, returnee or captured document, in addition to indirect evidence.

(3) A possible infiltration unit/group is one which is believed to exist on the basis of indirect evidence, even though no captive, returnee or document is available to verify the report or reports directly. This category was not listed separately before 1965.

(4) The total does not represent all infiltration data on hand. Other information is held which, based upon the application of consistent criteria and the professional judgment of analysts, has been evaluated as insufficient to warrant inclusion in one of the above categories.

*There is normally a long lead time between the infiltration of a given unit or group and the collection of sufficient intelligence to confirm the fact and time of the infiltration. In 1967, the infiltration has continued at a very substantial rate, but it will be some months before comparable figures for the year can be compiled.*
**EXPANSION OF COMMUNIST FORCES**

**IN SOUTH VIETNAM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC Cong Battalions*</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main-Force(\text{Total})</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>26,700</td>
<td>33,800</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>51,300</td>
<td>64,300</td>
<td>68,000</td>
<td>69,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other VC Forces(\text{Total})</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>120,500</td>
<td>164,200</td>
<td>176,300</td>
<td>176,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Vietnamese Battalions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Strength of North Vietnamese Army Units</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>26,600</td>
<td>46,400</td>
<td>49,600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These units now include a substantial number of ethnic North Vietnamese.

**End of third quarter.

***Local units and guerrillas.

If "Other VC Forces" is deleted, table should carry a conspicuous indication that substantial forces not reflected in the table do in fact exist. /
# TABLE III

## INFILTRATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY

### REGIMENTS INTO SOUTH VIETNAM

**SEPT. 1964 -- JUNE 1967**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DEP NVN</th>
<th>ARR SVN</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>NO. OF PRISONERS ON WHICH CONFIRMATION BASED</th>
<th>NO. OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS ON WHICH CONFIRMATION BASED</th>
<th>TOTAL NO. PRISONERS TAKEN FROM EACH UNIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>95th Regt</td>
<td>Oct 64</td>
<td>Dec 64</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Regt</td>
<td>Sep-Oct</td>
<td>Jan-65</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Regt</td>
<td>Dec 64</td>
<td>Feb 65</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Regt</td>
<td>Feb 65</td>
<td>Apr 65</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Regt</td>
<td>Jul 65</td>
<td>Sep 65</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Regt</td>
<td>Jul 65</td>
<td>Oct 65</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Regt</td>
<td>Jul 65</td>
<td>Oct 65</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Regt</td>
<td>UNK</td>
<td>Oct 65</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Regt</td>
<td>Aug 65</td>
<td>Oct 65</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Regt</td>
<td>Aug 65</td>
<td>Nov 65</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Regt</td>
<td>Dec 65</td>
<td>Feb 66</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Regt</td>
<td>Jan 66</td>
<td>Feb 66</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Regt</td>
<td>Dec 65</td>
<td>Mar 66</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Regt</td>
<td>Jan 66</td>
<td>Mar 66</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Regt</td>
<td>Jan 66</td>
<td>Mar 66</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Regt</td>
<td>Feb 66</td>
<td>Mar 66</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>11th Regt</td>
<td>May 66</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Regt</td>
<td>Jun 66</td>
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<td>1,500</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>11th Regt</td>
<td>Jun 66</td>
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<td>1,500</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Regt</td>
<td>Jun 66</td>
<td>Jun 66</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Regt</td>
<td>Feb 66</td>
<td>Jul 66</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Regt</td>
<td>Mar 66</td>
<td>Jul 66</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Regt</td>
<td>Mar 66</td>
<td>Aug 66</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
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"Experiences of the South Viet-Nam Revolutionary Movement during the Past Several Years," known as the CRIMP document. Part I (of two parts) of this document is printed in full, in translation, in the Appendix.

See for example Fall, Bernard B. (Ed.), Primer for Revolt: A Facsimile Edition of 'The August Revolution' and 'The Resistance Will Win' by Truong Chinh (New York, 1963). At the time these tracts were written, Truong Chinh was secretary general of the Indochina Communist Party. See also the official Lao Dong Party history of the war against France as reported in the party newspaper Nhan Dan, Hanoi, January 25, 1965.

The term Viet Minh is an abbreviation of Viet Nam Duoc Lap Dong Minh Hoi, or the Viet-Nam Independence League, which was established in 1941 as an anti-Japanese organization. By a series of pages the Communists gradually gained control of the Viet Minh, though it continued to include non-Communist elements. Anti-French forces operated under the banner of this organization in both North and South Viet-Nam during the French War, though the North was the principal theater of operations.

While Viet-Nam was technically a single country before 1954, there were two Vietnamese regimes at this time - the State of Viet-Nam, headquartered in the South and recognized by France, the U.S. and many other Western and Asian countries, and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, based in the North, backed by the Communist-controlled Viet Minh and recognized by the Communist countries. Earlier, Viet-Nam had been administered for a time under the French as three separate states, in northern (Tonkin), central (Annam) and southern (Cochinchina) Viet-Nam.

Truong Chinh, op. cit.

3. For example, a report on "The Expansion of the Party" and other
matters by the Party Central Committee in 1948; "Remarks on the
of the Party in the Army"; "Report on the Structure of the Committee
for Zone Occupied by the Enemy," March 12,
Structure of the Committee for Zones Occupied by the Enemy," March 12,
Instructions dated August 13, 1949 to the Nambo Regional Committee.

/Items 1 - 67

3B. Notice of the establishment of the Central Office for South Viet-Nam,
party document dated June 7, 1951, and signed Trung Nam. /Item 211/

4. Hanoi Radio announced Le Duan's prominence in South Viet-Nam as "Political
Commissar" on September 19, 1951. Viet Minh personnel captured by the French in late 1950 frequently reported Le Duan as having taken command
of the Party in the South. A 1951 summary of intelligence reports of the Party in the South during the 1951-55 period describes his position and Tho's. /Item 11/ y

"Instruction of 24 March 1954 on the Unification of Financial Administration," a Party document issued by the Central Office for the South, is a good example of the transmission to all party cells in the South of a policy act by the Party Central Committee in Hanoi in the pre-Geneva Conference period. /Item 203/

5. The effect of Viet-Nam's partition on the party as seen by a long-
time party cadre is described in the report of interrogation of Tran
Ba Buu after his capture in 1956. /Item 127/

5A. See for example "The Nambo (South Viet-Nam) Regional Committee," a
1959 intelligence summary. /Item 210/

5B. Viet Minh Policy Document obtained in November 1954 in the Saigon-
Cholon area, probably issued by the Central Committee of the Lao
Dong Party to the Eastern Interming of Nambo. /Item 200/

6. The course of events in Viet-Nam between 1945 and 1954 is perhaps
the best evidence of this, and the party itself has complained of it.
A Hanoi base reflects it. The Central Committee report on "The Expansion
as for example in the 1948 Central Committee report on "The Expansion
of the Party" referred to in (1) above. /Item 17/ See also Truong
Chinh, op. cit., and the party history reported in Mien Dan, Hanoi,

7. Firm statistics are not available. A July 1956 situation report by the U.S. military attaché in Saigon placed the number of armed Viet
Minh troops remaining in South Viet-Nam at around 5,000. This did

*Item numbers for internal use only; to be deleted.
not include non-military agents of the Party. Bernard Fall, in *The Viet-Minh Regime*, published in 1956 (revised edition) by Cornell University and the Institute of Pacific Relations, stated that certain "guerrilla units simply had merged into the southern Vietnamese countryside without going North." [Item 25]

8. e.g., the interrogations of Truong Van Hao and Lam Dua, former Viet Minh youth leaders, and Tran Van Khe, a party agent. [Items 26, 27]

9. Le Duan's retention of the senior party post in South Viet-Nam was much reported by prisoners and in other intelligence in the early post-armistice period. Two party agents interrogated in March 1956, for example, described a meeting of Le Duan and his regional command in Tan An Province the previous month; an intelligence report on contacts with Party members in the Saigon area during the same year describes his "struggle tactics" at the time. See also (11) and (22), below. [Items 17 and 31]

10. An example is Tran Tan Chi, a North Vietnamese intelligence officer sent to Saigon in 1954 and later arrested while operating a Viet Cong intelligence network from inside the compound of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group. Other members of this network also were North Vietnamese sent into South Viet-Nam after the armistice. (South Vietnamese counter-espionage report). [Item 28]

An intelligence report of November 1955, from a Vietnamese source, gives another example (paragraph 8). [Item 20]

11. Statement of a Viet Minh deserter in January 1956; document taken from a political officer with Communist forces in South Viet-Nam on November 27, 1955 (these first two items both refer to Le Duan, as well); description by a North Vietnamese of the Van Tien Dung/Pham Van Bach missions; summary of intelligence reports concerning Van Tien Dung and the Hoa Hao. [Items 16, 19, 21, 22]

11B. For one description of Viet Cong-Hoa Hao collaboration in this period, see the intelligence report cited in (10) above.

12. The report of interrogation of Tran Ba Buu and many of the other documents cited in this paper describe this structure. (item 12)

13. A good illustration is the Memorandum to All Provincial Committees from Eastern Interzone Committee, Lao Dong Party, obtained November 29, 1956. [Item 29] The CRIMP notebook, the Tran Ba Buu interrogation and other sources cited in this paper are also relevant.

[Handwritten notes]

15. Memorandum to All Provincial Committees (see (13), above). It is interesting to note that this document had at its head the slogan "Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, Independence - Liberty - Happiness." This kind of inadvertent disclosure of the party's direct identification with North Viet-Nam was later to be criticized as a "secrecy violation" by the party. The CRIMP document and the Tran Ba Buu statement are also suggestive of the party's morale problem at the time.

15B. Viet Minh Policy Document obtained in November 1954 in the Saigon-Cholon area (see (5B), above).

15C. Memorandum to All Provincial Committees (see (13), above).

16. See for example the Memorandum to All Provincial Committees and the Tran Ba Buu statement (see above).

17. Final Declaration, dated the 21st July, 1954, of the Geneva Conference on the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China, in which the representatives of Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, France, Laos, the People's Republic of China, the State of Viet-Nam, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America took part: Article 7.

There had also been one brief reference in the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam, signed the previous day by France and North Viet-Nam, to unspecified "general elections which will bring about the unification of Viet-Nam;" but South Viet-Nam, though it undertook not to disturb the cease-fire provisions by force, was not a party to this agreement, which was reached exclusively between the French and North Vietnamese commands.


18. Hoang Van Chi, From Colonialism to Communism (London, 1964), gives a credible account of North Vietnamese policy during this period. Chi was an eyewitness to many of the events he describes.
19. Unusually frank admission of these atrocities was made by official North Vietnamese during the temporary and tactical "Rectification of Errors" campaign which followed. In one notable confession, Vo Nguyen Giap told a Party Congress that "we have . . . executed too many honest people. We . . . resorted to terror, which became far too widespread . . . torture came to be regarded as a normal practice . . ."

(Nhan Dan, October 31, 1956).

20. There were numerous accounts of these violations in the early Diem White Papers; e.g., "The Problem of Reunification of Viet-Nam" (see (17A), above).


/ 21B. "Plan for strengthening the Organisms," Party document obtained in August 1956 in security operations south and southwest of Saigon. (Item 201.7)

22. For example, a report on a conference of party leaders in the Western Interzone on March 18, 1956: document taken from a political officer with communist forces (see (11), above); interrogation of a communist cadre who surrendered on March 29, 1956. (Items 19 and 18)

/ 22B. "Present Policy of the Central Committee and Plan of Operation," undated document believed to have been circulated to senior southern cadres only by the Party Central Committee in spring 1956; document obtained from a party cadre in the Saigon area in June 1956. (Item 204.7)


/ 24. Letter of March 28, 1960, from the Nambo Regional Committee to All Members of Cells. (Item 34.7)


Details of the planned "Liberation Army" buildup in 1959-60 are given in a statement made by a Viet-Cong regional committee cadre captured in late 1959. (Item 202.7)

/ 26. E.g., intelligence summary of February 25, 1960 (Item 35); the regional cadre statement cited in (25), above; an intelligence report of January, 1960, from a Vietnamese source (Item 206.7).
31. Interrogation of Nguyen Van Son. [Item 70]
32. E.g., interrogation of Ho Huu Su, border-crosser arrested in 1962. [Item 71]
33. Interrogation of Nguyen Bot, Commander of Company 2, 603d Battalion, and Nguyen Nua of the same battalion. [Item 72]
34. Interrogation of Senior Sergeant Doan Lot, 117th Transportation Company, earlier of Battalion 70. [Item 73]
35. Interrogations of Nguyen Bot and Nguyen Nua (see (33), above); "Vietnamese Communist Maritime Infiltration," summary prepared from numerous interrogations. [Item 76]
36. Interrogation of crew of junk captured on July 5, 1961. [Item 75]
37. Interrogation of Lam Dua (see (8), above), captured aboard a North Vietnamese sampan on June 5, 1961. [Item 77-same as item 26]
38. Interrogation of Dang Van To, Viet Cong deserter, trained at Son Tay. [Item 78]
39. Interrogation of Pham Ngot, of the Viet Cong 2d Regiment, formerly of 324th Division at Nghe An. [Item 79]
40. Interrogations of Tren Quoc Dan, Viet Cong battalion commander and former instructor and battalion commander at Xuan Mai, and Huynh Duc Tha, Viet Cong company commander, trained at Xuan Mai. [Items 80, 81, 83 - (Dan Q'd twice)]
41. Interrogation of Le Van Thanh, Viet Cong signal platoon leader. [Item 84]
42. Interrogation of Tran Quoc Dan (see 40), above. /Item 80/8


46. "Ethnic North Vietnamese Captured in 1964," a summary report from U.S. Embassy, Saigon, lists a number of these. /Item 85/

47. Interrogation of Nguyen Trong Hop, Nguyen Van Mieng, Nguyen Van Giap and Nguyen Van Dung of the 95th Regiment, 325th Division. /Item 86/

48. Interrogation of Nguyen Van Thanh of 808th Battalion. /Item 87/

49. Interrogation of 95th Regiment personnel (see (47), above). /Item 88/

50. Interrogation of Nguyen Duc Xe, of the 101st Regiment. /Item 89/

51. Interrogation of Nguyen Xuan Day, of the 18th Regiment. /Item 90/

52. Interrogation of Nguyen Ngoc Tri, 20th Transportation Battalion. /Item 91/

53. Interrogation of Hoang Thien No, 32nd Regiment. /Item 92/

54. Interrogations of Nguyen Van Dong, 22d Regiment; Nguyen Van Nhu, 250th Regiment; Nguyen Ngoc Xuan and Do Trong Tien, 33rd Regiment; Dinh Van My, 66th Regiment; (personal observation of 21st Regiment; intelligence report?) /Items 92, 93, 94, 95, 96/

55. Interrogation of Nguyen Van Vinh, 6th Regiment. /Item 97/

56. Interrogations of Nguyen Van Dong, Regiment 18B, and Vo Trong Dien, Regiment 95B. /Items 98, 99/

57. Military Region Four Draft Directive to Speed Up the Development of 'Four Good Quality' Party Chapters, April 17, 1966. /Item 66/

58. Interrogation of Nguyen Cong Navan, 141st Regiment. /Item 100/

59. Interrogations of Nguyen Van Chuoc, 24th Regiment, and three deserters from the 88th Regiment. /Items 103 and 104/
60. Interrogation of Ta Van Dan, 3rd Regiment. [Item 1057]

61. Interrogation of Le Xuan Ngoc, 52nd Regiment, and Hoang Kim Son, 165th Regiment. [Items 106 and 107]

63. Interrogation of Vo Hong Van of 324th Division. [Item 1057]

64. "Answers to a Number of Questions Raised by the Public," compiled by a party propaganda-training section; document captured in February 1967. [Item 1117]

65. "Guidance for Handling of Recruits"; document dated 1966 and signed by Political Staff, Cong Truong 9. [Item 1127]

66. Vinh Lecture (see (43), above); interrogation of Lieut. Col., Le Xuan Chuyen, North Vietnamese operations chief of 5th Viet Cong Division, who deserted in August 1966. Col. Chuyen had also been assigned to the Party's Central Office for South Viet-Nam, as described subsequently in this paper. [Items 69, 1107]

67. Interrogation of Lieut. Nguyen Khac Thanh, 98th Support Regiment. [Item 100, 1017, 2 interrogations]

68. See (30), above.

69. See (25), above.

70. Interrogation of Nguyen Van Tron, party recruiter; "Report on Propaganda and Foreign Affairs": document captured in March 1967. [Items 37, 527]

71. Instructions to inter-province committees, January 26, 1961. Excerpts from this document and a photo of the original are presented in "A Threat to the Peace," Part II, pp. 96-97.

71B. This political program was superseded on September 1, 1967, when a new NLF program was broadcast by Radio Hanoi, following a press conference by the NLF representative in Hanoi.

72. "Nature of South Viet-Nam's Liberation Army:" training bulletin. [Item 387]

73. "Regulations for the Party Committee System in the South Viet-Nam Liberation Army," issued by the Chin Nam Current Affairs Committee. [Item 397]

74. Interrogation of Tran Van Bo, Western Region National Front Committee member. [Item 407]

75. "Action Upon the Population in Saigon-Cholon": study document for Party Members. [Item 417]
75. Interrogation of Senior Lieutenant Le Thanh Lam, captured in July 1966. [Item 42]


79. Interrogation of Lieut. Col. Le Xuan Chuyen (see (66), above).

80. Interrogation of Lieut. Col. Le Xuan Chuyen. [Items 56 and 110]

81. Interrogation of Lieut. Col. Le Xuan Chuyen. [Items 55 and 110]


83. Instructions from the Provincial Committee in Ba Xuyen to district committees, December 7, 1961: Excerpts from this document are given in "Aggression from the North," p. 57.


86. Confidential letter of April 13, 1966, "concerning some strategems to be corrected." [Item 45]

87. Interrogation of Lieut. Col. Le Xuan Chuyen, [Item 46]

87B. Interrogation of Viet Cong cadre arrested May 26, 1967. [Item 208]

88. Interrogation of Viet Cong cadre arrested May 26, 1967. [Item 208]; Interrogation of Lieut. Col. Le Xuan Chuyen; Notebook of Viet Cong Cameraman, captured in July 1966; interrogation of Nguyen Huu Phuong Hung, assistant director of COSVN medical school, who defected in October 1966. [Items 47, 48, 59, 60, 63]

89. Interrogation of Major Huynh Cu, Viet Cong 5th Region Military Instruction Chief, who defected in March 1967. [Item 47]

Summary report of interrogation of a PRP senior cadre arrested in Saigon May 26, 1967. [Item 207]

Directive concerning development of party agencies, Baklak Province, June 30, 1966; "Definition of Command Relations Between Agencies at Village Level": document captured in June 1966; "Regulations for the Party Committee System in the South Viet-Nam Liberation Army": document captured in March 1966; interrogation of Dinh Van Cuong, Quang Ngai Province Committee member. [Items 51, 53, 54, 49]

"Regulations for the Party Committee System in the South Viet-Nam Liberation Army" (see (89), above). [Item 54]

Interrogation of Nguyen Huu Phuong Hung (see (88), above).

Interrogation of Major Huynh Cu (see (89), above). [Item 49]

"Strength Report of Chapter Party Committee B1," etc.: document captured in March 1966. [Item 58]

"Absolute Secret" letter to "Dear Comrades" and signed by Le Duan, captured in January 1967. [Item 64] The full text in translation is contained in the Appendix.

Speech by "Anh Sau," (code name for Nguyen Chi Thanh) from notebook captured in January 1967; Letter of Division Party Committee to Youth Members, May 16, 1966; Resolution of May 6, 1966, from Quynh standing committee; Vinh lecture (see (43), above); Military Region 4 Draft Directive (see (57), above). [Items 65, 67, 68 and 69]

Le Duan letter (see (97), above); speech by "Anh Sau" and Vinh lecture (above).

Le Duan Letter.

Military Region 4 Draft Directive (see (57), above).

Vinh lecture (see (43), above, and Appendix).
CONTROL LINES TO THE VIET CONG

MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY

LAO DONG PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE
  POLITBURO

PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE
  COSVN

MINISTRY OF NART DEFENSE
  CENTRAL RESEARCH BUREAU
  MILITARY SERVICES
  MILITARY HIGN CMD
  INTELLIGENCE AGENTS
  LOGISTICS SUPPORT
  ECO/WAR SUPPLIES

CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
  SECURITY
  ECONOMIC
  CIVILIAN PROSELYTIZING
    PROPAGANDA
    MILITARY PROSELYTIZING

MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
  C/S
  POLITICAL DEPT
  LIBERATION ARMY
  NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM
  DIRECTLY SUB. MAIN FORCE UNITS IN M7-I-VI

"COMMANDO" AND REGIONS IN NORTHERN VIETNAM DIRECTLY CONTROLLED BY HANOI

"OPERATION FRONTS" 2 SUBREGIONS "TAHA THEN" "WESTERN"