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(Article written by 'Cuu Long' for QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN daily: "New developments in the guerrilla war in South Vietnam")

(Text) Guerrilla war is playing an important role in the south. People's war must encompass two forms of war or two elements, which are: guerrilla war and war fought by regulars in concentrated units. The guerrilla war in South Vietnam has demonstrated that it is a basic form of war, the first form of people's war to appear. It has served as a base for the war fought by regulars in concentrated units.

Along with the regulars' war which plays the decisive role in the entire war, the guerrilla war in particular and the present people's war in general have come from the violent revolutionary struggle of the masses. This struggle began with peaceful struggles using political violence to demand the achievement of national and democratic rights. Since these struggles were terrorized and repressed, the revolutionary force organized a self-defense struggle against terror. Since this terror was increased day after day, the masses' struggles had to take a military character to oppose it, and finally they developed into local uprisings in rural areas.

Suffering defeats from the revolutionary movement, the enemy increasingly intensified military repression and constantly reinforced his expeditionary force. The all-out anti-aggression people's war appeared and developed day after day, and the people resorted to both military and political violence to defeat the enemy. Thus, we can see that guerrilla war was born from the masses' revolutionary struggle movement and developed through the following phases: the phase of military self-defense activities during the masses' struggle; the phase of local uprisings to seize the basic power in rural areas and protect and defend the liberated areas; the phase of guerrilla warfare versus the special war and the phase of initial shaping up of a concentrated combat form; and the phase of guerrilla warfare coupled with concentrated combat versus the U.S. war of direct aggression.

The succession of these phases comprises the evolution of guerrilla warfare from a low to a high degree. It constitutes the great strides of this warfare to maturity and, at the same time, reflects the development of the revolutionary forces from a small to a large scale, the development of a relatively peaceful struggle into a desperate one, the advance from an uprising to thwart the terroristization and repression by policy to the conduct of a war resulting in the defeating of a half-million puppet troops equipped, trained, and advised by the United States and, at present, in the defeating of a million U.S., puppet, and satellite troops. At present, guerrilla warfare has developed to a fairly high degree shown by the following characteristics:

1--Guerrilla warfare not only has played the role of harassing and wearing out by attrition and advanced to the point of coordination with and support for the regular war but also has broadly expanded the scale of potential enemy destruction, as shown by the usual enemy casualty figures of from one-third to two-fifths; in the general tactical scope, there have been battles resulting in the annihilation of small enemy units.
Guerrilla warfare not only wears out by attrition and destroys the potential of
the puppet armed forces but also accomplishes the same effect to a fairly high
degree in regard to the U.S. and satellite troops—which have modern equipment,
are supported by very powerful firepower, and carry out operations in conjunction
with all other army services and branches.

Guerrilla warfare does not confine itself to wearing out and annihilating scattered
enemy units, but sometimes it seriously wears out battalion-size enemy units and
cripples the flank of the enemy mop-up troops. Simultaneously with breaking up the
oppressive machinery to help the masses rise up, guerrilla warfare has proven highly
effective in annihilating the cruel agents who oppress the people and who are a
part of the enemy potential which cannot be easily annihilated by concentrated
units. Therefore, the wearing out and annihilation of the enemy potential by
guerrilla warfare has not only a quantitative meaning influencing the overall
military success of the war, but also a qualitative significance having an
important bearing on the political aspect of the war.

2--Guerrilla warfare not only defeats the enemy infantry, but is also able to fight
against the motorized, armored, and air forces of the enemy. This fact has of
particular significance during a national salvation war in which the aggressors
have a modern army. It has a greater meaning at a time when we fight against the
U.S. expeditionary troops—the most modern army which continuously boasts about
the supremacy of its air force and the power of its armored force. In reality,
the armored vehicles constitute an extremely useful shock force for the infantry
while the air force, with its powerful firepower, can easily control the battlefield
and bring pressure to bear on the adversary (words indistinct). But tanks, armored
craft, and aircraft cannot avoid insurmountable shortcomings. They can be smashed
and shot down. This the guerrillas have clearly realized and they have a high
determination.

Guerrillas in many areas, relying on their combat villages and rudimentary and
self-made weapons, have shot down aircraft and broken up tanks. During three mopups
in the first six months of 1966, Phu My Hung village, Cu Chi (district—ed.), broke
up and damaged 99 motorized vehicles most of which were armored. During the same
period, An Phu village, Cu Chi (district—ed.), shot down 12 aircraft and hit
19 others. That Hoa, Binh Dong, (?An Minh), Phu Cuong, and other villages also had
shot to pieces scores of armored craft and shot down several dozen airplanes.

If this ability becomes broadly generalized, it will be possible, by means of
thousands of our combat hamlets and villages and guerrillas, to compel the enemy to
add thousands more of armored vehicles and aircraft each year.

This is not to mention the number of armored vehicles and planes which have been
destroyed by our concentrated troops. During 18 months, from the beginning of 1965
to mid-1966, guerrilla forces damaged and destroyed 1,900 planes and destroyed and
damaged 1,600 military vehicles of all sorts. (sentence as heard) This exerted a
great destructive effect upon the enemy's fighting force and resulted in lowering
the U.S. soldiers' morale, damaging the prestige of their air force and armored
corps, causing their infantrymen to lose confidence in their mainstay, pointing up
the truth that men, and not weapons, decide the war, and developing the obviously
invincible power of the people's war.
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3--Guerrilla war not only stops the enemy, frustrates his raids, protects villages and hamlets, and protects the people's life and production, but also develops the continuously offensive power of the people. Guerrilla war attacks the enemy on roads and waterways, when he is stationed in posts or outside his installations. It attacks his rear (installations), warehouses, and command posts.

Its attacks also take various forms such as anti-U.S. belts, encirclement, extermination of cruel agents, destruction of the oppressive machinery (words indistinct) in the areas still under the enemy's temporary control, and mobilization of the people to destroy strategic hamlets. Moreover, guerrillas attack the enemy right in his cities and his political and economic centers through commandos' and special agents' activities--especially through the activities of the people's forces, self-defense armed forces, and secret guerrilla cells in and outside cities--thus sowing dreadful fear among the enemy.

The offensive power of the guerrilla war has developed quickly in the revolutionary forces, in small and large concentrated units, (and in) the regular units operating in independent campaigns, thus having a great effect and significance. It has caused the enemy to be on the defensive everywhere and prevented him from enjoying tranquility. It has forced the enemy to use a fairly high percentage of his force to protect his communication lines and rear. Thus, the enemy has been pinned down. He has been forced to thin out his ranks. As a result, the enemy actually has few (units) with large numbers, and he has been pinned down although he has many mobile means. He is not free to do what he wants, and he is tense. Therefore, our regulars and concentrated forces have had many opportunities to exterminate the enemy, further develop their effects, and become more versatile and offensive.

Guerrilla war has directed its strong attacks against the disputed areas and areas still under the enemy's temporary control, turned the enemy's rear into the frontline, enlarged and consolidated the liberated areas, protected and liberated the people, and cooperated with the regulars' attacks with the aim of widening the scope of activities of concentrated units. So long as the guerrilla war and concentrated attacks cooperate in such an harmonious way, the enemy--no matter how numerous his troops--will be bogged down increasingly deeply and unable to recapture the initiative or achieve any significant victory on the battlefield.

4--Guerrillas have improved their rudimentary weapons and traps and invented new ones. They resort to all means to attack the enemy, using rudimentary weapons as well as modern weapons, self-manufactured weapons, and improved weapons. Cu Chi guerrillas have recapitulated many famous experiences demonstrating that everyone can fight (and defeat) the Americans with any weapon, everywhere, at any moment, with any tactic, whether they are numerous or few, and so forth.

These experiences demonstrate that the potential of guerrilla warfare is unlimited. With these old and varied (fighting) and resistance experiences of our people, guerrillas can use anything at hand to fight the enemy. We have seen them use all sorts of spikes (words indistinct) traps, grenades, mines, and even wasps. Recently, realizing that the enemy was afraid of snakes, they used snakes to fight him. Buffalo keepers have used buffaloes to fight the enemy.
Many localities have fought the enemy with home-made zip guns, with grenades using bottles as covers, and with gasoline cans. Other localities have used weapons taken from the enemy and repaired them to fight the enemy, weapons such as fragmentation bombs, rocket, dud bombs, and dud (fshells). Guerrillas have resorted to many complex techniques to resist and fight the enemy, such as using hand grenades to attack tanks, infantry rifles to shoot at planes, and mines to attack helicopters.

It is worth noting that our people know how to use different weapons in the same battle, how to mobilize people of different levels and use different weapons in the same battle so that the weapons can complement each other. This way they can make use of their full power and have achieved victories during which entire enemy detachments have been annihilated such as in Quang Nam, Chu Chi, Gia Lai, and Binh Duong. With a very high determination to fight, our people can use any weapon, develop the full power of these weapons, and accurately strike at the enemy with its great combat strength. This is not to mention the stratagems and inventions which our people have resorted to cause the enemy to fight each other, to cause the enemy's planes to bomb his own communication lines, and so forth. Therefore, it is the enemy himself-equipped with modern weapons--who has modernized entire anti-aggression guerrilla detachments.

The superiority of modern guerrilla science lies in the fact that guerrillas use a small force to fight a greater enemy force, hit at the enemy accurately, face no difficulties concerning the supply of weapons, and satisfactorily achieve cooperation among various services and branches. This is an absolute superiority of the anti-aggression guerrilla war—a superiority which the enemy aggressors do not have.

5—Combat hamlets and villages become the core of the guerrilla war in rural areas. These are not only the instruments and combat organizations to protect villages and hamlets in the general sense but also a kind of flexible, kaleidoscopic battleground of the people's war against the war of aggression, capable of defeating every armed branch and weapons of the enemy, protecting life and production, and attacking to annihilate the enemy. These are not only the battlegrounds of the armed forces to launch attacks and mount defenses, but also the battlefield of the entire population—a scientific, new arrangement in which the people pursue their production activities in war conditions. It is in combat villages and hamlets that cattle, rice and paddy, and property are protected, classes are held, and artistic entertainment is offered. Every field, garden, or canal can be turned into a battlefield, the production battlefield in a military sense, where the people produce while guarding against the enemy's artillery and aerial attacks, and if necessary, they can man the fortifications to attack the enemy.

The combat villages and hamlets in the south have undergone an arduous but rich and significant process of evolution, which moved from the stage in which the people fought ground troops to the stages in which they fought the enemy's heliborne, carrier-borne, and highly intense artillery and aircraft attacks. Some villages got thousands of tons of bombs and shells annually; other were bombed at a rate of 3.6 bombs per inhabitant. One village received 10,000 artillery shells in a month-long mop-up operation, but was able to defeat even tanks and armored carriers and successfully coped with spies and special forces men.
While fighting the enemy, combat villages and hamlets must also insure the safety of the people's activity, production, and so forth. In order to achieve this objective, it is necessary to solve many difficult conflicts. To fight ground troops, it is necessary to have mines and traps; to fight tanks, it is necessary to have trenches and pits; to guard against artillery and aerial attacks, bombshelters are needed. In order to fight, there must be combat fortifications; to produce and work, there must be trenches and shelters at every place; to attack the enemy, there must be battlegrounds, bases, and so forth. All these must be coordinated systematically so that they will not hamper one another but strengthen and support one another. In many places, the people have solved this problem satisfactorily.

The process of building and consolidating combat villages and hamlets is characterized by hardships, resourcefulness, bravery, and sacrifices. It is also a process of ever heightening hatred for the enemy, revolutionary will to promote internal unity, and military knowledge to analyze and assess the balance between the enemy and us, of drawing-up plans and projects, and organizing the fight and fighting well with increasingly complex techniques. It is also a process of mobilizing and organizing the peasant force, improving and enlarging it. It is a process of improving the creative power. (words indistinct) manufacture and improve weapons. This process has led to the militarization of the entire population and to mixing all labor, production, and combat activities into a people's-war way of living which is tense and arduous but also full of glorious victories.

Combat villages and hamlets, linked together and developed, have turned many broad rural areas into very strong battlefields for the people's war, in some of which there are hundreds of kilometers of trenches, dozens of kilometers of tunnels, and thousands of fortifications of all sorts. These constructions, more extensive than those of the Dien Bien Phu battleground, have been built by industrious workers armed with intense patriotism.

Now guerrillas continue to engage in sabotaging and striking activities in order to bind the hands, blind the eyes, and cut the hands and feet of the enemy. But this war of destruction not only has a tactical value, hindering each action and each operation of the enemy, but also has a strategic value, dealing heavy blows at the enemy's weak points as well as his political and military plots.

The combat and sabotage activities on communication roads can annihilate the enemy's potential and destroy the enemy's war means and, at the same time, have the effect of disrupting and isolating the enemy. Though they have plenty of air, water, and road transportation means, the enemy's troops are always in trouble and can neither join each other nor become linked together which is essential for them. In addition, the attacks on and destruction of communication lines have compelled the enemy to disperse a very great proportion of his mobile regular troops on roads. As a result, the enemy's troops although numerous, have become scattered.

In some areas the enemy launches attacks to control a portion of the road, but the enemy's plot to round up the people and set up hamlets along communication roads is thwarted. Our liberated areas are enlarged and connected and the people are liberated and protected, thus preventing the enemy from plundering property and seizing the people to make up for their increasing war losses.
In a war like the one being waged now in South Vietnam, the interlocking between us and the enemy is very close. The enemy consolidates his (towards and hamlets) to divide us and protect his communication lines. Conversely, we divide the enemy forces and thus link our zones together. But our advantage over the enemy lies in the fact that everywhere we have the people and guerrillas while the enemy, to control a road section, must not only deploy his troops and set up posts, but also launch military operations to open the road and escort the convoys. The more troops the enemy must deploy and the greater his transport requirements, the more opportunities our guerrillas will have to attack them.

The enemy is involved in a more and more vicious circle. The ambushes, attacks, and shellings against the enemy's operational bases, logistic bases, airfields, and harbors as well as the more extensive fighting activities have not only contributed to exterminating the enemy forces and destroying his means of war, but also have driven the enemy into a state of constant fear of being constantly attacked.

Enemy troops are equipped with cumbersome weapons. To set up their barracks, they need large plots of land. To launch military operations, they must be divided into many columns. That is why they are unable to achieve security anywhere.

Moreover, since they can fight only when they have a large quantity of technical and material means, they are confused and lose all fighting spirit when the destruction or shortage of these technical and material means reaches a certain limit. It is precisely this point which has made important the strategic significance of the attacks against communication lines and material bases of the U.S. and puppet troops. Guerrillas in the south are able to fulfill this task satisfactorily. If leadership and organization are carried out more realistically, we will deal blows of strategic significance on the heads of the U.S. troops.

These are the steps leading toward the development of the scope and combat quality of the guerrilla war in the south. Yet, as far as the entire guerrilla warfare problem is concerned, we also see other major problems, such as the problem of organizing the forces that wage guerrilla war. On the bases of the realities on the southern battlefield, we clearly see that in guerrilla warfare, tactically, we use small but resourceful forces to launch skillful attacks and to take advantage of the surprise factor to a great extent, and, strategically, we acquire a position from which to launch all-out attacks against large numbers of enemy troops, and, thereby, drive them into an utterly miserable passive position.

These realities have also clearly shown that the forces waging guerrilla war include all the armed forces, from the main force troops to the regional troops, the people's guerrillas, and the entire people themselves, and also include special armed forces, such as the special task force and the ranger force, which are also concentrated forces but are particularly organized for waging guerrilla warfare. The concentrated forces, such as the engineer corps and the artillery corps, can also engage in guerrilla warfare.

A conventional war is waged solely by the concentrated forces, whereas the other forces are used in coordination and providing services. On the other hand, a guerrilla war is waged by all forces, including the people's militia.
We must clearly grasp the fact, which has already been asserted, that the guerrilla and people's militia organizations constitute the basic force for carrying out guerrilla warfare. The southern guerrillas are organized as the basic armed force, whereas the people's militia are a semi-armed force.

The guerrillas, on the one hand, engage in combat by themselves, and, on the other hand, provide the nucleus for the people's fight. The guerrillas cannot and must not fight alone. The guerrillas and the people's militia are organized very comprehensively and have great strength. Therefore, they play the role of the basic force in the guerrilla war.

As for the concentrated forces in various localities, they often engage in guerrilla-like combat, and, although they are concentrated organizationally, they often disperse in order to engage in guerrilla warfare. When operating on a concentrated basis, the main force units are simultaneously dispersed and concentrated and have certain components dispersed in order to engage in guerrilla warfare. In all, (words indistinct) the forces engaged in guerrilla warfare, such as the special task force, the engineer corps, and also the surveillance units.

Therefore, the militia and guerrilla movement does not constitute the entire guerrilla war movement. Yet, in speaking of the guerrilla war movement one cannot fail to see the militia and guerrilla movement as the basic component. Thus, the entire armed forces system of the people's war does not comprise simply three categories of troops. Although it is true that there are three basic types of forces, the organization of the three categories of troops has developed very rapidly. They consist of many resourceful components, are coordinated with one another scientifically, and have organic interrelationships.

The limits between the various categories of troops are in many instances difficult to determine. For example, aside from the district regional troops and the village guerrillas, there are also the inter-village guerrillas, who, in some localities, are organized on a permanent basis, and, in other localities, on a rotational basis. Therefore, it is hard to say that the inter-village guerrillas are concentrated troops, or to say that they are dispersed guerrillas.

With regard to the organization of the people's war forces at the basic level—such as the village, hamlet, or chief towns and urban wards—many localities have acquired advanced experiences which enable us to draw the following picture. At the basic level, especially at the basic level in the rural areas, how many organizations are there? The guerrilla organization is divided into: village guerrillas, which are small units operating independently and relatively adequately equipped, and the hamlet guerrillas, which are not independent units and which are fairly adequately equipped. These are the key combat units at the village level. Within the guerrilla ranks, there are also specialized guerrilla forces, such as the engineer units and the special task force, and, where necessary, the secret guerrillas. The militia organization consists of units which are not (words indistinct) and lightly equipped. Yet these units use many appropriate types of weapons, actually engage in combat, and participate comprehensively and relatively permanently in combat-serving activities. In addition, there are the people's combat forces consisting of almost all the people, who are organized to participate in combat with various types of primitive weapons (word indistinct) and to serve in each phase of combat or in each battle.
The forms of organization (words indistinct) the movements generated to organize the people's combat forces are different in each locality. Yet, they are on the whole similar to the militia organization. The third all-south guerrilla warfare conference based itself on this experience to clearly determine the procedures for organizing the three types of forces at the basic level. This is a formula for mobilizing and organizing the people in the most rational and active way to participate in the combat against aggression.

However, organizing the forces in accordance with the this line is not a simple organizational or military task. Actually it is a wide revolutionary mobilization task. It must be based on the task of mobilizing the people to carry out the revolution, supplying them rich revolutionary enlightenment, arousing national and class hatred, and pointing out the differences between the immediate and future interests, between the interests of each strata and locality, and the general interests of the nation and country. Then one must base oneself on this task to set up revolutionary mass organizations, and with these revolutionary mass organizations as a base to set up the armed forces and organize the people to combat. On the other hand, the militia, guerrilla, and fighting people's movement is also a political movement, having the subsequent effect of consolidating and developing the revolutionary mass organizations.

While building the military and paramilitary forces, one must pay special attention to the role of women. Southern women have great revolutionary courage. They have displayed not only outstanding qualities in political struggle and other revolutionary tasks, but also great capacity in armed combat. Many outstanding heroines and valiant women have appeared. Tens of thousands of women have joined the guerrilla and militia units. Millions of women have participated in the tasks of serving combat. Many village and district units have women as leaders.

Many localities have this capacity, but they have not paid attention to organizing women. Women may not be suitable for concentrated units, but they are very suitable for militia and guerrilla organizations at the basic level. If the women's role is developed appropriately, guerrilla forces can be increased by 50 percent and militia forces can be doubled immediately. The problem of (resolutely) building these forces on the basis of mobilizing the masses must be regarded as a problem of principle.

The NLF/SV Central Committee has pointed out the necessity of developing the guerrilla war movement on the basis of mobilizing and organizing the revolutionary masses. Comrade Le Duan has expressed a similar view in the following sentence: "We fail to fulfill the task of building the militia and guerrilla forces and local forces if these mobilization and building tasks are detached from the people's authority in rural areas and from the people's movement in rural areas." ("The Proletariat and the Peasantry Problem in the Vietnamese Revolution" page 169, published by the Su That Publishing House in 1965) That is why the quantitative aspect of the armed forces of the people's war must be understood in a more thorough and versatile way.

Another prerequisite is the content and form of guerrilla war in the south. The guerrilla war in the south has developed into a people's war against a neocolonialist aggressive war in both its special and regional forms. Moreover, it has developed along the general line of the revolutionary struggle, which is that military and politics must go hand in hand. This line is concretely reflected in the common struggle the motto of which is "attack from three directions: military, political, and military proselyting," as well as in the concrete struggles (with the tactic) of three-pronged attacks.
The political struggle is the use of political violence by the masses to struggle face to face against the enemy in order to achieve their demands, while military proselyting is aimed at disintegrating or breaking up the enemy's military forces with political means. All activities of the military struggle, political struggle, and military proselyting—even if they are carried out by the rebelling revolutionary masses—are of military significance in the people's war. In many battles against the enemy—such as antiraid operations, encirclement of the enemy, attacks on enemy's posts, and so forth—in rural areas, with military activities serving as a lever, the activities of political struggle and military proselyting have demonstrated that they have very great military effects. Even when there are no military activities serving as a lever, strong political struggle and military proselyting still have military effects because of the influence of the battles in other areas.

The political struggles—which have been militarized—have leading organizations, support each other, and have (self-defense bodies). In many fierce political struggles, the masses have fought the enemy troops with empty hands, sacrificed their lives, and so forth. Thus guerrillas have engaged in battles which have been joined by specialist teams and which have been coordinated indirectly with the political struggle and military proselyting. Among guerrillas in villages and hamlets the "three-pronged attack" tactic has been disseminated. A whole movement, a group, or an individual has resorted to this tactic. In areas where this tactic has been applied cleverly, widely, and versatility, there the guerrilla war movement is strong and firm and develops satisfactorily.

The guerrilla war in the south—especially in rural areas—encompasses not only the armed struggles, but also the nonmilitary violent actions of the masses. That is, it encompasses all the uprising activities of the revolutionary masses. We can base (ourselves on) reality to understand Comrade Le Duan's view that guerrilla war has become an uprising method for the people of the colonial and semicolonial countries who have risen up to struggle against the colonialists and aggressors. Therefore, the guerrilla war in the south—and more generally the people's war against the neocolonialist aggressive war—must be widened (to include) all the military, paramilitary, and nonmilitary activities of the people who rise up to fight the aggressors and their lackeys.

(Is it contradictory) to say so? This is a problem which must be further discussed. This is the content as well as the form of the guerrilla war. (Because of this view), leadership over the guerrilla war in various localities is not limited to military matters, is not (words indistinct), but is mainly the task of military organs. But the general leading organs of various levels in various localities are the source of leadership and of cooperation among the fighting activities of the masses. This is a new problem in which much experience has been gained. This experience is being developed. It is necessary to follow this experience constantly.

Since (the new developments) of the guerrilla war are as mentioned above, we must further discuss the problem of leadership. Realities on the southern battlefield have demonstrated that to have a strong guerrilla war movement, it is necessary to have two very basic factors: correct revolutionary line and correct fighting methods. The revolutionary line clearly asserts the objectives and tasks of the southern revolution.
This line and method must be thoroughly understood by the people, and turned into a great determination. They must achieve unanimity from leading organs to the people. They must stimulate the masses and cause them to build up an appropriate fighting force and mobilize all the people to create a very strong and large fighting force. If one of these two points is missing, there cannot be a guerrilla war movement.

In every area where there are good combat villages, good American-exterminating belts, and good guerrilla forces and fighting people, there are events which demonstrate that in these areas, these two points are clearly developed. The local NFLSV committees obviously play the leading role, have high determination, untiringly propagate and educate the masses regarding the objectives and tasks of the revolution, the balance of friendly and enemy forces, and the revolutionary struggle methods; constantly stir up hatred among the masses, develop their tradition, and accelerate emulation; ensure that all people closely unite with one another around the NFLSV; and raise high the spirit of determination to fight and win, with a view to liberating the south, protecting the north, and advancing toward reunifying the fatherland.

The leading organs constantly mobilize the people to participate in fighting the enemy, and organize various movements, such as the movement to hold a hoe in one hand and a rifle in the other, the movement to insure that all people engage in killing the enemy, the movement to insure that all people engage in building combat villages, encircle the enemy, launch attacks and grab the enemy's territory, and so forth.

Through these movements, appropriate organizations have come into existence and drawn all people into the struggle. Some of them mobilize their children and relatives to join the guerrilla ranks, some directly participate in fighting the enemy, some contribute their labor to building combat installations, and others take charge of transporting rice, water, medicines, and so forth. All people who have a high determination, are organized for action within a skilfully arranged apparatus. As a result, their respective localities have become very firm battle areas and, despite numerous hardships, have won glorious victories and deserve being the brass fortresses of the fatherland.

If any locality fails to gain these experiences, the movement to fight the enemy will not score good results, and the task of protecting the people will also be unsatisfactory. These experiences consist of the realization of basic principles of the task of exercising the revolution. From these principles, one can see that the guerrilla warfare movement can be guided, built, and expanded satisfactorily if the leading and guiding echelons pay attention to the following points:

1. First of all, they must clearly and deeply realize the role and nature of guerrilla warfare in the present people's war in South Vietnam. They must also realize all its new developments, its possibilities, and its basic factors. In this way, they can avoid erroneous concepts such as the idea of depending on concentrated troops and of overestimating the enemy's forces and weapons, and the incorrect views on combat villages, the use of weapons in guerrilla warfare, the building of forces, the role of the people in general and of women in particular, and the combat objectives and methods of the guerrillas.
Only by consolidating the correct and comprehensive understanding of these problems is it possible to pose and solve the guerrilla warfare problems satisfactorily and fully; to mobilize the masses actively and steadfastly; to pay attention to satisfactorily organizing and building armed and paramilitary forces at the basic level from both the political and military viewpoint; to thoroughly apply the view regarding the offensive in guerrilla warfare; to attach importance to combat villages; to generalize the substance and requirements of combat villages; to develop creativeness in investigating, manufacturing, improving, and coordinating different types of weapons to attack the enemy; and to fully develop the invincible and limitless strength of the people's war in order to annihilate a large number of enemy troops, to protect a large number of people, and to win victory.

2--It is very essential to thoroughly understand the aims of our war, to heighten the just cause of our anti-aggression war, to raise the national and class pride, and to highly develop the people's revolutionary tradition. To do so, it is necessary to thoroughly realize the revolutionary tasks and requirements at the present phase, to thoroughly realize the struggle line and aims, and to clearly analyze the balance of force between us and the enemy so as to display a very high, adamant determination to defeat the U.S. imperialist aggressors. The determination of the leading and guiding organs must be instilled rapidly and fully into the people so as to turn out into a common determination of the people. In this regard, it is necessary to carry out the ideological work sharply and urgently.

Determination is the mainstay for all conditions necessary to launch the guerrilla warfare, and it mobilizes all combat potentials of the people. Without determination, all tasks will become difficult and difficulties will exist in addition to opportunities. In many areas, the leading organs have set forth slogans suffused with revolutionary spirit for use in providing leadership for the task of analyzing the enemy's situation and ours so as to be able to defeat the enemy, and for analyzing opportunities and difficulties so as to be able to develop the former and eliminate the latter. Due to this spirit, the people in these areas have realized very clearly that no matter what the enemy is like, we will be able to defeat him; and no matter what difficulties there may be, we will be able to find ways to overcome them. Determination is the basic and strongest weapon of guerrilla warfare.

3--It is necessary to thoroughly realize and apply the mass viewpoint in building forces and guiding combat, and to reflect this viewpoint as exactly as possible by paying utmost attention to mobilizing and organizing the masses into revolutionary and combat organizations. It is necessary to closely coordinate the safeguarding of the immediate (interests), human lives, property, and production with the safeguarding of the long-term revolutionary interests, independence, freedom, and unification. It is necessary to coordinate national with class interests and to clearly point out that there can be true independence only when the power has been placed in the people's hands, when the laboring people have been liberated, and when peasants have been endowed with land and fields. It is necessary to know clearly the ability of each category of people to participate in combat and to serve combat.

The people must be reorganized scientifically into bodies in order to insure that guerrilla ranks are strong and close, that the militias are powerful, and that the people widely participate in fighting in accordance with their abilities and professional conditions.
Attention must be paid to improving these forces politically and militarily. Politics must be considered the principal and military matters must be considered as important. It is necessary to permanently consolidate organizations and to improve and boldly promote cadres. True importance must be attached to the women's role in combat organizations. Thoroughly realize the mass viewpoint in guiding fighting is to (stimulate) and respect the will of the masses and to broadly apply democratic rights in order to find all appropriate means to fight each type of enemy and to cope with each type of weapon at specific moments, in specific areas, and with each category of people and each individual. It is necessary to militarize and arm all the people.

Our nation has a very glorious and long-standing tradition of struggle against foreign aggression. In many areas, there have been peasants or women who, in just one battle, have been transformed from people who were ignorant about weapons into valiant combatants versed in annihilating the U.S. aggressors and destroying the enemy motorized craft. With the help of the people who analyze the enemy situation, many guerrilla units have been able to clearly understand the topographical situation and to skillfully apply combat methods. All this demonstrates the limitless combat potentials of our people.

4--It is necessary to thoroughly realize the guiding ideas and fighting mottoes of guerrilla warfare, especially the thorough knowledge of the ideas of active offense and of the motto of mobility, flexibility, surprise, and resourcefulness. It is necessary to understand well the motto of combining three categories of troops and three-pronged attacks, and the motto of three areas. Our guerrilla war is a protracted resistance designed to fight the enemy everywhere to regain power.

To fight an enemy who is the leading imperialist possessing great wealth and many weapons and having many brutal and insidious schemes in store, we must observe Lenin's method of uprising: attack and only attack; for in this fierce struggle, to pause at the defensive is to invite the danger of being annihilated. Even if we do not attack the enemy, he will attempt to exterminate us. Therefore, the idea of attack, strong and continuous attack, is a great guiding thought of our guerrilla warfare at present. It is necessary to understand the motto of three categories of troops, three-pronged attacks, and three areas--that is, the liberated area, the disputed area, and the area under the enemy's temporary control. All these are developing rapidly on the battlefields at present.

If we fail to combine the three categories of troops, each category of troops alone is not strong enough; if we fail to coordinate the three-pronged attacks, the armed struggle alone cannot bring into full play the power of the just cause of the masses; and if we separate the three areas and do not apply the method of advancing to control the disputed area and to penetrate deeply into the enemy's temporarily controlled areas, our defensive capacity (words indistinct). In addition, we must pay utmost attention to the motto of annihilating the enemy and building and improving our forces. If we do not have forces, we cannot extirpate the enemy. If we possess a force but do not actively develop and improve it, we cannot attack the enemy continuously.

5--It is necessary to attend the arrangement of guidance to implement satisfactorily all combat and building plans. To organize guidance, it is necessary to adhere to these problems: setting principles, guidelines, and guidance relations; insuring unified leadership; insuring the development of functions of each organ and each branch; placing cadres in suitable posts; paying major attention to promoting and
boldly strengthening the cadres; having constant control of the situation; thinking ahead and working out coordinated plans; supervising and penetrating the basic structures; and constantly recapitulating the experiences and launching emulation drives.

These are the most essential problems of the guidance link. Many experiences have proved that any locality which has high determination and skill in organizing things can overcome difficulties and shortcomings and advance the movement. A high determination can also be manifested concretely by an effort to (penetrate) the organization and to guide the plan execution. Any locality which fails to accomplish these things will face many difficulties and (words indistinct).

In brief, the present guidance tasks requires understanding of the following four matters: understanding the viewpoint of people's war, understanding the determination, understanding the mass viewpoint, and understanding the concept of guidance (words indistinct). At present, guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam suggests many great problems and is undergoing several developments which cannot be entirely dealt with here. It is one of the basic problems in the people's war of a new independent small country struggling against the aggressive war waged by U.S. imperialism, the most powerful ringleader of the imperialist camp.

Since this war has been fought in the second half of the 20th century with the greatest scientific inventions and high military techniques, the people's war bears therefore in itself the most up-to-date factors, not material and technical but spiritual, ideological, and organizational. It proves that despite its wealth, its numerous weapons, and its cruel and cunning schemes, imperialism cannot subdue the oppressed people in the world but is defeated by the revolutionary people. It proves that the revolutionary forces of the masses and people are invincible. The revolutionary people are the force which determines the direction of history. We have reason to be proud of our people's war and of our people's revolutionary tradition.

I have dealt with a number of achievements on the battlefield, hoping that they will be useful to the study of the military line of our people and that an exchange of experiences will help make this line richer and more perfect.

REPORT ON TAY NGUYEN AUTONOMY MOVEMENT

Peking NONA International Service in English 2021 GMT 28 November 1966--B

(Text) Hanoi, 28 November--The South Vietnam Tay Nguyen national autonomy movement recently held its second congress, calling on the army and people in Tay Nguyen to defy all hardships and sacrifices to continue to fight heroically and staunchly, and to thoroughly defeat the U.S. bandit-aggressors, according to the South Vietnam LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY.

Y Bih Aleo, chairman of the committee of the Tay Nguyen national autonomy movement, in a report at the congress said that during the past five years or more, people of all nationalities in the Tay Nguyen area, under the leadership of the NPLSV, wiped out over 30,000 enemy troops, including more than 4,000 Americans. They shot down or destroyed on the ground over 500 enemy planes, wrecked over 600 military vehicles, attacked and occupied 4 military subsectors and 70 strongholds and sentry posts, and razed to the ground a series of "strategic hamlets."