HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
AFO U.S. Forces (OCS)

MAC21

BULLETIN No. 8

ENEMY DOCUMENTS

Dec. 1965

27 Oct 1965

9-512-65

Memorandum

Copy dated 29 May 1965 by Le Van Chuong, Assistant Chief of Staff, Quang Tri Province
Unit Command Committee, of memorandum #167/TM, 21 May 1965 by Hoang Anh Do, in K.L.G.
calling for precautions against napalm bombs, the protection of warehouses and determination
to fight the U.S. Marines, in compliance with
orders issued on 9 May 1965 by the Military
Region.

9-526-65

Letter

Letter dated 3 July 1965 from an unidentified
person in Ky Khung Village Security Section to
Ly Tin District Security Section, reporting the
evacuation to the district, for interrogation, of
Vo Lang in Ky Xuan Village and Bai Than in Hamlet
2, Ky Ha Village, suspected of spying for RVN
authorities and apprehended on 1 July 1965.

9-527-65

Letter

Urgent letter (undated) from Ky Khung Village
Security Section to K.T.M., reporting that Nguyen
Hiep, a spy for RVN officials from 1965 to 1966,
his resumed his activities in Khung Ibon Hamlet.

10-478-65

List

Number of cadre of an unidentified unit KIA
during the first 6 months of 1965 to include:
1. Company commander
2. Platoon leaders
3. Squad leaders
2. Assistant squad leaders

10-479-65

Minutes of discussions

Minutes of cell discussions held in late May
and early July 1965 in Binh Dinh Province,
covering an assessment of RVN and NLF situations
in general, and the situation in Binh Dinh in
particular, a review of various activities
(civilian laborers, recruiters, finance-spying,
working procedures) and a study of the farmers' mobilization plan.

28 Aug 65,
TD15058G, 24 Bn,
1st RVNAF Inf.
Div.

During operation
starlight, Chu-
lai, U.S. Marines

During operation
starlight, Chu-
lai, U.S. Marines

10 Oct 65,
K2340415, Vinh
Binh Province,
unknown unit.

221609 Sep 65,
via 377421200,
A/1/4028, 4734
Anh Bde
(VC) TS orders "For combat and development"

230TH, Chief of Staff, 16 April 1965, originated Div.
by the Commander and Assistant Political Officer
of Thua Tien - Quang Tri Sub-Region. Addresses:
Quang Tri and Thua Tien Provinces.

Contents of this document are broken down as follows:

1/ Assessment of RVNAF situation
- Restricted reinforcement action due to
dispersion of forces.
- Low morale due to continuous operations.
- Shortage of troops.
- Heavy reliance on armor, intelligence,
  artillery and aircraft.
- Mobility potentials: two infantry
  battalions.
- Maximum armor available for reinforce-
  ment: one N-113 inter-platoon, one N-114
  platoon and one tank platoon (9 to 12 vehicles)
  of one regional forces mechanized rifle
  platoons (3 to 5 vehicles).
- Maximum artillery support available:
  6 to 8 guns.

2/ Assessment of VC situation
- 216 contacts with RVNAF (ambushes, counter-
sweep operations, attacks on communication axes,
surprise encounters, air attacks and attacks
on posts) within three months.
- Shortcomings:
  - Weak leadership
  - Lack of determination
  - Lack of initiative
  - Soldiers still balk at difficulties.
  - Fear of enemy armor, aircraft and
    artillery is still prevailing.
  - Weak forces! Combat capabilities do not
    meet the requirements.

3/ Mission of the Sub-Region
- Annihilate two to three enemy infantry
  battalions, one or two N-113 companies, 40 to
  50 military vehicles and ten aircraft.
- Commit target elements and artillery to
  sabotage and conduct firepower raids on munici-
  palities, airfields, depots and U. S. centers.
- Sabotage or attack communication axes
  (Highways 1 and 9, provincial roads, etc...).
- Step up guerrilla operations, build combat
  villages and consolidate liberated villages.
- Build up and train main and local forces.
4. Specific missions of each detachment

a. Main Forces
   - Conduct combat operations throughout Quang Tri and Thua Thien, from May to 15 August 1965.

b. Province Unit (Concentrated Battalion)
   - Annihilate one or two popular force Platoons in each battle.
   - Starting July 1965: Annihilate three to five popular force Platoons, then one regional forces company or one RVNAF company.

c. District Local Forces (District Units)
   - Annihilate two to three popular force Platoons, sabotage communication axes and conduct harassment operations.

d. Militia and guerillas
   - Defend combat villages and hamlets against enemy sweep and pacification operations.
   - Sabotage communication axes.
   - Set up booby traps.
   - Uncover enemy spies.

e. Province Independent Companies
   - Theater of operations: deep areas.
   - Main targets: enemy popular and pacification forces.
   - CSS's area of activity: Trieu Phuong.

f. Province Support Platoon
   - Sabotage and harass cities, enemy agencies, depots, airfields, H.G. RKN's, and other enemy units.
   - Main targets in Quang Tri: Dong Ha, Quang Tri, La Ha, Cam Lo and Dien Bien.

g. Theater of operations of the Province Concentrated Battalion
   - Annihilate the enemy mobile company stationed in Cam.
   - Combine with main forces to annihilate reinforcements on the Dong Ha - Cam Lo axis.
   - Attack the Dong Ha - My Chanh axis.
   - Annihilate popular forces deployed along Highway 1.
   - One company or the entire battalion may be committed as required.

5. Development mission
   - Activate companies capable of overrun popular force concentrations.
Doc Log No: Summary

- Indoctrinate and train militias and guerrillas.
- Dig secret underground tunnels.
- Build combat villages.

6/ Setting up and consolidating command guidance agencies:
- Set up and strengthen staff, political and rear service agencies.
- Provide additional cadre and specialized training to and reorganize guerrilla forces.
- Urgently set up training schools for squad and village unit leaders.
- Provide accelerated training to cadre of district units, companies, platoons, village and hamlet units.

7/ Battlefield preparation:
- Collect intelligence on the enemy, reconnoiter the terrain and investigate the local population.
- Revamp the province units' military intelligence agencies and the battalions' reconnaissance elements.
- Deploy people's military intelligence networks.
- Set up information liaison routes.

8/ Command and guidance:
- Step up guerrilla operations.
- Make full use of the district's capabilities.
- Break the enemy's grip.
- Build combat villages and hamlets.
- Concentrate guidance on O55, Mong Co and Nong Lu units.
- Improve the combat capabilities of militia and guerrilla forces.

9/ Signal and liaison:
- Always keep radio equipment in good operating condition.
- Familiarize personnel with liaison routes and stations.
- Set up a flash foot liaison system.

10/ Logistical support:
- Insure rice and ammunition supplies to operational troops.

11/ Deadline for preparations:
- Complete step 1 by 26 May 1965 and prepare for steps 2 and 3.
- Submit plans to Sub-Region on 10 May 1965.