<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DOC LOG #</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Capture Date</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>007-1391-66</td>
<td>(100 page original handwritten, typewritten)</td>
<td>Rice Account Book, 2d Regt aka &quot;Gua Long&quot;, 324th (B) Div.</td>
<td>17 July 1966</td>
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</table>

Rice Account Book kept by TRANDUH listing quantities of rice issued between 23 June and 11 July 1966, to the various elements of a unit identified as the 2d Regt aka "Gua Long", 324th (B) Div.

Strength of the regiment is estimated as 2,541 men, and is as follows:

- K.4: 527 men
- K.5: 545 men (four companies: Villages 1, 2, 3 and 4)
- K.6: 507 men
- Village 152: 125 men
- Village 153: 25 men
- Village 154: 122 men
- Village 155: 69 men
- Village 156: 96 men
- Village 157: 44 men
- Village 158: 121 men (Transportation)
- Village 159: 31 men (Surgical)
- Village 201: 149 men

Other recipient units were: "Song" IG, Worksite 1/5 F/1 MAV (rice loose), V13/14/1, Unit 61, V12/14, "Gua Long" IG, Guard.

[No further exploitable information.]

KIN INFO COLLECTED:

K.4, K.5, and K.6 were respectively 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Bn of 2d Regt aka "Song" river / Gua Long.

KIN IS A VIETNAMESE CLASSIFICATION EQUIVALENT TO CONFIDENTIAL AND WILL BE HANDLED ACCORDINGLY.
32th (B) Div. Companies were designated "Villages". Villages 1 through 20 were specialized companies of the 2d Bn V1, V2 and V3 were respectively Staff, Political and Rear Service Sections of the Regiment. Mortar 1/5 was assigned to the 32th (B) Div.

Diary.

Diary of WHITFORD, R.I., 3rd Ltr, 12th 1526 NY, containing notes compiled in 1955 - 1956.

19 Aug 65: Bldg. Co. C.O. P.O. P.O.
23 Aug 65: Ltngs on the situation of the revolution in SVN.
25 Aug 65: Ltngs on the mobilization of SVN.
31 Aug 65: Party church going.

Indications:

1 Aug Kilo Point
2nd Int Co. 1st Co. 3rd Co. 4th Co.

3 Sep 65: Ltngs on elections.
11 Sep 65: Ltngs on the army's traditions.
28 Sep 65: Ltngs on the army's development.
1 Oct 65: Ltngs on political activities.

Note on individual combat load, without weapons and ammunition: 16K.

29 Oct 65: Ltngs on the Vietcong revolution.
30 Oct 65: Ltngs on liberated zones.
28 Nov 65: Ltngs in Vietnamese language.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28 Dec 65</td>
<td>Lessons on enemy proselytizing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Jan 66</td>
<td>Resolution of the regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Americans attack SVN to prevent the NVA from providing assistance to the VC in SVN.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The unit must be ready to provide support to forces engaged in the South Vietnamese theater of operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 Feb 66</td>
<td>Lessons on enemy proselytizing by the company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Feb 66</td>
<td>Lessons on Communism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Feb 66</td>
<td>Lessons on the squad leader's responsibilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Mar 66</td>
<td>12th Resolution of the Party Central Committee.</td>
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<td>The US plan is to turn SVN into a neo-colonialist base.</td>
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<td>The main fighting force is the US expeditionary corps.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The VC must neither fear nor underestimate the Americans.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Americans have 250,000 men in SVN, but only one out of every four men can fight.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The others are non-combatants who support the VC.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>In the U.S.A., opposition to the war is steadily growing.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The VC struggle is winning broader support.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Communist shortcomings: military proselytizing in the cities is unsatisfactory, political and ideological requirements in SVN are not met.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Americans wish to turn SVN into a neo-colonialist military base and occupy SVN to prevent Socialism from expanding in Southeast Asia.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The entire Party, army, and people must unite and throw all of the nation's resources into the fight to defeat the imperialists, the main theater of operations being SVN. In the future, the fighting will be fiercer than ever. All resources and manpower in SVN will be mobilized for the liberation of SVN.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Mission: Destroy large US forces
Destroy puppet forces
Destroy puppet governmental organizations.

The policy is to rely mainly upon SVN forces, but with the assistance of brother countries.

The specific missions to carry out the implementation of the 11th resolution and mobilize all resources for support to SVN with the slogan "Everything for the Front, everything for Victory in SVN, all out assistance to the National Revolution."

Mission of SAV and SVN armed forces: Protect SVN, liberate SVN, support the National Revolution.

The US war machinery creates additional difficulties for the Revolution, but the US itself is having problems of heart and mind, one cannot fully use its war potential.

A mobile force is a steel dagger thrust wherever there are enemy troops. It must be specialized in short-range tactics.

22 May 66: Resolution of the 32nd Div.

The 32nd Div., is a mobile unit in the line of war and a decisive unit in the line of war. Its cadre have been trained to deal with civilians and to carry military actions. Their requirements are met in short periods, military activities, and training leave no room for individualism, rights, and privileges. In addition, there is a lack of solidarity between cadre and soldiers which may be corrected.

Mobility is still unsatisfactory. Leadership is difficult to exercise and equipment is frequently lost or damaged, etc...

Personnel at all levels must realize that although the enemy is at a standstill, in losing, the war will be a long one. The mission of the 32nd Div is of paramount importance and full of hardships, but it must be determined and ready to go wherever and whenever the Party directs it.

10-13 Apr 66: Reasons on enemy T & E

14-15 Apr 66: Lessons on experiences drawn from the battle of Phu Be, Van Truong, Ben Hau, and Dong Xai.

KIN
27 Apr 66: Lessons on enemy prpoputing in SVN.

Unit designations:
T. Binh /Post 37, Regt = "Song (River)" Tho Khuo."

Personalities:
Thao, Div. Gnr
Dung, Ulv. Deputy Qdr

Unit designations:
- 1st Regt
- 2rd Regt 3rd "Gia Long"
- 3rd Regt
- 4th designated H. 37
- K.3 (4 Dec 65)
- K.3
- K.4
- Plut designated "V" /Villars/
- 5th designated K.18 /Hualet/
- Main unit designated "THM" /Hualet/

Weapons:
9th Spt: Three 5.56 assault rifles
Three C32 rifles
One 120 light machinegun

8th Spt: Three 5.56 assault rifles
Two C32 rifles
One 120 light machinegun

7th Spt: Four 5.56 assault rifles
Three C32 rifles
One 120 light machinegun

15 Jun 66: Ill. report.

Maintenance of secrecy is imperative.

Implementation of the 12th Resolution of
the Party Central Committee to shatter the enemy's
dry-season offensive.

The unit's areas of activity are Quang Binh,
Quang Tri and Thua Thien. These areas are adjacent
to the demarcation line and to the corridor from
North to South Vietnam.

By failing to occupy the I CTZ, the VC have
let their enemy set up bases and concentrate
people into strategic hamlets.
Civilians support the Revolution, district guerrillas and troops go to SVN and bring back rice and salt.

The unit operates in the abovementioned areas to provide support for the VC and coordinates with VC forces in SVN, particularly in Phuoc.

By annihilating the enemy, revolutionary forces open the way for the liberation of Central and Southern areas. The policy is to attack the enemy outside fortifications, the main targets being enemy troops conducting sweep and relief operations. To do this, the enemy's movement and attack activities must be undermined. Hitting enemy, capturing enemy soldiers and weapon, etc., etc...

Terrain control, with rivers and mountains, are advantageous for they enable infantry to carry equipment to hide and harass enemy mobility.

The difficulty for the unit is that their cadre have no combat experience; hence, all personnel must be determined to carry out the mission as specified in the Party Central Committee's Resolution, i.e., liberate SVN.

The policy is to attack the enemy inside fortifications, destroy US and support local forces, attack continuously and continue to sweep.

Reckoning:

9th Sqi: 20 M1 assault rifles
     100 CAR rifles
     20 RPG II rocket launchers

8th Sqi: 20 M1 assault rifles
     20 CAR rifles
     20 RPG II rocket launchers

9th Sqi: 20 M1 assault rifles
     100 CAR rifles
     20 RPG II rocket launchers

16 Jan 66: Received from 3d supply from 3d Plt.

Also will be received from 18 to 20 Jan 66

Make up lists for mask, insignia and hats left behind.

Inspect all individuals and burn all personal papers.

Upon arrival, anyone who is found to have kept some papers will be punished.
June 17 is the day the unit sets out from the rear to battlefield.

More than 500m assembly area. Security must be strictly maintained. Troops must be combat-ready for they will be engaged in combat right upon arrival. Cooking will be done at night. No smoking at night. All individuals must have their weapons within reach at all times. Fortifications must be adequate. Antiaircraft guns and sentries must be deployed. Distance between squads will be 60m and distance between platoons 100m. Gas masks must be ready.

Starting from the rear or side of the diary, the following names have been extracted:

Ten platoons of the NAV service:

20 Aug 65: Lessons on squad on patrols.
17 Aug 65: Lessons on mines.

Hostile of mixed composition:

HOANG THI THANH, native of Quang Ngai, enlisted in 1965, age 21, weapon AK assault rifle.

PHUONG VAN GON, native of Ninh Binh, enlisted in 1965, age 25, weapon RPD light machinegun.

TRUONG VAN KHIEN, native of Ninh Binh (NVN), enlisted in 1965, age 20, weapon AK assault rifle.

LE NOC NGOT, native of Ninh Binh (NVN), enlisted in 1965, age 18, weapon G3KH rifle.

TRUONG VAN BU, native of Ninh Binh (NVN), enlisted in 1965, age 23, weapon G3KH rifle.

DO PHU NGUYEN, native of Ninh Binh (NVN), enlisted in 1965, age 24, weapon G3KH rifle.

LE VAN HUU, native of Ninh Binh (NVN), enlisted in 1965, age 19, weapon G3KH rifle.

NGUYEN DUC DUNG, native of Quang Ngai, enlisted in 1965, age 24, weapon AK assault rifle.

LE VAN KHOI, native of Thuan Hoa (NVN), enlisted in 1965, age 24, weapon AK assault rifle.
7 Dec 65: Congress of the 2d Co Party Chapter
16 Dec 65: Congress of the BN Party Committee

Difficulties: Fear of hardship.
Most cadre are too old, too weak, Some others have had to leave large families behind.

The majority of the BN are recruits.

Shortage of cadre (Prs and PFC are not hrs)

Clique in charge want to be promoted. Recruits think of desertion.

23 Feb 66: Learning to helicopter and helicopter troop tactics.
26 Feb 66: Learning to support tactics
27 Feb 66: Learning to mark tactics

May 66: Heavy training day involving a collision between the 9th, 4th, and 8th Plots of the 3d Pillar.
16 Jun 66: How to prepare (11 men) who have left a new chief and regular of our 3d Plt.

[No further exploitable information]