
Resolution, made by A32 on 6 April 66, relates to the development of guerrilla warfare in Binh Dinh Province and provides the following information:

1- Situation:

In Binh Dinh Province, the RVN continued to intensify military activities, harassing the liberated areas to round up villagers, destroying crops, etc. In the future, RVN will attempt to divide the province into small areas to facilitate their operations and control. If effective, this plan would cause the VC serious difficulties in command and comms-liaison. However, if proper and strong action is taken and guerrilla warfare is well-developed, the situation would turn favorable to the VC.

2- Mission:

One of the main missions of the guerrillas would be to intensify the attack on RVN communication-axes and facilities to disrupt their supply activities and limit the effectiveness of their supporting units.

Construct combat villages and turn them into strong resistance islands.

Improve the creation and use of rudimentary weapons.

Develop the part-time guerrilla forces. At least 15% of the population should join the part-time guerrillas. Place covert guerrillas in the disputed and RVN controlled areas.

3- Development of the Party and Group:

Designate young, energetic and reliable
Party members as leaders of the guerrilla units to maintain Party leadership. Develop the group until 20% of the guerrillas are ready to become group members.

"No further exploitable information."


Report, dated 5 Mar 65, from Tinh Phong of CL-P108, Cau Nan Region Party Committee, to Gung, covers his observations on the weak and strong points of the orderly missions served by the Regimental Quartermaster Section in the battle of Viet An.

Document provides the following information:

Strong Points:
Before departure for operations, the subordinate Battalion and Company adjutants were briefed on the Rear Service’s regulations for specialized missions in the field and given specific missions pertaining to rice, salt, dry rations and clothing supplies.

Weak Points:
(Observe during movement to contact)

The Regimental Quartermaster Section did not make any direct terrain reconnaissance in order to find out the location of the Chief of Regimental Staff. There was no close coordination between the Chief of Battalion Staff and the food supply stations of various "h Qo". As a result, when the staffs commenced contact with the unit, the unit was lost and resulted in great confusion. Some supply stations could not find their unit even after 5 days.

Other units left their own rice rations behind at the assembly area and suffered from hunger during deployment. The Regimental Quartermaster Section Chief was employed like all other ordnance to evacuate KIA’s from the battlefield without care for his food supply stations. The regulations for setting up supply points 30 minutes march from the objective during reinforcement attack were not observed.

Some soldiers were dead for ten days without a report and their rice and food rations.
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<th>Summary</th>
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<td>were continuously drawn by the unit. It is requested that due attention should be paid to combat orders by the unit because attacks will be conducted by concentrated units, either by a regiment with various other battalions or by inter-regiments. Addressed was also requested to CLF/DK for sketches for the battle of Viet A, Do Ngoc Pass and Gia Han area on Route # 9.</td>
<td>29 June 66 R493133, 1st Air Cav Div. Received COE: 10 Jul 66</td>
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HIS: Rice and Food Expense Account. Seven documents, composed of 24 pages, pertain to accounts of food and rice expenses of 31 Unit, Agricultural Site # 5, for subordinate units during the 4th quarter of 1965 and 1st quarter of 1966 on the basis of their monthly increase and decrease in strength. | 25 Jun 66 R497752, 1st Air Cav Div. Received COE: 8 Jul 66 |

No further exploitable information. Schedule of a 60mm mortar training by an unidentified unit. Schedule of a 4-day refresher training on the 60mm mortar of an unidentified unit, dated 30 May 66, signed by Nguyen, Chief of Artillery Section and approved by Nguyen Quang Dong, Chief of Staff. The schedule consisted of:

- 4 hours: Maintenance and sight adjustment.
- 12 hours: Employment of artillery in all types of terrain, sight adjustment in the dark, and night-firing instruction.
- 12 hours: Tactical march, gun emplacement, firing positions, and aiming.
- 8 hours: Firing Instructions.
- 4 hours: Distance estimation.

No further exploitable information. | 25 Jun 66 R497752, 1st Air Cav Div. Received COE: 8 Jul 66 |