1965 District Postal Communication Activity Report, Hinh Duong Province.


In 1965, the VC met many difficulties in postal communications. The enemy stepped-up combat operations and air and artillery attacks, and constantly harassed the corridors in the province. As a result of this increase in activity, confusion and desertion appeared in the ranks of personnel involved in postal work. Moreover, the volume of postal goods and personnel to be processed through the corridors increased. The constant threat of enemy infiltration of VC ranks and the disclosures, by VC defectors, of information concerning corridor operations added to the mounting difficulties.

The VC realized that the enemy's major concern was to check and cut-off the movement of troops and supplies to the various theaters of operations by harassing corridor lines militarily, politically, and through espionage. In Hon Cat and Vinh Anh Districts, enemy ground action support's M-52's increased in intensity as part of the enemy's plan of an offiCial "white" perimeters around villages and the main roads at Phu Loc Airfield. Enemy artillery continuously pounded Lai Chieu area (Hon Loc, Vinh Tan, Tan Hon), forcing the civilian populace to flee to strategic hamlets. A total of 25 sweep operations against corridor lines were recorded during the year, disrupting traffic from the province on down to villages. Enemy shelling of the district-to-province communication line running through Vinh Tan Village was frequently reported.

VC action in the province included the mortar raid on Phu Loc Airfield, a counter-sweep operation in Phu Loc, the attack of Phu Chanh post and deep thrusts into the enemy's rear. The district postal communication branch was consolidated, corridor lines from the province-to-the-district down to vil-
Lages and hamlets were revamped into one straight line running from the base all the way through to village and hamlet stations. A warning network was established with the cooperation of civilians providing information on enemy movement. In 1965, the postal communication branch sustained 1,260 AMS worth of material damage occasioned by an enemy raid on the base, and one transient, killed and three others wounded by enemy shelling.

Strength of the Postal Communication Section was reported as follows:

- Initial strength: 19 men
- Transferred to Higher HQ: 1 man
- Deserted: 2 men
- Strength as of reporting date: 17 men

Cadre of the section held the following positions:

a. Section Chief (assumed by a Party Committee member)
b. Assistant Section Chief
c. Party Committee Member
d. Squad Leader
e. Two post EQ Ltd
f. One cadre-in-charge of distribution
g. One Medic

Village postal personnel totaled 19 men. Two were killed in action, six abandoned their posts, one defected to the enemy and two were transferred to higher headquarters.

Security-wise, secret security agents were planted within the section and day-to-day activities of the men were closely watched. A separate base was established for transients. Reconnaissance patrols around the base were initiated every two days. Weapons included two Thompson submachineguns, one carbine, two German rifles and four red-stock rifles. Installations consisted of a 1,000m x 50m fenced, 4,000 spikes, 20 airraid shelters, a 25m underground tunnel, four secret underground tunnels, five underground sleeping quarters for 20 men, one school, two office buildings and one kitchen. To prevent the enemy from laying ambushes, movement routes and rendezvous procedures were constantly changed.

Postal communication activities during the year were reported as follows:

- 275 flash messages and 585 courier trips from province and district down to villages and hamlets.
- 20 combat casualties evacuated to dispensaries
- Processed 37,710 official documents, 2,950R of postal parcels, 35R of personal letters, 50 watches, 1 fountain pens, 2 radio sets and 1,779,718 VNS in cash.

2,031 transients were processed. A base for these transients was established complete with messing and billeting facilities, medical and air raid shelters.

Self-sufficient production yielded enough food for five months. By the end of the year, there was an excess of 10,000 VNS worth of food which was sold for cash to be used in 1966 self-sufficient production.

Party and Group membership, as of reporting date, amounted to 8 Party members and 7 Group members.

Resignation of shortcomings brought to light the failure by the postal communication section to apply scientific methods to working procedures, the lack of concern of postal personnel for their job and the failure by cadre to correct erroneous ideologies of their men.

***NO FURTHER EXPLOITABLE INFORMATION***

**Directive.**

Directive #73/CV, dated 2 July 1966, signed by MAC/IVN of the District Party/Committee Current Affairs and sent to Village Party Chapters, District Party/Committee members, pertaining to the launching of a phase of activity to commemorate the 20th of July. It consists of 4 main points:

1. Step up the people's struggle movement against NVA pacification efforts.
2. Step up political activities and military procuring activities aimed at both the NVA and the VC.
3. Encourage the people to use their full strength in the production effort by developing their revolution spirit and planning measures to protect their crops.
4. Consolidate and develop the political and military strength, in particular, hamlet and village guerrillas and self-defense (militia).

The directive also placed emphasis on the following points:

- In VC controlled area:
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<td>(Quang Giao, Ngai Giao, Binh Ba, Hao Dich, Long Tan and Long Phuc). Step-up guerrilla warfare, construct defense works in combat villages in order to counter RVNAF operations and to protect the people's life and property.</td>
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- **In area under mixed control:**

  - Encourage guerrillas to stay close to hamlets under mixed control so as to limit the scope and activity of RVN forces; organize underground agents and make the VC influence become stronger than that of the RVN.

- **On the overland axis of communication:**

  - Organize (special) units to attack RVNAF movements on Road #15, sabotage roads and bridges, and build obstructions to block road traffic.

- **Political struggle:**

  - Urge people to demonstrate against artillery shelling and defoliation and request free movement so that farmers can go to work and stay in their temporary shelters in the ricefields.

- **Military proselytizing:**

  - Step-up military proselytizing aimed at the contradiction between the RVN and US and disseminate propaganda leaflets in both Vietnamese and English.

- **Fare production activity:**

  - Encourage farmers in VC controlled areas (such as Quang Giao, Ngai Giao and Hao Dich) to grow supplementary crops and three month rice. Persuade the people to cultivate all the ricefields in Long Phuc, Long Xao, and Hong Xoc Villages and plan measures to protect crops; in particular, organize special cell to shoot the aircraft on defoliation missions.

- **Strength development:**

  - Develop both the political and military strength in particular, hamlet and village guerrillas and self-defense militia in the area surrounding Road #15 (Hoa Long) in order to attack US vehicles.

  The phase of activity will be from 3 to 20 July. The unique struggle of the entire province will be on 23 July 1966.

[NO FURTHER EXPLOITABLE INFORMATION]