### SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION REPORT

*Full Distribution Follows.*

**Diary of Le Van Lô, VC infiltrator.**

Diary, belonging to Le Van Lô, with dates ranging from 27 June 1964 to 30 May 1965, contained addresses of Lô's friends in Tam Hô (NUH) zone, autobiography since he left school for South Vietnam and his personal feelings written in private code (names in place of the letters).

Lô was a native of an area located on S.Chu River. He may have been part of the battle of "Da Chu Prong" on 17 November 1965. His two closest friends who gave him morale support during 3 years of separation from home were killed in that battle.

Lô was 17 years old when he was drafted into the NVN army in 1964.

**Notebook**

Notebook, (found in a hillfold with a photo which was identified by a PAVN as 1st Lt. My of the 7th Company, 8th Battalion, 66th Regiment, 25th Division (KIA in the vicinity of TAP56067) contained sketches of underground tunnels, combat trenches, overlays, troop deployment positions, weapons list and notes taken by My, VC Lt, at a Party N Committee meeting convened probably in August 1965.

Following is the significant information extracted from the notebook:

**VC observation on the American NVN military situation**
According to the information bulletin, the enemy was continuously defeated on all battlefields. Their plans for encroachment on our (VC) territory in Western Highland, north of Kontum were foiled & they were forced to withdraw from Tomohon. Eight American and two to three RNW companies were annihilated South of Kontum. However, their activity was still strong in this area. We succeeded in drawing 2 American brigades into Western Highland where the RNW troops could not have sufficient capability to conduct any operations. The Americans replaced them and operated in a reserved manner. Two of their battalions had anti-air attitudes.

**Enemy plans:**

They would remain in a defensive position with special forces and reconnaissance units launched to the front, carrying with them sound receivers to discover our positions for artillery fire.

They try to stop our (VC) activity and drag out the present situation until the dry season for counter-attack.

**Evaluation of enemy strong and weak points:**

**Strong points:** The enemy still have full troop strength with a high capability of air and artillery fire support. Our springboard in the south, therefore, can be undermined by them.

**Weak points:** Enemy troop morale was low, especially that of the units which had engaged in some battles with us.

Enemy aerial capability and mechanized equipment activity was limited during the rainy season.

Enemy troops were dispersed widely for reconnaissance missions.

Our units' probably replenish 7 missions.

Sweep all special forces from the regimental troop location area (enemy 1, 2, 3, station 4, 6).

Be ready to coordinate with other friendly units to destroy the points where the enemy intended to withdraw troops.

Establish battlefield base areas and on the spot defense system. Give training to units and coordinate combat operations with the guerrillas.
USMACV CDEC

Summary

Between now and 10 Aug 66, the Gouyt Tan Regiment must finish sweeping all Special Forces in troop location areas; by 31 Aug, complete the establishment of 1st battlefield base area. By 2nd September, the 2nd battlefield base area communication liaison routes should be cleared and by 31st September, the 3rd battlefield base area must be completed.

Battalion's mission:
- Establish 1st battlefield in Sinh & 1 and operate from this area to Tala and Bung Ban, attacking the enemy coming down from Pli Thira & Bia, with always one company operating in the front.
- Guide and coordinate with the guerrillas in production work and give assistance to the local people.

Observations on their advantages and difficulties:

Advantages:
- Our (Vietcong) Main Force units' continuous operations forced the enemy to disperse widely and leave many gaps vulnerable to our attacks.
- Our troops had mutual confidence in one another.
- Troops would be given additional valuable training in near future.

Difficulties:
- Long operations without breaks
- Poor health of troops due to lack of recuperation and rest.
- The area of operations was too large and the guerrilla activity was inefficient.
- Insufficient supply production. A prediction a possible hunger due to a shortage of food.
- Troops were not accustomed to living in caves and underground tunnels.
- Bad weather (much rain)
- Difficulties due to leadership and ideological tasks.

Promote troop combat morale by strengthening their determination to fight and fostering their combat aggressiveness.
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<th>Summary</th>
<th>Capture Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>Train troops in attacks on RVN posts.</td>
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<td>Fight off their fear of enemy air and artillery fire in a big operation and fear of loneliness in a small fight.</td>
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<td>Oppose self-content, lack of vigilance and tendencies for a break during wartime.</td>
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<td>Develop troops' determination to annihilate the Special Forces in troop location areas.</td>
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<td>Train troops to meet combat requirements.</td>
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<td>Execute the Party's billing policy: Help the people and train the guerrillas.</td>
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**H F R 1**

Sketch and description of "Badminton" and "Frag Blu 3/B" bombs (sic).

Sketch of "Badminton" and "Frag Blu 3/B" bombs made by collector Kim Huyen with a sketch of component parts of Frag Blu 3/B bombs, which had 2 parts.

Part I Covered the structure, characteristics, effect, and use of bombs, also the methods of employing them to fight the American and RVN troops, and methods of taking the bomb apart correctly.

Part II Included (the recognition) signs and characteristics of the butterfly bombs and/or mines.

The sketch was dated 1965.

**H F R 1**

Leonard H. S. McEwan
1st Lt, ABS
Chief Evaluation Branch.