KIN

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UNITED STATES, P.O. BOX 2036, HANDY, VIERGINIA
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FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1965

US NAVY ACTION

Summary

021330-66
(40 pages originally, handwritten.)

General: For Immediate Release

The following report reveals one of the major operations of the Viet Cong. A major unit, K2, along with a number of allied units, has been identified. This unit was last seen near the border on the 9th of October. It was reported to have infiltrated into the South Vietnamese Province of Tien Giang to participate in the Tien Giang operation.

The unit is reportedly composed of 450 men, with a mix of Vietnamese and Laotian personnel. They are believed to be a motivated and highly trained unit, with a strong history of success in previous operations. The unit is believed to be under the command of a senior Vietnamese officer, with support from local sympathizers.

A number of key players in the unit are believed to be involved in the capture of a local politician, as part of their infiltration plan. The unit is expected to continue its operations in the coming weeks, with a goal of occupying and securing key strategic areas.

The report also highlights the increasing presence of the Viet Cong in the region, and the need for heightened security measures to prevent further infiltration. The local authorities are advised to take all necessary precautions to ensure the safety of the local population and infrastructure.

For further details, please refer to the attached attachement.
KIN

Bulletin 15, 991

US.C.V. DIV

US.C.V. DIV

Use Loc 7

Summary

20 Unit

Fort 8 3/4

DM

Condition Team: 12

The Metancina, abbreviations "34", and "35", were frequently used in personnel strength

They probably implied "34 Mortar", and "35M, 35S, 35", appear to be a 12.7mm Anti-Aircraft Company compromises. 34 and 352 are possibly an M4 Company and a Mortar Company. The strength of 352, as of 21 Feb 61, was 179 men. In approximately 10-Mar

61, 352 had 70 men attached to 34.

1. SITUATION

The date of the unit's departure from US.C.V. is unknown. The document only revealed that 34

Fort Headquarters moved together with 35, 351 and 352. These elements also carried a considerable

quantity of medical supplies in addition to 3500 Bg ammunition, mortars ammunition and food

supplies, including many rations and water. Unit 352 also carried 8 cases of medical supplies.

However, the exact number is not known.

- From Then: From the infiltration route:

- Field along trails (20 kilometers). Composed of various trees, forest 1 km from 351, 1.5 km from 352 and 34

- Field vehicles hereon. Field vehicles hereon and

- Troopers: 10, 21 and 72 should take care of formations. 352 spent night in the jungle with 21. For

attention to fielding troops, enemy illumination shells were used to highlight movements from breaking our formation.

From millstones 2-11, we turned left to reach the Village (aka Light Villa). If hit

by an artillery strike, follow 24 and 35 easy units...

To reach villain at 15, new 5 men kilometers and turn right into the forest... Crossed a stream that was hit by an artillery strike. Ran pretty

along a concrete bridge... 1200-1230... 21-22-17 and the battalion headquarters arrived. Spent

the night in the jungle. Troopers taken to prevent any in 1200 meters, then 21st female

will hold a meeting.

- The bridge was jumped with men. Looked

right...

- 4th Floor pulled back 500m and spent the night in the jungle...

- Escorted the men, went and spent the night in the jungle...

- Crossed on a ferry and 21 exposed its

position for the 21st time...

- Climbed on slippery slope...

- Took a bath in a stream...

- CHIN and MICH dried clothing, not in...
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| compliance with the regulations.  
- We forgot to put out the lights.  
- United a slope with comrade KG and learned a lesson on PTJ geography.  
- I set fortifications and made baskets and gathered cadre to listen to comrade THAI's warning letter. The cold because of the morning mist and very tired.  
- Fell asleep beside a stream near slope #5.  
- RAN fell down and slept. Shot on the ground covered with ants.  
- Hit THAI going to get rice. The enemy dropped bombs at night. 

b) Late taken on a critique held between cadre cadre:  
- THAI: "Comrade THAI set fortifications and made baskets and gathered cadre to listen to comrade THAI's warning letter. The cold because of the morning mist and very tired.  
- CTHI: "Comrade (illegible) is a hot-tempered man whose loud shouting violated secrecy and prevented my man from approaching Hill."

THAI: "The Company Adjutant should check rice ration and the scales because it seemed that the 100-ram ration was not weighed correctly."

THAI: "Comrade CHAI should hold his anger and prove his good leadership by helping his men."

THAI: "Emergency cadre were serious, straight, enthusiastic and resolute in carrying out every directive and decision of the Group's Chapter."

Report sent to the Front Party Chapter on the situation of 21:  
- Combat readiness was noted along with good administrative and assignment of work.  
- Secrecy was observed.
- Good security (with adequate fortifications) was maintained.

Strength status: 127 men available (2 sick and 2 deserted).

Rice request:  
"Received from comrade NHU/HQ, from Group 1,700 kilos of rice issued by the Quartermaster".

31 January 1966  
(Signed)  
THAI, CM

KIN
BULLETIN No. 99

SUMMARY

2) Orders during the Movement:

Requirements:
- Insurance of combat readiness, security and troops' health.
- Under all circumstances, a commander must be ready to fight and use the battle.
- Reconnaissance units should stay close to the enemy at all times.
- Preservation of secrecy.
- Establishment of close liaison to control troops, practice during the movement.
- Element should move out with 3-5 minutes, and after the other, and platforms every 10-15 minutes.
- Troops to go only at very important 3-4 hours, a day or marching in ambush.
- Troops should disperse at suspicious times during cover.
- Anti-aircraft artillery and anti-aircraft warfare should be always carried along during the movement for use during and after the strikes.
- Transportation facilities should be provided to carry at least 20 days of food and the necessary quantity of ammunition.
- Troops must sleep in covered places located on the road and they are not authorized to enter villages and meet the inhabitants.

3) Limitations and conditions:

- Probationary Party member: 3.103
- Probationary Party member: 3.160
- First Class member: 3.100 (including secretary)
- Party Chairman: 3.100
- Party Committee member: 3.100
- Private: 3.100
- Corporal (last leg only): 3.100
- Sergeant: 3.100
- Junior Sergeant: 3.100
- Corporal (Plt.-ser): 3.100
- Sergeant (Co.): 3.100
- Junior Lieutenant: 3.100
- Captain: 3.100
- Senior Captain: 3.100
- Major: 3.100
- Lieutenant Colonel: 3.100
- Colonel: 3.100

I. POST-WAR UTILIZATION ACTIVITIES:

The document revealed that during March and the early part of April 1966, the unit made extensive preparations for combat. Politically, a series of political indoctrination sessions were held in an attempt to boost troop morale and motivate them to overcome hardships. The
military situation in the Western Highlands was also discussed. The author of the document noted that the Western Highlands include 3 provinces, Gia-Lai / Pleiku /, Kontum, and Daklak and was a very important strategic region. Kontum Province alone held a significant importance as it was adjacent to the “strategic route” and could be used to dominate the delta and Highways 14, 19, and 21. Furthermore, the author of the document expected the units’ operations to be engaged by the US 1st Air Cavalry and by the 25th Infantry Division.

[No Further Exploitable Information]
USNI NEW CENSUS COMMENTS: This document probably belonged to a cadre of the 180th Regiment in Phu Yen Province (see USMC CENSUS Bulletin 561), dated 7 July 1966. This unit had probably stopped at Dong Trong G after crossing the VII-III border in Kontum Province.

Henry A. H. Dir, US Elm, CBC